LANGUAGE POLICY, IDENTITY AND RELIGION: ASPECTS OF THE CIVILIZATION OF THE MUSLIMS OF PAKISTAN AND NORTH INDIA

By

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ABBREVIATIONS

D. *Dawn* (Karachi) English daily.

F 1948 File No. f. 216/11/GG/47 located in the Archive of the Chair on Quaid-i-Azam and Freedom Movement, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

LAD Legislative Assembly Debates. These Debates are called provincial or Constitutional Assembly Debates in the title. B stands for East Bengal: P for Punjab etc. References to date and page number are given parenthetically in the text.

MN. *Morning News* (Dhaka) English daily.

PO. *Pakistan Observer.* (Dhaka) English daily.

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The chapters comprising this book were written as separate articles for scholarly journals or chapters in books edited by others between 2001 to 2008. From 2001 till 2004 I was also writing a book on the education system of Pakistan which was pubished as *Denizens of Alien Worlds* (OUP, 2004). And from that time onwards till date I am collecting material and trying to write a book which, if it is written and published, will be entitled *A Social History of Urdu*. Material used in both books, whther published or unpublished, has not been included here. It does, of course, inform the material in this book in the sense that one gains some insight or the other by reading and research and it influences the rest of one's work. However, care has been taken to exclude material which is available, or may become available, to the reader between the covers of a book. In short, the chapters of this book present material which, though available in journals or edited books, is not available in any one of my own books. So, those who are working in the areas of language policy, identity formation and religion, especially religious identity, will find this book convenient. It will also be useful for those who want to teach a course on South Asia and find little which can be given to students as readings. As one of my books *Language, Education and Culture* (1999) was reportedly used for this purpose, I flatter myself that this too will meet with the same good fortune.

This research took me to so many libraries that it would be difficult to list them all. Let me only thank the following: The University of California Berkeley Library, The British Library (London), The Bodleian (Oxford University), The Nehru Memorial Library (Delhi), The Quaid-i-Azam University Library (Islamabad), the National Documentation Centre (Islamabad) and the Andhra Pradesh Archives (Hyderabad, India). I want to thank Dr Johann Baart especially for having helped me obtain books from Europe and for giving me access to his own collection on the languages of Pakistan. Also, I take this opportunity to thank Abdul Rehman, a researcher working on the Kundal Shahi language in the Neelam Valley, for giving me access to the data on this language which he had collected for the first time. Mohammad Zaman, who had obtained data on the death of some languages of the Northern Areas, was also generous in giving it to me for which I am most grateful to him.

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It goes without saying that I am solely responsible for all mistakes and omissions in this book. Comments pointing out all such errors and imperfections will be welcomed**.**

TARIQ RAHMAN

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LANGUAGE POLICY, IDENTITY AND RELIGION

General Introduction

This is a collection of research articles published in scholarly journals or as chapters of books. They pertain to three themes: language, identity and religion as played out in the history of the Muslims of north India and Pakistan. As many of them are directly or indirectly related to education, that too is a focal point which the sub-title refers too. The chapters were not initially written as chapters of a book with a single argument so they do not form a cohesive unit as a scholarly book should. They do, however, bring new material, or new interpretations of material, to the fore.

The chapters have been arranged in three sections. The first section is on language, the second on identity and the third on religion. These sections flow into each other and, indeed, can be re-arranged in other ways. This is because identity, for instance, is a pervasive concern of all chapters. In the first section, which is on language, specifically the English language in Pakistan, looks at the way Asian countries respond to English which is both a desiderated linguistic capital as well as an ex-colonial language. What is especially relevant is that English empowers a certain class. Language policies and the adaptation of languages for use in computers creates new ways of understanding, emphasizing and consolidating linguistic identities and, of course, oppositions to them.

More explicit concern with identity construction with reference to a number of variables – ethnicity, gender, class and religion—is the main theme of the second section. There is a chapter on these issues with reference to north India and Pakistan. There is also one on the English accent used in the call centres of Pakistan attempts to conceal the Pakistani identity as well as location in order to serve global capitalism. More interesting, perhaps, is an account of the perceptions of the Bengali identity, in opposition to the nationalistic Pakistani one, among West Pakistanis is looked into. Here too the religious theme is part of the construction and deconstruction of the unified Pakistani identity.

The religious theme takes more salience in the third section in which there is discussion of the events of 1857 in which an early attempt at mobilizing religious identities at a time when modernity was about to be ushered in into India in the wake of British rule, is touched upon. Later, the Muslim response to the introduction of English is dealth with. More specifically, the institution of religious debate (*munazara*) is related to the presence of polemical literature meant

to refute other sects, sub-sects, heretical doctrines and alien philosophies among the religious circles, both within religious seminaries (*madrassas*) and outside them in Pakistan.

The approach used in most chapters is historical. That is why the book may be considered a historical work with language as the main focus while the subsidiary themes are ideintity and religion.

The sections are introduced separately also but they should be understood as part of my overall interest in the way power enters the formation and implementation of policies, including language and education policies, and how identity is constructed and acted out in sets of complex variables such as religion, nationalism, sub-nationalism, class and gender. Because of these concerns the book should interest linguists, sociolinguistic historians, educationists and social scientists in general. Indeed, with Pakistan being in the limelight for various reasons (rightly or wrongly) it is imperative to understand this country from as many points of view as possible. This book will help the reader, whether scholar or undergraduate student, to do that.

The chapters of this book have been kept intact as individual units to facilitate photocopying, reproduction in readers of students and other such purposes. That is why there is a complete bibliography at the end of each chapter. In the end, however, there is an index for ease of reference to the book as a whole.

SECTION – 1

LANGUAGE POLICY

INTRODUCTION

All four chapters in this section deal with language policies and practices. The first three are about English, the language of wider communication (LWC), being the language of globalization itself, in the world. In his book entitled *The Empires of the Word* (2005), Nicholas Ostler writes:

> Our background study of five millennia of world language makes the eternity of this prospect [that English will dominate the world for ever] seem unlikely. The modern global language situation is unprecedented, but the constituents of modern language communities are still people. And, above all, people use language to socialize. Human societies have always had a way of multiplying languages. (Ostler 2005: 543).

However, as many highly respected scholars on English keep reiterating, English is certainly in demand because it is the language of international trade, media, services, science and technology and entertainment (Crystal 1997). For that reason, it is not surprising to find that many countries, including those which have never been British colonies, are teaching English and that there are so many learners of it. That is why it is necessary to look at the language policies of some major Asian countries towards English and then to understand Pakistan's language policies in this context. Of course, when we discuss Pakistan's language policies we have to take into account all the languages of Pakistan and whether certain policies are responsible for weakening or actually 'killing' some languages. This concept, that of 'language death' has been of much concern for linguists (Crystal 2000), and has been touched upon, though not in the detail it deserves, in the chapter on 'language policy'.

One aspect of language policy, but one which has received scant attention, is using Urdu on the internet. The last chapter in this section deals with this. I am afraid that, with my very inadequate knowledge about computers, it does not touch upon the technical aspects of this work. However, it provides some idea of what has been done and where to look for further guidance in this field of study.

On the whole this section provides the reader with insights into the way language policy works in Pakistan. The major point to understand is that a policy needs not be announced; need not be in the form of written documents; and yet it has effects of a profound kind on identity

formation, socio-economic mobility, class, education, the construction of knowledge and other variables which are contingent upon it or loosely associated with it. On the other hand, a policy may very much be announced and be on paper (even in the constitution itself) and yet it may be nothing but a propaganda point, an ideological necessity or merely a wish. What the real language policy is can only be understood by seeing what people do? What they actually study? In what language they find power and prestige? And pleasure? And intimacy? And solidarity? In short, it is in language practices that one finds the real language policies. And, therefore, to language practices we turn now.

1

ASIAN POLICIES ABOUT ENGLISH

Introduction

This paper looks at the way language relates to power, identity and education. Whichever language is used in the domains of power in the public and the private sectors—governance, education, media, commerce, service sector etc—is learned for empowerment through employment. If it is English, as it is in South Asia, then it is English which facilitates the acquisition of power and lack of it which becomes an impediment. But, for a nation-state, whereas pragmatism would dictate entirely pro-English policies, concerns about national identity and national pride would cater for the dissemination of the national language (s). And this is where the system of education—in addition to the media—comes in: for schools, colleges and universities teach languages and compel people to gain competence in them by making them media of instruction. These institutions, however, do not function autonomously—however autonomous they may call themselves. They are under pressure from the state which has a policy to govern them; the forces of the market which absorb their graduates in the economy; and, of course, the students and the faculty who, in turn, respond to different demands upon them.

The focus of this paper is Pakistan's policy towards English. This, however, is approached through brief references to similar policies of other Asian countries: Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, India, Nepal and Bangladesh. These policies are seen from the perspective of globalization which gives such value to English in employment as to make it a kind of 'capital'. The significant question to be addressed is whether, in Pakistan, the unequal distribution of this 'capital' is potentially problematic? And, if so, are there any solutions for this problem?

THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES

This paper rests on the notion of 'linguistic capital' which is defined by Pierre Bourdieu, a French sociologist, as follows:

> The constitution of a linguistic market creates the conditions for an objective competition in and through which the legitimate competence can function as linguistic capital, producing a *Profit of distinction* on the occasion of each social exchange (emphasis in the original Bourdieu 1981: 55).

The distinction lies in being able to speak the language used in the domains of power i.e. sites for the exchange, use or exhibition of power dominated by the state, the corporate sector or civil society itself. And the profit is being able to participate in networks or flows of power to one's advantage; increased capacity to obtain gratification (goods, services, prestige, coercive power, capacity to resist coercion etc); becoming a member of a 'club' of advantage etc. etc.

One definition of globalization may be as follows:

> …it has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian Pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former Exoduses of nations and crusades (Marx & Engels 1848:135).

But this, of course, is Marx and Engels's description of the rise of the bourgeoisie in the wake of the industrial revolution. This was, indeed, a major phase of globalization as the cultural artifacts, machinery, methods of production and consumption, knowledge, values and even the languages of Europe spread over most of the world making Indians eat on the dining table and the Japanese wear black suits.

However, the present phase of 'globalization', based as it is on the digital revolution increasing the extent and speed of communication and the desiderated fast movement of capital across national boundaries, is a new manifestation on the Westernization (globalization) of the world. So this term, used by Theodore Levitt in 1983 in an article published in the *Harvard Business Review*, is necessary to describe the present reality of the globe.

Globalization has many faces. The most relevant one for the world is probably the economic one i.e. the creation of a world order under the banner of the United Nation and the role of the International Monetary Fund and various affiliated bodies of the World Bank, such as International Development Association (IDA) and International Finance Corporation. This has led to a squeezing effect on the poorer economies of the world so that the gap between the rich and poor has increased as Joseph Stiglitz has so ably pointed out (Stiglitz 2002: 214). The domination of the free market has been associated with liberal democracy as a system of government which, in the words of Francis Fukuyama, 'may constitute the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and the "final form of human government", and as such constituted the "end of history" '(Fukuyama 1992: XI). But what we are concerned with in this article is the cultural—more specifically the linguistic—face of globalization. Even this can be disruptive because the polarization of society caused by the rich becoming richer while the poor

become poorer is compounded by the fact that the culture, language and worldview of both classes also tends to diverge to the point of complete alienation from each other. In Pakistan the students of expensive English-medium schools differ so much from those of ordinary, government Urdu-medium schools and religious seminaries or *madrassas* that they are 'denizens of alien worlds' (title of my book on education, Rahman 2004). The possible disruptive effects of globalization in developing societies is very aptly summed up by Kazim Bacchus as follows:

> With increasingly borderless societies in the field of trade, the individuals who are the main beneficiaries of globalization are likely to shift their bonds of national allegiance and by so doing disengage themselves from their less favored fellows. Globalization therefore could tear at the ties that bind its citizens together…. (Bacchus 2006: 66).

It is with such dire possibilities in mind that the following paper is being written.

LANGUAGE AND GLOBALIZATION

Language is an important aspect of empire as Nicholas Ostler's book *Empires of the Word* (2005) demonstrates. However, military power, or political domination, does not inevitably translate into linguistic domination. As Ostler says: 'A language does not grow through the assertion of power, but through the creation of a larger human community' (Ostler 2005: 256). English has such a community—almost 'a quarter of mankind is familiar with' it (ibid, 542)—but whether it will dominate the world for ever cannot be said with certainty considering the five thousand years of previous historical changes Ostler has paraded before us (Ostler 2005: 542-548). At the moment, however, it is the language of globalization and this has had the following consequences.

1. The weakening and death of the smaller (weaker) languages of the world has increased pace (Crystal 2000; Nettle & Romaine 2000).
2. English has emerged as the language of wider intra-and inter- cultural communication (Crystal 2003).
3. English, therefore, has more linguistic capital than most other languages in the global context.
4. In ex-colonies of English-speaking power (like Pakistan) English continues to consolidate, and even increase, its linguistic capital as it opens doors to lucrative employment in the corporate sector and advantage in the higher echelons of the state sector (Rahman 2007).

5. English, therefore, is the most powerful language of our times.

The responses to the above trends fall into two major categories: acceptance and resistance. An acceptance of the power and ubiquity of English in elitist domains calls for policies which preserve, consolidate and increase this linguistic capital. It also implies an acceptance of the gradual death of the other languages of the world. Resistance, on the contrary, would see the domination of English as 'linguistic imperialism' (Philipson 1992) and English as the greatest killer language (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000: 371). Such an attitude would resist English, as in a section of the Japanese intelligentsia (Matsuura, Fajieda & Mahoney 2004), and emphasize other languages—languages closely related to identity—and cultural traditions.

Mostly, however, people want the best of both the worlds. They want to retain, and enhance, the linguistic capital of English while also retaining their identity. Generally, unfortunately, such attempts are merely paper policies meant to please the UNESCO which emphasizes the teaching in the mother tongue (UNESCO 2003); donors who pay to support weak languages; or nationalist politics which would fail if one did not appear to support a language perceived as a symbol of national identity (Urdu in Pakistan and Hindi in north India). Let us now briefly book at the policies regarding English in some Asian countries in this context.

POLICIES TOWARDS ENGLISH IN SOME ASIAN COUNTRIES

We find that South Korea and Singapore as the most accepting of English among the countries of Asia we have considered here. At the other extreme, that of resistance, is Japan. All these countries are highly developed and Westernized. Sartorially, and in other cultural matters, Westernization is accepted as a norm. However, in Japan there is strong resistance to cultural homogenization to the detriment of the Japanese identity which is perceived as being contingent on the Japanese language (Hashimoto 2007). In South Korea, on the other hand, English is seen as a means of gaining international leadership (Sungwon 2007; Shim & Baik 2004: 172-195). In Singapore, too, it is promoted for its linguistic capital on the free market model. It is perceived as being empowering by individuals who are increasingly employed in the corporate service sector. And the state perceives this as being in the overall interest of the tiny 'nation' precisely because of the economic advantage it gives (Chew 2007). Is it that the Japanese have already modernized and prospered and are now self-confident enough to feel that they can resist the pressure of English which creates the resistance one finds there? Or is it merely the last-ditch effort of those who want to resist, as it were, the Mac Donaldization of the world by insisting upon Japanese?

One cannot say. But what needs to be noted is that even in Japan the younger generation is learning English and has better English-language skills than the older generation.

Malaysia is an unusual case because there the resistance to English was part of ethnic politics. The English-medium schools were replaced by Malay-medium ones between 1983-85 to give advantage to the Malays. Now that the Malays have caught up with the Chinese and Indians, English is being promoted again. In short, the resistance was not to English but to the advantage of non-Malays over the Malays (David & Govindasamy 2007; David 2004: 1-15).

Then we have the cases most relevant to in Pakistan—these of India, Bangladesh and Nepal. In all these countries English was, and remains, an elitist preserve. It is part of the nationalist theme, though a very subdued sub-theme, to support a major indigenous language as symbolic of the nationalist project. In India it is Hindi; in Pakistan, Urdu; and in Bangladesh, Bengali. In India M. K. Gandhi favoured Hindi over English (Raina 1994: 283-287) and there were movements to remove English *('Argrezi Hatao Andolan'*) in places, such as Gujrat after independence (Ramanathan 2005: 27-31). In Pakistan too there has been a pro-Urdu lobby of which Syed Abdullah was an active member (Abdullah 1974) and now the Muqtadra Qaumi Zaban, an official organization, presses the government for further inclusion of Urdu in the domains of public governance (Muqtadra 2007: 21). In Bangladesh, the national language 'Bengali', marked out to carry the symbolic weight of nationality, is actually a ghettoizing language as is Urdu in Pakistan.

It is English which offers 'obvious economic advantages' and, therefore, the present policy-of having cheap Bengali-medium and expensive English-medium schools, 'continues to support advantages for groups having access to high-quality English education' (Hosain and Tolefson 2007: 256; also see Alam et.al. 2001).

To sum up, in South Asian countries, English is an elitist preserve and even if the national language (s) is supported by a minority, that support is weak. As for the state itself, its stated policy is to support the national language (s) but this support is only to keep up appearances. It is, at best, only rhetorical. Powerful sections of the Westernized, dominant, urban elite—corporate giants, upper bureaucracy, officer corps of the armed forces, higher judiciary, articulate and visible sections of the academia and the intelligentsia—are actually not at all resistant to English. Indeed, they are enthusiastically accepting towards it. The dominant language and education policy—which some of them have actively influenced—preserves

English in elitist domains while promoting one (or more) vernaculars in the public educational system. This kills two birds with one stone: first, The Westernized elite which posseses the linguistic capital of English is facilitated in entering elitist domains of power in the country and abroad. And, second, the ruling elite preserves its credentials of nationalism on the pretext of supporting vernacular-medium education with public money. The reality, however, is that vernacular-medium schools are under-funded and, besides imparting poor English-language skills to their students, also subject them to other deprivations. Thus, the elite educates its own children in private, English-medium schools. Moreover, at least in Pakistan, the state does spend public friends—including land grants—on English—medium schools such as cadet colleges and schools run by the armed forces and other public bodies (Rahman 2004: 54-56). In short, while the nationalist project is left to the masses, the elite goes for the project of globalization. One side of it is the pauperization of the poor and the unprecedented riches of the rich. The other is the ghettoization of the educational institutions of the masses while connecting similar institutions of the privileged elite with the metropolitan, English-using educational institutions of the centres of globalization. This is not resistance to English nor acceptance of it. It is the monopolization and concentration of the linguistic capital of English for the elite while depriving the masses of it. This outcome of this policy is often called the vernacular-English divide.

THE VM/EM DIVIDE

Medium of instruction policies, as we are aware, are highly political processes (Tollefson and Tsui 2004). The vernacular-medium/English-medium (VM/EM divide in South Asia reflects this politicization. We can trace it back to British days (Rahman 2006: 39-58) to place present realities in their historical perspective, but it is instructive, as Vaidehi Ramanathan (2005) does, to understand the implications of this divide in present-day South Asia. To sum up, while in theory students in India have the right to choose to be educated in English or a vernacular language, higher education, especially science and technology, is in English. This proves to be an insurmountable barrier for many students who ‘drop out of the educational system during and after college’ (Ramanathan 2005: 6). This is not true only about Ahmedabad (Gujrat) where the research was undertaken, but is true for other parts of India as well as Pakistan. But, since these are the manifestations and consequences of the language policy, a matter for the ruling elite to deal with rather than teachers, it is to the policy-making that one would refer to before proposing changes in teaching methodology.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ABOVE FOR PAKISTAN

A range of policies, corresponding to the extremes of acceptance and resistance to English, have been adopted by different states in different periods. A policy of complete rejection, the 'ostrich' approach, is suicidal. It would cut off Pakistan from the advantages of globalization without, however, acting as a shield against its disadvantages. In post-industrial societies, driven by knowledge, the language in which most knowledge is produced (i.e. English), Pakistan cannot afford to have professionals, including senior commanders, bureaucrats and academics, not competent in English. In view of this, one possible solution is given by Sabiha Mansoor. She says:

> English medium in higher education be considered as a long-term goal (ten years), with English being taught as a compulsory subject from class 1 till university levels…for, schooling, Urdu and English be used as alternative medium of instruction till intermediate levels for both public and private sector institutions with students having the option to study in either medium (Mansoor 2005: 353).

Moreover, students of science and technical subjects will be facilitated in higher studies by teaching them in English (ibid, 355).

The problem with this policy is that it does not mention power and wealth at all. the option of 'English' is not an option for the poor at the moment because schools which teach English really well are expensive schools—monthly fees ranging between Rs. 3000 to 10,000—which even the lower middle-classes cannot afford. Moreover, one learns English through interaction with the peer group and the family and not only from lessons in the school. This excludes the less well-to-do and rural people who are not similarly exposed to English.

In short, language is not merely a 'medium of instruction' in any uncomplicated, straight forward manner. It is part of the poverty trap. If you are poor you are condemned to learning no English or poor English. If you are rich and powerful then, among your other advantages, one is that linguistic capital is scattered all around you and that you can afford to buy it at exorbitant rates. Sabiha Mansoor fails to address this issue which, in fact, is at the centre of our apartheid practice in linguistic and educational matters.

This apartheid, in my view, has the potential to increase the class-divide to the point of a revolution. The vocabulary of the revolution will probably be the idiom of global, political Islam but the anger behind it will be the rage of the dispossessed—an idea which has been expressed in

more detail elsewhere (Rahman 2005). Such a pessimistic scenario cannot be proved at the moment but, many writers on globalization point to its tendency to favour the rich and warn that increased polarization in society could increase 'inter-group conflict and general social instability' in developing societies (Bacchus 2006: 66). So, can anything he done to avert such a catastrophe?

THE PROPOSED POLICY FOR PAKISTAN

The alternative policy, proposed by the present author, is try to level the playing field by distributing the linguistic capital of English more evenly. This involves the elimination of for-profit, elitist, English-medium schools. English will be taught from class-1 as proposed by Sabiha Mansoor and the Ministry of Education from time to time. However, the attempt will be to spread it as widely as possible. This is not an entirely novel idea because many people, including Indian linguists, have recommended it for India (Agnihotri and Khanna 1997: 143-144). The problem is that they have not given concrete suggestions for reducing the power of those who study in English-medium institutions while this has been done so here. As the corollaries of this policy—such as the teaching of the indigenous mother tongues at the primary level before graduating to Urdu—have been discussed elsewhere (Rahman 2002: 539-540), they will not be repeated here. However, one warning, although it too has been sounded earlier (Rahman 2007: 232-233), is still needed. This is that Urdu has been made into a carrier of the ideology of the ruling elite in Pakistan. As this elite has used Islam to legitimize its own brand of nationalism (with jingoism as a part of it), a disproportionately large number of official discourses (including textbooks) are in Urdu.

Therefore, if Urdu is to be used as a major language of middle, secondary and higher secondary education, it will have to be reinvented. New discourses sensitive to the imperatives of tolerance, human rights, peace, women rights, animal rights, the rights of minorities, democratic values and conscious of our multi-cultural realities will have to be created. Without this, the promotion of Urdu will only empower the reactionaries who will further weaken liberal, humanist it values.

Further, I do not think science and social sciences or humanities ought to be treated differently. Doing so merely devalues the latter. Moreover, the power of analysis of society which the social sciences can teach its students, is decreased significantly because Urdu textbooks are old fashioned and out of touch with radical or deconstructive thinking. I would

recommend, therefore, that all students should shift to English at the university level. If they have had a level playing field in earlier years, they should have a more fair chance of empowering themselves through education than they have had so for.

PEDAGOGICAL TECHNIQUES

Since the rise of the English Language Teaching (ELT) profession in the last twenty years or so—the society of Pakistan English Language Teaching (SPELT) was established by Zakia Sarwar in 1984 (Rahman 2002: 316-317) innovative methods of teaching the language are discussed in fashionable 'workshops' and even used by a few enterprising teachers as long as the school administration allows them to do so. However, only elitist, English-medium school teachers are exposed to this innovation kind of thinking. Teachers of government schools are generally unaware of them and their own competence in English is so low as to make it difficult to benefit from workshop' conducted in English.

As mentioned above, the texts as well as the pedagogical practices of the English and the vernacular-medium students are different in India (Ramanathan 2005: 40-90) as well as in Pakistan. One major difference is that in the English-medium institutions, one gets far more exposure to spoken English than one does in the vernacular-medium ones. In order to develop speaking and listening skills all, rather than only elitist, students should be exposed to new pedagogical methods and tools.

PEDAGOGUE TECHNIQUES

First, in addition to written work as being undertaken at present, students should be exposed to drama, poetry, songs and films in English. The classics of English literature should all be shown to students in schools. Most importantly, contrary to the insistence of school administrators and teachers, no examination of any kind should be given to the students about them. This should simply be input—the provision of linguistic capital—without forcing out an immediate output.

Second, students should themselves be encouraged to act out skits, plays and sing songs in English, these should be improvised on models provided to them but memorization of parts should be discouraged.

Third, students should be exposed to news from the BBC, CNN, Al-Jazeera and other channels in English on a daily basis. The news could be discussed in class preferably in English but also in other languages.

Fourthly, students should be encouraged to debate current, controversial issues without written notes and memorized speeches in English. They may be allowed to lapse into other languages but this should be phased out gradually.

Fifthly, students should be encouraged to give prepared speeches, lectures and talks in English as the cadets of military academics do. This should be compulsory for all students at all levels beyond high schools.

This list is not exhaustive, of course, nor is it final. It is being offered with a view to suggest possibilities of debate and eliciting the opinions of the teachers of English. As the present author does not teach English at any level it is presumptuous to offer any suggestions at all and he hopes to be excused on the grounds that people more qualified than him will correct him.

Conclusion

In our present era of globalization, English has assumed an importance greater than it has ever had before. It has great linguistic capital because it is the language of globalization and the passport to the international as well as national (at least in South Asia) domains of power. With this in mind the language policies of some Asian countries ranging from acceptance to resistance have been examined. In the case of Pakistan it has been suggested that the linguistic capital of English be divided more evenly in society than it has been before. Pedagogical material and practices should move from the written to the aural; the production of language from the written to the oral. This should go hand in hand with making texts in all educational languages consistent with liberal, democratic and tolerant values so that the existing potential of reactionary, hate filled and pro-war discourses are countered and weakened.

Annexure-1

Country	Policy regarding English	Effects of policy
Japan	English is used from the 1990s/ TEFL is promoted/ Japanese values are to be maintained.	1. Conflict between globalization and Japanese identity/resistance to cultural homogenization. 2. Better English-language skills in the younger generation.
South Korea	English is a means for achieving the goal of gaining international leadership. English is a subject from Grade 3 onwards since 1997.	1. English is promoted. 2. It is used as a language for promoting national identity.
Malaysia	1. Malay-medium schools replaced English-medium schools initially (1983-1985) to give advantage to the Malays. 2. After 30 years English was re-instituted as the medium of instruction for science and mathematics for all schools.	English is being promoted and urban youth is better in it than the rural one.
Singapore	English is promoted as linguistic capital.	Language and culture are seen as commodifiable resources rather than markers of identity.
India	English is an elitist preserve. Vernacular languages are used for many purposes.	Class-based (and state-specific) competence in English.
Nepal	English is taught and there are also English-medium schools.	Class-based. English is the second most widespread language in Nepal.
Bangladesh	The public sector schooling is in Bengali while the private sector, elitist education is in English. Higher education is also in English	Class-based. English is an elite preserve and is seen as linguistic capital.

Sources: Tsui & Tollefson 2007; Saxena & Borin 2006; for India also see Agnihotri and Khanna 1997. For Bangladesh also see Alam et.al 2001.

2

LANGUAGE POLICY IN PAKISTAN

Introduction

Pakistan is a multilingual country. Its national language, Urdu, is the mother tongue of only 7.57 % of the people, although it is very widely used in the urban areas of the country. Its official status is the same as it was when the British ruled the country as part of British India. Apart from Urdu and English, the country has five major languages: Punjabi, Pashto, Sindhi, Siraiki and Balochi.

There are **fifty five** other languages, some of them on the verge of extinction (see Appendix 1). The aim of this paper is to examine the language policy of Pakistan and to attempt to identify how it privileges certain languages, and to explore what political, social, educational, and economic consequences this policy entails.

Table 1. Major languages in Pakistan (Source: Census 2001: 107)

Punjabi	44.15
Pashto	15.42
Sindhi	14.10
Siraiki	10.53
Urdu	7.57
Balochi	3.57
Others	4.66

2. Pakistan's language policies

There have been statements concerning language policy in various documents in Pakistan, including the different versions of the constitution, statements by governmental authorities in the legislative assembly debates, and, above all, the various documents relating to education policy which have been issued by almost every government. Language policies as seen in the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan are as follows:

(a) The National language of Pakistan is Urdu, and arrangements shall be made for its being used for official and other purposes within fifteen years from the commencing day.

(b) Subject to clause (a) the English language may be used for official purposes until arrangements are made for its replacement by Urdu.

(c) Without prejudice to the status of the National language, a Provincial Assembly may by law prescribe measures for the teaching, promotion and use of a provincial language in addition to the national language (Article 251).

The national language is Urdu (national languages were Urdu and Bengali from 1955 until 1971, when East Pakistan became Bangladesh) though this language is, and has always been, the mother-tongue of a minority of the population of Pakistan. This minority came from India, mostly after the creation of Pakistan in 1947, and is termed Mohajir (refugee or immigrant). The rationale for this privileged status of Urdu, as given by the government of Pakistan, is that Urdu is so widely spread that it almost holds the status of being the first language of all Pakistanis. Above all, it is a symbol of unity, helping to create a unified 'Pakistani' identity. In this symbolic role, it serves the political purpose of resisting any ethnicity which could otherwise break the federation. As for the provision that other Pakistani languages may be used, it is explained that the state, being democratic and sensitive to the rights of the federal units, allows for the use of provincial languages, if desired.

As for the medium of instruction, the rationale is that Urdu, the most widespread urban language, is the language used in education. As English is useful in official and international language instances, it, too, is taught at the higher levels, especially to those who study science and technology.

2.1. Political consequences of Urdu's privileged status

One major consequence of Urdu's privileged status has been the ethnic resistance to this status. As mentioned earlier, Urdu is not the mother tongue of most Pakistanis. However, Urdu is indeed the most widely understood language and is perhaps the major medium of interaction in the urban areas of the country. Even ethnic activists agree that it could be a useful link between the various ethnic groups. However, it has faced resistance because it has been patronized, often in insensitive ways, by the ruling elite in the centre.

The story of this patronization is described in detail in several books (see 3 Rahman 1996) but always fell short of what the more ardent supporters of Urdu demanded (for their position, see Abdullah 1976). In the beginning, since a very powerful section of the bureaucracy (being Mohajirs) spoke Urdu as its mother-tongue, there was an element of cultural hegemony

concerning the special status of Urdu. The Mohajir's elite position, stated or implied, was that they were more cultured than speakers of other indigenous languages of Pakistan. Hence it was only natural that Urdu should be used instead of other less-privileged languages.

This created much resentment against Urdu and, indeed, may be said to have infused the element of personal reaction to or antagonism against the speakers of Urdu in the first twenty years of Pakistan's existence. The main reason for the opposition to Urdu was, however, not linguistic or cultural. The main reason for the opposition Urdu faced in the provinces was because it was taken as the symbol of the central rule of the Punjabi ruling elite. The use of Urdu as an ethnic symbol is given in detail in Rahman (1996) but a brief recapitulation of major language movements may be useful.

The most significant consequence of the policy stating that Urdu would be the national language of Pakistan was its opposition by the Bengali intelligentsia, or what the Pakistani sociologist Hamza Alavi calls the 'salariat'—people who draw salaries from the state (or other employers) and who aspire to jobs (Alavi 1988). One explanation for this opposition is that the Bengali salariat would have been at a great disadvantage if Urdu, rather than Bengali, would have been used in the lower domains of power, such as the media, administration, judiciary, education, and military. As English was the language of the higher domains of power and Bengali was a 'provincial' language, the real issue was not linguistic. It was that the Bengali salariat was deprived of its just share in power at the centre and even in East Bengal, where the most powerful and lucrative jobs were controlled by the West Pakistani bureaucracy and the military. Furthermore, the Bengalis were conscious that money from the Eastern region, from the export of jute and other products, was predominantly financing the development of West Pakistan or the army which, in turn, was West Pakistani- (or, rather, Punjabi) dominated (GOB, 1982: 810–811 (vol. 6); Jahan 1972). The language, Bengali, thus became a symbol of a consolidated Bengali identity in opposition to the West Pakistani identity. This symbol was used to 'imagine', or construct, a unified Bengali community, using mechanisms such as the use of the printing press in the European context (Anderson 1983).

In Sindh, Balochistan, the N.W.F.P and South Western Punjab the languages used as identity symbols were Sindhi, Balochi, Brahvi, Pashto and Siraiki. The resulting linguistic mobilization of especially the intelligensia 4 made them powerful ethnic symbols, able to exert political pressure (Rahman 1996). However, Urdu was not resented or opposed much except in

Sindh, where there were language riots in January 1971 and July 1972 (Ahmed 1992). But even in Sindh, the crucial issue was that of power. The Mohajirs were dominant in the urban areas and the rising Sindhi salariat resented this. The most evocative symbol with which to mobilize the community was language.

Apart from the riots, the general population's conduct remained pragmatic. The Mohajirs, knowing that they can get by without learning Sindhi, do not learn it except in rural areas where it is essential. The Sindhis, again because they know they cannot get by without learning Urdu, do learn it (Rahman 2002, Chapter 10). However, if people learn languages for pragmatic reasons (Rahman 2002:36), they then give less importance to their own languages. This phenomenon, sometimes called 'voluntary shift', is not really 'voluntary' (see Nettle and Romaine 2000: 94–97, concerning Hawaiian). What happens is that market conditions are such that one's language becomes deficit in terms of what Pierre Bourdieu would call 'cultural capital' (Bourdieu 1991: 230–231). Instead of one's language being an asset, it becomes a liability. It prevents one from rising in society. In short, it is ghettoizing. Even if language movements and ethnic pride do not create a sense of shame, minority language speakers might not want to teach their language to their children, because it would overburden the children with far too many languages. For instance, Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum Khan (1864–1937) reported in 1932 that the Pashtuns wanted their children to be instructed in Urdu rather than Pashto (LAD-F 12 October 1932: 132). In 2003, the MMA government chose Urdu, not Pashto, as the language of the power domain in the N.W.F.P. In Baluchistan, too, the same phenomenon was noticed. Balochi, Brahvi, and Pashto were introduced as the compulsory medium of instruction in government schools in 1990 (LAD-B 21 June and 15 April 1990). Language activists enthusiastically prepared instructional material but, on 8 November 1992, these languages were made optional and parents opted for Urdu as the medium of instruction for their children (Rahman 1996: 169). Such decisions negatively influence the survival of minor languages and even somewhat devalue major languages, but this is precisely the kind of policy which has created what is often called 'Urdu imperialism' in Pakistan.

In short, the state's use of Urdu as a symbol of national integration has had two consequences. First, it has made Urdu the obvious force to be resisted by other ethnic groups. This resistance makes them strengthen their languages by corpus planning (writing books, dictionaries, grammars, orthographies) and 5 acquisition planning (teaching languages,

pressurizing the state to teach them, using them in the media) (for these terms see Cooper 1989). Second, it has jeopardized the additive multilingualism recommended by UNESCO **(2003)** and others (e.g. Edwards 1994) as the use of Urdu has spread, assisted by the media and urbanization. This adversely affects the other Pakistani languages and threatens linguistic and cultural diversity in the country.

2.2. Status of English in Pakistan

English was supposed to continue as the official language of Pakistan until the time that the national language(s) replaced it. However, this date came and went, as did many other dates before it and English is as firmly entrenched in the domains of power in Pakistan today as it was in 1947. The major reason for this is that this is the *de juro* but not the *de facto* policy of the ruling elite in Pakistan. The *de facto* policy can be understood with reference to the elite's patronage of English in the name of efficiency and modernization.

Initially the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was an Anglicized body of men who had moulded themselves in the tradition of the British. The officer corps of the armed forces, as Stephen P. Cohen suggests, was also Anglicized. It was, in his words, the 'British generation' which dominated the army until 1971 (Cohen 1994: 162–163). It is understandable that members of this elite group had a stake in the continuation of English because it differentiated them from the masses. It gave them a competitive edge over those with an Urdu-medium or traditional (*madrassa*) education and, above all, it was the kind of cultural capital which held an elitist position and constituted a class-identity marker. What is less comprehensible is why members of these two elite groups, who now come increasingly from the lower-middle and middle classes who have studied in Urdu-medium schools (or schools which are called English-medium but teach mostly in Urdu), should also want to preserve, and indeed strengthen, the hegemony of English—a language which has always been instrumental in suppressing their own class?

The answer lies in the fact that the elite has invested in a parallel system of elitist schooling of which the defining feature is teaching all subjects other than Urdu through the English medium. This has created new generations of young people who have a direct stake in preserving English. All the arguments which applied to a small Anglicized elite of the early generation of Pakistan now apply to the young aspirants who stand ready to enter the ranks of

this elite. Their parents, themselves not at ease in English, have invested far too much in their children's education to seriously consider decreasing the cultural capital of English.

Moreover, most people think in terms of present-day realities which they may be critical of at some level but which they assume as permanent facts of life. This makes them regard all attempts at change as either utopian or as suspiciously radical activities. For the last century and a half, the people of this part of the world have taken the ascendancy of English for granted. In recent years, with more young people from the affluent classes taking the British 'O' and 'A' level examinations, with the world-wide coverage of the BBC and CNN, with globalization and the presence of English as a world language, with stories of young people emigrating all over the world armed with English, English has become a commodity more in demand than ever before.

The present author carried out a survey of 1 085 students from different schools in Pakistan in 1999–2000 to study their attitudes towards English. The results of this survey are presented in table 2 (Rahman 2002: 592-93) (The results do not add up to 100 % in some cases because those choosing two or more languages have been ignored.).

Table 2 School-going youngsters' attitude towards English

	Madrassas (N=131)	Sindhi medium schools (N=132)	Urdu medium School (N=520)	English-medium School		
				Elitist (N=97)	Cadet College (N=86)	Ordinary (N=119)
1. What should be the medium of instruction in schools?						
Urdu	43.51	9.09	62.50	4.12	23.26	24.37
English	0.76	33.33	13.65	79.38	67.44	47.06
Mother tongue	0.76	15.15	0.38	2.06	Nil	1.68
Arabic	25.19	Nil	0.19	Nil	Nil	0.84
No response	16.79	37.88	16.54	5.15	Nil	8.40
2. Do you think higher jobs in Pakistan should be available in English?						
Yes	10.69	30.30	27.69	72.16	70.93	45.38
No	89.31	63.64	71.15	27.84	29.07	53.78
NR	Nil	6.06	1.15	Nil	Nil	0.84
3. Should English-medium Schools be abolished?						
Yes	49.62	13.64	20.19	2.06	12.79	5.88

No	49.62	84.09	79.04	97.94	86.05	93.28
NR	0.76	2.27	0.77	Nil	1.16	0.84

The results suggest that sixteen-year-old students of matriculation level or the equivalent in Pakistani schools are not in favour of English as the medium of instruction in schools unless they are already enrolled in English-medium schools. However, as they grow up and enter elitist positions, their investment in English, which then becomes the language of schooling of their children, becomes apparent. They no longer support policies which would replace English with other languages.

However, paradoxically, even school students in non-English medium schools do not support the abolition of English-medium schools. Perhaps this seems too radical, visionary, and impractical to them. Perhaps they feel that English-medium schools provide good quality education and should remain available for the modernization of the country. Or perhaps they understand that such schools are a ladder out of the ghetto of their socio-economic class into a privileged class, one which their siblings or children might make use of. In short, it is probably because of their pragmatism and a shrewd realization that nothing is going to change that they want the English-medium schools to keep flourishing.

As mentioned earlier, the British colonial government and its successor, the Pakistani government, have rationed out English. Their stated policy was to support Urdu but their underlying aim was perhaps only to create a subordinate bureaucracy at a low cost (vernacular-medium education is less expensive than English-medium education) and to maintain an anti-ethnic and ideological symbol within the country.

The armed forces, which were better organized than any other section of society, created cadet colleges from the 1950s onwards. These schools, run on the lines of the elitist British public schools, were subsidized by the state. In the 1960s, when students from ordinary colleges, who came by and large from vernacular-medium schools, protested against these bastions of privilege, the government appointed a commission to investigate their grievances. The findings of this commission agreed that such schools violated the constitutional assurance that ‘all citizens are equal before law’ (Paragraph 15 under Right No. Vl of the 1962 Constitution). However, the Commission was also convinced that these schools would produce suitable

candidates for filling elite positions within the military and the civilian sectors of the country's services (GOP 1966: 18). This meant that the concern for equality was merely a legal nicety. This, indeed, is what has happened. Today the public schools are as well-entrenched in the educational system of the country as ever before.

In short, by supporting English through a parallel system of elitist schooling, Pakistan's ruling elite acts as an ally of the forces of globalization at least as far as the hegemony of English is concerned. The major consequence of this policy is the weakening of local languages and the lowering of their status. This, in turns, opposes linguistic and cultural diversity, weakens the 'have-nots' even further, and increases poverty by leaving the best-paid jobs in the hands of the international elite and the English-using elite of the peripheries.

3. Language vitality in Pakistan

The year 2000 saw three excellent books on language death: David Crystal's *Language Death*, Daniel Nettle and Suzanne Romaine's *Vanishing Voices*, and Tove Skutnabb-Kangas's *Linguistic Genocide in Education or Worldwide Diversity and Human Rights*. Works such as these, along with other related efforts, have made linguists conscious that standardization and the increasing dominance of a restricted number of languages is negatively affecting a large number of smaller languages of the world.

In Pakistan, as mentioned earlier, the linguistic hierarchy is as follows:
English, Urdu, and local languages. In the N.W.F.P and Sindh, however, Pashto and Sindhi are seen as identity markers and are spoken informally. In Punjab, unfortunately, there is a widespread culture-shame about Punjabi (Mansoor 1993: 132). In all of the elitist English-medium schools the author visited, there were policies forbidding students from speaking Punjabi. If anyone spoke it, s/he was called '*Paendu*' (rustic, village yokel) and made fun of. Many educated parents speak Urdu rather than Punjabi with their children.

The children of elitist English-medium schools are indifferent to Urdu and claim to be completely bored by its literature. They are proud to claim their lack of competence in the subject even when they get 'A' grades in the O' and A' level examinations. They read only English books, not books in Urdu or other Pakistani languages. TV programs in Pakistan use the term 'Urdu-medium' to refer to less-sophisticated programs.

Such prevailing attitudes have a negative effect on Pakistani languages. Urdu is secure because of the huge pool of people very proficient in it and especially because it is used in lower level jobs, the media, education, the court system, commerce, and other such domains in Pakistan. Punjabi is a large language and will survive despite culture shame and neglect. It is used in the Indian Punjab in many domains of power and, what is even more significant, it is the language of songs, jokes, intimacy, and informality in both Pakistan and India. This makes it the language of private pleasure and if it continues to be used in this manner, it is in no real danger.

Sindhi and Pashto are both major languages and their speakers have a sense of pride. Sindhi is also used in the domains of power and is the major language of education in rural Sindh. Pashto is not a major language of education, nor is it used in the domains of power in Pakistan. However, its speakers see it as their identity marker and it is used in some domains of power in Afghanistan. It, too, will survive, although the Pashto variety which is spoken in cities in Pakistan is now adulterated with Urdu words. Educated Pashtuns often code-switch between Pashto and Urdu or English. Thus, the language is under some pressure.

Balochi and Brahvi are small languages under much pressure from Urdu. However, there is awareness among educated Balochs that their languages must be preserved. As they are not used in the domains of power, they will survive as informal languages in the private domain. Nevertheless, the city varieties of these languages will become very 'Urdufied'.

About fifty five very small languages of Pakistan (see Appendix 1), mostly in Northern Pakistan, are under tremendous pressure. The Karakorum Highway linking these areas to the plains has placed much pressure on these languages. The author visited Gilgit and Hunza in August 2002 and met, among others, local language activists. They all agree that their languages should be preserved, but are so appreciative of the advantages of the highway that they accept the threat to their languages with equanimity. Urdu and English words have already entrenched themselves in Shina and Burushaski and, as people emigrate to the cities, they are shift to Urdu.

In the city of Karachi the Gujrati language is being abandoned, at least in its written form, as young people seek to be literate in Urdu and English – the languages used in the domains of power.

In Sindh there are small languages so lexically close to larger ones that it is difficult to determine whether they are, in fact, varieties of the larger languages or were different languages but are now shifting towards the larger ones under pressure. These languages are described on

the authority of other researchers in Appendixes 2 and 3. Observations on possible language shift and vitality have been made, but the author has not done any field work in Sindh, at least as far as language vitality is concerned, and makes no claim to authority in this field. As far as the languages of the Northern areas are concerned, more certainty can be claimed, since some of these questions have been rechecked in the field by the author himself.

The languages of areas outside Sindh which are facing extinction include:

Badeshi

It has ceased to exist now according to field researchers who visited the valley in February and March 2004. The earlier reports about the people in the Chail Valley of Swat speaking what was probably a variety of Persian are wrong although the *Ethnologue* (Gordon 2005) still reports this. This language has died some generations ago (Zaman 2004b).

Chilliso

Spoken by a small number of people on the east bank of the Indus in the district of Kohistan, it is under great pressure by Shina. According to Hallberg 'A point which further underscores the idea that language shift is taking place in this community is the fact that of the thirteen individuals who were asked, 10 four said that they spoke Chilisso in their home as a child but speak Shina in their home today' (Hallberg in SSNP–1 1992: 122–123).

Domaaki

This is the language of the Doma people in Mominabad (Hunza). Backstrom reported only 500 speakers in 1992 (Backstrom in SSNP–2 1992: 82). The present author visited the village in 2002 and estimated only 300.

Gowro

Spoken on the east bank of the Indus in district Kohistan, mainly in the village of Mahrin, by the Gabar Khel class. Hallberg says that 'it would seem that the dominance of Shina may be slowly erasing the use of Gowro' (Hallberg in SSNP–1 1992: 131). Baart confirms that only 1 000 speakers are left now and it may be dying. (Baart 2003).

Ushojo

This is spoken in the Chail Valley of Swat. According to Sandra J. Decker of the SIL, it was spoken by 2 000 people in 1990 (Decker in SSNP–1 1992: 66). She also reported that both

men and women spoke Pashto with her (ibid: 76). J. Baart suspects that the language is under great pressure and is moribund (Baart 2003).

The smaller languages of Chitral, too, are about to be lost. The Kalasha community, which follows an ancient religion and lives in the valleys of Chitral, is in danger of losing its languages. Some young people are reported to have left the language when they converted to Islam (Decker in SSNP–5 1992: 112). Other small languages (Yidgha, Phalura and Gawar-bati) are also losing their vitality.

Two small languages which would have been lost otherwise are being documented by local language activists with the help of Baart. The first is Ormuri, the language of the village of Kunigaram in South Waziristan, which was described as 'a strong language in that area' by Hallberg in 1992 (Hallberg in SSNP–4 1992: 60). This language is being documented by Rozi Khan Barki, a resident of the village, with the help of J. Baart (Barki n.d. and 1999). The other is Kundal Shahi, which was discovered by Khwaja Abdur Rahman and is spoken in the Neelam Valley in Azad Kashmir, about 75 miles from Muzaffarabad. This is being preserved by Khwaja Rehman with the help of Baart (Baart and Rehman 2003).

In short, while only the remotest and smallest of the languages of Pakistan are in danger of dying, other languages have decreased in stature. The undue prestige of English and Urdu has made all other languages burdens rather than 11 assets. This is the beginning of language sickness, if not death. Although very little information is available on the languages of Pakistan, an effort has been made here to make observations about the use and vitality of a large number of these languages (a summary is presented in Appendix 3). The main point is that as small and isolated communities open up to the forces of modernity, their languages come under threat and may disappear if nothing is done to reverse the language shift.

4. Can language shift be reversed?

Awareness of language shift and the need to reverse it came to the attention of linguists through an epoch-making book by Joshua A. Fishman aptly entitled *Reversing Language Shift* (1991). Ten years after the book appeared the question was revisited by another volume edited by Fishman called Can *Threatened Languages be Saved?* (2001). However, these books are not known in Pakistan and the view they support—that language shift ought to be reversed is seen as fatuous or sentimental nonsense. The indigenous languages are seen as markers of backwardness or symbols of ethnic resistance to the center and are not taken seriously. A few anti-globalization

enthusiasts, however, pay some attention to language issues. In February 2004 speakers in a conference on Green Economics (arranged by an NGO called Shirkat Gah) pointed out that varieties of wheat and other agricultural products have decreased in number and that people do not even have names for varieties which existed about thirty years ago. The disappearance of local names is symptomatic of the depletion of local knowledge. Moreover, as people leave their languages, children are alienated from their ancestors, their roots, their culture and their essential self. Unfortunately, very few people in Pakistan think of this as a problem, and there are no policies about preserving the linguistic diversity of the country.

Under such prevailing circumstances can anything be done to preserve the languages of the country? I believe it can be, but that the first step would be to persuade the government to create a new language policy. This new policy would have to go beyond affirming that everyone has the right to preserve their language and culture. In addition to that, the policy would create programmes to teach children through their mother tongues. Primers would have to be produced on the lines of material already produced by language activists and linguists (provided in Appendix 2). As the UNESCO and other NGOs could finance this project, public funds will be saved and may later be used to hire teachers and provide additional assistance.

A crucial aspect of teaching children in their mother tongue is to overcome 12 the cultural shame associated with the traditional indigenous cultures and communities. This can be done by teaching all children, including those from the elite, through their mother tongue. Such teaching will, of course, be a bridge to the languages of wider communication (such as Urdu or the major provincial language).

Three RLS strategies are mentioned by Fishman: ‘One is “shoot for the moon!” Another is “anything is better than nothing”. The third is “the right step at the right time” (Fishman 2001: 474). Out of these, the third strategy seems to most fit Pakistan’s case. Individuals may be made sensitive to the necessity of using the language in private domains while taking advantage of such governmental interventions in favour of their languages as much as possible. Among these interventions, apart from teaching, should be the radio, TV, and computer programmes aimed at by RLS activists.

These steps may reverse or at least slow down the language shift which is in evidence in Pakistan. Language shift may eventually occur but those conscious of the loss it entails to their identities will at least have the satisfaction of having done something to try to slow it down.

5. Conclusion

We have seen that the language policies of Pakistan, both declared and undeclared, have increased both ethnic and class conflict in the country. Moreover, our Westernized elites, in their own interests, are threatening cultural and linguistic diversity. As a result they are impoverishing the already poor and creating much resentment against the oppression and injustice of the system. While it may not be possible to reverse language shift, it is possible to promote the concept of additive bilingualism rather than subtractive bilingualism. This means that we should add to our repertoire of languages to gain power while retaining skills and pride in our own languages. In order to do this, the state and our education system should promote the concept of linguistic rights.

There are tolerance-related and promotion-oriented rights. In Pakistan we have the former but not the latter. This means that, while we keep paying lip service to our indigenous languages, we create such market conditions that it becomes impossible to gain power, wealth or prestige in any language except English and, to a lesser extent, Urdu. It is this which must be changed and the change must come by changing the market conditions. This is what they did in the case of Catalan, a language which had been banned by General Franco of Spain, and which has been revived. Since they made Catalan the language of jobs and the government of Catalonia (Hall 2001), it changed the power equa-13 tion and people started learning Catalan.

What we need in Pakistan are such promotion-oriented rights for our languages. What will go along with such rights is a good but fair system of schooling which will teach the mother tongue, English and Urdu equally to all children, not as it is done now, with English being taught very well to the elite but very badly to all others (for details, see Rahman 2002, Conclusion). Such steps might save us from the more harmful linguistic effects of language policies.

Appendix 1: Minor languages and dialects of Pakistan

The number of languages listed in the *Ethnologue* (Gordon 2005) for Pakistan is 72. This chart however, lists 55 languages and dialects. The major languages (Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashto, Siraiki, Urdu and Balochi) are given elsewhere. The dialects of Pashto (3), Balochi (3), Hindko (3), Greater Punjabi (Pahari, Potohari) are subsumed under the language head itself. English, Sign Language, Badeshi (which is dead) have been excluded. Marwari, mentioned twice, is entered only once here. Kundal Shahi, not mentioned in the *Ethnologue*, is, however, included. Lexical similarity and intelligibility of varieties of a language are given if known. Judgments concerning a form of speech being a language or a dialect are not given.

Language or Dialect	**Other Names/ Lexical Similarity to other Languages and Dialects**	**Where Spoken**	**Speakers**	**Source**
Aer	None. 78% lexical similarity with Katai Meghwar and Kachi Bhil. 76% with Raburi; 76% with Kachi Koli.	Jikrio Goth around Deh 333, Hyderabad and Jamesabad. Also in Kach Bhuj in Gujrat (India).	200 in 1996	Gordon 2005.
Bagri	(Bahgri ; Bagria; Bagris; Baorias; Bauri). Dialect of Rajasthani 74% lexical similarity with Marwari Bhil of Jodhpur; 54% with Jandavra.	Sindh and Punjab (nomadic between India and Pakistan)	200,000 in Pakistan including 100,000 in Sindh	Gordon 2005
Balti	Baltistani, Sbalti	Baltistan; also India.	270,000 (Pakistan) 337,000 (World)	SSNP-2: 8 & Gordon 2005
Bateri	(Bateri Kohistani; Batera Kohistan; Baterawal; Baterawal Kohistani) 58-61% lexical similarity with Indus Kohistani; 60% with Gurgula.	Indus Kohistan Batera village (East of Indus North of Besham)	28,251 (Pakistan) 29,051 (World)	Breton 1997: 200; Gordon 2005
Bhaya	Lexical similiarity to	Kapri Goth near	70-700	Gordon 2005

	Marwari sweeper 84% and to Malhi 75%; Bhat 73%; Goaria,72-73%; Sindhi Meghwar 70-73%, Sindhi Bhil 63-71% and Urdu 70%.	Khipro Mirpur Khas (Lower Sindh)	(in 1998)	
Brahvi	Brohi, Brahuidi, Kurgalli, Brahuigi, (no similarity with any language in Pakistan but with many loan words from Persian, Balochi and Urdu.	Kalat region and East Balochistan. Also spoken by small communities in Sindh and Iran etc.	2,000,000 in Pakistan and 2,210,000 in all countries (1998).	Gordon 2005
Burushaski	Mishaski, Biltum, Werchikwar Khajuna (language isolate with no similarity with any language. Some words borrowed from Urdu, English and Shina).	Hunza, Nagar, Yasin valleys (Northern areas)	87,049 (2000)	SSNP-2: 37 Gordon 2005
Chilisso	(Chiliss, Galos) 70% lexical similarity with Indus Kohistani; 65-68% with Gowro; 50% Bateri; 48-65% with Shina.	Koli, Palas, Jalkot Indus Kohistan	1600-3000 (in 1992)	Breton 1997: 200 & Gordon 2005
Dameli	(Gudoji, Damia, Damedi, Damel) 44% lexical similarity with Gawar-Bati, Savi, and Phalura, 33% with Kamviri, 29% with Kativiri.	Damel Valley (Southern Chitral)	5000 (in 1992)	SSNP-5: 11 Gordon 2005
Dehwari also see Persian	(Deghwari) Iranian language somewhat close to Persian and influenced by Brahvi.	Kalat, Mastung (Central Balochistan)	13,000 (in 1998)	Breton 1997: 200 & Gordon 2005
Dhatki	(Dhati) Dialects are	Lower Sind in	131,863	Gordon 2005

	Eastern, Southern and Central Dhatki, Malhi and Barage. Varies from Northern Marwari but intelligible. 70-83% lexical similarity with Marwari dialects.	Tharparkar and, Sanghar.	(Pakistan) 148,263 (World)	
Domaaki	(Domaski, Doma) loan words from Shina and Burushaski but not intelligible to speakers of both.	Mominabad (Hunza & Nagar)	300 plus (in 2002)	SSNP 2: 79; Author's Personal observation in 2002.
Gawar-Bati	(Narsati, Nurisati, Gowari, Aranduiwar, Satr, Gowar-bati) 47% lexical similarity with Shumashti, 44% with Dameli, 42% with Savi and Grangali.	Southern Chitral, Arandu, Kunar river along Pakistan-Afghanistan border	1500 (in 1992)	SSNP-5: 156 Breton 1997: 200 & Gordon 2005
Ghera	(Sindhi Ghera, Bara) Quite different grammatically from Gurgula and similar to Urdu. 87% lexical similarity with Gurgula. 70% with Urdu.	Hyderabad Sindh; India	10,000 (in 1998)	Gordon 2005
Goaria	75-83% lexical similarity with Jogi; 76-80% with Marwari sweeper; 72-78% with Marwari Meghwar; 70-78% with Loarki.	Cities of Sindh	25,426 (in 2000)	Gordon 2005
Gowro	(Gabaro, Gabar Khel) 62% lexical similarity with Indus Kohistani; 60% with Bateri; 65-68% with Chilisso; 40-43% with Shina.	Indus Kohistan (on the eastern bank, Kolai Area, Mahrin village)	200 or less (in 1990)	Breton 1997: 200 & Gordon 2005

Gujari	(Gujuri, Gojri, Gogri Kashmir Gujuri, Gujuri Rajasthani) close to Hindko and related varieties of Greater Punjabi. 64-94% lexical similarity among dialects.	Swat, Dir, Northern areas, Azad Kashmir and Punjab	300,000-700,000 plus (in 1992)	SSNP-3: 96 & Gordon 2005
Gujrati	(Gujrati)	Karachi, other parts of Sindh. Major language in India.	45,479,000 in India and 46,100,000 in all countries. Probably 100,000 in Pakistan.	Gordon 2005.
Gurgula	(Marwari, Ghera) 87% Lexical similarity with Ghera	Karachi, cities of Sindh	35,314 (in 2000)	Gordon 2005
Hazargi	(Hazara, Hezareh, Hezare'i) similar to Persian	Quetta and other cities of Pakistan. Also in Afghanistan.	156,794 (in 2000)	Gordon 2005
Hindko	(Hazara Hindko, Peshawar Hindko, Hindki) a variety of Greater Punjabi. Intelligible to Punjabi and Siraiki speakers.	Mansehra, Abbottabad, Haripur, Attock Districts. The inner city of Peshawar and Kohat etc.	3,000,000 in 1993 i.e. 2.4% of the population.	Gordon 2005
Jandavra	(Jhandoria) 74% lexical similarity with Bagri and Katai Meghwar, 68% with Kachi Koli.	Southern Sindh from Hyderabad to Mirpur Khas; also in India	5000 (in 1998)	Gordon 2005
Jatki	(Jatgali, Jadgali, Jat)	Southern Balochistan and Southwest Sindh. Also in Iran.	100,000 in both countries (1998)	Gordon 2005
Kabutra	(Nat, Natra) intelligibility with Sansi and Sochi. 74% lexical similarity with	Umarkot, Kunri, Nara Dhoro (Sindh); also in India	1,000 (in 1998)	Gordon 2005

	Sochi.			
Kachchi	(Cutch, Kachi) similar to Sindhi.	Karachi	50,000 (in 1998)	Gordon 2005
Kalami	(Bashgharik, Dir Kohistani, Bashkarik, Diri, Kohistani, Dirwali, Kalami Kohistani, Gouri, Kohistani, Bashkari, Gawri, Garwi)	Upper Swat Khoistan from Kalam to upper valleys also in Dir Kohistan	60,000-70,000 (in 1995)	Baart 1999: 4
Kalasha	(Kalashwar, Urtsuniwar, Kalashamon, Kalash)	Kalash Valleys (Chitral) Southern	5,029 (in 2000)	SSNP-5: 11 & 96-114. Gordon 2005
Kalkoti	69% lexical similarity with Kalami but Kalami speakers do not understand Kalkoti.	Dir Kohistan in Kalkot village	6000 (in 2002)	Breton 1997: 200; Zaman 2002; Gordon 2005
Kamviri	(Skekhani, Kamdeshi, Lamertiviri, Kamik) there is a variety of Kativiri also called Skekhani.	Chitral (Southern end of Bashgal Valley)	2000 (in 1992)	SSNP-5: 143-156; Gordon 2005
Kashmiri	(Keshuri)	The Valley of Kashmir & Diaspora in Pakistan	4,391,000 in India. About 105,000 in Pakistan (in 1993)	Breton 1997: 200; Gordon: 2005
Kativiri	(Bashgali, Kati, Nuristani, Shekhani) Eastern Kativiri in Pakistan.	(Chitral) Gobar Linkah Valleys	3700-5100 (in 1992)	Gordon 2005
Khetrani	Similar to Siraiki but influence by Balochi	Northeast Balochistan	4,000	Gordon 2005
Khowar	(Chitrali, Qashqari, Arniya, Patu, Kohwar, Kashkara)	Chitral, Northern areas, Ushu in northern Swat	222,800 (Pakistan) 242,000 (World)	SSNP-5: 11&25-42; Breton 1997: 200; Gordon 2005
Kohistani	(Indus Kohistani, Dir Kohistani, Kohiste, Khili, Maiyon, Maiya,	Indus Kohistan West bank of river	220,000 (in 1993)	Gordon 2005

	Shuthun, Mair)			
Koli Kachi	(Kachi, Koli, Kachi Koli) similar to Sindhi and Gujrati (78% lexical similarity) but being influenced more by Sindhi in Pakistan. Its dialects are Rabari, Kachi Bhil, Vagri, Katai Meghwar, Zalavaria Koli and Tharadari Koli.	(Lower Sindh) around Towns of Tando Allahyar & Tando Adam also in India around the Rann of Kach.	170,000 (in 1998)	Gordon 2005
Koli Parkari	Parkari (Lexical similarity with Marwari Bhil and Tharadari) 77-83% lexical similarity with Marwari Bhil; 83% with Tharadari Koli	Lower Thar Desert Nagar Parkar. Also in India.	250,000 (in 1995)	Gordon 2005
Koli Wadiyara	(Wadiyara, Wadhiyara) intelligibility with Kachi Koli and its varieties.	Sindh in an area bounded by Hyderabad, Tando Allahyar and Mirpur Khas in the north, and Matli and Jamesabad in the South.	175,000-180,000 in Pakistan). Total in Pakistan and India 360,000 (1998).	Gordon 2005
Kundal Shahi		Neelam Valley, Azad Kashmir	500 (in 2003)	Baart and Rehman 2003
Lasi	(Lassi) similar to Sindhi but influenced by Balochi.	Las Bela District (south east Balochistan)	15,000 (in 1998)	Gordon 2005
Loarki	82% lexical similarity with Jogi and 80% with Marwari.	Sindh---various places; also in India	21,000 (in 1998)	Gordon 2005
Marwari	(Rajasthani, Meghwar, Jaiselmer, Marawar, Marwari Bhil) 79-83% lexical similarity with	Northern Marwari in South Punjab North of Dadu Nawabshah. Southern Marwari	220,000 (in 1998)	Gordon 2005

	Dhatki; 87% between Southern and Northern Marwari; 78% Marwari Mehwar and Marwari Bhat.	in Tando Mohammad Khan and Tando Ghulam Ali etc.		
Memoni	Similarities to Sindhi and Gujrati	Karachi	Unknown	Gordon 2005
Od	(Odki) similarity with Marathi with some Gujrati features. Also influenced by Marwari and Punjabi 70-78% lexical similarity with Marwari, Dhatki and Bagri.	Scattered in Sindh & south Punjab	50,000 (in 1998)	Gordon 2005
Ormuri	(Buraki, Bargista) 25-33% lexical similarity with Pashto.	Kaniguram (south Waziristan) some in Afghanistan etc	1000 (Pakistan) 1050 (World)	SSNP-4: 54 Gordon 2005
Persian	(Farsi, Madaglashti Persian in Chitral Dari, Tajik, Badakhshi and the dialects mentioned earlier). Dialects of Persian spoken in Pakistan. The standard variety is used for writing.	Balochistan, Shishikoh Valley in Chitral, Quetta, Peshawar, etc.	2000-3000 (in 1992)	SSNP-5: 11 Gordon 2005
Phalura	(Dangarik, Ashreti, Tangiri, Palula, Biyori, Phalulo) 56-58% lexical similarity with Savi; 38-42% with Shina	7 villages near Drosh, Chitral possibly 1 village in Dir Kohistan	8600 (in 1990)	SSNP-5: 11&67-95; Gordon 2005
Sansi	(Bhilki) 71% lexical similarity with Urdu; 83% with Sochi.	North-western Sindh	16,200 (in 2000)	Gordon 2005
Shina	(Sina, Shinaki, Brokpa)	Giligit, Kohistan, Baltistan and Ladakh	300,000 (Pakistan) 321,000 (World)	SSNP-2: 93; Gordon 2005
Sindhi Bhil	(Bhil) close to Sindhi. Its varieties	Badin, Matli, Thatta (Sindh)	56,502 (in 2002)	Gordon 2005

	are Mohrano, Sindhi Meghwar, Badin etc.			
Torwali	(Kohistani, Bahrain Kohistani) 44% lexical similarity with Kalkoti and Kalami.	Chail and Bahrain (Swat)	60,000	Breton 1997: 200; Lunsford 2001; Gordon 2005
Ushojo	(Ushoji) 35-50% lexical similarity with varieties of Shina.	Upper part of Bishigram Valley (Chail) in Swat	1000 (in 2002)	Zaman 2002; Gordon 2005
Vaghri	(Vaghri Koli) 78% lexical similarity with Wadiyara Koli.	Sindh many places. Also in India.	90,000 in India. 10,000 in Pakistan. (in 1998)	Gordon 2005
Wakhi	(Kheek, Kheekwar, Wakhani, Wakhigi, Wakhan) some influence of Burushaski.	Northern ends of Hunza & Chitral; Afghanistan; China; Tajikistan	9,100 (Pakistan) 31,666 (World)	SSNP-2: 61; Gordon 2005
Wanetsi	(Tarino, Chalgari, Wanechi) 71-75% lexical similarity with Southern Pashto.	Harnai (East of Quetta)	95,000 (in 1998)	SSNP-4: 51 Breton 1997: 200; Gordon 2005
Yidgha	(Yidghah, Luthuhwar) 56-80% lexical similarity with Munji in Afghanistan. Also influenced by Khowar.	Upper Lutkoh Valley (Western Chitral)	6,145 (in 2000)	SSNP-5: 11&43-66; Gordon 2005

Appendix 2: State of the languages of Pakistan

This chart provides information on the availability of written material in the 63 languages of Pakistan, especially that which is suitable for teaching small children or illiterate adults. The names of the writers of a primer is given in the third column. The names of authors of other material has not been given.

Language	**Material available**	**Names of writers of primers.**
Aer		
Bagri		
Balochi	Alphabet book, primers, folktales, health books, phrase book Balochi-Urdu-English dictionary, printed books on Islamic observances, poetry, modern literature, textbooks etc.	Tan et. al. 1999; Farrell &Sadiq 1986.
Balti	Ancient records (Devanagari based script); Grammar, parables (Roman); verse, folksongs etc (Nastaliq script)	Hussanabadi 1990
Bateri		
Bhat		
Bhaya		
Bhil Sindhi	Material in Sindhi may be used.	Many primers.
Brahvi	Alphabet book, primers, folktales, health books, phrase book; Brahvi-Urdu-English dictionary, printed books on Islamic observances, poetry, modern literature, textbooks etc.	Many primers.
Burushaski	Transition primer (Urdu to Burushaski), folktales, bilingual vocabulary: Burushaski-English	Nasir n.d
Chilisso		
Dameli		
Dehwari		
Dhatki	Alphabet book, primer, transition primer, folktales, stories for children.	Das et. al. 1991; Payne 1991; various 1991
Domaaki		
Gawarbati		
Ghera		
Goaria		
Gowro		
Gujari	Poetry books, short stories, songs etc.	Many primers.
Gujrati	Primers, grammars, textbooks, books etc. (in India also in computers).	Many primers.
Gurgula		
Hazargi	Alphabet book, folktales, health books, proverbs, stories for children. Material in standard Persian may also be used.	HLA 1997

Hindko	Primers, literature, prose, dictionaries, magazines etc.	Akbar 1994 and other primers.
Jandavra		
Jatki	Primers, word lists, grammars. Naskh/Nastaliq	Baloch 2003
Jogi		
Kabutra		
Kachchi	Primers of Sindhi may be used	Many primers
Kachchi (Bhil)		
Kachchi (Katiawari)		
Kalami	Alphabet book, transition primer, poetry books, collection of texts from Gawri writers' workshop, proverbs, phrase dictionary Gawri-Urdu-English	KCS 2002; **Zaman** 2002a; **Zaman** 2002b; Shaheen 1989
Kalasha	Alphabet book, pre-reader, dictionary.	Anonymous; last by Trail & Cooper 1999.
Kalkoti		
Kamviri		
Kashmiri	Primers, folktales, poetry, textbooks, other books etc. (most of this literature is in India).	Many primers.
Kativiri		
Khetrani		
Khojki (Script not a language)	Ancient records, *Ginans*, old documents, primers, school textbooks, others books.	Ali 1989.
Khowar	Primers, grammar, dictionary, folktales, poetry, religious books, other popular books.	Faizi 1987
Kohistani (Indus)		
Koli (Tharadari)		
Koli (Kachi)	Alphabet books, folktales, health books, stories for children, primer.	Masih and Woodland 1995.
Koli (Parkari)	Alphabet book, primer, folktales, health books, bilingual vocabulary: Parkari-English, stories for children.	Hoyle 1986; Hoyle, R 1990; Hoyle, R & Samson 1985; Hoyle, R et. al. 1990.
Koli (Wadiyara)		
Kundal Shahi		
Lasi		
Loarki		
Marwari		
Memoni	Primers of Sindhi may be used	Many primers

Od		
Ormuri	Primer, grammar, word list [Roman] verse, prose, grammar, word list Ormuri (Pashto script)	Barki 1999 and n.d.
Pashto	All kinds of textbooks and books; usable in computer. (also used in Afghanistan in some domains of power).	Many primers.
Persian	All types of books (also in digital form).	Many primers
Phalura		
Punjabi	Books on literature; history; textbooks etc in *Nastaliq* script. (All kinds of books in the Gurmukhi script in India).	Many primers.
Sansi		
Shina	Poetry, grammar, word lists, folktales, songs, religious books etc.	Taj 1989; Zia 1986; Namus 1961; Kohistani and Schmidt 1996
Sindhi	All types of books and in the computers.	Many primers.
Sindhi Bhil		
Siraiki	Ancient poetry, modern literature, magazines etc.	Mughal 1987 and other primers.
Torwali	Lexicographic work using Nastaliq is in progress.	Kareemi 1982
Urdu	All types of books and computers.	Many primers.
Vaghri		
Wakhi	Primer, word list, folksongs, proverbs, word lists.	Sakhi 2000
Wanetsi	Primer, songs, folktales, word lists Nastaliq (Pashto variant)	Askar 1972
Yidgha		

Appendix 3: Domains of use and vitality of the languages of Pakistan

Language	Domains of Use	Vitality	Source
Aer	Used in all functions within the group. Worship songs in Gujrati	Women monolingual. Men multilingual, generally in Sindhi. No evidence of language shift but shift possible to Sindhi as children go to school.	Jeffery 1999 (no pagination)
Bagri	Used in all functions within the group. Used in weddings; to tell Jokes; in songs.	All multilingual mostly in Sindhi. No evidence of language shift.	Jeffery 1999
Balti	Used in all functions within the group. Used by teachers as informal medium of instruction for small children if they are MT speakers themselves. Also cultivated by language activists, media persons (radio announcers etc).	Some bilingualism in Urdu especially among the educated and the employed. Positive attitude to MT. Desirous of learning to read their language. No evidence of language shift.	Backstrom in SSNP-2 1992: 23-26.
Bhil Sindhi	Used in traditional ceremonies and worship.	Bilingualism in Sindhi.	Jeffery 1999
Bateri	Used in all functions within the group.	Some multilingualism in Pashto and Urdu especially among the educated and those who travel on business. Positive attitude towards MT. No evidence of language shift.	Hallberg in SSNP-1 1992:137-139.
Bhaya	Not known	Shifting to Sindhi and related to Marwari dialects.	Gordon 2005 and Author's Personal information.
Burushaski	Used in all functions within the group. Used by teachers as informal medium of instruction. Also cultivated by language activists, media persons etc.	Increasing bilingualism in Urdu and English however, the language is being maintained desirous of learning Urdu and English but expressing positive feelings for MT.	Backstrom in SSNP-2 1992: 52-53.
Chilisso	Many speakers do not use the language even at home.	Bilingualism in Shina. Language shift to Shina in progress. People want their children to learn Shina and Urdu.	Hallberg in SSNP-1 1992: 121-122.
Dameli	Spoken by older people at home but younger people use other languages also.	Multilingualism in Pashto and Khowar. However, positive attitude to MT is expressed. Possibility of language shift to Pashto.	Decker in SSNP-5 1992:124-127.
Dehwari	Not known	Influenced by Brahvi	Gordon 2005

Dhatki	Used by the Malhi group for all functions. Urdu and Sindhi used for songs	Multilingualism in many languages.	Jeffrey 1999.
Domaaki	Possibly used by very few elderly people with each other. Most people do not know it.	Language shift to Burushaski is complete with no hope of reversal.	Backstrom in SSNP-2 1992:81-83.
Gawar-Bati	Used for all functions within the group.	Multilingualism in Pashto and to a lesser extent in Khowar. Positive attitude to MT. However, the language is under pressure by Pashto.	Decker in SSNP-5 1992:161-163.
Ghera	Used for all functions within the group.	Multilingualism in Sindhi and Urdu. Getting influenced by both.	Jeffrey 1999
Goaria	Used for all functions within the group. Hindi used in worship. Children use Sindhi and Urdu.	Multilingualism in many languages. Children use Sindhi or Urdu with outsiders.	Jeffery 1999
Gowro	Still spoken by the older people but younger people mix it with Shina and sometimes speak only Shina.	Bilingualism in Shina. Language shift to Shina in progress.	Hallberg in SSNP-1 1992: 129-132; Zaman 2004a
Gujari	Used in some communities but not among in Gujars settled in the Punjab and Azad Kashmir. Language activists are creating literature in the language. Songs, music and other things are broadcast from the radio and there is a TV programme from India.	Multilingualism in many languages and especially Urdu among the educated. In the NWFP, Northern areas and parts of Azad Kashmir the language is maintained. In the Punjab and near Muzaffarabad and Mirpur there is language shift to the local languages. Educated people use Urdu.	Hallberg and O' Leary in SSNP-3 1992:100.
Gujrati	Used for conversation within the family but younger people are switching to Urdu or English (depending on socio-economic class). All kinds of literature exists. Used in the media and in the state of Gujrat in India.	Multilingualism in Urdu and English as well as other languages. Language shift to Urdu and English is in progress at least in Pakistan.	Field research in Karachi.
Gurgula	Language used within community is strong.	Multilingual in many languages.	Jeffery 1999
Hazargi	Used in the group for all functions.	Multilingualism with Pashto, Balochi and Persian. Language is under pressure.	
Jatki	Not known	Not known	-

Jandavra	Private.	People proud of their language.	Jeffery 1999
Kabutra	Used in the group for all functions.	Multilingual in many languages. Positive attitude and pride in language. No shift.	Jeffery 1999
Kachchi (Bhil)	Used in the group for all functions.	Bilingualism in Sindhi. Being rural it is maintained at present but shift to Sindhi is going on.	Jeffery 1999
Kachchi (Katiawari)	Used by older people in some domains.	Shift to Sindhi going on.	Jeffery 1999
Koli Kachi	Used for all functions within the group.	Multilingualism in Sindhi but language being maintained.	Grainger & Grainger 1980: 42
Koli Parkari	Used for all functions within the group.	Multilingualism in Sindhi but language being maintained.	Grainger & Grainger 1980: 42
Koli Wadiyara	Used for all functions within the group.	Multilingualism in Sindhi but language being maintained.	Jeffery 1999
Koli Tharadari	Used for all functions within the group.	Men Multilingual in many languages. Women and children maintain the language	Jeffery 1999
Kalami	Used for all functions within the group.	Widespread bilingualism in Pashto. Educated people also know Urdu. Attitude towards MT positive and no language shift is observed.	Rensch in SSNP-1 1992:57-61.
Kalasha	Used for all functions within the group.	Positive attitude to MT but those who convert to Islam shift to Khowar or the language of the spouse. Some multilingualism in Khowar and Urdu because of tourism and education. The language is under pressure and there is a possibility of language shift.	Decker in SSNP-5 1992:107-113.
Kalkoti	-	Kalami used is a second language. Most people also speak Pashto.	Gordon 2005
Kamviri	Used for all function within the group.	Multilingualism in Pashto and surrounding languages. Positive attitude to MT but under pressure by Pashto.	Decker in SSNP-5 199:146-147.
Kashmiri	Small diaspora in Pakistan but used for all function within the Valley of Kashmir held by India. All kinds of literature available. Used in media and in teaching etc. Also taught at university level.	Multilingualism with Urdu and the local languages. Language shift in progress in Pakistan but is maintained in India.	Aziz 1983; Bukhari 1986.

Kativiri	Used in all functions within the group.	Positive attitude towards the MT but men multilingual in Pashto and surrounding languages. Difficult to predict language shift.	Decker in SSNP-5 1992:144-147.
Khetrani			
Khowar	Used in all domains in the group. Used by teachers as informal medium of instruction for small children if they are MT speakers themselves. Also cultivated by language activists, media persons (radio, TV announcers etc).	Some bilingualism in Pashto, local languages and Urdu, the last especially among the educated and the employed. Positive attitude to MT. Desirous of learning to read their language. No language shift observed.	Decker in SSNP-5 1992:39-42.
Kohistani (Indus)	Used for all functions within the group.	Multilingualism in Pashto and Shina is not common even among them. Positive attitude towards MT. People want it as a medium of instruction for small children. No language shift is observed.	Hallberg in SSNP-1 1992:110-113.
Koli (Kachi)	Probably used in the group	Bilingualism in Sindhi.	Jeffrey 1999; Gordon 2005
Koli Parkari	Not known	Bilingualism in Sindhi but language being maintained.	Gordon 2005
Kundal Shahi	Used only by the elderly in the family. No longer used by children.	Language shift to local language and Urdu in progress.	Baart and Rehman 2003.
Lasi	Not known	Not known	-
Loarki	Used for all functions within the Loar group	Multilingualism in Sindhi and some knowledge of Urdu.	Jeffery 1999
Marwari (Southern)	Used in all domains of the group.	Multilingualism in Sindhi.	
Memoni	Probably used by older speakers in the group as spoken language.	Most speakers are educated and multilingual in Sindhi, Urdu and Gujrati. The language is shifting to these three languages.	Gordon 2005
Od	Used in some Od communities while others use local languages.	Multilingualism in surrounding languages. Language shift in progress in this iterant community.	Grainger & Grainger 1980: 31
Ormuri	Used for most functions in the Kaniguram area. Words of Pashto are common among young people.	Bilingualism with Pashto. Though positive attitude to MT is expressed, language shift to Pashto is visible.	Hallberg in SSNP-4 1992; Barki 1999; Barki n.d.
Phalura	Used at home. Used informally by teachers.	Multilingualism in Khowar, Pashto and Urdu. Language shift to Khowar in evidence. However, ethnic	Decker in SSNP-5 1992:92-94.

		Kalasha have shifted to Phalura in some areas. Vitality picture mixed.	
Rabari	Used in all domains of the group.	Being maintained.	Jeffery 1999
Sansi	Used for worship and weddings.	Multilingualism in Sindhi and slightly in Urdu and Siraiki. No language shift observed.	Jeffery 1999
Shina	Used in all domains in the group. Used by teachers as informal medium of instruction for small children if they are MT speakers themselves. Also cultivated by language activists, media persons (radio announcers etc).	Considerable bilingualism in Urdu especially among the educated and the employed. Positive attitude to MT. Ambivalent about learning to read their language. No language shift observed. However, there is pressure of Urdu.	Backstrom in SSNP-2 1992: 173.
Sochi	Used in singing, weddings and telling stories.	Multilingualism in Sindhi and slightly in Urdu.	Jeffery 1999
Torwali	Not known	Men bilingual in Pashto but language being maintained.	Gordon 2005
Ushojo (Ushuji)	Used at home at least by the older speakers. There is much mixing of Pashto.	Multilingualism in Pashto and Torwali but educated people know Urdu. Young people who know the MT use Pashto in some areas. Language is under threat from Pashto. Language vitality is varied and mixed.	Decker in SSNP-1 1992: 75-79.
Vaghri	Used in private domains.	Bilingualism in Sindhi. Positive attitude to the language in spite of pressures.	Jeffery 1999
Wakhi	Used in all domains of the group. Language activists and radio broadcasters also cultivate it.	Bilingualism with Urdu among younger, educated people. Also knowledge of Burushaski. Positive attitude towards MT. Desirous of learning the written language in school. However, the language is under pressure from Urdu.	Backstrom in SSNP-2 1992: 70-73.
Wanetsi (Waneci)	Used in private domains but those who live in cities do not use it.	Bilingualism with Pashto. Positive attitude towards MT. However, under pressure from Pashto.	Hallberg in SSNP-4 1992. Askar 1972.
Yidgha	Used for in group functions. Used informally by teachers and for explaining religious texts.	Multilingualism in Khowar and sometimes Urdu, Persian and Bashgali. Language shift to Khowar in evidence.	Decker in SSNP-5 1992: 56-57.

3
ENGLISH IN PAKISTAN

Introduction

A traveller from an English-speaking country finds it easy to travel in Pakistan. The PIA (Pakistan International Airline). If that is the traveler's carrier to Pakistan, makes announcements in English in addition to Urdu, the national language. The air hostesses speak in English to the passengers. The immigration officials speak the requisite few phrases in English and even the taxi drivers and porters know enough English to serve the traveller. Out in the street, on the way to a hotel, the shops have signs in English as well as Urdu. Sometimes, confusingly enough, there are Urdu words written in the Roman script and vise versa. The hotel, if it is in an upscale locality, functions in English. In short, the penetration of English in Pakistani society, at least in the urban areas, is visible everywhere in the country.

This chapter examines the use of English in Pakistan in different institutions, including schools, institutions of higher education, the state sector, the private sector and the entertainment sector, with a view to understanding how English empowers and privileges the elite. Specifically, this chapter explores the use of English in public and private domains the relationship between English and the distribution of power (socio economic class), and the globalization of English and its possible impact upon Pakistan and the world. Thus English is the key to understanding the complex interaction between class, world view, medium of education, and globalization in Pakistan and, by extension, the rest of the world.

English is the language of the elite of Pakistan both formally in official interaction, employment, education etc—and informally (private conversation, entertainment, reading, travel etc). It is perhaps even more firmly entrenched today in Pakistan than it was during the British period. However, English has very few native speakers in Pakistan though it is spoken as an additional language by the Westernized, urban elite.

The variety of English spoken and written by Pakistanis has been called 'Pakistani English' in sociolinguistic literature (Baumgardner 1987; Rahman 1990). This is a non-native variety of English with its own rules. As it is created by the 'interference' of Pakistani languages, it is internally differentiated—with reference to the first language of the speaker ('Punjabi English', 'Pashtun English' etc). It is also differentiated according to closeness to native (in this

case 'British') norms of usage with the acrolectal sub-variety being the closest and the basilectal one being the furthest removed from British Standard English. The mesolectal variety, which most ordinary Pakistanis use, is in between. Pakistani English differs from British and American English most in pronunciation and accent but there are differences in grammar and vocabulary (for details see Rahman 1990). Pakistani English is used in the media, in literature and in advertising (Baumgardner 1993).

The number of Pakistanis who commonly spoke English (probably acrolectal sub-variety of Pakistani English, though this is not indicated anywhere) was less than 2 per cent of the population nor did those who claimed to read and write it exceed about 2.67 per cent of the population up to 1961 when the census recorded such information (Census 1951: Tables 7 & 8a and 1961 Tables Statements 5.1 & 5.5). After that one can only make guesses. According to David Crystal the estimate of English users comes to about 11 per cent of the population (Crystal 1997: 57-59). The source of Crystal's figures is not given. If all those who have passed the matriculation examination, in which English is a compulsory subject, are assumed to be literate in English (i.e. if they write it and read it with understanding), then the figure would be 17.29 per cent of the total population (132,352,000) according to the latest census report (Census 1998). However, as most matriculates from vernacular-medium government schools cannot use English in real life situations, the real number of those who can use it must be less. The members of the Westernized elite, who use the acrolectal variety of Pakistani English should be between 2 to 4 per cent of the population. This is the author's personal guess based upon, among other things, the proportion of those who opt for British school examinations versus those who do not (see Annexure-1).

English and the Power Structure in Pakistan

The role of English in Pakistan has been studied by Anjum Riaz ul Haque (1983), Shemeem Abbas (1993), Sabiha Mansoor (1993; 1995), and Tariq Rahman 1996; 2002). The first two writers merely touch upon the role of English in the country in survey articles. Mansoor, however, has conducted two major surveys on the attitudes of students towards languages. The first survey, conducted in Lahore in 1992, suggests that students have a linguistic hierarchy in mind with English at the top followed by Urdu, with their mother tongue (in this case Punjabi) at the bottom. She also found out that English is associated with modernity and efficiency while Punjabi is associated with informality and intimacy (Mansoor, 1993). Mansoor (2005) provides a

detailed analysis of the role of English in higher education. The study confirms positive attitudes towards English among Pakistani students, their teachers and parents, and university administrators.

English is the preferred language of the 'salariat'—defined by Alavi as those who 'share a common struggle for access to a share of limited opportunities for state employment' (1987: 226)—of Pakistan. In recent years, English has become the language of globalization and therefore, dominates the world. Thus Pakistanis seeking access to the international market also need English. Indeed, while state jobs in Pakistan have become accessible for people who have average proficiency in English, the most well-paying NGOs, the private educational institutions, the corporate sector and the most fashionable society all need very high proficiency in English. Thus, fifty eight years after independence from British rule, Pakistanis find themselves more in need of English than ever before. It was, and remains, the modernizing Pakistanis' major hope for empowerment as long as the present policies, which favour English, remain intact.

State Policies Favouring English

From the earliest days of Pakistan the state seems to have followed discrepant policies about English. The covert policy, or rather the practice, was to allow English to continue as an official language regardless of what the constitution might have declared. Moreover, it was allowed to function as the medium of instruction in elitist schools. Indeed, the civil bureaucracy and the armed forces, both institutions of the state, invested heavily in creating an English-medium system of instruction for the elite contrary to the declared policies of the state of Pakistan.

English in the Educational System

English is taught as a subject in the vernacular-medium schools either from class-1 or class-6 throughout Pakistan. It is also compulsory it the Higher Secondary level (classes 11 and 12) and the two-year bachelor's level (13 and 14 years of education). However, the level of competence attained is low and students are unable to understand and write, let alone speak, English. English is taught through the grammar-translation method. Students memorize a large number of rules without acquiring any real understanding of the language. They also translate passages from English to Urdu and vise versa. As the books are not changed for many years, people write guide books to help the students. Thus, the students cram lessons, such as essays,

from the guide books and get passing grades without acquiring any real competence in English. Passing percentages in Urdu, and overall passing percentages, are better than in English.

Those who do acquire varying degrees of competence go to English-medium schools. As mentioned earlier, there are (1) private elitist English-medium school (2) cadet college/public schools (3) Non-elitist English-medium schools.

Private Elitist English-medium Schools

Elite English-medium school is set up by private entrepreneurs in all the major cities of Pakistan. Some are single institutions while others are chains out of which the most notable are the Beacon House system, the City School System and Froebels. They charge tuition fees ranging from Rs. 1500 to Rs. 8000 per month besides admission and other fees. They generally prepare their students for the British Ordinary and Advanced School level examinations. They are not paid by the state but the armed forces, which own land in the most fashionable parts of the city, give them land at bargain prices on the condition that their own children pay reduced fees. In short, the elite uses public property for private advantage, an arrangement which probably violates the law but which goes unchecked.

The students of these schools generally come from the upper-middle classes (26.66%) and the upper classes (53.33%) (Rahman 2004: 157-158). There are far fewer students enrolled in these schools than in the vernacular schools. They learn English primarily from their families, peer group and exposure to the English through T. V, computer, songs, media and reading material in English. Their schools have books written by native speakers of English with attractive pictures and creative exercises. Their schools also expose them to real-life situations and extra curricular activities which test and hone their skills in English. Thus, generally speaking, the products of these schools use English spontaneously and naturally. This, however, is a product of class—as is their expensive schooling itself for that matter—than either good teaching or books or any single other factor.

In a survey of the opinions of 116 students of these schools in 2002-03 replies to questions about conflict with India suggest that the students of the elitist English medium schools do not support militant policies. They are aware of the disastrous consequences of a war with India and also oppose low-intensity war in Kashmir. The same survey also investigated the level of tolerance for women and religious minorities (Ahmedis, Hindus and Christians). Except in the case of Ahmedis where the large percentage of ‘don’t know’ suggests that students are confused,

students agree that religious minorities should be given the same rights as Muslims in Pakistan. They also support equal rights for women (The results are given in Rahman 2004: 175).

Despite this apparently liberal worldview, students at English-medium school students are social snobs. They look down upon their follow citizens from vernacular-medium schools and *madrassas*. They are also alienated from Pakistan's culture, languages, literature, dress and even cuisine. They listen to English music and like foreign food to their homegrown products. This elite was Anglicized till the sixties. They went to convent schools where they were taught by European missionaries. They aspired to British university degrees or a commission from Sandhurst; preferred the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) or a commission in the army to any other employment. Their evenings were spent in clubs and gymkhanas where bearers dressed as if they still lived in the world of the British '*burra sahibs'* and chatted in English over '*chota* pags' of whisky. The caricatures of these elite are found in Nasir Ahmed Farooqi's novels: *Faces of Love and Death (n.d)* and *Snakes and Ladders* (1968) (Rahman, 1991). By comparison, this elite today is Americanized and much richer than before. The children mostly go abroad preferably to the United States for education. They seek employment in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or the corporate sector and attend ostentatious parties where drugs are in fashion as much as alcohol. This lifestyle is described by Mohsin Hamid in his novel *Moth Smoke* (2000). What is common to both the Anglicized and the Americanized English-speaking elite is that both are callously indifferent to the peoples' aspirations, values and feelings. Thus, as long as they are not part of the decision-making apparatus they express ideas which appear liberal because they belong to an abstract, idealized, Western world.

Of course, as soon as they become part of the real world they operate differently. After all, the present-day Pakistan elite, which studied in English-medium institutions, took decisions which created the apartheid in the educational system we see today. They are also the architects, or at least the supporters, of militant policies and have increased the gap between the haves and the have-not. Hence the apparent liberal worldview of the English-medium elite does not automatically translate into support for peace with India, religious tolerance, or support for women's rights; instead, security, class interest and other factors affect their decision making as adults.

Cadet College/Public School Students

The cadet colleges/public schools are influenced by the armed forces. Their boards of governors, at times administrators, have armed forces officers. Because children of armed forces families have various concessions for elite schools, the student body at cadet colleges and public schools comes from a lower socio economic background than that of the private English-medium schools (Rahman 2004: 158). In The answers to the questionnaire given in survey 2003, the cadet college students were less militant and more tolerant of religious minorities and women than *madrassa* students (Ibid p. 175), but they are less liberal in their attitudes than their counterparts at elitist private English-medium schools.

The views of non elitist English-medium school students were not ascertained in 2003-2004 because they had revealed views very similar to their Urdu-medium counterparts in an earlier survey in 1999-2000 (Rahman 2002: Appendix 14.7, pp. 592-596).

The cadet college/public schools are said to run on money generated by fees. However, they are given land at nominal cost or on lease by the state. Moreover, the provincial government, while spending inadequate funds on their own schools running in the vernaculars, are more generous to the elitist cadet colleges running in English as we shall see in the next section.

The State's Covert Support to English in the Education Sector

Indeed, what never comes out in the educational reports is that the state actually spends public funds on elitist schooling. Agencies of the state, primarily the military and the bureaucracy, created the cadet college, or public schools, in order to groom young men for military and administrative positions since Ayub Khan military rule (1958-1969). Indeed, Ayub established such elitist institutions when he was the Commander-in-Chief of the army (Khan 1967: 43) without realizing that the state itself cannot place some of its citizens in an advantageous position compared to the others nor, indeed, can it finance institutions which violate its own educational policy (of not using English as the medium of instruction). It was precisely this point which the report on student's problems and welfare, reporting in 1966 on the causes of widespread student unrest of the 1960s, had to acknowledge as follows:

> … we cannot help observing that we are unable to appreciate the principle upon which such a discrimination is sought to be made by the government, particularly in view of the constitutional assurance given in paragraph 15 under Right No. VI to the effect that "all citizens are equal before law" (GOP 1966: 18).

However, having pointed out this legal nicety, the commission—nor anyone else for that matter—did not do anything about the elitist cadet colleges and they flourished and multiplied.

The position now is that the armed forces are the leading entrepreneurs of elitist, English-medium education in the country. Other agencies of the state follow. There are elitist English-medium schools administered by the armed forces, welfare organizations of the armed forces, organizations paid by public funds as well as the cadet colleges which are heavily influenced by the armed forces since their boards of governors have senior military officers in dominating positions.

The army runs brigade schools, garrison schools and, through the Fauji Foundation, nearly ninety secondary and four higher secondary schools. It also influences a number of cadet colleges/public schools. The Pakistan Air Force has established over 25 schools and colleges with an enrollment of over 43,000 students and 2000 teachers (*Air University Manual* 2003). The Pakistan Navy, through the Bahria Foundation, has also set up English-medium schools. Beneficiaries, generally depends of army personnel, pay lower fees than civilians. The schools of the armed forces, though English-medium, do not cater to the upper-middle and upper-class which are Westernized and highly exposed to English. Thus neither students nor teachers use English as the medium of private conversation as do their counterparts from the elitist private English-medium schools. However, the students of these institutions gain much more competence in English than their counterparts in the vernacular-medium institutions.

Moreover, all the federal government schools and colleges in the cantonments and garrisons, though financed by the federal government, are actually administered by a serving brigadier of the army. The cadet college/public schools are said to run on money generated by fees. However, they are given land at nominal cost or on lease by the state. Moreover, the provincial government, while spending inadequate funds on their own schools running in the vernaculars, are more generous to the elitist cadet colleges. In the year 2002, the cost per student borne by the state was Rs. 14,171 for the cadet colleges while it was only 2,264 for the government Urdu medium schools while the claim made by the Ministry of Education is that cadet colleges are administered entirely on tuition fees paid by the students. In fact, a number of grants, gifts and other privileges are available to these institutions (for a comparison of costs of different educational institutions (Rahman 2004: 147-148).

Although the armed forces are the most dominant among the institutions of the state to promote English-medium schooling for their dependents at low cost, the federal government too promotes English for its employees and the residents of the federally administered areas. The Federal Directorate of Education, established in 1967, administers 396 educational institutions. Their cost per student per year in 2002-03 was Rs. 4,818 which was almost double to that incurred in the Urdu-medium schools (Source: Federal Directorate of Education, 2003).

Education reports pretend that the English-medium institutions are financed by private means and, hence, government does not deal with them. As we have seen, this is not true. English is the language of elitist schooling in Pakistan and Pakistan's elite, especially the military and the civil bureaucracy, does promote it both through public means and private ones in an organized manner: That this is contrary to the state's declared policy or that it discriminates between citizens is something which is completely ignored in Pakistan.

The Press

We have seen earlier that the actual size of the elite which is really fluent in English is very small. Thus the circulation figures of newspapers given below tell us about the strength of the powerful, English-using elite in Pakistan. The figures are given in annexures 3 and 4.

So weak are the indigenous languages of Pakistan that none of them, including Sindhi (circulation 707,303), can beat English. In 2003 out of a total number of 945 publications, 628 are in Urdu and 204 in English. Sindhi, which is the highest in the indigenous language of the country, has 53 publications.

The major dailies in English are D*awn* (Karachi); *The News* (Rawalpindi), *The Nation* (Lahore); *The Frontier Post* (Peshawar) and *The Daily Times* (Lahore). They also have their internet editions. *The Dawn* has the distinction of being among the top 50 newspapers in the world as far as circulation of the internet edition is concerned (www.dawn.com).

The monthlies *Herald* and *Newsline* (both from Karachi) and the weekly *Friday Times* (Lahore) are read avidly by these who want a candid and detailed coverage of important news and frank, often very daring, analysis of their implications.

The English press is often more balanced and liberal in its analysis than are the major publications in Urdu. The *Nawa-i-Waqt* has always been an upholder of rights wing views favouring the complete Islamization of the country; the suppression of ethnic diversity in order to promote uniform, monolithic Pakistani nationalism; making Kashmir a part of Pakistan and,

therefore, support to militant policies and glorification of war and the armed forces. These policies stay intact and governments are supported in proportion to their adherence to them. Military governments are greeted with enthusiasm by this articulate section of the Urdu press but their liberal tendencies—an in Ayub Khan's (1958-1969) and Pervez Musharraf's case (1999-)—are criticized as being anti-Islam and anti-Pakistan. All liberal views are also castigated in the same scathing terms.

Besides giving informed analysis, the English press often features female models and features on fashionable parties and elitist social life. Their young reader's editions cater for the tastes of the Westernized youth and are written in an in-group idiom which is completely alienated from, and almost incomprehensible to, young people outside this small elite. In short, while the English press is more informed and liberal in its views than the vernacular press in Pakistan, it is essentially more alienated from the ordinary people whose worldview, values and emotions it often ignores.

The Computer

Computers, usually in the form of net cafes, are easily available to all except the rural working classes in Pakistan. Because of this greatly increased use of them, it is often conjectured that this generation of Pakistani children knows better English than the pre-computer one. This is not entirely true as upper-middle and upper-class children, who were educated in elitist English medium schools earlier, read much written material in English and also wrote letters in the language. They now spend more time on the computer and the T. V. This does not improve their English though it does give them other skills. Indeed, as they use contracted spellings in chatting and sending e-mail, they are under less pressure to standardize their spellings than was the pre-computer generation before them.

However, one remarkable effect of the computer revolution is that the Pakistani elitist youth with good skills in English has the opportunity to express itself much more openly than over before. Earlier generations either suppressed doubts about religion, sexual preferences and political dissent or discussed them in whispers with very reliable friends. Now, while on the one hand Pakistani society becomes more and more oppressive and intolerant, on the other, young people express themselves candidly in the internet. Among other things they create web logs (or blogs as they call them). (Rahma 2003). The 'blogs' are very often politically incorrect, sometimes blasphemous and most often about sexuality (mostly tabooed areas such as same-sex

love) (see www.aool.blogspot.com) Pakistanis also write informed, often dissenting, articles on the internet (see www.chowk.com) and exhibit much talent and acumen in their writings.

These who do not pick up good English from their families, friends and school do not create 'blogs' or write articles. They generally do not have computers in their houses in any case. Such young people come to the internet cafes which are widely available in all large, and even small, towns. Informal conversations and observation of such young people—most are boys—revealed that they just know enough English to get to the sites they want. In general these are pornographic sites. In a sex starved and fun starved society where dating members of the opposite sex is not permissible, pornography is the major source of pleasure for the urban upper-working and lower-middle-class young people. They also like to chat to each other for which a smattering of English is needed. However, they do not go beyond a few hackneyed phrases, sometimes mixed with Urdu in the Roman alphabet.

This exposure to English through the internet may have increased the desire to learn English or confirmed people in their view that English is the most useful bit of cultural capital they can possess, but it can hardly be said to have improved the English of the non-elitist school students or the ordinary people. However, as the exposure to the English script and words, especially words used in computers, has increased it is possible that English has entered the lives of people below the middle class in a way which was unthinkable before computers entered Pakistan.

Entertainment

State-owned television and radio channels mostly use Urdu but English is used for the news (total one hour in the day) and discussions meant for foreign audiences (another two hours in a week). Even the PTV World uses English for these two purposes. The English programmes are for information or projection not for entertainment. Private T. V channels, such as Indus Music, has entertainment programmes in English. Some Video Jockeys (VJ's) conduct entire programmes in English.

The very small elite which uses English almost like a first language also uses it for entertainment. Thus there are publications, movies, songs and theatre shows in English. The publications include foreign imports such as popular fiction, the classics of Western literature and popular American comics such as 'Archie comics'. Films in English are popular even among people who do not understand English very well because they cater to tastes to which other kind

of movies do not. Surprisingly the Censor Board examined more English films in 2003 than those in any Pakistani languages. Most of these films are not even dubbed in a Pakistani language (see Annexure-5). This shows what a strong presence English has in the entertainment world in Pakistan. Young people listen to foreign music channels through cable T. V and DVD discs of Western singers are commonly available. Some Pakistani singers too have attempted to release songs in English. For instance, the Entity Paradigm, Junoon, Codroy and Dusk groups have released such songs (see www.pakistanimusic.com). Moreover, popular Pakistani music has been profoundly affected by the tune, style, rhythm and melody of English music so that the older melody is no longer fashionable. In some cases old popular songs have been re-recorded with snatches of English words, or music with a distinctively Western beat. Some so-called 'underground' music is also under the influence of English while code-switching (Urdu and English) is common in others. Indeed, the effect of English music on the musical tradition of Pakistan is so profound that the country is in danger of losing its roots as far as music is concerned.

The theatre is mostly in Urdu and popular folk entertainment is in the local languages. However, plays in English are staged by students of colleges and schools and the cadets of military academics. Recently (23-28 April 2004) the old Grammarian Society staged a play called. 'The Amorous Ambassador' which the elite of Karachi enjoyed very much (Menzes 2004: 30). Sometimes professional groups also stage a show. One such show, 'The Phantom of the Opera', directed by Shah Sharabil in Islamabad in March 2004, was a great success. In short, the English-using elite is large enough to sustain an entertainment industry specifically catering for it.

The Official Domains

English remains the language of the bureaucracy, the officer corps of the armed forces, the superior judiciary, corporations (Pakistan International Airlines etc) and the parliament. However, the parliament allows Urdu to be used and it is used very commonly. The records of the parliament are printed in English but if speeches are in Urdu they are printed in that language (Jabbar 2004). The superior courts still use English though the council of Islamic Ideology, set upon in 1962, recommended that the change should be in the national language or a language the accused understands (CII 1983: Section 221, pp 6-7) and the record of the court too should be in Urdu rather than English (Ibid, Section 265, p. 12). Despite these recommendations, the superior

judiciary operates in English. Similarly, despite the presence of Urdu bureaucratic terms, the higher bureaucracy also operates in English though most new entrants in the bureaucracy are now from vernacular-medium schools and find it more congenial to operate in Urdu in their personal lives.

Literature

English was used for literary purposes ever since sake Dean Mahomet [Shaikh Deen Muhammad] (1759-1851) wrote his books entitled *Travels* (1794) and *Shampooing* (1822). According to Michael Fisher who had written an excellent biography of this fascinating man, 'Dean Mahomet mastered the classically polished literary forces of the day, complete with poetic interjections and allusions' (Fisher 1996: 208).

Before the partition a number of Indian Muslims such as Ahmed Ali and Mumtaz Shahnawaz had written novels on themes relating to the Muslim identity and polities in an era of rapid political change. The riots of the partition were reflected in literature in all languages including English. Bapsi Sidhwa, the famous novelist from Pakistan, wrote her *Ice Candy Man* (1988) on this painful but perennial theme. The other themes were the conflict between tradition and modernity which is expressed both in the choice of the appropriate idiom (Pakistani English versus British standard English?) and theme (indigenous values versus Westernized values?). As for the individual writers or the major works in each genre—poetry, novel, short story, prose and drama—the present author's *A History of Pakistani Literature in English* (1991) is useful up to 1988. After that there is no chronological historical account but Muneeza Shamsie's anthology *A Dragonfly in the Sun* (1997) gives a sample of representative poetry and short stories, with a few extracts from novels, up to 1996. Later, Muneeza Shamsie brought out another anthology, *Leaving Home* (2001) which brings together prose and short stories upto 2000 in one place. A number of outstanding works by Pakistani authors—Kamila Shamsie, Mohsin Hamid, Uzma Aslam Khan, sara Suleri, Nadeem Aslam, Sorayya Khan (Shamsie, K 2004)—have since been published. Alamgir Hashmi, himself a poet in English, dutifully collects references to these writings in yearly bibliographical entries which are generally published in journals of post-colonial literature. Pakistani universities generally ignore Pakistani literature in English though it is an option in some research (M. Phil) courses. On the whole the English literary tradition is less strong and vibrant in Pakistan than it is in India, Africa and the Caribbean.

English and Globalization

English is the language of globalization. The international corporate sector, bureaucracy (such as the UNO, World Bank etc), foreign funded NGOs, the services sector and the internet work predominantly in English in Pakistan as we have seen. This is of enormous advantage for the Pakistani elite which is very proficient in English. As such the lucrative private sector employment is almost entirely dominated by the English using elite while the vernacular educated proto-elite is increasingly joining public funded institutions (bureaucracy, education, judiciary, military). These trends have increased the pressure on Pakistan's languages, including Urdu, which are seen as being ghettoizing. As such, instead of efforts to save the weaker languages, Pakistanis (citizens and state officials both) are indifferent to their death.

Under such circumstances, what alternate policies are available? Mansoor (2005) recommends that English should continue to be used as an "alternate medium of instruction for government schools" until class 12 (Mansoor 2002, p. 316). Moreover, English should also be the medium of instruction in higher education. These recommendations, if implemented, will not change the distribution of power, because only a few urban government schools would be able to use English as a medium of instruction as, indeed, the model schools of Islamabad are already doing. All other schools would be forced to continue using Urdu, because they have neither the teachers nor the texts to use English effectively. In short, the present linguistic apartheid will continue (see Rahman, 1999).

Seeing this indifference to the local languages and conscious that the present patronage of English and its valorization has weakened the masses and keeps the hegemony of the elite intact the present author suggested that English medium elitist schools be phased out, Urdu and other Pakistani languages should be used in the domains of power at all levels while, at the same time, the teaching of English as a subject through modern means of instruction (film, cassette, DVD, drama, radio, interaction) should be spread out to all children (Rahman 2004: 152-153).

The advantages of such policies may be as follows:

Power will be redistributed more justly among the lower middle and middle classes instead of circulating, at least as far as the corporate and the fashionable private sector is concerned, among the Westernized elite.

There may be more cultural authenticity and multiculturalism which the globalized culture, mainly influenced by American trends and modes of thinking, is presently threatening

(even the Pakistani norms of linguistic politeness are being undermined by the English using elite from a position of power. See Rahman 1999: 183-223.

As English is spread out more widely and through contemporary, interactive methods, religious and vernacular-medium students will be exposed to liberal, democratic values of egalitarianism, women's rights and human rights. These, as we have seen, are kept in ideological ghettoes provided by the *madrassas* and the vernacular-medium schools.

This is the optimistic scenario which the present author wishes and hopes for. However, there is a pessimistic scenario also which should be mentioned for a fair appraisal of these policies. This is a follows:

If the vernacular proto elite is empowered it may bring its traditional, male dominating values to the fore and curtail women's rights even further. Moreover, since most discourses in Urdu which this proto elite has been exposed to, are nationalistic and Islam has been used by the Pakistani state to seek legitimacy, is likely to support religious intolerance, sectarian infighting (among the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam) and militancy towards India. It may even support Islamic globalized Islamic militancy being inspired by Huntingtonian (and Osma Ben Laden's) view of the antagonism between the West and Islam.

The Westernized elite, being denied of jobs in Pakistan, will abandon the country. The proto elite which will learn English only as a school subject will not be so proficient as to replace it. This will mean that Pakistan will lose whatever edge it has at the moment over countries which do not inherit English as a legacy of history. This will be a great loss for the country.

The already Islamized young students who will learn to use the internet if English is spread out to them may not be influenced be the liberal values they come across. Instead they may join the 'virtual ummah' available on the internet and become part of globalized Islam.

This last point needs elaboration. The concept of globalization with reference to Islam has been explained by Olivier Roy in his book *Globalized Islam* (Roy (2004). Roy points out that in this age of worker mobility and rapid communication, Muslims live in Western countries. They are deterritorialized and hence create a globalized version of their religion. The language of this globalized Islam is English and the medium is both the printing press and the internet. The theoretical rationalization is to go back to the fundamental sources (Quran and the *Hadith)* and to leave out the different traditions of Muslim culture (s). Thus not only the ethnic languages, cuisine, customs and traditions of Muslims cultural groups are purged but even the cult of mystic

saints and the debates of the medieval *ulema* are ignored or repressed. This neofundamentalist interpretation is spread out to the virtual religious community (the *ummah*) operating in English through the internet. This appeals powerfully to the Muslims in Western lands because they seek an identity which asserts their rights and provides some defense against the forces of globalization. The born again Muslims, or converts as Olivier Roy calls them, spread the word by the easy traveling facilities offered by globalization. As Roy says:

> Young converts can travel throughout Europe, going from one such mosque to another, ignoring ethnic divides and speaking English everywhere (just as Catholic clerics and monks in the Middle Ages, going from one monastery to another, spoke Latin (Roy 2004: 309).

As Islamic preachers, who were restricted to their language community, now have a wider influence because they are translated in English, the power of neofundamentalist Islam may be growing. As Roy tells us, the aged Wahabi Sheikhs based in Saudi Arabia rely on their English speaking disciples to be translated but also to be informed (Roy 2004: 169). This opens up the possibility of Pakistani religious students, hitherto shut out from the rest of the world because of their lack of knowledge of English and unfamiliarity with the internet, becoming part of a neofundamentalist (possibly militant) Islamic movement instead of remaining concerned with local, folk or typically South Asian Islamic movements. These possibilities suggest that the policies suggested by the present author may backfire and, instead of creating a more just and tolerant Pakistan, may end up doing just the opposite.

Conclusion

Despite the possibility of the negative, unintended consequences mentioned above, the author would opt for the ‘democratization of English’ accompanied with the elimination of English as a medium of instruction in elitist schools. This policy is just and humane and may reverse the long years of the injustice of placing elitist children much ahead in the race for jobs, power and prestige as compared to the under-privileged.

Annexure-1

Number of Students who appear in Pakistani Examinations Versus those who appear in British Examinations	
Total SSC (Pakistani Matriculation)	1,026,805 (2002 Annual)
Total HSSC (Pakistani F.A/F.Sc)	5,02,209 (2002 Annual)
Total O' Level (British Ordinary School Leaving Certificate)	10,546 (2002 Annual)
Total A' Level (British Advanced School Leaving Certificate)	5,680 (2002 Annual)

Ratio of Pakistani School Examinees to British Ones

Pakistani Matriculation (SSC)	1,026,805	98.95%
British GCE O' Level	10,546	1.05%
Pakistani Intermediate (HSSC)	5,02,209	98.88%
British GCE 'A' Level	5,680	1.12%
Sources: For SSC/HSSC 24 BISE's of Pakistan. Data Base of Inter-Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Islamabad. For O' and A' Level, British Council, Examination Section, Islamabad, May 2004.		

Annexure-2

Circulation of English Periodicals

Year	Circulation of English Periodicals	Circulation of Periodicals in other languages	Total circulation	Circulation of English periodicals to total circulation in percentages
1994	727,772	4,424,956	5,152,728	14.12
1995	712,698	5,046,292	5,758,990	12.38
1996	636,440	4,696,862	5,333,302	11.93
1997	675,185	5,063,582	5,738,767	11.77
1998	637,140	5,889,499	6,526,639	9.76
1999	701,018	6,609,968	7,310,986	10.61
2000	722,443	6,736,219	7,458,662	9.69
2001	747,165	6,841,971	7,589,136	9.85
2002	835,435	7,140,742	7,976,177	10.47
2003	866,825	7,383,810	8,250,635	10.51

Source: Audit Bureau of Circulation, Ministry of Information are Broadcasting, Govt. of Pakistan, May 2004.

Annexure-3

Number of English Periodicals

Year	Number of English Periodicals	Total Number of Periodicals	Percentage of English periodicals out of the total number of periodicals
1994	152	3242	4.69
1995	180	3429	5.25
1996	162	3444	4.70
1997	368	4455	8.26
1998	215	1344	16.00
1999	215	1571	13.69
2000	150	815	18.40
2001	153	763	20.05
2002	163	720	22.64
2003	204	945	21.59
Source: Provincial Public Relations Department, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of Pakistan, may 2004.			

Annexure-4

Films Examined by the Central Board of Film Censors (2003)

Language of the Film	Number	Percentage out of the total
*English	34	40.96
Urdu	18	21.69
Punjabi	15	18.07
Pashto	15	18.07
Other	01	1.20
Total	83	100
Source: Central Board of Film Censors, Govt. of Pakistan.		
* Out of these 11 (13.25 per cent) were dubbed into Urdu. Others were to be shown in English without being dubbed.		

4

LANGUAGE AND COMPUTERIZATION IN PAKISTAN

The national language, Urdu, has over 11 millions mother-tongue speakers while those who use it as a second language could well be more than 105 million (Grimes 2000). Those who may be considered barely literate in Urdu---if the rate of literacy is really 43.92 per cent as claimed in the census of 1998---are nearly 66 million. That is rather a large number compared to nearly 26 million (17.29 per cent) who, having passed the ten-year school system (matriculation), can presumably read and understand a little English (Census 2001). And yet computer programmes, including e-mail and the internet, function in English in Pakistan and not even in Urdu let alone the other languages. This means that most Pakistanis are either excluded from the digital world or function in it as handicapped aliens. Indeed, most matriculates from Urdu-and Sindhi-medium schools have such rudimentary knowledge of English that they cannot carry out any meaningful interaction, especially that which would increase their knowledge or analytical skills, with the computer. Perhaps only the 4.38 graduates (Census 2001) (about 6.5 millions) could do so if they could afford to buy computers. However, the mushroom growth of small shops, or 'computer cafes' as they are called, has made PCs available to most boys ---girls generally avoid such places because they are used by sex-starved youths to visit pornographic sites---with a little cash to spare. However, these 'cafes' are in the urban, not the rural, areas and for any prolonged and meaningful use of the computer one must possess a PC or have access to one in one's place of work or study. As only the rich can afford personal machines and very few people go to educational institutions which have computers, the number of Pakistanis actually benefitting from the computer can only be a small percentage of the whole population.

The question then is whether it is cost-effective to create computer programmes in Pakistani languages. This operation, or localization as it is called, is costly and time consuming. Should time and money be spent upon it or not? And if so, which should be the language or languages of localization? Urdu, the national language and the urban second language? or Punjabi, the language of 44.15 per cent Pakistanis? Or Sindhi, the language of 14.10 per cent people but, in addition to that, a language used in the education system, media, administration and judiciary in Sindh? Or Pashto, a very important language spoken by 15.42 per cent people

and also used in Afghanistan? These are important questions which can only be answered in the light of our values. That is why those with different values will have different answers.

This paper is on efforts at localization in Pakistan till date. This is an introspective, analytical but largely normative essay on future localization efforts in Pakistan This piece of writing, informed as it is with my personal values, can hardly be called a product of research and I do not expect much agreement with it. It is being presented here as the starting point of a debate and not as the only correct solution. Localization in Urdu

Localization, or technical localization, is merely the translation of programmes originally written in English into other languages. In Pakistan, for instance, programmes have been developed in order to use Urdu in place of English in Windows. The history of the creation of Urdu software is inspiring because it was initially seen as an exercise in misplaced nationalistic zeal---Urdu being the national language.

Urdu letters do not follow each other without changing shape. They adopt several shapes depending whether they are in the word-initial, medial or terminal positions. Moreover they do not begin at the same height. Their height (*Kursi*) varies according to the word they are used in. Thus the computer had to be fed, as in logoraphic systems, with ligatures giving different combinations of betters. Such a programme, not being alphabetical, occupied much space. The first such system was developed by Ahmed Mirza Jameel, proprietor of the Elite Publishers (Karachi).

He saw the Chinese characters being typeset in Singapore in 1979 and got the idea of using this kind of system for Urdu. He spoke to the sales manager of the firm in Singapore and the firm agreed to create a specimen of Urdu which was exhibited in July 1980 in Birmingham. The work of selecting the corpus was accomplished by Matlub ul Hasan Sayyid while their ligatures were determined by Ahmed Mirza Jameel. In six months he created 16,000 ligatures which could create 250,000 words of Urdu.

This was called Nuri Nastaliq and was exhibited in Urdu Science College in August 1980. It was adopted by the Jang Group of newspapers which started publishing their newspapers in it. It was also enthusiastically welcomed by Dr Ishtiaq Hussian Qureshi, Chairman of the Muqtadra, in 1980 (Jameel 2002: 8).

Later a number of softwares---*Shahkar, Surkhab, Nastaliq Nizami* were created. The last mentioned was created by the Pakistan Data Management Services (PDMS) Karachi, established

in Karachi in 1978, and it was installed by the National Language Authority (Maqtadra Qaumi Zaban)---an institution specifically meant for promoting the use of Urdu in Pakistan---in 1995. The PDMS has also created *Mahir* software which works with the latest version of Windows and processes both Urdu and Sindhi (Hisam 2002).

The second wave of development came in 1998 when FAST, a private university excelling in computer studies in Lahore, organized the National Urdu Computer Seminar on 12 September 1998 in which it was resolved that the Urdu code plate would be standardized (Muqtadra 2002a: 87). The representatives of the Muqtadra were Aqeel Abbas Jafri and Dr. Atash Durrani. The Unicode is basically for the Arabic script *naskh* which, according to all researchers, needs less positions than the *nastaliq* script in which Urdu is written. Atash Durrani became the incharge of this section and, according to him, exhibited the first code plate based on the American Standard Code International on 05 June 1999 at the Pakistan Science Academy in Islamabad (see *Muqtadra* 2002: 87). Dr. Sarmad Hussain, a prominent computational linguist from FAST, carried out linguistic research which fed into the resolution of technical issues. Dr. Mohammad Afzal, also present at the historic 1998 seminar, later developed a programme which was supported by Dr. Atta ur Rahman, Minister of Science and Technology, in General Pervez Musharraf's government from 1999-2002 (Afzal 2002). This programme was the URLSDF (Urdu and Regional Languages Software Development Forum) which standardized the keyboard and an encoding scheme by 2001. The Internationalization Standardization Organization (ISO) accepted the standards and added them to the Unicode in March 2002. According to Dr. Atash Durrani, he met Ahmed Abdullah incharge of Microsoft Dubai office, in software competition (ITCN Asia 2000 Exhibition) in March 2000 in Karachi (Also see Muqtadra 2002: 90-92). He persuaded Abdullah to include changes for Urdu in Unicode-4 (2003).

Later the Centre of Research in Urdu Language (CRULP) at FAST, headed by Sarmad Hussain, created the *Nafees Nastaliq* which was released on 14 August 2003. It enables one to make free websites in Urdu *Nastaliq* using Unicode Standard. Sarmad Hussain's team has also developed the *Nafees Pakistani Naskh* which allows one to write Sindhi and Pashto. Siraiki, Punjabi, and Balochi can be written in both the scripts so that there is no major Pakistani language which cannot now be written (Hussain 2004).

> Dr. Sarmad and his students' research on Urdu---see Muqtadra 2002a and 2003---has provided insights into the processing and use of Urdu for computerization. A number of

other people, such as Tahir Mufti, have also contributed in this development (see Muqtadra 2002). Computer-assisted translation from English to Urdu has been made possible by several people including Tafseer Ahmed (Ahmed 2002). The Government of Pakistan has now launched the Urdu localization project. The internet will be displayed in Urdu; English to Urdu translation will be carried out and speech recognition an processing in Urdu will also be possible. This project, also being carried out by Sarmad Hussain at CRULP, should be completed by June 2006.

The Muqtadra, headed by Professor Fateh Mohammad Malik, became very active in localization in Urdu (*Muqtadra* 2002: 87). At present this section is being supervised by Aqeel Abbas Jafri who has much expertise in using Urdu in the computer. Standards for e-mail and other procedures were established over the years and Urdu can now be processed conveniently. The new identity cards made by the Government of Pakistan are now made by computer programmes functioning in Urdu. In December 1999 a new keyboard, compatible with the Urdu programmes, was also developed.

. Urdu websites are available (Jafri 2002), though the official website of Pakistan is in English. Softwares to process Sindhi are being used but there is little development in Punjabi, Pashto, Balochi and other languages. This, however, is now technically possible as these languages are all written in variants of the *naskh* and the *nastaliq* scripts. However, to create programmes in all languages of Pakistan a new policy of localization would be required. It is to this that we turn now.

Section-3

4. The Desiderated Paradigmatic Shift in the policy for Localization

Pakistan should not rest content with localization in Urdu alone. We should go in for what Kenneth Keniston, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Human Development at MIT and one who has written on localization and its relation to language and culture, calls ‘cultural localization’. In this ‘software written in one culture is adopted to the needs and outlooks of another’ (Keniston 1997: 1). This is important because some assumptions and values do always go in the creation of computer programmes. Erran Carmel, a writer on software development, argues that most of those who work on software development belong to the ‘hacker’ sub-culture. The ‘hackers’ are rebellious, anti-authoritarian, highly individualistic and talented people who detest tradition, hierarchy and family values. Accordingly, programmes they make reflect a high

degree of individualism, irreverence, informality and egalitarianism. (Carmel 1996). These values are often resisted by other societies and Keniston has given many examples of this resistance from all over the world.

In Pakistan, although only one concern has been expressed---the easy availability of pornography on the internet---there are other issues also. The internet promotes a culture of pseudo-egalitarianism and informality which actually breaks established norms of politeness in Pakistani society. First, there is the implied atmosphere of irreverence for titles, spellings and naming patterns in the way e-mail addresses are made, chatting is conducted and messages are sent. For instance, although Pakistani norms of politeness insist on the use of titles or honorifics with the name, the internet promotes just the opposite as the norm. This is already being done from a position of power by a small highly westernized elite which promotes forms of address which are against Pakistani norms of politeness (Rahman 1999: Chapter 10). The internet also promotes the same values and, since it appears modern, it impresses its users to condemn traditional forms of behaviour.

The internet also promotes the use of contractions which, in a country where only a very tiny elite knows the standard British or American spellings, makes young people regard the standard as nothing but old fashioned legacies of the older generation. Then, because most programmes are American, the computer-literate young people tend to be excessively impressed by American values such as individualism, capitalism, market economy and the fragmentation of relationships. This creates the kind of reaction which Benjamin Barber mentions in *Jihad versus Mc World* (1995). In Pakistan this reaction takes the form of Islamist revivalism---as that term is defined by Qasim Zaman (2002)---which make young people educated in secular institutions reject modernist values while aspiring to change the world through modern technology. This means that the Islamists emphasize the use of the computer though they reject and resist the values and discourses of the world which created it. Indeed, knowing what a power-giving device it is, they use it quite as much as the Americanized section of the society. Thus, quite literally at times, the reaction of those who are appalled and dismayed by the American fashions and values displayed by the affluent young, becomes the response of *jihad*.

In short, if true cultural localization takes place some of these objections can be met. However, one problem can never be overcome. It is that computers create the illusion of speed and power. They are like magic. They give the illusion of immense power and breathtaking

speed at the tips of one's fingers. This creates a kind of 'hacker' culture among the digerati in Pakistan. They become impatient with all the processes of creating knowledge, beauty and relationships which traditional methods entailed. This visibly increases the gap between the older and the younger generation and increases the tendency to scoff at slow arts like writing letters. Whether it will decrease the capacity to read, write and create art---all slow processes—cannot be determined at this stage. But the fact remains that a fundamental change has occurred in the perception of knowledge in Pakistan.

Whereas traditionally knowledge was seen as part of civilized behaviour, it is now seen as information and skill. Whereas it was necessary for a learned, or even an ordinarily educated, man to know some history and literature---quoting or at least appreciating the masters of Urdu and Persian poetry was considered necessary fifty years ago---it is no longer necessary. Indeed, the digerati place a higher value on skills---computer skills, skills of persuasion, advocacy, 'selling' etc---than on facts, analysis, literary and artistic appreciation and so on.

It is not true to say that people were fond of reading books in the past and now they are not. What may be true is that the computer takes away the time of the intellectually curious in such a way that they read less books than they would have had it not been there. However, this assertion has not been tested in any manner and may be taken as the subjective opinion of the present author.

Whatever the problems associated with the computer, it is necessary to use it in Pakistan. So far the basis for its use is elitist power. It is proposed that the new basis should be peoples' power. This needs explanation.

Power is that which creates the possibility of obtaining tangible or intangible gratification (Rahman 1996: 8). Tangible gratifications are consumer and producer goods; intangible ones are prestige, popularity, the dissemination of ones' ideas, control over others etc. When computer programmes are in English they increase the power of the elite. They also save money which, again, strengthens the ruling elite as it invests this money in other power projects such as strengthening the armed forces, the bureaucracy and so on. It also strengthens the power of the elite of the Centre---America and the West are the 'Centre' in this case and Pakistan the periphery---which exports copyright computer programmes, disseminates its language and cultural values and control all matters to do with the computerization of a society. In short, the use of English in the computers is an elitist project in Pakistan.

Localization in Urdu is a step forward towards increasing the power base of the people. Initially, however, the investment will not appear to be cost-effective in terms of pecuniary calculations. At the moment the people who are spearheading the localization programmes in Urdu in Pakistan use English also. However, if the government actually starts using computers in Urdu-medium schools, it can really benefit a very large number of people. In these schools neither students nor teachers know enough Urdu to use the computer even if it is provided to them.

The next step should be localization in the other major languages of Pakistan. This will appear as a waste of money to begin with. After all, anyone who is literate can operate in Urdu in Pakistan though not in English. The rationale for this proposal is psychological and cultural more than pecuniary or practical. Culturally appropriate computer programmes in the indigenous languages of Pakistan will support and strengthen these languages. They will bring them more prestige and may, perhaps, encourage people to feel that they too can be used in modern domains.

The major Pakistani languages are too large to be endangered. However, they need to be given more prestige to take their rightful role in the domains of power. It may, therefore, be pertinent to repeat the six factors outlined by David Crystal for the endangered languages. These are:

1. An endangered language will progress if its speakers increase their prestige within the dominant community.
2. An endangered language will progress if its speakers increase their wealth relative to the dominant community.
3. An endangered language will progress if its speakers increase their legitimate power in the eyes of the dominant community.
4. An endangered language will progress if its speakers have a strong presence in the educational system.
5. An endangered language will progress if its speakers can write their language down.
6. An endangered language will progress if its speakers can make use of electronic technology (Crystal 2000: Chapter 5).

The last is especially relevant in the context of localization which we have been describing.

Although the candidates for localization, after Urdu, should be the major languages of Pakistan (Greater Punjabi [i.e. Siraiki, Hindko etc], Pashto, Sindhi, Balochi and Brahvi). However, it is the smaller languages, the ones which may be endangered, which will benefit much from localization. Besides making them more prestigious and enabling people to interact with them, one can think of practical situations in which e-mail, information CDs and web pages in minor languages in far flung areas may be useful.

Case-1: The Fishermen of Balochistan and Sindh

These fishermen living on the coastal lines of Pakistan often venture out when storms and tidal waves are expected. They also become prisoners of India when they stray in Indian waters. If computers are installed in the village schools, post offices and other public places they can be warned of a coming natural disaster. They can also be educated about straying into alien waters and, should they do so, what procedure they should adopt. In this case, the additional benefit can be that the school children, who read the e-mails in their own language and pass on the message to the fishermen, will develop a positive feeling for their language.

Case-2 Medical Help in Far flung areas

Supplementing the radio and T.V, the computer can also be used to give information about basic health issues in far-flung areas especially those which become snowbound during the winter. This information, in the local languages, should be on CDs and also on the web pages. As in Case-1, the computers should be located in prominent public places in villages and small towns.

Case-3 Advocacy Through the Computer

People can be made aware of women's rights, children's rights, AIDS, family planning in their local languages through the computer. The novelty of using their own language through this new technology, the computer, will tend to disseminate these new ideas and make them more pervasive than they are at present.

Case-4 Literacy for Children and Adults

Lessons in the local language as a bridge to the link language (which may be Urdu) may be given in attractive computer games which may be used for children in the morning and adults

in the evening. This will make children acquainted with their own languages before moving on to other languages.

In short, Pakistan needs a localization policy but it should be a policy which empowers the common people rather than the elite or the multi-national corporations. Such a policy will also serve to raise the prestige of the indigenous languages of the country and save them from being further marginalized in this age of computerization and globalization.

5. Conclusion

Pakistan's language policy has so far been in the interest of the elite. It has strengthened the English-using elite's hold over the most powerful and lucrative jobs in the state and the private sector. The policy of favouring Urdu has made ethnic groups express ethnicity in terms of opposition or resistance to Urdu. The policy of localization should not follow these lines. It should empower the masses rather than the elite. Although localization has begun in Urdu and Sindhi it should now be extended to the other languages of Pakistan. This will not be immediately cost-effective in pecuniary terms but it will be psychologically supportive of the identity and languages of the common people who will be able to preserve the positive aspects of their culture while undergoing modernization.

SECTION - 2

IDENTITY

This section has three chapters. The first deals with the way identity has been constructed among the Muslims of north India and Pakistan in modern times with reference to language politics, gender, class and religion. It tells us how modernity creates conditions in which, while older constructions of identity are transcended, new ones are created. The modern state, for instance, gives admissions in educational institutions and then jobs on the basis of paper qualifications obtained from there on the basis of certain categories of identity: Hindu, Muslim, urban, rural, backward, developed, Sindhi, Punjabi etc. Thus modern understandings of identity are produced and sometimes, a group is mobilized with reference to identity symbols when it perceives it is being denied its due share of power and resources. This, however, is the theme of my book-length study, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (1996) so it is given in a synoptic form here along with some new observations. The connection of identity with gender, class and religion is more original, at least as far as my work is concerned. Such themes more research as far as the Muslims of north India and Pakistan are concerned though, of course, they have been dealt with in other contexts before.

The chapter on the way the American (and to a lesser accent British) accent is adopted to hide the Pakistani identity of the workers of call centres in Pakistan is perhaps the only article which is sociological rather than historical. This, again, is a subject which has not been studied with reference to the call centres of this country though studies on the call centres of other countries, including India, are in abundance. The most interesting aspect of this study is that it adds to our understanding of what sociologists call ‘passing’ and which has been studied with reference to gender (passing for women by men and vice versa), race and ethnicity etc. Here the Pakistani workers of the call centres try to ‘pass’ for Americans or British and use accent for doing so.

Yet another aspect of identity is that it is constructed both by the actors and the audience i.e those who witness the actions and are recipients of the discourses created by the actors. For instance, the Bengalis constructed their identity around the major symbol of language (Bengali) while the West Pakistanis, fed with anti-Bengali state-inspired propaganda, created an identity based on notions of nationalism and its betrayal for them. Thus, they were labeled either as dupes of anti-state agents or being anti-Pakistan, anti-Islam and communists themselves. With the

exception of some, generally pro-ethnic political parties and dissident individuals, most Pakistanis imagined pro-Language movement Bengalis in these negative terms. This chapter looks at these West Pakistani perceptions of the Bengali language movement.

All three chapters focus upon different aspects of identity construction. However, as mentioned earlier, identity is a pervasive theme and impacts other sections also.

5

LANGUAGE, MODERNITY AND IDENTITY

Introduction

Language does not only reflect social reality; it also constructs it. It not only conveys ideas in the mind but also reinforces some ideas while attenuating others; plays up some while marginalizing others. In short, the relationship between mental reality and language is complex and cyclical and not transparent and linear. All political uses of language, whether undertaken by the state or some other group, depend upon the constructive potential of language. The idea is to use words to construct a certain type of social reality whether it pertains to class, gender, significant group, a favoured narrative, perceptions or values.

Modernity has had significant and far-reaching consequences on the relationship between language and identity. It has created new identities and marginalized, or erased, old ones. This process is part of social change anyway but the last two hundred years have increased the momentum of the change so much that they need special attention to understand them.

This article is one such attempt. It looks at the way language constructs, or mediates, new identities with respect to four dimensions: politics, gender, class and religion. My argument is that modernity, being a colonial product, has had an effect of creating identities with reference to Western categories. While this has had great success in the political field it has had less success with reference to the other three dimensions where the older, pre-modern identities lurk just below the surface even if the vocabulary to describe them may have changed. In this context the role of the Pakistani state is touched upon, especially because it is conflicted: on the one hand there is the desiderated modernism of the nation-state with all identity labels except ‘Pakistani’ being discouraged. But on the other there is implicit or active encouragement of forces which would define religious identities in sub-sectarian, conflictual, terms and play down upon the modern state’s definition of an equal citizen emphasizing the pre-modern baggage of essentialized inequality in both gender and class terms

In short, the state (with focus on the Pakistani state) tries to create modern identities in conformity with its major aim to consolidate itself as a nation-state. In doing so it suppresses ethnic, class and certain forms of religious identity. It also modifies gender identity in conformity with certain Victorian, colonialist, reformist perceptions about gender roles. However, the

nationalistic enterprise is driven by two discrepant discourses: modernity and sacralization. The first is to modernize the society so as to construct an empowered nation-state. The second is to legitimize the rule of an elite, as well as the whole project of creating a nation, with appeal to Islam. Language plays a role in both these discourses of the use of power. This role is the subject of our study in this paper.

The Construction of Identity

The Nationalist Identity

To understand the role of language in the modern state let us begin with the concept of language planning (LP). Language planning efforts are efforts at social engineering. Thus all kinds of LP—status planning, corpus planning, acquisition planning—have political aims among others. The status of a language (will it be a national language? an official one? etc) is decided by the ruling elite in its perceived interest; questions of what script to write it in, what words to use, what new terms to devise refer to questions of identity (corpus); and planning to spread the use of a language (acquisition) through the educational system and the media also refers to the perceived interests of the elite (Cooper 1989: 31-33). In short, if we want to understand the construction of social reality then we must take into account why a certain construction is favoured by an interest group which can manipulate language through LP.

Pre-modern India did not have the concept of a nation. It is after contact with the British that it was imported into Indian discourses. Thus, Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1899) uses the word '*qaum*' for all Indians and then, when the Muslims drifted apart from the Hindus, for only Indian Muslims. But '*qaum*' was, and even now is, used by ordinary people for extended class or fraternity (*biradari*). Thus the Pashto-speaking people were described as belonging to the Afghan '*qaum*' in India. Similarly, one could describe one's '*qaum*' as *arain*. Even occupational castes, like weaver (*juluha*) or barber (*nai*), were described as '*qaum*'. In short, what the nineteenth century Indian reformers did was to subsume a society fragmented along ethnic, occupational and class lines into a modern, basically Western, identity label: nation (*qaum*). They created the illusion of unity. They constructed a would-be nation, much in the way described by Benedict Anderson (1983), out of groups which did not see themselves as a nation in the Western sense of the term at all.

The modern Pakistani state inherited the vocabulary of modern nationhood and hastened to provide symbols of unity—the flag, the language, the historical narrative, the census and the

map. The museum—one of the symbols described by Anderson (1983: 163-185)—was a bit problematic because the past the state chose to display was Muslim but the relics the museum possessed went back to the Hindu, Buddhist and even earlier periods. For that matter there was a problem with the historical narrative also because it did not bear out the two-nation theory in its entirety and as neatly as the state bureaucracy wished. However, history can be manipulated and so it was in both Pakistan and India (Kumar 2001; Aziz 1993; Saigol 2000).

The real problem was language because the symbol of the Muslim '*qaum*' in British India was Urdu. It was claimed as the national language of all Muslims. Yet, the language of most Pakistanis was not Urdu as the following figures show:

LANGUAGE-SPEAKERS IN 1951	
Language	Percentage of speakers
Bengali	55.6 Per cent
Punjabi	29.0 Per cent
* Urdu	7.3 Per cent
Sindhi	5.9 Per cent
Pashto	4.9 Per cent
Balochi	1.5 Per cent
* Mother-tongue speakers only. Out of these 1.1 per cent of the population lived in East Bengal.	
Source: Census 1951: Table 7 A speech	

Urdu was, indeed, the second language of the urban areas of West Pakistan, but was used only by the Urdu-speakers (Biharis) and the religious establishment in East Bengal who constituted 1.1 per cent of the population of that province as given above.

The ruling Muslim League ignored these divisive facts to construct a unified Pakistani nationalist identity based around the symbols of Islam and Urdu. The attempt backfired most conspicuously in East Pakistan where an anti-West Pakistan resistance movement used language to deconstruct the imposed nationalistic identity. This, in essence, was the Bengali language

movement which started in 1948 and culminated in bloodshed on the streets of Dhaka in 1952 (Umar 2004: 190-229). In short, the Bengali elite countered the status planning of the West Pakistani ruling elite by its own status planning. And in 1955 it got Bengali recognized as the second national language of Pakistan. It also countered the ruling elites' efforts at corpus planning i.e. writing Bengali in the script of Urdu and adding more Urdu and Persian words in it (Rahman 1996: 88-90). But the basic imbalance between the East and the West, being economic and political, did not change and Bengali ethnicity changed into separatist nationalism culminating in the creation of East Pakistan in 1971.

The Pakistani ruling elite, which is predominantly Punjabi, retained the vision of the united, monolithic, seamless nation-state despite the concession of a second national language to the Bengalis. Thus the only language with the status of a national language after 1971 remained Urdu. The Pakistani nationalist identity was constructed once again at the cost of suppressing regional and group (ethnic) identities in the country. In response to this, ethnicity and resistance to the Centre were expressed with reference to linguistic symbols (Rahman 1996). While the central bureaucracy constructed new words (neologism) with Arabic and Persian roots to reinforce the Islamic identity of the nation, the ethnic language planners used words of their ancestral languages for the same to reinforce their indigenous, ethnic identities (Rahman 1999: 272-288). What is at the heart of the matter is the construction of the national identity. The Pakistani state sees it in the Western nation-state tradition with emphasis on unitary symbols. This involves denying or paying only lip service to pluralist realities with corresponding emphases on pluralistic symbols. If the state really embraces a truly pluralistic model it will call itself multi-ethnic and multi-lingual and, therefore, value diversity. This would bring about corresponding changes in the language used for talking about, and constructing, nationalism.

2. Language and Gender Identity

Modern scholarship has pointed out that biological sex is not the same as gender. Gender is acted out in terms of context-dependent roles, seen as feminine or masculine or in-between, and not fixed sets of biological traits and anatomical characteristics of individuals. Ideas of what is male and female varies over time and space. Thus, gender roles are socially determined and, therefore, capable of changing (Wodak 1997, Talbot 1998).

The Pakistani state has favoured constructions of gender which favour male dominance. This domination is pre-modern and both feudal and tribal. It is codified in the language as well as

other cultural institutions. The state, in consonance with its modern image, uses the discourse of legal equality of men and women but does little to combat the social inequality which exists in Pakistani society.

For one thing, all Pakistani languages, as well as the English used in Pakistan (for a description see Rahman 1990), is sexist. This means that these languages use words, expressions, ways of referring to people in such a manner that they discriminate 'within a social system on the basis of sexual membership' (Wodak 1997: 7).

Areas of bias in Urdu and Pakistani English include the following.

LINGUISTIC DEVICES FOR DIMINISHING THE FEMALE	
Sex specification	The outdated 'authoress', 'poetess' and even 'teacheress' is used sometimes
Gratuitous modifiers	These diminish prestige and draw attention to sex (Miller and Swift 1981)—lady doctor, *doctarni*, Dr. Miss XYZ.
Lexical gap or under-lexicalization	No or very few female equivalents of certain words: *mardangi* (manliness) used for courage and uprightness; *tharak* (lighthearted sexual teasing with connotations of being enterprising enough to take advantage of others) which is used for males but not females for whom *besharmi, behyai* (shamelessness) *beizzati* (dishonourable conduct) are used for corresponding behaviour.
Semantic derogation	More negative terms for women than for men, particularly pertaining to sexual behaviour or desirability. *Garam* (hot=lascivious); *kutti* (bitch); *Chalti* (running=promiscuous); *gashti* (one who walks=prostitute); *Kanjri* (prostitute); taxi (prostitute); *tota* (piece= desirable female).
Assymetrically gendered language items	Single words used to describe women, for which there is no equivalent for men, and vice versa. *Dai* (nurse); *kutni* (spy who finds matches but more often creates ill will among families); *mashuq* (beloved. Can be used for both male and female but is stigmatized for the female much more than for the male).
Connotations of language items	Such as 'girl' which sometimes indicates immaturity, dependence and triviality e.g. salesgirl. In Pakistan the male counterpart is called salesman.
[Adapted from Litosseliti 2006: 14-15.	

The male forms are coded as the norm in all Pakistani languages while women are marked as the 'other' and understood to be inferior. In English andocentric generics—man, mankind, he, him for all humans—are resisted by feminists who claim they make women invisible, promote male imagery and perpetuate male dominance (Litosseliti 2006: 28-45). In Pakistan the idea of such resistance is either unheard of or not taken seriously.

Andocentric generics are used in Pakistani languages both in nouns and verbs. Pronouns in Urdu, however, are not gendered.

EXAMPLE – 1 **ANDOCENTRIC GENERICS IN URDU**		
Example:	(1.1)	*Banda Kya kare*? What can a human (masculine form) do?
	(1.2)	*Insan kya kare*? What can a person do? (Neutral form)
Example	(2.1)	*Insan kya kare ga*? What can a person do (verb has a masculine declension).
	(2.2)	*Larki kya kare gi*? What can a girl do (verb feminine).

In other words, even *insan* (person), is construed as being masculine. The other word for a human, *banda*, is also construed as male. Thus, the generic term for human in Urdu is male. This is true for Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashto and the other Pakistani languages known to this author.

Moreover, people with authority are gendered male in Urdu. Among these are *nawab* (lord); *afsar* (from officer); s*ubedar* (governor of a province); *hakim* (physician); *alim* (religious scholar); *maulana/maulvi/mulla* (Islamic clergyman); *numberdar* (village headman) etc. even if a female version exists, as in the case of *mullani*, it refers to the wife of the *mulla* and carries no authority in its own right. For female rulers, like the Begums of Bhopal, the male title *nawab* was used in addition to the female form *begum*. Terms borrowed from English, such as doctor, are feminized as *doctorni* but this carries less prestige than 'doctor' and also 'lady doctor'. And even with many female officers, parliamentarians, ministers, advisers and judges in contemporary Pakistan—Benazir Bhutto was prime minister twice and the governor of the State Bank is a woman nowadays—the image which goes with these positions of power is that of a male. The language codes the male as the norm as the female case is treated as aberrant unless there are other linguistic clues to disambiguate the reference.

Being perceived as female signals sexuality. Pakistani languages, therefore, masculinize women—render them as honorary males—in order to show respect to them. Thus in Punjabi and Punjabized Urdu the male inflection of the verb is used for females one respects.

EXAMPLE - 2 **SHOWING RESPECT IN PUNJABI**	
(1)	*Tusi ae so*
	You (m) have come (m)
(2)	*Tusi baethe so*
	You (polite form) were sitting (male form)

The male pronoun, used for females, is a politeness marker (Rahman 1999: 179). This is like referring to powerful women, such as rulers, as Sultan and Nawab, their corresponding male titles, rather than the female equivalents of *Sultana* and *Begum*. Through it the speaker signals that he does not perceive the female referent as a possible sexual object or is conscious of their power just as he would be of men in such a position. In this context Fatima Mernissi (1990) points out that the entrance of women in domains of power, especially the caliphate which combined secular with spiritual power, was seen as problematic by Muslim philosophers. She begins by asking 'how does one say queen in Islam?' and clarifies that 'no woman has ever borne the title of caliph or imam in the current meaning of the word, that is, someone who leads the prayers in the mosque for everyone, men and women.' (Mernissi 1990: 1). However, words like *malika*, *al-hurra* (free woman), *sultana* and *khatun*, among others, have been used by Muslim societies for women in powerful political positions. Still, there is an uneasiness in using any female equivalent for the position of caliph which combines worldly with spiritual authority, which is greater in theory than and other, with political power.

It is also polite not to notice women—the opposite is ogling which is impolite—and the language has devices for this purpose. While older women, such as grandmother, mothers and aunts, are referred to by kinship terms with the suffix *ji* attached for respect, younger ones are not referred to directly.

The following circumlocutions may be used for them.

Relation	Word in Urdu	Word used

Sister	*Bahen*	*Hamsheera* (Persian for sister) Sister
Wife	*Bivi*	*Ghar vale, Ahl-e-Khana, androone-e-Khana* (the people of the house, those who one inside the house) Family Wife Mrs Begum
Daughter	*Beti*	*Bacchi* (little girl) but *beti* is also used.
Woman of same generation	Nil	*Bhabi* (brother's wife); *bahen*
Woman of Younger generation	Nil	*Beti*; *bacchi*
Women	*Aurten*	*Khawateen* (polite form); ladies (even a single woman is called 'ladies' by less educated people).

Punjabi also has circumlocutions about wife such as *kar vale* (people of the houses) and *bacche* (children). Pakistani English, as used by ordinary people, sometimes uses 'family' for wife (Rahman 1990).

All these circumlocutions are linguistic symbols connoting the desexualization of females connected with one's family, the family of one's friends or those one respects. By using them one distances oneself from the female by giving her a kinship relationship which precludes sex; the use of a foreign language; the use of terms connected with a place (house) rather than the female herself; evasion; and the denial of the grown-up status of the female (children).

Urdu literature constructs the female in terms of sexuality to the exclusion of other dimensions. This construction is done by male poets for the most part and mostly ignores the genderlect or women's language (WL). However, there is a genre of Urdu poetry called *rekhti* which purports to be in WL. This, however, is the language of the brothel i.e of prostitutes and sexually promiscuous women. This, at least, is the claim of Sa'adat Yar Khan Rangin (1755-1835) who claims to have collected specimens of such genderlect (WL) in order to use them in his *rekhti* verse (Rangin n.d).

Rekhti does have a number of words peculiar to the women of the nineteenth century in Lucknow and possibly other urban centres of North India but its whole purpose in to mock women not to represent them. As such the claim by some modern critics that the *rekhti* enables women to voice their sexuality, especially same-sex love (Vanita 2004), is basically flawed. It

represents the voice of the overconfident, insensitive, macho man constructing women as lustful, ridiculous, fatuous, aggressive and trivial.

Pakistani women do not use the words used either by *rekhti* women or the ladies who used *begmati zaban* whom Gale Minault (1998:69 and 1984) has written about. They do use expressions like *'hae!, 'uf!', 'hae Allah!', 'uf Allah*' and *'hae maen mer gayi*' (oh! I am dead!) even now. They differentiate the sexes and reinforce the view that their expected social roles are different. WL also signals emotional instability, lack of responsibility and lack of courage. Effeminate men, such as eunuchs (*hijras*), also use the same language for the same purpose (Rahman 1999: 176).

The Pakistani state has no stated policy on language and gender. Conventional gendering is related to class and Westernization. The media shows women from the lower classes using WL, as do *hijras* with even more exaggeration, but as one moves up the social (and linguistic) hierarchy the WL tends to disappear. Thus upper class women, especially those of the younger generation, speaking English and even Urdu, do not use WL or very little of it (maybe a '*hae*' thrown in once or twice).

The textbooks, media presentations and symbolic displays created or supported by the state do not specifically support WL. However, they do support the conventional gender roles which created it in the first instance. On the whole, because the education system tends to replace non-standard forms of speech by standardized ones, the tendency is to phase out WL just as the Muslim reformers phased out the *begmati zuban* in their quest for standardization of Urdu (Minault 1998: 69).

Another interesting consequence of the state's adoption of Western categories of gender classification was the abolition of the category of the sexually desirable adolescent boy (*amrad*). This category was borrowed from medieval Persian where the gender classification was as follows:

Category	Term	Sexual role
Man	*Mard*	Penetration of the bodies of the categories below
Woman	*Zan*	Being penetrated
Boy	*Amrad*	Being penetrated till obtaining adulthood/also penetrating females and other boys.
Eunuch	*Mukhannas/zankha/hijra/ uncategorized*	Being penetrated even in adulthood.

Persian as well as Turkish literature and culture recognize the beautiful adolescent (*amrad*) as a district gender role (for Iran see Najmabadi 2005; for Turkey see Andrews and Kalpakh 2005). Urdu literature makes much the same distinctions till the coming of modernity created culture shame about the phenomenon of boy-love—which I call ephebophilia elsewhere (Rahman 1988:126-141)—and it was abolished. This also occurred in Iran where the category of *amrad* disappeared (Najmabadi 2005: 232-244). In short, the possibility of expression one kind of sexual preference, which was neither considered abnormal nor deviant, was taken away with the loss of these pre-modern categories.

Moreover, the state tacitly supports notions of disgrace, loss of honour and shame upheld by the male-dominating tribal and feudal culture in which women were the possessions of men whose penetration by other males outside marriage was the ultimate loss of face for their male family members. Similarly, taking the passive role in sex by males, especially grown men, was loss of honour since it compromised the conventional manhood which was valued in such a macho society .Terms referring to such males are invectives. As in the case of promiscuous women, they reduce the whole personality of a person to his sexual role: *gandu* (arse-lender) or *kuni* in Pashto. For women *kari* (black), in Sindhi, means not only promiscuous but also liable to be killed for preserving male honour. The Religious preachers, though not officially subscribing to notions of honour and macho identity, nevertheless saw all sex in terms of permissibility: whether permitted by the *Shari'a* or not. But, in private, they too veered to the denigration of the woman, the *hijra* or anyone who is seen as being the recipient of the penis.. Hence age old ideas won fresh and continuing support from both the common interpretations of religion as well as the state's indifference towards applying notions of legal equality in so far as sexual conduct was concerned.

To sum up, modernity, and the Pakistani state, recognize only male/female closing their eyes to the present of transvestites, hermaphrodites, *hijras*, boys willing to take a female role in sexual relations and in-between categories whether situational, transient or stable. Thus, by suppressing medieval gender roles which made presently tabooed sexual desires explicit, the state reinforces the modern, Western binary gender identities of male/female with nothing in between. But, while it does that, it also allows some of the male-dominating notions of honour

stigmatize and even endanger the lives of women whose sexual roles are either heterodox or perceived as being permissive.

(3) **Class Identity**

Pre-modern India was a highly class-conscious, deeply polarized society. The Hindus had their caste system but the Muslims, with the exception of some tribal societies like that of the Pashto-speakers, too were divided according to socio-economic class, occupation and ethnic origin. The lower classes were called the *ajlaf*—in Punjab the *kammis* (*Kameen*)—while the upper ones were the *ashraf.* The *ajlaf* were generally indigenous converts from Hinduism while the *ashraf* claimed foreign, warrior-class, ancestry. However, those who were regarded as higher in the social order, such as the Rajputs, retained their high rank in the social hierarchy even after conversion to Islam. The *ajlaf* did working-class jobs. They were peasants, weavers (*julaha), potters (kumhar), barbers* (*nai*), butchers (*qasai*), dealers in oil (*teli*), scavengers (*bhangi*) etc etc. The *ashraf* were state officials, military officers, scholars, judges, teachers, clerks and ordinary leaders of prayers (*mullas*). The business and financial classes fell into both the classes with the costermonger on the street falling into the *ajlaf* and the great tycoon (*seth*) being part of the upper *ashraf* class. However, honour was not directly proportional to wealth as the landed aristocracy, even if impoverished, was considered more prestigious than rich businessmen.

Modernity made two transformations in the way identity labels were constructed: first, it denigrated, suppressed or marginalized indigenous labels; second, it introduced the idea of equality before the law which undermined the elaborate structure of class.

Let us take the first effect which was part of the second phase, the Anglicist and racist one, of British conquest. This process started by the 1920's but after 1857 it became the established ideology of the British as William Darlymple (2002; 2006), among others have shown. Thus military ranks, political ranks, teachers's titles, physician's titles were all degraded. The Indian *subedar* (governor) was nothing more exalted than a Viceroy's Commissioned officer. The *risaldar*, commander of a troop, had the same status. Police ranks such as '*Kotwal*' were junior functionaries in that department. The '*hakim*' and '*vaed*' were inferior to the 'doctor'. As for the teacher, local nomenclature, which referred to their ethnic or ancestral occupational identity (caste), were replaced by the ubiquitous 'master'. In 1850-51 the British found the following honorifics for the village school teacher:

TITLES OF SCHOOL TEACHERS DURING THE 1850S IN

THE PRESENT DAY UTTAR PRADESH	
Hindus	Muslims
Lalaji (Baniya or Kaesth)	*Mianji*
Nai Pandhe (barber teacher)	*Mullahji*
Panditji	*Munshiji*
Guruji	*Sheikh Sahib (Sunni)*
Maharajji	*Mir Sahib (Shia)*
Bajpeiji	*Mirza Sahib (Mughal)*
Parohatji	*Khan Sahib (Pathan)*
Daoji	*Kazi Sahib*
Reid 1852: 81-82	

In time these were replaced by the English 'master' or master sahib and *masterji*. Also the term '*ustad*' and its deferential variants such as *ustad sahib* and *ustadji* also came to be used especially in Muslim cultures. Teachers in higher institutions of learning came to called lecturers, readers and professors. However, 'professor' lost its prestige because it came to be appropriated by college lecturers, astrologers and high school teachers. The *madrassa* titles such as *Sheikh-ul-hadith* for professor of *hadith* studies were completely forgotten and are not known outside the *madrassa* nowadays.

The second idea, that of equality before the law, came slowly by the early twentieth century. By the time the Pakistani state came into being 'all citizens were equal'—at least officially. In keeping with this political philosophy, a new vocabulary was created. Now, at least in the more modern urban areas, class distinctions tend to be expressed through circumlocutions. These are as follows:

Term used	**Meaning**	**Implications**
Parhe likhe log	Educated people	Urban, professional middle class and above
Accha khandan	Good family	Wealthy people
Sharif log	Decent people	Upper and middle-class people
Peeche se raees	Rich since many generations	Wealthy--most probably from income from land.
Khate peete	Those who have enough to eat and drink	Affluent

Accha family background	Good family background	Upper and middle-class
Khandani log	People of well-known family	Wealthy--most probably from income from land
Purane khandani log	Of ancient and well-known family	wealthy and of feudal family
Bare log	Great people	Upper-class people; aristocrats, powerful people.

The Pakistani state does not recognize caste or class but it does recognize income inequalities. As such, while in real life class is signaled in various ways, in the official discourses it is not admitted except with reference to income. Interestingly, some of the signaling for class takes language into account. Thus the humorous programmes on the Pakistan Television used to use 'Urdu medium', for unsophisticated. The implication was that students from schools which used English as the medium of instruction, and these were expensive schools, were sophisticated. Even below the 'Urdu-medium type were those who only knew Punjabi as this meant that they were not formally educated. As Sabiha Mansoor brought out several years ago in a survey of the linguistic attitudes of students in Lahore the language hierarchy in their minds was as follows: English, Urdu, indigenous languages other than Punjabi and Punjabi (Mansoor 1993).

The place of residence, combined with language or accent, is also used to indicate class. Thus villagers, who are looked down upon, are called '*Pendu*' and comics often make fun of their Urdu and English accents. The essence of this kind of humour is that the more a person's first language interferes with his or her English or Urdu, the less educated, sophisticated and urbane that person is perceived to be. In short, the mastery of the languages of power—English and Urdu—even to the exclusion of the indigenous languages of the country is a mark of sophistication and a code word for a higher rank in the class structure. The modern state has not eliminated class in Pakistan but it has made Pakistanis more hypocritical about it.

4. **Religious Identity**

While the English-language academic and journalistic discourse talks much about types of Muslims: fundamentalists, militant, modernist, moderate, secular or cultural, tese are not the categories which are used by ordinary Pakistnais who do not know English nor are exposed to the newspapers of Urdu. The Muslim identities used by the ordinary people are with respect to sect and sub-sect: Sunni/ Shi'a and then within Sunni the Deobandis, the Barelvis, the Ahal-i-Hadees (called Wahabi) etc. The British Indian state discourse encouraged religious

categorization of Indians but the Hindu/Muslim identities were so salient that internal differentiation between them was not part of the public discourse. On special occasions, such as *Muharram* (the Shi'a month of mourning), the Shia/Sunni identities gained prominence but otherwise Muslims generally articulated a monolithic identity in competition with the Hindu majority in the political and public employment market. The Muslim *ulema*, and their devoted followers, were cognizant of the sectarian, and sub-sectarian, differentiation among themselves. In fact, as the printed word spread, sectarian tracts refuting the beliefs of other sects become more commonly available. The 1920s was a time of religious debates (*manazras*) in which not only the Shias and Sunnis engaged in polemical exchanges but also within the Sunnis the Deobandis, Barelvis and Ahl-i-Hadith did the same. Some of these debates are available (Nomani 2002) and show an intense consciousness of religious (sectarian and sub-sectarian) identity and the ability to express it aggressively. This was also the period when the beliefs of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed (Friedman 1989) of Quaidian--called Quaidiani, Ahmedi or Mirzai beliefs—were condemned as being heretical by both Sunnis and Shias. This added to the consciousness of religious identity among the Muslims of North India.

The Pakistani state, although created with appeal to religious identity, did not encourage either a sectarian or a sub-sectarian differentiation of it in theory. The Quaid-i-Azam began by saying on 11 August 1947 that religion would have nothing to do with the business of the state but this appeared to be going too far to the other decision-makers of the country (Munir1979: 30-32) Thus, the Islamic identity was supported by the state without, however, giving a definition of it. Indeed, the literal elements in official circles as well as civil society agreed with Justice Munir when he pointed out in his report on the Punjab disturbances in 1953 (in Munir 1979: 45 quoting his Report of 1954, p. 218) that even the *ulema* did not agree on a single definition of a Muslim. However, the reason why there were disturbances in the first place was because articulate *ulema*, supported by many prayer leaders in mosques (*maulvis*), had declared the Ahmedis as infidels (the word used was *kafir*). Ahmedis had been attacked in Lahore and the law and order broke down to such an extent that martial law was imposed on the city. It was to conduct an enquiry into these disturbances that Justice Munir had gone into the definition of Muslim mentioned above.

While the state did not give legal validity to any definition of Muslim in 1954 it did so in 1974 when anti-Ahmedi violence broke out again. This time, under pressure by the Islamic

pressure group, Z. A. Bhutto's PPP government defined Ahmedis as non-Muslims. General Zia ul Haq's military government (1977-1988), legitimizing itself in the name of Islam, further made this definition more stringent by adding clauses (298-B and C in 1984) which would prohibit the Ahmedis from calling their places of worship as mosques or calling themselves Muslims (Abbas 2005: 105). One consequence of these legal provisions was that the language of exclusion, persecution, oppression and intolerance got new terms (Ahmedi, Mirzai, Quaidiani) to stigmatize people on the basis of religious identity.

The state, under Zia ul Haq, also had to differentiate between Sunni and Shia religious identities. This happened when Zia ul Haq imposed *zakat* and *ushr*, two Islamic taxes, on the Muslim citizens. As the Shias protested against these impositions arguing that they had their separate system of the collection of such dues, they were directed to supply declarations to this effect to the banks. Thus, without intending to do so, the Shia minority was forced into asserting its sectarian identity. The Sunni identity too was played up and constituted into an aggressive, anti-Shia mould by Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi (1952-1990) and his associates of the Sipah-e-Sahaba in the Jhang district. This may have been a reaction to the dominance of Shia feudal landlords in Jhang, as Qasim Zaman argues (Zaman 2002: 127), but there was a hardening of sectarian identity throughout the country. Since this period Shia-Sunni conflict has become increasingly bloody and there are posters declaring other religious minorities, such as the Aga Khanis, as infidels. There have also been anti-Christian and anti-Hindu attacks but those against the Shias have been the most violent. It appears that, because of Zia ul Haq's appeal to religion, religious identities gained prominence. And as they did so the whole polemical discourse of difference as heresy became reactivated. The differences were, of course, taught in *madrassas* as *maslak* (ideological interpretation or set of beliefs of a sub-sect) but their passive knowledge does not translate into hostile action unless attention is directed to them. This new factor, the directing of attention to differences, came into prominence during the Zia ul Haq era. Moreover, it was then that religiously inclined or motivated youth were also trained and armed to fight in Afghanistan and Kashmir. These militant young men fought those whom they perceived to be non-Muslims abroad as well as at home (Abbas 2005: 204-216). They gave a new significance, and a potentially disruptive one, to religious identity. Vocabulary considered antiquated by the more modernized part of the elite—*kafir* (denier of belief), *murtid* (heretic*), wajib-ul-katl*(one who should be killed), Shia, Sunni, Ahmedi, Aga Khani—came to the fore and is very much part

of the discourse in pamphlets, Friday sermons in mosques and right wing Urdu newspapers. In short, the religious identity is more salient, more contested, and more differentiated at state and non-state levels in Pakistan today than it was in 1947 when the country was created.

Conclusion

The Pakistani state began with a dual, and conflicting, vision of national identity. One set of discourses originating from modernity and the imperative of creating a modernized state desired the dominance of the nationalist identity over all others. It reduced gender to the binary opposition of biological male and femaleness eliminating all inter-sexual and pre-modern identities. It also turned a blind eye to the existence of class-based identities seeing them either in economic, statistical, terms or not at all. It also reduced the religious identity to the single category of Muslim with non-Muslim as its 'other'. The other set of discourses, also patronized by the state, comes from South Asian interpretations of Islam. This seeks to place the religious identity over the nationalist (political) one; it sees sex in terms of permissibility (*halal* or *haram*) and, therefore, criminalizes sexual behaviour without subverting the pre-modern identities which exist in the people's minds. It also turns a blind eye to class and it sees the religious identity in pluralistic (sectarian), embattled, terms. In short, while modernity decreases the total number of identities substituting a Western way of looking at them, there are forces— forces using pre-modern categories but deployed to empower their users culturally and politically—which would multiply identities. Islam for instance, reduces the number of modern political identities—especially the nationalistic and ethnic ones—but increases the number of religious identities which would strengthen the religious parties and cultural groups. The state would like to **use** Islam but only to **support** the nationalistic identity while reducing the number of other, potentially conflict-promoting, identities. However, the state's use of Islamic symbols and discourses, again in the perceived interest of some major decision-makers like Zia ul Haq, has increased the number of sectarian identities and increased the salience of the religious identity which may be a source of increased conflict in Pakistan.

6

LINGUISTIC SWEAT SHOPS: A STUDY OF THE CALL CENTRES OF PAKISTAN

1. Introduction

Sweat shops exist because the workers of poor countries take lower wages to perform the same kind of labour as the workers of developed, post industrial societies. The corporate investors can get products made cheap and sell it a much higher prices with their brand name. Call centres are also based on this basic principle. They exist because the rapid development in communications, especially the telephone and the internet, make it possible to communicate all over the globe virtually without time lag. It is this aspect of globalization which makes them possible. In common with the sweat shops what makes them exist, multiply and remain in operation is because they contribute to the maximization of profits of the corporate giants which pay for them. As wages are higher in the United States and Europe it is cheaper for entrepreneurs there to hire workers in Asia who demand much lower wages. The profit gained from this contributes to increasing the profits of the corporate bodies which run these centres. In some cases Asian entrepreneurs provide such services to Western clients at cheap rates. They, in turn, hire local labour and pay them such wages as would keep them as well as their foreign clients in profit. Call centres perform two kinds of operations: they receive calls from abroad in order to provide services to Western customers (incoming); or, they initiate calls to clients in Western countries in order to sell them goods and services (outgoing).

Both sweat shops and call centres are part of globalization which makes capital move across the globe seeking cheap labour and fresh markets. The workers of both places feel they are getting a better deal than their counterparts engaged by local employers and see their labour in positive terms. However, in both cases the labour is extracted through a process of exploitation. In the call centres the process of learning the new linguistic skills also alienates the workers from the other Pakistanis and makes them agents of global capitalism.

This article looks at the way call centres use language and inculcate language ideologies which alienate their employees from other Pakistanis, including even the English-using ones, and how the call centres are an extension of globalized capital which has now extended to the

hitherto untouched aspects of one's linguistic identity. Furthermore, the new colonization of time, day and night, place, name and personality will also be touched upon.

1.1 Review of Literature

There are many studies of the call centre industry in the world. One of the most lyrical treatments is by the journalist Thomas Friedmann whose best-selling book *The World is Flat* (Friedmann 2005: 29-32 and 103-13) describes how the foundations of the call centre industry were laid in India (350,000 call centres were reported in 2007 according to Kenneth 2007). Among other things, he mentions the problem of outsourcing and the anxiety of Americans about losing their jobs to cheaper competitors in Asia. However, true to his belief in the free market, he says this should be seen by the Americans as an incentive for diversifying their services and seeking avenues other than demanding a closure of call centres abroad (Friedmann 2005: 469). Fears of unemployment also exist in the UK as call centres shift to India (Taylor and Bain 2005).

Although the Philippines is reported to have taken a growing share of call centre jobs from India (Dolor 2006), it is India which provides the nearest parallel to Pakistan in cultural and linguistic terms. Thus it is useful to review the literature pertaining to call centres there. In this context the most relevant work for our purposes is that of Kiran Mirchandani who studies three practices of call centres--- scripting, synchronicity and locational-masking—in India. By scripting she means the adherence of call centre workers to a uniform, standardized script supplied by their managers and, ultimately, controlled by the transnational corporations for which they work. Synchronicity refers to the use of Western—mostly American—time for operations which is night time in India (and Pakistan). And locational-masking refers to the attempt to dissemble where the call initiates, or is being answered, from. For this purpose Western pseudonyms (Bill, Mary etc) are also used. In a sense, then, all these processes hide the true nature of the work which call centres actually do—i.e. enhance profitability for big business by exploiting both the Western and the foreign workers. There is, however, some resistance in India to the masking of the Indian identity by affecting a foreign (mostly American) accent though, as this paper mentions in passing, these concerns did not emerge during this study. In India, however, when Capital One Credit Card services, Dell Computer Support and Lehman Brothers closed down their call centres in India because of the poor American accent of Indian workers, the *Economic Times* observed that there is no uniform American accent and asked: 'how long can customers around the world be fooled into believing that their calls are being

answered by someone in their own country? And why is that so important anyway?' (*Economic Times* 13 July 2004). Mirchandani, therefore, concludes that the nature of globalized capital is always heterogeneous, contested and in the process of being constructed (Mirchandani 2004: 371). Accent, it appears, is a major site of this contest.

The issue of identity management is the main theme of Winifred R. Poster who has also worked on Indian call centres. She tells us that globalization changes the nature of 'emotion management' (Hochschild 2003) to 'management of citizenship' (Poster 2007: 276). Accent, then, is one aspect of this management and the workers who change it are 'conduits of power for elites' whose power extends to aspects of the self hitherto considered less manageable than they have proved to be (Ibid 276). An important insight she offers is that Indian managers, more than the workers themselves, 'are internally conflicted, feeling that the American posturing (and call center life more broadly) is detrimental to Indian society, but also wanting to ensure job opportunities for their employees' (Poster 2007: 301). Other researchers on India also mention the 'emerging resistance' in India against such practices in the call centres (Taylor and Bain 2005: 278). In this context it is important to remember that race, not gender, is the operating variable in this game of power relations. Indeed, as Mirchandani argues, 'the eclipsing of gender at the discursive level and the racialized gendering of jobs transmationally—are not opposing, but rather mutually reinforcing trends' (Mirchandani 2005: 116).

A major study of the communication culture promoted by globalization is that of Deborah Cameron (2000). It argues that this culture is based on the values of 'enterprise' which prevails in the corporate sector. Despite all the rhetoric of empowerment, corporate sector practices impose such regimentation in the name of efficiency on their workers that they lose their agency. This is most true for call centre work in which workers are forced use a certain kind of language and repeat the same formulaic utterances again and again. This makes the call centres 'communication factories' in which the workers act like their counterparts in factories. However, unlike the unskilled or semi-skilled workers in factories they are highly skilled and educated and under much more stress than other workers. About this Cameron, after studying conditions in the call centres of Britain, says that: 'the conditions of the call centre impose particular pressures and restrictions on spoken interaction; operators negotiate these in various ways, but most still report some degree of boredom, frustration and /or stress' (Cameron 2000: 123).

1.2.1 **Accent as Linguistic Capital**

The workers of Pakistani call centres are called Customer Services Representatives (CSRs). They try to adopt either an American or a British accent when they interact with foreigners on the telephone in their daily work. As most of the call centres have business dealings with America we shall be concentrating on the way they acquire, use and think of the American accent in this acrticle. Clearly it is the American accent which serves as linguistic capital for them since it can be sold in the market for a job with higher wages than would ordinarily be available to young people of their age in Pakistan.

The notion of linguistic capital is derived from the work of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu who argues that linguistic differences are structured like social differences. Thus, there is a linguistic market in which whatever one says (or writes) has a certain value depending on how closely it approximates to the usages, or linguistic norms, of a powerful community which has legitimized or normalized these norms as 'the standard language'. Linguistic capital, then, is defined as follows:

> The constitution of a linguistic market creates the conditions for an objective competition in and through which the legitimate competence can function as linguistic capital, producing a *Profit of distinction* on the occasion of each social exchange Because it derives in part from the scarcity of the products (and of the corresponding competences), this profit does not correspond solely to the cost of training (Bourdieu 1981: 55).

The use of the foreign accent (called 'native accent' in the call centres) produces profit if one is mistaken for a native (American or British). As such an accent is rare—most of those who speak English in Pakistan speak what is called 'Pakistani English' (Baumgardner 1987; Rahman 1990)—it is remunerated better than other accents. Hence, in a very real sense, at least as for as the call centres are concerned, the American accent is invested with value. It represents 'capital' which can be invested in the 'market' to produce the tangible profit of employment and a fairly good salary (see annexure 2). The mean salary per month is Rs. 21,853 but there is also a bonus for selling goods and services which may take the total income to the range of Rs. 100,000 plus. They annual salary of the 'agent' (CSR) as announced by the Ministry of Information and Technology is $ 2,504 (Rs. 144,000) which comes to Rs 12,000 per month (Rs EB 2005: 10). There is also the intangible profit of prestige among one's peer group and the confidence that one

can negotiate the globalized linguistic labour market more advantageously than one's peer group which lacks this kind of capital.

It must be pointed out that, though the consumption of accent in the globalized market is more visible today than before, the linguistic practices of the powerful have always been invested with value. And, because they are, the disadvantaged have always aspired to acquire them. Thus Lynda Mugglestone, who traces out the rise of accent as a social symbol in England, argues that 'by the end of the nineteenth century, popular notions of "educatedness" were …strongly associated with the possession of a set of standard pronunciation features' (Mugglestone: 1995: 258). Working class accents were looked down upon and social climbers, such as Leonard Bast in E. M. Forster's novel *Howards End* (1910), educated themselves in pronunciation, especially those of 'foreign words', in order to acquire entry into the British elite (Forster 1910: 37).

Ideologies of correctness serve the function of elite closure (Scotton 1993) as Insha Allah Khan Insha (1802), the pioneering linguist of Urdu, the national language of Pakistan, argues. Insha defines the notion of 'correctness' (*fasahat*) in Urdu narrowing the in-group of the 'correct' speakers to the culturally elitist Muslim families of Delhi and Lucknow of the early nineteenth century (Insha 1802: 102). Such a definition closed the ranks of the elite excluding the speakers of the other languages as well as Hindus who spoke Urdu. Under the circumstances, in order to gain entry into the exclusive club of the elitist speakers of Urdu (the *ahl-e-zaban*), other people did their best to acquire the 'correct' accent of Urdu and were sometimes rudely admonished for their mistakes.

Similarly, colonial Indian gentleman aspired to the Received Pronunciation (RP)—or Oxbridge as it was sometimes called in India—and were appropriately called 'Brown Sahibs' (Vittachi 1987). In Naseer Ahmed Farooqi's novels, even in the Pakistan of the 1950s, people abbreviated their names to sound like English names, drank in clubs, read English literature and the English press and aspired to education in British universities and working in British companies in Pakistan (Farooqi 1968: 9).

In short, one response of dominated groups everywhere is to accept the norms, values, tastes, cultural and linguistic superiority etc of the dominant group voluntarily. As Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) says:

> The "spontaneous" consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is "historically" caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production (Gramsci c. 1930s: 12).

The other response may be that of resisting the political or economic domination of the dominant group. And the same person is capable of both responses mediated as they are by circumstances.

1.2.3 **English and Language Ideology in Pakistan**

Language ideology refers to attitudes and perceptions about language and the way it is used in different domains. The value one gives to a certain language, variety or feature is determined by this ideology and, in turn, the ideology informs our linguistic behaviour (Scheffelin et. al 1998). In Pakistan, being a former British colony, English is most highly valued followed by Urdu after which come the various mother-tongues of the people (Mansoor 1993). This ideology is inculcated and upheld in the elite English-medium schools of the cities. For instance the principal of an English-medium school in Islamabad told me in informal conversation.

"I was horrified to hear not only Urdu but even Punjabi. I had to put my foot down immediately. No. We cannot have vernaculars here.'

I: 'But Punjabi is the language of 44 per cent people in this country and if one adds Siraiki to it then an additional 10. 53 per cent also. How can we discourage it. And Urdu is supposed to be our national language'.

Principal: 'well we are going for quality not quantity. Our job is to eradicate bad language habits at least in school. If we do not teach English al the time nobody is going to learn it. Why do you think parents pay us so much? Is it to teach them Punjabi or Urdu?'

I: 'But you can add English to the other languages. They must not be ashamed of Punjabi'.

Principal: 'No. I think our job is to teach good English. That cannot be added on to other languages. In nay case we do teach Urdu and Punjabi is all around us though I do not want them to learn it'.

To teach English the English-medium schools ask teachers to speak to students in English even in preparatory classes when they are about three years old. A teacher called Tania explained this as follows:

Tania:'I teach three-year old children. They are so sweet but they tend to speak in Urdu with one another'.

I: 'But why shouldn't they. It is natural isn't it?'

Tania: 'The Principal says we should never respond in Urdu. Only English is our job'.

The kind of policies one witnesses in Pakistan were found in many parts of the world in the past as the examples of linguistic imposition by powerful institutions and groups has been recorded in detail by linguists and others (Skutnabb-kangas 2000: 316-374). Although in Pakistan these policies do not have the power to kill Urdu or Punjabi, they have certainly alienated the elite from them. Students from English-medium schools are proud of not knowing Urdu or its rich literature well though they can speak conversational Urdu. As for Punjabi, it is not considered as a sophisticated language and many upper class Punjabi families do not use it even privately at home (Rahman 1996: 208-209).

Further, the older generation consider the British Standard English in the Received Pronunciation (RP) the ideal norm. Nobody educated in Pakistan claims to speak it but they do speak what is called 'educated English'. Linguists describe this sub-variety of Pakistani English as the acrolect. Next is the mesolect which is more influenced by features of Pakistani languages than the acrolect. Least in intelligibility for a native speaker of English is the basilect which has a very heavy admixture of Pakistani languages (Rahman 1990). As one moves down the cline from the acrolect one's prestige as a speaker of English decreases.

The American pronunciation of English is prestigious for the younger generation and it is tolerated by the older one if it is perceived to be natural i.e. one has acquired it as a child in the United States. However, if one has acquired it an adult it is generally perceived as being affected or phony.

It is in the context of the linguistic attitudes that the linguistic policies and practices of the call centres should be understood.

2. Method

This study is based on observation and interviews. These interviews were open ended and unstructured for the most part. However, in some cases they were structured so that the same questions were asked form all the interviewees. As access to the CSRs was limited I could only meet them in the canteen and, in some cases, some former CSRs gave details of their experiences in the call centres when they served there. Most of the information for this article comes from

long conversations with the trainers of accent and floor managers who had several sessions with me and also consented to be my guests at dinner.

I personally visited three call centres in Islamabad—Touchstone, Infospan, E-surf and one, The Resource Group (TRG) in Lahore. I also observed workers talking to American and British clients on the phone and taking classes on 'accent neutralization' in two major call centres of Islamabad (Touchstone and Infospan). I visited Touchstone four times, E-surf three times and Infospan twice during the months of September and October 2007. In November 2007 I visited TRG only once. In all cases I tried to engage both trainers and CSRs in conversation in the canteen and elsewhere. My visits lasted between 2 to 6 hours and each was with the permission of the administrators of the call centres. I had to wear a tag on which the word 'visitor' was written so that I could only be an observer in the working areas. In the canteen, however, I could sit and chat with anyone who came along without any formal permission. I also invited to accent trainers for dinner and talked to one for a long time while traveling with him from one call centre to another in Islamabad. I also attended accent training classes in T-hone although they were held between 12 am to 2 am PST (Pakistan Standard Time). I took notes and went through them later filling in the context and developing leads. Notes were taken whenever possible even sometimes during informal conversation. This informal contact with employees of the call centre gave me deeper understanding of their way of life and attitudes towards their job. Four trainers allowed me to interview with them formally and informally on several occasions. There were: Abid Riaz, Mohammad Waqas, Waseem Waqar and Sadia. There views as well as those of their friends whom they brought with them off an don have been referred to by name.

3.2 **Linguistic policies of English-medium schools and call Centres**

Within the call centres there are advertisements of trainers claiming to conduct 'Accent Neutralization Courses' of between a few weeks to three months. Within the hall where the calls are received and made there are notices proclaiming an 'English Only Policy'. I noticed that nobody I interviewed thought there was anything wrong about discouraging the speaking of Urdu and other Pakistani languages in the call centres.

One of the trainers, Abid Riaz, told me:

Abid Riaz: 'You can learn the American accent like I did—by listening to it and trying it out. But for this never speak Urdu unless you are in the bazaar where nobody speaks anything else. You have to continue speaking English and that is the trick'.

I: ‘But one cannot learn perfect American accent can one?’
AR: ‘I think we should not say such things to the trainees. I do not do so. It takes away the incentive from them. In any case one should try for perfection’.

The language ideology behind such kinds of policies and practices is a sub-set of the language ideology about English in the rest of the society. The British American pronunciation is valued to the exclusion of all pronunciations of Pakistani English including the educated English pronunciation (acrolect). This alienates the workers of the call centres from the other speakers of Pakistani languages. Further, they have a strong belief that this accent can be learned whereas among other users of English accent is not such an important matter at all. This makes them intolerant of the other speakers of English in the country. However, the call centres are so few that their workers’ ideology does not affect the society as a whole. They cannot impose their linguistic ideology on anyone else but they do look down upon other users of Pakistani English in private.

As Mohammad Waqas told me: ‘They are lazy. I see know reason why they cannot pick up the hang of pronunciation which our internees do fast enough’
I: ‘But you do not know American English in this country. So why should anyone pick it up?’
MW: ‘Maybe. Yes with us it is a business deal. Americans won’t give us business if they don’t get what we are saying. But it is good to be like them. They are native speakers so why should we stick to our sloppiness?’.

In the call centres there are notices proclaiming a ‘No Urdu’ policy. There are people whose job is to make sure that nobody uses Urdu or any other Pakistani language. On one floor the trainer who was part of what others jokingly described as the ‘language police’ took her duties rather seriously but in other places I saw some CSRs speaking to each other in Urdu though they kept code switching to English as they did outside the Call Centre also.

The young workers are offered courses in ‘accent neutralization’ as they are in India (Cowie 2007). While there are no firms offering such courses there are individuals hired by the call centre or offering the courses for a fees within the call centres. These courses begin at midnight, which is like day in the call centres, and last about two hours. I attended classes here and found out that they call the Americanization of accent as ‘accent neutralization’. Sadia did several of such courses and, like Abid Riaz, is now a trainer without having actually gone abroad. Mohammad Waqas went to America as a child and was brought up there. For him the

American accent is natural and one reason why he works in the call centre is that he finds it like 'home'. Waseem Waqar did not go to America as a child but he lived there for over twenty years and speaks both English and Spanish. All of them think that the Pakistani accent is 'wrong' and needs correction. Their basic idea is that the Pakistani pronunciation is a strong, marked feature which must be neutralized. Such an ideology assumes that the natural unmarked accent of native-speakers, in this case Americans, is not 'accent' at all. It is the pure product free of such a defect as an 'accent' which non-native speakers do have and which must be removed through corrective interventions.

A corollary of such ideologies is that there is a Westernized elite which looks down at all Pakistani languages within this country and a small part of this elite, the workers of the call centres, in turn look down upon all accents of English except those which are associated with America or England.

3.5 **Colonization of Time and Lifestyle**

Call centres are generally situated in modern, glass-and-metal glittering buildings with *avant garde* furniture and ample lighting. The security is tight and access to the CSRs is controlled by managers and other administrative cadres. Call centres are a replica, or shadow, of life in the USA. The lights turn the night into day—the day of the United States or Britain. There are four clocks on the wall giving the four American time zones. The time when I would normally step on the floor was 5 minutes past 9 p.m. the four clocks gave the following time:

Pacific	9.5 (a. m) same day.
Mountain	10.6 (a. m) same day.
Central	11.7 (a. m) same day.
Eastern	12.7 (a. m) same day.

Same people had been there from 6 p. m Pakistani time because their projects were on the East coast but by 9 p. m all the halls are full and humming with activity. The young people, mostly boys, wear T-shirts and jeans and speak in an American accent which, in some cases, is obviously affected. Their body language is also like Americans. They have 'mimicked' it—a word several of them used—from American movies. In the case of British and Spanish projects the working hours are between 4 to 5 hours ahead of Pakistan's own time so the CSRs do not stay all night in the work place. Most people, however, work in American call centres and stay at work till 6 a. m. The girls are provided transport but the boys travel on their own. However,

although the number of girls is far less than boys none of the girls I talked to complained of any incident of harassment within the work place. The whole atmosphere is pseudo-American with people addressing each other by American-sounding pseudonyms and using greetings like ‘hi’ and ‘bye’ and ‘I am good’.

I could not find any resistance to the idea that identity was managed and that they themselves chose to represent an alien identity through pronunciation and pseudonyms. Indeed, if anything, there was considerable pride about ‘passing’ for a native speaker of English and the compliment ‘you sound like an American’ was received with obvious pleasure. However, resistance to it has been reported from India (Taylor and Bain 2005: 273). They did report incidents of hostility from customers but explained it with reference to their dissatisfaction with the product or the time of the call etc. The idea that globalization, like earlier colonial movements, tended to establish the ascendancy of the norms of the capitalist North over the rest of the world, was alien to these young people. For them, call centre work established their credentials of being skilful and ‘smart’—an elite of Westernized, and therefore superior, language skills which the world capital valued and demanded. When research from India was discussed where such forms of resistance have been reported, some of them agreed that this aspect of the matter could have some truth in it but they insisted on the necessity of the policies they followed.

The Workers of the Call Centres and the Pakistani English-Using Elite

The workers of the call centres mostly come from English-medium schools. They speak what has been described as the acrolectal form of Pakistani English. This is also called the ‘educated Pakistani accent’ and it is quite intelligible for American and British speakers of English. However, it is neither RP to which it aspires nor, of course, American English. However, while coming from this elite, the workers of the call centres imbibe the ideology of looking down even upon educated Pakistani English accent which they start considering ‘wrong’, ‘accented’ and ‘strong’. Instead they aspire to the ‘neutral’ accent which is either a copy of the American accent or the British one. As there are many Pakistanis who return from the United States and Britain and work in the call centres there are exemplars of the desired accents as models before them. There are also some workers who were brought up abroad and went to some American or British international school in childhood. They also speak near-native accents of English to begin with. Others learn them from accent trainers and work hard at them. All of those who were

interviewed agreed with the idea that it was necessary to use such accents and that the Pakistani educated accent was not enough.

The Pakistani English-using elite has a high regard for RP but one speaking it is alienated from it by virtue of this foreign sounding accent. The American accent is not invested with this prestige but if someone is known to speak naturally from childhood having been brought up in the United States it is tolerated. If, however, the speaker is known to have picked up the American accent in the call centre or as an adult in the United States the attitude of other members of the Pakistani elite is negative. The speaker is regarded as a language cheat and the accent is called 'fake', 'phony', and 'affected'. As the agents of the call centres are known for putting on such an accent and also affect sartorial and behavioral patterns not normally seen in the country, they are regarded as being phony.

'I believe they do it to get jobs. I was in Harvard for years and did not need this phony accent', remarked an academic upon hearing a CSR who was with us for dinner.

'Those in business in the states always try these tricks' said another person. 'Obviously they are exposed to much more prejudice than we are in the universities', he added.

Yet another difference from the English-using elite is that the call centre workers operate at night while other people work during daytime. This means that the former cannot be part of the social and political life of the country. Even in the civil society movement for the restoration of the judiciary in 2007-2008 when the students of the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) came out in large numbers on the streets the workers of the call centres continued working as if nothing had happened. I used to talk to them about the events of the day but found them blank and unresponsive as they had spent the day trying to sleep after duty.

Like the low-ranking members of the English-using elite the workers of the call centres also had no autonomy and no agency. The most apt comparison is with teachers of elite schools which have cut down the agency of teachers in the name of efficiency. The teachers had to prepare a lesson plan which they had to show to the principal. They also had to show checked notebooks of their students to their principal. Moreover, they were not left on their own in the classroom. The principal or some functionary from the head office could inspect them at work and grade them on their performance. The independence of their predecessors in school teaching is something which they know only by hearsay.

In the same way the workers of call centres are constantly monitored. Their accent, way of speaking, adherence to a formulaic script and even the emotion they will display on their face is imposed upon them. If their clients shout at them they cannot hang up upon them. In some cases those who were caught out as being Asians speaking from Pakistan were insulted but if this happened several times they were removed from their jobs. There was no understanding of the possibility that the client, being from a powerful country, did not make any effort to understand the worker who came from a poor country. Indeed, power differentials were not mentioned at all. Even the other workers of the call centres appeared to have no sympathy for those whose identities were discovered as being false. Instead of questioning the system which made such lying necessary they found fault with the worker who was not 'smart' enough to keep up the deception.

In this way, then, the workers of the call centres have a much more difficult and stressful job than the English-medium school teachers who, like them, are also victims of the new corporate culture which reduces people to a kind of slavery in the guise of making them efficient and responsible.

Identity Management and Exile

Yet, whether they are conscious of it or not, in one sense the experience of the young workers of the call centres in South Asia is different from that of their colonized ancestors who modified their behaviour to adjust to Persianized Mughal or British cultural norms. While the Mughal and British elitist groups created sub-cultures and new, exclusive, elitist realities of their own, the culture of the call centres exists in a nocturnal bubble. It is, therefore, much more alienated from the world around it than the Persianized and Anglicized elites ever were.

The only analytical category in which the call centre existence falls is best described as that of 'exile' which Edward Said defines as follows:

> …exile, unlike nationalism, is fundamentally a discontinuous state of being. Exiles are cut off from their roots, their land, their past. They generally do not have armies or states, although they are often in search of them (Said 2001: 177).

The workers in the call centres cut themselves off from the symbols of group identity by changing their language, accent, body language, clothes, time, name and national identity. The extent of this cutting off—especially that of time, space (locational- masking) and identity (Western pseudonyms)—is new and more alienating than the experience of the Anglicized

officers who shaped time, space and identity into proud, new, modernist configurations. The officers, both Mughal and British elites, had the power to shape things and invested emotionally and otherwise in this change. They perceived themselves as the new, progressive face of India. The workers of the call centres do not possess power beyond the marginally higher wages they can invest on their individual selves. They can change the location of their exile from night-time America in Pakistan to day-and night America in the United States but nothing more than that.

They do, however, have a 'triumphant ideology' as many exiles are said to possess (Said 2001: 177) but this is not a political or economic vision for their land like that of Lenin or the Ayatollah Khomeini. It is the triumph of the market place, of globalization, which makes their kind of life possible.

Agents of World Capitalism?

Rajesh, one of the Indians quoted by Friedmann says: India is going to be a superpower and we are going to rule'. But when asked who India would rule he says: 'It's not about ruling anybody. That's the point. There is nobody to rule anymore. It's about how you can create a great opportunity for yourself and hold on to that or keep creating new opportunities where you can thrive' (Friedmann 2005: 191). Two points are worth noting: that nation-states which could be conquered and administered are irrelevant; that enterprise is essentially individualistic. Both, incidentally, underpin globalization and the triumph of the market forces. So, in an important sense, the call centre workers mostly represent themselves as the success stories of the triumph of capitalism. They are, in Francis Fukuyama's dramatic phrase, the 'last' men representing 'the end of history' (Fukuyuma 1992).

They forward a 'discourse' [in Michel Foucault's sense as given in *The Archaeology of knowledge* (1969) and *Discipline and Punish* (1975)] which privileges business over other activities and the loss of authenticity this entails—whether it be of accent or national identity—as the necessary price for it. Thus, without necessarily meaning to, they construct the '*desi*' (best translated as the 'Orient') as the 'Other'. The qualities of this 'other'—including its accent—are anti-business at best and essentially inferior at worst. In a sense, then, much like Edward Said's 'Orientalists' the workers of the call centres are 'able to manage—and even produce—the Orient' (Said 1978: 3). And, while doing so, also produce, and thereby increase the hegemonic power of, globalized (American) culture. By working for globalized capital, call centre workers support the ideology behind the political economy of this new stage of capitalism.

Writing in 1987, Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman outlined a 'propaganda model' for the American media in which one 'control mechanism' over the media was anticommunism (Herman and Chomsky 1988: 29-31). This has been superceded almost entirely by the new focus of anti-Muslim fundamentalism (or political Islam) which the American media now uses to filter out anti-capitalist, anti-American news. What could be said about the call centres, or rather the ideology they subscribe to, is that it to acts as a filter. In this case it filters out accents, identities, names, locations and behaviour which could be alien and threatening (such as that related to the al-Qaeda or even Muslim) thus doing what filtered or sanitized news do—'manufacture consent' of both workers and entrepreneurs for the 'normal' way of life; for 'the end of history' i.e. hegemonic American cultural practices and the capitalist ideology. But this 'history' refuses to end and the filtered out reality of the alien (Muslim) invades the news mainly through violence. It is, in fact, one reaction to the domination of the world by this manufactured consent which privileges the North over the South, the globalized over the local, the Western over the non-Western and capitalism over all its ideological rivals.

This is where the connection with militant Islam comes in. Militant Islam, based in turn on certain interpretations of fundamentalist Islam, has also been seen as a reaction to modernity and, especially, the globalizing, intrusive, consumerist culture which goes with it. Karen Armstrong sums up the conflict between the secular and the religious aptly as follows:

> Because it was so embattled, this campaign to re-sacralize society became aggressive and distorted. It lacked the compassion which all faiths have insisted is essential to the religious life and to any experience of the numinous. Instead, it preached an ideology of exclusion, hatred, and even violence. But the fundamentalists did not have a monopoly on anger. Their movements have evolved in a dialectal relationship with an aggressive secularism which showed scant respect for religion and its adherents (Armstrong 2000: 370-371).

The youth working in the call centres have no direct connection with any of these opposing camps. They are simply young people making a living. But the bubble world they occupy can be viewed as an outpost of the West in the Muslim world. There is no evidence that this is happening in Pakistan yet because the call centres are so few in number and those who work in them merge with the rest of the elitist, Westernized youth in the country. However, if the

'battle for God' (Armstrong's evocative phrase) becomes more intense in Pakistan, this section of the elite will be seen as abettors of Western processes of neo-colonization.

Conclusion

Like sweat shops the world over the call centres of Pakistan are the new sites for the extension of globalized capitalist market practices and the ideology which underlies them in the world. They create a virtual reality in which the language, accent, names, locations and identities of the hegemonic centre (America) are invested with value which is exchanged for money. However, the process entails greater acquiescence to discourses of Western hegemony and alienation from one's own cultural reality than ever before. They accept the philosophy of work, opportunity and business so well that they do not realize that they are being colonized in ways much more drastic and far-reaching than ever before. Their agency is reduced in the name of efficiency and standardization and even their time is colonized and reversed. As most of them accept this colonization, they support global capital and represent themselves as the agents of the homogenizing and Westernizing ideology which is privileged by the expansion of the free market all over the world.

Though alienated from their own cultures, the workers of the call centres do, nevertheless, form part of a global workforce which lives in perpetual exile having cut itself off from the roots of its identity. The very existence of this kind of labour force marks the Western (American) as being 'normal' and, therefore, legitimizes capitalism as the natural condition of existence.

The resistance to this, though expressed as individual grievances against discrete experiences, even in the call centres themselves, is not very pronounced or clear. However, there is a minority—as small as the workers of the call centres—which does resist the domination of the world by globalized business (and American culture) in the idiom of political Islam. It is often in the news because of its militancy though it is as alienated from most of the people of this country as the workers of the call centres are. Although the idiom of Islam it uses makes people see it as a religious phenomenon, it might more credibly be seen as a political phenomenon—a militant reaction to the globalization of the world of which the call centres are both a consequence as well as a manifestation.

NOTES

1. Pakistan's offshore Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) industry is growing fast and claims to be 30 per cent cheaper than India. In 2006 out of 49 BPO service providers 29 were call centres employing 3,500 people (Bhatti 2007; Khan 2006). However, the industry has been adversely affected by the political crisis in the country resulting in closures (reported to be 75 per cent) (Kenneth 2007).

7

WEST PAKISTANI PERCEPTIONS OF THE BENGALI LANGUAGE MOVEMENT

Introduction

In 1948 and 1952 a number of urban Bengalis---mostly students, intellectuals and educated people---demanded that their language, Bengali, should be a national language of Pakistan and should also be used in public domains. This movement, called the Bengali Language Movement or *Bhasha Ondolan*, was politically significant because it was a reaction to the perceived domination and injustice of West Pakistani decision-makers towards the people of East Bengal. However, the Muslim League in particular and West Pakistanis in general, saw it as a conspiracy of communists, Indian agents and enemies of Pakistan to destabilize the new state. Among the few West Pakistanis who saw it as a spontaneous response to West Pakistani hegemony were ethno-nationalist leaders who were themselves regarded as anti-state forces by the West Pakistani establishment.

West Pakistani Perceptions of the Bengali Language Movement

In a book published by the National Language Authority Islamabad in 1992 Gilani Kamran makes the following observation:

> Giving it [Bengali] the status of a national language; making it a national language; were in no way fair or justifiable steps. The advocacy of Bengali was only to make it and the Devanagari script the rivals of the national language Urdu so that the creation and strengthening of nationalism would be impeded (Kamran 1994: 148).

This was, in fact, the dominant view of the West Pakistani establishment---the bureaucracy, armed forces, most politicians from the Punjab, their allies from the other provinces and most of Pakistani intellectuals---from 1948 till 1954 and was repeated by many people even after the emergence of Bangladesh. Thus Syed Mustafa Ali Barelvi and Syed Abdullah, both strong supporters of Urdu and Pakistani nationalism, repeat this view (Barelvi 1987: 20; Abdullah 1976: 45) and it is repeated *ad nauseam* by right wing Urdu dailies such as *Nawa-i-Waqt* every now and then.

This view is based upon a conspiracy theory: that certain forces—Hindus, communists, anti-government or anti-state agents—created the *Bhasha Ondolan* in order to destabilize

Pakistan. It is also supported by another view of ethnicity which may be called a 'primordialist' view albeit a crude version of it. According to this theory all ethnic revival movements in Pakistan are survivals from the past; they are merely selfish, old fashioned prejudices which will go away as we get modernized and nationalism replaces 'provincialism'—provincialism, incidentally, is the term used for ethnicity or ethno-nationalism in Pakistan (Hutchinson and Smith 1996).

The paper focuses on the perceptions of the *Bhasha Ondolan* by an articulate section of West Pakistanis. They were the ones who had, and continue to have, the widest circulation among the reading public in Pakistan. These views were disseminated by state-sponsored media programmes and were discussed among members of the public in most of the major cities of the country. The views of socialists and ethno-nationalists were marginalized or viewed with scepticism and suspicion during the *Ondolan* itself and till quite recently. As such, the views which loom large in the debate and form the major part of the discourse about Bengali ethnicity are those of the West Pakistani establishment. It is because of their centrality that they are the focus of this article.

Before taking up the views of West Pakistan, however, let us briefly recapitulate the major events of the Bhasha Ondolan (Umar: 1970 and 2004).

The Language Movement

The Tamuddun Majlis, a private social organisation, demanded Bengali as the language of instruction, administration and means of communication in East Bengal as early as September 1947, only a month after Pakistan was established. However, it was ignored till the December of that year when it was feared that Urdu alone would be the language of the State (MN 6th December 1947). The language movement started off in earnest in 1948 when Mohammad Ali Jinnah, or Quaid-i-Azam (the Great Leader) as he is called in Pakistan, declared on 19 and 21 March 1948 that the State Language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other Language (GOP 1998: 183). Jinnah made that statement on the assumption that one language unites a new nation and that nobody, except anti-Pakistan agitators, were against Urdu. Why he came to believe such conspiracy theories can only be conjectured but in another section of this article evidence will be adduced that he was presented with anti-Bengali material. Later, in 1952, Khwaja Nazimuddin, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, repeated these sentiments in Dhaka (PO 29 January 1952). After this the language movement really gathered momentum. The

students of Dhaka University were the leaders of the movement and there used to be processions in favour of Bengali every day. On 21 February 1952 the police fired on the students who had decided to defy Section 144 by coming out of the University in batches of four and five. As a result of this firing, according to the police report given to the inquiry conducted by Justice Ellis of the Dhaka High Court, there were 'nine casualities of whom three were students and six outsiders' (Quoted in Umar 1970: 32 and 48). This day, called *Ekushe*, became a significant symbol of Bengali defiance of the West Pakistani ruling elite and evokes strong sentiments even today. The language movement appeared to come to an end in 1954 when Bengali was accepted as one of the national languages, the other being Urdu, by the Constituent Assembly (D 08 May 1954). However, the sentiments it had created lingered on and formed the basis of Bengali nationalism which created Bangladesh in 1971. In this sense, then the Bengali language movement remains crucial for the understanding of identity-formation, ethnicity, nationalism and the clash of the elites and proto-elites in multilingual aspiring nation states. However, what we shall be concerned with in this paper is reality-construction---the way different actors build up their version of reality of which they become prisoners however misleading it may be.

The Construction of Reality by the

Pakistani Establishment

The leaders of the Muslim League which ruled Pakistan from 1947 till 1954, the years of the *Ondolan,* already had an ideological commitment to Urdu because it had become a mark of Muslim identity in India even in the late eighteenth century. During the Hindi-Urdu controversy (1860-1947), Urdu had become a subsidiary symbol (the first being Islam) of Muslim identity and so contributed to the Pakistan Movement. In the same way Hindi in the Devanagari script had become symbol of the Hindu identity and this congruence of symbols, as Christopher King calls it, had become a powerful emotional force which continued to influence the way the leaders of the Muslim League in Pakistan saw reality (King 1994). Apart from the politicians, the bureaucracy was dominated by Punjabis and Mohajirs from India who held a hierarchical view of languages in which English came on the top and Urdu came second while the other languages of Pakistan were dismissed as crude dialects. Apart from the political objectives of the Punjabi (and Mohajir) elite, educated Punjabis had a long standing relationship with Urdu. Indeed, it became the second language of educated Punjabis after the British recognized it as the vernacular of the literary writing but even for personal communication (Chaudhry 1977). Not only did the

Punjabi Muslims not object to Urdu but during the Hindi-Urdu controversy days they owned it even to the exclusion of their mother tongue, Punjabi. Indeed, the report of the Education Commission of 1882 makes it clear that the Punjabi Muslims identified with Urdu, Punjabi Hindus with Hindi and only the Sikhs with Punjabi (GOI 1884: 209-210 and 457-602).

This is why Sheikh Zahur Ahmed got away with the following insulting statement about Punjabi in the December 1910 session of the Muslim League:

> Delhi, the home of Urdu, is in the province of the Punjab and it would be a very sad day, indeed, if the birth-place of Mir, Ghalib and Zauq should be vulgarized by the Babylonish jargon, by courtesy called Punjabi (Pirzada 1969: 196).

Not surprisingly, the Punjabi Muslims did not protest. This could, however, be explained on the theory that in 1910 the Muslim League identified with Urdu for political reasons and protest would have been counterproductive. However, even now the activists of the Punjabi language movement complain that the Punjabi middle class despises their language (Kammi 1988) and a survey of students' attitudes towards it in Lahore suggests that they hold it in affectionate contempt (Mansoor 1993: 119). In the census of 1998, some middle class Punjabis gave their mother tongue as Urdu according to newspaper reports and Fakhar Zaman, an activist of the Punjabi language movement (Personal Communication, 07 March 1998).

Thus, Urdu already held a higher place in the esteem of most of the decision-makers in Pakistan than Bengali. Moreover, Urdu was also in the political interest of these decision-makers. They wanted a strong, unified Pakistan and felt---as the quote from Gilani Kamran illustrated---that one language could guarantee that whereas more than one would split Pakistan along ethnic lines. Thus, while the ruling elite itself kept using English, it used the symbol of Islam and Urdu for national integration.

The construction of reality also seems to involve ego-gratification and rationalization of privilege as if it were a natural right. Thus, whether they were conscious about it or not, the use of Urdu was actually in the interest of the ruling elite. In the case of Punjabi, Shafqat Tanvir Mirza argues that it is given less rights than the other ethnic languages so as to impress upon their supporters that the sacrifice of one's mother tongue, which only the Punjabis give so willingly, is the real criterion of Pakistani nationalism. However, the real reason is that Urdu extends the power base of the Punjabi ruling elite which can then rule over all the other provinces in the name of Pakistani nationalism (Mirza 1994: 833-896). I am not arguing that the

ruling elite actually decides that it will extend its power base or exploit other provinces through such a policy. Some crucial decision makers may, indeed, make decisions consciously in their interest as a group. Most other people, especially intellectuals and hangers-on, are not consciously aware of these aspects of policies. They believe in them because they believe sincerely in the rationalizing myths upon which they are based: nationalism, patriotism, efficiency, modernization and so on.

Thus without suggesting that most West Pakistanis who held the anti-*Bhasha Ondolan* views expressed below were cynically in favour of exploiting Bengalis and oppressing them, I will outline the views below. Basically, as mentioned earlier, the views are part of belief in a conspiracy theory: that external agents were powerful enough to create a movement as powerful as the Bengali language movement. The views are as follows:

The View of Hindu Manipulation

The 1948 *Bhasha Ondolan* was triggered off when Dhirendranath Datta, a Hindu member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, raised the question that Bengali should be used in the Assembly. To this Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister, replied:

> Pakistan has been created because of a hundred million Muslims in this subcontinent and the language of a hundred million Muslims is Urdu (LAD-P: 25 February 1948, p. 16).

This statement denied that the Muslims of South Asia had any other language but Urdu. Such a statement would not have been disputed in the Urdu-Hindi controversy days (as, indeed, such statements against Punjabi were not), but now it hurt the Bengalis whose protest took on intensity because of the contempt with which their language, and so they themselves, had been dismissed. This link with Islam was, indeed a part of the thinking of many Pakistanis. In 1953, Syed Salman Nadwi, a famous religious leader, said in the Third Pakistan Historical Conference that Bengali was saturated with Hindu traditions and culture and it should be Islamized (Quoted from Abdullah 1976: 45). Indeed, the state did try to Islamize Bengali from 1948 onwards. There were suggestions that the script of Bengali (a variant of the Devanagari script) should be replaced with the Perso-Arabic script of Urdu and that the indigenous words of Bengali, based upon Sanskritic roots, should be replaced by Perso-Arabic ones (Rahman 1996: 88). The East Bengal Government set up a Language Committee on 07 December 1950. Its chairperson, Maulana Akram Khan (a famous Bengali Muslim leader), also declared in Karachi on 15 April

1951 that those who opposed Urdu were antagonistic to Islam (PO 18 April 1951). The Committee recommended the exclusion of Sanskrit words and the teaching of Urdu as a second language (LAD-P 31 October 1951, p. 25: Islam 1986: 147-161). However, the students of the Bengali Department of Dhaka University, among others, declared that they would not allow the script of their language to be changed as they would alienate them from cultural heritage (Umar 1985: 204-260). Apprehensions of such change were also expressed in the Legislative Assembly (LAD-B 01 March 1951, p. 61) as, indeed, they had been even earlier (PO- Several issues of April 1948).

During the language movement of 1952 the West Pakistani press, both in English and Urdu, carried articles, editorials and letters against the movement (Editorials of D 23 February 1952 and other dailies). In most of these writings, communists, Hindus and anti-Islamic forces were held to be responsible for the movement. The Hindu influence was supposed to come from school teachers, journalists, student leaders and members of the legislature. This influence was called the Calcutta School or the *Dabistan-e-Kulkutta* in Urdu. Thus, Syed Abdullah, one of the foremost conspiracy theorists of Pakistan, writes that after the departure of Khwaja Nazimuddin 'those forces became more powerful which I call the Calcutta School (*Dabistan-e-Kulkutta)*'(Abdullah 1976: 35). However, a secret document entitled 'Note for Governors' Conference' of the Ministry of Home Affairs, dated 1958, reported that India had not done anything concrete lately at the higher official level to make East Pakistan secede from West Pakistan (HBWI Vol. 2 1982: 36).

The View of Communist Manipulation

Another variant of this theory was that the communists had created the language movement. As many school teachers in east Bengal were believed to be Hindus as well as communists (Franda 1970: 596), some people in Pakistan even now believe in this theory. At that time almost everybody, except the ethno-nationalists who were themselves leftists, believed in it. The Anjuman-e-Taraqqi-e-Urdu actively disseminated this theory. Abdul Haq, its major intellectual figure, declared that the *Bhasha Ondolan* was inspired by 'a few self-seeking gentlemen'. Another gentleman, arguing in a similar view, called them "traitors to Islam and enemies of our nation" (Haq 1952: 37). The Calcutta-based Indian Communist Party daily *Swadihinata* too claimed in two articles that the movement was organized and turned into a mass movement by communists (10 and 11 March 1952 issues). Nur ul Amin, the Chief Minister

of East Bengal, quoted extracts from it on 24 March and blamed the communists for the whole movement.

However, other studies show that the Communist Party was in an embattled position (Franda 1970) and did not initially play an active role in the *Bhasha Ondolan*. Indeed, according to Ayesha Jalal, who quotes confidential reports from the Central Intelligence Department of the USA, there were 'no important communists by July 1951 at large in Pakistan and that any threats from the organization ha [d] ceased for an indefinite period (Jalal 1990: 123).

However, the Action Committee of the *Bhasha Ondolan* had four communist (Youth League) members out of twelve in 1951 and communists were sympathetic to it (Muniruzzaman 1973: 229). The Communist Party circulated a long circular on 11 February 1952 which stated *inter alia:*

> The demand for making Bengali as one of the state languages is a demand for national right of the Bengali nation. This demand is a birth right of the Bengali nation and a demand for democratic right. Therefore, the movement for state language is a movement for establishing the rights and democratic rights, of the Bengali nation' (Quoted in Umar 2004: 196).

The circular went on to recognize the same rights for Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtuns and Baluchis etc. In short, it defined the Pakistani identity with reference to ethnicity not religion. The circular exhorted the communists to respond to the call of the All-Party State Language Committee of Action and organize strikes and demonstrations (ibid 197).

The communists, however, did not lead the movement. Indeed, the Party, knowing that others were leading, allowed their members to be led by the majority. For instance, when the All Party State Language Committee of Action met on 20 February to discuss whether Section 144 (forbidding people to gather together in public places) should be defied or not, the communists were not the leaders. Toaha, who himself favoured violation, wrote later:

> I said that 144 had to be broken, otherwise how could there be any movement. But for that there was no need for any voting. But I remained silent and did not talk much. I had been waiting for instructions. I said, the university students were the main force. We do not know their opinion. We should ascertain it. In fact, I was waiting for instructions. At that point Matin and others reached there and said that they wanted to violate 144. At the

> time of voting I received party instruction, so I did not vote. Oli Ahad did not understand Party discipline (Umar 2004: 200).

Another communist leader, Shahidullah Kaiser, reported that the instructions were to accept majority decision. Indeed, the Party, which initially favoured violation of 144, decided not to do so when it became clear that Awami League and others were not in favour of doing so (Umar 2004: 200). However, even the decision of the All Party Committee, which was not to violate 144, was overturned by the highly charged students on their own the next morning.

After the firing on 21 February the communists tried to form a new Committee of Action (Umar 2004: 208). At his point the Communist Party also issued a cyclostyled leaflet called 'Build up a great United Movement throughout East Bengal against the Barbaric Massacres of the tyrannical Government of Nurul Amin' (Ibid 210). However, the communists still did not lead the movement. Students, common citizens, even Islamic minded people (such as those who dominated the control room in the Salimullah Muslim Hall on the day after the firing) did. The communists did try to capitalize on the movement but did not control it. Indeed, according to Badruddin Umar, himself a communist, and a scholar of the politics of this period:

> The communists failed because they did not realize that regional or national exploitation and repression was a specific form of class struggle and the struggle for socialism. The consequence of this was that in spite of their work among the peasants and workers, they could not involve them in their work among their political struggle. The working people remained politically inclined towards the bourgeoisie, particularly the Krishak Sramik Party, the Awami Muslim League, and to some extent the National Awami party (NAP) (Umar 2004: 224).

The Communist Party did, however, learn from the *Bhasha Ondolan*: first, that the Ranadive thesis, advocating the semi-terrorist line, was wrong (it had, however, been discarded in 1951 but now this decision was confirmed); second, that the students were the main hope for political change. The East Pakistan Students Union was formed in April 1952 because of this conviction. However, even so the main political forces in East Pakistan remained out of communist hands though the politics remained left of the centre. That is why the eventual fruition of ethnic nationalism during the 1970s was led by the Awami League rather than the Communist Party. In short, the Communist Party influenced the language movement and took advantage of it but it did not create it nor could it control or dominate it.

The View of State Destabilization

Whether Hindus or communists (or both), the West Pakistani elite was unanimous in its opinion that the purpose of the *Bhasha Ondolan* was to destabilize the government and to break up Pakistan. This view was expressed repeatedly by the press and is expressed even now though no longer by informed people. After the firing on 21 February 1952 this view was expressed by Nurul Amin in the Provincial Legislature on 24 March 1952. He asserted vehemently and emphatically that the *Ondolan* was an attempt to overthrow the government and deal a blow at the very security of Pakistan (LAD-B 24 March 1952, p. 11). Even later when the ruling elite itself had accepted Bengali as one of the languages of the state, many Pakistan nationalists kept protesting against this decision. Thus Abdul Haq kept insisting that only Urdu could be the 'national and state language of Pakistan' (D 11 May 1954). Indeed, as mentioned in the beginning of this paper, even now there are many people who believe that it was the recognition of Bengali as a state language and not its suppression or other factors which led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.

Anti-Bengali Views and Jinnah's Decision

When the Quaid-i-Azam visited Dhaka in March 1948 he was presented with letters, petitions, memoranda and other documents asserting the Hindu link without, however, offering any proof. Most of these are preserved in a file available in several archives in Pakistan to which this writer has had access. The file lists several petitions in favour of Urdu while those in favour of Bengali are dismissed as the work of anti-state agitators (F 1948).

The Bengal Muslims Students League, appreciating his action, wrote to him that fifth columnists, such as Abdur Rahman Choudhary and Mohammad Toaha (leaders of the Bhasha Ondolan), would co-operate with the communists and Hindus to uproot train lines and blow off telegraph lines in East Bengal (F 1948). The Jamiat Ulama-i-Islam of Chittagong, in an address of Welcome to Jinnah, also blamed a 'foreign hand' for the language agitation and recommended that the Urdu high schools be opened and *madrassa* students be given military training (F 1948). Indeed most of the petitions which were presented to Mr. Jinnah were against the language movement. Members of the joint State Language Committee of Action were, however, allowed to meet him but with the remarks that they were persons responsible for recent language agitation (F 1948).

Evidence supporting Bengali---indeed the writings in the Bengali press, the English daily *Pakistan Observer* and even the sheer numbers in the processions in support of Bengali---was not pointed out to him. Moreover, the Quaid, like other people from West Pakistan, must have read more about the movement in the West Pakistani press which believed in the conspiracy theory that the movement was not spontaneous and that it should be suppressed. Thus, it is not surprising that he perceived the situation in the same terms as other West Pakistanis. He too believed, like others in West Pakistan, 'that the noise was being created by a bunch of rabble rousers' (Rahman, Ataur 1990: 171). That is probably why he took a firm stand against it in his speeches of 19 and 21 March 1948 and told the delegation of students who met him that the eight-point agreement they had reached with Khawaja Nazimuddin earlier had been signed under duress. Like others he too believed that one language would unite and more than one divide the country. One reason of this is that at that time the multilingual model of national development was seen as odd and exceptional. The sates with more than one state language – such as Switzerland, South Africa and Afghanistan – were not on the mental horizon of most decision-makers. It was later that Canada, Belgium and Spain emerged as bilingual countries and conceding more than one language in such roles helped rather than harm nationalism. Even India did not create linguistic states till 1956 (King, R 1997: 120). Thus, the existing models of nationalism must have suggested to the Pakistani decision-makers, including Jinnah, that only one language should be the national language. Moreover, it must be remembered that Jinnah was frail and in failing health so it must have been very difficult for him to go against the intellectual tide created by the press, bureaucratic advice and the existing theories of nationalism in order to understand the reality of the Bengali situation. Even supporters of the *Bhasha Ondolan*, like Tajuddin Ahmad and Badruddin Umar suggest that he (the Quaid) held his belief sincerely though they do not agree with him (Ahmad in Umar 1984: 112-113).

But whatever the sincerity of Jinnah and other Pakistanis the fact remains that such erroneous views about reality did have negative consequences. This particular rigid view, for instance, made it impossible for Pakistanis to understand the grievances of East Pakistanis and give them just and equal treatment. In 1955 the inequalities in the military and civil service positions at higher ranks were so disproportional that they were mentioned in the constituent assembly (LAD-P Vol.1 07 January 1956, p. 1844). Thus, up to 1971 East Pakistanis complained, and justly, of being exploited economically (Jahan 1972) and despised culturally.

Begum Rana Liaquat Ali Khan reflecting on the way she had seen East Pakistanis confessed later:

> In those days, I would argue that Muslim food was different and dress was different. It did not dawn on me till much later that in East Pakistan Muslim women wore sarees like the Hindus and spoke Bengali and not Urdu (Masroor 1980: 33).

In short, East Pakistanis were acceptable only by distorting the reality of their identities. There was such distrust of them that in 1962 'we find a report that while leading 'Id prayers in Karachi, Maulana Ehtishamul Haq charitably included a supplication to the Almightly to "create love for Pakistan in the hearts of Muslims of East Pakistan''' (Feldman 2001: 171). Omar Kureishi, the cricket commentator, tells us that he did not find many East Pakistanis in the dinners he attended in Dhaka.

> 'There isn't a lot of mixing', my hostess explained to me. There was a 'we' and the 'they' mindset (Kureishi 2003: 57).

And very often the arguments would reiterate the conspiracy theories held by West Pakistanis and contested with anger and mortification by the East Pakistanis (Rahman, Ataur 1960: 108-111).

The Views of Ethno-Nationalists

The period from 1948 to 1955 was crucial not only for the development of Bengali ethnicity but also for ethnic mobilization in the North West Frontier Province, Sindh and Balochistan (Amin 1988). In the Frontier the Pashto-speaking people were mobilized by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan with Pashto as a symbol of identity while in Sindh the Sindhi language was used in the same symbolic manner by G.M Syed and others. In Balochistan, however, Baloch ethnicity was expressed militantly from the very beginning though the Balochi language did have a subsidiary role in its expression too (Rahman 1996: 160-164). Thus ethnic leaders and their supporters did not oppose the Bengali language movement nor did they support the hegemony of the Centre over any of the non-Punjabi provinces of Pakistan.

The ethnic leaders and their intellectual supporters in the Western wing too were equated with socialists. However, in the Western wing the Communist Party was even more embattled than in the Eastern one. In March 1951 Major General Akbar Khan was arrested in what is known as the 'Pindi Conspiracy' case. Faiz Ahmed Faiz, the famous leftist poet and journalist, was arrested with him. And this arrest, says Ayesha Jalal, gave the central intelligence

department an excuse to hound and hunt down prominent writers, trade unionists and members of the Mazdoor-Kisan and Communist parties of Pakistan (Jalal 1990: 123). Thus, though the communists were not strong enough to express themselves openly and strongly on the subject of the *Bhasha Ondolan* in West Pakistan, the ethnic parties which were permeated by some of their ideas, opposed the domination of the Centre in common with the supporters of Bengali in East Bengal.

In February 1952 Khan Ghaffar was in jail but when he was released he addressed the Pakistan Parliament on 20 March 1954 as follows:

> The masses were ruthlessly persecuted and oppressed. Their needs were overlooked and they were subjected to extreme hardships and oppression. The cumulative effect of all these factors was that the Muslim League could secure no more than a nine percent of the seats in provincial elections…
>
> About the fear of the separation of East Pakistan he remarked:
>
> …We have detected in certain influential quarters of West Pakistan an undertone of discord which smacks of a separatist move and seems to be designed to rend asunder the two wings of Pakistan. The reading of the situation is confirmed by the demonstrations held in Karachi on the language issue, the slogans raised on the occasion, the malicious propaganda campaign persistently maintained in the Karachi press and the speeches delivered to create bad blood between the Bengalis and non-Bengalis (Tendulkar 1967: 840).

In 1947 G.M Syed formed the Sindh Progressive Party which was also in favour of 'Provincial autonomy within a socialist framework' (Amin 1988: 92). In Balochistan the Kalat State National Party was banned by the Centre and its aim too was the formation of 'Greater Balochistan' (Janmahmad 1989: 177). In the N.W.F.P Khan Ghaffar's *Khudai Khidmatgar* organisation was banned in 1948 but he formed the Peoples' Party in 1948. Its avowed aim was to create a union of socialist republics with full autonomy for all the republics within Pakistan. All the ethnic parties from Pakistan, including those of East Bengal, merged themselves into the National Awami Party (NAP) in 1957 (Amin 1988: 89).

By this time, however, Bengali was a national language if only in name. After this, although the ethno-nationalists of the West wing condemned the Punjabi-dominated ruling elite, they did not defend the Bengali language. Indeed, their major struggle now was to get their

languages---which were called ‘regional languages’---recognized as national languages. The report on national education, published in 1959, reduced the importance of Sindhi while Bengali was given lip service in it as a national language (GOP 1959: 284). In 1969 when Air Marshal Nur Khan circulated proposals for a new educational policy, Urdu was supposed to be the official language in the Western wing while Bengali would enjoy the same status in East Pakistan (GOP 1969: 3-4). While the ethno-nationalists kept quiet about the status of Bengali they opposed Urdu vehemently. The Jeay Sindh Naujavan Mahaz proposed that all the ‘recognized mother tongues of Pakistani people, including Bengali and Urdu, should be declared as national language’ (Talpur 1969). The Punjab Adabi Sangat proposed that Punjabi, rather than Urdu alone be adopted as a medium of instruction at the primary level (Memorandum 1969). On the whole, though, the ethno-nationalists of West Pakistan rejected the conspiracy theories of the establishment and maintained that the Bengali language movement was a reaction to the hegemony of the ruling elite and should not have been suppressed in the first place.

Theoretical Synthesis

While the minds of the West Pakistani establishment were closed because of the reality they had constructed, those of the activists of the *Bhasha Ondolan,* and other East Bengalis, were closed too. In the West Pakistani version of reality the ethnic Bengalis were either traitors to the state or Islam (being Indian or communist agents) or their gullible dupes. In the Bengali view the West Pakistanis were aware that they were denying them their rights and therefore, in their version of reality, the West Pakistanis were oppressors and exploiters. The behaviour of arrogant civil and military officers confirmed their beliefs and added insult to injury. In short then, both the West and East Pakistanis generally explained the conflict between the two wings on the basis of conspiracy theories---the former that some Bengalis wanted to break away from Pakistan and had fooled the others to support them; the latter that the Punjabis and Mohajirs had decided to humiliate and exploit East Bengal and would always deny them their rights.

As I have mentioned earlier, reality is much more complex than any theoretical framework of its analysis can adequately address. For instance, the actual motivations of the participants of events such as the *Bhasha Ondolan* are difficult to determine though its consequences can be determined more easily. Among these determinable consequences, or possible outcomes or effects, it could be argued that some of the charges of the conspiracy theorists were true. For instance it is true that West Pakistanis did hold much more power and

took far more money out of export earnings in united Pakistan than they had a right to (HBWI 1982: Vol. 6: 811. Jahan 1972: 89). To a lesser extent it is also true that ethnic politicians and intellectuals were left-leaning and, in some cases, some of them (in Sindh and the NWFP) did receive aid from foreign powers (Rahman 1996: 120 and 144). However, as already mentioned, the aid was very less and movements spread only when people felt aggrieved, dissatisfied and exploited. So, ethnic movements cannot be explained by crude versions of 'Primordialist' theories such as that of the so-called 'provincialism' which is said to be a legacy of the past in Pakistan. I believe the explanation for the *Bhasha Ondolan* must be sought in the instrumentalist theories of ethnicity in combination with a variant of the primordialist theory which may be called the theory of extra-rational motivation. A number of scholars have, indeed, argued that instrumental reasons: the desire for power, jobs, goods and services commensurate with their greater numbers in Pakistan---led to the mobilization of East Bengalis in the name of the Bengali language (Alam 1991).

While I agree with this instrumental explanation, I would like to add that the actors in the *Bhasha Ondolan* were motivated by extra-rational (or emotional) factors too. This rationalist framework must then be modified because if we want to understand the mental reality of the participants of the *Bhasha Ondolan.* For this necessary modification we will have to take extra-rational factors into account. We need not call them 'primordial' in the sense that they have been present from time immemorial (Shils 1957; Geertz 1963). But they do share the quality of being extra-rational---not susceptible to neat calculations of material loss and gain---with primordialist sentiments. What the activists of the *Bhasha Ondolan* (and other participants of mass movements) have in mind are not immediate rationalist aspirations for merely jobs, goods and services. These may form part of the myths of deprivation which they believe in but what motivates them, what brings them to a high pitch of emotion, is a sense of injustice. In this sense, then, they act to redress perceived injustice; to assert their human dignity; to strike a blow against oppression in the abstract. Such motivations are predominantly emotional, extra-rational and, therefore, not susceptible to precise calculations along rationalist lines.

When language or religion are the symbols of ethnic mobilization, the extra-rational element is present even in the choice of these symbols. While it is true that pre-modern communities had local loyalties and kinship ties, very often language was not part of their symbols of consolidation (Smith 1986: 27). It is also true that language, being the repository of

an ancient, real or imagined heritage, is an obvious symbol of continuity and unity. This symbol is as salient for the elites as it is for the masses and easily becomes a major, or one of the major, markers of identity. Thus elites do not choose to manipulate language as a symbol of mobilization in a calculating, rationalist way. To imagine this would be a kind of conspiracy theory. What can be suggested is that language, being a potential marker of identity, becomes salient in the imagination of the elite of a group as well as its members during certain external conditions (Skinner 1974). These conditions go by the name of modernity which, in the case of South Asia, was brought in by the colonial rule of the British. Thus, as the state monopoly over jobs and power increased, pressure groups had to be formed to take a quota of these goods. And as increased communication and the advent of print made it possible to imagine a large community speaking the same language (Anderson 1983), it became possible for movements like the Bengali language movement to take place. These movements, then, are rationalist (instrumental) insofar as they are responses to domination and underdevelopment by ruling elites. They are extra-rational (but not primordialist according to the usual interpretation of that term) in the sense that people struggle not only for jobs, goods and services but for intangibles like their identity, their way of life, their pride and the idea of putting an end to perceived injustice. The affective component of mass movements-- the love; feelings of outrage, of being cheated, of dispossession; the hatred and other such emotional responses – is so often ignored that it is important to mention it as part of the extra-rational dimension of these movements which we cannot operationalize and measure.

West Pakistani perceptions about the *Bhasha Ondolan,* at least those of the establishment, included both the rational and the extra-rational motivations: the rational because they did not believe that East Bengalis were being unjustly treated and deserved a greater share than they themselves of Pakistan's resources and power in the country; the extra-rational because they failed to understand the sense of outrage, the feeling of humiliation, which the denial of Bengali produced in East Bengal. Moreover, they felt that the Bengalis were under Hindu influence and lacked patriotism. Many of them were racists too and believed that the Bengalis belonged to an inferior race. Such beliefs are hardly conducive to understanding others.

Conclusion

To conclude, the dominant perception of the Bengali language movement in West Pakistan was that it was created by Hindus, communists and anti-state elements. Allied to this

was the primordialist view that ethnicity, or provincialism as it was called, was a remnant of the past and would go away as modernization took place and Pakistani nationalism took stronger roots. For this to happen, the establishment felt that language- based ethnicity must be suppressed. While this was the dominant view in West Pakistan, the ethno-nationalists and leftist intellectuals supported ethnicity in general and saw the *Bhasha Ondolan* as a response to West Pakistani dominance and misrule. This view was expressed in the context of ethnic politics which was seen as being anti-state in Pakistan till quite recently. It is only recently that ethno-nationalism has been analyzed by political scientists (Amin 1988), historians (Zahir 1994) and sociolinguistic historians (Rahman 1996). That West Pakistani perceptions of the Bengali language movement may be changing now owes much to these recent works.

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SECTION - 3

RELIGION

This section has four chapters. The first looks at what I call '*munazara* literature'. This is that kind of writing which draws upon the tradition of religious debate which was oral and the purpose of which was to refute a rival sect, sub-sect (maslak), philosophy or point of view. It is polemical and carries many features of the oral tradition which is why the genre of this writing is appropriately described by the term 'munazara'. These texts, like the well-known munazaras of the twentieth century onwards are in Urdu which became associated with Islam, among other reasons, because of the religious debates available in it. The chapter also provides insights into the construction of the religious 'self' and the 'other' both having boundaries defined and consolidated through arguments in the munazara literature.

The second article takes us back to the response of the Muslims to English. The whole discourse around English is part of the way Muslim identity was conceived of and how it changed when the British brought English to South Asia as the language of power. While aspects of the history of education, as well as language policies and practices during the British era, have covered much of what this chapter touches upon the treatment is new and it is helpful to have all aspects of the Muslim response to this aspect of modernity in one place.

The third chapter, that on the contemporary or near-contemporary Urdu writings about the events of 1857, seems a little out of place in this section because its focus is upon the perception of that major event in South Asian colonial history by (mainly) Muslim, Urdu-using contemporaries. However, the most interesting insight which emerges from this brief study is that the anti-British writings, while advocating resistance to British rule, inevitably referred to religion. Their appeal to religious rather than an pan-Indian nationalistic identity should serve as a corrective to those nationalists who perceive 1857 to the first 'Indian War of Independence' in a non-problematic manner.

The fourth chapter is on the inscriptions on Pakistani trucks. The idea is to investigate what the major themes of these inscriptions are? As it happens they are mostly romantic, fatalistic and about filial devotion. The religious inscriptions are in Arabic and they are mostly ritualistic. Ther are very few inscriptions belonging to the extremist or fundamentalist world view. As these inscriptions are pat of the owrldview of truck drivers and painters of trucks they

belong to the culture of the working classes which has not shifted to militant or fundamentalist Islam yet.

All the chapters touch upon the themes of identity construction as well as language usage which gives them a certain unity.

8

MUNAZARA LITERATURE

1. Introduction

The *Munāzarā* is defined by the *Encyclopedia of Islam* as follows:

> The scientific, in particular the theological-juridical, dispute on the one hand, the literary genre of the struggle for precedence on the other (Wagner 1993: 565).

Among South Asian Muslims, however, it is associated with theological disputes almost to the exclusion of the other meanings given above. Traditionally the *munāzarā* was held before an audience and often in the presence of a powerful personage who sometimes acted as an arbitrator. It 'was not only important for oral theological dispute' but also entered 'theological literature' (Wagner 1993: 566). There were rules for carrying out the debate (*ādāb al-djadal*) and treatises such as Shams al-Dīn Muhammad bin Ashraf al-Samarkandī's *Risālā al-Samarkandiyyā fī ādāb al-bahth* (c. 13 C) on the subject. In South Asian Islamic seminaries (*Madrassas*) the *Sharifiyyā* of Mīr Sharīf al-Jurjānī (1339-1413) and the *Rashīdiyyāh* of Abdul Rashīd Jaunpurī (1591-1672) are taught. However, it is not from the written text in Arabic, which has to be mastered with considerable difficulty, that the art of disputation is learned. The most useful way of learning it is by the example provided by the teachers and the prayer leaders who deliver the Friday sermon in mosques and Urdu books refuting ideological opponents which are the focus of this article. Indeed, the art of the *munāzarā* is at the heart of the teaching methodology in the *madrassas* as lectures on subjects such as the *'aqa' id* (beliefs); *fiqh* (the law) and the selection, emphases and exposition of the *ahādḥith* (prophetic traditions) illustrate.

Since certain features of the oral *munāzarā* to be described later enter into the literature about religious controversy in circulation in Pakistan, this literature is called the *munāzarā* literature in this article irrespective of whether it was ever presented orally or not. As its purpose is to refute (*rad*) the arguments of another sect, sub-sect (the distinctive beliefs of which are called *maslak*), heresy or an alien philosophy, it has also been referred to as *rad*-literature (or *rad*-texts) in my previous publications (Rahman 2008: 70).

2. Objective and Methodology

The objective of this article is to examine some of the *munāzarā* texts in the Urdu language which are in circulation among religious readers, both within and outside the

Madrassa, with a view to understanding their major themes and how they are likely to influence the formation of ideological identity and its 'other' in Pakistan. While a number of controversies are touched upon, one major text—an account of actual *munāzarās* between two Sunni sub-sects—will be presented in more detail so as to provide a deeper understanding of the *munāzarā* tradition as a heuristic device.

Urdu emerged as a major language of Islam in South Asia during the nineteenth century (Rahman 2006) and is also the language of the *munāzarā* thus, when we examine the institution of the *munāzarās* in South Asia, we are at the same time examining one major dimension of language-spread in the subcontinent.

The criterion for choosing the texts used for this study is their availability and circulation among religious people both within the *madrassas* and outside them in Pakistan. Thus, while certain classical texts on the *munāzarā* are absent, others, which are far less in scholarly worth, are present solely because they are regularly printed and disseminated to the public. The assumption here is that such texts, because of being in Urdu and because of their availability, feed into the worldview of religious people in Pakistan with which we are concerned here.

1. Review of Literature

The only detailed study of the *munāzarā* as a social institution in South Asia is Awil A. Powell's study of the debates between the Muslims and the Christian missionaries in north India before 1857 (Powell 1993). This book tells us that the initial missionary attacks on Islam, such as the Urdu tract *Dīn–i haqq kī taehqīq* (1842) by William Smith and Charles Leupolt, went unnoticed. However, the missionary Carl Pfander, who argued with the *ulema* between 1844 to 1847 at Agra, provoked opposition. Finally, Maulvi Āl-i Hasan of Lucknow participated in a *munāzarā* with Pfander in 1848 in Agra (Powell 1993: 191). Even more publicized was Rahmat Allah Kairanawi's debate with Pfander in 1854 at Agra. The rancour of these brushes with Christianity may have contributed to the militant resistance against British rule in north India in 1857 among the Muslim *ulema* (Powell 1993: 273). However, even after 1857, Muslims and Christians continued to engage in religious debates (Metcalf 1982: 214).

Debates between Christians and Muslims, as well as those between Arya Samajists and Muslims, during the 1920s are also mentioned by Barbara Metcalf. One such debate was between Maulana Mahmud Hasan Deobandi and two Ahl-i-Hadith debaters (Metcalf 1982: 212-214). This debate was carried out by letters but the rhetorical devices and the tone was that of an

oral *munāzarā*. In addition to this epistolary debate, there were face-to-face *munāzarās* between various sects of Muslims as well as Muslims and non-Muslims (Arya Samajists and Christians) (Metcalf 1982: 215-234). Such public events must have increased the consciousness of differing religious beliefs among urban populations. Thus, according to Barbara Metcalf:

> Pious people at the time lamented divisiveness among Hindus or among Muslims, respectively. But that very competition helped create a familiarity with religious issues that was unprecedented in Indian history (Metcalf 1982: 234).

Knowledge of these issues coupled with the increased means of communication which modernity makes available makes this 'familiarity' a potential source of increased conflict. It was probably because of this that the British authorities banned at least some highly inflammable religious literature between 1907 and 1947. The list of such material includes 26 works against Ahmedis by their opponents (Barrier 1974: 172-175); 13 anti-Shia works by Sunnis and 2 anti-Sunni ones by Shia's (Barrier 202-203) as well as Muslim attacks on Hinduism and Sikhism and Hindu attacks on Islam (Barrier 184-185 &190). However, the institution of the *munāzarā* flourished under British rule as we have seen and the books now in circulation in Pakistan are not among those banned either by the British or by the Pakistani authorities.

Surprisingly, studies of Pakistani *Madrassas* pay little attention to the *munāzarā*. Even the present author, who does mention it in passing, does not connect what he calls the *rad*-texts—Urdu writings meant to refute heresies, other sects and sub-sects and alien (Western) philosophies—with the *munāzarā* tradition (Rahman 2008: 70-71). Arshad Alam, an Indian scholar, calls the *rad*-texts of Rahman as 'non-*dars*' texts because they are not included in the printed curriculum of the Indian *Madrassa* he describes (Alam 2008: 51). He too does not explicitly connect these texts with the institution of the *munāzarā* but does go on to describe practices which are, indeed, the essence of that institution. For instance, he tells us that in the *Madrassa* Ashraffiyya in Mubarakpur, U.P (District Azamgarh, India), every Thursday evening students form groups of twenty or more and make speeches and sing verses (*nā't*) in praise of the Prophet. These speeches use arguments and other rhetorical skills to refute the ideas of the Deobandis. In another Barelvi *madrassa*, *Madrassa* Ain al-Islam in Gaya, Bihar, one group of students act out the role of the Barelvis and the other of Deobandis. They ask questions and counter-questions and hone their debating skills—the very skills one needs in a *munāzarā*—till the Deobandis are defeated (Alam 2008: 55-58).

The kind of literature which is the focus of attention here derives in important ways from the *munāzarā* tradition as practiced by the Urdu-using Muslims of India and Pakistan. As Urdu is understood by most educated Muslims in Pakistan and north India these books are internalized rather than Arabic ones. In some cases the books in circulation are actually transcripts of *munāzarās* which took place between rival sub-sects such as the one between the Deobandis and Barelvis given below. In other cases they were written as tracts to refute rival sects, sub-sects or heresies. In such cases the style of argumentation, the use of irony, wit, poetry and other rhetorical devices come directly from the oral genre of the *munāzarā*. Even the acerbity of tone, so much the characteristic of a face-to-face encounter, is found in the books presumably because the words of the opponent with beliefs which are objectionable are quoted and the response they evoke is one of antagonism and anger. That is why I use the term *munāzarā*-literature as an alternative to my earlier term of *rad*-literature for the literature of religious controversy mentioned here.

2. Ideological Divisions Necessitating Refutation

Pakistan is a Muslim majority country but there are sectarian, sub-sectarian and other ideological divisions within Muslims. First, there is the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian division (for the rise of the Shia sect see Jafri 1979). Although no official figures are available, the Shi'as are said to be about 20 per cent of the Muslim population of the country. The majority Sunni sect is divided among sub-sects (*maslaks*) such as the Barelvis, Deobandis, Ahl-i-Hadith and revivalist groups such as the Jamat-i-Islami whose views will be described later. The Shi'as are also sub-divided into sub-sects but these are not significant with respect to the dissemination of polemical literature because, in the face of such overwhelming Sunni dominance, the Shi'as of Pakistan do not flaunt their ideological differences in public nor is their literature openly on sale all over the country. Hence, it will only be the debates between Sunnis which will be taken into account in this article.

It is not only the sects or *maslaks* which need to refute each other; it is also doctrines which are regarded as heretical such as those of the Ahmedis. The Ahmedis are followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed (1830-1908) of the town Qadiyan now in India. He believed himself to be a messiah or a non-legislative prophet. He believed that Prophet Muhammad was the 'seal'—one who authenticates or is the most excellent—of the prophets but not the last one (Khatam= 'seal' and also 'the end') (Friedmann 1989). The Ahmedis clashed with the other Muslims

initially—Mirza Ghulam Ahmed himself being given to debate—but are now merely struggling for survival as a non-Muslim minority in Pakistan. There are only 800 students in Ahmedi *Madrassas* in Jhang (Rabwa District) but there is widespread alarm and many conspiracy theories to the detriment of the Ahmedis in Pakistan (Butt 2006: 7). Moreover, certain Western philosophies—socialism, capitalism, individualism etc—are also refuted by the *ulema*. In addition to that, in the guise of 'comparative religions', other religions such as Christianity are also refuted.

The number of *Madrassa* students in the Punjab during 2005 according to police reports are as follows:

Sects/sub-sects	Number of students	Percentage
Deobandis	200,246	45.4
Barelvis	199,733	45.2
Ahl-i-Hadith	34,253	7.8
Shi'a	7,333	1.7
Total	441,565	-
Source: Butt 2006		

The figures given by the Government of Pakistan for roughly the same period, this time about the number of *Madrassa* not students, are as follows:

	2006 Number	Percentage
Deobandis	3454	30.1
Barelvis	2654	23.1
Ahl-i-Hadith	Not given	-
Jamat-i-Islami	906	7.9
Shi'a	Not given	-
Others	934	8.1
Not affiliated	3543	30.8
Total	11,491	-
Source: GOP 2006: 215		

The major *maslaks* of the Sunnis are the Deobandis and the Barelvis. The Ahl-i-Hadith, also called Wahabis, are far less in number. Let us, therefore, look at the Deobandi and Barelvi sub-sects in Pakistan. The Barelvis are followers of Ahmed Raza Khan (1870-1920) of Bareilly, a city in U. P (India). The views of Barelvis which we encounter in the public, and with which we are concerned here, do not derive necessarily from the writings of Ahmed Raza Khan. However, because they are popular they are the focus of our attention here. The central belief of the Barelvis who enter into debate and discussion with the others is that the Prophet Muhammad had knowledge of the unseen (‘*ilm ul ghaib*), was created from radiance (*Nūr*), and that he had the power to intercede or help his followers in life and after death. Moreover, they also believe that the intercession of saints is possible and they control the events of the world through mystical, esoteric means (for a biography of the founder and the development of his views see Sanyal 1996).

The Deobandi movement was founded in 1866 at the *Madrassa* called the Darul Ulum Deobandi at about 90 miles northeast of Delhi by Maulana Qasim Nanautvi (1833-1877) and his associates (Metcalf 1982). The other great figure associated with this *madrassa* is Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1829-1905) who is regarded as one of the leaders and exemplars of the Deobandi school of thought. The Deobandis regard the intercession of saints, the veneration of tombs, and other practices of folk Islam as sinful innovations (*bidā*). The major point of controversy with the Barelvis, however, was that they believed that the Prophet had only as much knowledge of the unseen as God gave him and that he was made of earth like ordinary human beings.

The Deobandi-Barelvi differences led to *munāzarās* which will be described in more detail below. However, even more importantly it has led to violence in Pakistan in the last decade or more. For instance, the number of the organizations of a social and political nature by 2003 was 245 out of which 48 were Barelvis and 44 were Deobandis. The two sub-sects have had theological quarrels which turned violent in 2001 (*New Statesman* 24 Sept 2001). The Sunni Tehrik (ST), a Barelvi organization, has been fighting against the Sipah-e-Sahaba, an anti-Shi’a Deobandi organization. On 18 May 2001, when Maulana Saleem Qadri, Chairman of the ST, was killed (*Newsline* June 2001), there was violence in Karachi for several days (UNHCR 2008).

While the Deobandi-Barelvi differences are the major focus of this article, other debated issues, such as the orthodox *ulemas’* (Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahl-i-Hadith) objections to the

views of Abul ‘Ala Maududi (1903-1979) (Nasr 1996); the refutation of Shi’a beliefs by Sunni *ulema*; and objections to Western ideologies, again by the *ulema*, are also touched upon in passing.

3. The place of the *Munāzarā* Texts in Pakistan and North India

Although not part of the variant form of the Dars-i-Nizami used in the *Madrassas* of South Asia, the *munāzarā*-texts are used in them. One example is from a *Madrassa* Ashraffiyya (India) where, as mentioned earlier, these books were ‘extremely popular with students’ (Alam 2008: 51). The books were written to refute the doctrines or *maslak* of the Deobandis and the Ahl-i Hadith. What the students learn are the central beliefs of their *maslak* and the arguments used to support them. And, therefore, the ‘identity which is created in such a setting is at once oppositional, depending on the negation of the other, feeding on a sense of being wronged, and committed to the “true Islam” of their *maslak*’ (Alam 2008: 59).

The present author also found the *munāzarā*-texts significant in the *madrassas* of Pakistan. First, the printed syllabi of several *madrassas* had books to refute the beliefs of the Ahmedis as well as rival sects (Sunnis versus Shi’as and the reverse); and sub-sects among Sunnis themselves (Barelvis, Deobandis and Ahl-i Hadith) as well as revivalist interpretations of Islam such as that of Maudūdi. The *Report on Religious Seminaries* (GOP 1988) lists several such books including Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanautvi’s *Hadiyyat al-Shiā*—a polemical book refuting Shi’a beliefs—which remains in print (see Annexure 1). Recently (after 2002), however, *Madrassa* teachers do not admit to teaching anything which could incite sectarian violence. However, the *maslak* is still taught and the views of the major theorists—who contributed in varying degrees to the controversies between the *maslaks* and other ideological debates—are well known. The students also make speeches and learn the art of the *munāzarā* from the fiery preachers who harangue their listeners through passionate sermons in the style of the *munāzarā*.

The books about ideological controversy are in circulation since they are regularly printed and, besides the *Madrassa*, they are read by other religious readers. Readers, therefore, form their views about religion, as well as their own religious identity, from these disputations and polemical tracts. There are also *munāzarās* on the internet including one between the Sunnis and Shi’as on some points held in Manchester in 1999 (Munāzarā 1999). Some of them, including one between the Barelvis against the Deobandis and the Wahabis (which are called

'Batil Firqas=Untrue sects] and which took place on 31 July 2006 is also available (Nooremadinah 2006). Others are available on http://www.Haqchaaryaar.net/Munazara.html and can be downloaded. Some of the sites are visited by many people. (www.yarasool.info). It is not possible to claim whether this learning experience makes those are exposed to them less tolerant of the religious 'Other' than they would have been if they had read other books of a religious nature. However, the possibility the *munāzarā* creates or increases sectarian antagonism cannot be denied.

4. **Religious Writings in the Public Domain**

Most writings on Islam in South Asia are not about controversies nor are they polemical. They are about the traditions (*hadīth*) of the Prophet; commentaries on the Qur'an (*tafsīr*); the Islamic law (*Shari'ā*) and theological studies of various kinds. In addition, there are a large number of books on various themes of folk Islam: *Nūr Nāmās, Karbalā Nāmās, Jang Nāmās* and so on. The *Nūr Nāmās* trace out the creation of the world itself as contingent upon the being of the Prophet who, it is believed, was made of radiance (*nūr*). The versified books in Urdu, Punjabi, Pashto, Sindhi and other languages are about the presence of the *nūr,* or the spirit of the majesty of the Prophet in the phenomenal world from eternity. The '*Karbalā*' and '*Jang*' *Nāmās* are about the Battle of Karbala (680 CE) between the Omayyad caliph Yazīd bin Mu'āwiyā (645-683) and Imām Hussain (624-680), the maternal grandson of the Prophet.

As mentioned earlier, these stories in verse are found in most of the languages used by the Muslims of South Asia. The present author has mentioned those in Urdu (Rahman 2002: 208), Punjabi (p. 386), Pashto (pp. 356-360) and Sindhi (pp. 328-329) in some detail. Yet another sub-genre are books about the Islamic law and practices in these languages. These books, again in verse, are meant to instruct Muslims about the rituals of Islam and provide guidance to live according to Islamic norms of behaviour. Like the chapbooks on folk Islam, they too are in Punjabi (Rahman 2002: 381-386), Sindhi (p. 328), Pashto (pp. 356-358), Balochi (pp. 431-432) and Brahvi (pp. 429-430). This sub-genre, which may be called the '*Shariā* guide books', finds its crowning achievement in the Urdu work called the *Bahishtī Zēwar* of Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi (1863-1943) and the *Bahār-ē-Shariat* (1939). This book is in 20 volumes, The first 17 were written by Amjad Ali Qadri Rizvi a disciple of Ahmed Raza Khan and the remaining three by his disciples after his death. The former is a Deobandi work and the latter a Barelvi one. While the former is written in simple Urdu and the verdicts (*fatāwa*) are given in synoptic and

unequivocal terms so as not to confuse the reader, the latter contains detailed legal opinions and statements of faith which presume both learning and familiarity with the style of argumentation used by the *ulema*. Possibly for these reasons the *Bahishtī Zēwar* is very well known even among those who are not Deobandis. Yet another form of popular religious literature is that which deals with after-life (called *Qiyāmat Nāmāhs* or *Ahwāl-al-Ākhirat*). One of the most popular book in circulation is the Urdu translation of Syed Qutab's *Manāzir-e-Qiāmat* (Qutab 1975) which is an exposition of belief in the life hereafter and, hence, at a higher intellectual than the ordinary popular books of this genre. Moreover, this is not a polemical work nor does it use the disputations style of the *munāzarā*. It merely texts from the Qur'ān and the Hadith to describe the hereafter, hell, heavens and redemption. The book confirms beliefs which are already current among Pakistani Muslims.

All the sub-genres of Islamic writings mentioned above are outside the scope of the present article. They have been mentioned here in order to make it clear that the *munāzarā* texts are not the only kind of learning input available to religious Pakistanis.

5. The World of the *Munāzarā*

The purpose of the *munāzarā* was to convince the opponent of the falsity of his (all *munāzarās* in South Asia in the public domain were between males) views. This was done by appeal to sacred texts and deductions from their implications. The debaters, called *munāzir*, began with courtesies and honorifics with names and, though the honorifics remained till the end, the courtesies gave place to anger, insinuations and insult. Both parties often ended by apostatizing the other and neither was persuaded to abandon their position. Victory was claimed by the party which was reporting the events though in many cases the official judge of the proceedings decided in favour of one party. In some cases the assembled audience cheered one party which was then deemed to be the victor.

In all such discourses, rhetoric, figures of speech, sarcasm, and wit and, of course, arguments from the Qur'ān and the Hadīth are used to prove a point. As the language of the *munāzarā* in Pakistan and north India is Urdu, a language which contains a vast tradition of amorous *ghazal* poetry, the disputants *(manazir*) use couplets which they otherwise condemn for their aesthetic, amorous and erotic references. Polemics and oratory are very much the weapons of the debaters but very often these degenerate into acerbic personal attacks, slander, allegations of apostasy and heresy on the opponent and even vitriolic invectives.

Although the purpose of the *munāzarā* was declared to be heuristic, it was not of immediate educational value because the atmosphere of the actual event was competitive, argumentative and belligerent. However, despite the anger and the polemics, the *munāzarā* contributed to the educational discourse because it made the nature of the doctrinal disagreements clear. The hairsplitting which went with it brought out in the open what might have been taught in the *madrassa* or in a religious family but which did not come into relief in the absence of other, dissenting, opinions. It is, indeed, because of the *munāzarā* tradition that sectarian and sub-sectarian orthodoxy defines itself, marks boundaries, and stands in opposition to its rival orthodoxies.

6. Major Religious Controversies Among South Asian Muslims

The Shia-Sunni debate is found in a large number of books. The most famous refutation of Shi'a beliefs from the Sunni point of view is the *Hadiyat ush Shi'ā* by Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanautvi. The book is in print being used in the Deobandi *madrassas* and read by many others though it was first published during the author's lifetime.

The style of writing is like that of a *munāzarā* though the Shi'a point of view is not from a member of that sect but is mediated through the Maulana's thinking. At places Shi'a opponents are mentioned and faults are found in their *munāzarā* practices for instance, he says at one point, 'and which indecent person has taught him the art of *munāzarā* that he gives an argument without proof' (Nanautvi 1962: 335). The purpose of the book is to refute Shi'a beliefs— that the leadership of the Muslims descended to the Caliph Ali and his children from Fatima, the Prophet's daughter, who are called the *ahl-ē-bait*. A number of other beliefs, that the Qur'an has more than the thirty parts (*sipārē*) which it has at present; that the first three caliphs were usurpers and, therefore, should be criticized (*tabarrā*); that the spiritual leadership of the Muslims descended to Ali and then to his heirs, the *imāms* (leaders), who can cancel, put in abeyance or modify all religious injunctions including even the orders of the Qur'ān and so on— are refuted at length. The writing takes on the acrimonious overtones of the *munāzarā* in reference to the Shi'a opponent's works which are cited repeatedly in the book. In this context it needs to be mentioned that remarks of the Shi'a writers—the ones cited here and others—are equally acrimonious and the personages revered by the Sunnis are held up to criticism which necessarily appears to be harsh to Sunnis.

The debate between the Sunnis themselves, which are the focus of this article, are given in many books. One such book, summarized by Arshad Alam, giving the Barelvi view against the Deobandis is called *Zalzalā*. The book is written by Arshadul Qadiri (1925-2002) and he graduated from the Barelvi seminary called the Mardrassa Ashrafiyya in Mubarakpur in 1944. He refuted the Deobandi *maslak* in a number of books. *Zalzalā* was published in 1972 and is circulated widely in India and Pakistan. The book begins with the well known Deobandi argument that the Prophet did not have knowledge of the unseen (‘*ilm-i Ghaib*) except as much as God granted him. After referring to passages from the Deobandi *ulema* claiming this, he points out that the Deobandis nevertheless credit their own leaders—Muhammad Ismail (1781-1831), Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Ashraf Ali Thanvi and Manzur No’mani—with such esoteric knowledge and supernatural powers (Alam 2008: 52-53).

The second book *Dāwat-i Insāf* (1993) develops the same arguments: the Deobandi belief in the miracles of the elders of their own *maslak*; the alleged disrespect towards the Prophet by denying him knowledge of the unseen; the Deobandi preaching against visiting the graves of saints and denying that they constituted a ‘spiritual ladder’ to the divine; and, finally, the Deobandi belief that some of the folk practices of Indian Muslims are an innovation (*bidā*) (Alam 2008: 54). Qadiri subjects all these Deobandi views to criticism and points out that they were internally inconsistent because, in fact, the Deobandis believed in the spiritual powers and knowledge of the unseen in the case of their pioneers. The book was written, as he put it, to enable the Muslims to decide as to the justice of the case he presented to them.

Another debate is between the Ahl-i-Hadīth (called *Wahābīs*) and the other Sunni sub-sects. The Ahl-i-Hadith claim to get direct guidance from the Qur’ān, Hadith and the companions of the Prophet (*Salf*). They do not, at least in theory, follow any of the traditional interpretations of the *fiqh*: Hanafī, Hanbalī, Mālikī and Shāfi’. Moreover, even more strictly than the Deobandis, they oppose the intervention of the saints and other institutions and beliefs of folk Islam (Ludhianvi 1975: 30-32). However, the Ahl-i-Hadīth are a small minority in Pakistan though they are much strengthened by the Saudi ideology of Wahabism:

Yet another debate which went on among the *Madrassa ulema* was occasioned by the writings of Abul ‘ala Maudūdī. Two books which are in circulation are by Sajid Qureshi (1999) and *Fitnā-e-Maudūdiat* (Zakria 1975).

Qureshi argues that Maududi's famous book *Tafhīm ul Qur'ān* is not in accordance with the established, orthodox principles of writing exegeses of the Qur'an. Whereas the orthodox practice accepts all the authentic traditions of the Prophet (*ahādīth*) as true, Maududi uses his personal sense of understanding Islam which implies rejection of those traditions which, in his view, do not conform to the spirit of Islam. Qureshi rejects this argument and, moreover, alleges that Maududi refers to the Bible which, therefore, gives prominence to Christian and Jewish scriptures which have been superceded by the Qur'ān.

In the other book, the *Fitnā*, the author claims that Maududi deviates from the established meanings of concepts as they are understood by the *ulema*. First, he makes the case for understanding Islam without reference to the works of the traditional jurists and the *ulema* which is misleading. Second, he does not distinguish between worship (*ibādāt*) and good conduct (mu'āmlāt) which is deviation. And, third, he denigrates absorption into worship which, again, is misleading. In short, according to Zakaria, Maududi's work is seriously misleading for ordinary Muslims and, therefore, may be considered as *fitnā.*

Maududi's own criticism of the orthodox *ulema* on the graunds that they are hidebound, narrow and pedantic and, therefore, do not understand the true spirit of Islam is well known (Maududi 1974). However, while he is impatient and dismissive of them, the *ulema* who oppose him catch every argument of his and test it according to their received interpretations and refute it with horror.

7. The Case Study of a Paradigmatic *Munāzarā* Book

The term 'paradigm' is being used in Kuhn's meaning of 'models or examples' (Kuhn 1962: 175). The book described below is a representative example of the way a *munāzarā* is conducted and what the emotional tone of such an event is. However, the summarized arguments given below do not do justice to the book. This summary is based on actual *munāzarās* held between the Deobandi debater Maulānā Muhammad Manzūr Nu'mānī (1905-1997) and a number of his Barelvi opponents. The *munāzarās* were held in several cities of British India and they were public events. As the Deobandis, who have transcribed them in this book, describe them as victories hence the name of the book is *Futūhāt-i Nu'māniyyāh* (The Triumphs of *Nu'mān*).

The following *munāzarās* are recorded in *Futūhāt-i Nu'māniyyāh*.

7.1 Munāzarā-e-Durū 1928

7.2	Munāzarā-e-Sunbhal	1928
7.3	Munāzarā-e-Lahore	1933
7.4	Munāzarā-e-Giā	1936
7.5	Munāzarā-e-Barēli	1935
7.6	Munāzarā-e-Silānwāli	1936

They are described below as succinctly as is consonant with the requirement of providing insights into the institution of the *munāzarā* itself.

7.1 **Munāzarā-e-Durū**

Duru is a small town in the Naini Tal district of India. The inhabitants of this town were mostly Barelvis. A certain *hakīm* (physician), called Muhammad Hanif, had a relative who was married to a certain Pir Baksh's sister. The people of the town forced Pir Baksh to get the marriage annulled on the grounds that the *Hakīm* was a Deobandi and this sub-sect (the Deobandis) were disrespectful towards the Prophet, did not believe in the end of prophethood etc. The Hakīm, therefore, requested his sub-sect to hold a *munāzarā* with the Barelvis to clear these misunderstandings about his religious beliefs. The dates set for the event were the 18, 19 and 20th of July 1928.

Maulana Muhammad Ismail and Maulana Muhammad Manzur represented the Deobandis and Maulana Rahem Ilahi represented the Barelvis. Both parties arrived in Duru on 18 July and the magistrate of the town fixed the time and place of the *munāzarā*. The debate was initiated by Maulana Ismail who praised the Holy Prophet but pointed out that, despite being perfect as a human being, he was not the creator and only God had that distinction. Rahem Ilahi, in response, attacked an *ālim* of the Deobandis called Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi. After this the *munāzarā* proper started.

Here the Deobandi compiler claims that the Barelvis did not want to carry out with the *munāzarā*, a claim which they make on other occasions too, but there is no independent means to verify this claim. However, when the *munāzarā* start the Deobandis are represented by Maulana Manzur while the Barelvis are represented by Rahem Ilahi. The gist of the argument is the Deobandi claim—made by Ashraf Ali Thanvi in *Hifz ul Īmān*—that the Prophet did not have knowledge of the unseen (*'ilm ul ghaib*) except that much which was given to him by God. The Barelvis contested this and especially objected to the language used by Ashraf Ali Thanvi who said, while arguing that all beings have as much knowledge of the unseen as God given them,

that the Prophet had as much knowledge of the unseen as God gave him and that animals, insane persons etc also had some knowledge of the unseen which God gave them. The Barelvis found this so offensive that they declared Maulana Thanvi an apostate (*kāfir*).

The *munāzarā* lasted for three days. Besides the knowledge of the unseen, the end of prophethood was also discussed. The Deobandis clarified that they did believe that Prophet Muhammad was the 'seal of the Prophets' (*Khatim un nabī 'yin*) but the 'Seal' was to be used both chronologically and qualitatively i.e. he was the best, or most exalted, too. Here, again, the Barelvis objected to the language used in the writings of the Deobandis. They pointed out that the Barelvi argument that chronology in itself did not confer value was meant to denigrate the Prophet.

The *munāzarā* lasted three days and, at least according to this account, the Barelvis very aggressively and repeatedly condemned the Deobandis as unbelievers (*kāfir*). Both the debaters used couplets in Urdu and Persian, some of them very amorous, in the course of their arguments. In the end the debate ended without any consensus except that another *munāzarā* was to be held in Sanbhal from the 22nd till the 24th of October 1928.

7.2 **Munāzarā-e-Sanbhal**

Sanbhal is a town in District Muradabad, U. P, in India. The *munāzarā* was held here on 24 and 25 October 1928. This time the Barelvis were represented by Maulana Hashmat Ali and the Deobandis, as before, by Maulanā Nu'mānī. Once again the subjects discussed and the arguments used were much the same as before. This time, however, the debaters asked each other for more written statements about particular points than before. The Barelvis celebrated their victory after the third day but, according to their opponents, this was only to cover their defeat.

7.3 **Munāzarā-e-Lahore**

This *munāzarā* was scheduled to be held at Lahore in January 1933 but did not take place. According to the Deobandis the Barelvis forced the authorities to cancel it in view of the possibility of violence. The Deobandi arguments which were to be used to refute the Barelvis were published in the form of a pamphlet and this is reproduced in the *Futūhāt-i Nu'māniyyāh* (pp. 295-419). Here the Deobandis argue that Ahmed Raza Khan had apostasized Shah Ismail Shaheed (d. 1831) as well as the pioneers of the Deobandi sub-sect (or movement) Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanotvi, Maulana Rashid Ahmed Gangohi and Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi.

This *fatwa* was sent to the *ulema* of Makkah and Madina in 1905 and they endorsed it. The Deobandis argued that this endorsement was obtained by quoting statements from the works of the above writers out of context. Thus, when the *ulema* of Arabia were apprised of the true import of the works in question, they took back their earlier verdict. They did this, however, after asking twenty six questions in Arabic which were answered in writing in the same language by Maulānā Khalīl Ahmed (d. 1927). These are given in the original Arabic as well as Urdu translation in a book which is in circulation in Pakistan (Saharanpuri 1984).

7.4 **Munāzarā-e-Gia**

Gia is a city in the province of Bihar in India. The *munāzarā* was held on 20-21 February 1936. The Deobandis, as before, were represented by Mulana Manzūr Nu'mānī while the Barelvis were represented by Maulana Hashmat Ali. Here too, the Deobandis spent much energy on refuting the Barelvi charge that their pioneers, such as Maulana Nanotvi, were apostates. The subjects under discussion were the same as before and a number of written statements were exchanged. This time, however, on the second day there was so much unpleasantness that the authorities intervened and the *munāzarā* was stopped.

7.5 **Munāzarā-e-Bareli**

This was held at Bareli between 27-30 April 1935 in the *Madrassa* Jamia Rizvia which, being a Barelvi stronghold, was considered an act of great moral courage by the Deobandis. Maulana Sardar Ahmad argued on behalf of the Barelvis and, as usual, Maulana Nu'mānī on behalf of the Deobandis. The subjects dwelt upon were the same and the arguments were also the same. The *munāzarā* continued for four days. In the end Muhammad Shabbir, the Secretary of the Islamic Commercial Committee, Lucknow and the patron and judge of the *munāzarā* gave his verdict that the Deobandis were not heretics as alleged by their opponents (Ibid 289-291).

7.6 **Munāzarā-e-Silānwāli**

Silanwali is a small town in district Sargodha, now in Pakistan. This *munāzarā* was held here. The debater on behalf of the Barelvis was Maulana Hashmat Ali and the Deobandis were represented by Maulana Manzur Nu'mānī. It began in February 1936. A president was elected and terms and conditions, including the time to be given to each debater, were agreed upon. The subjects and the arguments were the same as before. This time too there was much heated debate and the atmosphere became very hostile by the end of the *munāzarā.*

These *munāzarās* have been given in some detail so as to give some idea of how the debate was governed by rules. However, once emotions were stirred up, the opponents descended from arguments to polemics and even to invectives. Their relevance as extra curricular reading material for *Madrassa* students and general readers of a religious orientation is testified by the fact that they are still in print.

It should be mentioned here that not all books in circulation in Pakistan, even about religious controversies, follow the discursive features of the *munāzarā*. Some are descriptive in a style which nearly imitates academic writing. *Ikhtilaf-e-Ummat*, for instance, has been written from a Deobandi point of view but is not in the *munāzarā* tradition (Ludhianwi 1975).

8. The *Munāzarā* and Reform in Religious Education in Pakistan

As brought out in the previous sections, the institution of the *munāzarā* brings out the ideological differences which lie at the core of the different sects, sub-sects (*maslak*) and the Islamic identity, as differentiated from non-Islamic and secular Muslim identities, among Pakistani Muslims. However, only the students of *madrassas* are taught the art of disputation while other religious people do not get any formal training of this kind. Other people are, however, exposed to *munāzarās* which take place from time to time and, more often, to the books based upon them which have been mentioned earlier. They are also exposed to the internet versions of *munāzarās* and the audio-tapes of some famous events of this kind. Above all, since every leader of prayers (*maulvi*) picks up the verbal style of the *munāzarās*, the congregations of Friday prayers and other such events are often exposed to argumentation of this kind.

As such, it is surprising that the *munāzarā* and the books on refuting other opinions (*munāzarā* texts) are not mentioned in any proposal on reforming Islamic education in Pakistan. The International Crises Group (ICG), for instance, has written several reports about the *madrassas* and Islamic militancy in Pakistan. The assumption of the ICG, in common with other Pakistanis, is that modern education can counteract the tendency towards violence which religious education will presumably create. Thus one report says:

> There are many precedents that show that modern education can coexist with these two features of *madrassa* education. NGOs such as National Rural Support Program have helped some local communities to transform their *madrassas* by including modern education. The religious identity remains intact but there is less emphasis on traditional subjects (ICG 2002: 29).

Christopher Candland, who has published on this very subject, points out, however, that many *madrassas* do 'teach these subjects' natural sciences, computer studies etc) but that modern education 'is not a guarantee of an enlightened mind' (Candland 2008: 111). Indeed, the Islamist militants who were involved in the 9/11 attacks had generally attended secular educational institutions (Roy 2004: 310). However, Candland too does not recommend anything except an 'alternative curriculum' based on those teachings from the seared texts which teach one 'how to relate peacefully with other communities through goodwill and tolerance' (Candland 2008: 111).

Many officials and foreign donors working on the *madrassas* of Pakistan blame the Dars-i-Nizami which, they claim, is stagnant and very conservative because some texts in it come from the 13th century (The curriculum is described in Robinson 2002:249-251. More details are in Sufi 1941: 17). However, these texts are about purely theological matters which do not emphasize *jihad* to the exclusion of other duties. Moreover, because they belong to the medieval age they do not refer to contemporary events which Muslims regard as being unfriendly acts towards them. Among these are the creation of Israel by dislocating Palestinian Arabs from their homes, the discriminatory policies of Israelis towards them later, the post-9/11 occupation of the U. S and its allies of Islamic lands such as Afghanistan and Iraq. These contemporary realities create and sustain the anti-Western backlash among Muslim countries which we are witnessing and it is not the Dars-i-Nizami but the scores of pamphlets written in the polemical style of the *munāzarā* which are sold outside mosques which make people aware of them.

Moreover, the *Dars* is in Arabic and is memorized (though, like textbooks in secular institutions, they are not meant to be memorized) while the *munāzarā* texts are in Urdu and are internalized. They provide ready-made arguments which the debater or preacher can use easily and which the audience understands and responds to emotionally. Also, the *Dars* precedes the Deobandi, Barelvi and Maududi interpretations of Islam. It does not even dwell upon the Shi'a-Sunni differences nor does it refer to the heresies of the present time. It is mainly concerned with theological matters and these are far removed form the antagonistic religious identities which are in conflict with each other in Pakistan today. In short it is not the *Dars-i Nizāmī*, which consists of the Qur'ān, *Hadīth* and exegesis which creates the sectarian intolerance among *madrassa* students but the *munāzarā* texts which are extra-curricular and, therefore, normally ignored by would-be reformers of *Madrassa*. For the same reasons, those religious readers whose staple fare

is not the canonical texts of Islam nor the eclectic and tolerant writings of the mystics, would also tend to be sectarian and intolerant. A large number of religious readers, however, confine themselves to prayers, the Qur'ān and chapbooks of mystical or folk Islam. Thus, even among religious readers, it cannot be claimed that the texts described above are the only informal learning experience available to Pakistanis. What can be suggested, however, is that those who are exposed to the *munāzarā* texts are more liable to develop a disputatious, intolerant religious identity than others. To sum up, the *munāzarā* texts rather than mainstream religious education contributes to the acerbity and friction which makes the Pakistani religious scene a matter of concern for those who aspire for peace in the country.

These pamphlets and books will not form part of any scheme for curricular reform since they are not part of the Dars-i-Nizami. Indeed, no college or university course on Islam even mentions them and, while some *madrassa* syllabi do refer to them as supplementary reading material, not all of them do so. This means that *madrassa* reforms, as presently envisaged, cannot remove a major cause of intolerance towards other religious and ideological beliefs. Inasmuch as these are influenced by the *munāzarā* texts, they will remain part of the Pakistani, religious world view.

This being so, can such polemical texts be banned? In view of the British experience of banning controversial literature—such literature went underground and banning itself went with authoritarianism --(Barrier 1974), it would be unrealistic to suggest such an extreme measure. It would provide the Islamists with another grievance, undermine democratic values further, and probably backfire as such literature will then go underground.

Working with the *ulema* to reduce the volume of such writings could have positive results. But, above all, let us remember that ideological differences have always been a part of the Islamic world. They are being translated now, as they have sometimes been in the past, in violence because of government policies. For instance, poor people were recruited in the name of *jihad* to fight the proxy wars of the U. S. A against the soviet Union in the 1980s in Afghanistan; they were also used, again in the name of *jihad*, by the Pakistani intelligence agencies to fight against India in Kashmir between 1989 to 2002 when the policy was put on hold or reversed. Being armed and inspired with religious zeal, they indulged in sectarian killings in Pakistan and now try to impose a code of life they regard as sacred upon the whole country. These are political and economic matters and the solutions must be political and economic. Curricular

reform—especially that which does not touch upon the informal input into religious education—will not change present realities in Pakistan.

9. Conclusion

This article looks at the institution of debate, the *munāzarā*, in the religious education sector of Pakistan. It argues that the *munāzarā* occupies an important position in *madrassa* education and the clergy creates its identity around a core of differences from other sects, sub-sects and heretical or alien beliefs which are brought out in the open in *munāzarās*. Moreover, certain books and pamphlets embodying the form of argumentation and other features of the *munāzarā* are part of the informal, extra-curricular reading material both of *madrassa* students and teachers as well as religious people outside it. This kind of literature emphasizes differences and, therefore, presumably predisposes those who are exposed to it to intolerance of the 'other'. However, the solution of this problem is not to ban such literature but to reduce Muslim anger and change government policies in the direction of avoiding violence by non-state actors in neighbouring countries.

Annexure-1

BOOKS PRESCRIBED AS READING

MATERIAL FOR MADRASSA STUDENTS

DEOBANDIS		
Christianity	*Isāiyat kyā Hai?*	Maulana Mohammad Taqi Usmani
Ahmedi Beliefs	*Qāidiāni Mazhab, Qaidāniat* and 6 other books.	Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi
Unbelief *	*Islam aur Maghribiat kī Kash ma kash* and 8 other books	Abul Hasan Alī Nadvi
Socialism/ Communism	*Ishtirākiat aur Islām*	Mas ‘ud Alam Nadvi
	Islām aur Ishtirākiat and 2 other books.	Maulana Kandhalvi
Shia’ ism	*Hadiat al-Shi’ā*	Maulana Qasim Nanautvi
	Hidāiyat al-Shi’ā and 6 other books.	Maulana Rashid Ahmed Gangohi
Barelvi beliefs	14 books including Nu’mānī	
Other ‘false beliefs’ (*firqāhā-e-bātila*)	*Mahāsba ‘Ilmi Jaizā Maudūdi Mazhab* and 11 other books.	Qazi Mazhar Hussain
	Source GOP 1988: 71-74	
BARELVIS		
Books under *‘taqābil Adiān’* (comparative religions) are not specified except four including *Bahār-i Shariat* (Vol-1) GOP 1988: 75		
AHL-I-HADITH		
They also mention *‘taqābil Adiān’* (Ibid, 91-92),		
AHL-I-SHI’A		
They mention *‘taehqīq-ē-adiān* or *mazāhib*’ (research on religious and ideology) ibid, 93.		

Note: These books are not part of the traditional *Dars-i-Nizami*. Not all of them are written in the *munāzarā* style. However, their purpose is to refute other doctrines.

* Though given under the label of refutation of ‘unbelief’, the book refutes and criticizes modernity and argues that the West dominates Muslim countries them through their own elite.

9

THE MUSLIM RESPONSE TO ENGLISH IN SOUTH ASIA

Introduction

Pakistan was created out of British India in 1947. The British used English in the domains of power---government, administration, judiciary, military, higher education, higher commerce, media, the corporate sector---which made it the most prestigious and coveted language in this part of the world. The Pakistani rulers have continued with this policy so that it remains the principal language for acquiring power in the country (Rahman 2002).

A number of writers have written on the role of English in education (Abbas 1993; Malik F 1996; Mansoor 1993 and 2002; Rahman 1996 and 2002), but there is no detailed treatment of the response of South Asian Muslims to it; the construction of new identities with reference to it; the social and economic changes brought about in Muslim society in South Asia because of it; its effect on the world view of Pakistani Muslims; the way it is distributed in society by the state and whether the process is unjust and unequal and, therefore, a potential source of creating polarization and resentment in society.

Methodology

The historical reception of English by South Asian Muslims has already been studied by historians and this data is consolidated here to provide new insights and create analytical categories which help us in understanding Pakistani society at present. The part dealing with the distribution of English by the colonial and the Pakistani state likewise comes from documents and other published sources.

The world view of students form different socio-economic classes and corresponding educational institutions, teaching no English to using English almost as a first language, comes from a survey of 488 students who filled in questionnaires in late 2002 and early 2003 on issues such as militancy or peace (in Kashmir); equal rights for Muslims and non-Muslims; and of men and women in Pakistan. The incomes of the families of students are given in Annexure A and their responses are in Annexure B.

Historical Background

One of the arguments advanced by the Anglicists---the British officers who wanted. English rather than the classical languages of Indian Islam (Persian and Arabic) to be promoted in India---was that it would dilute the opposition to British rule. The view had been expressed even by Charles Grant (1746-1823), a director of the East India Company, in his *observations* (1792). He hoped that English literature would undermine the beliefs of the Indians. However, Grant was also afraid that it would teach them 'English liberty and the English form of government' (Grant 1792: 92). It took almost a century to shake off the second fear but by 1924 the Directors of the company complained that the establishment of purely indigenous seminaries was not a good policy. The letter of 18 February 1824 to the General Committee of Public Instruction said clearly that teaching 'mere Hindoo, or mere Mahomedan literature' is 'to teach a great deal of what was frivolous, not a little of what was mischievous' and only a little lit of what could be called useful (in Basu 1952: 153). A well known Anglicist figure, Charles Trevelyan, pointed out that for the Indian Muslims the British were 'infidel usurpers of some of the fairest realms of the Faithful' (Trevelyan 1838: 189). However, those who read literature in English would 'almost cease to regard us as foreigners' (ibid 189-90).

Trevelyan was right in his use of the words 'infidel' and 'faithful' in so far as Muslims all over the world did use religious categories for the demarcation of the boundary between the 'self' and the 'other' as evidenced by medieval books of Indian history in which terms like infidels', 'perishing in hell' (i.e. dying), the 'benighted ones' etc are used more often than not for non-Muslims. Bernard Lewis, looking at Turkish history, has this to say about this trend in Ottoman documents:

> During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Ottoman chroniclers devote some though not a great deal of attention to relations with Europe. The various European nations are still referred to invariably as "the English infidels", "the French infidels", etc, though the curses and insults customary in earlier historiography become less frequent and less vehement (Lewis 1982: 161).

That the Anglicist officers were equally committed to 'Othering'---indeed the major theme of Orientalist scholarship was to objectify, caricaturize and hence devalue the Orient (Said 1978)---is doubtlessly true. This 'Othering' had many strands: the first was expressed in

civilizational, social-Darwinist, terms of superiority and hence the ethical imperative of improving the East ('the white man's burden'); the second was purely racist ('the prestige of the white man'); and the third, rarely expressed and increasingly rare as modernity eroded the power of religion, was religious. Trevelyan did express this last aspect of ethnocentric bias, however, in a private letter of 9 April 1834 to Lord William Bentinck, the Governor General of India, as follows:

> The abolition of the exclusive privileges which the Persian language has in the courts and affairs of court will form the crowning stroke which will shake Hinduism and Mohammadanism to their centre and firmly establish our language, our learning and ultimately our religion in Indian (Philips 1977: 1239).

The Anglicist misgivings about Orientalist education as a source of anti-British resistance proved to be borne out by some of the events of 1857. For instance, the senior teacher of the Oriental Department at Bareilly was reputed to be anti-British. The Head Moulvi of the Oriental Department of Agra College actually worked one of the guns at Delhi in 1857 and, in general, those not schooled in English were reputed to be bigoted and narrow minded in their views. Indeed, when British rule was restored, the oriental departments of these colleges were eliminated (GAD-NWP 1868).

The view that English would reduce Islamic anti-British militancy got strengthened till the English educated elite came to be seen as allies and mediators between the British rulers and the Indian masses. It is this view which is attributed to Macaulay:

> We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect (Macaulay 1835 in Aggarwal 1984: 12).

But, as we have seen, this view did not come originally from Macaulay. It was present almost from the beginning of British rule and got strengthened till it vanquished the rival view that British rule would be strengthened by non-interference in native education and culture.

Eventually, as Gauri Viswanathan argues, English literature created a socializing force which made English values appear as an ideal moral force and, therefore, legitimized British rule

(Viswanathan 1987; 1989). It was just such a moral, as opposed to a purely utilitarian, use which Indian Muslims opposed.

The Muslim Response to English

The Indian Muslims probably could not articulate clearly exactly what it was which made them oppose English to begin with. It is, indeed, very likely that their opposition came simply as a reaction to their political defeat at the hands of the English. It may also have been part of their boundary-marking ('Othering') on religious grounds which has already been referred to. But, if one goes deep into the polemical diatribes which the Muslims wrote against English, it becomes clear that they were extremely anxious about its alienating potential. It was obviously seen as a socially disruptive force which would change the thoughts, dilute the religious fervour, and blunt the opposition to British dominance---the very things which the British hoped English, and especially English literature, would do. There were, however, three types of responses to English.

Resistance and Rejection

The first kind of response was that of rejection and resistance to it. This is perceived to be religious in nature but it was not purely theological. After all, Shah Abdul Aziz (1746-1823), a very influential Islamic Scholar (*alim*), had permitted the study of English (Aziz n.d: 571-72. Quoted from Rizvi 1982: 240-41). Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1829-1905), one of the pioneers of the Deobandi sub-sect of the Sunnis in South Asia, had also permitted it (Gangohi n.d.: 54. Quoted from Rizvi 1980, Vol 2: 231). So had the pioneer of the Barelvi school of thought in Indian Islam, Ahmed Raza Khan Barelwi (1856-1921) *(Fatawa-e-Rizwiyya* in Sanyal 1996: 183). And of course, the Nadwat-ul-Ulama, at least in its initial period, aspired to understanding modernity through English while teaching about the faith (Zaman 2002: 69). And, Abd al-Bari of Farangi Mahal, (d. 1925-26), an influential seminary of Lucknow, specifically said that the *alim* should study English in order to understand the thought of the West (Robinson 2002: 166-167). The problem was one of identity. Despite the *fatwas* the *ulema* were wary of including English in the Dars-i-Nazami, the curriculum of the *madrassas* in South Asia. Ordinary Muslims, no less apprehensive of losing their identity in a welter of alien values brought with English, condemned it outright. Some of them might never have heard of the *fatwas* of their religious leaders, but they instinctively felt that English would bring in new values and

threaten their world view. This resistance and rejection still characterizes the Islamic conservatives.

Acceptance and Assimilation

At the opposite end was the response of acceptance and assimilation. Though it legitimated itself in the name of 'pragmatism', it led to assimilation and, hence, to the emergence of modernist or secular, Westernized Muslims. It started because, from the pragmatic point of view, it was foolish to resist English especially when the Hindus and Parsis were getting more than their due share of power in British employment because of it. Hence the modernizing reformers---Abdul Latif (1828-93) and Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-99)--- insisted that the Muslims learn English and take their due share in power under the British. This response---the acceptance of English ostensibly for pragmatic reasons---became the defining feature of the new professional middle class which got completely alienated from the English-rejecting *ulema* (or *mullahs* as they were contemptuously called) and those who did not know English. Thus, English became the chief marker of modern identity; the major factor separating Muslim society into the English-using elite and the traditionally educated proto-elite or the illiterate masses.

Pragmatic Utilization

The third response to modernity was to accept aspects of it selectively, tactically as it were, in order to empower one's self while maintaining one's identity as firmly as one could. This, essentially, is the Islamist response to English. The Islamists, educated in modern educational institutions, 'are drawn to initiatives aimed at radically altering the contours of their societies and states through the public implementation of norms they take as "truly" Islamic' (Zaman 2002: 8). Abul Ala Mawdudi (d. 1979), the major Islamist figure in Pakistan, emphasized the study of English but only to have access to the knowledge, and hence the power, of the West.

Going back in time, the Ahl-i-Hadith (called Wahabis), the inveterate enemies of British rule in India in the nineteenth century (Ahmad 1994), did not mind acquiring Western knowledge---especially if it pertained to armaments---because resistance was impossible without power. Some of the Wahabis who had been tried by the British in 1863-65 for anti-British resistance, 'changed their names, took to learning English and achieved an equal degree of eminence in the new field of their activity' (Ahmad 1994: 224). One of their leaders, Wilayat

Ali, advocated 'the use of guns and cannons in place of catapults used during the time of Prophet Muhammad against the "canon-firing infidels" (the British)' (Ibid, 283). This attitude towards modernity---selective adoption for tactical reasons---is common to the Islamists all over the world even now. Fanatical groups, inspired by Islamist thought, such as the al-Qaeda of Osama Bin Laden are always ready to use modern technology and learn English to acquire it though they remain averse to the Western world view.

In short, there was an ambivalence in the nature of the project of English in Muslim society in South Asia. It was suspected because it was associated with alien values and, therefore, threatened indigenous identity. But, along with it, it was desiderated for pragmatic reasons either leading to assimilation in a quasi-Western mould or remaining rigidly and consciously opposed to it. The suspicion led to disempowerment because modern knowledge is, after all, predominantly in English. The acceptance led to varying degrees of Westernization or a constant awareness of antagonism and the creation of a siege mentality such as Islamists, especially those in the Muslim diaspora in the West, often appear to exhibit.

The State's Role in Distributing English

The British state in India invested English with social 'capital'---a term used by the French sociologist Bourdieu (1991:15)--- so that it became the means for acquiring power in the modern domains of employment (administration, judiciary, military, media, commerce, education, corporate sector etc). It also became the marker of sophistication, high social status, good breeding and modern outlook. All these factors facilitated entry in the circles of power created by the British, in elitist clubs, families and informal groups. That is why those who accepted English---the modernist reformist stance---wanted to acquire it as competently as possible. For this, however, they would have to spend much more money than others who studied in vernacular-medium schools. They could also study in the English-medium schools if they belonged to the elite of power---the military and the higher bureaucracy.

In short, English, the coveted cultural capital, was rationed out by the state. It was part of the socialization considered necessary for the Indian chiefs in order to Anglicize them and, thus, alienate them from the concerns of ordinary Indians. This, indeed, was the aim of Captain F.K.M Walter whose vision about establishing an 'Eton in India' was part of benevolent imperialism at its cleverest (Mangan 1986: 125-131).

Then there were the European or English-teaching schools administered by the armed forces, the missionaries or otherwise under the patronage of the state (PEI 1918: 185). They charged more fees than ordinary vernacular-medium schools (Rs 156 against Rs. 14 in all institutions from a university to a primary school) and the state itself spent more (Rs. 34 per student per year more than the average spent on ordinary Indian students) on subsidizing elitist education than it did on the education of the masses (Rahman 1996: 53).

This state of affairs continued in Pakistan. English-medium schools expanded with the expansion of the middle class. Private English-medium schools appeared in all the major cities of Pakistan displacing the missionary institutions. The state built cadet colleges whose boards of governors were dominated by the military and the bureaucracy. Though most of the huge budgets of these elitists institutions came from tuition fees, the state gave cadet colleges huge subsidies in the form of land and construction costs and helps them financially even now. Indeed, as the following figures indicate, the cost to the state in the cadet colleges is much more than in the Urdu-medium schools and most colleges.

Box 1

DIFFERENCES IN COSTS IN MAJOR TYPES OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
(in Pakistani rupees)

Institution	**Average cost per student per year**	**Payer (s)**	**Cost to the state**
Madrassas	5,714 (includes board and lodging)	Philanthropists + religious organizations	*Rs. 1.55 in 2001-02 an additional sum of Rs. 28.60 for subsidies on computers, books etc in some *madrassas* in 2003-04.
Urdu-medium Schools	2264.5 (only tuition)	State	2264.5
Elitist English medium schools	96,000---for 'A' level & 36,000 for other levels (only tuition)	Parents	None reported except subsidized land in some cantonments.
Cadet colleges/public schools	90,061 (tuition and all facilities).	Parents + state (average of 6 cadet colleges + 1 public school	14,171 (average of 5 cadet colleges only)

Public universities	68,000	Parents + state (parents pay an average of Rs. 13,000 per year)	55,000
Public Colleges (provincial)	9,572	State + parents (parents pay Rs. 1,591 per year on the average).	7,981
Public Colleges (federal)	21,281	Parents pay Rs 2,525 for B.A on the average.	18,756

* The cost per student per year in the *madrassas* is calculated for all 1,065,277 students reported in 2000. In 2001-02 a sum of Rs. 1,654,000 was given by the government to *madrassas* which accepted financial help. In 2003-04 Rs. 30.45 million will be given in addition for computerization and modernization of textbooks. However, not all students receive this subsidy as their *madrassas* refuse government help (these figures are from Khalid 2002: tables 1.17 and 1.19).

Source: Data obtained from several institutions.

These privileged schools have often been under attack and the Hamood ur Rahman Commission, set up precisely after one such attack in the form of the student riots of the sixties, did concede that these schools violated the constitutional assurance that 'all citizens are equal before law' (Paragraph 15 under right No. VI) (GOP 1966: 13). However, the schools only multiplied and people have taken them for granted and do not even wish for their closure. The fact remains that all educational policies of Pakistan expatiate at length about government vernacular-medium schools dismissing elitist schools-- which are, however, never called 'elitist'-- in a few lines as private concerns touching very few peoples' lives. That all students from the upper down to the middle classes actually attend private English-medium schools and the vernacular-medium schools are only for the have-nots, is not addressed in educational policies (for educational policies see Bengali 1999).

Meanwhile English is even more deeply entrenched in Pakistan than ever before. Earlier only the upper level domains of the state used it---the officer corps of the civil service and the armed forces, higher judiciary, universities etc---but now it is also the language of employment in the growing corporate sector, NGOs, media and private educational institutions. Even the colleges and universities, where students from the English and vernacular-medium used to meet after having been educated in separate schools are becoming segregated on the basis of socio-

economic class and language. The students from English-medium schools tend to go to expensive private universities which pay better and, therefore, attract academics fluent in English. The government colleges and most public universities, on the other hand, have both students and lecturers from the Urdu-medium schools. The language apartheid which ended in schools now continues in the universities and, as the corporate sector takes employees increasingly from the best private universities, vernacular-medium education leads to low paid jobs or no jobs at all. Thus the army of the unemployed keeps increasing and getting more and more frustrated.

The Acceptance and Assimilation Response in Pakistan

As in British India, the pragmatists want to learn English for empowerment. It is because of this that even lower middle class people send their children to non-elitist English-medium schools. These schools are visible in all localities in the urban areas, even in small towns, and charge tuition fees from Rs. 50 to Rs 1000 per month. According to a census of these schools there were 33,893 of them in 2000 and 78 per cent were primary ones (Census Private 2001). Their students and teachers come from the lower-middle and upper-working classes and, although most subjects are said to be taught in English, the students are not competent in that language when they leave school. Considering that one becomes spontaneous and fluent in English by interacting with an English-speaking peer group and grownups, being exposed to English movies, songs, reading material etc, it is not surprising that students from humble backgrounds hardly achieve greater ease if communication in English than their vernacular-speaking counterparts.

However, rather ironically, English which functions to put and keep these unprivileged students down, is what they aspire for; it is what their dreams are made of. Their response to English is as follows:

Box 2

	Madrassas (N=131)	Sindhi medium schools (N=132)	Urdu medium schools (N=520)	English-medium schools		
				elitist (N=97)	Cadet college (N=86)	Ordinary (N=119)
1. What should be the medium of instruction in schools?						

Urdu	43.51	9.09	62.50	4.12	23.26	24.37
English	0.76	33.33	13.65	79.38	67.44	47.06
Mother tongue	0.76	15.15	0.38	2.06	Nil	1.68
Arabic	25.19	Nil	0.19	Nil	Nil	0.84
No response	16.79	37.88	16.54	5.15	Nil	8.40
2. Do you think higher jobs in Pakistan should be available in English?						
Yes	10.69	30.30	27.69	72.16	70.93	45.38
No	89.31	63.64	71.15	27.84	29.07	53.78
NR	Nil	6.06	1.15	Nil	Nil	0.84
3. Should English-medium schools be abolished?						
Yes	49.62	13.64	20.19	2.06	12.79	5.88
No	49.62	84.09	79.04	97.94	86.05	93.28
NR	00.76	2.27	0.77	Nil	1.16	0.84
Note: The results do not add up to 100 in some cases because those choosing two or more languages have been ignored. Source: Rahman 2002: Appendix-14.						

The Resistance and Rejection Response

The conservatives, chiefly led by the Islamic *ulema* in the *madrassas*, remained resistant to English in Pakistan as they had been in British India. They felt that the demand for English, though couched in pragmatic terms, was really part of the state's project to 'colonialize' Islam (a term used by Jamal Malik 1966). Ayub Khan's Commission on National Education (GOP 1959) recommended English as the alternative medium of instruction (the other was Arabic) in the *madrassas* at the secondary level. The *ulema* opposed these reforms and they 'were translated into action in a limited way' (Malik 1996: 128).

Mawlana Muhammad Yusuf Ludhianwi (d. 2000) wrote a critique of the Government of Pakistan's report for reforming *madrassas* (GOP 1979). He argued that the educational system established by the British, of which English was an integral element, was meant to undermine Muslim identity. Summing up his views Qasim Zaman, a Pakistani historian, says:

> Ludhianwi's critique of the *Report* of 1979 makes explicit an issue that is central to all discussion of madrasa reform: the question of religious authority. Any attempt at reform

that is perceived to threaten the identity and the authority of the ‘ulama is by definition suspect (Zaman 2002: 79).

The reason for this resistance to reform was not only English. Indeed, as Qasim Zaman argues, the real issues were those of power and identity. The *ulema* felt, and rightly so, that the reforms would modernize the *madrassas* by secularizing them and, hence, change their identity altogether (Zaman 2002: 77-79)

Yet, the *ulema* do not reject the pragmatic value of English altogether. The Ahl-i-Hadith teach it more consistently than the Deobandis, Barelvis and Shias. The ideological baggage of the West is scrupulously removed in some cases---as by the Deobandis---by writing special textbooks in which most lessons are Islamic (Rahman 2002: 314). The teachers who are hired to teach English are closely scrutinized for their ideological proclivities and the students are not exposed to discourses, both electronic and print, originating from liberal Pakistanis or from foreign sources. In 1988, as calculated by the present author, the percentage of students who learnt English in the *madrassas* was only 2.2 per cent (Rahman 2002: table 29, p. 313).

In a recent report on the *madrassas* by the Institute of Policy Studies, a think-tank of the Jamat-i-Islami, it is recommended that English should be taught (Khalid 2002: 328 & 353). An earlier report from the same institution also considered this problem and, in principle, agreed with the necessity of learning English. However, Mufti Syed Saiyyah Uddin Kakakhel was of the opinion that English would distract the students from their study of religious subjects so it should be taught after they have finished their religious studies (Kakakhel 1987: 211).

In short, despite some misgiving among the lower level clerics, senior *ulema* agree with the teaching of English for empowerment, maintaining contact with the South Asian Muslim diaspora, preaching Islam in foreign countries and opening up opportunities of employment for *madrassa* graduates. The response of these would-be graduates themselves, though we have encountered it earlier in a comparative context, may be considered again.

Box 3	
1. What should be the medium of instruction in schools?	
Urdu	43.51 percentage (out of 131)
English	0.76
Mother tongue	0.76

Arabic	25.19
No response	16.79
2. Do you think higher jobs in Pakistan should be available in English?	
Yes	10.69 percentage (out of 131)
No	89.31
NR	Nil
3. Should English-medium schools be abolished?	
Yes	49.62 percentage (out of 131)
No	49.62
NR	00.76
Note: The results do not add up to 100 in some cases because those choosing two or more languages have been ignored. Source: Rahman 2002: Appendix-14.	

This means that the students of religious seminaries still remain resistant to English. Indeed, English schools being expensive, the ordinary *maulvi*, teaching in a *madrassa*, is neither a product of them nor does he send his children to be educated in them as the following survey indicates:

Box 4
Medium of instruction of Self and children

Madrassas	Number of respondents	Not written	Urdu	English
Own Medium of Intruction When in School	27	02 of 27 (7.41%)	21 of 25 (84%)	0 of 25 (0%)
Childrens' Medium of Instruction in School	27	12 of 27 (44.44%)	13 of 15 (86.67%)	2 of 15 (13.33%)
Source: Annexure 'A' section-2				

Pragmatic Utilization

The response of the Islamists to English has been mentioned earlier. In Pakistan Syed Abul 'Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979), is undoubtedly the greatest thinker among the Islamists. His orientation towards Islam is revivalist whereas the *ulema* were conservative. Mawdudi interpreted Islam (submission to God) to mean *active* submission to God, by which he meant rigorously implementing the teachings of Islam with the aim of establishing the ideal Islamic

order' (Nasr 1996: 57). From this came his emphasis on power---for without power no order, let alone an ideal one, could be established. And to obtain power in the world as presently constituted, it was necessary to learn modern subjects which were mostly in English. But Mawdudi combined this new emphasis in his book *Talimat* (1974) with heightened Islamic activism. He dwelt on the moral bankruptcy of the West and was, therefore, much more anti-imperialist and political than the *ulema* whose concerns were mostly theological.

The Jamat-i-Islami teaches English in its *madrassas* of the Rabta tul Madaris. In the Sanvia Amma (equivalent to matriculation), the English course of this level (10^{th} class) is offered. In the intermediate class, *Sanvia Khasa*, the F.A (11 and 12 class) course is taught. English is also taught in the colleges of the Jamat-i-Islami (Khalid 2002: Annexure 7 and interviews of Jamat activists in 2003). In India too, the Jamaat teaches English at the school level (Khalid 2002: Annexure 10).

A number of people themselves educated in government schools and colleges have come increasingly under the Islamist influence either because of the perceived dominance and injustice of Western, especially American, neo-imperialist policies or because of the Pakistani state's use of Islam for the creation of the Pakistani identity. Such people are very conscious of having been left behind in the world and they seek Islam as a defining feature of their identity. The rule of General Zia ul Haq (1977-1988) has made this section of society more articulate, and perhaps increased their strength in the state apparatus, so that Islamist discourse is much more salient since the eighties than it was before in Pakistan.

One of the activities of Islamists is to create schools which combine modern education with Islam. One such project is the Hira Educational project which teaches sciences and mathematics in English but call themselves English-medium (Rahman 2002: 302-303). Another such chain of schools is the Siqara school system which calls itself English-medium though the present author found that most lessons were being given by the teachers in Urdu in 2000. One principal of a Lahore School had drawn full sleeves and head scarves with his own pen in the pictures of women in English books for use in schools.

It is because of these tendencies that Khalid Ahmed, a well known Pakistani editor and columnist, said that '90 per cent' of the English medium institutions in Pakistan are 'Islamist institutions' (Ahmed 1999: 5). While the number may be disputed, it is true that the Islamists are aware that English, because of its global reach and the knowledge in it, is essential for them.

The Jihadi organizations, which practice *jihad* in order to transform the world, also ran their own schools. Those which are Ahl-i-Hadith in orientation are fundamentalist in the sense that they go back to the fundamental sources of Islam (Quran and Hadith) while the other *ulema* follow medieval jurists.

English and World View

English, like other languages, comes with normative baggage. The discourses in English, especially social, cultural and literary ones, assume certain distinctive features of 'normality'---individualism, the nuclear family, individual rights, the desirability of development etc---which may not be considered 'normal' elsewhere in the world. The *ulema* as well as the Islamists fear this normative aspect of the discourses in English. They try to purge the discourses they make available to their students, when they do make them available at all, of precisely these very elements.

The Jihadi schools such as that of the Ad-Da' wah (Ahl-i-Hadith), which created the now banned Lashkar-e-Tayyaba has printed its own textbooks for English. They focus entirely on Islam, as interpreted by the Ahl-i-Hadith, and more on the militant aspect of this interpretation than other things. The preface of *Ad Da' wah Way to English* says:

> We earnestly desire to enable our students to view Islam as a complete way of life rather than a mere set of rituals (FYG 2002: 64).

However, the young children are introduced to weapons and war in primers (p= pistol. In the Urdu ones t= *talwar* = sword and r = rocket and so on) (ibid 65). The books instruct teachers to repeat again and again ideas such as that of the necessity of making war with the infidels and using weapons (Ibid 66).

However, it is only very poor children who cannot leave their boarding houses and who are not exposed to the T.V, the radio and Urdu newspapers who are most influenced by their textbooks and teachers. In other cases, many other discourses do have an impact on them and dilute the religious fervour which is sought to be inculcated in them by the Islamic conservatives and the Islamist militants.

Students who are exposed more to English, and hence have better access to discourses created in liberal circles in the Islamic world as well as the West and the rest of the world, do

have a radically different world view than their less exposed counterparts. They believe much more in the equality of men and women in society, equal rights and opportunities of work for Muslims and non-Muslims in the country and, generally, oppose militancy in foreign policy. In the context of Pakistan this means that they do not favour either an open war with India or covert militant activities, such as sending guerrillas across the line of control, in Kashmir.

The results of a survey of the opinions of 10^{th}-11^{th} class students of elitist English medium schools, cadet colleges, Urdu medium schools and *madrassas* is given in Annexure B. It is clear that the *madrassa* students do not favour equal rights for Ahmedis, Hindus and Christians while those from elitist English-medium schools do. Also, students of English-medium schools oppose militant policies in Kashmir while those of the *madrassas* support them more than all other types of students. As for the equality of men and women according to the Western definition of 'equality', once again the *madrassa* students oppose it while those from the English-medium schools favour it ardently. (See Annexure B).

It should, however, be clarified that the students of elitist English-medium schools are not exposed to English as a subject alone. Nor does exposure mean merely an hour or two of English lessons in the classroom. What it means is listening to English songs, watching English films, watching the T.V with channels such as the CNN and the BBC, reading books written in the West, interaction with similarly exposed members of the peer group and interaction with adults who have travelled abroad. Because of the normative content of the discourses one is exposed to, certain Western concepts such as the rights of women do get internalized in the students of elitist English-medium schools. Their less militant reaction to Kashmir is probably because the idiom of peace disseminated by the Western media---notwithstanding the fact that it is used to justify aggression in the post Nine Eleven world by the United States---has become part of the vocabulary of the English-using classes in Pakistan (and the parents of elitist children come from the affluent classes; see Annexure A). Moreover, Pakistani liberals too oppose war and support peace. It may be because of these reasons that English-medium students oppose militant policies. However, it must never be forgotten that it is the Western educated leadership of Pakistan, both military and civilian, which has created the militaristic policies in which the religious groups joined only in the 1980s and are mostly used as cannon fodder.

In short, what emerges is a scenario of acute polarization between those who are most exposed to English (elitist English-medium school products) and those who are least exposed

(*madrassa* products) to it. As it happens, the elitist English-medium students are the most affluent while the madrassa students are the poorest. (Rahman 2004: Annexures 1 & 2). Thus, the apartheid of language is coterminous with the class division in Pakistani society. Does this mean that class struggle, the rage of the have-nots, is being expressed in Pakistan through the idiom of religion? Qasim Zaman provides evidence that in Jhang the rhetoric against the exploitative landed gentry which happened to be Shia, created the sectarian zeal of the newly launched Sipah-i-Sihaba (Zaman 2002: 120-125). Mawlana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi (1952-90) the pioneer of the Sipah-i-Sahaba, helped common people in the courts (Zaman 2002: 125) as did Maulana Isar al-Qasimi (1964-91) who was known for 'denouncing them [Shia magnates of the area] for their high-handed dealings with their peasants' (Ibid 127). It should, however, be mentioned that feudal lords in most parts of Pakistan are Sunnis and there seems to be no organized movement against them. It appears then that the Jhang case is atypical and is seen as being anti-Shia than being anti-feudal by the actors involved in the case. While in this case the militant energies were channeled against rival sects, it is possible that the same energy is also directed at the non-Muslim---Hindu, American, Jewish---'Other' outside Pakistan. Even more worrisome is the prospect of this militant energy being used to launch a civil war against Pakistani modernist Muslims and secular people who can all be grouped together under the label of pragmatist acceptors of English. However, such foreboding lies in the realm of the unknown and we will leave them unexplored.

Conclusion

There were three responses to English when the colonial conquest of India introduced it to the Indian Muslims: resistance and rejection (Islamic conservatives); acceptance and assimilation (the secular professional and middle classes); and pragmatic utilization (Islamists). The state, both colonial and Pakistani, created market conditions which made English an expensive product to which the elite of wealth or power had privileged access. As such English became a constructor of the modern, Westernized, secular identity in South Asia. It became a class marker and the basis of a new kind of social division and polarization in society.

English is still unevenly divided with the rich having easier access to it than these down the socio-economic ladder. It is still looked at with misgivings by the Islamic conservatives though, in principle, no significant *alim* opposes learning it. It is, however, valued as a tool for empowerment by the Islamists and the Islamic militants because it contains technologically

useful knowledge. However, primarily because of the Western provenance of discourses in English, the Islamic conservatives and militants teach such restricted courses in English that their students do not become very proficient in it.

The polarization of views on issues such as militancy, tolerance for non-Muslims etc in Pakistan between the products of elitist English-medium schools and *madrassas* is alarming because it carries the potential of internal violence and even civil war. If exposure to English is increased Western views will gain in strength. If, however, this exposure is restricted the potential for violence will increase as tolerance for the religious 'Other' will decrease. Also, as those least exposed to English favour militant policies, the possibility of militant conflict in Kashmir will also increase. The policy on Kashmir, however, is controlled ultimately by the military which is hawkish for nationalistic and not religious reasons. Thus exposure to English is not related in any direct way with the implementation of a policy for peace (as opposed to talking about it). Indeed, most policies and possibilities are not, of course, reducible to only one variable: exposure to English. Even more important is socio-economic class, degree of Westernization and secularization, one's own personality and so on. However, this one variable has been given attention in this paper because it has not been studied in this context and related to such values as tolerance and militancy.

In short, the solutions one wants will depend upon what kind of world one wants to see. The present author, for instance, opposes the hegemony of Western norms of behaviour encoded in English studies. He also feels that the Pakistan's real policy, as opposed to the stated one of supporting the national language Urdu, is that of subsidizing the elite in its quest for acquiring English. He emphatically feels that this policy is unjust. It devalues Urdu as well as the other languages of Pakistan and should, therefore, be corrected. However, English should be taught as a subject to all students in a uniform, state-financed, competent system of education. The teaching of good English as a subject need not be the monopoly of English-medium schools only. Indeed, there should be no English-medium schools at all. All schools must teach in the local language, or at least the provincial language, at the primary level and then in Urdu if it is accepted as a link language by all the provinces. But English should be taught in a just manner (i.e. to all students) through texts which expose students to the values of peace, tolerance and respect for rights. These concepts may have been articulated in their present form in Western democracies but they are of universal application. If English is useful in disseminating them then

that is an aspect of it which should be valued. In short, instead of allowing English to become a source of class and ideological conflict, it can be made into a source of empowerment and humanitarian improvement for all in Pakistan.

10

THE EVENTS OF 1857 IN CONTEMPORARY WRITINGS IN URDU

Introduction

The year 2007 marked the 150th anniversary of the climactic events of 1857. 1857 has been variously described as a 'revolt', a 'war of independence' (in the nationalist historiography of both India and Pakistan) and as a 'mutiny' by early British historians.[1].Today in India it is seen generally as a predominantly secular, joint Hindu–Muslim project;[2] but in Pakistan the Muslim role is emphasised while the Hindu one is ignored. And the debate as to whether it was a 'mutiny' or a 'war of independence' goes on.[3] Urdu-speaking literary critics of Urdu—Ibadat Barelvi, Ahmad Nadeem Qasmi, Hasan Askari, and Izhar Kazmi for instance—all agree with the war of independence thesis, on the grounds that it was more organised and widespread among ordinary people than would have been the case had it been a mere mutiny of the soldiery.[4] However, Kazmi is aware that his use of the term '*ghadar*' in the title ('*Ghadar ki Tā' bīrēn*) [the interpretations of the Mutiny] may be seen as being a national insult a century after the event.[5] My objective in this article is to assess what contemporary authors writing in Urdu made of the uprising. Among the sources which I discuss, most were written contemporaneously, but some were also written later. Works in the last category are included where they shed light on how perceptions of 1857 changed.

The Emergence of Urdu as a Language for Non-Creative Discourse

Though used in poetry for a long time—as Gujarati from the fourteenth century and Dakkani from the fifteenth—Urdu did not become a language for non-creative discourse till the early nineteenth century. The first Hindustani newspaper, the *Bengal Gazette*, began publication in

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[1] K.C. Yadav, 'Interpreting 1857. A Case Study', in Sabyasachi Bhattacharya (ed.), *Rethinking 1857* (Delhi: Orient Longman, 2007), pp.3-21.
[2] *Ibid*., p.15.
[3] R.P. Singh, 'Re-assessing Writings on the Rebellion: Savarkar to Sarendra Nath Sen', in Sabyasachi Bhattacharya (ed.), *Rethinking 1857* (Delhi: Orient Longman, 2007), pp.44–57.
[4] Nasir Kazmi and Intizar Hussain (eds), *1857 Khial Number* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, [1957], rpr. 2007), pp.17–44.
[5] *Ibid*., p.40.

1816. However, the first real Urdu newspaper, the *Jām-e-Jahān Numā*, dates from 1822[6]. By the 1850s the North Western Provinces (NWP) were home to 37 'native' or vernacular newspapers with a combined circulation of 1839.[7] The majority of them were in Urdu, which by this time had replaced Persian as the language of written communication for educated people, both Muslims and Hindus, in North India—i.e. in the area where the soldiers of the East India Company rose against its rule.

The Argument

The argument advanced in this article is that the 'rebels' of 1857 mostly justified their stance with reference to categories borrowed from religious discourse; they legitimised their actions with reference to an alleged British attempt to destroy their religious identity. The 'non-rebels', on the other hand, tended to see the resistance movement as a symptom of 'disorder' or catastrophe. Although the latter agreed that the British were guilty of mistakes and bad governance, they did not believe the colonial government had lost political legitimacy. Therefore they deemed armed resistance against it a 'mutiny' (*ghadar*).

Eventually, the 'rebel' argument was completely overwhelmed and supplanted by the discourse favoured by the 'non-rebels' and, of course, the British. We know this because, whereas the contemporary narratives are fairly evenly distributed between the two positions, all the later writings in Urdu categorize the events of 1857 as a 'mutiny' and the 'rebels' as *bāghī*. This colonial discourse was, in turn, supplanted with the internalisation of nationalism as a principle of categorisation of social reality in the first quarter of the twentieth century. The new vocabulary, calling 1857 a 'national war of independence', is misleading in so far as neither the 'rebels' nor the 'non-rebels' thought of these events in nationalistic terms. Moreover, the assumption that the 'nation' can be constructed of unitary space (the whole of India) or a unified people (transcending religious, ethnic and other categories) is also inapplicable to the events of 1857 since the uprising was not spread all over India—the areas now in Pakistan experienced very little of it—nor did the anti-British fighters transcend their religious identities.

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[6] Tahir Masood, *Urdū Sahāfat Unnīswīn Sadī Mein* [Urdu: Urdu Journalism in the Nineteenth Century] (Karachi: Fazli Sons (Pvt) Ltd, 2002), p. 130.

[7] *Report on the Native Presses in the North Western Provinces 1853*, IOR v/23/118 Pt. 19 Art 26, Acc No. 11479, National Documentation Centre, Islamabad.

Methodologically, the study draws on the work of Anna Wierzbicka, Professor of linguistics at Australian National University, which shows how an analysis of the key words used by people in their writing can provide an insight into their political ideas[8]. Thus, we can understand (1) how the 'Other'—in this case the British or the 'rebels'—were seen by the writers of Urdu, (2) how certain discourses, backed by the power of the colonial state, became hegemonic after 1857, and (3) how, these in turn were eclipsed and replaced by others, judged more serviceable.

The Writings of Non-Rebels

Memoirs, Histories and Letters

The major apologist of the British, but the only one who took great pains to explain the Indian position to the British at some personal risk, was (Sir) Syed Ahmed Khan (1817–98). Syed probably started writing *Asbāb Sarkashī-e-Hindustān kā Jawāb-ē-Mazmūn* [An essay on the causes of the Indian revolt] (1858) in Muradabad in Urdu and then had it translated into English. However, he was in such a hurry to send it to members of parliament in Britain that he sent the Urdu version initially. The first edition was of 500 copies and most of them went to London. A translation into English followed—using the title given above—but such was the paranoia of the time that the foreign secretary initially tried to prevent its publication.[9]

Syed begins by defining the term '*sar kashī*' (literally, taking out or raising one's head). He defines it as fighting against, or defying government. He also deploys the term '*baghāwat*' to describe acts of violent insurrection or mutiny.[10] From his point of view, many ordinary people in 1857 were guilty of *sar kashi*, but only the soldiers of *baghāwat*. Secondly, Syed makes the point—a courageous one for those days—that the British had brought the insurrection upon themselves by various acts of commission and omission towards their Indian subjects. Against that, Syed clearly regards the East India Company's rule as legal and violent opposition to it, therefore, as unacceptable.

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[8] Anna Wierzbicka, *Understanding Cultures through their Key Words: English, Russian, Polish, German and Japanese* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

[9] Saleem Uddin Qureshi '*Risālā Asbāb-ē-Baghāwat-ī Hind'* in Mohammad Ikram Chughtai (comp.), *1857: Rōznāmche, Mu 'āsir Taehrīrēn, Yāddāshtēn* (*Diaries, Memoirs and Contemporary Writings*) (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel 2007), p.805.

[10] *Asbāb Sarkashī-e-Hindustān kā Jawāb-ē-Mazmūn* in *Ibid* p. 10.

Asadullāh Khān Ghālib (1797–1869) is usually regarded as the greatest poet of Urdu and was certainly the greatest man of letters of his day. His Persian work *Dastanbū* (1858) was specifically written to appease the British.[11] It is a journal purporting to describe 'from the beginning to the end those things that I [Ghalib] myself experienced or those which I personally heard' (*sar tā sar īn nigārish yā ānst kē bar man hamīravad ya ān khuahid būd kē shunīda mī shavad*'[12] from May 1857 to 31 July 1858. It was published in 1858 although the date 1860 is also given in some accounts.[13] The first edition was of 500 copies and copies were sent to high British officials in the hope of getting financial and other benefits. It may have been 'suitably revised to meet the requirements of the situation', but there is no evidence either for or against this conjecture.

Ghalib begins with a conventional paean of praise (*qasīdā*) for the monarch—in this case Queen Victoria. Using negative terms such as *rastkhēz bējā* (unwarranted revolt), he goes on to make the claim that 1857 was morally and legally unjustified—a position which, as we have seen, echoed that of Syed. However not everything in the book is favourable to the Raj. He calls Delhi a jail (*zindān*)[14] and points out that the Muslims suffered shortages of basic necessities such as candles—so that 'their houses were dark at night' (*shabānā khānā hai īn mardum bē chirāgh ast*).[15] He was also among the first commentators to accuse the rulers of adopting a discriminatory attitude towards Muslims. The Muslims, he says, were not allowed to bury their dead while the Hindus could 'take them to the river and burn them' (*Hindū hamī tawānad ke murdā rā ba dariyā burd 'o bar lab-ē-āb dar ātish sozānd*).[16] However, despite mentioning these grievances, Ghalib's lexicon confirms the legality of British rule since the sepoys and their rebellion are called (*shorish*=mutiny, evil; *sipāh kīna khuāh*=soldiers seeking malice; *kūr namakān*=blind to their salt).

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[11] Asadullah Khan Ghalib, *Dastanbū:* [Persian: Bouquet] Lahore: Matbu'āt-ē-Majlis-e-yādgār-ē-Ghēlib, 1969).
[12] *Ibid*., p.21.
[13] The book was published in the Maktaba Mufid-ul-Khalaiq in Agra by Munshi Hargopal Tafta who gives the date of 1858. The date of 1860 is given by the chronogram *rast khēz bējā* in Asadullah Khan Ghalib, *Dastanbū:* [Persian: Bouquet] Lahore: Matbu'āt-ē-Majlis-e-yādgār-ē-Ghālib, 1969), p. 83 & 38.
[14] Ghalib, *Ibid* p. 70.
[15] *Ibid*, p. 78
[16] *Ibid*, p. 62

Even in his letters, where he could have been more frank, Ghalib does not challenge the legality of British rule—although he freely laments the destruction of the city and, above all, of his own class by the chaos unleashed by the uprising. For instance he says he was 'afraid' (*dartā hūn*);[17] in several letters he uses the words '*fasād*', '*fitnā*', etc. At one place he suggests that the name of a new magazine about 1857 to be brought out by his friends should be *Ghogha-ē-Sipāh* (*Chaos of the Soldiers*)*, Fitnā-ē-Mehshar* (*Evil of the Doomsday*) or *Rastkēz-ē-Hind* (*Doomsday of India*).[18] He did have English friends and lamented the death of one, Major John Jacobs, at the hands of the 'dark-faced blacks' (*rū siāh kālon*).[19] In another letter Ghalib says that Delhi was attacked by five forces: the rebels (*bāghi*); the British army (*khāki*) and so on.[20] In short, it seems that Ghalib regarded the uprising of the sepoys and the events which succeeded it as a breach of order. His references to the sepoys as '*kālē*' (blacks) and '*rūsiāh*' (dark-faced)—racist terms both—indicate that he regarded their power in Delhi as something of an anarchy. The British troops (*gorē*) are no better than the native soldiers but, though guilty of individual excesses, were part of a legitimate order which Ghalib trusts to keep anarchy at bay.

There is remarkably also a European account in Urdu. Its author, George Puech Shore (1823–1894), was born of a French family who had come over during the eighteenth century to fight for the Marhattas. They had settled in Gwalior, and then in district Aligarh. There Shore acquired land and picked up the habits of the *zamindar*s of Delhi. He even wrote poetry in Urdu which Ram Baba Saksena has referred to in his book on the European poets of Persian and Urdu.[21] He was one of the last of Dalrymple's 'white Mughals'.[22]

Shore penned *Wāqaē' Hairat Afzā'* (*Astounding Incidents*) in 1862.[23] It is written in ornate prose on the model of Rajab Ali Beg Suroor's *Fasānā-ē-Ajaib* [Tale of the wonderful] (1824), as well

[17] Letter from Ghalib to Mirza Shahabuddin Saqib, 8 February 1858, in Ghulam Rasul Mehr (ed.), *Khutut-e-Ghalib* (Lahore: Sheikh Ghulam Ali and Sons, 1982), p.92.
[18] Letter from Ghalib to Munshi Shiv Naraen, 12 June 1859, in *ibid*., p.212.
[19] Letter from Ghalib to Hargopal Tafta, July 1858, in *ibid*., p.130.
[20] Letter from Ghalib to Anwar ud Daula Shafaq, 1860, in *ibid*., p.305.
[21] Ram Babu Saksena, *European and Indo-European Poets of Urdu and Persian* (Lahore: Book Traders, rpr. 1943), pp.228–47.
[22] William Dalrymple, *White Mughals: Love and Betrayal in Eighteenth-Century India* (London: Harper-Collins Publishers Ltd., 2003).
[23] Saksena, *European and Indo-European Poets of Urdu and Persian*, pp.243–5.

as in verse. He and his family, being Europeans, suffered in the 1857 uprising. Not surprisingly, he describes it as a '*ghadar*'. He also uses labels like '*fitnā*' and '*fasād*' and describes the rebels as marauders. Like other Indian poets, Shore also wrote verse (*musadda*s) lamenting the ruin of Delhi.[24]

As for the histories, Kunahiya Lal's famous narrative is called *Mahāraba-ē-Azīm* (*The Great War*).[25] But despite its title, the book uses the same terminology—*baghāwat, fasād*, etc.—which other works do. Similarly, Maulvi Zaka Ullah's *Tārīkh-e-Hindustān* uses the term *'hangāmā-ē-baghāwat'* (The upheaval of the mutiny) for the event and *'bāghī'* for those who fought the British.[26]

Poetry

There is also a good deal of writing in verse about 1857. Its major theme is the ruin and devastation of Delhi and other urban centres of North India; its sensibility one of agony and despair over the cruel deaths of contemporaries. Another response was that of resentment at the government's handling of the crisis, but it is muted out of fear of reprisals. Yet a third, though very rare, was sympathy for the insurgency born out of a sense that the East India Company had exploited India. Thus the poet Shaikh Ghulām Hamadānī Mushafi (1750-1824), who saw the rule of the Company before the events of 1857, remarked that the 'infidel' (*kāfir*) British had snatched away the wealth of India by fraud (*daghā bāzi*).[27] Yet despite these political sallies, it is not clear if any of these poets actually took part in the uprising. In fact, in some poems the victims are blamed because of their alleged 'sins'. For instance the poet Mubīn, a minor poet of the period, says:

Zulm gōrōn nē kiyā aur nā sitam kālōn nē

[24] *Ibid*., p.239.
[25] Kunahiya Lal, *Tārīkh-ē-Baghāwat-e-Hind* [History of the Mutiny of India] (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2007) (based on the 1916 edition).
[26] Munshi Zakullah, *Tārīkh-ē-Hindustan: Saltanat-ē-Islāmiā kā Biān*, [Narrative of the Kingdom of Muslim rulers] Vol.9 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 1998), pp.347–8.
[27] Quoted from Syed Ehtesham Hussain, '*Urdu Adab aur Inqilāb* 1857' ('Urdu Literature and the Revolution of 1857'), in Mohammad Ikram Chughtai (comp.), *1857 Tarīkhī, 'ilmī aur adabī paehlu* (*1857: Historical, Scholarly and literary Aspects*) (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2007), p.563.

Hum kō barbād kiā apnē hī āmālōn nē.[28]

[Neither did the whites nor the blacks were cruel to us/Rather we were ruined by our own bad deeds]

Mufti Sadruddin Khan Azurda, the *muftī* (interpreter of Islamic law) of Delhi, wrote a poem in which he calls the soldiers *purbiyē* (dwellers of the East)—a pejorative term for mercenary soldiers—as well as '*khudā kā qaher* (God's wrath).[29] Mirza Dagh Dehlavi (1831-1905) says that they who chant '*Dīn, dīn*' (religion, religion) do not known what religion is.[30]

Fiction

One of the most famous novelists of the period was Deputy Nazeer Ahmad (1830–1916).[31] Nazīr Ahmad's novel *Ibn ul Waqt* (1888) refers to the events of 1857. The protagonist, an Indian Muslim gentleman named Ibn ul Waqt, saves the life an Englishman, Mr. Noble, whom he finds lying wounded near Delhi. Ibn ul Waqt gives him the hospitality of his house for three months. After the British prevail, and Noble is once again installed in a position of power, he rewards Ibn ul Waqt by making him a subordinate official. At the same time he encourages him to move to the European part of the city and adopt Western ways. However, the newly-Anglicised Ibn ul Waqt is not accepted by the English and loses the respect of his compatriots. In the end one of his relatives, Hujjat ul Islam, convinces him that he should stop trying to be a Westerner.

Hujjat ul Islam's argument is not that British rule is wrong or should be resisted. He considers it a blessing. Rather his argument against Westernisation is that it can lead to Indians considering themselves equal to the rulers and this, he feels, is insulting to the imperial state (*aur hākim ō maehkūm mēn musāwāt kā hōnā zōf-ē-hukūmat nahīn tō aur kyā hai*?') (and equality between the

[28] Syed Mohammad Abdullah, '*Dillī Marhūm kā Marsiyā*' ('Elegy for Dead Delhi') in *ibid*., p.593. Please check translation. Seems rather odd. It could be either 'Elegy for the Dead in Delhi' or 'Elegy for Dead Delhi'

[29] Sadruddin Khan Azurda's Urdu poem quoted from Mohammad Ikram Chughtai (comp.), *1857 Majmuā' Khwājā Hasan Nizāmī* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2007), p.526.

[30] *Ibid*. p. 526

[31] For his biography see Iftikhar Ahmad Siddiqui, *Maulvī Nazīr Ahmad Dehlavi*: *Aehvāl-o-Āsār* (*Biography of Nazīr Ahmad*) (Lahore: Majlis Taraqqī Adab, 1971).

ruler and the ruled, if it is not the weakness of rule, then what is it?)[32] Elsewhere he calls the uprising an evil conspiracy (*mufsidānā shōrish*) and makes fun what he sees as the cowardice and incompetence of the Mughal princes.

Among these later works one of the most important is Khwaja Hasan Nizami's (1878–1955) prose accounts of the fate of the Mughal royal family.[33] Basically, the theme can be summed up as 'how the mighty are fallen'. Most of the stories start by recalling what life was like at the Mughal court prior to 1857. Then the focus shifts to the eventful day of 11 May when the rebel troops entered the Red Fort. It is a catalyst for chaos. Eventually, Nizami's princely characters flee to the villages and jungles despairing for their lives.

Although written after 1919, at a time when nationalism was in full swing, the word Nizami uses for the 1857 event is still '*ghadar*'. The rebel soldiers are called '*bāghī*'. And at various points the Mughal princes and princesses accuse the rebel soldiers of perpetrating all sorts of cruelties on the British (although British cruelties, of which the narrators are victims, are also reported graphically).[34]

Rashid ul Khairi's narratives of the woes of the Mughal princesses are very similar.[35] In his story about Maulvi Abdul Qadir's heroic rescue of a wounded British woman from certain death, the Indian soldiers are called not only rebels (*bāghī*) but also cruel (*zālim*). In another story 1857 is said to be a terrible affliction or misfortune (*musībat*).[36]

The Writings of the 'Rebels'

These fall into two categories: the writings of those who wrote after the war was over; and those who wrote during the upheaval. These former knew that their work would be seen by the British

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[32] Nazīr Ahmad, *Ibn ul Waqt* (1888. Lahore: Kashmīr Kitāb Ghar, 1984 edition), p. 319. Full publishing details needed.

[33] Khwaja Hasan Nizami, 'Bēgmāt kē Ānsū' ('The Tears of the Ladies'), in Mohammad Ikram Chughtai (comp.), *1857 Majmuā' Khwājā Hasan Nizāmī* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2007), pp.13–136.

[34] *Ibid.*

[35] Rashid ul Khairi, '*Dillī kī Ākhrī Bahār*' ('The Last Spring of Delhi'), in Mohammad Ikram Chughtai (comp.), *Majmuā' Khwājā Hasan Nizāmī* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2007), pp.870–80.

[36] Rashid ul Khairi, '*Aglē Lōgōn kī ēk Jhalak*' ('A Glimpse of Traditional People'), in *ibid*., pp.876–80, (p. 876).

and, very often, wrote under the patronage of British officers. As such their work is not very different in tone to that of the non-rebels. The writings of those who fought and were prepared to die for the cause are another matter entirely.

Writings of Former Rebels

The poet Syed Zahīr Uddīn Dehlavi (1825–1911) was a student of the Mughal court's poet Shaikh Muhammad Ibrāhīm Zauq (1789-1854) and an official at the court of Bahadur Shah II. During 1857 he and his brother travelled to Jhajar, Sonipat, Najeebabad, Bareilly and Rampur. In 1864, after the hue and cry had died down, he returned to Delhi; but then went to Alwar and became a police official, spending 16 or 17 years in British service in Tonk. Later he went to Hyderabad, where he died in 1911. It is not known when his book D*āstān-ē-Ghadar* (the story of the Mutiny)[37] please give title of book & translation of title was written but some scholars believe it must have been at the end of his life after he had settled in Hyderabad.[38]

He begins by giving an account of the sepoys who had intruded upon the Red Fort. He calls them '*bāghī*' '*namak harām*' ('not true to their salt') and '*balā-ē-Āsmāni*' ('a bolt from the blue'). The soldiers tell the Mughal courtiers that they were driven to mutiny by the insistence of their British officers that they should cut greased cartridges with their teeth—but now, having taken that awful step, they are resolved to 'spread mutiny in the whole of India' (*tamām Hindustān mēin ghadar machā dō*).[39] The king though insists that he is powerless to intervene, and offers to ask the resident at Delhi, Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, to mediate between the rebel soldiers and the government. And later, when he talks to the resident about his proposal he uses the terms '*fitnā*', '*fasād*', '*mzhab kā jhigrā*' (religious quarrel), etc. His language is quite unsympathetic. He blames the 'rebels' for disturbing the peace of the city, and goes on to say:

Nā rōz-e-hashr sē kam thī azāb kī sūrat

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[37] Syed Zahīr Uddīn Dehlavi, *Dāstān-ē-Ghadar* (Urdu: Story of the Mutiny) (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2007).

[38] See article by Asghar Hussain Khan Ludhianwi and Salahudin Ahmad, '*Dāstān-ē-Ghadar*' ('Story of the Mutiny') (1955), reprinted in Mohammad Ikram Chughtai (comp.), *1857: Rōznāmche, Mu 'āsir Taehrīrēn, Yāddāshtēn* (*1857: Diaries, Memoirs and Contemporary Writings*) (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel 2007), p.864.

[39] Syed Zahīr Uddīn Dehlavi, *Dāstān-ē-Ghadar* (Urdu: Story of the Mutiny) (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2007), p. 47. Full citation needed for Dehlavi

Khudā dikhāe na is inqilāb kī sūrat.[40]

[The misery and torture was not less than that of the Doomsday/May God not make anyone experience such a revolution]

Occasionally Dehlavi uses the word '*inqilāb*' (revolution) to describe what is happening in Delhi. Yet this is a modern interpolation, and not meant approvingly, as the author's use of the word in the context of chaos, evil and anarchy, makes clear.

Dehlavi does not, it is true, attempt to conceal the brutalities handed out by the British after their re-conquest of the city. He describes how British soldiers ('*gore*') (whites) entered the homes of residents, and robbed and sometimes killed them. However, while he condemns these excesses, he remains convinced that the uprising was morally reprehensible, illegal and wrong. In short, he too supports the legality of British rule.

Moinuddin Hasan Khan's family had rallied to the British after Lord Lake's conquest of the NWP in 1803 and were rewarded with estates, titles and pensions. The author himself, though, rose to be the chief of police (*kōtwāl*) in the service of Bahadur Shah. On 11 May when the rebel soldiers arrived at Delhi, he was on duty at the Paharganj Police Station. Over the following turbulent days he used his position to save the life of Sir Theophilus Metcalfe—whereupon his own house was raided and robbed by the rebels. After the British victory he went to Bombay and then on to Arabia. Upon his return he was arrested as a 'rebel' but was subsequently absolved of all charges on the intercession of Metcalfe.

Moinuddīn's book, *Khadang-ē-Ghadar* (*The Arrow of the Mutiny*) was written in 1878,[41] but published only after the author's death in 1885. Moinuddin was not willing, in his lifetime, to risk jeopardising his freedom and possibly too the reputation of his patron Metcalfe. Such was the fear and paranoia that gripped the country in the wake of the British re-conquest. Yet the

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[40] *Ibid*., p.90.

[41] Moinuddin Hasan Khan, *Khadang-e-Ghadar* (*The Arrow of the Mutiny*) (1887), in Mohammad Ikram Chughtai (comp.), *1857:Rōznāmche, Mu 'āsir Taehrīrēn, Yāddāshtēn* (*1857: Diaries, Memoirs and Contemporary Writings*) (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel 2007), pp. 217-369. It was translated into English by Charles Theophilus Metcalfe in 1898. I assume this was Sir Theophilus' son. Should it be spelt Metcalfe?

book was very moderate in its criticisms. It makes it clear that the ordinary people of India, including women and men of the working classes, supported the rebel cause at least in the areas around Delhi and Lucknow.[42] However his evidence does not point to an organised uprising even in these areas. Of course, in other parts of British India the common people remained quite indifferent to the rebel cause in part because they never received more than scanty and belated information about it. Moreover it is quite scathing in its treatment of the insurgents. The revolt is variously described as '*Shōrish-ē-Mufassidā*', '*ghadar*', '*balwā*', '*shōr*', '*shar*', '*fasād*' and '*baghāwat*'.[43] The soldiers are called '*bāghī*', '*namak harām*', '*mufsid*' and '*badmāsh*'.[44] His account also confirms that the rebel soldiers forced the king to acquiesce in their plans and that he tried to save the lives of English women and children. The overall impression which emerges from the book, however, is that there was anarchy in the city—wrought by people of 'inferior' breeding. For instance Moinuddin writes disparagingly that a certain Mir Mohammad Hasan Khan (no relation of the author) had inducted weavers, spinners of cloth, sellers of oil, and sellers of betel leaf (*dhunē, julāhē, tēlī, tanbōlī*) into the rebel army. This is a view from above—by an author of the Muslim gentlemanly class (*ashrāf*).[45]

'Rebels' Who Wrote During the Struggle

The most effective means to disseminate anti-British feelings, however, was the press. One of the most important outlets of the type was the *Dillī Urdū Akhbār* of which copies survive from 1840.[46] Maulvi Muhammad Baqir, father of the Urdu man of letters Muhammad Husain Azad, was its editor during the crucial year of 1857. After the British conquest of Delhi he was hanged for sedition.[47] Baqir used Islamic terminology to legitimate the uprising. His columns from May

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[42] Khwaja Ahmad Faruqi, '*Khadang-ē-Ghadar*' (1972) [Urdu article on the book]. p. 872. In Mohammad Ikram Chughtai (comp.), *1857: Rōznāmche, Mu 'āsir Taehrīrēn, Yāddāshtēn* (*1857: Diaries, Memoirs and Contemporary Writings*) (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel 2007), pp. 866-873. Full citation needed Why is the author here Faruqi?

[43] Moinuddin Hasan Khan, *Khadang-e-Ghadar* (1887) in Chughtai, *Ibid* p. 223.

[44] *Ibid.*, p.222.

[45] *Ibid*., p.293.

[46] Margrit Pernau, 'The *Delhi Urdu Akhbar*: Between Persian Akhbarat and English Newspapers', in *Annual of Urdu Studies*, Vol.18 (2003), pp.105–31. Also see Tahir Masood, *Urdū Sahāfat Unnīswīn Sadī Mein* [Urdu: Urdu Journalism in the Nineteenth Century] (Karachi: Fazli Sons (Pvt) Ltd, 2002). Pp. 320-375.

[47] According to Shireen Moosvi 16 issues of this paper from 1857 are preserved in the National Archives of India, New Delhi. As I have not had access to these archives, all quotations and references to this and other newspapers are from secondary sources. See Shireen Moosvi, 'Rebel Journalism: *Delhi Urdu*

1857 thank God for punishing the foreign infidels (*kāfir*) who had conspired to wipe out the true religion.[48] He rejoiced in the British reverses and considered the revolt a war for faith. His son, not to be left behind, supplemented this rhetoric with a poem:

> O Azad, learn this lesson:
> For all their wisdom and vision,
> The Christian rulers have been erased
> Without leaving a trace in this world.[49]

The newspaper even published a *fatwa* authorising Muslims to rise up against British rule. However as Shireen Moosvi observes,

> ...from 14 June both the vocabulary and attitude change. Now the sipah-i-diler ('the brave army') the Tilangan-I nar sher (the lion-like Tilangis) are being enjoined, if Muslims, to take the name of God and the Prophet, and, if Hindus, to pray to Parmeshar and Narain.[50]

This more inclusive stance was justified to the paper's readers by the assertion that the Hindus shared with Muslims a belief in one God (*Adī Purush*).[51]

Another prominent Urdu newspaper, the *Sādiq-ul-Akhbār*, was published by Saiyad Jamīluddīn Khan of Delhi.[52] Although its circulation was only about 200, it was passed from reader to reader and also read out aloud so that many times that many people heard what it had to say. The paper was cited during the trial of Bahadur Shah Zafar as evidence against the king.

Akhbar. May–September 1857' in *People's Democracy*, Vol.XXXI, no.17 (29 April 2007), pp.1–6 [http://www.cpim.org/ps/2007/0429/04292007_1857.htm, accessed 6 May 2008].

[48] *Dillī Urdū Akhbār* (17 May 1857) in William Darlymple, 'Religious Rhetoric in the Delhi Uprising of 1857', in Sabyasachi Bhattacharya (ed.), *Rethinking 1857* (Delhi: Orient Longman, 2007), p.25. Full citation needed for Bhattacharya.

[49] *Dillī Urdū Akhbār* (24 May 1857) in *ibid*.

[50] Moosvi, 'Rebel Journalism: *Delhi Urdu Akhbar*. May–September 1857', p.3.

[51] *Dillī Urdū Akhbār* (14 June 1857), in *ibid.*

[52] Faruqui Anjum Taban, 'The Coming of the Revolt in Awadh: The Evidence of Urdu Newspapers', in *Social Scientist*, Vol.26, no.1/4 (Jan.–Apr. 1998), p.23.

In the issue of 19 March 1857 there is a story of a person called Sadiq Khan who had come from Persia. Sadiq is reported as saying that the Shah wants to conquer India. The editor wonders what kind of happiness will the rule of the Shah of Persia give to the people of India?[53] Still, the paper anxiously anticipates the arrival of Persian troops. When they do not arrive, the *Sādiq ul Akhbār* is disappointed. By 13 September it is forced to concede that the Persians are not likely to come soon, though they would arrive one day.[54] The very next day, 14 September, the city was re-conquered by the British.

The Urdu newspapers sympathised with the plight of the ruling family after the British victory. Reporting Bahadur Shah's death, on 7 November 1862, the *Kashf ul Akhbār* laments that the empire of Taimur has ended; that 'the lamp of Delhi is put off'.[55]

Shireen Moosvi thinks that

> ...the Delhi Akhbar mirrors the feelings of much of the Delhi populace, especially its educated section—its elite—and it is singular how from the early feeling of estrangement towards the sepoys, they become in its pages, much before the fall of Delhi, the object of admiration, and then begin to be viewed as the valiant defenders and protectors of the city.[56]

But it is not clear whether the *Dillī Urdū Akhbār* does, indeed, 'mirror' the feelings of much of the Delhi populace or even those of its 'elite'. Certainly Ghalib's letters do not confirm this (though it could be argued that the poet, like almost everybody else who wrote after the event, was so frightened of British reprisals that even in personal letters he was too cautious to express his real views).

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[53] '*Iqtisābāt Sādiq ul Akhbār*' [Urdu: Excerpts from the *Sādiq ul Akhbār*] in Mohammad Ikram Chughtai (comp.), *Majmuā' Khwājā Hasan Nizāmī* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2007), pp.431–40.
[54] *Ibid.*, p.440.
[55] In *Kashful Akhbār* (27 November 1862). Quoted from Ghulam Rasul Mehr, '1857 *Mutafarriqat*' (1857 Miscellaneous Items], *Aaj Kal* (September 1957) [Delhi]. Reprinted in Mohammad Ikram Chughtai (comp.), *1857 Tarīkhī, 'ilmī aur adabī paehlu* (*1857: Historical, Scholarly and literary Aspects*) (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2007), pp. 161-166 (quoted from p. 163). The quote appears to come from *Kashf ul Akhbār.* Please check this citation
[56] Moosvi, 'Rebel Journalism: *Delhi Urdu Akhbar*. May–September 1857', p.6.

There were, however, Urdu newspapers, like the *kōh Nūr* of Lahore which supported the British against the mutineers (*bāghī*) but they need not be quoted in this section[57].

Let us now turn to the categories of social affiliation in mid nineteenth-century India. These could be personal or 'feudal' (expressed by terms like *namak halālī*, i.e. being true to one's salt) or ethnic affiliations. However the wider category of religious identity was also available. The 'non-rebels' often accused the 'rebels' of being '*namak harām*' (betrayers of their salt). For their part, the 'rebels' used the idiom of religion to legitimate their struggle against the British. For instance Tapti Roy refers to a 124-page long pamphlet written, or finished, on 15 September 1852 in the handwriting of Sheikh Saied Rungin Rakam. It acknowledges that the British had pledged good governance and by and large kept their word, but goes onto point out that recently they had broken faith by imposing indiscriminate taxation and pushing Indians to become Christians. There are also anecdotes and stories about alleged British lust and drinking.[58] Another pamphlet, *Fatēh Islām* (Victory of Islam) written sometime in July 1857, also appealed to Muslim religious sensitivities as well as to *ashraf* snobbery. The British, the pamphlet alleged, appeared to recognise no distinction between the Muslim upper classes and the lower ones—which, of course, was unendurable.[59]

Another rebel leader was Maulvi Ahmadullah Shah. A poetic Urdu biography of him was written in 1863 by F.M. Taib called *Tawārīkh–i Ahmadī*. Taib was an aristocrat of Lucknow and a disciple of Ahmadullah Shah. The biography glamourises the anti-British exploits of Ahmadullah Shah who is presented as a hero, for whose actions no apology is needed.[60]

Another well-known 'rebel' was Maulana Fazlul Haq Khairabadi (1798–1861). Charged with signing a religious decree (*fatwā*) supporting armed struggle (*jihād*) against the Company government he was condemned by a British court to imprisonment and exiled to the Andamans

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[57] Tahir Masood, *Urdu Sahāfat Unnīs wīn Sadī Mein* [Urdu: Urdu Journalism in the Nineteenth Century] (Karachi: Fazli Sons (Pvt) Ltd, 2002), pp. 386-389.
[58] Tapti Roy, 'Rereading the Texts: Rebel Writings in 1857-58', in Sabyasachi Bhattacharya (ed.), *Rethinking 1857* (Delhi: Orient Longman, 2007), pp.226–32. Full citation needed for Bhattacharya.
[59] *Ibid*., p.233.
[60] Saiyid Zaheer Husain Jafri, 'Indigenous Discourse and Modern Historiography of 1857. The Case Study of Maulavi Ahmadullah Shah', in *Ibid*, pp.243–52. Full citation needed for Bhattacharya

in 1859. During his time in jail he wrote a book in Arabic called *Al- Sūrat al-Hindiyā* (1860) (translation needed) which was later translated into Urdu. However despite the title the Maulana's point of view is religious not nationalistic. He talks of martyrdom (*shahādat*) but it is obvious that he refers only to Muslim rebels not to non-Muslims who also died opposing the British. And as for the Muslim rebels, he stigmatises them as '*bad bakht*' (unlucky) and '*bad kaēsh*' (of evil belief) and even goes so far as to dub them '*murtid*' (apostates). The British are called 'Christians' (*Nasārā*) throughout and the Hindus are accused of having helped them. However, these are Hindus of the West (*Gharbī* Hindus).[61] In short, for the Maulana, the Mutiny was a religious war, a *jihād*, which could only be won in the name of Islam. The British were usurpers for him but so was the majority community. The Maulana remained, in the mid nineteenth century, a firm believer in a theocratic form of rule.

The *fatwā* attributed to Maulana Khairabadi by the British does not, however, contain either his name or his signature. It was first published in the *Akhbārul Zafar* of Delhi, then in the *Sādiq ul Akhbār* on 26 July 1857. Since the Maulana did not reach Delhi until August he cannot have been its author.[62] However his book makes it clear that he thought *jihād* was 'a religious duty for the people of Delhi in proportion to their capability' (*farz-ē-aēn hai ūpar tamām is shaher kē lōgōn kē aur istā'at zurūr haē is kī farziat kē wāstē*).[63] On the other hand, Syed Ahmad Khan says that he actually saw a *fatwā* saying that this was not *jihād*.[64] Moreover, he argues that this particular *fatwā* was a fake. It even carried the seal and signatures of certain dead *ulema*.[65]

Ironically, though, support for the concept of the revolt as a *jihād* was patchy even in the areas—sometimes called Hindustan proper—where most of the action in 1857 took place. In the areas

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[61] Fazlul Haq Khairabadi, *Al-Sūrat al-Hindiyā* (1860) (trans. from Arabic into Urdu) in Mohammad Ikram Chughtai (comp.), *1857: Rōznāmche, Mu 'āsir Taehrīrēn, Yāddāshtēn* [*Diaries, Memoirs and Contemporary Writings*] (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel 2007), pp.513–31.

[62] Imtiaz Ali Khan Arshi Rampuri, '*Maulana Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi aur 1857 ka Fatwa-e-Jihad*' (*Khairabadi and the Decree of Jihad of 1857*) in Mohammad Ikram Chughtai (comp.), *1857: Rōznāmche, Mu 'āsir Taehrīrēn, Yāddāshtēn* [*Diaries, Memoirs and Contemporary Writings*] (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel 2007), pp.874-885 (quoted from p. 877).

[63] Rampuri, *ibid* in Chughtai *ibid,* p.878. Should this be *ibid*., p.878.? i.e. is it Rampuri?

[64] Rampuri, *ibid* in Chughtai *ibid,* p. 883.

[65] *Ibid*, p. 883.

with Muslim majorities—the present-day Pakistani Punjab, North West Frontier Province, Sind, Baluchistan and Bangladesh—the idea did not gain either credence or currency.

Contrary to the romantic view that he gave evidence against himself, inviting punishment, Maulana Khairabadi tried his best to get off.[66] In a letter to Yusuf Ali Khan, the Nawab of Rampur, he implored the Nawab to intercede on his behalf with the British authorities. Dated 18 February 1859, the letter protests that 'he has been imprisoned by them without any crime' (*fidwī rā mahez bē jurm muqayyad kardā und*).[67] Apparently he wrote two earlier letters to the nawab but this is the only one to have survived. The Maulana's main argument seems to be that another person, one Mir Fazle Haq of Shahjahanpur, was actually responsible for the crimes he was supposed to have committed.[68]

Thus, rebel writings did try to delegitimise British rule but more in the name of recent mis-governance and, especially, interference with traditional belief systems than any pan-Indian feeling of nationalism.

Thus the identities which the rebels' works invoke are mainly religious and, therefore, potentially divisive. I take up this point in the next section.

Mobilization of Religious Identities

William Dalrymple, in an insightful article, points out that religion 'might not have been the only force at work [in 1857], nor perhaps the primary one; but to ignore its power and importance, at least in the rhetoric used to justify the uprising, seems to go against the huge weight of emphasis on this factor given in the rebels' own documents'.[69] The above analysis of the language of the rebels who wrote during the uprising supports this conclusion. Although it has focussed on the

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[66] *Ibid*., pp.880-881.
[67] *Ibid*., p.881.
[68] Imtiaz Ali Khan Arshi Rampuri, '*Maulana Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi aur 1857 ka Fatwa-e-Jihad*' (*Khairabadi and the Decree of Jihad of 1857*) in Mohammad Ikram Chughtai (comp.), *1857: Rōznāmche, Mu 'āsir Taehrīrēn, Yāddāshtēn* [*Diaries, Memoirs and Contemporary Writings*] (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel 2007), p.881.
[69] William Darlymple, 'Religious Rhetoric in the Delhi Uprising of 1857'. In Sabyasachi Bhattacharya (ed.), *Rethinking 1857* (Delhi: Orient Longman, 2007), pp. 22-43 (quoted from p. 38). Please give full citation

deployment of the Muslim religious idiom—terms such as *jihād*, *dār ul Islām*, *ghāzī*, etc.—as this is what infused Urdu writings, it is noteworthy here that Muhammad Baqir, the editor of the *Dillī Urdū Akhbār*, also drew upon the language of Hindu mythology in an attempt to mobilise the Hindus against the British.[70] The Hindus, he argued, also need to save their faith (*dharmā*) from British colonial corruption.

However, even if the Hindus are asked to join forces against the British for the sake of expediency, it is clear that the idiom of religion is potentially divisive and backward-looking. Thus Taib's account notes that when the sepoys chose Prince Birjis Qadar, the son of Zeenat Mahal and the former ruler of Awadh Wajid Ali Shah, as their leader, Ahmadullah Shah opposed this on the grounds that the *jihād* can only be conducted under the guidance of an *imām*. Since the prince was a Shi'a, he could not be allowed to lead the *mujāhidīn* who were dominantly Sunnis.[71] Moreover, Ahmadullah Shah went on to destroy the Hindu temples of Hanumangarhi which had allegedly been built 'at the site of a destroyed mosque'.[72] In short, religious identity, once invoked, had the potential to polarise the people along sectarian lines.

That said, we do find in the Urdu sources some references to motherland (*watan*), country (*Hindustān*) and freedom (*āzādi*). However, it is not clear whether they refer to present-day U P (Hindustan proper) or what came to be called British India.[73] It appears from the use of such terms in other contexts that probably the former was meant. In any case, these references are few and far between.

This is not surprising. In the mid nineteenth century religious identity was really the only type of identity available to Indians which transcended those of kinship (*birādari*), occupation (*zāt*) or

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[70] *Dillī Urdū Akhbār* (14 June 1857), in William Darlymple, 'Religious Rhetoric in the Delhi Uprising of 1857'. In Sabyasachi Bhattacharya (ed.), *Rethinking 1857* (Delhi: Orient Longman, 2007), pp. 22-43 (quoted from p. 32).

[71] F.M. Taib, *Tawarikh-i- Ahmadi* (The History of Ahmad) (Lucknow: 1863), in Saiyid Zaheer Husain Jafri, 'Indigenous Discourse and Modern Historiography of 1857. The Case Study of Maulavi Ahmadullah Shah' in Sabyasachi Bhattacharya (ed.), *Rethinking 1857* (Delhi: Orient Longman, 2007), p. 249. Please give full citation for Bhattacharya

[72] *Ibid.*, p.247.

[73] 'Revolt of 1857–Flag Song', South Asian Research Centre for Advertisements, Journalism and Cartoons [https://www.sarcajc.com/Revolt_ of_1857_Flag_Song.html, accessed 8 May 2008].

ethnicity. Nationalism was yet to be born, so the evocation of an 'Indian' identity was not an option.

Conclusion

While it is possible that many people shared the rebels' anti-British sentiments in the general area of present day UP and parts of the Punjab, the Urdu writings which we find today are predominantly by those who thought that the upheaval of 1857 was a mutiny. It is very much possible that the fear of the government post-1857 was so great that people dissembled their true feelings—but this remains a hypothesis yet to be proved.

Still, the widespread use of the words *ghadar*, *bāghī*, *fitnā*, etc. foreshadowed an embryonic anti-colonial discourse. Passed down to the next generation, and thence into the corpus of the received wisdom about the country's history, this became indeed the hegemonic discourse of the period 1858 till about 1930. Only in the twentieth century, when nationalistic histories came to be written, did an alternative discourse emerge. And until it did, these hegemonic Indian narratives served to confer legitimacy upon the British. The rebel's own vocabulary of resistance was quickly marginalised. Indeed as late as 1930 when Khwaja Hasan Nizami published his book on the revolt, he insisted on calling it a mutiny (*ghadar*). Significantly, when this book was reissued in 1946, it was re-named *Dillī kī Sazā*. [The punishment of Delhi]

Thus only in the 1940s did the idea that 1857 might have been a 'war of independence' rather than a 'mutiny' gain acceptance at least within the genre of Urdu historical writing. Now of course, it has become so entrenched that it is presented as fact in Pakistani school textbooks. This makes it very difficult for Pakistani historians to explain how the Punjab and the North West Frontier Province actually supplied soldiers for the British conquest of India. That is probably why isolated incidents of resistance, such as that of Ahmed Khan Khural, are still magnified and glorified in recent Pakistani historiography about 1857.[74]

[74] Ahmed Saleem, *Āzādī aur Awām* (*Freedom and the People*) (Lahore: Nigarshat, 1990), pp.33–54.

11
LANGUAGE ON WHEELS: INSCRIPTIONS ON PAKISTANI TRUCKS AS A WINDOW INTO POPULAR WORLDVIEW

In the summer of 2002 the Smithsonian Folk life Festival featured a decorated truck brought from Karachi by Professor Mark Kenoyer and bodywork expert Jamil ud-Din (Kenoyer 2008). Trucks are, indeed objects of art in Pakistan. They are painted in bright colours all over and most of them have flowers, animals, mythical creatures and sometimes even human beings painted on them. Out of all the trucks in Pakistan plying over 246,904 kms of roads, most also have inscriptions in Arabic, Urdu, Pashto, Balochi, Brahvi, Sindhi and Punjabi written on them. In addition to that trucks have chains, bells and tinsel to make them look beautiful. They are, as some inscriptions state explicitly, bedecked like brides or princesses. The beautiful female eyes painted upon them 'are active elements in attributing a feminine personality to the truck' (Elias 2003: 193).

But do these inscriptions tell us something about popular culture and the dominant world view which obtains there? This is our major research question.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

There are several writings on truck art in Pakistan. The pioneering work was a doctoral dissertation written in Paris (Dutreux, 1978); a picture book with an introduction published in 1990 (Grothues 1990) and Anna Schmid's informative monograph called *Pakistan Express* (1995).This was part of an exhibition in Hamburg from 13 December 1995 to June 1996. The monograph describes the profession of truck driving in Pakistan along with details of how the driver, his apprentice and others operate. The way trucks are decorated is explained but inscriptions receive very little attention. The religious motif is emphasized and examples of it from the crown of a truck are shown in a photograph (Schmid 1995: 90). As for the other motifs, there is no detailed mention nor analysis though it is noted in passing that aphorisms—about fate for example—are written on the body of the truck (Schmid 1995: 93).

Martin Sokefeld has also written on truck art. He too notes that the 'highest part of a truck is invariably reserved for Islam. 'Calligraphies reading Aya Allah and Aya Mohammad, along with pictures of the Kaaba at Mecca, are found on what is called *ataj*, the crown' (Sokefeld

2000: 41). Like Schmid, he too has written more about the paintings than about the inscriptions. Among other things, he notes that there are two kinds of trends in painting trucks: the simple and the 'disco', the latter 'being very lavishly decorated' (Sokefeld 2008: 177). The work is done by thousands of painters and calligraphers in workshops all over the country. In Karachi alone 'more than 50,000 people toil in small, family-run workshops comprised of apprentices and highly trained artisans, each with his well-defined specialty' (Covington 2005: 2-3; also see Rich and Khan 1980). The article quotes Mark Kenoyer, well-known for his archeological work on Pakistan as well as Durriya Kazi, an academic at Karachi University, for a possible history of truck art. While Kazi refers to 'the exquisitely refined court decoration of 16th-and 17th-century Mughal emperors' (Covington 2005: 6) for the roots of contemporary truck art, Kenoyer goes back to the 'heavily decorated camel caravans' of Neolithic traders who used routes from Central Asia into modern-day Pakistan (Covington 2005: 2).

More importantly for our purposes the article refers to Durriya Kazi's views about the inscriptions on trucks.

> "One classic line" says Kazi, is "If your mother prays for you, it's like a breeze from heaven". Other selections, particularly on buses, are racier, like the teasing, convoluted come-on that reads, "I wish I were the book you are reading, so that when you fall asleep and the book falls on your chest, I would be so close to you". In general, she points out, trucks display themes of distance, the journey and spiritual longing, while "90 percent of the messages on buses have to do with love, particularly unrequited love" (Rickshas, [sic] with far less space, make do with a cryptic word or two like "I wish" or "broken pearl") (Covington 2005: 7).

Trucks not belonging to multinational companies, or those trying to emulate them [the companies], are decorated. The Islamic content, as Jamal J. Elis points out is 'apostrophic or talismanic, in that it protects the truck, its contents, and the individuals dependent on the trucks from misfortune and—sometimes simultaneously—brings good fortune on them' (Elias 2005: 51). The most austere, fundamentalist or militant version of Islam is generally absent as the data presented later brings out. Elias's articles (2003; 2005) are the most detailed upon the subject of art and he gives attention to inscriptions too.

Elias identifies five regional styles of truck decoration out of which the commonest is called the 'Punjabi style' (2003: 189). He also classifies the decoration motifs into size categories (Ibid 192). More relevant for this study, however, is his second article in which he describes the inscriptions on four trucks which have been used as case studies of types. One type of trucks displays a religiosity which may be called folk Islam or low church. Calling it the 'intercessory' model of Islam i.e. that which believes that holy personages can intercede on behalf of ordinary people with God, Elias argues that:

> Devotion to Muhammad, Sufi saints, as well as to Ali, Fatima, and their children is a common characteristic of Islam as it has been practiced in present-day Pakistan for several centuries (Elias 2005: 60).

This is commonly the kind of Islam which is supported by the Barelvi sub-sect of which Ahmed Raza Khan (1856-1921) of Bareilly, a city in U. P (India), is the major exponent (Sanyal 1996).

Apart from the religious inscriptions there are non-religious ones too. These are divided by Elias into the purely utilitarian ones (such as the names of companies on the sides); the whimsical writings and the romantic and philosophical poetry which, in the worldview of the driver and his associates, is 'high art' (Elias 2003: 194).

Inscriptions have been noticed by Pakistanis also. For instance there are two collections of truck inscriptions entitled *Pappu Yar Tang na Kar* (do not bother me friend Pappu)—a common humorous saying on many trucks—published by Parco Pak-Arab Refinery (Haq 2001 Parts 1 and 2). Part-1 consists of Urdu couplets, some of a risque quality, along with aphorisms on trucks whose numbers are given. Part-2 consists of the Urdu poet Ghalib's (1797-1869) couplets on rickshaws, taxis and trucks. There is no attempt at analysis nor is the sample representative. Indeed, the compiler has merely chosen the lines he found enjoyable or noticeable. Thus, from this sample it cannot be determined which languages besides Urdu—only the Urdu lines are given—are used in inscriptions and what themes, other than the ones represented in the sample, are to be found on Pakistani trucks. Much more information on these inscriptions is to be found in the scholarly works on truck paintings mentioned earlier.

This article, then, intends to fill the gap in our knowledge on truck inscriptions in Pakistan. The research questions are: which languages are used for writing inscriptions on trucks and in what proportion? What are the themes of the inscriptions and how are they distributed on the body of the truck? Is there a difference in their distribution across regions in Pakistan? And,

above all, do the themes of the inscriptions shed some light on the popular worldview in the country? Connected with this is the question whether this worldview is changing with the perceived increase in Islamic fundamentalism and militancy in the name of Islam in Pakistani society in the past few years?

Method

Non-random sampling was used to choose trucks whose inscriptions were noted and, in most cases, photographed. The researchers—the author and his research assistants (see 'acknowledgements' for names)—went to truck stands where hundreds of trucks were parked. They also recorded the inscriptions on the backs of moving trucks while traveling. First a pilot survey on trucks was conducted in the summer of 2008 by the author personally. The truck's body was divided into top front, top bottom, left side, right side and back. This made it possible to understand what part of the truck is reserved for what type of inscriptions. Later, research assistants were sent to Peshawar, Quetta, Southern Punjab and Sindh to carry out similar surveys. In Balochistan, as trucks with Balochi and Brahvi inscriptions were very few a special effort was made to collect a sample of them but the research assistant found only nine such trucks after much effort. As the major site for writing for the specific purpose of being read is the back of the trucks there is more data for the inscriptions on the back of trucks as compared to separate data for the front and sides.

The focus of this research being inscriptions, most of the time and effort was spent on collecting specimens of them from the bodies of trucks. Their analysis uses statistical methods and, therefore, the research appears quantitative. However, in common with other researchers on trucks in Pakistan—as well as in other countries such as the United States (Agar 1986: 12-14)—qualitative research methods have been used. Thus, the present author visited workshops where trucks were being painted to see how the work was done. A number of painters (10), owners of painting workshops (5), drivers (20) and apprentices of trucks (5) were interviewed. These interviews were open-ended and the interviewees were free to talk of all subjects, including politics and religion, which came to their mind. Most of these interviews were conducted by the author himself in Rawalpindi (5 owners, 5 drivers and 5 painters). The results of these interviews are quoted in this paper with reference to the names (fictitious) of the interviewees. In addition to that research assistants also got answers to specific questions in a written form from Hyderabad (Sindh) (5 drivers; 2 painters), Rahim Yar Khan (South Punjab) (5drivers; 2 painters); Peshawar

(North West Frontier Province) (5drivers; 2 painters) and Quetta (Balochistan) (5 drivers; 2 painters); Rawalpindi (2 painters) (Annexure-A). Ten questionnaires were distributed initially but, as the subjects were reluctant to fill them in, this method was abandoned. Better results were obtained by open-ended, loosely structured interviews.

Discussion of the Data

A total number of 627 trucks registered in the following parts of Pakistan were selected as described earlier.

Province of registration	**Inscriptions on back**	**Inscriptions on all sides**
Punjab	154	129
NWFP	161	88
Sindh	123	117
Balochistan	127	15
Gilgit/AJK	62	50
Total	627	399

Themes of Inscriptions

The inscriptions were divided into major themes as follows:

Advisory: About life in general and of an advisory nature e.g. *phal mausam dā gal vēlē dī* [Punjabi] (The best fruit is that which is of that of the season and the best saying is that which is appropriate for the occasion).

Driver's life: Pertaining to the driver's life of perpetual traveling, not having a fixed home, and pride in his profession e.g. *driver kī zindagī maut kā khel hai/ bach gayā tō central jēl haē* [Urdu] (The driver's life is a game of death/even if he survives there is the central jail).

Fatalism: Pertaining to the idea of there being a fixed, unalterable destiny; predestination; kismet with all its variant forms e.g. *nasīb apnā apnā* [Urdu] (to each his/her own destiny).

Goodness: General goodwill and good wishes for all e.g. *khair hō āp kī* [Urdu] (I wish your life is blessed).

Islam: All sayings from the Qur'an, references to Islamic mystics (*Sufis*), pictures of sacred places in Islamic culture and religious formulas e.g. *bismillāh* [Arabic] (In the name of Allah).

Islamic Fundamentalism: A sub-theme of the above, these refer to *tablīgh* (proselytizing), the Talibān (Rashid 2000), and exhortations to say prayers. These were not common some years back and, in view of the increasing militancy using the idiom of Islam in Pakistan, these inscriptions were tabulated separately e.g. *dāwat-ē-tablīgh zindābād* [Urdu] (long live the invitation to proselytize [Islam]).

Islamic mysticism: Also a sub-theme of the Islamic inscriptions. These refer to some reputed *Sufi's* shrine or *Sufi* idea e.g. *Malangī sakhī Shahbāz qalandar dī* [Punjabi] (I am the female devotee of the Generous Shahbaz Qalandar).

Mother: Pertaining to devotion, love and respect for the mother e.g. *mān dī duā jannat dī hawā* [Punjabi] (Mother's blessings are like the breeze of paradise).

Nationalism: Pertaining to Pakistani nationalism e.g. Pakistan *zindā bād* [Urdu] (Long live Pakistan).

Patriotism: Pertaining to love for one's native area e.g. *khushāb merā shaher hai* [Urdu] (Khushab is my city).

Romance: Pertaining to romantic love, flirtation, desire, aesthetic appreciation of (female) beauty and, sometimes, the mildly erotic e.g. *rāt bhar mā'shūq ko paēhlū mēn bithā kar/ jō kuch nahīn kartē kamāl kartē haen* [Urdu] (Those who spend the whole night with the beloved next to them/ and still do nothing; verily perform a miracle!)

Truck: Pertaining to the truck itself. The truck is often portrayed as being feminine. This is common with the USA where the truck 'usually has a name, typically feminine' (Agar 1986: 115) but in Pakistan Muslim female names are not used for trucks. Common names such as princess (*shahzādī*) are used e.g. *Japan kī shahzādī* [Urdu] (Japan's princess).

Blanks:	No inscription or picture.
Languages:	Details of the languages used for inscriptions are given below.

The themes were coded and the frequencies of their occurrence were recorded. This data was then analyzed in order to find out the percentage of occurrence, the reservation of certain parts of the trucks for specific themes and whether there were significant differences between trucks registered in one province from another.

Apart from the fact that the inscriptions are in a language, such as Urdu, the more interesting idea is that they constitute a language: a symbolic system. As Peter Herriot in his book on religious fundamentalism writes:

> The elements of religious language include recurring types: the repentant sinner, the victorious warrior, the humble servant, the dutiful wife, the wise ruler, the fearless prophet, the prudent merchant, the sinful woman, and so on (Herriot 2009: 207).

But this is not restricted to religious language only. There is the language of love; of stereotyping human beauty; of imagining fate; relationships and one's place in the world. The inscriptions help create the symbolic system in which the driver and the people he meets on the roads live and function. Thus is part of their worldview; emanates from it and, in turn, constitutes it and supports it. This will be taken up in some detail later.

The Theme of Religion

As pointed out by other researchers (Elias 2003: 192-193), the explicitly religious symbols, images and inscriptions are on the front, top of the truck. While the images, as pointed out by Elias, never appear 'on the sides or the back' (Elias 2003: 192), religious inscriptions do. They mostly appear on the front, down either on the bumper or on the engine itself. They also appear on the back and even on the sides.

However, it is the front top, the part of the truck which precedes the rest of it, which carries the name of the sacred. This is in the Arabic language, the sacred language of Islam, and it helps people place themselves in relation to the divine. It is an act of homage not necessarily of deep commitment. This is consistent with Muslim culture everywhere in so far as most activities—business activities, educational activities, eating, drinking, marriages, deaths, births,

festivities—begin with religious rituals and formulaic utterances in Arabic such as *bismillāh* (in the name of Allah). The following data makes it clear.

THE USE OF ARABIC ON THE FRONT TOP OF TRUCKS		
Province of registration	**Percentage of inscriptions**	**Percentage of blanks**
NWFP	89 per cent *	9 per cent
Punjab	90 per cent	11 per cent
Balochistan	100 per cent	7 per cent
Sindh	90 per cent	14 per cent
** GLT/AJK	91 per cent	12 per cent
Source: Annexure-C-1		

Note: The above frequencies are rounded off to whole numbers.

* The percentages in this column are based on the total number of trucks with inscriptions.

** GLT = Gilgit and AJK = Azad Jammu and Kashmir were both parts of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir and are now controlled by Pakistan. They are counted as 'regions' of Pakistan.

The top sometimes carries more than one inscription of a religious kind. While some trucks, especially those belonging to modern institutions such as multinational companies, are completely blank, trucks with any inscription at all almost always have some religious symbol or inscription on the top. The commonest inscriptions are as follows:

Mā shā Allāh (Let God be praised)

Wallāhō khaērur rāzeqīn (God is the best provider of sustenance)

Subhān Allāh (All praises are for God)

Yā Allāh ya Muhammad (SAW) (O God! O Muhammad-Peace be Upon Him)

Yā Allāh Madad (O God Help me!**)**

Alhamd ō lillāh (Thank God)

Hāzā min fazl-ē-rabbī (Here is God's grace).

As mentioned earlier, these formulaic utterances are commonly used among Pakistani Muslims in daily life. They are considered auspicious and are spontaneous cultural habits. They do not indicate any special religious commitment which, however, the inscriptions subsumed under the theme of 'religious fundamentalism' do.

The 'fundamentalist' type of Islam is called non-intercessory by Elias, because it denies intercession by saints and rejects mystic (*Sufi*) practices and folk Islam. It takes several forms such as Wahabism (or Ahl-i-Hadith in South Asia), Deobandi sub-sect as well as the more fundamentalist and militant interpretations of the last few decades. Elias has given a case study of one such truck which carries the line: '*Dā'vat -ē-tablīgh zindābād*' (long live the call for proselytization). This is inspired by the Tablighi Jama' at and is 'not commonly encountered in Pakistan' (Elias 2005: 61).

This truck carries exhortation to prayers: '*namaz rah-e-nijat hai* (Prayer is the path to salvation) (Elias 2005: 63). As Elias says, he noticed this development 'for the first time in 2003, after four years of fieldwork on Pakistani truck decoration' (Ibid 64). He goes on to connect it with the inspiration of the Tablighi Jama' at of Maulana Ilyas (1885-1944) which began to preach against the syncretic practices of Meo Muslims from 1934 and now attracts millions of people in Pakistan at its annual meeting at Raiwind near Lahore (Masud 2000).

These latter inscriptions, however, hardly appear on the top of trucks. They are meant to be read—as opposed to the inscriptions on the top which are symbolic—and occur on the sides or the back. These inscriptions are about commitment. They are fundamentalist according to the meaning given to the term in social science parlance i.e. they are reactive (believing that Islam is under mortal threat); millenialist (believing that eventually God will establish His rule through the Islamic law or *sharia*); going back to the fundamentals which mean the Qur'an and the Sunnah as interpreted by their own ideologues (adapted from Herriot 2009: 2-3). In Pakistan the Taliban are the most noted fundamentalists and, therefore, the inscriptions called fundamentalist are generally about the Taliban (*Talibān zindābād* or Long live the Taliban is one of the inscriptions on trucks) or prayers, fasting and preaching or proselytizing in order to establish the *sharia*. The Taliban (students) rose to power in Afghanistan after 1994 when the warlords had divided the country into warring fiefdoms after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 (Rashid 2000: 17-30). They are Deobandis i.e. followers of the school established at Deoband (India) by Mohammed Qasim Nanautawi (1833-77) and Rashid Ahmed Gangohi (1829-1905) (Metcalf

1982). They were against certain forms of folk Islam in India including excessive reverence for *Sufi* saints and the idea that they had miraculous powers of intercession in human life. Their interpretation of the *sharia* was strict and they opposed rituals, especially around the graves of saints, which were common in India and which their main rivals, the Barelvis, defended. However, according to Ahmed Rashid, 'the Taliban were to take these beliefs to an extreme which the original Deobandis would never have recognized' (Rashid 2000: 88). The Pakistani Taliban, like their Afghan counterparts, are extremely strict about women's seclusion, the growing of beards by men and the observance of the rituals of Islam. They condemn *Sufis* and do not allow people to visit their graves – something which the Deobandis could never do with such inflexibility and fervour. So, when one talks of 'fundamentalist' inscriptions one means those which support the 'Taliban', extreme Wahabi or Ahl-i-Hadith worldview. Although the Taliban movement is mostly in the NWFP, the difference between the frequency of occurrence of fundamentalist inscriptions in that province is not significantly different from the number of such inscriptions found in Balochistan and the Punjab (See Annexure-D for statistical details).

The mystical inscriptions are those which are specifically about *Sufi* saints or shrines. This sub-genre is part of peoples' worldview, popular poetry and songs and is frowned upon by the fundamentalists and others who regard it as seeking intercession from someone other than God (*shirk*) (See Annexure-C).

The Themes of Romance, Fatalism and the Mother

The back of the truck is for inscriptions which are meant to be read as the truck, generally slower than other traffic, exposes itself to the gaze of travelers longer than other vehicles. Here one finds mostly romantic inscriptions. These occur as follows:

Punjab	56 Per cent
NWFP	50 Per cent
Sindh	37 Per cent
Balochistan	59 Per cent
GLT/AJK	51 Per cent
Source: Annexure-C-3)	

NB: The above frequencies are rounded off to whole numbers.

Though apparently there are differences between the provinces/regions in the exhibition of romantic themes, these are not statistically significant as the chi-square values given in Annexure-B suggests.

The romantic nature of most of the salient and noticeable inscriptions on trucks has been remarked upon by several observers who have reproduced them in photographs, (*Nation Plus* 5 Oct 2008).

Collections of inscriptions (Haq 2001: Parts 1 & 2) and even a film documentary by Sarmad Sehbai, a liberal left-leaning film-maker and poet, are available. Most inscriptions draw on the conventions of the *ghazal*, the sub genre of Urdu poetry which has been popular among educated and urbanized Muslims for about two hundred years. The themes of the *ghazal* are unrequited romantic love, appreciation of female (and boyish) beauty, the fickleness of life and fatalism (Sadiq 1964: 19-32). While there is much eroticism in the Lucknow school of poetry (Kashmiri 2003: 403-477), it is the more idealized, ethereal and emotional style of the *ghazal* which prevails. While some of the couplets of the classical masters of the *ghazal*, such as Mirza Asadullah Khan Ghalib or Mir Taqi Mir (1722-1810) are in circulation, most drivers choose verses from unknown poets or, sometimes from modern popular poets such as Ahmed Faraz (1930-2008).

The most frequently occurring inscriptions on romantic themes are as follows:

Aē shēr parhnē walē zara chehrē se zulfēn hatā ke parhnā

Gharīb nē rō kar likhā haē zarā muskurā kē parhnā

[Urdu] (O reader read this couplet after removing the tresses of hair from your face/ a poor man has written this so please smile while reading it)

and: *anmōl dām dūngā ik bār muskurā dō*

[Urdu] (I will give you incomputable wealth if only you smile but once).

And one of the commonest ones is:

Dēkh magar piyār sē

[Urdu] (see me but with love).

The examples given above are not from Urdu's large corpus of amorous poetry. They have been written by unknown poets who do not appear to know the rules of versification in Urdu. However, the worldview of the *ghazal*—the poet supplicating an indifferent and fickle beauty for favours—is ubiquitous.

Fatalism—the belief that one's life chances are pre-ordained—is very much a part of Pakistani folk beliefs. In Islamic philosophy it is called *masalā-ē-jabr-ō-qadr* (loosely translated as Predestination and Free Will) (Watt 1984; Ishrat 2007) and, at least in its more extreme forms, completely denies free will. Among ordinary people, however, the denial of free will goes along with a pragmatic valuation of the place of common sense, self-interest, and effort in life.

Inscriptions about belief in some form of fatalism are found in trucks from all the regions of Pakistan.

INSCRIPTIONS ABOUT FATALISM ON THE BACK OF TRUCKS.		
Region	**No of trucks with inscriptions**	**Percentage**
NWFP	27	20
Punjab	18	15
Balochistan	11	9
Sindh	9	13
GLT/AJK	10	27
Source: Annexure C-3		

However, there seems to be a significant difference between the provinces in the occurrence of such inscriptions on the backs of trucks (Annexure-F). However, if the data from AJK/GLT is not taken into account there is no significant difference between the provinces (Annexure-F-1). As the number of trucks from these two regions was less—only 37 with inscriptions on the back—this data may be misleading. Interviews with drivers also confirmed belief in fatalism in all parts of the country.

Inscriptions about the mother are also very common.

INSCRIPTIONS ABOUT THE MOTHER ON THE BACK OF TRUCKS:		
Region	**No of trucks with inscriptions**	**Percentage (rounded)**
NWFP	15	11
Punjab	15	13
Balochistan	14	11
Sindh	21	30
GLT/AJK	02	05
Source: Annexure C-3		

The drivers often quote a prophetic tradition to the effect: 'paradise lies under the feet of the mother'. They claim with much reverence and visible emotion that their mothers' prayers had made them successful. A typical comment by Gul Haseeb from Peshawar is as follows:

'Sahib but for my mother's prayers I would be in jail. Our profession is very tough and it can send a poor driver to the graveyard or the jail while his hair is still black'.

Yet another driver compared the mother to the sun which gave life to the earth. 'When the mother dies the house is cold', he said.

Yet despite inscriptions about the mother being present on trucks from all regions of Pakistan, there are significant differences between the frequencies of their occurrence on the backs of trucks (Annexure-G). However, between the provinces of the NWFP, Punjab and Balochistan there are no significant differences (Annexure G-1). While the data from AJK/GLT may be dismissed because it is limited, there is no valid reason for not considering the data from Sindh. There is, indeed, no explanation for there being more inscriptions about the mother on trucks registered in Sindh than in the other major provinces. And, indeed, drivers in all provinces of the country showed the same emotion for the mother in interviews.

The Languages of Inscriptions

The languages used for inscriptions on trucks are Arabic, Urdu, Pashto, Sindhi, Balochi, Brahvi and English. Arabic is used only as part of Islamic symbolism as mentioned earlier. English is generally used only as part of the registration formula e.g. (Peshawar 12345) and sometimes, but very rarely, for the name of the company on the sides—which is normally in English but written in the perso-Arabic script of Urdu—or phrases like 'Good luck'. Balochi and Brahvi are used to express all themes but they are so rare that the researcher had to make a special effort to find 9 trucks in Balochistan which had inscriptions in these languages. Sindhi too is used less than Urdu in Sindh but it too can convey all themes.

The reasons for the use of Arabic have been discussed earlier. Here the frequency of the occurrence of Arabic inscriptions on the top front, front down, left and right sides of trucks is given. Note that there are no inscriptions in Arabic on the back of trucks in our sample.

INSCRIPTIONS IN ARABIC ON TRUCKS					
	NWFP	**Punjab**	**Balochistan**	**Sindh**	**GLT/AJK**
Trucks with inscriptions	80	115	14	101	44
Front Top	71 (88.75%)	104 (90.43%)	14 (100.00%)	91 (90.10%)	40 (90.91%)
Trucks with inscriptions	40	56	10	34	17

Front Down	3 (7.50%)	-	-	4 (11.76%)	-
Trucks with inscriptions	12	20	-	22	13
Left	-	1 (5.00%)	-	-	1 (7.69%)

NB: Source: Annexure-C-1, C-2 & C-4. The percentages are calculated on the basis of trucks with inscriptions and are different in all cases as the number of blanks differ from case to case.

The writing in Arabic offers no real choice as it is the language of Islam and all formulaic, liturgical writing in Islamic societies is in this language so it has to be present as an icon of Islam. However, the other languages of Pakistan offer choices for the writer of the inscriptions. To the questions about (1) who had decided which language to use for inscriptions and (2) on what basis, most drivers and painters replied that they had jointly decided this and the basis was intelligibility (Annexure-A, Q 1 & 2). The language, they said, had to be intelligible to them and to the common people they came across during their eternal traveling all over Pakistan. Some workshops have diaries or scrapbooks with couplets which the driver can choose from. The present author saw several of such books. One owner of a workshop commented on his scrapbook as follows:

> 'These are the most popular couplets for thirty years. When I show them to the drivers they want all but we have limited space only'.

Most of the inscriptions were in Urdu though there were Pashto ones too. The Pashto inscriptions were found even in Rawalpindi, otherwise a Punjabi and Urdu-speaking city. This was explained by painters with reference to the large number of Pashto-speaking truck drivers in all provinces of Pakistan. 'We have to cater for the drivers', said painter Abdul Ghani while in the process of painting a truck near Pirwadhai in Rawalpindi. 'If they like Pashto so be it. Besides we painters can write in Pashto as well as in Urdu—even in English. Actually English is the easiest'. However, as Urdu is used in all the urban trade centres of Pakistan and is the language of wider communication in Pakistan, it is the major language of inscriptions in the country. As Urdu is used all over the country this language was the logical choice for the kind of writing which was meant to be read, understood and enjoyed by most Pakistanis.

Pashto, however, follows Urdu not because it is understood all over the country—indeed it is not even taught formally in the Pashto-speaking areas for the most part—but because the

drivers are mostly Pashtuns and it is part of their Pashtun identity to identify with it (Rahman 1996: 133-154) and carry it with them as a portable tie to their Pashtun roots.

The emergence of Urdu as a popular language of wider communication (LWC) is underscored by the following figures.

FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE OF INSCRIPTIONS IN THE LANGUAGES OF PAKISTAN					
	No of trucks with inscriptions on the Back	**No of trucks with Urdu**	**No. of trucks with Pashto**	**No. of trucks with Sindhi**	**No. of trucks with Punjabi**
NWFP	134	70	50	-	14
Punjabi	119	99	1	-	19
Balochistan	124	109	14	-	1
Sindh	71	52	2	5	12
GLT/AJK	37	33	1	-	3
	485	636	68	5	49
		74.85%	14.22%	1.03%	10.10%
Source: Annexure-C-3					

Expressing the same realities in terms of percentages so as to compare the use of these languages on trucks with the number of their speakers we get the following chart:

THE USE OF LANGUAGES ON TRUCKS		
	Frequency of occurrence on trucks in percentages	percentage of mother-tongue speakers
Urdu	75% *	7.57% **
Pashto	14%	15.42%
Sindhi	01%	14.10%
Punjabi	10%	44.15%

NB: * Figures do not add up to 100 because the same truck may have inscriptions in more than one language.

** These figures are from Census 2001.

However, there are significant differences between the provinces/regions in use of Urdu inscriptions on the back of trucks (for chi-square values see Annexure-E). These differences are introduced because of the NWFP where Pashto is used along with Urdu whereas in other provinces/regions of Pakistan the local languages are not used so often on the trucks. If the NWFP is removed from the data there are no significant differences in the use of Urdu on trucks in Pakistan (Annexure E-1).

Punjabi is not taught formally in most educational institutions though, like Pashto, it is an optional language in some government Urdu-medium schools. Yet, it does feature on the trucks since it is regarded as a language of intimacy, jokes and risqué male, in-group bonding. Thus the following inscription.

Rul tē gayē ān/par chas barī ayī

(I am ruined/but I really enjoyed myself) written on many trucks hints at the possibility of sexual adventurism and its consequences. Yet another one hinting at the lover's frustration with the inability of his beloved from meeting him is as follows:

āg lāvān tērī majbūriān nūn.

(I feel like burning your constraints)

Such types of innuendoes to lovers' meetings or desires are enjoyed by people, especially men, in Pakistan. Thus, trucks are often a source of diversion on the otherwise frustratingly congested and often pockmarked and cratered roads of Pakistan.

The worldview of the Truckers

Despite the threat of 'Talibanization' the inscriptions on the trucks suggest that the worldview of truckers (drivers, painters, apprentices and owners of trucks) remains easygoing, romantic, fatalist, superstitious and appreciative of beauty and pleasure. To call it 'liberal' may be misleading as it does not respect women's rights or political liberalism. However, despite the apparent shift in voting patterns in the NWFP from 'Pakhtun nationalism to Islam' in the elections of 2002 (Waseem 2006: 231) the elections of 2008 again saw the victory go to the Pakhtun nationalists in the same area. Nevertheless, the fact that the same area is witnessing the rise of the Taliban has complicated the issue and it is not clear what the true situation regarding Islamist tendencies among the general population really are. Historically, the ordinary people of Pakistan have voted pragmatically though their worldview has been Islamic. But this is folk Islam and not the puritanical, misogynist, strictly Islamic and anti-pleasure variety of Islam which is associated with the Taliban.

Thus, while the extremist interpretations of Islam prohibit amorous literature or the description of female and boyish beauty for the gratification of men, South Asian high culture has always valued love poetry. The inscriptions on trucks operate within the familiar paradigm of South Asian culture in which poetry, especially romantic poetry, is much in demand. The genuflection to religion as ritual, as evidenced by the ritualistic inscriptions on the top of trucks,

is also part of Muslim popular culture in South Asia. Fatalism, a prominent theme of inscriptions, is also a part of the same worldview.

This worldview has much respect for *Sufis* and their ideas. This is evidenced by inscriptions which refer to popular *Sufis* and their shrines in Pakistan: Bari Imam (Islamabad), Data Sahib (Lahore), Pir Baba (Buner), Baba Farid (Pakpattan), Shahbaz Qalandar (Sehwan) etc. other inscriptions on *Sufi* themes appeal to fate, unityism (*wahdat ul wujūd*) and the omnipresence of the deity. The frequency of the occurrence of the theme of Islamic mysticism is as follows:

INSCRIPTIONS ABOUT ISLAMIC MYSTICISM										
	Number of Trucks	NWFP %	Number of Trucks	Punjab %	Number of Trucks	Baloch-istan %	Number of Trucks	Sindh %	Number of Trucks	GLT/ AJK %
Top (Front)	(80)	Nil	(115)	16	(14)	Nil	(101)	7	(44)	18
Bottom (Front)	(40)	3	(56)	11	(10)	Nil	(34)	6	(17)	Nil
Back	(134)	1	(119)	Nil	(124)	Nil	(71)	1	(37)	Nil
Left	(12)	Nil	(20)	5	(0)	Nil	(22)	Nil	(13)	8
Right	(7)	Nil	(15)	7	(0)	Nil	(22)	Nil	(11)	Nil
Source: Annexure-C										

NB: Figures in parentheses are the numbers of trucks on which there is some transcription. Other figures are frequencies expressed as percentages rounded off to the nearest whole number. Blanks are not counted for calculating percentages.

We find that both the NWFP and Balochistan have less frequency of Islamic mystic themes than Punjab, Gilgit/AJK and Sindh. Whether this is because of the opposition to *Sufi* ideas among the Deobandis—and the Taliban were trained in Deobandi seminaries—is not easy to ascertain.

Another indicator to measure the presence of Islamic fundamentalism is the occurrence of inscriptions with these kinds of themes. These are tabulated as follows:

INSCRIPTIONS ABOUT ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM										
	Number of Trucks	NWFP %	Number of Trucks	Punjab %	Number of Trucks	Baloch-istan %	Number of Trucks	Sindh %	Number of Trucks	GLT/ AJK %
Top (Front)	(80)	Nil	(115)	1	(14)	Nil	(101)	Nil	(44)	Nil
Bottom (Front)	(40)	3	(56)	Nil	(10)	Nil	(34)	Nil	(17)	Nil
Back	(134)	5	(119)	3	(124)	2	(71)	0	(37)	0
Left	(12)	8	(20)	30	(0)	0	(22)	0	(13)	8
Right	(7)	14	(15)	27	(0)	0	(22)	45	(11)	9
Source: Annexure-C										

NB: Figures in parentheses are the numbers of trucks with some transcription. Other figures are frequencies expressed in percentages rounded off to the nearest whole number. Blanks are not counted for calculating percentages.

While the NWFP trucks have more fundamentalist themes than those of the other provinces the difference is not statistically significant (See Annexure-D). What may be alarming from the liberal point of view is that fundamentalist themes—including inscriptions praising the Taliban—have appeared at all on trucks.

It appears that ordinary people do not object to the romantic inscriptions but do object to the paintings of the human figure as it is considered a sin. However, somewhat surprisingly, in response to Q. 7 most of the drivers (90 %) got a painter to paint a woman for them while some (10 %) first tried their hand on it and, being unsuccessful, turned to the painters. The painters all did it too and most said it was their favourite hobby. Only one painter, who used to paint women, has left off because he now considers it a sin (Annexure-A, Q.7). Driver Gul Khan, originally from Swat, said: 'I tried to paint women. I like Ashwiriya Rai's painting a lot and tried to copy it. But I got something funny---[laughing]---it was not like her at all. So I gave up and got painters to do it for me'. Painter Haseeb Ullah from Rawalpindi said he liked painting women in tight trousers—often in a police uniform—but since people objected to these he left off. 'He was forced to leave off', said an apprentice. 'His women revealed too much'. Everybody laughed. As for boys—defined as adolescents between the ages of 14 to 18 or so—only a few drivers (15 %) said they got painters to paint them but most denied having done it. The painters, however, almost all (70 %) confessed to painting boys though one has left doing so on account of it being a sinful activity (Annexure-A, Q. 8). Painter Amanullah from Rawalpindi said: 'Yes many drivers do want boys painted. I used pictures of boys in books and magazines for this. I used to like it. But I heard the story of the Prophet Loot *alaeh-as- salam* [Lot in the bible] in the Qur'an and I never do it again'. Children, however, are liked by everybody. Some said they had greater 'emotion' in them than other human figures. It also came out that these children – pre-pubescent boys between the ages of 3 to 10—were the sons (daughters are not painted) of the owners or, in some cases, the painter himself. Most drivers (50 %) complained that they would like to get their children painted on the truck they drive but the owner does not allow them as they had their own children on it (Annexure-A, Q. 9). Driver Irfanullah said; 'I want my sons to be with me but the child here is the owner's son. But anyway all children are innocent and with reality in them'.

One painter from Peshawar said he did not care for the Taliban and would not listen to them even if they destroyed his shop. A driver reported that he knew of trucks with pictures of women being stopped by the Taliban and the driver warned to get them removed. That women's pictures were frowned upon by the Taliban and other religious people was clear as 60 % drivers and 80 % painters reported that these were objected to in the last few years (Annexure-A, Q. 11). However, they also said that the Taliban had not forcefully interfered with them. Yet, the number of the pictures of women had decreased in the last few years though romantic verses continued to be written on the trucks (Annexure-A, Q. 12).

The case of the beautiful boys is problematic since it can only be understood with reference to the pre-modern ideas about beauty and sex which still prevail in parts of Pakistan. That there is a problem is evidenced by the fact that most painters and drivers said that painting boys was seen as being especially sinful (Deen 1965). However, some of the painters said that they liked painting beautiful boys as well as women (Annexure-A, Q- 8). These attitudes can be understood in the light of the cult of the beautiful boy—in common with pre-modern Persian (Najmabadi 2005) and Turkish cultures (Andrews & Kalpakli 2005)— which is still prevalent in the Pashto-speaking area in particular and in South Asian Muslim culture in general (for evidence from literature see Rahman 1990; also see Kidwai 2000). In the light of the religious reformers' fulminations against the 'vice of Sodom', some drivers and painters said that they did not get adolescent boys painted any more as they had realized that it was especially sinful.

The Taliban even object to the romantic verses calling poetry itself sinful but even they have generally left them unharmed (Annexure-A, Q-10). Most of them do, however, object to the human figures calling them a grave violation of the Islamic law (*sharia*) (Annexure-A, Q-11). Driver Mahabbat Khan from Mansehra said: 'My elders often told me not to paint living beings. The *mullah* must have told them about the sin in it. But I still get beautiful poetry written on the truck! For this reason people who used to get actresses painted are now replacing them with national leaders. Several drivers from Quetta reported that a police officer who had helped truck drivers a lot, had become so popular that his picture still adorned many trucks from Balochistan. President Ayub Khan too was very popular with the truck drivers but now his picture seems to have gone out of fashion. Yet, most drivers and painters still like actresses and actors (Annexure-A, Q-13). However, Sokefeld, who has been doing field work in Pakistan since the 1990s, reports that 'on the sides, portraits of women had become very common. While they were rather

exceptional in the 1990s, such portraits are now seen on almost every *disco gari* that leaves the workshops' (Sokefeld 2008: 177). This can be explained in two ways. Either that the drivers and painters' memory goes back only to the last two or three years since Talibanisation spread in society and by this time the trend of making womens' pictures had increased already. Or, maybe the pictures of women have been displaced from the backs of the trucks where they are more prominent to the sides.

Conclusion

This article takes inscriptions as an indicator of the worldview of the drivers and painters of trucks plying on the roads of Pakistan. As these people come mostly from the rural areas and belong to the working class, their worldview is shared by the larger community they belong to. Judging from the inscriptions and their strategic location on the body of the truck, it appears that the talismanic nature of folk Islam represented by religious symbols and inscriptions on the top of the truck is part of the culture of the ordinary people of Pakistan. The occurrence of largely romantic inscriptions on the back of the trucks is indicative of the presence of a taste for romantic love and appreciation of beauty which is associated with the *ghazal* poetry commonly admired in educated circles in north India and Pakistan. The themes of fatalism and devotion to the mother are also part of the worldview of ordinary people.

Inscriptions on trucks from the different parts of Pakistan suggest that the worldview of people associated with trucks—mainly drivers but also their assistants, painters and owners—has not shifted to radical or militant Islam yet. It still remains rooted in popular culture which adheres to low church beliefs and practices. The point has been noted, among others, by Sokefeld (2008: 190). This popular culture is in transition and may be transformed as Talibanization increases but, as yet, it offers the hope that some of the core values of Pakistani culture which made this country hospitable and lively may be more resilient than the headlines about suicide bombers, the burning of CD shops and the suppression of the arts might lead us to believe.

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My special thanks go to Dr Azam Chaudhary, my colleague and friend, who translated the German sources for me into English. For the statistical part of this paper I am indebted to Dr Anila Kamal, Director of the Institute of Psychology at Quaid-i-Azam University, who taught me statistics. The chi-square values were worked out by Muhammad Usman, incharge of the computer laboratory in the same Institute, to whom I am much indebted.

The funding for this research came from domestic savings for which I thank my wife.

Annexure-A

SYNOPSIS OF THE QUALITATIVE DATA

In both the questionnaires in Urdu as well as the interviews the following questions were asked. The following results are from the interviews conducted by the research assistants from Rawalpindo, Hyderabad, Rahim Yar Khan, Peshawar and Quetta. Out of the 30 subjects who were interviewed 20 were drivers and 10 were painters.

The replies to the questions were in the form of loosely structured, open-ended responses. These were jolted down in notebooks and later reduced to this quantitative form.

1. What is the source of the inscriptions you have on your truck i.e. is it from a book or some other source?

	Book	Magazines	Self	Newspapers	Other trucks
Drivers	10 (50%)	5 (25%)	5 (25%)	1 (5%)	2 (10%)
Painters	8 (80%)	2 (20%)	1 (10%)	Nil	Nil

2. Who has chosen these inscriptions?

	Self	Drivers + Painter	Owner
Drivers	2 (10%)	18 (90%)	Nil
Painters	1 (10%)	9 (90%)	Nil

3. Who has decided which language these inscriptions should be written in?

	Self	Drivers + Painter	Owner
Drivers	1 (5%)	19 (95%)	Nil
Painters	2 (20%)	8 (80%)	Nil

4. What did you have in mind when you made the decision about which language to use?

   All drivers and painters said it should be intelligible

5. Has anyone over objected to these inscriptions?

	Yes	No	No clear answer
Drivers	8 (40%)	11 (55%)	1 (5%)

Painters	7 (70%)	3 (25%)	Nil

6. Has anyone ever objected to the painting of human beings?

	Yes	No	No clear answer
Drivers	15 (75%)	5 (25%)	Nil
Painters	8 (80%)	2 (20%)	Nil

7. Have you ever painted the picture of a woman or got it painted by someone else?

	Yes	No	No clear answer
Drivers	8 (10%)	1 (5%)	1 (5%)
Painters	10 (100%)	Nil	Nil

8. Have you ever painted the picture of a boy or got it painted by someone else?

	Yes	No	No clear answer
Drivers	3 (15%)	16 (80%)	1 (5%)
Painters	7 (70%)	3 (30%)	Nil

9. What do you think about the paintings of children on trucks?

	Drivers	Painters
(1) Children have much emotion	2 (10%)	Nil
(2) Children are a blessing	6 (30%)	4 (40%)
(3) I want my children on the truck	10 (50%)	2 (20%)
(4) Children are innocent	2 (10%)	4 (40%)

10. Have the Taliban objected to the verses about romance, love and beauty?

	Yes	No	No clear answer
Drivers	8 (40%)	8 (40%)	4 (20%)
Painters	6 (60%)	3 (30%)	1 (10)

11. Have the Taliban objected to the pictures of human beings on the trucks?

	Yes	No	No clear answer
Drivers	12 (60%)	4 (20%)	4 (20%)
Painters	8 (80%)	2 (20%)	Nil

12. Have you seen any change pertaining to the use of poetry or pictures on trucks during your own lifetime?

		Drivers	Painters
(1)	Pictures of women have decreased	Yes 16 (80%)	10 (100%)
		No 4 (20%)	Nil
(2)	Pictures of boys have decreased	Yes 18 (90%)	10 (100%)
		No 2 (10%)	Nil
(3)	Pictures of men have decreased	Yes 2 (10%)	2 (20%)
(4)	Poetry has decreased	No 18(90%)	8 (80%)

13. Which is your favourite painting? Your favourite verse? Saying?


Drivers named their favourite paintings. Two named Indian actresses Ashwariya Bachan and Rani Mukherjee. Five named the Burraq, the mythical house with the face of a woman who is believed to have carried the Prophet Muhammad on his celestial journey. Others mentioned scenes of nature, homes and flowers. The painters gave similar responses.

As for the favourite verses, they were all romantic while the sayings were about the mother, fate or a blessing.

Annexure-B

THE OCCURRENCE OF ROMANTIC INSCRIPTIONS

Province	O	E	O-E	(O-E)^2/E
NWFP	50	50.6	-0.6	0.007115
Punjab	56	50.6	5.4	0.576285
Baloch	59	50.6	8.4	1.394466
Sindh	37	50.6	-13.6	3.655336
AJK	51	50.6	0.4	0.003162
	253	253	-7.1E-15	
			Chi-Square	**5.636364**



df=4

chi sq value= 5.636364

Tab value = 9.48773

Conclusion: At 95 per cent (0.05) confidence level there is no significant difference between the provinces in the occurrence of romantic inscriptions on the back of trucks

Annexure-C-1

INSCRIPTIONS ON FRONT TOP OF TRUCKS										
NWFP			**Punjab**		**Balochistan**		**Sindh**		**GLT/AJK**	
Inscription on Trucks		**80**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**115**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**14**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**101**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**44**
Blank on Top		**8**	**Blank on Top**	**14**	**Blank on Top**	**1**	**Blank on Top**	**16**	**Blank on Top**	**6**
Total Trucks		**88**	**Total Trucks**	**129**	**Total Trucks**	**15**	**Total Trucks**	**117**	**Total Trucks**	**50**
Advisory	-		-		-		-			
Drivers Life	-		-		-		2	1.98		
Fatalism	1	1.25	2	1.74	-		-		1	2.27
Goodness	2	2.50	-		1	7.14	-			
Islam	76	95.00	111	96.52	14	100.00	97	96.04	41	93.18
Islam Fundamentalism	-		1	0.87	-		-			
Islamic Mysticism	-		18	15.65	-		7	6.93	8	18.18
Mother	-		1	0.87	-		-			
Nationalism	-		-		-		-			
Patriotism	-		-		-		1	0.99		
Romance	1	1.25	-		-		-		1	2.27
Truck	-		-		-		1	0.99		
Blank	6	6.82	14	10.85	1	6.67	16	13.68	6	12.00
Arabic	71	88.75	104	90.43	14	100.00	91	90.10	40	90.91
Pashto	3	3.75	-		-		1	0.99	-	-
Punjabi	-	-	-		-		-		-	-
Urdu	10	12.50	25	21.74	1	7.14	18	17.82	11	25.00

Annexure-C-2

INSCRIPTIONS ON FRONT DOWN OF TRUCKS										
NWFP			**Punjab**		**Balochistan**		**Sindh**		**GLT/AJK**	
Inscription on Trucks		**40**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**56**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**10**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**34**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**17**
Blank on Down		**48**	**Blank on Down**	**73**	**Blank on Down**	**5**	**Blank on Down**	**83**	**Blank on Down**	**33**
Total Trucks		**88**	**Total Trucks**	**129**	**Total Trucks**	**15**	**Total Trucks**	**117**	**Total Trucks**	**50**
Advisory	3	7.50	1	1.79	-	-	2	5.88	-	-
Drivers Life	8	20.00	12	21.43	-	-	-	-	1	5.88
Fatalism	4	10.00	5	8.93	2	20.00	1	2.94	4	23.53
Goodness	4	10.00	5	8.93	3	30.00	3	8.82	2	11.76
Islam	7	17.50	3	5.36	-	-	27	79.41	1	5.88
Islam Fundamentalism	1	2.50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Islamic Mysticism	1	2.50	6	10.71	-	-	2	5.88	-	-
Mother	2	5.00	5	8.93	1	10.00	1	2.94	-	-
Nationalism	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Patriotism	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Romance	8	20.00	16	28.57	4	40.00	6	17.65	11	64.71
Truck	-	-	8	14.29	1	10.00	2	5.88	-	-
Blank	48	54.55	73	56.59	5	33.33	83	70.94	33	66.00
Arabic	3	7.50	-	-	-	-	4	11.76	-	-
Pashto	5	12.50	1	1.79	-	-	1	2.94	-	-
Punjabi	2	5.00	5	8.93	-	-	-	-	-	-
Urdu	26	65.00	43	76.79	5	50.00	31	91.18	15	88.24
English	1	2.50	3	5.36	4	40.00	-	-	-	-

Annexure-C-3

INSCRIPTIONS ON BACK OF TRUCKS										
NWFP			**Punjab**		**Balochistan**		**Sindh**		**GLT/AJK**	
Inscription on Trucks		**134**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**119**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**124**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**71**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**37**
Blank on Back		**27**	**Blank on Back**	**35**	**Blank on Back**	**3**	**Blank on Back**	**52**	**Blank on Back**	**25**
Total Trucks		**161**	**Total Trucks**	**154**	**Total Trucks**	**127**	**Total Trucks**	**123**	**Total Trucks**	**62**
Advisory	12	8.96	12	10.08	6	4.84	11	15.49	3	8.11
Drivers Life	8	5.97	23	19.33	10	8.06	14	19.72	7	18.92
Fatalism	27	20.15	18	15.13	11	8.87	9	12.68	10	27.03
Goodness	11	8.21	4	3.36	1	0.81	2	2.82	2	5.41
Islam	7	5.22	3	2.52	5	4.03	2	2.82	2	5.41
Islam Fundamentalism	7	5.22	3	2.52	3	2.42	0	0.00	0	0.00
Islamic Mysticism	1	0.75	0	0.00	0	0	1	1.41	0	0.00
Mother	15	11.19	15	12.61	14	11.29	21	29.58	2	5.41
Nationalism	2	1.49	1	0.84	0	0	0	0.00	1	2.70
Patriotism	1	0.75	3	2.52	0	0	2	2.82	1	2.70
Romance	67	50	67	56.30	73	58.87	26	36.62	19	51.35
Truck	9	6.72	6	5.04	5	4.03	10	14.08	2	5.41
Blank	27	16.77	35	29.41	3	2.36	52	42.28	25	40.32
Pashto	50	37.31	1	0.84	14	11.29	2	2.82	1	2.70
Punjabi	14	10.45	19	15.97	1	0.81	12	16.90	3	8.11
Urdu	70	52.24	99	83.19	109	87.90	52	73.24	33	89.19
Sindhi	0	0	0	0.00	0	0	5	7.04	0	0.00
Picture	21	13.04	28	18.18	8	6.30	5	4.07	12	32.43

Annexure-C-4

INSCRIPTIONS ON LEFT OF TRUCKS										
NWFP			**Punjab**		**Balochistan**		**Sindh**		**GLT/AJK**	
Inscription on Trucks		**12**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**20**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**0**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**22**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**13**
Blank on Left		**76**	**Blank on Left**	**109**	**Blank on Left**	**15**	**Blank on Left**	**95**	**Blank on Left**	**37**
Total Trucks		**88**	**Total Trucks**	**129**	**Total Trucks**	**15**	**Total Trucks**	**117**	**Total Trucks**	**50**
Advisory	1	8.33	3	15.00					3	23.08
Drivers Life							1	4.55		
Fatalism			1	5.00			1	4.55	1	7.69
Goodness			1	5.00			2	9.09	1	7.69
Islam	4	33.33	1	5.00			6	27.27	2	15.38
Islam Fundamentalism	1	8.33	6	30.00			8	36.36	1	7.69
Islamic Mysticism			1	5.00					1	7.69
Mother			2	10.00			2	9.09		
Nationalism										
Patriotism										
Romance	7	58.33	6	30.00			4	18.18	6	46.15
Truck			1	5.00			2	9.09		
Blank	76	86.36	109	84.50			95	81.20	37	74.00
Arabic			1	5.00					1	7.69
Pashto	1	8.33		0.00					1	7.69
Punjabi	1	8.33	1	5.00						
Urdu	10	83.33					21	95.45	10	76.92
English										


Annexure-C-5

INSCRIPTIONS ON RIGHT OF TRUCKS										
NWFP			**Punjab**		**Balochistan**		**Sindh**		**GLT/AJK**	
Inscription on Trucks		**7**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**15**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**0**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**22**	**Inscription on Trucks**	**11**
Blank on Right		**81**	**Blank on Right**	**114**	**Blank on Right**	**0**	**Blank on Right**	**95**	**Blank on Right**	**39**
Total Trucks		**88**	**Total Trucks**	**129**	**Total Trucks**	**15**	**Total Trucks**	**117**	**Total Trucks**	**50**
Advisory	1	14.29	2	13.33			1	4.55	3	27.27
Drivers Life							2	9.09		
Fatalism			1	6.67			1	4.55	1	9.09
Goodness	1	14.29	1	6.67			4	18.18	1	9.09
Islam	1	14.29					5	22.73		
Islam Fundamentalism	1	14.29	4	26.67			10	45.45	1	9.09
Islamic Mysticism			1	6.67						
Mother			1	6.67			2	9.09		
Nationalism									1	9.09
Patriotism										
Romance	1	14.29	5	33.33			3	13.64	5	45.45
Truck							2	9.09		
Blank	81	92.05	114	88.37			95	81.20	39	78.00
Arabic										
Pashto	1	14.29							1	9.09
Punjabi			1	6.67						
Urdu	4	57.14					22	100.00	9	81.82
English										

Annexure-D

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST THEMES ON THE BACK OF TRUCKS

Province	**O**	**E**	**O-E**	**(O-E)^2/E**
NWFP	5	2	3	4.5
Punjab	3	2	1	0.5
Baloch	2	2	0	0
Sindh	0	2	-2	2
AJK	0	2	-2	2
	10	10	0	
			Chi-Square	**9**



df=4
chi sq value= 9


Tab value = 9.48773 χ^2 10 (4) = 7.779

Conclusion: At 90 per cent (0.10) confidence level the difference between NWFP, Balochistan and Punjab in the manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism in inscriptions at the back of trucks is significant. At 95% it is near to significant.

Annexure-E

THE USE OF URDU IN INSCRIPTIONS ON TRUCKS

Province	O	E	O-E	(O-E)^2/E
NWFP	52	77	-25	8.116883
Punjab	83	77	6	0.467532
Baloch	88	77	11	1.571429
Sindh	73	77	-4	0.207792
AJK	89	77	12	1.87013
	385	385	0	
			Chi-Square	**12.23377**



df=4

chi sq value= 12.23377


Tabuted value= 9.48773 χ^2 .05 (4) = 9.48773

Conclusion: At 95 per cent level of confidence (0.05) there are significant differences between the provinces in the usage of Urdu on the backs of trucks.

Annexure-E-1

If we remove the case of the NWFP where Pashto is used along with Urdu on trucks we get the following values:

URDU				
Province	O	E	O-E	(O-E)^2/E
Punjab	83	83.25	-0.25	0.000751
Baloch	88	83.25	4.75	0.271021
Sindh	73	83.25	-10.25	1.262012
AJK	89	83.25	5.75	0.397147
	333	333	0	
			Chi-Square	**1.930931**



χ^2 1.930931

Df = 3


Tab value = 7.815

At 95 per cent level of confidence (0.05) there are no significant differences between the provinces/regions in the usage of Urdu on the backs of trucks if the NWFP is not taken into account.

Annexure-F

THE OCCURRENCE OF INSCRIPTIONS ABOUT FATALISM

Province	O	E	O-E	(O-E)^2/E
NWFP	20	16.8	3.2	0.609524
Punjab	15	16.8	-1.8	0.192857
Baloch	9	16.8	-7.8	3.621429
Sindh	13	16.8	-3.8	0.859524
AJK	27	16.8	10.2	6.192857
	84	84	0	
			Chi-Square	**11.47619**



df=4


chi sq value = 11.47619

Tab value = 9.48773

Conclusion: At 95 per cent (0.05) confidence level there is a significant difference between the provinces in the manifestation of the theme of fatalism on the backs of trucks.

Annexure –F-1

FATALISM WITHOUT AJK/GLT				
Province	**O**	**E**	**O-E**	**(O-E)^2/E**
NWFP	20	14.25	5.75	2.320175
Punjab	15	14.25	0.75	0.039474
Baloch	9	14.25	-5.25	1.934211
Sindh	13	14.25	-1.25	0.109649
	57	57	0	
			Chi-Square	**4.403509**



Taking out AJK/GLT

$\chi^2 = 4.40$

df = 3


Tab value = 7.815

At 95 per cent (0.05) confidence level there is no significant difference between all provinces if AJK/GLT is not taken into account.

Annexure-G

THE OCCURRENCE OF INSCRIPTIONS ABOUT THE MOTHER

Province	O	E	O-E	(O-E)^2/E
NWFP	11	14	-3	0.642857
Punjab	13	14	-1	0.071429
Baloch	11	14	-3	0.642857
Sindh	30	14	16	18.28571
AJK	5	14	-9	5.785714
	70	70	0	
			Chi-Square	**25.42857**



df=4


chi sq value = 25.42857

Tab value = 13.2764 (at 99 per cent level of confidence)

Conclusion: Even at 99 per cent (0.01) confidence level there is very significant difference between the provinces in the occurrence of inscriptions about the mother on the back of trucks.

Annexure-G-1

INSCRIPTIONS ABOUT THE MOTHER IN NWFP, PUNJAB AND BALOCHISTAN				
Province	**O**	**E**	**O-E**	**(O-E)^2/E**
NWFP	11	11.66667	-0.66667	0.038096
Punjab	13	11.66667	1.33333	0.15238
Baloch	11	11.66667	-0.66667	0.038096
	35	35	-1E-05	
			Chi-Square	**0.228571**



$\chi^2 = 0.228571$

df = 2


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Conclusion= At 95 per cent confidence level there is no significant difference between the NWFP, Punjab & Balochistan.

Annexure-H

THE OCCURRENCE OF PICTURES ON THE BACK OF THE TURCKS

Province	O	E	O-E	(O-E)^2/E
NWFP	13	14.6	-1.6	0.175342
Punjab	18	14.6	3.4	0.791781
Baloch	6	14.6	-8.6	5.065753
Sindh	4	14.6	-10.6	7.69589
AJK	32	14.6	17.4	20.73699
	73	73	0	
			Chi-Square	**34.46575**



df=4

chi sq value = 34.46575

Tab value = 13.2764 (at 99 (0.01) per cent confidence level)

Conclusion: Even at 99 per cent (0.01) confidence level there is a significant difference between provinces in the occurrence of pictures at the back of trucks.

GLOSSARY

Not all Urdu terms used in the text have been included in the glossary, esp. if they only appear once.

Please check consistency of diacretics. E.g. in the glossary it is spelt *ghadar* but in the text *ghadar*. Please check which is correct & also ensure all other Urdu words have the same diacritics.

Ashrāf	Elite, the gentlemanly class.
bad bakht	of evil fortune.
bad kaesh	of bad creed, of evil belief.
Badmāsh	Hoodlum, bad character, rough. Please check if I have translated this correctly [yes]
Baghāwat	Rebellion.
Bāghī	Rebel.
Balwā	chaos, insurrection, rebellion, mutiny (synonyms: *fasād, dangā, sar kashi, baghāwat, halchal, bad intizāmi, dangā, hangāmā.*
Dār ul Islām	Land of peace; Land of Islam.
Dhunē	Weavers.
Fasād	destruction, evil, opposition.
Fitnā	conflict, fight, evil
Ghadar	Rebellion
Ghāzī	A Muslim who fights in the way of God
Gōrē	Whites; British.
Imām	Religious leader; A spiritual guide (especially of the *shi'ah* sect)
Inqilāb	Revolution.
Jihād	religious war; *Bellum Justum* in Islam.
Julāhē	Spinners of cotton
Kālē	Blacks; Native soldiers.
Khāki	Once who wear dress of the colour of mud i.e. the British army.
Kur namakān	Blind to one's salt; Unfaithful.

Mufsid	troublemaker, evil person.
Mufsidāna Shōrish	Evil upheaval
Musaddas	A sub genre of Urdu poetry.
Namak harām	untrue to his salt, unfaithful
Nar shēr	Male lion
sar kashī	taking out or raising one's head out (literal),.rebelling
Shahādat	Martyrdom
Shar	Evil
Shōr	Loud noise; upheaval
Shōrish-e-Mufassidā	Evil upheaval
*Shō*rish	Evil; mutiny
Sipah Kīna Khuāh	Soldiers seeking malice
Tanbōli	Sellers of betel leaves
Tilangān	Soldiers
Tēlī	Sellers of oil
Zamindārs	Owners of land

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