

# HISTORY OF PARTITION OF INDIA

Origin and Development of the Idea of Pakistan

Volume 2

**K.K. AZIZ**

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# 7

## A VISION SEEN IN CAMBRIDGE: 1931-1940

### The Climate of Opinion (1931 - 1932)

Between Iqbal's Allahabad address and Rahmat Ali's call for a Pakistan Muslim political thinking presents a strangely unreal panorama. Most of the parties and persons continue to discuss federation as a solution of the communal problem, at the same time calling increasingly for the recognition of the Muslims as a separate nation and expressing the fear that even a federal arrangement would not be enough protection against a Hindu rule. Hindu leaders and parties still find it difficult to reconcile themselves to Muslim claims and wishes. It may involve some repetition, but we will get a better view of the political scene if we begin this summary of contemporary thinking from mid-1930.

In July the Executive Board of AIMC made a significant demand relating to the communal composition of the Indian army. It asked for a legal guarantee for "an adequate and effective representation of Muslims in all grades of military service and other fighting forces, such as navy and air force".<sup>1</sup> In December the general Muslim position won unequivocal support from a Parsi leader during the RTC deliberations in London. "The Musalmans feel—and in my opinion rightly feel—that while the Hindus enjoy power and influence in 8 or 9 provinces, that at least in 2 or 4 provinces, they should have a similar right and a similar power."<sup>2</sup>

The leader of the Ahmadiyya community criticized the Nehru Committee for rejecting the federal solution; this was such a serious matter as to amount to the denial of all Muslim demands.<sup>3</sup> He explained that the Muslims wanted a federal system because this alone could give each community "full scope for progress"; in its absence the Muslim provinces might lose their rights, privileges and majority rule at any time at the discretion of the Hindu-

controlled central government.<sup>4</sup> The Aga Khan summarized this point of dispute during 1930 as follows: "For while the whole drive of the Hindu movement to self-government was concentrated on the idea of a strong central government and the establishment of an immediate democracy, conceived solely in terms of numbers, in which religious differences counted as such and as nothing more, Muslim opinion had crystalized steadily in favour of a distribution of powers from the centre to virtually self-governing and autonomous provincial governments".<sup>5</sup>

Non-Muslim neutral opinion tended to confirm Muslim apprehensions throughout the year. A British observer of Indian religious life noticed that Muslims "dread a Hindu supremacy" and were fearful "lest their charitable institutions, schools, marriage and testamentary laws, should be interfered with".<sup>6</sup> In the words of a French professor of law, the Muslims "n'envisagent pas sans une certaine crainte la naissance d'une Inde autonome ou ils risqueraient de se trouver opprimes par une majorite hindoue. Cette crainte a ete accrue dans ces dernieres annees par l'aggressivite des Hindous. . .".<sup>7</sup> An Englishman, who was studying Indian politics from close quarters, asserted that the Muslims, though in a minority, had "no intention whatsoever of submitting to Hindu domination"; in fact, some of them were looking forward to ruling India again should the British withdraw; if the Hindus got their "complete independence" and the British troops withdrew, Muslims "would at once attempt the reconquest of India, and they would succeed".<sup>8</sup> One of Gandhi's admirers had told him that the real object of *swaraj* was "the revival of Hinduism in all such forms as existed before the British intervened".<sup>9</sup>

All information about Muslim thinking in 1931 indicates that the community was determined not to let itself pass under the sway of a Hindu government. But its hope still lay in a federal balance of forces.

Speaking in the Minorities Sub-Committee of the RTC on 1 January 1931, Sir Muhammad Shafi expounded this idea. "To my mind the Federal India of the future with the Central Government in the hands of the majority community, and the Provincial Governments in 6 of the 8 Governors' Provinces in the hands of the same community, the 4 Provinces in which the majority community will be in a minority and the minority community will be in a majority, will in itself constitute a guarantee of good treat-

ment by both the communities . . . In the majority of the Provinces, our Hindu brethren have the position of advantage. . . In only a minority of the Provinces—four—have the Musalmans a similar position of advantage, with the result that there will be an automatic guarantee of good treatment to both the communities. That will be the permanent solution of the Hindu-Muhammadan problem in India.”<sup>10</sup>

On the same day Muhammad Ali, forty-eight hours before his death, composed a letter to the British prime minister in which he took the argument one vital step further and questioned the appellation of “minority” to the Muslim community. “A Community that in India alone must now be numbering more than 70 millions cannot easily be called a minority in the sense of Geneva minorities, and when it is remembered that this community numbers nearly 400 million of people throughout the world, whose ambition is to convert the rest of mankind to their way of thought and their outlook on life, and who claim and feel a unique brotherhood, to talk of it as a minority is a mere absurdity.”<sup>11</sup>

On 7 February 1931 Hasrat Mohani introduced a resolution in AIMC working committee which underlined the depth of Muslim fears. It read: “Whereas the Muslim community is now convinced that the Hindus are bent upon establishing a Hindu Raj in India and whereas the Hindus and the British Cabinet have joined hands to ignore most of the important Muslim demands contained in the Delhi resolution of this Conference, this Committee believes that the establishment of Dominion Status in India and the vesting of responsibility in the legislatures is detrimental to Muslim interests and will, therefore, not be acceptable to them.” After a 6-hour discussion the working committee decided to postpone final decision on this resolution till the ensuing special session of AIMC.<sup>12</sup>

Almost simultaneously a call for a clear partition of India came from an anonymous correspondent, presumably a domiciled European or an Anglo-Indian, who argued his case in a letter to the *Civil and Military Gazette* of Lahore. The “most reasonable solution” of the communal problem was to divide India into three States: one for the Hindus, one for the Muslims, and one for the Europeans and Anglo-Indians. In case the Sikhs were not prepared to lose their identity in the Hindu state, a portion of the third state would be reserved for them. All the portions of the sub-

continent north of a line joining Bombay to some point below Bihar and Orissa should be made over to the Hindus, and the remainder to the Muslims, except for a small portion of the coastal country from Bombay towards Bangalore which the domiciled Europeans and Anglo-Indians should be given.<sup>13</sup>

In April AIMC again turned to the future of the Muslims. In his presidential address Shawkat Ali warned that "no one should forget that we ruled in India for over 850 years, and, on the whole, I think we ruled well. . . . We have got to rouse ourselves to realize that our future must be worthy of our past".<sup>14</sup> This special session of the Conference resolved that "all transfer of power shall be from Parliament to the provinces" and "no subject shall be made federal without the previous and mutual consent of the autonomous units".<sup>15</sup> Muslim opinion was coming round to demanding a very loose federation, so loose that it could serve as a stepping-stone to separation.

In mid-year Sir Theodore Morison published in England a comprehensive article on the Muslim problem which read the Muslim mind faithfully. To describe the Hindus and Muslims of India as communities, he said, was to misrepresent facts and under-estimate their seriousness. There were, in fact, two nationalities in conflict, and the passions that were driving them into collision were of the same magnitude and gravity as those which in Europe had produced the catastrophe of 1914. In India all the persons who followed the same religion, shared the same culture and had a community of historical antecedents, belonged to one nationality regardless of whether they inhabited the same region or were separated from one another by considerable distances. Then he quoted Sir Abdur Rahim as follows: "Any of us Indian Muslims, travelling, for instance, in Afghanistan, Persia, Central Asia, among Chinese Muslims, Arabs, Turks, would be at once made at home and would not find anything to which we are not accustomed. On the contrary in India we find ourselves in all social matters total aliens when we cross the street and enter that part of the town where our fellow Hindu townsmen live." Each of these nationalities is moved by its own separate ideals, its memories of past glories or past sufferings, its noble patriotism or, at times, its ignoble chauvinism.

As the Congress was in the main a Hindu body, its leaders were asking for the establishment of what in fact would be a Hindu

national State. But a national state in India was only possible if the several nationalities were first segregated into homogeneous blocks. "I can imagine a Muslim national state in the north of India buttressed against Central Asia, a promontory of Islam jutting into the waters of Hinduism. Such a state would hold a very strong strategic position and could defy all attacks from the south. . . . Can a modern state which derives its authority from the consent of the governed be founded on the basis of two or more nationalities? A survey of the world today does not justify a positive answer to this question."<sup>16</sup>

In the same month, June, the India correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* sent home a report which gives a clear idea of Muslim search for a permanent and workable solution of the problem posed by their existence in India. They now realized, said the dispatch, "that the new Federal Government, if and when it comes into existence, will have a large Hindu majority. The entrance of the States has increased the majority, for the States are chiefly Hindu. There is a strong tendency to counteract the permanent majority by trying to form a large northern block of provinces which will be Muslim, and in which the Hindus will be, as it were, hostages of the good behaviour of their co-religionists in the centre and the South. . . . Many Muslims do not believe in the permanence of a Federal India, and they foresee a Muslim state in the North stretching from Karachi to North Bengal".<sup>17</sup>

It will be recalled that an almost identical finding was recorded by the correspondent of *The Times* in March 1928, which proves that the current of Muslim thinking had continued determinedly to flow in the same direction. Yet the date of this dispatch is significant. In 1928 the federation was a vague idea, rather an ideal, floating only in Muslim consciousness, far from being a possible or realizable objective. By the middle of 1931 it had become a solid reality, an arrangement whose broad contours had been accepted and drawn, and only the refined details left to political bargaining and constitutional expediency. But it seemed as if the Muslim question was still as far from being resolved as it had ever been. As the report pointed out, the entry of the native states might have brought the ideal of an all-India federation nearer, but it had complicated the Hindu-Muslim problem by making the federal centre the axis of a permanent and unchangeable Hindu majority. The Muslims were trying to find an escape

from this dilemma by creating a northern block of provinces which would bring them some relief and consolidate their strength. Such an arrangement was being proposed by several persons, Iqbal being the latest and the best-known exponent.

The last sentence of the dispatch indicates two new points of departure. Muslims were losing faith in the permanence of the federal arrangement even before it had been finalized. This betrays the depth of their anxiety and explains their persistence in seeking a different solution even while they were discussing the making of a federation. Secondly, the contemplated north-west state has now been developed into a northern state whose boundaries will touch North Bengal. None of the recent proposals for Muslim consolidation had stretched its scope to include the Muslims of the eastern wing of India. We don't know whether the *Manchester Guardian* correspondent had some actual scheme in view when he wrote this or, by a natural extension of thought, he had interpreted Muslim wishes to their logical conclusion of including all Muslim-majority provinces within the hoped for state.

On 21 July, Zafrulla Khan declared from Delhi that the Muslims felt that the Congress had also abandoned them and identified itself with the interests of the majority community, and this made them fear that "any constitutional advance that might result from the deliberations of the RTC is likely to expose them to the domination of a stronger and more powerful community".<sup>18</sup>

In the following month, Hasrat Mohani, in his presidential address to the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind at Allahabad, asked what would be the form of government after the British connection had disappeared. He answered the question himself: it would be nothing else than a Hindu raj which Muslims would under no circumstances tolerate or accept. Therefore, at present they should think only of complete provincial autonomy and safeguards for their rights, and wait for a chance to attain "autonomy in the centre".<sup>19</sup> The "autonomy in the centre" could only have meant a separate state. At the same time, the *Manchester Guardian* realized that Muslim demands at the RTC foreshadowed a Muslim plan for domination in north-west India.<sup>20</sup>

A British Cabinet paper of September, studying the Hindu-Muslim aspect of the problem of central authority in India, concluded that it was a "question whether the Muslim provinces, or the provinces in which the Muslims hope to consolidate their

power, should be under any degree of control from a centre which will be predominantly Hindu". It said that the Muslims' "primary object" was the creation of a "Muslim India"; the secondary object was to secure Muslim interests elsewhere by the operation of the hostage theory.<sup>21</sup>

Far from paying serious attention to Muslim fears of Hindu rule or from considering any alternative political or constitutional suggestion to ease the communal problem, the Hindus showed no inclination even to talk about the least controversial Muslim demands. The characteristic Congress response was contained in Jawaharlal Nehru's remarks in his letter to Gandhi of 27 September. ". . . if I had to listen to my dear friend Mohammad Ali Jinnah talking the most unmitigated nonsense about his 14 points for any length of time, I would have to consider the desirability of retiring to the South Sea islands, where there would be some hope of meeting with some people who were intelligent or ignorant enough not to talk of the 14 points. . . . I marvel at your patience."<sup>22</sup> When a man of Nehru's sophistication and intellect behaved in this manner, the attitude of the rest of Congress leadership can well be imagined.

In October, the Sikhs presented their own plan of dividing the Punjab, or rather of expropriating most of it, at the expense of the Muslims and the Hindus. Sardar Ujjal Singh submitted a memorandum to the RTC on 8 October, in which he suggested that the two western Divisions of Rawalpindi and Multan (minus the Lyallpur and Montgomery districts) should be detached from the Punjab and amalgamated with the NWFP. This would achieve two purposes. It would give the Sikhs such a strong majority in the Punjab that they would be freed of the necessity of demanding any special rights or protection. It would also enlarge the NWFP to a level where it would merit the status of a governor's province.<sup>23</sup>

On 12 October, Sir Geoffrey Corbett, a Punjab civilian, tabled a memorandum at the RTC on the same subject. (It was circulated on Gandhi's request. Why? We don't know). He argued that the Ambala Division (minus the Simla district and the north-west corner of the Ambala district) should be separated from the Punjab; at the same time the unwieldy United Provinces should be divided into a Western Province of Agra, which would include the Ambala Division, and an Eastern Province of Oudh. In the new

Punjab religious percentages would be as follows (existing percentages in parentheses): Muslims, 61.8 (55.3); Hindus, 23.6 (31.8); Sikhs, 12.6 (11.1); others, 2.0 (1.8).<sup>24</sup>

The Punjab Hindus rejected both the Ujjal Singh proposal and the Corbett scheme.<sup>25</sup> On 16 October, the Hindus of Delhi "wholeheartedly endorsed" the Corbett scheme and urged the constitution of a province comprising Ambala, Meerut, Agra and Rohilkhand Divisions and Delli.<sup>26</sup> This suggestion actually went beyond what Corbett had prescribed, and would have resulted in the creation of a predominantly Hindu province. The Delhi Muslim Association at once rejected the scheme. The *Civil and Military Gazette* commented, "The communal problem is an all-India one and such devices as the transfer of districts from one administration to another in the north-west will do nothing to heal communal differences in other parts of India."<sup>27</sup>

Redistribution of provinces now became a popular topic, and towards the end of the month Sir Muhammad Yaqub expressed the opinion that the real solution of the communal problem lay in the rearrangement of provinces "into small and less expensive autonomous States, inhabited, as much as possible, by people of common descent, having common family traditions and using common language, provided the Muslim majority in the existing provinces is not affected". India should not be treated as one country, but as a sub-continent inhabited by different nationalities. If "India is formed into small homogeneous units, having full autonomous powers, leaving only a defined and limited authority in the centre, I am sanguine that the problem of our country would be automatically solved to a very great extent, and a happy and contented Federal India would form the brightest and the most precious gem in the Crown of the British Empire".<sup>28</sup>

Muslim intentions and plans were now being increasingly grasped by the British press. As Yaqub was issuing his statement, the *Economist* was writing: "Evidently the Muslims are manoeuvring already for an effective control of the entire Indus Basin from Kashmir to the NWFP through the Punjab to Sind inclusive. They may also reasonably look forward to making themselves masters of Eastern Bengal, where they have an overwhelming majority. In addition, they have a fair chance of dominating a corridor between Eastern Bengal and the Punjab—a corridor which contains all the historic centres of the Muslim Raj in India, though

numerically the Muslim element here is in a minority. With these great territories in their hands, the Muslims would hold a large Hindu population in pawn, as pledges for the safety of the scattered Muslim minority in other parts of India. In the worst event, they could retreat into their north-western and north-eastern citadels, pending reinforcements from the solid core of the Islamic world, which lies just on the other side of the Sulayman Mountains. That is how the Indian Muslims see the future, supposing that the British Empire in India were to go the way of the Manchu Empire in China. They do not seem to be afraid of the future. At any rate, they are not clinging at all apprehensively to the skirts of the British Raj. They welcome the transference of power from British to Indian hands by the constitutional process, on the condition that they are assured, at this stage, of these minority guarantees which they have now demanded, jointly with the other minorities, from the Prime Minister. Supposing that the constitutional process of transference breaks down and there is a scramble for the British legacy, in that event also the Indian Muslims seem to be confident of holding their own against the Hindus in spite of the disparity of numbers."<sup>29</sup> In spite of its rather over-optimistic tone this would have gladdened the hearts of the Muslims who were then groping their way to some such future.

In December the Muslim League held its annual session in Delhi under the chairmanship of Zafrulla Khan. In his presidential address Zafrulla described the Muslim situation in India as "peculiar and unique". "It would be difficult to point out a parallel in the contemporary or past history of any other country or community. Our numbers exceed the numbers of many communities which are today enjoying and have in the past enjoyed the position and privileges of a nation. Our religious, cultural, social, and I may even add, linguistic unity, supplies us with all the essentials that go to form a nation. Our common civilization, traditions, and history furnish additional factors that bind us together. We are anxious to preserve intact all these factors, and past experience has taught us that special provisions and safeguards are necessary for such protection, although we feel that even with those provisions and safeguards in the constitution, the protection afforded will not be complete or even adequate. This, however, is a disability to which all political minorities are subject and it is not capable of being remedied by constitutional safeguards." With

a view to affording greater protection and autonomy to Muslim provinces, he suggested the provincialization of all services the officers of which would normally serve in provincial governments and administrations.<sup>30</sup>

The Muslims are now called a nation; the first such declaration from the Muslim League platform. The last sentence of the above quotation implies that if safeguards proved useless some non-constitutional solution (e.g., partition) might be the only way out.

Similar trends of thought continued into 1932. Some talked of unity and federation, others of alienation and separation.

Shafaat Ahmad Khan made it clear in January that the Muslims had "no desire to create an *imperium in imperio*" and no wish "to form a separate independent State of their own"; they did not want to create barriers which "will prove insuperable obstacles to the unification of India".<sup>31</sup> In February, a British writer on Indian affairs prophesied that a federal India would be a Hindu India under the rule of the Congress to which Muslims would never submit.<sup>32</sup>

On 22 March AIMC demanded in its Lahore annual session "the immediate introduction of provincial autonomy in all provinces" while the details of the federal structure were yet being negotiated.<sup>33</sup> On 26 March the *Economist* realized that Muslim policy was to keep the federal government as weak as possible, since they could not hope to have more than a third of the power there, and to secure as much local power for the provinces as possible, in order that "the provinces in which the Muslim community is in a majority may serve as Muslim citadels".<sup>34</sup>

On 16 April, Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, wrote to Hailey: "I must confess, though I should not dare say so publicly, that to me the prospects of an All-India federation seem to recede in favour of some division of India that would hold better hope of containing means of settling the communal difficulty."<sup>35</sup> On 19 May, H.T. Lambrick, an ICS officer posted in Sind, wrote home: "We may well have an India split into Muslim provinces and Hindu provinces; the dividing line being softened and a certain unity maintained by the presence of enormous communities as hostages on each of the 'wrong' sides of the line. . . it seems cynical, but it is a solution thoroughly in keeping with the genius of the country. . . . Of course, the pan-Muslim belt from Kashmir through half the Punjab, NWFP, Baluchistan and Sind looks rather like a pistol aimed at the

heart of India. with behind it the Khilafat and the Jihad. It is Shaukat Ali's dream. . .".<sup>36</sup>

In June, AIMC working committee again called for the provinces to be invested with "complete financial autonomy."<sup>37</sup> In the same month, a detailed and comprehensive statement of their position was sent to the Aga Khan by Indian Muslims with a request to make it public in Britain if it met with his approval. He associated himself with it unreservedly, and the full text was published by *The Times* on 11 June. Portions of this testament are relevant. ". . . we can do no other than offer the strongest opposition to Hindus having political supremacy even where they are in a minority. . . We are confident that if the alternative to British rule were the ubiquitous supremacy of Hindu rule, the mass of our Muslim brethren would prefer the former, not only because of the safeguard offered by its impartiality, but also because under the alternative system there would be hideous strife between the virile and martial Muslim races and those many Hindus in whom the Congress's Left Wing has sown the seed of lawlessness, insidious conspiracy, and rebellion."<sup>38</sup>

On 2 July, Srinivasa Sastri conjured up the horrifying spectre of the future in a letter to a friend: "Imagine what will happen if provincial autonomy is granted and four provinces under Muslim rule oppose central responsibility (or stipulate impossible conditions) while seven Hindu provinces wish to go ahead."<sup>39</sup> In August, Lord Lloyd, a former governor of Bombay, foresaw a great obstacle to the proposed federation in the shape of Muslim determination not to submit to Hindu rule.<sup>40</sup> On 27 September, in his presidential address to AIKC at Ajmer, Shaikh Abdul Majid declared that "the Hindu is bent upon having domination in India with the aid of British bayonets and the real problem before the Musalman is how to save himself from the combined domination of the Britisher and the Hindu".<sup>41</sup>

Lord Eustace Percy recalled that "I saw enough of Indian opinion in 1932 to be aware of the attraction exerted upon some Moslem minds by the memory of Sir Edward Carson and by the analogy of Ulster".<sup>42</sup> Sir Theodore Morison again underlined the basic Muslim unity in India. "It is the sympathy which springs from a common manner of life, common usages, and common ideals. . . . The characteristics of an Islamic civilization can hardly survive under an alien government, especially if that government

be a democracy, which inevitably tends towards the standardization of its citizens." There was no point in enumerating the differences between Muslims and Hindus. "The only thing that matters is that they do in fact feel and think of themselves as separate peoples. In all disquisitions on nationality this is the only test which is found to cover all cases. If a certain body of persons think of themselves as one nation and are willing to endure tribulation and material losses in order to remain together, then they are one people, if they cannot pass this acid test, they are not. Judged by this standard the Muslims of India are a nation."<sup>43</sup> No Muslim leader or ideologue had so far presented a better or more lucid argument in favour of the two-nation theory.

Another Englishman summarized the Muslim inclination towards separation and possible division in equally sympathetic words. John Coatsman wrote that the Muslims had realized that the institution of democratic government, with its central doctrine of majority rule, would put them permanently in a minority in the central government of India and in the governments of most of the provinces. Therefore, they feared that their future would be controlled by the Hindus, who would, inevitably, foster Hindu interests and extend Hindu ideas and culture, to the detriment of non-Hindu communities. Muslim policy now was, therefore, aimed at "the transformation of the Indian Provinces, now existing or to be created, into political units as autonomous as the American or Australian States". The Muslim proposals would give them "complete and possibly permanent control over the government of the North and North-West of India, whilst leaving the Hindus in control of the rest of the country".<sup>44</sup> The creation of a strong, united India was daily becoming impossible, and "in its place it seems that there may be brought into being a powerful Muhammadan state in the north and west, with its eyes definitely turned away from India, towards the rest of the Muslim world of which it forms the fringe..."<sup>45</sup>

With such ideas inhabiting the minds of many in Muslim India the time was ripe for a clear-cut partition scheme to appear which could not be misunderstood and had, in addition, a name to itself. The time put forth the man, and Rahmat Ali published such a plan from Cambridge, complete with all argument and logic and, above all, with a name for the country to be carved out of India.

To come to Rahmat Ali after a study of Iqbal is to step into a world where every particle shines in clear light. No longer are we obliged to seek interpretations or read between the lines for meanings, or collate words and phrases in pursuit of clues. He is free of all controversies of text, all uncertainties of motives, and all difficulties of ambiguity. Assumptions are not required to read Rahmat Ali's mind. He says what he wants to say in unmistakable phrases. One may disagree with him but dare not misunderstand him.

Beyond their love of Islam, their corroding anxiety to save Indian Islam from disintegration, and an affiliation with the University of Cambridge, there is little in common between Iqbal and Rahmat Ali. One was a poet of world fame and a thinker of immense power; the other an unknown student in a foreign land. One was the president of two national organizations and a delegate of his country to a high decision-making forum; the other a mere political worker thrown on his own initiative, without any office, without a party, without any recognition. Both were engaged in solving a problem which they knew had to be tackled; but one saw several possibilities and hesitated to make the final choice; the other took to one path as if none other was open to his steps. One argued in many directions and left behind him a legacy of controversy; the other took hold of one idea and voiced it with ferocious intensity. One still pined to make one India out of the many by using the principle of internal harmony; the eye of the other saw no ground where the forces of faith and heathenism could meet. One was afraid of the dangers lurking in the spirit of a nationalism imported from the Christian west; the other sought to vanquish such fears by calling for a nationalism which was at the same time territorial in arrangement and spiritual in content. One still thought in terms of India; to the other Indianism was a foul anathema and a perilous snare. One hoped for British cooperation in solving the Hindu-Muslim problem; the other warned against a Hindu-British alliance bent upon administering a *coup de grace* to Indian Islam. One stood for some sort of rapprochement with the Hindus within the wider Indian context; the other saw salvation in nothing less than a clear partition resulting in Muslim sovereignty. One became a hero and a prophet to whom nothing

could be denied; the other remained an unhonoured name to whom the country he had envisioned and christened could offer nothing but bitter humiliation and a lonely exile.

Rahmat Ali is a sad figure in the history of the idea of Pakistan, for in many respects his contribution to it is outstanding, and yet he has been treated with an indifference which even ignorance and prejudice cannot explain. We will return to this point later when we have studied the man and his ideas.

Rahmat Ali belonged to a small village in the district of Hoshiarpur (now in the Indian Punjab), where he was born on 16 November 1897. His father, Haji Choudhary Shah Muhammad, possessed some land whose income assured the family the comforts of a middle-class life. Rahmat Ali received his early education in two small rural towns, and then matriculated in 1912 from a Hindu school in Jullundur city. After graduating from Islamia College, Lahore, in 1918, he served as a tutor at the Aitchison Chiefs' College, Lahore, till 1923. During 1923-25 (here dates are unreliable) he attended the Punjab University Law College, Lahore, but left without taking a degree. In the Aitchison College he came in contact with the children of the Mazari family and, through them, with the head of the Mazari tribe. At this time the Mazari estate became the subject of litigation, and Rahmat Ali helped the Mazari chief with legal advice and acted as his private secretary. When the case was decided in favour of his patron, he was given a handsome amount for services rendered. Immediately he decided to invest this money in giving himself higher education in Britain. Arriving in England towards the end of 1930, he entered Emmanuel College, Cambridge, in January 1931, where he passed the Law Tripos, Part II, Examination in June 1932 and took the degree in 1933. Later he was called to the bar in 1943 at the Inner Temple Inn. He lived in Cambridge after finishing his education, came to live in Pakistan in 1948 but was ordered out by the government, returned to Cambridge, and died there in February 1951. He is buried in Cambridge.

As we have noticed earlier, Rahmat Ali first talked about a Muslim state in India in 1915 when he was still an undergraduate in Lahore, but of this we have no direct evidence except his own word. He himself did not return to the subject till his student days in Cambridge. These days coincided with the sessions of the RTC, and he revived his old plan and tried to persuade the Muslim dele-

gates to the RTC that a federation, for which they were working, would bring an end to Islam in India, and that, instead, they should demand the creation of a Muslim state which would be separate and sovereign. When he was not heard, he decided to publish his own scheme.<sup>46</sup>

On 28 January 1933 he issued a declaration entitled *Now or Never: Are We to Live or Perish for Ever?* addressed to the world on behalf of the 30 million Muslims of north-west India. It appealed for "sympathy and support in our grim and fateful struggle against political crucifixion and complete annihilation". The homeland of these Muslims was defined in the first sentence as PAKSTAN, "by which we mean the five Northern units of India, viz., Punjab, North-West Frontier Province (Afghan Province), Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan". Then came a stinging attack on the Muslim delegates attending the RTC. These so-called leaders were sacrificing the nation "with reckless disregard to our future and in utter contempt of the teachings of history". They "have submitted, in the name of Hindu nationalism, to the perpetual subjection of the ill-starred Muslim nation". By agreeing to a federal constitution they had signed the death-warrant of Islam and its future in India.<sup>47</sup>

India was neither a country nor a nation. Its heterogeneity was a proven fact. The Muslims were a separate and distinct nation. "Our religion, culture, history, tradition, economic system, laws of inheritance, succession and marriage are basically and fundamentally different from those of the people living in the rest of India." The ideals which moved the Muslims were different from those which inspired the Hindus. These differences extended to the minutest details of their lives. "We do not inter-dine; we do not inter-marry. Our national customs and calendars, even our diet and dress are different." To force these Muslims into an Indian federation would sound "the death-knell of the Muslim nation in India for ever". What would this mean to Islam and the world? He reminded his readers that these 30 million Muslims of "Pakstan" counted for about one-tenth of the entire Muslim world. Their homeland constituted an area four times that of Italy, three times that of Germany and twice that of France. In population, they were seven times as large as Australia, four times as Canada, twice as Spain, and as large as France or Italy. Therefore, they "deserve and must demand the recognition of a separate national status by

the grant of a separate Federal Constitution from the rest of India".<sup>48</sup>

To enable the two nations of India to develop themselves "without one being subject to another", a separate federation of the five predominantly Muslim units in the north should be created. This would bring several advantages. It would act as a buffer state against any invasion, either of ideas or of arms, from outside. It would not materially disturb the ratio of the Muslim and Hindu population in the rest of India. It was in the interest of British and Hindu statesmanship to have as an ally a free, powerful and contented Muslim nation. He pointed out that his demand was "basically different" from Iqbal's. Iqbal wanted an amalgamation of these provinces into a single province forming a unit of the Indian federation; his own plan was for these provinces to have a separate federation of their own.<sup>49</sup>

An Indian federation was rejected because it would be based on the uncertain principle of safeguards, which was no substitute for the loss of nationality and independence. No safeguard could turn the Muslim minority of one in four into something different. No safeguard could compensate the Muslim loss of their social and religious ideals. No safeguards could give them the status of a nationality. "However effective and extensive the safeguards may be, the vital organs and proud symbols of our national life, such as army and navy, foreign relations, trade and commerce, communications, posts and telegraphs, taxation and customs, will not be under our control, but will be in the hands of a Federal Government, which is bound to be overwhelmingly Hindu."<sup>50</sup>

Rahmat Ali could not understand why, in the face of such facts, Muslim leaders were still prepared to go into an Indian federation. Was the nation to be crucified to save the faces of these leaders? The people of these provinces were not in favour of strangulating themselves to please these politicians. "We will not crucify ourselves upon the cross of Hindu nationalism in order to make a Hindu holiday."

The declaration concluded with a ringing appeal to the forces and future of Islam. "We are face to face with a first-rate tragedy, the like of which has not been seen even in the long and eventful history of Islam. It is not the question of a sect or of a community going down; but it is the supreme problem which affects the destiny of the whole of Islam and the millions of human beings

who, till quite recently, were the custodians of the glory of Islam in India and the defenders of its frontiers. We have a still greater future before us, if only our soul can be saved from the perpetual bondage of slavery forged in an All-India Federation. Let us make no mistake about it. The issue is now or never. Either we live or perish for ever. The future is ours only if we live up to our faith. It does not lie in the lap of the gods, but it rests in our own hands. We can make or mar it. The history of the last century is full of open warnings, and they are as plain as were ever given to any nation. Shall it be said of us that we ignored all these warnings and allowed our ancient heritage to perish in our own hands?"<sup>51</sup>

Rahmat Ali alone drafted this declaration, but in order to make it "representative" he began to look around for people who would sign it along with him. It took him more than a month to find three young men in London who were prepared to support and sign it. Aslam Khan Khattak was at Oxford; Sahibzada Shaikh Muhammad Sadiq was reading for the bar at one of the Inns of Court in London; and Khan Inayat Ullah Khan was studying engineering in London.<sup>52</sup> Khattak signed himself as president of the Khyber Union, and Inayat Ullah as the secretary of the same body. Soon Khattak backed out and withdrew his support.

A few points in the declaration are noticeable. One is its narrow scope. Like Iqbal and a majority of other Muslim planners, Rahmat Ali ignored Bengal. He stated clearly that there were 80 million Muslims in India and his "Pakistan" would contain 30 million of them. But the significance of these figures seems to have been lost upon him. His scheme, propounded expressly in the name of Islam and with a view to saving the Muslims of India from Hindu rule, would still leave a clear majority of Indian Muslims in Hindu hands. It was much later that he rectified this omission by suggesting another separate state for Bengal and Assam.

An interesting feature of the declaration is the clear and firm tone in which he proclaimed the Muslims to be a separate nation. None before him had pronounced this so insistently and so rationally. When, later, the Muslim League came to advocate its own Pakistan plan, it could not think of any new arguments and repeated and elaborated his points. Jinnah's presidential address at the 1940 Muslim League session at Lahore, where partition was first demanded by the party, contains several sentences which repeat the very words used by Rahmat Ali in this declaration.

That is a measure of Rahmat Ali's understanding, percipience and foresight. But he ignored logic in claiming a separate nationhood for the north-western Muslims on the basis of Islam, and forgetting the Muslims of Bengal who were also among the faithful. Iqbal had also dismissed the Bengali Muslim from the horizon of his thought, but two points can be entered in his defence. He did not believe in the two-nation theory; on the contrary, he had set out to create an Indian nation and an Indian unity with his principle of internal harmony. He was also making a case for an Indian federation in which, anyway, Bengal would have figured as a Muslim-majority unit. Therefore he was not obliged to fight the battle of the Bengali Muslim. Rahmat Ali could not use this defence. He stood for a partition of India on the basis of a separate Muslim nationhood, and yet he excluded a majority of this nation from his view. No justification can be found for this.

The most remarkable thing in this declaration is the first appearance of the word "Pakstan". He gave this name to the sovereign Muslim state demanded on behalf of the Muslims of the five north-western areas. It must be noticed that here he spelt the word without an "i", in-the Persian fashion, as it is still written in Urdu, though the pronunciation follows the English spelling. In meaning, origin and terminology the two versions are the same, but it is of some historical importance to notice that when the word was used, printed and proclaimed for the first time it was spelt as "Pakstan", not as "Pakistan".

Rahmat Ali was conscious of the great significance of the declaration. He wrote later: "This Declaration and this date will be memorable in history. . . the date marked the birth-day of Pakistan, the death-day of India, and the dissolution-day of British Imperialism in India. Not only that. This Declaration on that date started an ideological revolution in the life of one-fifth of mankind living in India, a revolution the repercussions of which will be felt throughout Asia and the world."<sup>53</sup>

It is not necessary to share Rahmat Ali's self-congratulatory enthusiasm to realize the inherent importance of the declaration. It proclaimed the Muslims of north-west India as a separate nation. It declared a war against the concept of an Indian federation. It staked a claim to a sovereign and independent Muslim state in the north-west. It gave this state a name. On all these points Rahmat Ali was far in advance of his time. These aspirations and sentiments

had been in the air for some years, and had propelled the Muslim mind in a certain direction. But they had remained half-felt, half-uttered wishes. It was his achievement to draw all the threads together, to make a coherent philosophy of them, to expound the final idea in words which were at once rational and passionate, and to present the world with a new name for the state of freedom which his people would one day attain.

Once Rahmat Ali had declared the truth as he saw it, he felt the need of putting up a co-operative effort to publicize and promote the ideal. Not being a politician, he could not take his message to the masses. Living in a foreign country, he could not establish a new political party to espouse his cause. He was a thinker, not an organizer. Therefore, he decided to establish a movement rather than a proper organization. In fact, even this movement did not amount to more than he himself and a few Indian Muslim friends who were studying in Cambridge or London. Mostly he did the entire work, wrote all the pamphlets, contacted influential people, corresponded with his friends and acquaintances in India, toured Europe to speak about his ideas, and spent his own money on the project. Later he founded a few more movements, but really he was the inspiring spirit and throughout his life the headquarters of these movements were situated at 16 Montague Road, Cambridge, where he had lived for some years.

Anyhow, he needed, in his own words, "a centre of members to work for Pakistan, for the Pak Plan, and for the Pak Ideology".<sup>54</sup> And in 1933 he founded the Pakistan National Movement, and directly published an 8-page pamphlet, *What Does the Pakistan National Movement Stand For?*, stating "the fundamentals of the political ideology" of the movement.

He began by defining "Indianism" as the force which had dominated all the countries of south Asia and defeated the efforts of their peoples to improve their lot. This was a destructive power, victimizing men and nations, crippling religions and states, and enslaving at least half of the continent of Asia. With the coming of the British it had manifested itself in the establishment of the Indian National Congress. In this clever way it had designated all British possessions in south Asia as India, denied to the non-Indian nations the right to their own nationhood, and stamped Indian nationality on the peoples of this area. So insidious was this influence that when the various nations, communities, sects

and groups came to set up their organizations and parties, they used the prefix "Indian" or "All India". They did not realize that by so doing they were acquiescing in calling themselves Indians, and their leaders had fastened fetters of "Indianism" on them. The latest move in this campaign of perpetuating "Indianism" was the plan for establishing an all-India federation. The federal device was chosen because, of all constitutional arrangements known to law, it could alone enslave for ever the non-Indian peoples, extract from them a permanent renunciation of their claim to nationhood, and demand from them a formal acceptance of a single Indian nationality. This was the central idea underlying the proposal for an all-India federal constitution.<sup>55</sup>

The Pakistan National Movement was formed to fight against this federation. This it was to do by adhering to seven principles, which might be called its aims and objects.

First, the movement stood for the *spiritual liberation* of the nations of south Asia from the *secular thralldom* of "Indianism". During the previous 3,500 years Indianism had opposed all religions and worked for their disintegration: banishing Buddhism, absorbing Jainism, menacing Islam and stifling Sikhism. This anti-religious process had "grievously retarded the spiritual emancipation of mankind and dwarfed the moral development of half the population of the continent of Asia".<sup>56</sup>

Secondly, the movement stood for the *cultural liberation* of the nations of south Asia from the *barbarian influence* of Indianism. Indianism had corrupted the cultures of the non-Indian nations without contributing anything to their intellectual, artistic and moral fabric. Self-defence against such a record was essential, so that these nations could revert to "their original conception of life and regenerate their respective cultures in their national strongholds". Indianism must, therefore, be confined to its historical and national sphere—India (Hindustan)—so that other nations got an opportunity to liberate themselves culturally from its barbarian environment.<sup>57</sup>

Thirdly, the movement stood for the *social liberation* of the nations of south Asia from the *caste tyranny* of Indianism. Of all creeds and philosophies in the world, Indianism stood alone against the universal belief and practice of the brotherhood and equality of man. Thus it created perpetual divisions among the people and stopped their integration into one nation. This was a curse which

must be removed. All disabilities imposed and sanctioned by Indianism would be swept away so that people regain their social status and become full human beings.<sup>58</sup>

Fourthly, the movement stood for the *economic liberation* of the nations of south Asia from the *impoverishing capitalism* of Indianism. For centuries Indianism had exploited men, women and children for its material gain, surpassing even the plunder of despotic kings, corrupt dynasties and foreign rulers. The poor and the landless had been pitilessly treated by the money-lender and the *bania*. These groaning masses must be saved from the Indian greed of gold.<sup>59</sup>

Fifthly, the movement stood for the *national liberation* of the nations of south Asia from the *destructive domination* of Indianism. Indianism had physically exterminated the ancient race of the Dravidians, destroyed the depressed classes, politically ruined the Muslims, the Rajputs, the Sikhs and the Marathas, and finally "dragooned them all into subjection to British imperialism". To remedy this, the movement admitted "the birth-right of each and every nation which is under Indian domination to a nationhood of its own in the territory wherein it may form a majority of the population", and promised "to support by all legitimate means the actual realization of this right by all such nations". The movement, thus, stood "for the birth-right of all nations to their national existence, even if that birth-right may have to be satisfied, as in the case of the Sikhs, at the expense of Pakistan itself".<sup>60</sup>

Sixthly, the movement stood for the *inter-national consolidation* of the nations of south Asia against the *de-nationalizing dangers* of Indianism. Not only was the demon of Indianism to be exorcized, but the freed nations were to be "Asianized" by the creation of a spirit of international solidarity among them. This was to be achieved by each one of them recognizing and guaranteeing the integrity of one another in such a manner that, without let or hindrance, they could all develop along their own lines and attain their national ideals in their own ways. Then, in a voluntary and mutual co-operation, they "must consolidate themselves inter-nationally by entering into alliances with their neighbours so that they can for ever offer a united front against the de-nationalizing dangers of 'Indianism' ". This would open a new chapter in the history of south Asia.<sup>61</sup>

Finally, the movement stood for the creation of a *new order*

of *Asianism* to take the place of the *order of Indianism* in south Asia. History would not be allowed to repeat itself, nor Indianism permitted to reappear in a different shape or form. The movement appealed to all nations to evolve a new order so that their national life and liberty be protected and the moral entity and political integrity of south Asia live for every.<sup>62</sup>

Rahmat Ali always used strong words and wrote with clarity. He also tried to be comprehensive in scope and frank in his prejudices. Here, no aspect of a nation's life was ignored. Cultural and economic autonomy was recognized as a vital characteristic of modern nationalism. The spiritual base of a people's life was to be strengthened. The ultimate aim was to destroy caste Hinduism, and eliminate all prospects for its imperial resurgence. His outlook, however, was not limited to the narrow horizon of nationalism. He looked forward to the day when a supra-national spirit would take these nations into the broader field of an Asian comity inspired and enlivened by mutual co-operation.

He did not mince words in talking about Hinduism (his "Indianism"). All his efforts were directed to breaking its power, and he was anxious to enlist the help and support of all Indian minorities, including even some Hindu groups, in this crusade. This led him to the idea of self-determination which he believed to be the right of all oppressed and disinherited peoples of India. The sincerity of his promises is not questionable, for he was prepared to see the Sikhs win their freedom, though this would be at the cost of Pakistan as they were to be found in the Punjab.

Rahmat Ali's repeated references to India as South Asia have a prophetic quality. After 1947 this name for the sub-continent (plus Ceylon and Nepal) has been adopted by everyone writing on or speaking of the area. Probably no contemporary political scientist, historian or economist is aware that Rahmat Ali had used it first in 1933.

### The Climate of Opinion (1933 - 1935)

Between the appearance of Rahmat Ali's declaration and his next attempt to argue in favour of a Pakistan, Hindu and Muslim views in India continued their march down the traditional path of mutual incomprehension, dislike and incompatibility. A few examples will illustrate this.

In February 1933, A Bengali Muslim legislator complained that 45 years' experience of public life had taught him that "as a community the Hindus are incapable of taking a broad view of public affairs. In their vocabulary, nationalism and Hinduism are synonymous terms. To them Nationalism means subservience of all sections to their views and interests".<sup>63</sup>

In June Haji Rahim Bakhsh of the Punjab, writing in the *Civil and Military Gazette*, made a case for the Muslims being a separate nation; and his line of argument betrayed Rahmat Ali's influence, though he mentioned neither him nor the word Pakistan. Hindus and Sikhs on the one hand and Muslims on the other "form two distinct nations in the truest sense of the term". "The two live side by side but they do not inter-dine or inter-marry, and practically lead two mutually exclusive social lives. In other words, the corporate lives of the two nations run as two distinct and parallel currents. In short, those powerful historical and social forces which unite individuals into nations have divided Indians into two distinct nations which may be broadly called the Muslim nation and the Hindu nation. . . .A constitution which secures political power to Islam in certain provinces and to Hinduism in certain others, creating a happy balance of power in a federation through which Muslim India and Hindu India would work for certain common purposes can alone satisfactorily solve the problem of Swaraj for the two *Swas* (selves) in India. A certain portion of the Indian Muslim nation would be living as a minority in Hindu India and similarly a certain portion of the Hindu nation would be living as a minority in Muslim India—for them due safeguards as minorities are a necessity. But the Hindu nation or the Muslim nation as a whole should seek its self-expression through what would be Hindu India or Muslim India respectively. In short, the choice before India is between continuing to fight against itself and accepting the idea of giving the Hindu and Muslim nations opportunities of self-expression and self-development."<sup>64</sup> This came very near to demanding a partition, for a nation can find its self-expression only in an independent state; but the author did not spell out the logical conclusion of his argument.

In September an Englishman (F.F. Holsinger) put forward a definite and clear scheme of splitting India into Hindu and Muslim dominions. Despaired of any solution of the Muslim problem which could retain the unity of India, he arranged the sub-

continent into a number of independent entities which by their size and resources could stand as separate dominions within the British Commonwealth. According to him, Muslim districts of the United Provinces would form one dominion with Lucknow as its capital, the NWFP and Muslim districts of the Punjab would make up another dominion, Bengal would be divided into a Hindu and a Muslim dominion, and so on, until 13 dominions covered the area of British India. Twelve of the bigger states could be turned into kingdoms.<sup>65</sup>

The attraction of this solution lay in its freshness. From the idea of dividing India into two parts, which had so far been the limit of new proposals, he developed the pattern of a mosaic of dominions spread over the whole country, and still giving it some sort of a supra-national unity. This was decidedly a step beyond federation, even beyond confederation, and might have appealed to the British imperial instinct with its possibility of retaining India within the Commonwealth.

The idea of making practically every province into a dominion looks less impracticable if we remember that the Commonwealth of that day had such tiny dominions as New Zealand and was later to have a number of small members like the West Indies, Zambia, Uganda, Kenya and Ceylon, few of whom were larger than an average Indian province or even a quarter of a province like Bengal or the United Provinces. The weakness lay not in the nature or the underlying principle but in the difficulties inherent in its application. Several of the dominions, in northern and central India, would have been landlocked territories with no outlet to the sea or to foreign lands except through neighbouring dominions. The will to co-exist peacefully and co-operate readily which such a configuration took for granted was something that the future could not have produced out of the bitter and irreconcilable present. Communal rivalry would have been transferred to the national level, thus made more respectable but also more intractable. It would also have failed to solve the problem of Hindu-Muslim friction within each dominion. (These two objections could also be raised against the later Muslim League Pakistan scheme. The first was proved true and has soured Indo-Pakistan relations since 1947. The second was removed—but only in West Pakistan—by a huge transfer of population which could not have been foreseen in 1933 and was not contemplated even until the middle of 1947). What-

ever its weaknesses, and it was a mere suggestion not a full-fledged detailed plan, it showed a deep concern with the magnitude and gravity of the Muslim problem. It might also have influenced Rahmat Ali to demand, in 1935, a number of Muslim states and enclaves within India.

We don't know if any of these post-1930 suggestions owed something to Iqbal. He is not mentioned in any of them, but then nor are others who had specifically demanded a partition. This does not mean that Iqbal's Allahabad address had no effect at all, but it does mean that it was not considered an outstanding event meriting special mention. He was one of several voices speaking of a future which the present was not contemplating but whose seeds lay far back in the past. He added to the chorus and perhaps helped to make it a little louder, but he could neither change its words nor alter its music.

In October, Sir Muhammad Yaqub repeated that India "is not a country but a sub-continent". Its different parts were as far apart from one another as were the various countries of Europe. "Would it ever be in the range of practical politics to frame one single Constitution for the whole of Europe? How could it therefore be possible, or even prudent, to frame one single Constitution for the whole of India? Different provinces must therefore have different qualifications for franchise and different systems of election."<sup>66</sup> Once again the major premisses of the argument for a partition are presented and supported, but partition is not demanded. This was a habit to which nearly all Muslim leaders were addicted.

The Hindu answer to all such sentiments was the same as it had been since late nineteenth century. India was the land of the Hindus alone; other peoples were there on Hindu sufferance.<sup>67</sup> Urdu was a foreign language which "is a living monument to our slavery". It "must be eradicated from the page of existence".<sup>68</sup>

Towards the end of 1933 the *Star of India* discussed a territorial distribution of provinces attributed to Sir Henry Lawrence, a former Commissioner of Sind. It had originally been entitled "The Balkanization of India". It was pointed out that the existing territorial division had been formed in a haphazard way through accidents of war during a protracted period. This was an irrational scheme of things. The remedy was to limit the number of provinces and give this status to large areas which could enjoy administrative and financial autonomy. Provinces like the Central Provinces,

Assam, Sind, Orissa and NWFP would have to be amalgamated with other provinces. It was suggested that such a re-distribution should not cause any concern to statesmen who had seen the re-distribution of states in Europe after the world war.<sup>69</sup>

Encouraged by the Muslims, and more specifically by Rahmat Ali's appeal to the Indian minority groups, Sir Henry Gidney now asked for a separate state for the Anglo-Indians, pressing his demand for an area of two hundred thousand acres.<sup>70</sup>

An Indian Christian commentator (Albion R. Banerji), who wrote several books in this period to show that he was enamoured neither of Congress policies nor of Muslim separatism, feared, above all, that Muslim nationalism, if encouraged or allowed to develop unchecked, would one day result in a sentiment of pan-Islamism and an "Islamic Empire".<sup>71</sup> He did not identify the sources of his fear: it may have been the general trend of Muslim thinking, or Iqbal's emphasis on Islam as the prime mover of Muslim politics, or more specifically the plan recently propounded by Rahmat Ali in England where Sir Albion was then living.

In the summer of 1934, Abul Kasem repeated his words of February 1933: that the Congress was an organization of the caste Hindus and in its vocabulary "nationalism" meant "Hinduism".<sup>72</sup>

At the same time Sardar Iqbal Ali Shah reported that the idea of creating a "great Central Asian Confederacy" had taken a "definite shape" in Central Asia. Recent events in Chinese Turkistan were of "poignant interest" to the Muslims of India, Turkey, Afghanistan and Tatar republics of the Soviet Union. "Many will see in these struggles the dawn of a new Muslim era, and the institution of another Islamic buffer state on the borders of India. They point to the close historical and cultural affinities of the British Muslims with their co-religionists in the disturbed Turkistan, and emphasize the fact that the area that stretches from Kashgar is situated on the very threshold of Kashmir, and is closely linked up by trade relations with the Punjab and the Afghan Frontier Province. Thus, it is believed, that the time is ripe for detaching Eastern Turkistan from its loose connection with China; and creating there an independent Muslim State." How this movement for a Central Asian Confederacy could be spread far and wide "can be seen by noting the geographical cutlets [*sic.*]. Indiawards, it can pass by two roads. One is from Khotan via

Gilgit and Chitral through Kashmir; the other lies by way of Kashgar, the Pamir Passes, Afghanistan and the Khyber Pass, into India."<sup>73</sup> Shades of the supposed Jamaluddin message!

In July, an anonymous writer in the *Star of India* blamed the Hindus for alienating Muslim support and sympathy from the mainstream of Indian nationalism, and warned that "unless the Hindu Press reforms its tone and starts respecting the sentiments of Muslims there can be no hope of unity or concerted action on the part of Muslims".<sup>74</sup> In the following month, the president of the Congress Nationalist Party raised the old and by this time obsolete question of communal electorates. He believed that with this system in force the country would never get a government by the people, for the people and of the people, but a government of one community over another. This would not be democracy, but a special kind of despotic government.<sup>75</sup> But he did not recommend any solution of the problem. A Punjabi Hindu commentator saw dire consequences of the creation of a Pakistan. "If a Muslim Federation for the five North-Western provinces is established as is demanded by some Muslims, the federal Government for the rest of India would not be worth the paper on which its constitution may be drawn."<sup>76</sup> He did not explain, however, how the creation of this Muslim federation would affect the rest of the sub-continent so deeply. In contrast, Muslims continued to complain that the Hindus were out to establish their own raj under the beguiling name of swaraja, and to express their preference for British rule which, with all its shortcomings, had admirably preserved the political life of the Indian minorities.<sup>77</sup>

The report of the Joint Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform was published in 1934, and its findings reflected the considered views of a large band of distinguished British and Indian statesmen who had manfully wrestled with the Indian problem for five years. It is interesting to see what the report had to say about majority rule and provincial autonomy and the apprehensions of the Muslims. The members were sufficiently impressed by the gravity of the communal situation to remark that "it must be recognized that if free play were given to the powerful forces which would be set in motion by an unqualified system of parliamentary government, the consequences would be disastrous to India, and perhaps irreparable".<sup>78</sup> (In the event they did prove irreparable, as the institution of parliamentary governments in the

provinces and the treatment meted out to the Muslims in the Hindu provinces accelerated the movement towards the demand for a Pakistan). The unity of India was perhaps the greatest gift which British rule had conferred on India. But, in transferring so many powers to the provinces, and in encouraging them to develop a vigorous and independent political life of their own, the new system would "be running the inevitable risk of weakening or even destroying that unity".<sup>79</sup> The risk did, in fact, materialize and destroyed the unity.

Some time in 1934-35, Sir Fazli Husain is reported to have talked in the Viceroy's Executive Council of "creating Muslim-majority zones as a counterpoise to Hindu-majority areas".<sup>80</sup> This was told to Durga Das, a journalist, by Sir Brojendra Mitter the law member of the Council. We have not been given any further details, but the report, if true, is significant because Fazli Husain was opposed to the Muslim League policy.

In January 1935, Gulshan Rai, a Punjabi Hindu, probably realizing the inevitability of some kind of Pakistan, recommended a partition of the Punjab on communal lines.<sup>81</sup> Simultaneously, a Muslim writer (Waris Ameer Ali) asked, "How will supposedly Muslim 'autonomous' provinces, even if the Muslim majority functions in them, work harmoniously within a Hinduized centre at distant Delhi? Some Muslim leaders have a pathetic faith in the idea that they can secure fair treatment for their brethren in Hindu provinces by a threat of reprisals upon Hindus under their sway. What an augury for the harmonious working of the new Constitution, and how will this archaic method succeed with a centre increasingly under Brahminical influence? Even the foreshadowing of such events causes the birth of disturbing ideas, such as the plan formulated by some Muslim intellectuals for the setting up of a separate Federation of provinces in the North-West, completed by the expropriation of the Kashmir State. This proposed Federation is to be styled 'Pakistan'. But whether Pakistan materializes or not, Imperial interference to uphold the authority of a Brahminical Federal government is likely to coincide with grave repercussions beyond the frontiers, where Muslims have never remained quiet when their co-religionists in India were in trouble with Hindu powers."<sup>82</sup>

Still another warning from Sir Muhammad Yaqub came in March: "Until the Hindus create a feeling of trust and security in

the minds of the Muslims, the dream of Swaraj can never be fulfilled. Eight crores of dissatisfied Muslims would make it impossible for any constitution to work.”<sup>83</sup> This was reinforced in April by an anonymous British writer.<sup>84</sup> In July, a Muslim, writing in a Calcutta paper, argued for a separate nationhood for Muslims in terms which brooked no compromise or weakening. Referring to the Congress-cum-Hindu ideology he said, “Never can we enter that contaminated and poisoned atmosphere which reeks with the foul breath of such putrid nationalism. There shall be no nation out of a merging of us into them or with them. If such was your hope, forsake it! If such was your pledge, forswear it! If India bleeds, let her lie bleeding. From now onwards, build a dream anew; with the iron yet hot and blazing in your soul, make another determination. THERE SHALL BE A TRUE NATION OF GENUINE PATRIOTS IN INDIA, A NATION OF EIGHTY MILLION MUSLIMS. . .”<sup>85</sup>

### Rahmat Ali (1935)

So far Rahmat Ali's efforts to persuade the people engaged in making the new constitution for India had been fruitless. The RTC had met thrice to determine the basic principles of Indian federalism, a white paper had come out containing a summary of recommendations, a Joint Select Committee of the two houses of Parliament had worked long hours and made its report, a bill for the government of India had been drafted and was now, in 1935, before the Parliament for final disposal. All this time Rahmat Ali must have been meeting the men in authority, and especially Muslim members and witnesses of the Joint Select Committee, and warning them that the coming of a federation would be disastrous to Muslims. His expostulations came to nought; the unanimity with which Muslim leaders told the Committee that the “Pakistan” plan was a fantasy cherished by a student and was not worth talking about, was a humiliation to Rahmat Ali, and must have galled him. He decided, in the summer of 1935, to make one more effort.

On 8 July, he addressed a letter running to four out-size pages to the members of the House of Lords who were then considering the Government of India Bill. He may have sent a similar communication to the members of the House of Commons when the bill

was before them, but of this we have no record. In his letter to the peers of the realm, he appealed "on behalf of the people of Pakistan" for sympathy and support in their struggle against "the ruthless coercion of Pakistan into the proposed Indian Federation". The demand of Pakistan was for the recognition of its right to a separate national existence, distinct from Hindustan, based on social, cultural, religious and historical grounds. "Pakistan is not Hindoo in soul nor are its people Hindoostani citizens. It has always possessed a historical, spiritual, territorial and national individuality of its own. . . . While Hindoostanis claim Hindoostan as their mother country by birth, we claim Pakistan as our fatherland by the same right. If Hindoostan is theirs because they form three-fourths of its inhabitants, Pakistan is ours because we constitute four-fifths of its total population."

The two peoples were so different in everything as to be two nations. "We have, as a nation, nothing in common with them, nor they with us. In individual habits, as in national life, we differ from them as fundamentally as from any other civilized nation in the world. The very basis and content of our national life is founded on fundamentals essentially different from those on which Hindooism lives and prospers. Our age-long social systems and our ancient national tradition has [*sic.*] given us a civilization with a philosophy, a culture, a language, a literature and an art basically and fundamentally different from that of Hindoostan." These were hard facts which none could controvert. "They remain today, as they have ever been, unchangeable realities. This supreme distinction between Pakistan and Hindoostan is ineffacable, as it is based on eternal truths. Our constitution-makers must reckon with Nature's decrees."

Nature had made Pakistan a geographical identity. The Jumna flowed as a boundary between Pakistan and Hindustan. History had confirmed the work of nature. "This great cleavage. . . has existed from time immemorial, and must exist for ever. It represents our body and soul, as it stamps our separate national entity, and gives us an unchallengeable right to demand its recognition. It constitutes our ancient national heritage—of Faith and Fatherland—and we are firmly resolved to preserve it."

Repudiating the officially-nominated Muslim delegates who had come to London to make the "shameful surrender" of the right of their nation, Rahmat Ali demanded the creation of two federa-

tions in India, a Pakistan Federation and a Hindoostan Federation, with equal status and identical legal position. This demand, he said, was not actuated by any hostility towards the British or the "Hindoostans" It sprang from "the motives of self-defence and self-preservation alone". The people of Pakistan were neither anti-British nor anti-Hindustani, they were simply pro-Pakistani. They realized that their acceptance of Hindustani nationality and their amalgamation with Hindustan were not only impossible, not only unthinkable, but also inhuman. They had, therefore, a moral and legal duty to oppose, by all constitutional means open to them, the proposed federation. It was a pity that the British plan for one Indian federation did not take notice of these "eternal differences" between the Hindustani and Pakistani nations with which the makers of the plan were quite familiar. "The Indo-Pakistanian problem is not an inter-communal issue and will never be solved on inter-communal lines. It is an international problem and, therefore, will submit itself to a permanent solution on that basis alone. Any constitution—Federal or Unitary—which disregards this vital fact, while destructive for the Pakistanians, cannot but be disadvantageous to the British and Hindoostanis as well." If Burma was being separated from Hindustan and accorded a distinct national status, it was a mystery why Pakistan was being forced into an Indian federation against its will and in complete disregard of its interests and rights.

A federation for all India could be conjured up by the fiat of law, but could not be worked without the willing co-operation of the Pakistanians. The British Parliament could not impose a constitution unless it also imposed justice. The proposed federation denied "sacred justice" to Pakistan and would, therefore, "never satisfy the soul of the nation". The Pakistan National Movement would never accept the official dispensation as a permanent solution of the Indo-Pakistanian problem. "Nothing on earth will ever induce us to play this suicidal part allotted to us under the Indian Federal Scheme. We cannot give up what we have inherited from our forefathers, nor can we surrender what has been bequeathed to us by our heroes and martyrs. We can sacrifice all but we cannot commit an act of self-strangulation by joining the Indian Federation to please the British, or to satisfy the HIndoos. . . . The struggle may be long and trying: it may entail suffering and sacrifice: but no trial can be too severe and no sacrifice too great

in this noble cause. We have the fullest faith in the justice of our national demand, and an unshakable belief in the destiny of our Fatherland." The letter concluded with a prayer that the help of God bless these efforts and the inspiring example of national heroes sustain them.<sup>86</sup>

### Muslim Thinking (1935)

On 13 August, the Aga Khan wrote to Sir Fazli Husain: "What should be the future policy of the Muslims of India? . . . To this there is only one answer: that we should take advantage of our position in the North, and in Bengal, and get all the natural advantages we can out of it. First, in all-India affairs we should be out and out Federalists using all our influence so that our provinces get at least such autonomy as the great Indian Princes will enjoy under the Federation. Secondly, by gradually changing the character of the Army from a professional force to a territorial one and having for each province the kind of advantage that Bavaria had in the old German Empire (which great Princes will have in the new Indian Federation), by using all our strength for this legitimate end, make India what she really is, i.e., a United States of Southern Asia rather than something on the model of present day Italy or Germany. Thirdly, internally we must strengthen our numbers by child welfare, by hygienic home life . . . Here is the crux of our policy. How are these things to be carried out? In self-interest, if for no other reason, our attitude should be hardest possible political work on the lines of moderate State socialism, a policy that will get for us the sympathy of many depressed and poor Hindus as well as being in touch with the world movement—even in such reactionary countries as Germany and Italy. Our members in all the provinces (and especially in Bengal) should always be on the side of putting as many taxation burdens as possible on the upper and middle classes and reducing as much as they can indirect taxes, which fall generally on the poor. This being the case we have to start a real Economic Party with a semi-Socialist programme throughout each province and a purely Federalist programme at the Centre."<sup>87</sup>

This is a significant communication, both for its authorship and its contents. The Aga Khan had had immense influence on Muslim India, and though this was now waning and he played no

important part in the making of Pakistan, yet his insight into Indian politics was unparalleled. His advice to concentrate on the Muslim provinces (even to the extent of initiating the creation of provincial armies) and to win as much autonomy as possible was an indication that Muslim interest was now transferring itself from the Indian plane to that of Muslim provinces. One could interpret it as the foreshadowing of a possible partition.

An even more striking feature of this letter is the Aga Khan's socialist leanings. Coming from a man of his wealth and origin, the suggestion to follow a socialist policy shows how well he understood the needs of his community. Muslims were poor and in great economic distress, not only because the Hindus were exploiting them but also because the rich of their own community were indifferent to their welfare. A socialist programme would have two other advantages. It would help the Muslims to unite behind any party that promised to improve their material condition. It might also attract the sympathies of certain down-trodden and discontented groups among the Hindus. The advice was shrewd but unfortunately ignored by the Muslim leadership of that time, by the persons who led the later Pakistan movement and by their successors who came to rule the new country. As we will see shortly, similar recommendations were made by Rahmat Ali and Iqbal.

In October, the *Star of India* assured the Hindus that the Muslims did not want to dispossess them of anything that they had; they only demanded a proper share for themselves in the future India. And, this "the Hindus will never concede"; they wanted the Muslims to remain "perpetual economic and political serfs to them while they alone rule the roost".<sup>88</sup>

In December came the golden jubilee of the Indian National Congress, and the pro-Congress Muslims asked the mass of the community to celebrate the occasion. Most Muslim public men and newspapers rejected the idea and used the opportunity to enlarge upon the anti-Muslim past and policies of the Congress. One example typifies the line of argument.

One Ahmed Idrisi commented: "It is a historical truth that from its very foundation the Congress has been a Hindu body working for Swaraj, which in effect will be Hindu Raj . . . . To ask the Muslims to join the Congress Jubilee celebrations is to ask the injured victim to kiss his oppressor. . . . The Hindu policy in a

nutshell is that they want to utilize the presence of British troops in India during the period of the preparation for Hindu Raj, which is their distant goal. Moreover, the interests of the Muslim Kingdoms [did he mean Muslim native states, or Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey?] and the British Empire are identical. The strength of the British Government in India is not only of the greatest help to Indian Muslims for preserving their existence and individuality and for future progress, but is, at the same time, a sure guarantee for the safety and continued existence of the Muslim Kingdoms, which the British Government is bound, in its own interest, to protect from the common danger."<sup>89</sup> The message was loud and clear. If there were a choice, the Muslims would prefer the British to the Hindus.

The answer of the extreme-wing Hindus was equally blunt and unmistakable. "India is for the Hindus", said Dr. Kurtkoti at the Shuddhi Conference at Poona, "and other communities are merely guests of the country, of which fact they should be informed. They should also be warned to behave themselves as guests."<sup>90</sup> The gulf was as great as it could be.

Some British commentators of long Indian administrative experience confirmed Muslim fears and fortified their convictions. One of them wrote in this year: "... the Indian Legislative Assembly is dominated by Congress, and that all but one or two Provincial Assemblies are in Congress hands, one can see that if Responsible Government is given now, it must mean Congress Rule. Once Congress got the power, nothing but military force or a successful rebellion can make them quit it." Then followed some sharp comments on Hindu mentality. "The Hindu elements, whose vocal organ the Congress is, though experts in legal chicanery and political gerrymandering, are incapable of ruling India. Were they left to themselves they would not last an hour. The martial races of the north would soon take control, perhaps in the wake of an Afghan invasion."<sup>91</sup>

### Rahmat Ali (1935-1940)

As far as we know, Rahmat Ali did not publish anything between 1935 and 1940 except a letter in *The Times*, and it is difficult to know how his ideas were developing in these crucial years. This was the period when Muslim India turned, slowly

but firmly, towards partition, thus finally vindicating him. This was also the period when several students of public affairs suggested alternatives to an Indian federation which, they claimed, could secure Muslim rights without splitting the sub-continent. To make our study of Rahmat Ali complete (till 1940, the terminal year of this work) we will break our chronological order and get along with him, postponing a consideration of other schemes to later chapters.

Rahmat Ali published nothing, but one chance window is opened into his mind by a comprehensive "interview" he gave to the Turkish woman of letters and traveller, Halide Edib. She visited India in the mid-'thirties and has left us an account of the visit. In her book, which was published in London in 1937, she reproduced a 10-page "interview" with Rahmat Ali, which in fact he had written himself and persuaded her to incorporate in the book in the shape of a conversation between him and her.

Emphasizing the separate identity of the Muslims of "Pakistan", Rahmat Ali said that their racial origins were from Central Asia, and socially their type of civilization was totally different from that of Hindustan. "Islam, as a social, moral, and political system, is the key to, and the outstanding feature of, the Pakistani nation." Then he made a startling point. The Muslims of Pakistan were separate even from the rest of the Muslims in the sub-continent. "The Muslims in Pakistan are in their national home. The Muslims in Hindustan (i.e., India proper) went there as conquerors. Therefore Hindustan was the Muslim Empire, where for over nine hundred years, they ruled over a vast native majority. But when they lost this Colonial Empire, as distinct from Pakistan, the Muslims who settled in these Muslim Imperial Dominions of Hindustan became a minority community in Hindustan . . . . At the time of the fall of their empire, had the Muslims possessed leaders with vision and courage, they could have preserved the national as well as territorial integrity of their homelands in Pakistan."

Barring a few honourable persons, Muslim politicians were "a mere crowd of careerists" who divided themselves into two classes: the communalists, who were pro-British but anti-Hindu, and who followed a policy of subservience to the British; and the nationalists, who were pro-Hindu but anti-British, and who advanced the cause of Hindu capitalism and Hindu nationalism. Both had no policy of their own and had never considered that there was, or shall ever be, "a distinct Muslim homeland in Pakistan". This

rudderless leadership had pushed the Muslims into an Indian federation where they would be a mere minority community belonging to the Hindu nation. The Pakistan National Movement had been created to fight this grave menace and to struggle for the establishment of "an independent and separate Pakistan", and it believed that this solution alone could ensure an honourable existence for both nations and also put an end to the exploitation of both by British imperialism.<sup>92</sup>

The British had declined to consider the demand for Pakistan. They suspected that the Muslims were aiming at the revival of the old Muslim empire, a sort of pan-Islamism. But this was a mistake and a misrepresentation of the movement. It was neither anti-Hindu, nor anti-British, nor pan-Islamist. It was simply a realization of the truth that "*within Hindustan we will be a minority community, but, outside it, a virile nation of forty-two millions*". Pakistan would be the fourth largest state in the world among the 54 countries in the League of Nations. It was the destiny of the Muslims, and sooner or later bound to come true. "It may or may not be realized in my lifetime; but, with time, it is sure to command recognition and become for the people of Pakistan an ideal worthy of the highest dedication."<sup>93</sup>

About the economic prospects of Pakistan Rahmat Ali showed the same confidence that Jinnah expressed later during the Pakistan movement and stressed the same point, namely, that an honourable existence was more important than an easy life of slavery. Pakistan had vast moral and material resources and with the removal of Hindu capitalism and British exploitation it should pay its way. The expensive, top-heavy administration would disappear, and public services would be "made to work for the nation, not the nation for the services". There would be no place for an unfeeling and highly-paid bureaucracy presiding over the misery and poverty of the common man. Karachi was a first-class port. The soil was the most productive in the sub-continent. With all the sources of revenue then going to the Government of India in the hands of the nation, there was no cause for worry about the future.<sup>94</sup>

Like Jinnah in later years, Rahmat Ali refused to be drawn into a discussion of details. Asked about the form of government in his Pakistan, he said that the first objective was to achieve independence. But one thing was certain. Pakistan would be "fundamen-

tally both democratic and socialistic". Whether it would be federal or unitary would be determined by the people when they were free to make a choice.<sup>95</sup>

He was optimistic that, once the two nations had achieved independence in their respective national states, "the national pride of each will be satisfied, and the historic clash replaced by neighbourly goodwill and friendly co-operation". The root of the problem lay in Hindu refusal to recognize Pakistan. Both logic and history rejected such an attitude. The Hindus denied to Pakistan the right of self-determination which they claimed for themselves in India. Their claim to Pakistan on the ground that it was once upon a time a part of the Indian empire was absurd. There had been Hindu empires and Muslim empires, and once they went, their boundaries too disappeared with them. Imperial frontiers of the bygone ages must be forgotten if a new future was to be shaped.<sup>96</sup>

To the important inquiry about the future of the 45 million Muslims to be left behind in India Rahmat Ali gave an honest answer. "The truth is that in this struggle their thought has been more than a wrench to me. They are the flesh of our flesh and the soul of our soul. We can never forget them; nor they, us. Their present position and future security is, and shall ever be, a matter of great importance to us. As things are at present, Pakistan will not adversely affect their position in Hindustan. On the basis of population (one Muslim to four Hindus), they will still be entitled to the same representation in legislative as well as representative fields which they possess now. As to the future, the only effective guarantee we can offer is that of reciprocity, and, therefore, we solemnly undertake to give all those safeguards to non-Muslim minorities which will be conceded to our Muslim minority in Hindustan . . . . But what sustains us most is the fact that they know we are protecting Pakistan in the highest interest of 'the Millet'. It is as much theirs as it is ours. While for us it is a national citadel, for them it will ever be a moral anchor. So long as the anchor holds, everything is or can be made safe. But once it gives way, all will be lost."

He continued: "Times come when even brothers have to part. Cruel as such times naturally are, the highest good of the Millet must come before everything else . . . . The nobler spirits among them appreciate this truth and are, therefore, actively supporting

the Movement. They are fully conscious of the fact that Pakistan's struggle is as vital to them as it is to us. We all know that the idea of earth-rootedness is repugnant to Islam. The world is remoulding itself, and political boundaries are disappearing before the tide of moral and spiritual allegiances. Sooner or later, but sooner rather than later if we can make it, Nature's decrees are bound to be obeyed. Therefore, if all of us hold fast and remain true to our teachings, we have every hope that the future will see us even closer to one another than we are at present."<sup>97</sup>

The last question Halide Edib asked him was, "isn't there an alternative in 'one Indian nationhood' for you all?" To which Rahmat Ali's immediate answer was, "No, Madam, certainly not! We are not Indians: we are Pakistanis." It would be "our national death" to embrace Indian nationalism. "Has any nation in the world ever committed national suicide in the interest of its neighbours' unity? I believe not. Defeat is a curse, but surrender, a sin." To unite these two nations politically and physically would be a grievous disaster. "Therefore for us to seal our national doom in the interest of 'One Indian Nationhood' would be a treachery against our posterity, a betrayal of our history, and a crime against humanity for which there could be no salvation."<sup>98</sup>

This "spoken" testament is important for some new ideas not to be found in his earlier writings and hardly referred to in later statements. For example, his straight answer that the government of Pakistan would be based on the principles of democracy and socialism is of much significance. He wanted a socialist state at a time when even the Congress had not committed itself to socialism, when no Muslim leader was giving thought to the economic issues of the future, and when even in Europe socialist states were scarce on the ground. Again, his emphasis on the weaknesses and dangers of a bureaucracy bred in the imperial stable put the finger on one of the important problems of the future. But what is more striking is what he did not say. There is no mention of an Islamic state in his programme. In spite of his intense devotion to Islam, the Islamic basis of his two-nation theory, and his anxiety to save Islam from Hindu domination, he stood for a state which would be Muslim without being Islamic.

Another interesting feature of this "interview" is his remarks on the future of the Muslims living outside Pakistan. In his theory of hostages, though he did not use these words, he foresaw what

was to be repeated by many in later years. His explanation that Muslims to be left behind in India would also gain by the creation of Pakistan, in so far as they would be participating in a cause which was in the interest of the entire *millat* and would be able to look to Pakistan as their moral anchor, is the only rational and realistic argument which could justify the two-nation theory and still find it practical to surrender a part of the nation.

In its issue of 5 December 1938, *The Times* had carried a special article entitled "Federation in India", in which Muslims were said to be "again toying" with the idea of the creation of a "Pakistan" in the Muslim-majority provinces of India. Rahmat Ali wrote a letter to the journal on the same day, alleging that the words used in the article were "somewhat misleading" in the sense that they gave "the impression to the reader that 'the idea' of creating a Pakistan has been intermittent and spasmodic". After pointing out that the idea had first been put forth in 1933 and since then consistently upheld by the Pakistan National Movement, he affirmed that "no Constitution, whether federal or unitary, can succeed which condemns our 80,000,000 Muslims to the status of a minority community, especially in the territories where, for centuries, we have been, and still are, the overwhelming majority of the population". He concluded by declaring that the Muslims living in the north-western India "have never been 'Indian' in the true sense of the word; nor do we aspire to that title in the future".<sup>99</sup>

In November or December 1938 Choudhry Khaliquzzaman was in England, and one evening Rahmat Ali invited him to tea, and the two men had a long talk on Pakistan and the Muslim problem. Khaliquzzaman tells the story like this: "This was my first meeting with him and I took a sincere liking for this tall, graceful and well-cut figure. When we started talking about the scheme of Pakistan I found that not only had he thought deeply over the question but was earnest about its realization . . . . After meeting him I felt sad that a man of his calibre and attainment was being reviled by his own people in India, without any justification, as a British stooge. After some discussion I informed him that I was already a convert to the idea [of Pakistan] but I told him that I was not ready to use the word 'Pakistan' for partition of the country because that would make the British suspicious on the one hand and antagonize the Hindus on the other. Why should we

not claim the right of self-determination for our areas instead of bringing in the name 'Pakistan'? But this did not appeal to him. We had many other talks on the subject later on . . . . In this scheme Bengal was excluded while the whole of the Punjab including Delhi found mention. Among others this was also one of the reasons why I was unwilling to give the scheme of partition the name of Pakistan. I preferred the idea of having two Muslim Federations."<sup>100</sup>

Several things are revealing in this narrative. Khaliqzaman says that he had been converted to the idea of Pakistan before he met Rahmat Ali; which shows how close Muslim India had come to the idea of a partition by the end of 1938, and Rahmat Ali's plans must have played a considerable part in effecting this change in Muslim attitude. But Khaliqzaman's refusal to accept the name "Pakistan" is not easy to understand. The reasons he pleads make it even more difficult. Why would the British be suspicious of the name, and, anyway, why should this consideration have deterred the Muslims from owning it? As for antagonizing the Hindus, any demand for Muslim separation was an intolerable anathema to them, no matter by what name one called it. These were no grounds for rejecting Rahmat Ali's name for the Muslim state. A more reasonable objection was that since Bengal was excluded from the Pakistan scheme, its adoption would not reflect the real wishes of the Indian Muslims who wanted a partition embracing the eastern wing. (In fact, the Lahore Resolution later asked for two or more states, and the north-western state could have been given the name of Pakistan). At the same time, it is interesting to note that Khaliqzaman himself, and probably some others too who shared his views, were in favour of two Muslim federations in India; in other words, two separate Muslim states, one in the west and one in the east. This continued to be the Muslim ideal, and the Lahore Resolution staked a claim for "States", not a State. Khaliqzaman's further objection that Rahmat Ali's Pakistan included the whole of the Punjab is meaningless, for later the Muslim League leaders also included the whole of the Punjab in their demand, though the Lahore Resolution did not mention provinces but Muslim-majority areas.

It is very interesting to find Khaliqzaman making no reference to Rahmat Ali's plans for the future of the Muslims living outside the five northern provinces. He himself came from a Muslim-

minority area, the United Provinces, and might have given some thought to the fate of the Muslims of his province in any plan of partition. The fact that he did not do so, in company with all others from these areas, shows the strength of Rahmat Ali's arguments as presented to Halide Edib.

It seems, however, that during their conversation Khaliqzaman had drawn Rahmat Ali's attention to the future of the Muslims of the Hindu provinces, and perhaps inquired how and why they were to be expected to support a scheme which left them where they were, or rather weakened their total strength in a free India. Rahmat Ali replied to this in writing, and Khaliqzaman has reproduced this letter: "At the moment, the millat in the whole of the bi-national sub-continent counts 77,677,545, which is 22% of the total population. Whatever our present representation in the Central Legislature, ultimately it will depend on our population. Now, if the whole millat supports the creation of Pakistan as separate from India it will, by doing so, be reducing its representation in the Central Legislature from 22% to 16% at the lowest. Whether we should suffer this reduction of 6 seats in order to lay the foundations of a Muslim nation in Pakistan is a question that I leave to the judgment of all those who, like yourself, have always tried to safeguard the future of the millat both within India and without it."<sup>101</sup> The argument could not have been put better.

On 22 March 1940, one day before the Lahore Resolution was moved at the Muslim League Lahore session, the Supreme Council of the Pakistan National Movement assembled in Karachi, perhaps its first meeting outside England. Rahmat Ali was present, and his address to the Council was later published as a pamphlet by the Movement with the title of *The Millat of Islam and the Menace of "Indianism"*.

Rahmat Ali began his speech by declaring that now after seven years, "according to all signs and indications, the millat understands the mission of the Movement, appreciates its work, and looks to it for guidance". The first part of the programme had been completed by creating successfully a national consciousness and by demonstrating the inevitability of the establishment of Pakistan. Struggle on this front would of course continue. In the meantime, the moment for initiating the second part of the programme had arrived. This related to Bengal and Hyderabad-Deccan.

He again attacked "Indianism" in strong words. To accept the territorial unity of India in any shape was to acknowledge the paramountcy of Indianism.<sup>102</sup>

He was glad that at long last AIML had come to claim for the Muslims a nationality different from the Indians. But it puzzled him to see it still clinging to India and calling it their "Common Motherland". There was no logic in it. How could one be half-Indian and half-non-Indian; territorially Indian, but nationally non-Indian; internationally Indian, but internally non-Indian? India never was and would never be the Muslim motherland.<sup>103</sup>

Defining the fundamental creed of the movement, he declared: "It is that we are Muslim, not Hindoo; Pakistani, not Hindoostani; and Asian, not 'Indian'; that, in retrospect, the 'India of today' is the 'South Asia of yesterday', but, in prospect, the sphere of the individual solidarity of several nations of tomorrow; that, at present, 'India' is the arbitrary name of the British Empire in South Asia, but, in future, it will be the natural designation of 'Indianism', confined to its national home in India proper (Hindoostan); that as this Empire is composed of several countries of South Asia, of which India (Hindoostan) is only a minor unit, no system of government, whether inspired by the Gladstonian soul of British Imperialism or by the Gandhian spirit of Indian nationalism, or by the grasping capitalism of both, can ever succeed unless it recognizes, and guarantees, the distinct nationhood of the nations living therein; and, finally, that, in so far as we are concerned, we will accept only that political situation which is based upon the aforesaid eternal verities—verities which inspire the 'Creed of the Movement' and ensure the sovereign status of Pakistan, of Bengal, and of Usmanistan." The Muslims must "first realize its inner truth before they expect others to recognize it".<sup>104</sup>

What, then, was the next step? Pakistan, Bengal and Usmanistan were the "political foundations of our heritage", which must be saved to ensure the ultimate safety of the *millat*. The Pakistan demand, which was put forward in 1933, was merely the first part of the movement whose final objective was, and remained, the "permanent defence of our entire millat against the persistent dangers of 'Indianism' ". The second part, now to be taken in hand, was to save Bengal and strengthen Usmanistan.

Bengal, with its hinterland of Assam, was to the Muslims the "Bang-i-Islam". Like Pakistan, it too had a Muslim majority, and

was therefore entitled to the exercise of the right of self-determination. For this purpose a national movement would have to be started and built up on the soil of Bengal. It was the duty and the responsibility of Muslim leaders of Bengal to create such a movement, remembering that on their sincerity, labour and devotion depended not only the immediate future of the 30 million Bengali Muslims but also the ultimate fortunes of Islam in South Asia.<sup>105</sup>

Usmanistan (Hyderabad-Deccan) was a princely state, not a part of British India. Yet it was "a part of our patrimony", and its future was inseparably bound up with that of the *millat*. The Muslims derived their right to Usmanistan "from those canons of International law from which other nations deduce their claims to their domains". The *de jure* sovereignty of Usmanistan was a fact, acknowledged in the treaties originally made by the British and the Nizam. No other state in India enjoyed the special status and privileges of Usmanistan. "These facts and factors constitute our title-deeds to Usmanistan." The people of the state should now embark upon a "sustained constitutional struggle" for the *de facto* recognition of her *de jure* sovereignty. It was imperative for them to establish an organization to work to this end.<sup>106</sup>

The moral foundations of the demand for a Muslim Bengal and a sovereign Hyderabad were secure. Both "countries" were clear-cut territorial units, treated as such for hundreds of years. They were different from Hindustan "in character, culture and in composition as well as in geography, in history, and in ideology". To push them into India would be an act of injustice. The restoration of these lands, as of Pakistan, to their rightful positions on the map "involves no revision of the boundaries of India proper, no redistribution of her territories, no fresh demarcation of her provinces, and no exchange of her populations". They would form three independent Muslim nations in South Asia.<sup>107</sup>

But the struggle for the achievement of their independence could not be left in separate, divided hands without weakening it. The national effort must be co-ordinated by creating an "international" organization. The only existing central organization, the Muslim League, had become "an anachronism and a fatal one at that", because the *millat* had decided to sever its ties with India and seek its future in Asia. So it must go and be replaced with "an alliance of the nations of Pakistan, Bengal, and Usmanisation".<sup>108</sup>

Some features of this address will strike the reader at once.

Perhaps because it was the spoken word, it lacked the close reasoning and crystal clarity characteristic of most of what Rahmat Ali wrote. There is too much of rhetoric here, as if he was carried away by his own eloquence. Words supplant arguments; metaphors are mixed; fondness for alliteration spoils the general effect.

The importance of the statement lies in its claims on behalf of Bengal and Hyderabad. Though Rahmat Ali said that they constituted the second step or stage of his programme and stemmed out of his original conception, there is no mention, direct or indirect, of Bengal or Hyderabad in his earlier declarations. We can safely take these new claims as after-thoughts, but after-thoughts which were by no means original. Between 1935 and 1940 Bengal had featured in various ways in several proposals suggested to solve the Muslim problem. Even Iqbal, who like Rahmat Ali had originally dismissed Bengal from his consideration, had later come to reckon in the eastern Muslims. The Hyderabad case was tricky, for it was neither a part of British India nor a Muslim-majority area. Yet it had been agitating the Muslim mind, partly because of its historical interest and partly because of a sustained Hindu campaign to harrass the Nizam and demand majority rule. The new Congress policy of interfering with the internal affairs of the native states, particularly where this suited the Hindus (there was no Congress movement for democracy in Kashmir, which had a huge Muslim majority living under a Hindu ruler), was also intensifying Muslim fears. Mawdudi had already claimed Hyderabad to be a *dar-ul-Islam*, and Sayyid Abdul Latif, himself a Hyderabad, was trying to save at least the culture of his home by making the state a separate zone under his scheme. Finally, Rahmat Ali's interest in Bengal coincided with the Muslim League's new policy of claiming it for its own Pakistan. On two important points there was agreement between him and the League. Both demanded Assam in spite of its over-all Hindu majority, and both declared that Bengal-Assam would be a separate state.

In this speech Rahmat Ali mentions, in passing, that he had given the name of Bang-i-Islam to Bengal and Assam in 1937.<sup>109</sup> In a later pamphlet of October 1942, he again claimed that he had announced this for the first time in 1937.<sup>110</sup> It is possible that he had done so, but no pamphlet or other writing has come to my notice in which such a claim was made. His *Pakistan*, which con-

tains all his important pamphlets and other writings, does not reproduce any declaration of 1937, nor does it print any pre-1940 map embodying Bang-i-Assam.

It is obvious that Rahmat Ali was well aware of the different schemes which had been prepared by others during the three previous years. He did not make a detailed criticism of them, but his single uncomplimentary reference to them suggests that he was not interested in wasting his time on any plan which retained the identity of India and kept the Muslims within it.

### Rahmat Ali's Influence

Rahmat Ali influenced the development of the idea of Pakistan much more deeply than has been acknowledged by historians. He not only invented a beautiful name for the country but also converted a large group of people to the concept of separation. He was also the first Muslim to present a detailed case for Indian Muslim nationhood.

The main channel of his influence was the young student class, both in England and India. It felt the impact of his ideas and let him inspire its imagination. The founders and leaders of the Punjab Muslim Students Federation were all his followers. Some of them wrote a large number of articles in the Urdu papers of Lahore in favour of Rahmat Ali's Pakistan in 1937 and 1938, when the Muslim League had not yet made up its mind whether to ask for any kind of division or not. The word Pakistan was at this time in use in the Punjab, where both Hindus and Muslims employed it, but in different and opposite contexts. The Hindus used it as a synonym for communalism; Gulshan Rai's articles in the *Civil and Military Gazette*, when referring to Muslim communal feeling or reactionaryism, employed the term "Pakistani mentality". The Muslims, on the other hand, used it as a slogan that stood for freedom, separation, and the right of self-determination.

An even greater impetus was given to the movement for Pakistan through Muslim students who went to England for higher studies or professional training. Here was the cream of the nation, ready to be converted to any reasonable plan which safeguarded the rights and future of Muslim India. This group was well informed, educated, politically conscious, and mostly mature in years. Some of them had already heard of Pakistan, and were anxious

to meet Rahmat Ali. When they met him, his sincerity of purpose and persuasive power eliminated the few doubts they might have had, and the great majority of them became his followers, friends, co-workers and publicists.

These young men who fell under Rahmat Ali's spell came from all walks of life, and on their return to India joined different professions and services. In the main they belonged to three classes: lawyers, who later became successful advocates, judges and politicians; senior research students, who were either already lecturing at a college or a university and went back to it or made fresh entrance to the academic world on their return; and probationary members of the Indian Civil Service, who had been sent by the Government of India to Oxford or Cambridge to study some useful subjects and imbibe British culture. This was undoubtedly the elite of Muslim India, and Rahmat Ali gained an inestimable advantage in being able to interest it in his ideas and, in most cases, to convert it to his point of view.

When these men returned to India, full of zeal for Pakistan, they acted as valuable channels for the spread of the idea. Without actually entering politics or making public speeches, they were able to introduce the concept of a separate state into the Muslim mind. Each of these categories was ideally suited to take the message to the people without going through political or party channels. The lawyers met a large section of humanity in the course of their professional work, wrote articles for the press, and let their opinions be known in general during the interminable discussions and conversations in the thousands of bar rooms scattered all over India. The teachers were in an even better position to propagate Rahmat Ali's ideas. In Muslim universities and colleges they could of course talk about Pakistan to their hearts' content. In other places there was nothing to stop them from injecting the idea into the minds of their Muslim students, in private conversation or in small circles, and from distributing or lending Rahmat Ali's pamphlets to their students and colleagues. The ICS officers were not public men, but their exceptional position in the Indian society of those days made them powerful instruments in the service of the idea. Here was a "sahib", a part of the olympian bureaucracy, a very big man in common estimation, and whatever he said in private talk, in the club, in the family circle, or among friends, was taken note of, remembered and

repeated hundreds of times. If a servant of a foreign government, a dispenser of favours and privileges, said that Pakistan was a desirable goal, for thousands the idea immediately became unquestionable.

We should also remember that even in the 'thirties the "England-returned" had a special prestige in Indian eyes. Irrespective of his profession, status in life, income or ability, he enjoyed a unique distinction in society. (Even those who came back without a degree had an aura of respect around them, not available to the most highly educated in local universities). By virtue of his stay in England he became, in some mysterious way, a part of the common image of British authority and infallibility. His opinions commanded respect. His person demanded esteem. To question his ideals required extraordinary courage.

Thus we see how wrong it would be to measure Rahmat Ali's influence by the number of people who joined the ranks of his following in the technical sense of becoming members of his Pakistan National Movement. He was neither a politician seeking popular support, nor an election candidate begging for votes. Even more than being an arm-chair politician, he was a philosopher of political ideas, a creator of concepts, a maker of plans. For such people mass contact is not the aim, and hardly of much use. Communication of ideas takes place on a higher plane than the spread of political opinions. The channels used are also of a different variety. Men of influence are needed to carry the philosophy abroad, to talk to and convince other men of influence, to mould the mind of the elite in a certain direction. When this has been done, the philosopher of ideas has achieved what he had set out to do. The rest lies in the hands of the politicians and in the way they manipulate the political machine. But if the idea has sunk deeply into the consciousness of those who make, rather than follow, public opinion, the task of the politicians becomes lighter. In this sense, Rahmat Ali's contribution to the history of the idea of Pakistan is unique, and all those who helped to make his ideas known to their own circles in India must justly share the credit.

In spite of Jinnah's failure to acknowledge his debt to Rahmat Ali's ideas (and the Muslim League and most Pakistanis followed him in this regard), any one who has put Jinnah's pronouncements and Rahmat Ali's declarations side by side and read them together

will be immediately struck by the common thread of argument running through both. Each makes out a clear and rationally thought out case for the two-nation theory and for separation. But Rahmat Ali came first, and Jinnah could not have influenced him.

Rahmat Ali was the first to develop the consciousness of Hindu-Muslim differences into a finely constructed theory of two nations. Jinnah was the first Muslim leader to make the theory the basic plank of his policy and programme. When we read Jinnah's major speeches on the two-nation theory and then go back to what Rahmat Ali had written several years earlier, we find too many resemblances in argument and phraseology to be explained away by the long arm of coincidence. To take a specific instance, some passages in Jinnah's presidential address to the Muslim League session at Lahore in March 1940, delivered extempore on the most momentous occasion in the history of the League, echo not only Rahmat Ali's ideas but also his language and style. Jinnah summarized the theory of two nations in these words: "The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religions, philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither inter-marry nor inter-dine together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Musalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and, likewise, their victories and defeats overlap . . . Musalmans are a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory and their State."<sup>111</sup>

What Rahmat Ali had written in 1933 was this: "Our religion, culture, history, tradition, economic system, laws of inheritance, succession and marriage are basically and fundamentally different from those of the people living in the rest of India . . . These differences are not confined to the broad basic principles — far from it. They extend to the minutest details of our lives. We do not inter-dine; we do not inter-marry. Our national customs and calendars, even our diet and dress are different . . . The Hindus and Muslims are the followers of two essentially and fundamentally different religious systems."<sup>112</sup>

Again, in the same address Jinnah said: "The problem in India is not of an inter-communal but manifestly of an international

character and it must be treated as such. So long as this basic and fundamental truth is not realized, any constitution that may be built will result in disaster and will prove destructive and harmful not only to the Musalmans, but also to the British and Hindus."<sup>13</sup> Rahmat Ali had written in 1935: "The Indian-Pakistanian problem is not an inter-communal issue and will never be solved on inter-communal lines. It is an inter-national problem, and, therefore, will submit itself to a permanent solution on that basis alone. Any constitution—Federal or Unitary—which disregards this vital fact, while destructive for the Pakistanians, cannot but be disadvantageous to the British and Hindoostanis as well."<sup>14</sup>

Obviously Jinnah had made himself thoroughly familiar with Rahmat Ali's ideas, and had probably re-read his writings before coming to Lahore for the session. Some of his later statements and speeches also reproduced the Cambridge views, at times word by word.

The similarities in the thinking of the two men do not stop here. The arguments they gave for the creation of one or more separate Muslim states bear the same points: fear of Hindu rule, contempt for some Hindu practices, protection of Muslim culture, futility of safeguards or promises of good treatment, failure of the federation to solve the communal problem, irreconcilable differences between the interests of the two nations, proud memories of Muslim rule in India, freedom to follow Islamic ideals in an Islamic environment, confidence that non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan would be well looked after, and a hope that Muslim minority in Hindustan would receive similar treatment. Another point common to Jinnah and Rahmat Ali is their faith in a constitutional approach to the settlement of all issues. Each undertakes to use all legal and peaceful means in the achievement of his ends. Each is opposed to the use of violence or to extremist action of any kind.

Any reader who cares to make a comparative study of the writings and speeches of the two men will discover that there is a great deal of material to draw a parallel between them. Enough has been said above to indicate that they had much more in common than is generally realized. But in spite of this close affinity Jinnah never mentioned Rahmat Ali in public or in private, and he opposed the adoption of the name of Pakistan till at last

strong public sentiment overcame his objection. Reasons for these actions are unknown to us.

To recapitulate, there are five points on which the Muslim League policy was inspired or influenced by Rahmat Ali's ideas. First, for reasons which we will examine later, the League leaders did not use the word Pakistan in the Lahore Resolution or in their speeches at Lahore and for some time afterwards; yet, everyone, including these leaders, knew that it was Pakistan that was being demanded. Secondly, the two-nation theory on which the demand for separation was based was for the first time argued in detail by Rahmat Ali. Thirdly, until April 1946 the League's official position was that separate states should be created in north-west and north-east India; and this followed Rahmat Ali's scheme in which Pakistan and Bangistan were to be separate countries and states. Fourthly, the League's insistence on including Assam (not a Muslim-majority province) in the north-eastern state can also be traced to Rahmat Ali, whose Bang-i-Islam or Bangistan was to embrace Bengal and Assam. Finally, almost every argument brought forth by the Muslim League in support of the desirability and inevitability of Pakistan had already been used by Rahmat Ali.

To dismiss all this as coincidence is to reject history in favour of prejudice. The Muslim League leaders might have had their reasons for not mentioning Rahmat Ali in their campaign for Pakistan, and later historians of the League might or might not be able to acknowledge his influence, but if facts are anything to go by there is little doubt that the Muslim League's ideal of and struggle for Pakistan owe a great deal to the Pakistan National Movement of Cambridge and to the ideas and opinions of Rahmat Ali.

I have found no satisfactory explanation of the Muslim League's failure or refusal to mention the word Pakistan in the Lahore Resolution. (As will be mentioned later, in 1939 Jinnah had asked "A Punjabee" to drop the original title of his book, which was *Pakistan*, which had created some embarrassment for the author as the book argued for a total separation). The term had been current since 1933, and since 1937 or 1938 it had actually been used in India by Muslims to define and describe their aspirations. In the Punjab there were identifiable groups and individuals who were demanding a Pakistan long before the League made its own

claim in March 1940. The silence of the Lahore Resolution is open to several interpretations.

It might have been an effort to snub or disown Rahmat Ali; an open declaration that the League wanted a Pakistan, but not of Rahmat Ali's variety. Or, it might have been aimed at demonstrating that the League did not owe anything to an outsider. Rahmat Ali was not a member of the Muslim League (in fact, he was a strong critic of its policies and title), yet the League had taken up his ideal and pronounced it as his own. This naturally put it in an embarrassing position. To announce that it had borrowed the idea from Rahmat Ali would have been an admission of lack of originality. Therefore, the party decided not to use the word Pakistan, but at the same time to retain the idea behind it. The League leadership might have thought that in this way they could use the plan without the obligation of acknowledging their debt to its author. Another possibility is that the League did not employ the word lest it scared the Hindus. The Hindus had picked up the name from Rahmat Ali, and were using it in a pejorative sense to emphasize the "communalism" of the Muslims. They were also making it out as the first stage of a pan-Islamic conspiracy against themselves, thus frightening the common Hindu into making a determined stand against any such demand. Jinnah and his colleagues might have thought it wiser not to give heart to this Hindu fright by persisting in calling their demand by the name of Pakistan.

Still another possibility is that the name was deliberately dropped as its official use would have conveyed to the Hindus and the British that the state(s) demanded by the League would embody a pure Muslim *raj*. As the areas claimed in the Lahore Resolution contained a fairly large percentage of non-Muslim minorities who were then expected by everyone to stay there (Jinnah was opposed to a transfer of population, and no one could then have foreseen the wholesale migration forced upon the people by the unsettled conditions attending the actual process of partition), anything that encouraged a feeling of insecurity among the prospective minority groups was to be avoided. Already many a Hindu commentator had made much play of the meaning of the word Pakistan, and let his imagination loose on the intentions and secret motives of those who wanted to create a "land of the pure".

Finally, another explanation occurs to mind. The League's

policy of aloofness in relation to native states did not allow it to use a word whose very composition announced the inclusion of Kashmir in the country demanded by the party. Once having accepted the name formally, the party could not in justice claim that this meant no change in its policy on the native states. Nor could it eliminate the letter "k" from it, for that turned a beautiful name into an absurd and meaningless monstrosity.

For these reasons, I think, the Muslim League decided to avoid the dilemma by leaving the state(s) of its demand unchristened. Everyone, including the leaders, knew that Pakistan was being demanded and that with time the name would inevitably gain currency, and its silent implication would be transformed into common use without a formal announcement with its attendant political complications. After saying all this—and this is nothing but speculation, as there is no information available on this point in the published and unpublished material made public so far—I still find it rather curious that a party should have demanded the creation of separate and sovereign Muslim states without giving them a name; though it must be admitted that this had been done by so many persons (but not by parties in an official claim) before Rahmat Ali who had suggested a division of India on religious basis. The argument that the use of the word Pakistan would have scared the Hindus loses weight when we recall that in all his speeches Jinnah identified Islam with his demand and pointed out that the Muslims wanted a country where Islamic culture and values could flourish unhindered. Then how could the adoption of the name Pakistan have damaged the prospects of League's success in achieving it?

The mystery deepens with the Muslim League's ultimate adoption of the name. In practical terms, of course, this was a natural and obvious development. The Muslim demand was so universally known as Pakistan that it would have looked silly to continue to ignore the word. How could the leaders overlook it when in every meeting and procession their followers shouted themselves hoarse with the cry of "Pakistan zindabad" (long live Pakistan), and when every article, letter and editorial in the Muslim press asked its readers not to accept anything other or less than Pakistan? But when the League finally decided to own the name, was this not the right occasion to mention the origin of the word and the person who had coined it? Instead, Jinnah said that it was

the Hindus who had thrust the name on the Muslim demand, and his party was glad to accept it. This was hardly an explanation of the change of mind; in any case, it did not free the League from expressing its obligation to the man who had invented the word. All this wears the look of a deliberate decision to ignore Rahmat Ali.<sup>115</sup>

In one particular respect Rahmat Ali's name is unique in the history of the world. He is the only man to have given a name to a country many years before that country came into existence. There are examples, though not many, of countries being called after a great man, but Pakistan stands alone as a country which owes its name to the imagination of one man.

## NOTES

1. AIMC Executive Board Resolution, Simla, 4-6 July 1930, *IAR 1930*, Vol II, p. 328. For the All India Muslim Conference in general see K.K. Aziz (ed), *The All India Muslim Conference, 1928-1935: A Documentary Record*, Karachi, 1972; for this resolution, pp. 61-63. It was moved by Dr. Shafaat Ahmad Khan and seconded by Sayyid Habib Shah of Lahore.
2. Sir A.P. Patro, speaking in the Minorities Sub-Committee, 23 December 1930, *Indian Round Table Conference, 12 November 1930-19 January 1931, Proceedings of Sub-Committees (Part II), Sub-Committees II-IX*, London, 1931, p. 83.
3. Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad, *The Nehru Report and Muslim Rights, Qadian, 1930*, pp. 85-86.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
5. *The Memoirs of Aga Khan: World Enough and Time*, London, 1954, p. 216.
6. A.C. Underwood, *Contemporary Thought of India*, London, 1930, p. 81.
7. Andre Philip, *L'Inde moderne: le probleme social et politique*, Paris, 1930, p. 245. He was a professor of law at Lyons.
8. J.E. Ellam, *Swaraj: The Problem of India*, London, 1930, pp. 168-169.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 251.
10. Sir Muhammad Shafi, speaking in the Minorities Sub-Committee, 1 January 1931, *Indian Round Table Conference, op. cit.*, p. 99.
11. Muhammad Ali's letter to the British Prime Minister, 1 January 1931, pub in *ibid.*, p. 142.
12. *IAR 1931*, Vol I, p. 284.
13. Much Concerned, letter, *CMG*, 12 February 1931. On the European community see R. Pearson, *A Social History of the European Community in Calcutta*, London, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1954. Next month, the *Round Table* thought it "certainly possible" that India might break up, first into a Muslim and a Hindu India, and later into a number of national states. as Europe did after the Renaissance and the

Reformation, *Round Table*, March 1931, p. 346.

14. Mawlana Shawkat Ali, Presidential Address, AIMC, Special Session, New Delhi, 5 April 1931, *CMG*, 8 April 1931.
15. AIMC Resolution, New Delhi, 5 April 1931, *IAR 1931*, Vol I, p. 288.
16. Sir Theodore Morison, "The Hindu-Muslim Problem of India", *Contemporary Review*, June 1931, pp. 710-717.
17. *MG*, June 1931, quoted in R.J. Moore, "The Making of India's Paper Federation, 1927-1935", a paper read at the Study Conference on the Partition of India, 1947, held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 17-22 July 1967 (mimeo).
18. Zafrulla Khan, statement to the press, Delhi, 21 July 1931, *CMG*, 23 July 1931. In the same month, the Marquess of Zetland appreciated that a chain of predominantly Muslim provinces stretching across the north-west of India would be "a basis of great strength and influence" to the Muslims generally; see *Asiatic Review*, July 1931, p. 428.
19. *CMG*, 12 August 1931; also in *IQR 1931*, Vol II, pp. 238-239.
20. "Round Table Problems", *MG*, 8 September 1931.
21. India Office Departmental Note on Communal and Minority Problems, 25 September 1931, *Templewood Collection*, cited by R.J. Moore, in C.H. Philips (ed), *The Partition of India*, London, 1970, pp. 65-66, also in R.J. Moore, *The Crisis of Indian Unity, 1917-1940*, Oxford, 1974, p. 219.
22. Jawaharlal Nehru to Gandhi, 27 September 1931, *Gandhi Collection*, quoted in R.J. Moore, *The Crisis of Indian Unity*, pp. 241-242.
23. Memorandum by Sardar Ujjal Singh, "A Scheme of Redistribution of the Punjab", 8 October 1931, *Indian Round Table Conference (Second Session), 7 September 1931-1 December 1931, Proceedings of Federal Structure Committee and Minority Committee*, London, 1932, Appendix XVII, p. 582.
24. Memorandum by Sir Geoffrey Crobett, "The Communal Problem in the Punjab", 12 October 1931, *ibid.*, Appendix XVI, pp 579-580. It was circulated on Gandhi's request.
25. Raja Narendra Nath, "Note on the Redistribution of the Punjab", *ibid.*, Appendix XVI A, p. 581.

26. *CMG*, 18 October 1931.
27. *Ibid.*, editorial, 19 October 1931
28. *Ibid.*, 1 November 1931.
29. *Economist*, 7 November 1931, p. 844. A month later, Sir Alfred Knox, speaking in the House of Commons, saw no hope of the Hindus and Muslims coming into one organic whole (*H.C. 260, 5S*, 3 December 1931, cols. 1370-1371).
30. Zafrulla Khan, Presidential Address, AIML, New Delhi, December 1931, *IAR 1931*, Vol II, pp. 214-219.
31. Shafaat Ahmad Khan, "Muslims in the New India", *Asiatic Review*, January 1932, pp. 1-14.
32. Ian D. Colvin, "Trial and Error in India", *National Review*, February 1932, pp. 207-214.
33. AIMC Resolution no. 2, Lahore, 22 March 1932, *IAR 1932*, Vol. I.
34. *Economist*, 26 March 1932, p. 672.
35. Irwin to Hailey, 16 April 1932, *Hailey Papers*, HYC/24, quoted in Waheed Ahmad, *The Formation of the Government of India Act, 1935*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1969, p. 238. Two weeks later, Sir Walter Lawrence acknowledged the existence of many great and well-defined nationalities in India and saw the only hope of natural and healthy growth in their recognition; speech at the opening of the Indian Durbar Hall at Hastings on 29 April, *The Times*, 30 April 1932.
36. H.T. Lambrick, "Prospects for a United India after the Cessation of British Rule, as These Appeared in Sind, 1930-1946", a paper read at the Study Conference on the Partition of India, 1947, held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 17-22 July 1967 (mimeo).
37. AIMC Working Committee Resolution, Simla, 7 June 1932, *Pioneer*, 11 June 1932.
38. *The Times*, 11 June 1932.
39. S. Sastri to P. Kodana Rao, 2 July 1932, T.N. Jagadisan (ed), *Letters of the Right Hon'ble V.S. Srinivasa Sastri*, London, 2nd ed 1963, pp. 231-232.
40. Lord Lloyd, "India: Facts or Fiction", *National Review*, August 1932, pp. 182-187. In the same month, even the *MG*, always a friend of the Congress, realized how utterly

opposed to each other were Hindu and Muslim attitudes to life, and how useless were such remedies as Pax Britannica, education and self-government (editorial, 8 August 1932).

41. Shaikh Abdul Majid, Presidential Address, AIKC, Ajmere, 27 September 1932, *IAR 1932*, Vol II, pp. 334-336. See also K.K. Aziz, *The Indian Khulafat Movement, 1915-1933: A Documentary Record*, Karachi, 1972, pp. 331-334.
42. Eustace Percy, *Some Memories*, London, 1958, p. 157.
43. Sir Theodore Morison, "Muhammadan Movements", in J. Cumming (ed), *Political India, 1832-1932: A Co-operative Survey of a Century*, London, 1932, pp. 95-96, 99, 104-105. At the same time, Sir Reginald Craddock asked that if Norway and Sweden could not keep together, if Ulster and the Irish Free State could not be got to unite, "how can it be expected that the infinitely greater diversities and divergent racial elements to be found in India could be welded into one self-governing and democratic whole?" (*The Dilemma in India*, London, 1932, pp. 7-8).
44. John Coatman, *The Indian Riddle: A Solution Suggested*, London, 1932, pp. 28, 31.
45. John Coatman, quoted from Shaukatullah Ansari, *Pakistan: The Problem of India*, by Rajendra Prasad, *India Divided*, Bombay, 2nd ed June 1947, p. 206. Neither gives the source. What we definitely know is that he said: ". . . it may be that Muslim India in the north and north-west is destined to become a separate Muslim State or part of a Muslim Empire" (*Years of Destiny: India, 1926-1932*, London, 1932, p. 376).
46. Choudhary Rahmat Ali, *Pakistan: The Fatherland of the Pak Nation*, Cambridge, 3rd ed 1947, pp. 222-224. Hitherto cited as *Pakistan*.
47. Choudhary Rahmat Ali, *et. al.*, *Now or Never*, Cambridge, 28 January 1933, p. 1. This is a 4-page leaflet printed on large-size paper. It is a rare document. The reader interested in consulting the original will find it, along with everything that Rahmat Ali published, in K.K. Aziz, *Complete Works of Rahmat Ali*, Islamabad, 1978-80, 2 vols (Vol. II confiscated by the publisher).
48. *Now or Never*, p. 2.

49. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
52. Rahmat Ali's memory is at fault when he says that Inayat Ullah Khan was studying veterinary science (*Pakistan*, p. 227). I have met Inayat Ullah Khan, and he has confirmed this.
53. *Pakistan*, p. 227.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 227.
55. C. Rahmat Ali, *What does the Pakistan National Movement Stand For?*, Cambridge, 1933, pp. 3-4. The pamphlet was reprinted in 1937 and 1942. I use the first ed.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5. All italics in this section are in the original.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
60. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.
61. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
63. Abul Kasem, "A Plain Talk to Muslims", *TSI*, 1 February 1933. In the same month, a retired British ICS officer foresaw that within a short period the projected federal government would be faced with a "strong separatist movement" (G.T. Garratt, "The Third Round Table Conference", *Nineteenth Century*, February 1933, p. 137).
64. Haji Rahim Bakhsh, "The Two Distinct 'Nations' of India", *CMG*, 15 June 1933. A month earlier, Sir Elliott Colvin, a retired civilian, had given his opinion that the creation of a national union between Hindus and Muslims was likely to be a "matter of a century's duration" (E.G. Colvin, "India: The Longer View", *Nineteenth Century*, May 1933, pp. 545-546).
65. Frederic F. Holsinger, "Not One Dominion But Many", *Indian Affairs*, September 1933, pp. 176-179.
66. M. Yakub, "Indian Muslims and the Reforms", *Asiatic Review*, October 1933, pp. 638-643.
67. Bhai Parmanand, Presidential Address, All India Hindu Mahasabha, Ajmere, 1933, quoted in Nandalal Gupta (ed), *Nehru on Communalism*, New Delhi, 1965, p. 2.
68. Bhai Parmanand, Hindu Mahasabha Address, quoted in A.B.

- Rajput, *The Muslim League Yesterday and Today*, Lahore, 1948, pp. 54-55.
69. *TSI*, 4 December 1933.
  70. V.R. Gaikwad, *The Anglo-Indians*, Bombay, 1967, p. 30. See also K.E. Wallace, *Life of Sir Henry Gidney*, Bombay, 1945, pp. 188-196. On the community see Dorris W. Goodrich, *The Making of an Ethnic Group: The Eurasian Community in India*, California, 1952, Sharad J. Malelu, *The Anglo-Indians: A Problem in Marginality*, Ohio State, 1965, and Roy Dean Wright, *Marginal Man in Transition: A Study of the Anglo-Indian Community of India*, Missouri, 1970; all unpublished Ph.D. theses.
  71. Sir Albion Rajkumar Banerji, *The Indian Triangle*, London, n.d., pp. 234-244.
  72. Abul Kasem, "Beware of the Traps", *TSI*, 29 June 1934.
  73. Sardar Iqbal Ali Shah, "The North-Eastern Frontier: A Central Asian Confederacy", *ibid.*, 2 July 1934.
  74. Anul Islam (pseud.), "On Men and Matters", *ibid.*, 5 July 1934.
  75. M.M. Malaviya, Presidential Address, Congress Nationalist Party Conference, Calcutta, August 1934, quoted in Asoka Mehta and A. Patwardhan, *The Communal Triangle in India*, Allahabad, 1942, pp. 157-158.
  76. Gulshan Rai, in *CMG*, 19 August 1934.
  77. Report from Madras, *TSI*, 28 August 1934.
  78. *Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform (Session 1933-1934), Volume I (Part I), Report*, London, 1934, para. 20.
  79. *Ibid.*, para 26.
  80. Durga Das, *India from Curzon to Nehru and After*, London, 1969, p. 166.
  81. Gulshan Rai, "The National Liberal Standpoint", *CMG*, 29 January 1935.
  82. Waris Ameer Ali, "Moslems and the Proposed All India Federation", *National Review*, February 1935, p. 192.
  83. Sir Muhamamad Yakub, "Shock to Peace-Loving Muslims", *TSI*, 5 March 1935.
  84. Recorder, "Indian Communalism Now and Hereafter", *Indian Empire Review*, April 1935, pp. 153-159.
  85. Archer (pseud.), "Slings and Arrows", *The Musalman*,

- 19 July 1935, quoted in full in M.A.H. Ispahani, *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah As I Knew Him*, Karachi, 2nd ed 1967, p. 7. "Archer" was Altaf Husain (later editor of *Dawn*), and *The Muslim* of Calcutta was the spokesman of the Muslim Majlis Party of Bengal, *ibid.*, p. 4.
86. Choudhary Rahmat Ali, letter of 8 July 1935, addressed to "My Lords". It is a printed document, by some freak chance not available in the library of the House of Lords. I have a copy in my private collection. Page references are not given as the letter is unpaginated.
87. The Aga Khan to Sir Fazli Husain, 13 August 1935, Azim Husain, *Fazli Husain: A Political Biography*, Bombay, 1946, pp. 300-302.
88. *TSI*, editorial, 29 October 1935.
89. A. Ahmad Idrisi, "Muslims and Congress Jubilee", *CMG*, 28 December 1935.
90. Dr. Kurtkoti, Presidential Address, Shuddhi Conference, Poona, Christmas Week, 1935, quoted by Gulshan Rai, "Is India for the Hindus Only?", *ibid.*, 18 January 1936. His Holiness Dr. Shankaracharya Kurtkoti (b. 1879): hereditary Brahman landlord of Kurtoki, district Dharwar. One of the founders of the Bhandarkas Research Institute, Poona. Occupied the Holy Seat of Jagadgurn of Karveer since 1917. President, All India Hindu Conference, Allahabad, 1918. Founder, Maharashtra Hindu Dharma Parishad, 1920. First Vice-Chancellor, Tilak Maharashtra University. Founder-President, All Faiths Conference, Nasik, 1933. President, All India Hindu Mahasabha, Lahore, October 1936. Won his Ph.D. from an American University on a thesis on Bhagvad Gita.
91. H.K. Trevaskis, *Indian Babel*, London, 1935, pp. 189, 190.
92. Halide Edib, *Inside India*, London, 1937, pp. 352-356. The quaint spellings of "Muslims" are in the original.
93. *Ibid.*, pp. 356-357. Italics in the original.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 357.
95. *Ibid.*, pp. 357-358.
96. *Ibid.*, pp. 358-359.
97. *Ibid.*, pp. 359-360.
98. *Ibid.*, pp. 361-362.
99. C. Rahmat Ali, letter, *The Times*, 7 December 1938.

00. Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Lahore, 1961, p. 200.
01. *Ibid*, pp. 200-201. The letter was written on 12 December 1938.
102. C. Rahmat Ali, *The Millat of Islam and the Menace of "Indianism"*, Cambridge, n.d., pp. 1-5.
103. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.
104. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.
105. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-11.
106. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-13.
107. *Ibid*, pp. 13-14.
108. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-16.
109. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
110. C. Rahmat Ali, *The Millat and the Mission*, Cambridge, October 1942, p. 2 fn.
111. Jamiluddin Ahmad (ed), *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Lahore, 1952 ed, Vol I, pp. 178-180.
112. Choudhary Rahmat Ali, *Now or Never*, Cambridge, 1933, p. 2.
113. Jamiluddin Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 177.
114. Choudhary Rahmat Ali, *Letter to the Members of the House of Lords*, Cambridge, 8 July 1935, p. 3.
115. This and several other points are examined in detail in my forthcoming *Rahmat Ali: A Biography*, Wiesbaden, 1986. The biggest Pakistani work of reference is scandalously ignorant about him: according to it, Rahmat Ali founded a "political party" in "London" in "1932" and held "public meetings" in England to propagate for the creation of an "Islamic" state in India (the words in quotation marks indicate errors of fact); Sind was not included in his Pakistan; see *The Urdu Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Lahore, Vol. V, 1971, p. 420 (article prepared by the editorial board).

# 8

## IN A FAIR WAY: 1936-1950

### Muslim Thinking (1936-1937)

Muslim thinking in the years 1936 and 1937 was the same old, curious medley of mixed sentiments. Some talked of being Indians, some being outside of them. Some wanted safeguards, others desired to effect changes in the 1935 federal act. Almost everyone was dissatisfied with the prevailing conditions, but a very few considered partition as a solution of their problem. Continuing the practice of previous chapters, I will first indicate the "feel" of the period by citing important or typical contemporary opinions, and then examine the concrete proposals offered in these two years.

Delivering his presidential address at the Khilafat Conference at Calcutta on 4 January 1936, the Nawab of Dacca (Khawaja Habibullah) confessed that "we are 'Indian Muslims'. We refuse to believe that our being true and loyal 'nationals' of an Indian 'nation-state' should be a bar to our being faithful members of the 'Commonwealth of Islam' which is the mightiest single power for world peace, social democracy and international brotherhood in the world. We accept India to be our only 'Fatherland'. We look to no other country as our homeland. We have been born and bred up in India and we will live and die as Indian Muslims. In the past and present we have contributed our best 'National-Self' to the making of Indian life and culture and in the future we want to be a free and progressive people in order to contribute our best to the building of a free self-governing and progressive India. The fundamental political objective of the Indian Musalmans is a self-governing India in the Political Polity of which Islam must have a place as a free community of culture. We have no use for a system of 'Imperium-in-Imperio'. But equally we cannot allow the freedom

and unity of India to mean in practice the political subjection, economic exploitation and cultural submission of the 80 million Indian Muslims who constitute what Sir Bijoy Chand Mahtab aptly terms 'a community and race within a race, a sub-nation within a sub-continent'. The political individuality of the Indian Muslims must be recognized in many [*sic.*] schemes of national self-government of Swaraj. That is our political ideal. There is no earthly reason why such an idea should be regarded as incompatible with that of a real creative and catholic Indian Nationalism. If Indian Muslims are guaranteed that position we are ready to become the corner-stone of a free 'Indian Nationality' and the frontier guards of a free 'Indian Nation-State' ".<sup>1</sup> There is no mention of separation, not even of Muslim nationalism.

The *Star of India* believed that the Hindus wanted to make India free so that they alone might reap the fruits of that freedom. They forgot that unless "the position and power due to the Muslims as equal partners in this freedom is assured", the Hindus alone would not be able to win freedom.<sup>2</sup> Professor Gulshan Rai of Lahore answered these claims with his own suggestion. "As soon as the Muslims dissolve their Muslim Leagues, Muslim Conferences and the Khilafat Committees, the Hindus also will have no necessity for Hindu Sabhas and Hindu-Buddhist alliances. When that stage arrives, then no one among the Hindus will have any occasion to call the Muslims guests of India."<sup>3</sup> There is no mention of the Congress dissolving itself to please the Muslims or to help the communal problem solve itself.

In April the *Star of India* returned to the reality of Muslim fears. "A great menace faces the Muslims and threatens to wipe out their culture. Are they ready—are they preparing to face it?"<sup>4</sup> "As long as the present policy of the Congress lasts, as long as the present mentality the Hindus persists, as long as hypocrisy and deceit continue to play so large a part in Hindu politics, the Muslims would much rather die under the Crescent fighting the Tricolour than surrender their birthright, their cultural and national integrity."<sup>5</sup> Strong words! But still no indication of where the solution lies. A front-ranking Congress leader replied by appealing to all groups and parties, Muslim and others, to join the Congress, because "sooner or later Hindus and Muslims will join together", and there was no room for more than two parties in India, those working for India's freedom and those opposed to it.<sup>6</sup>

In July, or a little before that, a British ICS officer belonging to the Punjab commission, in a new edition of his book *The Wealth and Welfare of the Punjab*, offered the suggestion of creating a new federation consisting of the Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir State, NWFP, Baluchistan and Sind. Calvert made this proposal because he believed that in the Indian federation the commercial and industrial interests of Bombay would be so strong that the central government would be forced to adopt a still more protectionist policy, and that would cause the imposition of a greater burden of indirect taxation on the agricultural consumers of the Punjab. Already the Bombay mill and factory owners had brought about a fall in the prices of the Punjab agricultural produce.<sup>7</sup> Though the case is built on purely economic grounds, the proposed federation is identical with Rahmat Ali's scheme.

In an article on the Congress behaviour in the Indian Legislative Assembly, Sir Muhammad Yaqub concluded his treatment with these two sentences: "This is the state of affairs when the majority is still almost impotent and without possessing any real power. What will be their behaviour towards the minorities and how they will crush them when real power comes to their hands can easily be imagined."<sup>8</sup> A week later, an important Hindu leader added to Muslim fears by saying from a public platform that the "Hindus must recapture for themselves the fundamental historical and political truth that India must be considered theoretically and legally as a Hindu State".<sup>9</sup> Shawkat Ali reminded the Hindus that a self-governing India was impossible if the majority had not the goodwill and co-operation of the minorities and if the Hindus were not prepared to concede Muslim demands.<sup>10</sup> The Democratic Swaraj Party deflected this reminder by confirming that "Hindustan is for Hindus and Muslims cannot dictate to us".<sup>11</sup> On 6 December, Edward Thompson wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru from Oxford: "You have the Princes and Moslems against you. . . [if you take office] you will make the National Movement not an almost solely Hindu Movement as (I am sorry, but) it now is, but an Indian movement."<sup>12</sup>

Among all the Muslim public men and editors quoted above none yet talked of a partition of India as a solution, or even as a threat to extract more concessions. The underlying Muslim feeling of insecurity and the rarely-expressed but real sentiment for separation were underscored by Hindu and British observers.

The introduction to a Hindu compilation noted that "this spirit of separatism flourishes under various disguises, and expresses itself in political discussions sometimes as possessing a special importance for the gate-keepers of India; sometimes as still capable of carrying on the traditions of imperial rule, sometimes calling in the aid of pan-Islamism to restore the balance disturbed by Muslim weakness in India . . . . The mentality that diverts and deflects national energies from the main current of building up a composite national life in India had its birth a century back".<sup>13</sup>

In the same year was published John Coatsman's *Magna Britannia* which devoted a few pages to the Islamic renaissance of the twentieth century. The remarkable prescience and intelligent speculation of this account makes it worth our while to study some passages in their original wording. "One of the most notable, and yet least remarked, of all the developments in world politics, within the last two or three decades, is the political renaissance of Islam. Twenty-five years ago it seemed as though the last traces of political independence were about to disappear from the Muhammadan world . . . . But now a marvellous transformation has taken place. From East to West—from India to Northern Africa—we see new or renascent Muhammadan States, all of them the centre of political ideals and ambitions and some of them the seats of reviving Islamic culture. In a word, Islam is on the march again, and it can hardly be doubted that Islamic countries will play an increasingly important part in world affairs. No serious attention need be paid to any talk of Pan-Islamism, the bogey which at one time shared the stage with the Yellow Peril. A federation—even an alliance—of all or of any important number of Islamic countries is completely out of the question. Yet there are strong invisible bonds of sympathy which link all Muhammadan communities throughout the world . . . . The Islamic renaissance now in progress across the whole middle east and north of Africa can be a powerfully disruptive factor in international relations and the world order of the future. Although, as we have seen, there is no substance in the talk of Pan-Islamism, there is very material substance in some of the plans, or at any rate possibilities, of the growth of greater Muhammadan States by the union of neighbouring Muhammadan peoples; and further, there is the certainty that such growth will be partly at the expense of non-Muhammadan peoples. One example of the international disorganization which would be

produced by any such development as this would be provided by the amalgamation of Afghanistan and the Muhammadans of North-Western India into one State. Such a project as this may be a chimera, but it is discussed seriously enough by some Muhammadans of standing in both the countries concerned. There are enthusiasts who foresee the rise of a great Muhammadan kingdom, stretching from the eastern borders of Persia to Calcutta, and including Kashmir and some of the khanates, or little kingdoms, of Turkestan and Central Asia. It is easy enough to point out the tremendous dislocation which would ensue from the realization of such dreams as this and the permanent insecurity and the certainty of ultimate disaster from the inclusion in such a new State of millions of Hindus, who would form the Hindustan irredenta.”<sup>14</sup>

Political statements and announcements of 1937 reflect the same confusion and increasing disillusionment. An anti-Muslim League Muslim paper of Delhi could say in January that “when an old Congressman and seasoned nationalist like Mr. Jinnah cannot tolerate the dictatorship of the Congress, the generality of Muslims would not be ready to be Congress camp-followers in hundreds of years”. Jinnah’s idea of “equal partnership” was “the common idea of the whole Muslim community”. The policy of the Congress had been to establish the “despotism and dictatorship of the Congress leaders so that they and they alone may be enthroned as the absolute masters of the country”.<sup>15</sup> *Sarfraz*, the Lucknow organ of the All India Shīa Conference (which was opposed to the Muslim League), admitted that the Congress had become the political platform of the majority community. “Muslims, distrustful and despairing of the Hindus, have gone far away from the Congress, and the Hindus, far from trying to collect them together within the Congress fold, have driven the Muslims still farther away from the Congress by their selfish activities. It is an undeniable fact that Muslims, as a community and as an organized corporate body, are not at all with the Congress.”<sup>16</sup> Even more revealing were the views of *Ansari*, a Congress Muslim newspaper of Delhi, which wrote: “We have stated it times without number and are still bold to assert that the Congress by overlooking the problem of Hindu-Muslim agreement and understanding is committing the greatest blunder which has made the position of all those Congressite Muslims extremely critical who in view of the great

objective of India's freedom incite Muslims in general to join the Congress . . . . It is a matter of thousand pities that the more these mighty Muslim leaders of Indian nationalism stressed this point the more the Congress diverted away from the objective of a mutual understanding."<sup>17</sup> Significantly, this was written before the 1937 general election and before the ascension to power of the Congress in the Hindu-majority provinces under the 1935 federation.

No wonder that on the eve of the election the *Star of India* administered a serious warning to the Bengali Muslim electorate. "Another week, and the Muslims of Bengal will be proving by their own action whether they wish to live with honour in a land that is theirs by birthright—or to languish in eternal servitude. . . . The time has come for every true son of Islam to look deep into his being, to examine the stuff he is made of, and to ask himself whether he will be a saviour or a slaughterer of the great community to which he belongs."<sup>18</sup>

Why was the Congress behaving so arrogantly and refusing to acknowledge any other party as speaking for the Indians? Part of the answer is found in what Edward Thompson, who was in close touch with Congress leaders and especially Nehru and apparently knew their mind, told Sir Thomas Jones. Thompson's estimate of the situation, as communicated to Lady Grigg by Jones on 19 March, was that the Congress believed that Germany would declare war in the summer of 1938, that the British would be forced to withdraw their troops from India, that the native troops would not be reliable without the British stiffening, and that then the Congress would take charge and step into British shoes as the master and ruler of the sub-continent.<sup>19</sup>

If that was so, Muslim reading of the Congress intentions was not far wrong. Congress nationalism was "nothing more or less than Hinduism"; the party "stands unashamed in the fact that it is an organization working for a Hindu *Raj*".<sup>20</sup> The constitution of India could not be based on principles of unqualified nationalism. It must make room for diversity and "give scope for collective sentiments".<sup>21</sup> Sayyid Zakir Ali, Joint Secretary of the U.P. Muslim League Parliamentary Board, and Mulla Abdus Samad Mukhtadari, Working Secretary of the U.P. Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind (so far a pro-Congress body), declared in April that it was against the best interests of the Muslims to join hands with the Congress.<sup>22</sup> Sir Muhammad Yaqub called the Congress a "purely communal

organization" which was aiming at the "destruction of Islamic culture. Islamic civilization and the separate entity of Muslims in India". Still the Muslims were prepared "to co-operate and collaborate on terms of equality with any political organization in the country which aims at the elevation of our status to that of equal partners in the British Commonwealth of Nations by constitutional means"<sup>23</sup>

The chronicler of these years is bored stiff with reading such statements hour after hour. They show discontentment, disillusionment, displeasure, even despair; but they repeat each other *ad nauseam*, without hinting at any possible solution. without even referring to the solutions already proposed. Here and there, a bold person crosses the line of convention and asserts something new—and yet with caution and circumspection, as if he was not sure how the community would receive his *obiter dicta*. One such figure was Saïd Akbar Kiani, an obscure lawyer from Gujjar Khan in Rawalpindi district, who declared that "we are not merely a community but a nation—an integral part of the great Islamic fraternity of the world. We want to live in this country not only as Indians, but as good Muslims . . . . The Hindu, whether Congressite or otherwise, cannot brook the idea of our loyalty to Islam. Hence only the Muslim who curses his religion in public can remain a true nationalist".<sup>24</sup>

The Muslim press warned Nehru that he was "deliberately hatching plans not for the good of the Muslim masses but for the complete political domination of the Muslims of India"; he was in close alliance with persons who were "actively and even openly working for the extermination of Islam and Muslims from India".<sup>25</sup> Partnership between the Congress and the Muslims was an impossible dream. Partners must have common aims and ideals; the Congress and Muslims had nothing in common.<sup>26</sup>

In an article published in May, F.K. Khan Durrani, whom we have met before, argued the case for Muslim nationhood. The Muslims, he said, had become very fearful of their future. Partly by virtue of their faith and religious discipline and partly owing to recent political developments, they had become conscious of their "national oneness". Now they possessed a "national individuality" of their own. But they stood bewildered and were in a state of utter disorganization. The Muslim League was there and was trying to do its best, but "after a long study of the Musalman

psychology we have come to realize that their malady lies deeper than can be cured by mere political leaders". A political leader was, by the nature of his profession, an opportunist; and could not give true and basic guidance to the community. A body was needed that should aim at working a revolution in the hearts of men and prepare them by a spiritual discipline for the attainment of their real ends. The absence of coherence and sense of direction in their activities were due in a very large measure, if not entirely, to their ignorance of the true purposes of Islam. To carry this knowledge to the masses a new organization, the Muslim India Society, was being formed under Iqbal's presidentship. The idea of subjection to non-Muslim rule was foreign to the ideology of Islam. The Quran "conceives of Muslims only as free and independent and never as a subject people". The great need of the hour was to create an awakening about the true teachings and purposes of Islam. Any political work that did not touch the spiritual faith of the Muslim was bound to remain "ineffective and superficial".<sup>27</sup>

In August, Mian Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, the Punjab Unionist Party leader, warned the Congress that its policy in the Hindu-majority provinces would compel Muslims to organize an all-India protest against it, and, in the end, "may very well drive India towards that fatal idea with which certain ultra-communalists on both sides have already made the country familiar—I mean the idea of dividing India into a Muslim India and a Hindu India, a Pakistan in which the Hindus are a subject people and a Hindustan in which Muslims occupy a similar position".<sup>28</sup>

Next month, Zafar Ali Khan declared the Muslims a separate nation from the platform of the Calcutta Muslim League. "The Muslims were a distinct, self-contained and self-sufficient people with their own glorious traditions and distinct civilization and culture, and they wanted to retain all these attributes of a great Muslim nation intact." Britain had betrayed them and thrust a constitution upon them which had done more harm to the cause of Islam and the Muslims of India than to the cause of the Hindus. "They had been handed over to the tender mercies of the majority community where the rule was that of the vote."<sup>29</sup>

*The Times of India*, a British Indian newspaper, affirmed that Muslim fears of Hindu rule "spring from deep feelings, the product of race, tradition and culture"; they could not "be dissolved by explanation alone"; and they must be accepted by the

“realistic politician”.<sup>30</sup>

At the Lucknow Muslim League session of October, Hasrat Mohani, while moving his resolution on independence, characterized the cry of freedom from the Congress platform as “fraudulent and dishonest”. However much the Congress leaders might talk of breaking the federal plan, he was convinced that Gandhi, Nehru and Malaviyya “would very soon accept it with thanks for they believed that although it might not bring real independence and freedom for India, it would inaugurate Hindu raj at the centre as in the Provinces and that the entry of the Hindu Princes in the Government of India would strengthen the power and position of Hindus as a whole”.<sup>31</sup> On 4 November, Khawaja Hasan Nizami, a spiritual leader of great influence in northern India and a man of letters, wrote to Jinnah: “As the Congress has begun an All India Campaign against the Muslim Nationality and the Muslim League, it is now indispensable to start daily papers in English, Urdu and Hindi.”<sup>32</sup> As the original letter was in Urdu and only an English translation has been published, we don’t know which word he used to describe the Muslims as a “Nationality”.

Congress reaction to these thoughts and activities was one of unchanging incomprehension. For Nehru, to attack the Congress and to weaken it was “to attack the conception of Indian unity itself and of nationalism and freedom”. He asked: “What will take its place? And what of all of us if there is no such organization?”<sup>33</sup> Strangely enough, it was the right-wing, extremist Hindu Mahasabha which now grasped the emerging reality. Its president, V.D. Savarkar, told the party’s annual session that “Let us bravely face unpleasant facts as they are. India cannot be assumed today to be a unitarian and homogeneous nation, but on the contrary there are two nations in the main, the Hindus and the Muslims”.<sup>34</sup>

The British establishment, too, was leaning to the view that the federal scheme would be unworkable in the face of united Muslim opposition. On 13 December, the Secretary of State for India wrote to the Viceroy: “. . . if one thing is certain it is that the Muslims are united in their determination not to be dominated by the Hindus in any form of Central Government which may come into being.”<sup>35</sup> A week earlier, he had already told Linlithgow that “the strongest opposition” to the federal scheme would come from the Muslims.<sup>36</sup>

## Iqbal's Letters to Jinnah (1937)

The first Muslim suggestion to be made in this period came from Iqbal in a series of letters he wrote to Jinnah from Lahore between March and August 1937. It is important to remember, however, that these letters were not published till many years later, and that therefore their contents were known to Jinnah alone and perhaps to some of his closest colleagues. The other proposals which we will examine could not, therefore, have owed anything to Iqbal's suggestions to Jinnah.

It was in his letter of 20 March that Iqbal first referred to the future of the Indian Muslims as a "distinct political unit in the country". But the idea of partition or separation still eluded him. Talking of the new federal constitution which was to come into operation (on the provincial level only) on 1 April, he wrote: "I believe you are also aware that the new constitution has at least brought a unique opportunity to Indian Muslims for self-organization in view of the future political developments both in India and Muslim Asia." But he did not explain how a federal India would help the Muslims to better organize themselves, or what future political developments in India and Muslim Asia he was foreseeing. Then turning to Indian politics he favoured Muslim co-operation with "progressive" forces. "While we are ready to co-operate with other Progressive Parties in the country, we must not ignore the fact that the whole future of Islam as a moral and political force in Asia rests very largely on a complete organization of Indian Muslims." Next, he turned to the All India National Convention which had recently met at Delhi at the command of the Congress after its successful performance in the provincial elections, and at which Nehru had made a provocative speech. He advised Jinnah: "I therefore suggest that an effective reply should be given to the All-India National Convention. You should immediately hold an All-India Muslim Convention in Delhi to which you should invite members of the new Provincial Assemblies as well as other prominent Muslim leaders. To this Convention you must re-state as clearly and strongly as possible the political objective of the Indian Muslims as a distinct political unit in the country." In answer to Nehru's argument that the Hindu-Muslim problem was nothing but a rivalry for jobs, and that the real issue in India was economic, not communal, Iqbal asked Jinnah to

emphasize the cultural problem. "It is absolutely necessary to tell the world both inside and outside India that the economic problem is not the only problem in the country. From the Muslim point of view the cultural problem is of much greater consequence to most Indian Muslims. At any rate it is not less important than the economic problem." The holding of the proposed convention "would further make it clear to the Hindus that no political device, however subtle, can make the Indian Muslim lose sight of his cultural entity".<sup>37</sup>

It was on 28 May that he made his first reference to the creation of a Muslim state or states in India, and it is interesting to notice that he came to this decision through his anxiety to improve the economic condition of the Muslim masses. We need to quote this letter at length.

He began by underlining the seriousness of the situation. "I have no doubt that you fully realize the gravity of the situation as far as Muslim India is concerned. The League will have to finally decide whether it will remain a body representing the upper classes of Indian Muslims or Muslim masses who have so far, with good reason, taken no interest in it. Personally I believe that a political organization which gives no promise of improving the lot of the average Muslim cannot attract our masses." Regretting that "our political institutions have never thought of improving the lot of Muslims generally", he went on, "The problem of bread is becoming more and more acute. The Muslim has begun to feel that he has been going down and down during the last 200 years. Ordinarily he believes that his poverty is due to Hindu money-lending or capitalism. The perception that it is equally due to foreign rule has not yet fully come to him. But it is bound to come. The atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal is not likely to receive much response from the Muslims. The question therefore is: how is it possible to solve the problem of Muslim poverty? And the whole future of the League depends on the League's activity to solve this question. If the League can give no such promises I am sure the Muslim masses will remain indifferent to it as before."

After thus sketching the nature and proportions of the problem, he prescribed his own solution. "Happily there is a solution in the enforcement of the Law of Islam and its further development in the light of modern ideas. After a long and careful study of Islamic Law I have come to the conclusion that if this system of Law is

properly understood and applied, at last [*sic.*] the right to subsistence is secured to everybody. But the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or states. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India. If such a thing is impossible in India the only other alternative is a civil war which as a matter of fact has been going on for some time in the shape of Hindu-Muslim riots. I fear that in certain parts of the country, e.g., N-W. India, Palestine may be repeated." He said it again towards the end of the letter. "But as I have said above in order to make it possible for Muslim India to solve these problems it is necessary to redistribute the country and to provide one or more Muslim states with absolute majorities. Don't you think that the time for such a demand has already arrived . . . Muslim India hopes that at this serious juncture your genius will discover some way out of our present difficulties."<sup>38</sup>

The next letter, written on 21 June, contains the longest elaboration of his suggestion that we have in this one-sided correspondence. He began by painting a dark picture of Hindu-Muslim riots which were then occurring, and of the "storm which is coming to North-West India, and perhaps to the whole of India". Once again it is necessary to quote his words so that the reader knows exactly what he was saying. "I tell you that we are actually living in a state of civil war which, but for the police and military, would become universal in no time." Then after giving some instances of communal disturbances, he wrote: "I have carefully studied the whole situation and believe that the real cause of these events is neither religious nor economic. It is purely political, i.e., the desire of the Sikhs and Hindus to intimidate Muslims even in the majority provinces. And the new constitution is such that even in the Muslim majority provinces, the Muslims are made entirely dependent on non-Muslims. The result is that the Muslim Ministry can take no proper action and are even driven to do injustice to Muslims partly to please those on whom they depend, and partly to show that they are absolutely impartial. Thus it is clear that we have our specific reasons to reject this constitution. It seems to me that the new constitution is devised only to placate the Hindus . . . I have no doubt in my mind that this constitution is calculated to do infinite harm to the Indian Muslims. Apart from this it is no

solution of the economic problem which is so acute among Muslims."

He had also changed his earlier opinion on the Communal Award, which till recently he had accepted though without much enthusiasm. "The only thing that the communal award grants to Muslims is the recognition of their political existence in India. But such a recognition granted to a people whom this constitution does not and cannot help in solving their problem of poverty can be of no value to them. The Congress President has denied the political existence of Muslims in no unmistakable terms. The other Hindu political body, i.e., the Mahasabha, whom I regard as the real representative of the masses of the Hindus, has declared more than once that a united Hindu-Muslim nation is impossible in India. In these circumstances it is obvious that the only way to a peaceful India is a redistribution of the country on the lines of racial, religious and linguistic affinities. Many British statesmen also realize this, and the Hindu-Muslim riots which are rapidly coming in the wake of this constitution are sure further to open their eyes to the real situation in the country . . . Some Muslims in the Punjab are already suggesting the holding of a North-West Indian Muslim Conference, and the idea is rapidly spreading."

Presumably, Jinnah had, in a previous letter, disapproved of the idea of such a conference, for Iqbal continued, "I agree with you, however, that our community is not yet sufficiently organized and disciplined and perhaps the time for holding such a conference is not yet ripe. But I feel that it would be highly advisable for you to indicate in your address at least the line of action that the Muslims of North-West India would be finally driven to take."

Then he repeated his own solution in some detail, the most significant feature of which is his emphasis on the north-west India, with only a casual reference to Bengal, as if it were an after-thought. "To my mind the new constitution with its idea of a single Indian federation is completely hopeless. A separate federation of Muslim provinces, reformed on the lines I have suggested above, is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are?"

He was not interested in the Muslims of the rest of India, for he

made it clear: "Personally I think that the Muslims of North-West and Bengal ought at present to ignore Muslim minority provinces. This is the best course to adopt in the interests of both Muslim majority and minority provinces. It will therefore be better to hold the coming session of the League in the Punjab, and not in a Muslim minority province."<sup>39</sup>

He repeated this last point in his next letter, sent on 11 August. "Events have made it abundantly clear that the League ought to concentrate all its activities on the North-West Indian Muslims."<sup>40</sup>

There is much in these three letters that reveals the working of Iqbal's mind. First of all, he does not seem to be able to make up his mind about the grounds on which separation was to be demanded—if separation it was that he really wanted. In the first letter he rejects the Congress view that the problem of India was fundamentally economic, and wants Jinnah to bring out the significance and relevance of the cultural problem for the Muslims. In the second letter, however, it is the poverty of the Muslim masses which agitates his mind to the exclusion of every other factor. In fact, he is so much impressed with this problem that he makes it the starting point of demanding a "free" Muslim state, where the observance and enforcement of the law of Islam would guarantee economic justice. In the third letter he again changes ground and expresses his conviction that the real problem is neither religious nor economic, but political, by which he means the Muslim fear of Hindu rule and the Hindu determination to dominate the Muslims. Nowhere does he argue, as Rahmat Ali had done earlier and Jinnah was to do later, that the Muslims were a nation by themselves.

Secondly, his criticism and unqualified rejection of the federal constitution is a completely fresh development in his political thinking. He had approved a federal plan for India in his Allahabad address; he had participated in the process of making the new constitution at the RTC; and he had been issuing statements in appreciation and acceptance of the federal dispensation, including the communal award.<sup>41</sup> We have no record of his views, favourable or otherwise, on the federation from the middle of 1934 up to the time of writing these letters. It is clear that his attitude towards the 1935 constitution underwent a radical change during these three years. We have no means of knowing the cause of it; but it

might not be unreasonable to attribute it, at least in part, to the influence of Rahmat Ali. This brings me to my third point.

It is a little strange that Iqbal does not mention Rahmat Ali or his demand for Pakistan in these letters, though some important points in Iqbal's arguments betray the influence of the Pakistan National Movement. Iqbal's rejection of the federation is now as uncompromising as Rahmat Ali's, and is based on several grounds which Rahmat Ali had already covered. Further, the very words used by Iqbal to describe his solution—"a federation of Muslim provinces"—came from Rahmat Ali. Moreover, Iqbal calls the Muslims of the north-west and of Bengal "nations", not one nation. This too reminds us of Rahmat Ali, who had first declared the north-west Muslims a nation, and only later showed interest in the Bengali Muslims. Finally, Iqbal's reference to "other nations" in India clearly indicates Rahmat Ali's prompting, for none before him had called the various Indian communities by that name.

In spite of his *volte face* on the issue of federation, Iqbal remained thoroughly consistent in his attachment to and interest in the future of the north-west. Like his Allahabad address, these letters also testify to his anxiety to secure the future of the Muslims of north-west India. His reference to Bengal is obviously a fugitive thought, for in the last letter quoted above he drops it. Nor did the fate of the Muslims living in Hindu provinces move his heart or imagination. Rahmat Ali, too, had set out with the same idea, but he had grown out of it and proceeded to demand Bangladesh and Usmanistan in addition to the north-west Pakistan. Iqbal died before he could expand his vision to embrace the independence of other Indian Muslims. Whether such a stage would ever have come in his thinking had he lived longer is an open question. What is certain is that in the eight years granted him to evolve his scheme he preferred to confine his gaze to the north-west. (In a peculiar and tragic way history was to vindicate him in 1971, when the Bengali Muslims broke away from Pakistan, and what remained of Jinnah's efforts and Muslim League's campaign was the north-west Muslim India of Iqbal and Rahmat Ali).

It is of considerable significance that the word used by Iqbal throughout his political life for what he wanted to be done to India was "redistribution". It appears in the Allahabad address and in these letters. It is a word of vague connotation, and lies at the bottom of much controversy about his real aims. In the letter of 28

May he wants "to redistribute the country and to provide one or more Muslim states with absolute majorities". In that of 21 June he argues for "a redistribution of the country on the lines of racial, religious and linguistic affinities" and "a separate federation of Muslim provinces, reformed on the lines I have suggested above". If by this he meant a partition—it is not absolutely sure that he did—then the basis for this was not going to be religion alone. In other words, the country was not to be divided on Hindu-Muslim lines. Other "affinities", like those of race and language, were to receive equal consideration. To where would that have led? To a partition of every province of the north-west? Because the Sikhs spoke the same language as the Muslims of the Punjab but were different in religion; the Pathans shared the religion of the Muslims but were of a different race and used another tongue; the Sindhi Hindus were different in religion from the Sindhi Muslims but the two spoke the same language and were probably of the same race. This is confusion run riot. The creation of a separate Muslim federation in the north-west would not have solved anything unless lots of people changed places. But Iqbal does not mention any plan for a transfer of population. Yet he wants his state or states to have "absolute majorities". One does not really know what to make of all this, except that he studiously avoids the use of any term—partition, division, separation, splitting up, etc.—which would put it beyond doubt that he wanted the same thing as Rahmat Ali's or (later) Jinnah's Pakistan.

One thing which comes out strongly in these letters is Iqbal's unbounded faith in Jinnah's leadership and capacity to save the Indian Muslims. He impresses this on his correspondent again and again. "Muslim India hopes that at this serious juncture your genius will discover some way out of our present difficulties" (28 May). "... you are the only Muslim Indian today to whom the community has a right to look up for safe guidance through the storm which is coming" (21 June). There is no reason to doubt the sincerity with which Iqbal held this conviction. Time was to bring full vindication of this belief. It is a proof of his perceptive intellect that he saw this truth at a time when Jinnah's hold over Muslim India was extremely shaky, when Muslim politicians well entrenched in their provincial realms were unwilling to help him, and when his party had just emerged from a severe beating at the hands of the electorate.<sup>42</sup>

It is equally clear that Jinnah did not return the confidence so generously reposed in him by Iqbal—and for politically understandable reasons. In these letter Iqbal made six separate suggestions to Jinnah; none of them was acceptable to the latter. The suggestions were: hold an all India Muslim convention of members of new provincial legislatures and other prominent politicians, hold a north-western Indian Muslim conference, hold the next annual session of the Muslim League in the Punjab, concentrate the activities of the League in the north-west, ignore the Muslims of the minority provinces, and demand a separate Muslim state or states.

The Muslim convention was not called, for the simple reason that at that time the total number of provincial legislators elected on the Muslim League ticket was too small to be convened into a national gathering. Such a plan would also have raised unnecessary difficulties of organization, invitation and discipline, e.g., to allow or not to allow the Punjab Unionists to attend the convention, for they were on the point of entering into a pact with the Muslim League; to invite or not to invite other parties which had won some seats in opposition to the League but were in reality only offshoots of and seceders from the party. As Jinnah fully realized the extent and tradition of disorganization among Muslims he could see that the holding of a convention at that time would probably achieve nothing beyond demonstrating their disunity.

The idea of calling a separate conference of the Muslims of north-west India, for which Iqbal had been campaigning since 1930, was clearly opposed to Muslim League policy and interest. The next three suggestions went along with this. The Muslim League was a national organization, the only party which could make some claim to speak for all Indian Muslims. It was weak and poor and in a bad state of organization. Its leadership was neither firm nor of the first quality. But all these were things which Jinnah was then trying to repair. To accept Iqbal's advice was to cut up the League into so many small groups: one for the north-west, one for Bengal, and one or more for the rest of India. Instead of bringing all Muslims to one platform, so that they could bargain with the Hindus and the British as an equal party, Iqbal wanted to weaken the organization by surrendering its national outlook, alienating its national following, and giving up its traditional place in Indian politics. The reduction of the League to the status of a provincial or regional party was the exact opposite of Jinnah's

aims Did Iqbal seriously hope that the Muslim League, which had never in its history been very strong in the north-west, would agree to make its home in that hostile environment and leave in the lurch the minority provinces which, on the whole, had been more loyal to it? Iqbal was inviting the League to a region where, in spite of a Muslim majority, not a single province had a League following of a respectable size, not to speak of a majority in the legislature. Nor could Jinnah see any profit in ignoring the Muslims of the minority provinces, who in fact were in greater need of protection and moral support, and whose past record of loyalty to the party was better than that of the Muslims of the Punjab and NWFP. Similar arguments ruled out the possibility of the League's jettisoning the Bengali Muslims who, if one went by Iqbal's own arguments, had a better title to the Muslim League on ground of their numerical strength. It would not have taken Jinnah more than a few minutes of reflection to reject all these suggestions, including the apparently harmless one of holding the next party session in Lahore. The small following of the League in the Punjab combined with the strong hold of the Unionists over the province would not have permitted the League to hold a successful meeting.

That leaves the last suggestion which asked Jinnah to demand one or more Muslim states. Jinnah did not do so for almost another three years. Reasons for this are not confined to the timing or nature of Iqbal's advice, but spread themselves over so many different fields and considerations that we cannot examine them until we have gone a little further in our study and looked closely at the development of Muslim League thinking on the issue of partition.

The reader ought to be told here how this correspondence between Iqbal and Jinnah has come to us in an incomplete and one-sided shape. Jinnah had saved these letters from Iqbal but had kept no copies of his own replies. In early 1943 he thought of publishing the correspondence, and with this in mind on 28 January wrote to Mian Bashir Ahmad of Lahore that "as these letters have become of great historical importance . . . could you kindly arrange at Lahore to secure my replies to Iqbal?" On 15 February he again impressed upon Bashir Ahmad that "the publication of this whole correspondence may render great service to our people and the cause for which we stand". But Jinnah's replies could not be found among Iqbal's papers (he had died in

April 1938), and after making some unfruitful efforts and inquiries, he reported to Jinnah: "On this I replied to him on 24 February 1943 that Choudhry Muhammad Husain, a trustee of Allama's property and assets, could not trace the letters wanted by the Quaid and that, therefore, I would suggest that he should publish Iqbal's letters to him with or without his comments as desired."<sup>43</sup>

In the meantime, Bashir had shown Jinnah's letters to Muhammad Shafi, a journalist of Lahore who had been in close attendance on Iqbal during the latter's last years and had actually written several letters on the poet's instructions and dictation, in the hope that perhaps Shafi had in his possession or knew something about Jinnah's replies to Iqbal. Shafi himself wrote to Jinnah on 2 February, reporting failure in tracing the letters, and holding out no hope that they would ever be available. "The idea has thrilled me", he said, "But I am afraid you will be disappointed in so far as it would of necessity be one-sided correspondence. I was his scribe during the last two or three years of his life and I remember that there existed no arrangement for preserving his correspondence, and their replies. . ."<sup>44</sup>

In 1937 Jinnah was heavily engaged in re-organizing the Muslim League and negotiating with the Hindus and the British. He had insufficient secretarial help and therefore failed to retain copies of his replies to Iqbal. At the other end, as Shafi tells us, there were no proper arrangements to preserve letters received by Iqbal. The poet was at this time in ill health, his life was disorganized, and his associates and aides were careless. His son was too young to realize the value of his father's papers. When Iqbal died, the people entrusted with his papers do not seem to have taken their responsibilities too seriously. It is a great pity that probably a few thousand letters written to and by Iqbal—for he was at one time or another in correspondence with practically every Hindu and Muslim political, intellectual and literary figure—were thus lost to posterity.

From the point of view of our present inquiry it is a still greater tragedy that we do not possess Jinnah's replies. As we have seen above, it can be deduced from the text of Iqbal's letters and from Jinnah's opinions as expressed in his statements during this period that Iqbal's suggestions were utterly unacceptable to him. If we had Jinnah's replies before us it would have made it much easier

to settle the controversy about Iqbal's exact role in the history of the idea of Pakistan.<sup>45</sup>

Later commentators have obviously read too much in Iqbal's Allahabad address and his letters to Jinnah. For example, there is scarcely any solid evidence to sustain Dr. Ambedkar's assertions that "there can be no doubt that the [Lahore] Resolution merely resuscitates a scheme which was put forth by Sir Muhammad Iqbal in his Presidential address to the Muslim League at its annual session at Lucknow[sic.] in December 1930", and that "the League has only enlarged the original scheme of Pakistan. It has sought to create one more Muslim State in the East to include the Muslims in Bengal and Assam. Barring this it expresses in its essence and general outline the scheme put forth by Sir Muhammad Iqbal and propagated by Mr. Rahmat Ali".<sup>46</sup> This is an over-simplification, and does not take notice of the various proposals made during the one or two years preceding the adoption of the Lahore Resolution, and of the political developments of 1937-39 which influenced and moulded Jinnah's mind, Muslim League policy, and the attitude of the Muslim masses.

Similarly the observations made *ex cathedra* by a former chief justice of Pakistan, that Iqbal "was also the inspirer of the idea of Pakistan"<sup>47</sup>, represents more a popular impression than an historical truth. The poet's son shows more prudence in phrasing the claim for his father and clothes it in words of commendable caution: the establishment of Pakistan is "the realization in a concrete form of his abstract and nebulous political ideal".<sup>48</sup>

It has been reported by Matlubul Hasan Saiyid, a former private secretary to Jinnah, that once, soon after the 1940 Muslim League session at Lahore and probably in reference to the Lahore Resolution, Jinnah said to him, "Iqbal is no more amongst us, but had he been alive he would have been happy to know that we did exactly what he wanted us to do".<sup>49</sup>

All this is hearsay, popular impression or private opinion. The right place to find the truth is Jinnah's own words. Iqbal's letters were addressed to him, and it was he who finally, after a long interval, decided to make a demand for Pakistan. As far as first-hand evidence is concerned we can do no better than to hear Jinnah's opinion about Iqbal's position in the evolution of the idea of Pakistan. We don't have his replies to Iqbal's letters, though we know that he turned a deaf ear to Iqbal's advice on practically

every point, including the demanding of a separate Muslim state. What we do have is the foreword Jinnah wrote to the letters when they were published in 1943 or 1944 (the publication is undated).

In the foreword Jinnah admits that his success in organizing the Muslim League owed much to "the invaluable support that I obtained through the sincere efforts and patriotic and selfless activities of many friends like Sir Muhammad Iqbal, amongst others". In a later passage he repeats this: "It was a great achievement for Muslim League that its lead came to be acknowledged by both the majority and minority Provinces. Sir Muhammad Iqbal played a very conspicuous part, though at the time not revealed to public, in bringing about this consummation." And finally comes this very significant comment on Iqbal's plans for the future and their influence on Jinnah. "I think these letters are of very great historical importance, particularly those which explain his views in clear and unambiguous terms on the political future of Muslim India. *His views were substantially in consonance with my own and had finally led me to the same conclusion* as a result of careful examination and study of the constitutional problems facing India, and found expression in due course in . . . the Lahore resolution."<sup>50</sup>

This is the farthest that Jinnah could go in acknowledging Iqbal's influence on his own thinking on Pakistan. It is clear that Jinnah's mind was working on the same lines, and Iqbal's suggestion did no more than demonstrate a coincidence. It can hardly mean that Iqbal inspired Jinnah to demand Pakistan, or presented him with a brand new idea which had never before entered Jinnah's mind.

The final conclusion about Iqbal's contribution to the making of this idea is that he was one among those who thought of Pakistan. His own words and all historical evidence bear this out. To go beyond this and to call him the original author of the idea or the sole "dreamer" of the future state is to put a false construction on history in the service of a myth.

### Gazdar's Proposal (1937)

On 10 July 1937, M.H. Gazdar of Sind wrote to Jinnah, asking him to consider the proposition for an independent Muslim state comprising the four Muslim provinces of north-west India. His

argument was that the Muslims of these areas would not be secure until they could no longer be manipulated by the Hindus. "I would go so far", he said. "as to suggest a separate federation of the North West India, viz. Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab, and the North Western Frontier Province. Without this I have despaired of any economic, political and educational improvement of Muslim masses of these provinces."<sup>51</sup>

### Sayyid Ali Jawwad (1937)

In October 1937, one Sayyid Ali Jawwad proposed a partition of India as a solution to the Congress-League struggle for power, at the same time hoping that things would not reach a pass where this would be unavoidable "An alternative to a friendly settlement of our dispute is the partitioning of India into two parts, namely, Muslim India and Hindu India . . . Let us hope and pray that such a drastic cure of our ills will not have to be resorted to."<sup>52</sup>

### F.K. Khan Durrani (1937)

In the summer or autumn of 1937, F.K. Khan Durrani issued a 16-page pamphlet from Lahore entitled *The Muslim National Ideal* in which he explored the avenues open to the Muslims. He took it as said that Indian Muslims were a nation apart.

First he considered the position of the pro-Congress Jamiat-ul-Ulema, the right-wing party of the divines which stood for complete co-operation with the Congress "to join the battle of India's freedom". These men, he said, were honest in their views, but honesty was no guarantee of sanity, and these *ulema* "live so utterly divorced from the facts of life that their lead in worldly matters is anything but safe". They were ignoring certain obvious factors of political life. One of these was that when a community merged into another and larger community, it ceased to count as a political force in the country, because it was no longer a community. "A community is a community only so long as it has a political creed of its own, a goal of its own, a definite purpose of its own, in short, a soul of its own." When a community lost its soul and abandoned the principle that gave it unity and internal strength, it was dissolved as a body politic and its members became

naked and defenceless.

Muslims were interested in the fate of India because they were a part and parcel of the country. If they ceased to have any stake or share in the country, their interest also evaporated. "It means, India is we and we are India, and there is no India beyond ourselves. Our fight for India's freedom can only mean a fight for our own freedom." But if the end-result of this fight was going to be a freedom for the other communities, not for the Muslims, they could not participate in the struggle. "A political community can fight legitimately for its own political progress. If it ignores its own self and fights, Quixote-like, on behalf of others, it is only committing suicide. Are the Musalmans of India prepared to commit suicide?"

Identifying Congress with Hinduism, he castigated the Indian creed in words redolant of Rahmat Ali's style. "Hinduism means caste. Hinduism means untouchability. Hinduism means racial exclusiveness. The race has been under the most rigid discipline imaginable for three thousand years of these anti-national and anti-human institutions, and the Hindu is not yet born who could purge his soul of this ancient virus and think nationally." In truth, the greatest obstacle in the way of the Muslims' joining the Congress was "the communalism, sly and secret in some, open and blatant in others, of Hindu leaders in and outside the Congress".

Thus the Muslims could not give their loyalty to the Congress or other Hindu organizations or the pro-Congress Muslim groups. These were the negations of his thesis. What was the positive way open to them? No nation or community could be built on mere negations; defence was the weakest of all strategies. If the Muslims desired to maintain their separate identity, they "must justify it by a high principle". The questions to be asked were: "Are the Musalmans a unity by virtue of their internal structure? Does Islam want them to be a separate and self-contained political and social unit as distinguished from the rest of the world? If so, why?"

His answer to these inquiries, partly inspired by Iqbal's philosophy, may be summarized as follows : A nation perishes when it becomes unconscious of its Self, that is, its separate individuality or identity, and loses sight of the part the World-Spirit has called it into being to play. The Muslims cannot be an exception to this law of nature. They can live and prosper so long as they remain

true to this ideal; their present misfortunes are due wholly and solely to the fact that in recent centuries they have not been true to their divinely appointed ideal, and they can regain their national vigour only if they take hold of that ideal again and live in its light.<sup>53</sup>

He concluded the survey, not by asking for separation, but by ruling out Muslim-Congress co-operation. "Let it be understood that I am not 'against' the Congress. I am against it only in so far as it is against the interests of Islam. India must be freed from foreign domination; the hunger and poverty of the masses must be removed; the country must be put on the way to power and prosperity. To this end co-operation between the Congress and the Muslims is essential. But it must be co-operation and not surrender of one to the other. Trouble arises when the Congress demands surrender . . . It is a demand which the Musalmans are bound to resist, which every Muslim who has any faith in him shall continue to resist to the last. We are not prepared to let others walk over our bodies. But co-operation is neither practicable nor even possible, and nothing can save the Musalmans from being submerged under the Congress avalanche, until and unless they get organized among themselves. Political forces are gathering awful momentum. The mental twilight in which the average Musalman passes his days may hide these forces from his eyes, but cannot save him from the calamity that is approaching fast. The time is not far when it will be too late. We shall fall singly wherever we stand, and Islam will be wiped out of this country as it was wiped out of Spain. What are you waiting for? Would you wake when the calamity is already upon you?"<sup>54</sup>

It is difficult to see why a man of Durrani's strong views and Islamic zeal should have stopped at making this call to recognize the dangers of current developments without going further and suggesting the creation of one or more Muslim states. He was deeply influenced by Iqbal's ideas and was writing *A Study of Iqbal* when this pamphlet was published. Internal evidence shows that he had read Rahmat Ali. His total rejection of any kind of co-operation with the Congress and its satellite parties implied that the Muslims must carve their own separate path to the summit of freedom. But he did not propose, or even refer to, any solution by division. Possibly, he confined himself in this pamphlet to making an appeal for unity and issuing a warning that events were over-

taking current Muslim policy. Probably he planned to follow up the warning with a concrete scheme but circumstances, unknown to us, intervened and he was unable to pursue the matter.

### Muslim Thinking (1938)

Muslim public opinion in 1938 did not show any startling change from its confused and confusing flow of the previous two years. Political statements and press announcements are full of apprehensions of Hindu rule and oft-repeated determination that Muslims would not submit to this fate. Congress and other non-Muslim parties still continue to talk of Indian nationalism and Indian unity, under-estimating Muslim discontent. Except for the resolution of the Sind Muslim League Conference of October (to be studied in chapter 13 in the context of the evaluation of the Muslim League point of view), the general talk is one of inadequate safeguards, unsatisfactory concessions and betrayed promises. Hardly any one gives serious consideration to partition. These currents of thought are summarized in this section, as far as possible in the words of the speakers and the writers.

In a political novel on India published in 1938, Edward Thompson remarked, "And it was more certain than ever that in the womb of old India, struggling to be born, were two nations tugging and fighting for mastery even before birth."<sup>55</sup> The significance of this comment lies more in the reporter than the report, for Thompson was a person of strong and unconcealed pro-Congress sympathies.

Muslim circles talked of discontent and threats, not yet of action. On 29 January, the *Star of India* wrote: "If Muslims wish to live in India as free men, if there is to be a free Islam in a free India, we exhort the leaders of the community to prepare for a fight and to launch such an agitation throughout the country as may rouse these Governors to a sense of their duty towards the helpless and betrayed minorities."<sup>56</sup> The reference was to the persecution of Muslims by the Congress administrations in Hindu provinces and the failure of the governors to intervene and exercise their duty under the constitution. On 3 February, the paper declared that this "communal tyranny" was "filling Muslims throughout India with a terrible dread."<sup>57</sup> On 21 February, it asked how long Muslims could tolerate "these outrages upon their

most cherished sentiments, these denials of their fundamental rights, these acts of organized goondaism, arson and loot". The hope that safeguards could protect them had vanished; the dream that the governors would step in to save them had been shattered. "It is the strength of the Muslim faith, Muslim arms and Muslim determination alone—it is the uniting of the eighty million sons and daughters of Islam in one solid phalanx of a defensive Islamic army that can save Islam from the menace of its foe".<sup>58</sup> A call to battle! Yet, there is no mention of partition.

On 2 March, Khawaja Hasan Nizami stated from Delhi that the Muslims did not need any help from the Congress or any protection by the British. They had "awakened from their slumber", recognized their strength, and were now fully self-conscious and self-confident.<sup>59</sup> The decision to separate was still not a part of this self-consciousness. But the Hindus feared what the Muslims were not yet prepared to utter. In his presidential address at the annual session of the Hindu Religion Protection Society at Indore on 9 March, B.S. Moonje appealed to the Hindus to enter the federation and frustrate the "mischievous efforts" of those who wanted to divide the country as Hindu India and Muslim India. He warned that if they in haste rejected the federal solution, the British government might give them a new communal award involving the native states also. By accepting the federation the unity of India would be assured and the resulting unity would not be broken without a civil war.<sup>60</sup>

A Hindu of Bihar admitted that "the average Muslim today honestly fears that his contact with Hindus will ultimately result in the complete disappearance of his ancient religion, his language, culture, means of earning a decent and honest livelihood and in fact his individuality as a group. He honestly believes that the Congress is a Hindu body and that the Hindus really want to substitute Hindu for British rule".<sup>61</sup> As if to confirm this, on 10 June S.C. Bose, in a speech at Chittagong, declared that "the only alternative to British rule was Congress rule".<sup>62</sup> Another Hindu reported from Patna in October that "the Congress plan of the cultural extinction of the Muslims as a people is now no secret", and that "the Congress excesses and intrigues are now fast driving the North Western Indian Muslims to the Pakistan ideal as they have lost all hopes of a fair deal from the Congress".<sup>63</sup> In December, Gandhi echoed Bose when he warned the native states to

“cultivate friendly relations with an organization [he meant the Congress] which bids fair in the future, not very distant, to replace the Paramount Power—let me hope, by friendly arrangement”.<sup>64</sup>

Impatient as the youth is, some young men of the Punjab established in Lahore a society under the name of Majlis-i-Pakistan in June or July 1938, and its central body, Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan in January 1939. Some branches were opened in other towns. It propagated the Pakistani idea, held meetings, wrote articles for the Urdu newspapers, and functioned as the distributing agency of some published material.<sup>65</sup> Its membership form carried on its forehead a map of Pakistan copied from Rahmat Ali's pamphlet. Its text was a promise made by the member and read: “I sympathize with the Pakistan Movement which aims at separating the provinces of the Punjab, NWFP, Sind, Kashmir and Baluchistan from India proper and uniting them under a free and independent government. I promise to make all efforts to make the Pakistan Movement a success. I am enclosing my annual membership fee of 4 annas for the year 19—. Please elect me a member of the Majlis. I shall abide by every decision of the Central Majlis.”<sup>66</sup>

Towards the end of 1938 British newspapers were talking of the coming of Pakistan. Two dispatches from India which appeared in *The Times* will bear quotation. The first said that “so serious have these ideological tendencies become in India that many Moslems in the North are again toying with the idea of creating a ‘Pakistan’ of those Provinces in which the Moslems are in a majority”.<sup>67</sup> The second analysed the Muslim attitude in some detail. The Muslim League opposed the federation almost entirely on the ground that it implied Hindu domination at the centre. “This is a much more serious objection than anything the Congress Party brings against Federation, for it means an intensification of that communal bitterness which it was hoped the scheme for unifying India would tend to lessen. Many Moslems, with a view to maintaining the internal sovereignty of the Moslem Provinces, urge a confederation of these Provinces as a preliminary step to association with the greater Federation of the Act. This theory has given renewed interest to the old proposal of creating a ‘Pakistan’ of the Moslem Provinces, a proposal that does not ignore the possibilities of linking the Moslem Provinces of Northern India with those Islamic areas which form a belt of peoples of one faith stretching from Saharanpur to Istanbul. The seriousness

with which Moslems are now seeking unification against the Hindus may prove to be as great a stumbling-block to the inauguration of Federation as will the political objections of the Hindus."<sup>68</sup>

On the last day of this year Gandhi issued a statement which intensified Muslim fears. "The Congress does claim to be the one and the only party that can deliver the goods. It is a perfectly valid claim to make . . . . It would love to be absorbed in or to absorb the Muslim League so far as the political programme is concerned. For religious and social activities, of course, every community can have its separate organization . . . . You may try to damn it by calling it Totalitarianism. Absorption is inevitable when a country is engaged in a struggle to wrest power from foreign hands; it cannot afford to have a separate rival political organization . . . . I claim to be able to look at the whole position with a detached mind. There is no substance in our quarrels. The points of difference are superficial, those of contact are deep and permanent."<sup>69</sup> How wrong and short-sighted even a "great soul" could be!

The Hindu Mahasabha said the same thing in slightly higher notes. Its president, V.D. Savarkar, declared at Nagpur: "When we will be in a position to retaliate and do retaliate the Muslims will come to their senses in a day. We shall not only save Hindu rights and honour in Hindu provinces but in provinces where the Hinds are in a minority. Knowing that every attempt to tyrannize the Hindus is sure to recoil on themselves and react for the worse on Muslim interests in all India—the Muslims will learn to behave as good boys."<sup>70</sup>

Sir Harry Hodgson found no "accredited Muslim leader" supporting the idea of Pakistan.<sup>71</sup> Both Jinnah and Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan told him that Muslims would fight rather than accept a Hindu raj. "It is, however, difficult to see on what front and with what weapons they would fight, except it be by mutiny in the Army. That does not seem very probable. On the whole one is bound to conclude that the Muslims' bark is likely to prove worse than their bite." He continued: "Nevertheless while the communal problem remains as bitter as it is now, we must take into account that the establishment of what the Muslims would regard as a Hindu Raj would be fraught with danger. We must also reckon with the possibility that in the long run the unity of

India may prove impossible under domestic conditions and that a Muslim north-west may split off and seek its destiny in association with other Muslim countries rather than with South and Central India.”<sup>72</sup>

### A Turkish Proposal (1938)

The year 1938 opened with a Turkish proposal for the creation of three independent Muslim states in India. According to Mian Kafayet Ali, who later presented his own scheme under the title of *Confederacy of India* writing as “A Punjabi”, a movement for the unification of the nations of Islam, called the *Silsila-i-Jamiat-i-Vahdat Umam Islam*,<sup>73</sup> was started in Turkey under the patronage of Sayyid Jalil Ahmad Sinyusi and at the instance of Mustafa Kamal Ataturk. “One of its aims was to create more Muslim republics in all those parts of the world which are predominantly Muslim, in addition to the Muslim States already functioning.” Among the ten republics proposed by the *Silsila* three were to be established in India: Haidrya Republic in the Hyderabad state, Muhammadiyya Republic in Muslim Bengal, and Islamistan in Muslim north-west.<sup>74</sup> The other republics were to be: Surya Republic (Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordan), Sinuysia Republic (Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya), Azarya Republic (Azarbaijan, Daghistan, Crimea, all in Central Asia), Turanian Republic (eastern and western Turkistan), Aqsa Republic (Muslim provinces of China), Barghashia Republic (Muslim tracts of East Africa), and Java Republic (Isles of Java, Sumatra and Borneo).

Two features of this scheme should be noticed. It was a part of a large pan-Islamic plan aimed at liberating a vast portion of Muslims from foreign rule, establishing many new Muslim states, and creating unity among the Islamic world. The suggestion for the three republics in India seems to have been borrowed from Rahmat Ali. It is significant that the Turkish scheme concerns itself with Bengal at a time when a majority of Indian Muslim planners were giving little or half-hearted attention to the Muslim majority of the north-east.

It is almost impossible to accept the reported association of Ataturk with this scheme. His views on Islam and the impetus of his entire revolution in Turkey<sup>75</sup> rule out all possibility of his initiation or support of such a plan; he would not even have

tolerated it. Unfortunately, Mian Kafayet Ali provides no further information about the movement or its proposal.

### Jamiluddin Ahmad (1938)

Towards the end of 1938, Jamiluddin Ahmad, a lecturer in English at the Aligarh University, wrote a pamphlet called *Is India One Nation?* in which he favoured a division of India on religious lines. "The only way out of the impasse therefore seems to be to divide India into two federations—federation of Muslim majority provinces and states and another of Hindu majority provinces and states. The relations between the two federations should be regulated by a voluntary treaty of alliance as between two sovereign states. There should also be provision for mutual exchange of population and reciprocal safeguards for the minorities living in each federation. The creation of two such federations is quite feasible and would be in the best interests of both Muslims and Hindus."<sup>76</sup>

He goes beyond the Muslim League official policy of not concerning itself with the native states, and he adds them to the Muslim provinces in his proposed federation. He suggests one federation of Muslim areas; it is not clear whether he was ignoring Bengal and concentrating on the north-west or thinking that somehow the north-east could be tagged on to the north-west (as actually happened in 1947). The idea of an exchange of population is also striking, coming from a Muslim Leaguer in a tract published by the party. There is no mention of Rahmat Ali or any other source that inspired him.

I asked Jamiluddin about the exact date of the writing of this pamphlet and the influence or influences which had worked upon his mind to produce this solution. About the date, he confirmed that, as far as he could recall, he wrote it "towards the end of 1938". About the influences, he wrote: "I merely echoed the prevailing feeling of the Muslim intelligentsia at that time . . . . Hindu-Muslim riots had become a common occurrence ever since the British started patronizing the Hindu majority as against the Muslims and they were not a new phenomenon during the period of Congress rule in the provinces. I had been watching the attitude and the designs of the Hindu majority since 1925 and I like many other young men of the time made a deep study of the Hindu-

Muslim problem as it developed ever since the decline of the Muslim power in the sub-continent. To put it briefly, these observations and studies led me, as they led so many others, to the conclusion that for Muslims there was no other way out but the establishment of a separate Muslim State.”<sup>77</sup>

### **Abdus Samad Khan Rajisthani (1938)**

On 4 November the *Star of India* carried a letter from Jaipur by Abdus Samad Khan Rajisthani, the propaganda secretary of the All India States Muslim League. He asserted that instead of “Pakistan” the Muslims must “demand and fight” for two federations: Northern Indian Federation and Southern Indian Federation. The first would be made up of NWFP, Sind, Punjab, United Provinces, Bihar, Bengal and Assam. It would “secure supremacy for the Muslims and solve the complicated questions of political, social, linguistic and cultural nature and importance”. The second will be for the Hindus, and will comprise Bombay, Central Provinces, Madras and Orissa and Bihar. For a country the size of India this division was “the only right, rational and acceptable solution for all classes and communities and the different schools of thought”. The British would provide the policy and the machinery to maintain harmonious relations of political, administrative and territorial nature between the two federations; they would also deal with any questions of dissension and discord that might arise in the future. “This Federal Division of India will be the most balanced one in the British Empire finding its equilibrium in size and area in the American Federation.”<sup>78</sup>

The suggestion calls for no comment. It would not have solved the communal problem. It was no remedy for Muslim insecurity. The Hindu provinces of United Provinces, Bihar and Assam would never have accepted it. A confederation under the control of the British, regulating these two federations, would have been unworkable; it also implied a permanent imperial connection.

### **Abul Ala Mawdudi (1938)**

The next person to suggest a re-arrangement of India on an “international” basis was Abul Ala Mawdudi. In the October,

November and December issues of his journal *Tarjaman-ul-Quran* (which he issued in Urdu from Hyderabad Deccan), he wrote a series of articles on the Hindu-Muslim problem. Rejecting the Congress claim of secularism as a mere pretence and its slogan of democracy as another name for Hindu rule and a system which would for ever give three votes to the Hindus and only one to the Muslims, he showed how unsuitable for India was the western dogma of majority rule. After a detailed examination of the political and constitutional circumstances obtaining in India he concluded that the Muslim problem would find no solution in expedient devices like separate electorates, weightage in legislatures, reservation of seats in public services, minority safeguards and composite executives. All this had been tried and found wanting.<sup>79</sup>

His own proposal took the shape of three alternatives, any of which, he claimed, would be better than what was then being suggested or considered by various parties and individuals. The three alternative schemes were: (1) An "international federation", which should be a State of Federated Nations, in which each nation would be "sovereign" and would enjoy cultural autonomy; (2) The scheme envisaged in the *Cultural Future of India* prepared by Dr. S A. Latif (it is considered in the following chapter) should be implemented, and separate regions should be demarcated for the establishment of "autonomous" States of respective nationalities. The centre should retain the minimum possible subjects. A period of 25 years should be provided for exchange of population between them. East Bengal, Hyderabad, Bhopal, Junagadh, Chendra, Tonk, Ajmer, Delhi, Oudh, North-West Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan should be assigned to the Muslims. Separate regions should be allocated to the Sikhs and the Depressed Classes, if they so desired; (3) If these two alternatives are not acceptable then there should be separate National Federal States, one of the Hindus and one of the Muslims, with a "confederacy" (*tahalaf*) between the two. There should be a pact or treaty between the federations regarding defence, communications and trade and commerce.<sup>80</sup>

First some minor points of clarification should be noted. In alternative number one, the term "international federation" (*bain-ul-aqwami wafaq*) is meaningless. Mawdudi used it either as an equivalent or variant of a "confederation", or as a new construction meaning a federation made up of several nations.

Similarly, it is difficult to see how "each nation" of this federation could be "sovereign". In the alternative number two, it must be carefully noted that the "autonomous States" to be established under the Latif scheme were not to be independent states (in spite of the capital S) but mere provinces or units of a federation. This is made clear by the stipulation that the centre was to retain the minimum possible number of subjects. Mawdudi's demand that Muslim native states (Muslim by the religion of the ruler, not by the majority of the population), like Hyderabad, Bhopal, Junagadh and Tonk, should be included in the Muslim zone shows his anxiety to bring as much of India as possible under Muslim control; his reference to Hyderabad might have been influenced by Rahmat Ali's suggestion or by the fact that he himself was living there and depended on the state court for his living.

The significance of these proposals is two-fold. In the first place, they come from the pen of a person who was in no way allied with the Muslim League or even in sympathy with its outlook. From the first day of his political emergence till the creation of Pakistan (and even afterwards) Mawdudi was a vitriolic critic of Muslim League policy, of Muslim nationalism, of the Pakistan demand, and of the persons of Jinnah and his associates. His objection was based on the incompatibility of nationalism and Islam. In Islamic orthodox theory nationalism has no existence. To divide the Muslim community among national groups and areas is to split the faithful and to go against the will and pleasure of God. Mawdudi mocked the Muslim Leaguers with the taunt that unless they guaranteed an Islamic state in Pakistan (presumably of his own definition), their Pakistan would not be a land of the pure but a land of the filthy and the ritually unclean (*na-pak*). He also made bitter personal attacks on Jinnah and other League leaders, accusing them of a complete ignorance of Islamic teachings, charging them with leading un-Islamic lives, and warning the Muslims of dire consequences to their faith and future if they followed such irreligious leaders.<sup>81</sup> To hear of proposals envisaging Muslim separation from such a person is irrefutable testimony of general Muslim anxiety about the prospects of living in a united India. It shows that even the non-Muslim League opinion had come very close to demanding a Pakistan more than a year before the passing of the Lahore Resolution.

<sup>81</sup> In the second place, the reader will notice the essential simila-

rity between the third alternative of Mawdudi's and the Lahore Resolution. Mawdudi provided for a "pact or treaty" between Hindustan and Pakistan "regarding defence, communications, trade and commerce", and stipulated the establishment of a "confederacy between the two". The Lahore Resolution did not want a confederacy or confederation, but its last paragraph carried an implication (admittedly ambiguous, but then the entire resolution, as we will see, was an exercise in ambiguity) of some kind of connection, however temporary and transitional, between the two countries or states: "This session further authorizes the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution . . . providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary." But as Mawdudi does not go into the details of his proposals it is difficult to say why he preferred a confederal relationship between Hindu India and Muslim India to complete separation. Besides, he wrote in Urdu, a language in which technical political terminology is still in the formative stage. When he used certain terms, like autonomy, international federation, confederacy, a federation of nations, etc., we are not sure about what he wanted to convey.

I wrote to Mawdudi on 14 October 1969, requesting him to clarify certain points in his three alternatives, to define the terms he was employing, and also to explain the contradiction in his theory of non-nationalism. I wrote: "In the late 'thirties you were very critical of the Muslim League policies and afterwards when the League demanded a Pakistan you were opposed to it; and yet in 1938-39 you yourself proposed a partition of India on 'national' lines. Your critics will say that there is a contradiction here, not only between your scheme and your opposition to the Pakistan plan, but also between your general theory that there is no nationalism in Islam and your proposal for a division of India on national lines. Could you explain this for me please?"

Mawdudi's special assistant, Ghulam Ali, answered my letter on 23 October, saying that Mawdudi was away in Mecca and would write to me on his return, and asking me to read Mawdudi's several writings in order to understand his ideas.<sup>82</sup> On 6 November, Mawdudi wrote to me. He said that "my real proposals cannot be properly understood until you are aware of the entire discussion on which they were based. It would be better if you read my book

*Tahrik-i-Azadi-i-Hind awr Musalman*, which contains this discussion". In reply to my inquiry about his contradictory stand on nationalism, he asked me to read the third volume of his *Musalman awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmir*; adding that he wanted an Islamic state and the Muslim League wanted a national state, and hence their clash.<sup>83</sup> He did not care to explain the terms he had used in presenting his proposals.

### The Islamabad Tahrik (1938)

Sometime in 1938 one Muhammad Yousuf Yaqub published a 4-page leaflet in Urdu from Chakrawala in Karachi. On the top of the first page was printed an outline map of the sub-continent, showing the north-west as a separate area with the name of "Islamabad". Entitled *Islamabad Tahrik Kya Hai?*, it contained a rhetorical and passionately-written introduction of a page and a half, and then a catalogue of twenty aims and objects of the movement. Nineteen of these asked the people to be good Muslims, spiritually, doctrinally, socially and personally; no. 8 said: "The purpose and goal of our life is to create national self-respect and Islam's collective domination (*Islam ka ijtemai ghalba*) in our fatherland (*pidr-i-watan*), Sind, Punjab, Baluchistan, NWFP and Kashmir."<sup>84</sup>

I have not been able to discover anything about the author of this leaflet. The area of his demand and the map on the first page show Rahmat Ali's influence; he also sent a copy to Rahmat Ali. He must have written something before this, explaining his scheme, giving reasons for his initiation of the proposal, and saying why he chose the name "Islamabad" for an area which had already been christened "Pakistan" by Rahmat Ali and accepted as such by a large number of people in north India. But of this there is no available record; nor does any of my informants know anything about the man. Anyway, he was a straw in the wind that was then blowing towards Pakistan, and his name should be entered in the list of those who thought about partition and even gave a name to the state of their dreams.

## NOTES

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4. *TSI*, editorial, 9 April 1936.
5. *Ibid.*, editorial, 16 April 1936.
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9. Dr. Radha Kumad Mukerji, Presidential Address, All India Youth Conference, Lahore, *ibid.*, 20 October 1936.
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11. A leader of the Democratic Swaraj Party, speaking at the party's conference, Nasik, 1 November 1936, *ibid.*, p. 10.
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15. *Al-Aman* of Delhi, quoted in *TSI*, 18 January 1937.
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24. Said Akbar Kiani, letter, *ibid.*, 30 April 1937.
25. *TSI*, editorial, 10 May 1937.
26. *Ibid.*, editorial, 1 June 1937.
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28. Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, "Congress Policy and Muslims", *CMG*, 7 August 1937; rep by *TSI*, 16 September 1937, under the title "Congress Communalism and Muslim Minorities".
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30. *TTI*, quoted in *ibid.*, 23 October 1937.
31. Quoted in M. Noman, *Muslim India*, Allahabad, 1942, p. 353.
32. Khwaja Hasan Nizami to Jinnah, 4 November 1937, Mukhtar Masud (ed), *Eye-Witnesses of History: A Collection of Letters addressed to Quaid-i-Azam*, Karachi, 1968, p. 53.
33. Jawaharlal Nehru to Nawab Ismail Khan, Allahabad, 26 December 1937, *CMG*, 3 July 1938.
34. V.D. Savarkar, Presidential Address, All India Hindu Mahasabha, 1937, quoted in Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims*, Bombay, 1959, p. 264.
35. Zetland to Linlithgow, 13 December 1937, quoted in R.J. Moore, "British Policy and the Indian Problem, 1936-1940", in C.H. Philips (ed), *The Partition of India*, London, 1970, p. 84.
36. Zetland to Linlithgow, 6 December 1937, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 83.
37. *Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah: A Collection of Iqbal's Letters to the Quaid-i-Azam conveying his Views on the Political Future of Muslim India* (with a foreword by M.A. Jinnah), Lahore, n.d., letter of 20 March 1937, pp. 11-13. Actually these letters begin on 23 May 1936 and end on 10 November 1937, but here I deal only with those which contain references to the future of Indian Muslims and the Muslim League policy on it. It is reported that an Urdu tr of these

letters was pub; but the only reference to it that I have come across has fallen victim to a vital misprint, "Sa'id, Abdurrahman, 'Iqbal ke Khatut Jinnah ke Nam', Haiderabad Deccan, 1914 [sic], pp. 32" (K A. Waheed, *A Bibliography of Iqbal*, Karachi, 1965 p 20)

38 *Ibid*, letter of 28 May 1937, pp. 14-18.

39 *Ibid*, letter of 21 June 1937, pp. 18-23

40 *Ibid*, letter of 11 August 1937, pp. 23-24.

41 His latest statement, asking the Muslims "to stand boldly by the Communal Award even though it does not concede all their demands", was issued on 19 June 1934; see Shamloo, *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, Lahore, 1948, pp 212-213

42 It may be mentioned in passing that there is not a shred of evidence to prove the claim, made by several persons, that it was Iqbal who had persuaded Jinnah in 1934 to return to India and to politics. For such assertions see, among others, *Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947*, Government of Pakistan, Karachi, n.d., p. 61; and Allah Bakhsh Yusufi, *Sarhad awr Jidd-o-Jhadd-i-Azadi*, Lahore, 1968, p. 582.

43 Mian Bashir Ahmad, "Quaid-i-Azam: Some Glimpses of His Greatness", in Jamiluddin Ahmad (ed), *Quaid-i-Azam as Seen by His Contemporaries*, Lahore, 1966, p. 17.

44. Muhammad Shafi to Jinnah, 2 February 1943, Mukhtar Masud, *op cit.*, p. 106. Mian Bashir Ahmad's letter to Jinnah of 24 February is also reproduced here, p. 108.

45. It should be recorded here that during the period in which Iqbal was writing to Jinnah, and later till his death on 21 April 1938, he was expressing views which did not confirm his suggestion of demanding a separate state or states. On 29 July 1937, he wrote to Hakim Raghbir Muradabadi that "in brief my advice is that if Muslims join the Congress *unconditionally*, it will bring harm to Islam and them" (my italics) (original Urdu letter reproduced in B.A. Dar (ed), *Anwar-i-Iqbal*, Karachi, 1967, p. 223). On 10 January 1938, he told Nazir Niazi that an Islamic state would be established "provided that we maintain our unity and do not give up the claim that India is inhabited by several nations, not one" (Syed Nazir Niazi, *Iqbal ke Huzur*, Lahore, 1971, p. 46). On 2 February 1938, he told a visitor that "we should make

- a definite demand for joining Sind with the Punjab" (*ibid.*, p. 136). On 11 February, he told Ghulam Rasul Khan of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League that the plan for the creation of a new province comprising the Ambala division of the Punjab, Delhi, Ajmere and Marwar was a "mubarak" (auspicious) one and that Muslims should "immediately welcome it" (*ibid.*, p. 182).
46. B.R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or Partition of India*, Bombay, 2nd ed 1945, p. 5.
  47. S.A. Rahman, "Iqbal: The Apostle of Muslim Renaissance", in K.A. Rahim (ed), *Iqbal: The Poet of Tomorrow*, Lahore, n.d. For another similar opinion, see Aziz Ahmad, "Remarques sur les origines du Pakistan", *Orient*, no. 26 (1963), p. 23, who says that the demand for the creation of Pakistan was due to "la conversion finale de Jinnah a ces theses au cours de sa correspondance avec Iqbal".
  48. Javid Iqbal (ed), *Stray Reflections: A Note-Book of Allama Iqbal*, Lahore, 1961, Introduction, p. xxi.
  49. M.H. Saiyid, *Muhammad Ali Jinnah*, Lahore, 2nd ed 1953, p. 439. Saiyid is quoted by Hector Bolitho (*Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan*, London, 1954, p. 129), and Bolitho by S.A. Vahid (*Studies in Iqbal*, Lahore, 1967, p. 304). Thus unsupported statements become by repetition a part of history.
  50. *Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah*, Jinnah's foreword, pp. 2, 3, 4-5. My italics.
  51. M.H. Gazdar to M.A. Jinnah, 10 July 1937, quoted in Lawrence Ziring, "Jinnah: The Burden of Leadership", in *World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah*, ed by A.H. Dani, Islamabad, 1979, p. 406.
  52. *The Pioneer*, 16 October 1937, cited by S.S. Pirzada, *The Foundations of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1970, Vol. II, p. xviii.
  53. F.K. Khan Durrani, *The Muslim National Ideal*, Lahore, n.d., pp. 1-14.
  54. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.
  55. Edward Thompson, *An End of the Hours*, London, 1938, p. 175.
  56. *TSI*, editorial, 29 January 1938.
  57. *Ibid.*, editorial, 3 February 1938.
  58. *Ibid.*, editorial, 21 February 1938.
  59. Khwaja Hasan Nizami, statement from Delhi, 2 March

- 1938, *ibid.*, 7 March 1938.
60. *CMG*, 10 March 1938.
  61. Ram Nath Dar, in an article in a Patna daily, reproduced in *TSI*, 16 May 1938.
  62. S.C. Bose, speech at Chittagong, 10 June 1938, *CMG*, 12 June 1938.
  63. Ram Nandan Chaudhry, statement from Patna, *TSI*, 18 October 1938.
  64. *Harijan*, 3 December 1938.
  65. Mian Kafayet Ali's letter to me, dated 26 May 1976; Mr. Khurshid Alam's letters to me, dated 14 November and 28 December 1969; Jamiluddin Ahmad's letter to me, dated 24 October 1969.
  66. An original blank form was kindly sent to me by Mr. Khurshid Alam with his letter of 14 November 1969.
  67. India Correspondent, "Federation in India: The Princes and the Provinces: An Old Conflict in a New Guise", *The Times*, 5 December 1938.
  68. India Correspondent, "New Factors in India: The Attitude to Federation: Parties and Princes", *ibid.*, 21 December 1938.
  69. *CMG*, 2 January 1939. For Jinnah's reply of 3 January see *ibid.*, 4 January.
  70. V.D. Savarkar, Presidential Address, All India Hindu Mahasabha, Nagpur, December 1938, quoted in Asoka Mehta and A. Patwardhan, *op. cit.*, p. 158.
  71. Sir Harry Hodgson's report, quoted in Kanji Dwarkadas, *Ten Years to Freedom, 1938-1947*, Bombay, 1968, p. 32.
  72. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.
  73. Mian Kafayet Ali's tr of the name of the movement is "a movement for the unification of the Muslim World"; considering the word "*umam*" used by the Silsila, I should rather tr it as "the nations of Islam" rather than "the Muslim World".
  74. A Punjabi, *Separation—A Reply to Its Critics*, Lahore, 1942, pp. 14-16.
  75. For a general description of Ataturk's revolution and an account of his ideas on Islam and secularism see Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, New York, 1958; T. Cuyler Young (ed), *Near Eastern Culture and Society*, Princeton, 1951; Dank-

- wart A. Rustow, *Politics and Westernization in the Near East*, Princeton, 1956; Serif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, Princeton, 1962; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London, 1961; E.I.J. Rosenthal, *Islam in the Modern National State*, Cambridge, 1965; C.H. Dodd, *Politics and Government in Turkey*, Manchester, 1969; Firouz Bahrapour, *Turkey: Political and Social Transformation*, Brooklyn, N.Y., 1967; Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Montreal, 1964; Kemal H. Karpat (ed), *Social Change and Politics in Turkey*, Leiden, 1973; Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds), *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, Princeton, 1964; Geoffery Lewis, *Modern Turkey*, London, 1974; and articles in the relevant journals.
76. Jamiluddin Ahamd, *Is India One Nation?*, Muslim University Muslim League Publications no. 6, Aligarh, 1939, reproduced in *India's problem of Her Future Constitution*, Bombay, n.d., p. 139. Jamiluddin Ahmad told me that he had written this 17-page pamphlet in 1938; later he confirmed this in his "Evolution of the Concept of Pakistan", *Contemporary Affairs*, Autumn 1969, pp. 154-155.
  77. Jamiluddin Ahmad's letter to me, dated 9 December 1969.
  78. Abdus Samad Khan Rajisthani, letter, *TSI*, 4 November 1938.
  79. For a detailed description of Mawdudi's opinions on these points see his *Musalman awr Mawjuda Siyasi Kashmakash*, Lahore, n.d., 3 vols.
  80. *Tarjuman-ul-Quran*, October, November and December 1938.
  81. For examples of his unrestrained and vituperative language see his *Musalman awr Mawjuda Siyasi Kashmakash*, Lahore, n.d.; *Nationalism and India*, Pathankot, 1947; *The Process of Islamic Revolution*, Pathankot, 1947; *The Message of Jamaat-i-Islami*, Lahore, 1955; and the file of *Tarjuman-ul-Quran*. On him see M. Sarwar, *Mawlana Mawdudi ki Tahrik-i-Islami*, Lahore, 1956; Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961; Government of the Punjab, *Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to inquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953*, Lahore, 1954 (Munir Report); K.K. Aziz, *Party Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1958*, Islamabad

1976, pp. 139-159; and Kalim Bahadur, *The Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan*, New Delhi, 1977, pp. 9-32.

82. Ghulam Ali's letter to me, dated 23 October 1969.
83. Abul Ala Mawdudi's letter to me, dated 6 November 1969.
84. Muhammad Yusuf Yaqub, *Islamabad Tahrik Kya Hay?*, Karachi, n.d. A copy of it was sent to Rahmat Ali in 1938, from which I presume that it was published in that year. He might have published more pamphlets on the subject before or after this one, but I am not aware of them.

# 9

## CULTURE TRIUMPHANT: 1938-1940

### The First Latif Scheme (1938)

Perhaps the best known and certainly the most controversial set of proposals came from Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif between 1938 and 1943. First, a few words about the man himself. He lectured on English literature at the Osmania University of Hyderabad Deccan, and little is known about him before the mid-thirties. In 1936, however, he began to take an increasing interest in the political future of the Indian Muslims. He was particularly struck by the Hindu argument, offered among others by Jawaharlal Nehru in his *Autobiography*,<sup>1</sup> that there was no such thing as a Muslim culture in India, that what the Muslims called their distinct culture was not materially different from the culture of the Hindus, and that therefore the Muslim talk of cultural safeguards was meaningless. In 1936-37 Latif set out on an all-India tour to find out if Muslim intellectual and cultural leaders agreed with the Hindu thesis. He visited Aligarh and the Jamia Millia of Delhi (which, incidentally, was a centre of "nationalist" Muslims who were loyal to the Congress), and impressed upon their leading dons the need for counteracting Hindu propaganda.

In Delhi he met Iqbal who invited him to come to Lahore and spend a few days with him. During this stay in Lahore, Latif told Iqbal that his Allahabad scheme, which aimed at bringing north-western India "into a single administration", was not a complete solution of the cultural problem of the Muslims of the whole of India, and that "a scheme should be devised such as might comprehend the needs of the Muslims not merely of the North-West but of the Muslims of Bengal and Assam where also they were in the majority; and comprehend above all the needs of the Muslim minorities so thinly distributed from Delhi,

Lucknow, Patna downwards to Cape Comorin; as also of the Indian Muslim States”.

On his return from this tour, and as a result of what he had discovered during it, Latif founded the Muslim Cultural Society whose membership came mainly from “the higher Muslim intellectual talent available in Hyderabad”. In August 1937 he delivered his inaugural address to the Society on “The Muslim Culture in India”, which was a direct answer to Nehru’s allegation that there was no Muslim culture in the country. Among the audience were Shawkat Ali and Mrs. Sarojini Naidu. “The address made it clear that the culture of Islam was not a culture which attached importance to the mere externalia of life. It was, on the other hand, an expression of the inner forces of Muslim life, and embodied two fundamental laws of human existence—the law of movement, and the law of unity, stimulating and welcoming on the one hand every urge for progress and on the other striving to let that urge subserve or advance the cause of unity in life. The abiding or permanent form in which it manifested itself was the law of Islam called the *Shariyyat* which moulded its followers into a distinct social order with its own problems to solve on its own lines—problems, educational, social, economic, and political, national and international. Indeed, it was a culture to be preserved as a force for national emancipation, if its intrinsic value could only be properly appreciated by the non-Muslims”.

On these arguments Latif built up the Muslim demand for cultural safeguards. In the Haripura session of February 1938 the Congress, going back on its earlier claims that no separate Muslim culture was in existence, admitted the principle of cultural safeguards and asked the Muslim League to submit its list of safeguards. Jinnah refused to acknowledge that arrogant attitude of the Congress which pretended to occupy the place of supreme authority from where to direct other parties to make submissions. Latif interpreted this in a different way. Construing it as Muslim League failure to know what Muslim cultural safeguards were, and calling it “a humiliating situation”, he felt “that the absence of any specific plan of cultural and other safeguards was due primarily to the absence of any specific goal for the Muslims to aim at”.<sup>2</sup>

This goal he put before Muslim India in his pamphlet *The Cultural Future of India*, published from Bombay in 1938. Its contents must be looked into carefully.

He began by asserting and arguing that the main factors of unity were absent in India. In whatever way we approached the idea of nationhood its basic principle was the presence of a "common moral consciousness", which permeated the entire body of the people who would like to live together as a nation. Ethnologically and culturally India was not a unit. Two great cultures, not to speak of others, subsisted here side by side, inspired by two separate religions affecting every detail of one's life. "Islam and Hinduism stand poles asunder. The two have evolved two entirely different social orders, the one a monotheistic democracy which for the sake of uniting humanity brushes aside all barriers of colour and race and language, and takes little account of geographical limitations; the other, a graded and diversified caste system deeply rooted in symbolism. If I may so express it, it is a federation of religions and cultures, a social imperialism holding under its powerful grip through its Brahminic ritual people standing at every stage of intellectual development, a social system where spirituality or philosophy or even philanthropy comes in as a matter of only individual religious experience, hardly calculated to react on the general spiritual or moral uplift of the entire society . . . . What factor of unity can we then invoke to help the formation of a single nationality for the whole of India covering every section of its people, the Hindu, the Muslim, the Christian, the Buddhist and others?" A common language might have served as a binding force, but that was yet to be. "India is not a country; it is a continent as wide as Europe minus Russia. Even the unity, political or economic, that exists at the present moment here, is after all the result of British rule which so many are out to destroy."

The advocates of a single nationality talked of the possibility of creating a country-wide consciousness through a programme of hate against foreign domination. But every consciousness born of hate was "at best an urge for wilful negation". It would not generate positive virtues. Thus, the question of India's freedom should stand on its own ground. To mix it up with a proposition of a single nationality was to create fresh obstacles in its way.

The cultural peculiarities of the Hindus and the Muslims remaining what they were, the idea of a single composite nationality for them was an impossible proposition unless the Muslims gave up their culture and identity and tagged themselves on as an

additional sub-caste to the Hindu hierarchy. Any programme on the basis of a single nationality would amount to a wilful attempt to strengthen the Hindu nationality only. That probably explained why the Muslims were not enamoured of the policy of the Congress. Its politics was inseparable from Hinduism. "If the Congress electoral arrangement is to consolidate Hinduism or further the cause of a Hindu nationality, even as a separate electorate for the Muslims is considered necessary to prevent the disintegration of Islam in India, and to preserve the Muslim national individuality, the sanest procedure for both is to come to terms with each other on a footing of equality as between two nationalities following two different cultural ideals but obliged by circumstances to live together in a common geographical area, and to effect a pact allowing none to have an upper hand over the other but affording both every urge to work peacefully together for the country's good." If the Congress aimed at imposing the Hindu majority nationalism particularly on the Muslims, through the machinery of the state, it was courting a civil war. "It will be a war India has never experienced in its long history."

The problem of Indian unity was really a cultural one. Therefore, any solution that might be suggested should provide for two things: cultural autonomy to each Indian nationality and political unity for India. The tendency in the modern international world was to allow every cultural unit a geographical home which one might call his own and on which one might raise the edifice of a prosperous nationality. Instead of seeking a unity for India through a federation of Indian states and provinces, each one of which had its own Hindu-Muslim problem, we should work for a confederacy or federation of free states, culturally autonomous, formed through a feasible exchange of population conveniently extending over a number of years.

India should be divided into four cultural zones for the Muslims and at least eleven zones for the Hindus. The native states might be distributed among the different zones in accordance with their "natural affinities". Each zone would form a free autonomous state with a federal form of arrangement within it, but fitting along with other zones into an all-India confederacy.

The four Muslim cultural zones were to be: (I) North-West Block, consisting of Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab, NWFP, and the states of Khairpur and Bahawalpur. These six units would form

a federation and become a "single autonomous State", thus allowing over 25 million Muslims "a free home of their own". (2) North-East Block, consisting of Eastern Bengal and Assam, which would give 30 million Muslims "a free political existence". (3) Delhi-Lucknow Block, which would extend "in a line from the Eastern border of Patiala to Lucknow and rounding up Rampur on the way", would accommodate 12 million Muslims of the United Provinces and Bihar. (4) Deccan Block, which would contain the 12 million Muslims at present scattered below the Vindhyas and Satpuras, would be carved out of the Hyderabad state with a strip of territory restored to it in the south running down to the city of Madras.

Muslims living in Rajputana, Gujrat, Malwa and Western Indian states would need to be concentrated in the territories of the Muslim states of Bhopal, Tonk, Junagadh, Jaora and others, and a newly-constituted Free City of Ajmer.

The rest of India would organize itself into eleven cultural zones "guaranteeing permanence to every Hindu cultural interest in the country". These zones would be Bengal and Bihar, Orissa, Hindustan proper, Rajput states of Rajputana, Gujrat, Mahratta territories, Canarese areas, Andhra, Tamil territories, Malayalam, and a Hindu-Sikh zone in the the north-west. A Royal Commission might be appointed to demarcate the boundaries of the suggested zones.

With economic security assured in his new home to every individual through a system of reciprocity, a higher and nobler sentiment would vanquish the earth-rootedness of the people affected, and an exchange of population would be practicable on a basis of goodwill. This movement might be spread over a period of 15-20 years to minimize its inconvenience. The Muslims, particularly those of the south and the proposed Delhi-Lucknow block, would suffer more than others in this migration. "But it is better that the present generation of them face the ordeal manfully rather than leave the task to their children who may not probably have the chance of a peaceful exchange which at this time may be possible for us to effect."

This large-scale migration might still leave some minorities in most zones. These would be afforded security of person and cultural interests under a "Public Law of Indian Nations" adopted by the central government. In addition, all religious shrines,

monuments and graveyards belonging to any one of the two nationalities left behind by either would be preserved and looked after by each Free State under the supervision of the central government.

The Depressed Classes counted by millions and were dispersed all over the country. They did not possess any common culture among them. They would have to be given the fullest freedom to select their own place in either the Hindu nationality or the Muslim or the Christian; for, left alone, they would probably take ages to develop a culture of their own.<sup>3</sup>

### The Second Latif Scheme (1939)

In the meantime, the Muslim League had appointed a "Foreign Committee" to consider constitutional arrangements alternative to the 1935 Act and providing the Muslims greater security. Sir Abdullah Haroon of Sind, a member of the Muslim League Working Committee and chairman of the Foreign Committee, was so much impressed with Latif's proposals contained in the *Cultural Future of India* that he invited him to Lahore "in order that he might discuss his views with the members of the Foreign Committee of the Muslim League which was to meet there on the 29th January 1939". Latif duly came to Lahore and had conversations with the Committee. After hearing him, the Committee requested him "to prepare a scheme under which the goal suggested might be reached by successive stages".<sup>4</sup> The revised scheme was prepared and sent to the Muslim League in March 1939, and simultaneously released to the press.<sup>5</sup> As soon as he had dispatched it to Haroon, Latif began to elaborate the bare details he had been able to embody in his memorandum, and in July published from Karachi the enlarged version under the title of *The Muslim Problem in India together with an Alternative Constitution for India*, which carried a foreword by Haroon. A summary of the recommendations made in this pamphlet was later reproduced in *The Pakistan Issue* (pp. 2-12).

The following account of the 1939 scheme (the year is important because Latif was to present other schemes in later years) follows the text of *The Muslim Problem in India*.

He opened the book with the question: "Why are the Muslims of India at this moment in a state of serious anxiety over their

future?" The answer, he said, lay "in the fact that the Muslims have lost faith in the Hindus and apprehend that the Act of 1935 and anything that may follow on its lines will sooner or later destroy their individuality and reduce them to the position of a helpless minority". Muslims were also convinced that the British Parliament had "set aside every moral obligation towards them in an anxious desire to placate the Hindu majority". The British had made a great mistake in devising for India a constitution which was "out of tune with the genius of its people, their history, tradition and social organization". It was framed on the assumption that India was a composite nation, "which it is not and does not promise to be". The Hindus and the Muslims, "the two leading and major nationalities of India"; were divided "into two different social orders drawing direct inspiration in every detail of life from two fundamentally different religions and cultures". The new constitution was bound to establish governments, both in the provinces and at the centre, of "a single majority nationality".<sup>6</sup>

Further, the kind of democracy brought to India by Britain was "a direct challenge to the basic principles of the Hindu social structure"; because caste was "a comprehensive system of life dealing with food, marriage, education, association and worship". Democracy was not merely a form of government but a "state of society", a "system of social relationships". That was why human equality became the basis of democracy, and that was where Hinduism, with its inequality written into the creed and enforced by the fear of the Brahman, clashed with the essence of the democratic principle. "Indeed the fascist tendency so clearly noticeable in the high-command of the Congress at the present moment is but a phase, a development of the self-same high caste Imperialism which from time immemorial has denied to the Hindu masses their birth right of freedom". Caste and democracy were "fundamentally opposed in ideals, contrary in methods, and different in results". How could one have a political system based on equality where the social system was based on inequality?<sup>7</sup>

This weakness of the Indian social organization perhaps might not have been fatal to the evolution of democracy had the people of the country been of one nation. But India "is a congeries of races and cross-breeds". Still it might have been a nation if it were culturally unified. Even within the fold of Hinduism "*a single stable nationality for all the Hindus*" was impossible. The

political and economic unity which India showed was "after all the result of British rule which so many are out to destroy". There was no common moral consciousness permeating the entire body of the people. A unity born of an anti-British feeling would be a child of hate, and no nationhood could be based on this negation. Hindus and Muslims would never unite culturally, and therefore the birth of a composite nation in India was a remote possibility.<sup>8</sup>

After reading *The Cultural Future of India*, Gandhi had written to Latif: "I see we look at things from different angles of vision. I believe in the possibility of the two cultures blending. The difficulties which you picture don't baffle me." Now Latif asked himself the question if the two cultures could "so blend into each other as to create a composite nationality for India".

The only result of centuries of intercourse that he could see was "a process of interaction in ways of living materially assisted by a common climate". Even this, however, was primarily in the externals of life, leaving the inner soul of each unaffected. Their life-currents did not meet. Their spirits did not blend. They still had no common ways of thought and living, no common personal laws, no common ideals. Occasional manifestations of toleration and courtesy could not amount to the adoption of a common culture. The "true seat of culture is the mind of man", and here the distinction between Hindus and Muslims was clear and stark. "The blending of two such cultures calls for the blending of the religions themselves which have inspired them." Culture could not be divorced from religion. It was synonymous with life, and life was the expression of man's deepest convictions. Religion alone embodied these convictions and offered ideals to uplift the human spirit. Culture was the cultivation of the mind as it had been moulded by religion.

If religion was the basis of culture, how could Muslim and Hindu cultures blend unless Hinduism and Islam blended? And, was that possible? For the Muslim to give up his spiritual ideals and his way of life was to go down the scale. He would never do it. Would the Hindu try to build a half-way house by discarding his ritualism and his caste beliefs and practice and by cultivating a genuine fraternal feeling towards the Muslim?

Gandhi might talk glibly of an Indian culture, but "neither he nor any of his followers can deny that his one aim in life has

been to consolidate Hinduism, and that to him his Hinduism has been synonymous with Indian nationalism. The Muslim culture would come in for his recognition if and only if it could fit into his own brand of Hinduism. His *Hindi-Athwa-Hindustani* movement, his Wardha and Vidya Mandir schemes of education, and his attitude towards that provocative polytheistic song, *Vande Mataram*—all, show the type of blending *he* likes. Under his influence, the intellectuals among the Hindus have gradually and at times with determined effort discarded one after another the things which were a common heritage from the country's past, the heritage left by the traditions of the Moguls." At Yaravada in 1932 Gandhi had staked his life to prevent the granting of separate electorates to the untouchables, "not in the name of India's freedom, not in the name of an Indian nationality, but merely to 'consolidate Hinduism' as he put it". So, on the record of the man who had for so long guided the destiny of the Congress, for the Hindus politics was inseparable from religion.<sup>9</sup>

Thus it was clear that the Act of 1935 embodied principles inapplicable to India. It transferred power to one single majority community which would hold office in perpetuity. The Muslim minority would never be able to become a majority and would therefore live entirely on the sufferance of the Hindu majority. The result would not be a responsible government, but one-party tyrannies the like of which had already been established in all Congress provinces. It was an added misfortune that the new rulers were strangers to the art of government. Never before in their history were Hindus called upon to rule over such a large number of Muslims. It was therefore not surprising that they succumbed to the lure of power and to the urge to put down their former masters and to force their own culture upon them. Jinnah had warned against this tendency, but the Congress leaders, flushed with their own power, were not in a mood to hear of equality or fair treatment. Jinnah's "one desire is to have for the country a constitution under which no single community, Muslim or Hindu, should gain an upper hand over the other. The Congress refusal to see this had created a strong reaction among the Muslims. They had taken the decision to resist this constitution with all the strength that they still possess and fight it to the bitter end." This resolve was so strong that the Congress would be courting the calamity of a civil war if they persisted in their effort to

impose their Hindu nationalism on the Muslims through the machinery of provincial governments. It would be foolish for the Congress to count upon its "nationalist" Muslims: they would be swept off the board when the crisis came. Unless the Congress and the British government did something to improve the situation, the country would be in the grip of a civil war "such as India never knew before in its long history".<sup>10</sup>

Using the term "culture" in its widest sense, the Hindu-Muslim problem was really cultural rather than purely political. Its solution must provide for two things: "cultural autonomy to each Indian nationality or community, and political unity for India". This could be attained in either of two ways. "One is to allow each community or nationality to fit into the existing conditions and adjust their relationship in a manner that may allow none to have any commanding influence over the other; the other is to alter the existing conditions and create separate homelands or cultural zones for the different Indian nationalities all bound together by a common political nexus, and thus eliminate for ever the never-ending clashes arising everywhere out of the fundamental cleavage existing between their cultural ideals and social orders." The first alternative more or less represented the kind of approach Jinnah had all along taken to bring about a settlement, but the Congress had refused to negotiate with the Muslims on terms of equality. "Personally I believe in the possibility of a reconciliation—a reconciliation which at least in our time might suspend mutual acerbities", provided that Hindu leaders of every complexion "sincerely feel contrition over the wilful designs they have had on the Muslims", and agreed to a constitution under which none gained an upper hand over the other.

If this solution was unacceptable to the Hindus, a partition of the country remained the only alternative. For several years the Muslim mind, particularly in the north-west, had been thinking on the lines of a Pakistan scheme which was based on the principle that "the Muslims should be rulers somewhere instead of being subjects everywhere". The one great advantage of this plan was that it did not involve any exchange of population. "But in other respects, it was at best a patch-work, and no permanent solution to the Hindu-Muslim problem." It ignored the Muslims living in Hindu provinces. By leaving Hindu and Sikh minorities in Pakistan it would still have on its hands the problem of minority-

majority adjustments and safeguards. Thus all plans involving separation led to endless complications.

Therefore one returned to the solution by reconciliation. The scheme urged as a last resort by *The Cultrual Future of India* had been "fundamentally different" from these separatist proposals. "It was a scheme for the unification of India on natural lines, and was therefore entirely Indian in outlook."<sup>11</sup>

The cultural distribution of India would work as follows. It would create four cultural zones for the Muslims and at least eleven for the Hindus. The native states would be distributed among the different zones in accordance with their natural affinities. "Each such zone will form a homogeneous State with a highly decentralized form of government within, wherever more than a unit should compose the zone, but fitting along with similar States in an All-India federation."

The North-West block would save 25 million Muslims, and the North-East block 30 million. The Delhi-Lucknow and Deccan blocks would each have 12 million Muslims. The creation of the Deccan block would restore to the Muslims of the south "the historic consciousness that they are the common inheritors of the Muslim culture that developed and flourished here for centuries consummating in the time of the Moguls when the whole of this area formed part of a single *Suba*." The rest of India would be arranged into eleven zones. Ten of these were the same as had been indicated in the earlier scheme. The eleventh would be demarcated for the Hindus and Sikhs of the north-western Muslim block. It would contain all the non-Muslim states of the Punjab States Agency and part of Kashmir. Districts of Kashmir occupied by Muslims would be transferred to the Punjab, and in exchange the Maharaja would receive a portion of the north-east of the Punjab comprising the Kangra Valley.

The scheme would involve a large-scale exchange of population which might not be to the liking of many persons who would be asked to move. But the advantages of the transfer would "far outweigh" the disadvantages and inconveniences. Once the individual was assured that the move would not bring any economic handicaps, "a new sentiment immeasurably higher and nobler than that of earth-rootedness will be his inevitable reward". As the object of the exercise was to guarantee to the Hindus and the Muslims perfect freedom to follow their own culture in their own

homelands, everyone would bear the inconvenience with good cheer. The suffering would be greater in the case of the Muslims of the United Provinces and those of Hyderabad and the south because they were scattered over a large area, but it was better that the present generation faced the ordeal manfully than that they left the task to their children who might not be able to effect the move peacefully. Anyway, such migrations were not unknown to the Muslim race. In the case of the Hindus, the shift would be less inconvenient because it would cover a shorter distance and would not take them to very different climatic conditions.

The resulting problem of compensation for the property left behind by the migrants would not be difficult to settle between the governments of the federal units concerned. The parties involved would discharge their financial obligations in a spirit of reciprocity under a "Public Law of Indian Nations" covering these obligations and embodied in the new constitution.

The smaller nationalities, such as the Christians, Parsis, Buddhists and Anglo-Indians, would be given by each state, Hindu or Muslim, all necessary religious and cultural safeguards. If they so desired, they could also ask for a cantonal life for themselves. The Harijans or the Untouchables, who did not belong to any one culture, were dispersed all over the country and had, in most cases, no landed property, would be given a choice to make their permanent homelands in any Hindu or Muslim zone.

Thus, said Latif in conclusion, "is the federal order which the Muslim is anxious to see ultimately established in the country". The Congress could have no objection to it because its own creed looked forward to re-fashioning India on a cultural basis. In the Congress programme cultural distribution was to follow linguistic lines. In this scheme "the cultural lines are fuller, comprehending the linguistic as well". While the Congress proposal provided no cultural autonomy to the Muslims, this scheme guaranteed cultural freedom to every cultural unit in its own homeland. It also gave a promise of greater freedom to the smaller minorities. Moreover, it left the native states intact, at the same time enabling them to share a common regional and cultural life with contiguous territory possessing common affinities. Finally, it did not disturb India's connection with Britain. In the closing sentence, Latif emphasized that "the scheme is a scheme for unity and not for disruption".<sup>12</sup>

In the last chapter Latif outlined an alternative constitution

"which may mark the first step towards the realization of the zonal ideal". The most important issue was that of provincial autonomy. India was too vast and varied to be encompassed into a close federation with a strong centre. Its divergent units could not be yoked together except in matters which were absolutely common to all, namely, defence, foreign affairs, commerce, communications, and the like. Three further considerations dictated the establishment of a weak federal centre. The cultural diversity of the country did not lend itself to regulation by a distant, central legislature: federal interference would result in social disturbances and unpleasant feelings. The native states, already reluctant to enter an all-India federation, could be brought into a federal arrangement only if their security and autonomy were fully assured. For the Muslim minority the only real safeguard in the future constitution would be the reality of self-rule in their own provinces and zones. If all power was to be vested in the centre with its inevitable Hindu majority, Muslims would not have anything to do with it. In a country where there was no single homogeneous nation, the prospect of the majority community seizing power at the centre in the name of a non-existent nationalism would never be acceptable to the Muslims.

The centre would therefore have very limited powers enumerated in one list. The residue would be vested in the units. There would be no concurrent list. In order to co-ordinate the activities of the contiguous units in such cultural and economic matters as were common to them, zonal boards would be established to evolve common policies on common problems. Legislation on the basis of policies thus evolved would be left to the individual federal units. The formation of such zonal boards would remove the need of making sub-federations out of provinces.

A parliamentary executive, which in India would be bound to degenerate into a perpetual tyranny of one majority party, would be substituted by a composite one. This would not be a coalition government of two or more parties or communities, but a composite government "such as exists in America and follows an agreed policy". In concrete terms, the prime minister in each province would be elected by the entire legislature to function during the complete term of the legislature. He would make up his cabinet "in terms of the ratio fixed on an all-India basis by agreement between the communities concerned". An adverse vote by the

assembly would not dislodge the government which would "devote itself exclusively to the welfare of the people by following a policy agreed by the members composing the government".

Special safeguards for Muslims were prescribed, arranged in seven categories. In representation on legislatures, separate electorates were to be maintained along with the existing system of weightage. The native states would be allowed entry into the federation on the condition that they returned to the federal parliament as many Muslims as would be sufficient to ensure that the total Muslim strength was not less than one-third in the whole house. In the zonal boards Muslims would have adequate and effective representation commensurate with their total strength in the legislatures of the several units composing each zone. In the legislature, personal law and culture would be the exclusive concern of Muslim members, who would for this purpose constitute themselves into a special committee. This committee was to be augmented by a third through co-opting representative Muslims learned in law and religion. Its decisions would be accepted by the whole legislature.

In the "composite governments" already suggested, in the portfolios of law and order and education there would be a minister and an assistant minister, and one of these posts would always go to a Muslim. In all provinces where Muslims were in a minority and at the centre, at least one member of the public service commission would be Muslim, and one of his duties would be to see that the government maintained the ratio fixed for Muslims in public services. In the judicial field the personal law of the Muslims was to be administered by Muslim judges. Each province would have a Muslim board vested with the authority to control and supervise the cultural side of the education of Muslims and their technical and industrial training, and to devise measures for their economic and social uplift. Whenever the Muslims wished to tax themselves for any special purpose, the necessary legislation would be passed without opposition.

Finally, the transitional constitution would make arrangements for the transfer of population. In the transitional period migration would be on a voluntary basis. A Royal Commission would be appointed to lay down a suitable programme of gradual exchange of population. Periodical reviews of results of voluntary migration should be made, and if it were found that it had "eliminated the

cultural clashes between the Muslims and the Hindus to an appreciable extent and given them a sense of security wherever they need it, or has brought about a change of heart in either camp", the operation of compulsory migration might be postponed indefinitely and the use of voluntary method continued.<sup>13</sup>

Some points of this plan were elaborated by Latif in his correspondence with Dr. Rajendra Prasad in January 1940. It would be better to look at these clarifications before attempting an appraisal of the scheme.

On the projected division of Kashmir, he added that the Maharaja would be compensated for the exclusion of his Muslim-majority areas in the west by the transfer to him of a portion of the Kangra valley "on the basis of respective land values". "The balance, if any, may be adjusted by payment in cash by the government concerned." The Hindus of Sind would be accommodated in Gujrat and Rajasthan when the Muslim population shifted from these areas. He reiterated that the creation of the Delhi-Lucknow Muslim block was so important that preparatory to the exchange of population that part of the block which lay in the British Indian territory should have to be demarcated into a province and given a Muslim prime minister. He justified the establishment of the Hyderabad block and the inclusion of Madras as its outlet to the sea on three grounds: it alone could effect the concentration of the Muslim population of the south into one territory; it alone allowed the Mahrattas, the Andhras, the Kanaras, the Malayalis and the Tamilians homogeneous states with exclusive boundaries of their own; the allotment of Madras to the Muslim zone would preserve the homogeneity of the Hindu zones mentioned above. The territory of the Hyderabad block was calculated on the assumption that the Harijans of this block would not migrate to a Hindu zone.

On the cost of transfer of population, he made it clear that compensation would be permissible only in respect of the immovables, such as land and houses. It was expected that the migrant would be able to dispose of his heavy movables like furniture and cattle before he left his town or village.

Any Indian citizen, or even a foreigner, would have the right to take up residence in any block and carry on his business there. But he would be considered as a national of the block he came from.

Full freedom of conscience would be allowed, but propaganda

for conversion, would be restricted. If an individual changed his religion, he would be allowed to migrate to a block where his new co-religionists were in a majority; or, if he chose to stay back, he would be counted among the minority community of the block, and so automatically governed and protected by the "Public Law of Indian Nations". As regards the Untouchables, Latif said that "my impression is that those living in areas to be reserved for Muslims may not find it profitable to shift along with the Caste Hindus". If they wanted to leave the Muslim blocks no obstacles would be put in their way. If they desired to live among the Muslims, they would not only be welcome but "I would give them a permanent interest in the land under some equitable distribution of the landed wealth of the block concerned". To Rajendra Prasad's inquiry if Latif treated the Untouchables as non-Hindus, he replied, "I have no right to call them either Hindus or non-Hindus. They will have to determine which they are."<sup>14</sup>

It is reported that Haroon widely circulated *The Muslim Problem in India* both in India and in Britain, and was pleased at its favourable reception in many circles. In a letter to Latif written on 5 January 1940, he expressed his great pleasure at finding that the book "has received great popularity in England and many people view it as being an excellent representation of Muslim opinion". He had also received some other letters "which undoubtedly show that the book has been appreciated by a large section of public-minded people". He concluded with a significant sentence: "Under the circumstances I must express my utmost thanks for the labour you undertook for the supreme cause of Musalmans by evolving such a scheme which if materialized embodies in itself the separate and free Homelands for Muslims in India."<sup>15</sup>

There is some indication that Latif's book was well reviewed in certain British circles. Writing in the *Great Britain and the East* of 14 December 1939, Professor Rushbrook Williams commented: "This little book is important because it is not written from the British point of view, nor from the Pan-Islamic point of view, but the Indian point of view. The author counts himself as good a nationalist as anyone else; but he is determined to oppose the kind of nationalism which would eliminate Islam as a political force in India. We commend it to those well-intentioned critics who believe that the minority problem is a nettle which needs

only to be grasped firmly and with courage in order to render the spines impotent. The particular spine is far 'more likely to pierce the hand which fails to show it proper respect.'<sup>16</sup>

Another British reviewer saw in the scheme a pointer to the serious threat posed by the Muslim problem to the progress of India towards self-government. "Even if the proposal be ignored", wrote H.J. Fells, "its appearance is a clear indication of the fact that if nothing remedial be done India's attainment of the stature of a self-governing unit in the Empire is permanently barred and the canker of communalism will eat still further into the heart of India."<sup>17</sup>

### The Scheme Analyzed

The first thing that strikes us in Latif's argument is its extraordinary similarity with the Muslim League point of view and the general Muslim opinion of the time. All the points which the Muslims were then beginning to make against the conception and possibility of a united India are to be found in Latif: Muslim loss of faith in Hindu sincerity and promises, Muslim fear of Hindu rule, the inapplicability of democracy to India, the creation of a perpetual Hindu majority by the operation of the 1935 constitution and Muslim resolve to fight this to the bitter end, the danger of a civil war if no ameliorative steps were taken, the rejection of India as one national entity and refusal to see any possibility of it in the future, a firm belief in the presence of two nations in India based on the two major religions, a conviction that Congress politics were rooted in Hinduism, and a settled opinion that Congress ministries in the provinces were oppressing the Muslims and forcing Hindu culture upon them. All these were ingredients of the Muslim campaign against the Congress objective of establishing the principle of majority rule in the name of freedom, and in favour of an alternative which would alleviate Muslim apprehensions and grant them adequate protection and effective autonomy. Latif was the first to make use of all these arguments and, by putting them in some kind of order, to build a coherent case against the assumptions underlying the 1935 constitution and the future arrangements prescribed by the Congress. It stands to his credit that he saw the problem in a clear perspective and stated it in terms which could not be misunderstood.

-It is, therefore, a matter of much significance and considerable surprise that Latif did not agree with the advocates of partition. After fully supporting the Muslim League policy of opposition to the Congress, after praising Jinnah for his patriotism, moderation, leadership and foresight, after bitterly condemning the Congress for its narrow mentality and its exclusively Hindu thinking, after reprimanding the Hindu leadership for their treatment of the Muslim minority in their provinces, after firmly rejecting the theory of a single Indian nationalism, after repudiating the possibility of the blending of the two cultures—after all this he still believed in reconciliation and a kind of co-existence. The contrast between his premisses and his conclusion amounts to a contradiction. If what he says about the Congress attitude and the Muslim reaction to it is true, then facts should have ruled out reconciliation. If he is right in claiming that reconciliation could work, then the premisses from which he argued could not have been correct.

This apparent contradiction can be partially, but only partially, explained by his determination to provide for the protection of Muslims living in the minority provinces and areas. This comes out in his criticism of the Pakistan proposal. He raises three main objections against it: it neglects the Muslims living in Hindu provinces, it ignores Hyderabad, and it will not solve the cultural problem. It is not clear which "Pakistan" he was criticizing in these arguments. Strictly speaking, the only Pakistan scheme before the public at that time was the one prepared by Rahmat Ali; and that should have satisfied Latif because it created several national homelands for the Muslims of Hindu provinces and turned Hyderabad into a sovereign Muslim state. But obviously he had some other general proposals in mind; for by 1939 the term "Pakistan" had come to be applied, both by Muslims and Hindus, to any scheme which suggested a partition of India. Thus we can safely assume that Latif was rejecting some imprecise and undetermined scheme which, like the later Muslim League demand of Pakistan, did not concern itself with Muslims living outside the north-west and Bengal-Assam.

As he himself belonged to Hyderabad, his critics might well detect a parochial tendency in his anxiety to save the Muslims of Hindu India even if this led him to self-contradictions and indefensible conclusions. His scheme of making Hyderabad into a

Muslim zone is based on no democratic or national principle. Like Rahmat Ali he trots out three sets of arguments in justification of this proposal: culturally Hyderabad was an "Urdu area" and needed to be kept as such, historically it had been a Muslim-ruled state since the Mughal times and ought to be retained as such, nationally it would be able to offer protection to a few million Muslims scattered all over south India. These arguments do not convince. In fact, Latif went beyond Rahmat Ali in refuting his own logic. He divided Bengal on a religious basis, giving the eastern half to the Muslims and the western to the Hindus; he also divided Kashmir on religious lines, allotting the western districts to the Punjab and the eastern to the Maharaja. Both Bengal and Kashmir were Muslim-majority 'entities, and yet he wanted them to be broken up so that Hindus were not forced into living under Muslim rule. But he was anxious to keep the whole of Hyderabad, enlarged by the addition of some more territory, as a Muslim region, unmindful of its overwhelming Hindu majority.

And that was not all. He went further and created pockets for Muslims in the heart of Hindu India. By suggesting that the Muslim native states of Bhopal, Tonk and Junagadh should be Muslim areas and that Ajmer should be a free city, he offered a proposition far worse than Rahmat Ali's. Far worse, because these areas were of tiny proportions in comparison with Rahmat Ali's national homes. Similarly, his Delhi-Lucknow zone was to be a landlocked region containing a thinly-spread Muslim population. He was so keen on this zone that, in Section II of his alternative constitution, he conceded that new provinces might be created piecemeal, but insisted that the one to be carved out of the United Provinces ought to be demarcated at once and put under a Muslim prime minister.

His determination to protect the Muslims of minority areas did not brook any obstacle. He made light work of the necessity of a migration on a huge scale without which his plans could not be realized. For him there were no great difficulties in effecting a transfer of population involving a few hundred millions. Such movements, he proclaimed almost like a medieval historian, were not unknown to the Muslim race.

Other weaknesses of his over-all scheme may be noticed more briefly, but without implying that they are unimportant. Probably because he was a Hyderabadi, he retained intact the princely

states in his structure of the future. He did not even mention the incongruity of making up a federation of such diverse units as provinces and native states. He also failed to make any reference to the undemocratic nature of the administration of these states. Perhaps he did not realize that he was perpetuating an oppressive and unprogressive system of government, and consequently siding with the cause and spirit of reaction.

Throughout the scheme there is not a word about the independence of India. The indefinite continuation of British rule is taken for granted. There is no criticism of foreign domination, no timetable for its withdrawal, and no provisions for readjustments if and when the imperial connection would be severed.

When we come to the concrete proposals embodied in his alternative constitution we notice some peculiar suggestions. He starts with a most impracticable proposition in rearing the whole constitutional fabric on the basis of a weak federal centre. The British-made 1935 constitution had decreed a close-type federation with immense powers in the hands of the centre; the provinces enjoyed a spurious autonomy. British anxiety to see a united India taking firm roots ruled out any possibility of British acquiescence in the creation of a loose federation. The Congress leaders were even more devoted to a strong centre, and no amount of Muslim opposition seemed to shake them out of this belief. It is true that their fanatical efforts to establish a strong federation were a testimony to their knowledge that the fissiparous tendencies prevalent in India would destroy the facade of its precarious unity unless a permanent Hindu majority controlled a powerful federal government. In view of Congress insistence on a strong centre all suggestions for the making of a weak federation were unrealistic.

The setting up of zonal or regional boards would have made the constitution too complicated to work smoothly. In spite of Latif's denial that he was erecting sub-federations, the fact is that he was offering a three-tier federal structure, something similar to the later Cabinet Mission plan of 1946. Though he made the establishment of these boards optional, yet their absence would have rendered the whole zonal system pointless.

The "compositive executive" suggested in the constitution ran counter to all principles of political science, and would have been unworkable in practice. It was worse than a coalition government, for it would have had no unified policy to carry out and at the

same time no option to resign and let another cabinet take charge. Being irremovable through an adverse vote, it could easily develop into a corrupt tyranny. Legislative accountability disappears when the will of the house cannot change a government. Latif was also wrong in claiming that this system was modelled on the government of the USA. A president elected by the whole country by (virtually) a direct vote is quite different in stature, authority and popularity from a prime minister chosen by an assembly. Nor does the president of the United States form a cabinet from among the legislature. Nor is his government "composite", for it is a party government in every sense.

In his clarification of a point raised by Rajendra Prasad, Latif postulated a strange feature in his federation. There would be no Indian citizenship, i.e., no federal citizenship, but separate citizenships for each block or zone. This is unknown to the federal principle. The whole idea behind federalism is to create a new state embracing several units or areas. This new state would be incomplete, in fact not a state at all, if all its inhabitants did not have a common citizenship. Separate citizenships are possible in a confederation, but evidently Latif was not suggesting a confederal arrangement.

In conclusion, we must notice that, in spite of Latif's failure to mention Rahmat Ali or to acknowledge any influence of the Cambridge movement upon his own ideas, his scheme has much in common with that of Rahmat Ali's Pakistan. Both refuse to see any unity in India, underline the fundamental clash between Hindu and Muslim cultures and ideals, and expound a two-nation theory according to which Muslims constitute a separate nation or nationality. When Latif spoke of the impossibility of the two cultures blending with each other, his very phraseology seems to have been borrowed from Rahmat Ali. Both reject the 1935 constitution on identical grounds, and emphasize Muslim determination to oppose its implementation and operation regardless of consequences. Both are anxious to retain the Nizam's dominions as a Muslim region: Rahmat Ali wants it to be a sovereign state, Latif makes a separate zone of it. Both provide for the creation of a small "home" for the Hindu and Sikh minorities of the north-west. Both establish several small Muslim strongholds in the heart of Hindu India. Both include Assam, a Hindu-majority province, in the Muslim north-eastern zone or state. Both are deeply concerned

with the future of the untouchables, whom they want to see separated from the Caste Hindus and, if possible, allied with the Muslims. Such sharp resemblances could hardly have been a matter of coincidence. In fact, the only major point distinguishing them is that while Rahmat Ali stood for a complete separation of the Muslims from the rest of India, Latif did not want to break up the unity of the country and believed that, in spite of the Muslim loss of faith in the Hindu, a reconciliation was possible and a common federation workable.

### The Third Latif Scheme (1940)

In the following year (1940), Latif offered still another scheme which was an amended version of the one we have been examining above. The background against which this was done was his opposition to the Lahore Resolution. Some time after the adoption of the Resolution by the Lahore session of AIML (March 1940), he realized that the Resolution did not conform to the concensus of opinion held by the Constitution Committee, which had been appointed in February 1940 to examine each plan submitted to the Muslim League executive body and to see if a consolidated scheme could finally be framed. Apart from protesting against this to the Foreign Committee, on whose request Latif had prepared his scheme and under whose auspices the Constitution Committee was supposed to be working, he sent it a "preliminary note" analysing the Lahore Resolution.

To begin with, he asked four questions about the meaning of certain provisions of the Resolution. "Are the several regional states to combine for any specific purpose or purposes under a single constitution for the whole of India, or is each state to live a separate existence of its own? The Resolution would provide 'mandatory safeguards for minorities in the constitution'. But under whose mandate? and in which constitution,—constitution of the region or of the constituent 'sovereign units' thereof, or of India as a whole? . . . If each state should be independent, who is to guarantee that the mandatory safeguards sought for the Muslim minorities in regional states, where Hindus predominate or for the non-Muslim minorities where the Muslims predominate, will be properly respected by the governments of the states concerned? In other words what are the 'sanctions', and who is to apply

them? . . . The Resolution implies that at any rate for some time, the powers of defence, etc., will have to be exercised by some authority other than these states. This argues a transitional constitution for the whole of India, at least for this purpose. What is that arrangement to be like?"

To him the meaning of all this was that the plan envisaged by the Resolution could not be implemented except by fitting it into an all-India constitutional scheme. He asked the League to decide at once about the shape of this all-India constitutional structure. "A tentative outline of it, as submitted by me, has been under the consideration of the Working Committee for over a year. Some of its features, including the provision of regional sovereign states have, no doubt, been incorporated in the Lahore Resolution. But the background for the framework of an All-India Constitution has not been reproduced." He particularly wanted the League to give close attention to the question of mandatory safeguards, which was "of supreme importance to the Muslims of all those provinces where they are in the minority. They are alarmed at the plan envisaged in the Resolution, and are therefore to be assured that their position is safe under it, and also shown how it is so."<sup>18</sup>

The scheme which he now offered, and called "a broad outline of the Union or Commonwealth of India", was a new version of his 1939 constitution revised in the light of the Lahore Resolution. Whether India achieved the status of a dominion or became completely independent, it would be in her best interests "to resolve herself into a Union with a federal form of constitution peculiar to Indian conditions". This Union was to be composed of "sovereign states" of two categories. those carved out of the territory known as British India, and the native states. Each of the states in the first category should be "so constituted through a readjustment of existing provincial boundaries as to form a compact block affording absolute cultural homogeneity to the majority community inhabiting the areas and cultural autonomy to the minority communities wherever necessary". It might consist of several units, each administratively autonomous, which together would form a zonal federation fitting into an all-India union along with other similar zonal federations. To take one example, the linguistic areas known as Tamil Nad, Andhra, Malabar and Canara might choose either to remain as "separate sovereign

federated states", or combine to form a zonal federation of Dravidian races or cultures which would then be linked with the Indian Union.

Two such "sovereign states" to be created in the north-west and the north-east to satisfy the political aspirations of the Muslims of these areas would be (1) a zonal federation composed of Sind, British Baluchistan, the NWFP and the Punjab, and (2) a zonal federation composed of Bengal and Assam. Each unit within these two federations would be autonomous.

The larger native states would remain "sovereign states and join the Union in their individual rights". The smaller ones would either merge with contiguous states in British India or group themselves together "for purposes of representation at the Centre though individually enjoying autonomy in internal affairs".

The distribution of powers between the centre and the units making up the Union would be based on the principle of one list enumerating the powers of the centre and limiting them to the barest minimum. Broadly speaking the four subjects allotted to the Union would be external relations, defence, major communications, and customs. In the field of defence, the navy would be entirely under the control of the centre "subject to such concessions as the coastal states might need". But each state would have its own army, whose strength and size would depend on the importance and strategic position of the state and would be specified in the constitution. Part of the army would be classified as "federal", and the centre would share the military expenditure of each state in proportion to the strength of the army maintained by it. In normal times the military forces of each state would be controlled by its own government under the supervision of the centre. In time of war, however, the centre would assume full control of all armed forces. The "federated states or units" would be fully autonomous with all residuary powers vested in them. These were to include the right of entering into commercial treaties with foreign countries and of seceding from the Union.

On the levels of units and zonal federations the minorities, whether Hindu or Muslim, were given two safeguards relating to their representation in legislatures. They would have the option of returning their representatives to the assemblies through their own electorates. A minority with a strength of less than one-third in the population of a unit or a zonal federation would be given

one-third of the total seats in the legislature: but this concession was limited to the two major communities, the Hindus and the Muslims, wherever they were in a small minority. In the parliament of the Union, Muslims would be entitled to "at least two-fifths of the seats reserved for them". These Muslim seats were to be filled through election by Muslim members of the legislatures of the federated states. This concession was based on two considerations: the size of Muslim share in the defence responsibilities of India (the Simla Deputation of 1906 had used the same argument), and Muslim fear of Hindu domination at the centre.

The executive at the centre and in each federated state and its unit would be of the composite variety and would "follow an agreed policy". In each case the head of the cabinet would be free to choose some of his ministers from outside the legislature, and these would automatically become members of the legislature on their appointment. The cabinet would be selected from a panel suggested by the leaders of the different communities in the assembly. The office of the head of the cabinet would rotate between Hindus and Muslims. No decision of the cabinet would be effective if it were opposed by its Muslim members. Like representation in the legislatures, Muslims were to have one-third quota on the executives of all federated states and units where they were in a minority (with a corresponding concession to the Hindus where they were in a minority), and two-fifths quota in the executive of the Union.

In all legislatures no law could be enacted if it was opposed by four-fifths of the Muslim or Hindu members on the ground that it prejudiced their interests.

There was only a brief reference to transfer of population in this constitutional draft. Obligatory migration was not mentioned this time. One of the objects of the constitution, it was declared, would be "to facilitate inter-migration of Muslims and Hindus wherever sought or wherever necessary, between states or between parts of the same state so as to promote a sense of security among them". Each state would pass the legislation required for this and set up a competent machinery to organize and regulate the migration and assign compensation for property left behind by the migrants.<sup>19</sup>

We may briefly notice the points in which this scheme differs from the earlier one. Most of the amendments and changes are obviously aimed at bringing his plan nearer to the Lahore Resolu-

tion. The constitutional structure is now made even more loose by designating it as a Union or a Commonwealth instead of a federation, by setting up a very weak centre, by providing for state armies, and by granting the units the right of secession. The former zones, blocks and regions have been replaced by zonal federations, and the two such federations in the north-west and the north-east follow the demand of the Lahore Resolution. The suggestion for dividing Bengal between Hindus and Muslims has also disappeared. He has also given up the previous scheme for creating small Muslim centres (based on Muslim native states like Bhopal, Tonk, etc.) in the midst of Hindu regions. But he still insists on retaining the identity and independence of the princely states, and has an obvious eye on Hyderabad when he makes the larger states "sovereign" in the Union.

These changes have, however, failed to remove the major weaknesses of his proposals. All the defects of the earlier plan are still there: a three-tier federal arrangement, a mixture of provinces and princely dominions in the Union, a weak centre, composite executives, irremovable cabinets, and transfer of population. Some new disadvantages have been added, the most serious of them being the creation of state armies and the right of secession. These things make the plan even more unpracticable than the previous attempt. Latif must have been completely out of touch with realities and blindly ignorant of Congress opinion to hope that a union with such a weak centre, with independent state armies, and with states' right of secession, would receive the slightest consideration from the Hindus. To make matters worse, he has the irritating habit of calling the federated states "sovereign". But of this more at the end.

If this was an attempt to produce a scheme which would be more acceptable to the Muslim League than was his previous effort, or to persuade Jinnah that it opened up better prospects than did the Lahore Resolution, anyone with some understanding of contemporary Indian politics would have told him that he was pursuing a mirage with so much misplaced vigour. It did not matter what new boundaries he drew, what fresh constitutional arrangements he made, what special concessions he gave to the minorities, what label he stuck on the packet he offered, and how loose an Indian union he proposed—the fact remained that he was bent upon retaining the unity of India as a country and as a state. All the

vagueness, ambiguity and evasive wording of the Lahore Resolution notwithstanding, it stood for two Indias, not one. With all the separatist thinking that had gone into the making of the final decision of the Muslim League, it was rather naive of Latif to expect the League to forget what had been happening in India during the past several years and to ignore the rising tide of Muslim opinion. The League had not reached the moment of decision lightly, accidentally or abruptly. In fact, it had been lagging behind the popular demand for some years.

### The Fourth Latif Scheme (1941)

But Latif was persistent if nothing else. Undaunted by rebuffs and unmoved by rejections, he went on opposing the Lahore Resolution, fighting the case for the unity of India and producing one constitutional plan after another which could avoid a partition.

It appears that Latif really thought that the Muslim League would change its mind on the Lahore Resolution after having adopted it; its confused wording and imprecise phrasing might have led him to entertain such a belief. When, however, the Muslim League, far from retracting the Resolution, wrote it into its constitution at the 1941 annual session at Madras, he realized that the party was serious about Pakistan. But even then he did not give up his efforts to force the League to at least compromise on the Pakistan issue. His argument was that the passing of the Lahore Resolution had estranged the League from the Congress and diminished the chances of an agreement between them.

In the words of Nawab Nazir Yar Jung, "the deadlock seemed so unresolvable that it seemed to the author [Latif] imperative that some *modus operandi* should be devised on the basis of each conceding to the other the substance of their respective demands, viz., sense of security and sovereign status to Pakistan areas on the one hand and of political unity to the whole of India on the other".<sup>20</sup> With this impossible end in view (impossible because it sought to combine Muslim sovereignty with Indian unity), Latif prepared a rough draft of a new constitutional plan and circulated it on 15 May 1941 among the prominent leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League. Nawab Nazir Yar Jung does not produce any replies sent to the scheme by Muslim League leaders because they "were not intended for publication", but he

reports that they offered "their moral support to the proposal".<sup>21</sup>

In his covering letter to Jinnah, Latif said that "I have, during the last few years, in my own humble way, tried to support the cause of the League". On the Madras Resolution, which had made the Lahore Resolution a part of the League's constitution, he wrote. ". . . allow me to say that your Madras Resolution has saddened some of your best friends, including me. The Pakistan idea has served its purpose; it has roused the necessary political consciousness among the Muslims. But that consciousness now needs to run into practical channels . . . I may repeat that the Pakistan scheme in its latest form will neither establish Muslim States properly so-called; nor get rid of the Hindu-Muslim-Sikh problem; nor afford any security to the Muslim minorities in the proposed independent Hindu India, unless a wholesale exchange of population is effected, which no one favours. I am not the only person to hold this view. A compromise on the *basis of complete separation* is unthinkable."<sup>22</sup>

The "Constitutional Plan for India" which was enclosed with this letter aimed at "finding a solution—not a patch-work compromise, but an agreeable and permanent solution". The "primary impulse", which had directed the Muslim League to reject the 1935 federal constitution and also other federal arrangements and had forced it to demand a partition, was "the fear of a strong Centre where Muslims would be submerged by non-Muslims". This fear had to go if any lasting settlement was to be reached. It was for the majority party, the Hindus, to show how this could be done; but "for aught I know, it seems to me that a solution is possible, if at least the *substance* of the Muslim League demand is conceded". This demand "amounts to no more than a strong desire for the utmost freedom from an external Centre in the internal administration of the provinces in the North-West and the North-East of India where the Muslims are in the majority". If that was the objective, the League should accept an arrangement under which these provinces, "as constituent Units in a new constitution, are assured, equally with other Units, the maximum or the utmost possible autonomy consistent with the safety of India as a whole". The units would have all the residuary powers and the centre would be "such as not to allow any particular party to dominate other parties". Such a plan "will afford to the contending parties the *substance* of their respective demands". If this principle was

accepted, the question of effective and adequate constitutional safeguards for the minorities, which was "the only other basic demand of the League", would not present any serious difficulty. If the two major parties were agreeable to such a settlement, the current deadlock could be resolved by setting up an "interim composite government" at the centre and similar composite governments in all provinces. The native states might be invited to enter the federation on "agreed terms" at the time of framing a new constitution.<sup>23</sup>

It was a sincere attempt to keep India united and at the same time concede *something* to the Muslims. But it came too late to make any sense to the Muslim League. (Though, the critics of Latif must remember that the Muslim League accepted the Cabinet Mission plan of 1946 which did not provide for a partition). Had it been suggested in, say, the early 'thirties, or even a little later, it might have had a chance of being seriously considered by the League. But now the adoption of the Lahore Resolution and the emotional associations of the Muslims with the concept and name of Pakistan had rendered such proposals obsolete. The fundamental mistake made by Latif was in his assessment of the Pakistan solution. He looked at it as a mere constitutional arrangement decided upon by a political party. In fact, by this time, it had become an "ideological" objective, an intensely emotional issue, which touched every feeling of the Muslims, and inspired them with happy dreams of a future which would bring them everything that their minority status had so far denied them. They were not demanding provincial autonomy or a weak centre: these demands had been made ten years ago at the RTC and rejected by the British and the Hindus. They did not want a fresh federal arrangement or a new constitutional structure. They were not asking for safeguards and political promises. They had been through all this in the last fifty years, and had discovered that such demands and such concessions constituted movement without progress. Now they wanted sovereignty and states of their own with no apparent connections or links with the rest of India. Pakistan was not to be a geographical re-distribution and nothing more: it was a concept with a whole background of associations, sentiments and values, which raised it from a constitutional suggestion to a national urge for freedom. Latif did not appreciate this, and therefore failed to realize that his proposal could be of no interest to the League

It is possible that, living in south India, he was not aware of the strong grip Pakistan had secured on the minds of the Muslims in the north. His objections to the Pakistan solution were perfectly valid. It did not protect the Muslims of the minority provinces. It solved the communal problem within Pakistan only by an extraneous and unanticipated accident: the migration of Hindus and Sikhs from the north-west. The Hindu-Muslim issue remained present in East Pakistan and spread so much poison in the body-politic of the country that it ultimately contributed to the break up of Pakistan.

But Latif's scheme contradicted itself on the narrower, constitutional plane. He claimed that it conceded to the two parties the substance of their respective demands, and he defined this substance as "sense of security and sovereign status to each unit on the one hand, and political unity for the whole of India on the other".<sup>24</sup> But a sovereign Pakistan and a united India were incompatible. If each unit was given "sovereign status", the result could not be the "political unity of the whole of India". Moreover, even if by "sovereign status" he meant no more than maximum autonomy, he ought to have known that the Congress was not prepared to offer that to the Muslims. Whatever individual Congress leaders told him in private conversation or in letters, the Congress as a party did not, even once in all these years, commit itself to the establishment of a federation with such a weak centre and such strong provinces. Latif was arguing from a wrong major premiss, and the fact that this misconception put the Congress in a more favourable light (by trying to show that it was agreeable to a loose federation while the League was obstinately refusing to consider any alternative to the Lahore Resolution) made his *bona fides* suspect in sensitive League circles.

The Muslim League ignored him completely, and Jinnah did not think it worth his while to reply to his letter accompanying the 1941 constitutional plan. Rajendra Prasad evaded the responsibility of choosing between agreement and disagreement, by first saying that "I do not possess any status to speak on behalf of any group or party or community", and then making it clear that "any device which in any way jeopardises the unity and safety of India as a whole is not likely to be accepted by the vast majority of Indians".<sup>25</sup>

Neither silence nor evasion could discourage Latif. He continued

to repeat his opposition to the Pakistan plan and to prescribe his own solution to the ills of India. In a statement issued in October 1942, he said that "a Pakistan in isolation, such as Mr. Jinnah dreams of, is not a happy vision". The League should agree to his own scheme "under which India would be a Union of *sovereign* States including one in the north-west and one in the north-east". These states would enjoy the "largest measure of autonomy, residuary powers and the right of secession". The League should review its policy and "cease to feed the Muslim masses on blissful thoughts of a 'Pakistan in isolation'." The age of small sovereign states had gone. "The wiser course is to concentrate all energy on securing a Pakistan organically linked, on agreed terms, to the rest of India in the interests both of the Muslim majorities in the north-west and north-east, and of the Muslim minorities in Hindu areas." The conditions which had once warranted a demand for separation had disappeared. The Congress was now agreeable to let the federating units have the largest measure of autonomy, residuary powers and the right of secession.<sup>26</sup>

Latif's most detailed criticism of the Lahore Resolution in particular and of the Pakistan proposal in general is contained in the foreword which he contributed to *The Pakistan Issue*. It is dated 1 December 1943, which makes it his last word on the subject, for we have no available published record of his later opinions. A look at the contents of this foreword will bring this account of his proposals to a close.

He began by declaring that he was not an opponent of the Pakistan plan. "I do not oppose 'Pakistan' or the formation of sovereign states in the North-West and the North-East where the Muslims form a predominant majority in population. Let that be clear to everybody. Indeed, how can I, having been the first in the field, as admitted by the leaders of the League, to have nursed the idea of allowing to every cultural zone, Hindu or Muslim, a sovereign existence, and the first to outline a constitution for India on that basis." But he differed from Jinnah's interpretation of the Lahore Resolution, which was contrary to the spirit of the Resolution. "Mr. Jinnah insists that the Pakistan states should remain in isolation and should have no constitutional relation with the rest of India. I, on the other hand, hold that such an attitude will prove suicidal to the Pakistan states. I firmly believe that in the abiding interests of these states themselves and of the thinly

distributed Muslim minorities in Hindu zones, they should, while enjoying perfect freedom or autonomy in their internal affairs, link themselves to the rest of India to administer with others on terms of equality a minimum of subjects indispensably common to the whole of India . . . . The irresistible conclusion that has forced itself on me is that the proposed states, when isolated from the rest of India, will soon or late find themselves unable to maintain their independence, and in consequence will either lapse into the position of a dependency or protectorate of some foreign power or return chastened in spirit to the Indian Union. This is a prospect I have shuddered against." -

The Pakistan of the Lahore Resolution was bound to result in the creation of an undesirable state of affairs. Under the principle enunciated in the Resolution the states of Pakistan would cover only those areas which had real or predominant Muslim majority. This would mean that the Muslims would get only half of the Punjab in the north-west and only eastern Bengal and the Sylhet district of Assam in the north-east. If, on the other hand, larger states are desired, this could be done either by exchanging a large population or by including non-Muslim areas with the free consent of their inhabitants. The first alternative was out of question. "Exchange of population is somehow disagreeable to you, you are earth-bound unlike the Muslims of old." If the second alternative is followed, the resulting states would be larger in size but certainly not Muslim in character. "They will be composite states and not 'Pakistan' and will have naturally to be governed by composite governments. You cannot, as is your dream and hope, establish therein *hakumat-i-ilahiyya* or the 'Rule of God' or of the *Shariyyat*." Moreover, these states would be miniature Indias with the same communal problem as then confronted the Muslims.

The creation of smaller but properly Muslim states presented serious difficulties of its own. These states would amount to nothing beyond the "two poverty-stricken patches" in which Muslims were truly in the majority—"patches torn from each other by vast spaces of land and sea, and incapable of evolving between them any unified life or federal administration". With their limited and undeveloped economic resources it was impossible to run a modern state or to meet the cost of defence without outside help. "And why should you deny yourselves the larger resources of India

when they are yours by every natural right?"

Another major weakness of the Pakistan solution, but of a different nature, was its abdication of all responsibility for the future of the Muslims living in the rest of India. Of what use would this Muslim state be to the millions of Muslims who would be left "eternal orphans" in an independent Hindu India? The "mandatory safeguards" spoken of by the Lahore Resolution would be futile. Who was going to be the mandatory authority? Who would apply the sanctions? What sanctions would or could be applied? Would an independent Hindu India agree to an external mandate? Retaliation would break down as a remedy if the Hindus of Pakistan were law-abiding and loyal citizens while the Indian government was oppressing its minorities.

The Muslim League solution would spell equal disaster in the realm of culture. There was much talk of a single Muslim nation in India. But the future of this nation would certainly be in peril if it was to be "parcelled out among several independent states or dominions having no organic relationship with one another". The cultural unity of Islam in India would be lost. "Will not some of us who will be left in Hindu Zones slowly succumb to the impact of a vivified and dominating non-Muslim culture zealously fostered by an independent and powerful non-Muslim state, and cut themselves off for ever from the main current of Islamic life in India?"

Still another thing which worried Latif was the future of Muslim princely states. He was deeply concerned with the failure of the Pakistan plan to offer any protection to the Muslim native states which were surrounded by Hindu areas and were predominantly populated by Hindus. In case of a partition they would be forced to live on terms of dependence on "Hindustan". In a united India they would occupy an honourable place.

It was in view of these difficulties, said Latif, that as far back as 1939 he had suggested "the formation of a Union of India composed of sovereign states". He was still of the same opinion, and could not see how any arrangement without a common centre would be workable or desirable for the Muslims. Recent developments had confirmed the truth of his view. There were meagre chances of the League realizing its objective of the Lahore Resolution. The Hindus were firmly opposed to it. The British were certainly not in favour of splitting India. He warned the League

that "if the Indian political parties do not reach a settlement between themselves in respect of India's future constitution, and Britain is eventually called upon to arbitrate, it will frankly decide in favour of the federal ideal". The British solution might not be of the orthodox variety with majority rule and a parliamentary executive, but it would undoubtedly create a united India.

If a union was thus inevitable, wisdom demanded that it should be grasped and bent to "our purpose". Instead of fighting on the issue of a "Pakistan in violation"—which would be a "nightmare" and a "suicide" for the Muslims—the League should prepare its own plan of a "Union of Sovereign states" with a centre which could remove all Muslim fears, enable the Muslims to protect the interests of their minorities and their native states, and offer them terms of perfect equality with the Hindus.<sup>27</sup>

This critique of the Muslim League policy contains some very good arguments and some which are not so good. Among the latter is his persistence in the misuse of the word "sovereign". Throughout these pages, as elsewhere, he employs this adjective as the equivalent of autonomous. He does not seem to realize the meaninglessness and absurdity of such phrases as an "Indian Union of sovereign states". It is more than a matter of bad language, for the entire case rests upon what he is asking the League to accept in place of the Lahore Resolution. But we must remember, in fairness to Latif, that the Lahore Resolution indulged in a similar absurdity.

His emphasis on the economic poverty of the areas claimed for Pakistan echoed a general sentiment, and was theoretically and substantially correct. But it underrated the internal mechanics of nationalism. The lure of economic prosperity plays but little part in the upsurge of nationalism. If riches alone were to determine the future of nations, Burma would not have cut itself off from India, Canada would not have disregarded the certainty of material gain resulting from a merger with the immensely rich United States of America, Afghanistan would not have thought twice before throwing its lot with Iran or India, the continent of Europe would not have remained a collection of big and small national sovereignties, and the Arab world, with so many bonds of unity, would not have persisted in maintaining its several national fragments. The Muslims wanted Pakistan not in order to be rich but in order to be free.

Latif's concern for the future of the natives states which had Muslim rulers can hardly be called an argument from democracy. He was not interested in the rights of the people of the princely states. What worried him was the future of the Muslim princes in an independent Hindu India. It is interesting to see that he does not even care to argue the point: to him it seemed self-evident that the failure of the League to work for the protection of these native states was a sufficient condemnation of its policy and plans.

So much for the weaknesses in Latif's approach to the Pakistan issue; but they should not be allowed to hide the good points he makes. The two alternatives he saw before the makers of Pakistan make up a valid picture. It had to be either a large Pakistan with a sizeable non-Muslim minority or a small Pakistan with an almost purely Muslim population. In the one case it could not be a truly Muslim country, and would have reproduced the Indian communal problem on a smaller scale. In the other it could produce a purely Muslim state where the fear of Hindu domination was permanently removed. Put like this it could confront the League with a real problem. But the League never saw the problem in this light. It made a demand on the basis of Muslim provinces (though the Lahore Resolution had spoken of Muslim-majority areas, not provinces), and if the result was a large non-Muslim minority in Pakistan, then what? A similarly large Muslim minority would also be left in Hindu India. But one could not argue in this way. The League wanted a Muslim state where Islamic values and culture could flourish unhindered. This could not have been realized if the population of this state contained such a large Hindu and Sikh element. In fact, the final turn of events which translated Pakistan into reality eliminated the problem in one part of the new country, and removed the necessity of a choice by dividing the Punjab and Bengal and giving to Pakistan only the Sylhet district of Assam. But something that happened as an accident and at the last moment cannot relieve the League of the responsibility for demanding a Muslim state with a view to solving the communal problem while defining the state in such a way that the communal problem would survive the physical division.

The other dilemma to which Latif referred was far more serious and raises a fundamental problem. If all the Indian Muslims were a nation and if the Muslim League was fighting for the salvation of this nation (as it professedly was), then the creation of Pakistan

left a sizeable part of the nation in Hindu hands. How can we reconcile the achievement with the claim? This is a question of great historical importance and interest, and is related not only to Latif's criticism but to the very nature and background of the Lahore Resolution. Therefore, we would be better placed to discuss it at a later stage when we can look back over the whole panorama and see how history moved across it.

### The Public Reaction

For various reasons—his lack of contact with and remoteness from the Muslim north, his opposition to the Muslim League, his criticism of Jinnah, his non-participation in practical politics, his presentation of the Congress as an organization ready to concede all reasonable Muslim demands, his anxiety to avoid a partition of India at any cost, etc.—Latif's scheme did not appeal to the Muslim mind and therefore did not become an issue of public debate. It got some minor notices in contemporary newspapers and a few politicians cared to pass judgment on it. This reaction may be summarized as follows.

The *Madras Mail* called the Latif scheme of 1938 "fantastic".<sup>28</sup> About the 1939 version, the *Statesman* conceded that since it had been prepared at the request of the Muslim League and its general lines were known to be approved by the party's executive, "it cannot be brushed aside as a dream fantasy". It was honestly put forward as a means of holding India together and producing "not indeed the kind of nation that we have dreamt of but a nation comparable to that which the British and French in their separate areas agree in amity upon in Canada . . . . It is meant to be a constructive, not a destructive, proposal. Its object is peace . . . . Nevertheless we believe that there exists today an essential unity of Indian life from Peshawar to Comorin and a growing sense of nationality of which the Scheme takes far too little account. The Government of India Act of 1935 is therefore not only far better in ideal but is also, we believe, workable. We do not believe that in the existing state of the world it is either possible or desirable as the League scheme proposes to scrap the provincial self-government we already have, adopt reactionary measures at the Centre and in the provinces, and postpone a new form of federation for a long term of years. India has to find union

urgently, and this can be done by federating now.”<sup>29</sup> A correspondent, presumably Hindu, wrote from Calcutta that it was impossible to see millions of Hindus migrating from one part of India to the other to appease the Muslims. The scheme was “akin to the Pakistan idea”; indeed, it was more utopian. The “absurdity of the scheme is so overwhelming that it would be waste of time to consider it”,<sup>30</sup> Somebody writing a column in the *Statesman* under the name of “An Indian Observer” had some good words for the scheme. It was the result of “careful and painstaking study” and it was not possible to dismiss it as a belated piece of constitution making. When Latif claimed that Muslims were not so much a minority as a nation, “he states no more than truth”.<sup>31</sup>

Hindu and Muslim opinion bifurcated. One Muslim Leaguer warned that if the Latif scheme did not find favour with the political India, there would be no alternative left to the Muslims but to suggest a partition of India as demanded by Rahmat Ali. If Burma could be separated from India, there was no reason to refuse the right of self-determination to the Muslims of the north-west, though the Congress might not like the idea.<sup>32</sup> When the *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, a Hindu paper, attacked the scheme on 26 April, one Shamsuddin Ahmad Mumtaz of Calcutta declared it “an uncontradictable fact” that no possible solution other than that of Latif would allow the Indians a “perpetual peaceful living”. The sooner it was put into execution the better.<sup>33</sup> The *Star of India* refrained from offering its views pending the decision of the League, but wrote: “It does, however, warmly commend itself to us in its conception—the practicability of its being carried out is another matter.”<sup>34</sup>

A former Hindu minister of the Alwar state found the Muslim claim put forward by Latif to be “preposterous, irritating and misleading”. The bogey of Hindu rule “is a bugbear that cannot stand scrutiny”; it only shows the “defeatist and slave mentality” of the Muslims. Latif’s scheme was nothing but “a transparent version of the *Pakistan* day dream”, and it was well known that the latter’s ultimate aim was to conquer the whole of India with the help of Afghanistan and Iran.<sup>35</sup> A reply to this was given by one Sajjad Husain from Dacca.<sup>36</sup> Yusuf Ali, a former ICS officer and a scholar of Islam, found some attractive features in the scheme but rejected the “almost impossible exchanges of populations” implied in it.<sup>37</sup>

F.K. Khan Durrani saw much in it that was distasteful to the Muslims and detrimental to their long-term interests. From the religious point of view the scheme was faulty. Latif, said Durrani, "passes over the Islamic duty of proselytisation in silence. If the two cultures are to be segregated, the question of proselytising does not arise. There would be no room for it, for the man who wants to change his religion would have first to migrate from one zone to another. The scheme deprives Islam of one of its essential attributes. In fact, it puts Islam in jail." From the political point of view it left too much to Hindu promises of good behaviour. "There can be no peace or agreement between the two nations, until and unless the major community abandons the dream of Hindu Raj. The Muslims are not afraid for their culture. What they fear is political oppression, against which segregation in cultural zones is no protection. Dr. Latif leaves much to goodwill. He does not seem to understand that aggressive nationalism knows no goodwill, except such as a rival nationalism may command by force of arms, and Hindu nationalism has proved itself as aggressive as Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany." Nor was provincial autonomy, which formed the essence of Latif's plan, an adequate safeguard against the domination of a Hindu centre. "As the provincial armies will be under the supervision of the Centre and the navy will be entirely the Centre's affair, the overlapping, the waste, and the resultant futility so far as the protection of the federating units against an aggressive Centre is concerned, reduces the whole scheme to sheer absurdity."<sup>38</sup>

Hindu criticism was no less friendly. If Latif had hoped that his efforts to retain the political unity of India would endear him to the Hindu leaders or draw compliments from the Congress, he must have been disappointed. From the day he sent copies of *The Muslim Problem in India* to Hindu leaders up to the time of his last proposals he received no support, sympathy or approval from any Hindu organization or individual.

Jawaharlal Nehru's reply embodied his standard thesis that he did not see any Muslim problem in India, that the real problem was economic, and that all those who drew his attention to the Muslim problem had a medieval outlook. After having read the book he wrote to Latif: "I have read this book with interest and have tried to understand your argument. I am afraid I am wholly unable to appreciate it. You say in your letter that you are not a politician

but you have written as a politician, and accepted as facts many assertions which have yet to be proved . . . the inferences you draw do not seem to be justified . . . . The fundamental problem of India today is not political but one of poverty and unemployment and low production and vested interests, both foreign and Indian, which prevent progress. There is nothing in your essay which touches these problems . . . . I proceed from different premisses completely . . . . I feel therefore that your background is somewhat medieval and does not fit in at all with modern theory or practice, and does not take into consideration the fundamental importance of the economic side." On the relationship of religion and state, Nehru saw in the development in certain Muslim countries a refutation of the ideals of the Indian Muslims, and was pleased with it. "Where democracy is creeping into the Islamic States, it is on the basis of modern scientific political theory which separates the State from religion, though keeping religion intact for the individual and the group. Turkey is an outstanding example of an Islamic State which has deliberately ceased to call itself Islamic as such. The same tendency is visible in the other Islamic countries more or less."<sup>39</sup>

Two months later he repeated his objections in still clearer language. "I fear that your approach to the Hindu-Muslim question is so entirely different from mine that I find it difficult to see any reality behind your proposals. That makes it difficult also to discuss them with any profit to you or me . . . . Your proposals seem to me opposed to this world tendency [of inter-dependence] and are therefore reactionary. They proceed from a static conception of society which is singularly out of keeping with the modern dynamic age . . . . I am entirely in favour of all real cultural strands in a people to be protected and given full freedom of growth . . . . I do not think your way is the way to remove these repressions or to tone down the conflicts that exist."<sup>40</sup>

There is no point in examining Nehru's criticism, for he offers no arguments, and his general approach to the Muslim problem, hardened into a dogma with years, is well known. But the optimistic tendency which he saw in Muslim states (which he wrongly calls "Islamic States") betrayed an ignorance of the problem of nationalism and minorities, which is surprising in a man of his education and political experience. Therefore, Latif's reply to him on this point is worth quoting. "Turkey whom you cite in your

favour turned a secular state only after she had got rid of her alien population. So far as I could understand the mind of the Muslim world, it is this: Where the Muslims are in the majority, as in most Muslim countries, their politics is their religion; but where they are in the minority, or have to live in the midst of an overwhelming non-Muslim population as in India, their religion or culture is their politics. They assume this attitude because religion with them is a way of living sanctioned by certain truths of life in which they believe, and they therefore let every circumstance subservise it. You know of Islam only in terms of feudalism, of Persinized-cum-Hinduized Islam. That marks a period of neglect and wastage. There is now a new spirit abroad among the Muslims. They are anxious to build their future on their democratic heritage, rather than their feudal, and live in peaceful relations with their neighbours, and thereby promote the united good of the whole country. You can easily negotiate with a people developing such an outlook. No hide and seek policy will bear fruit".<sup>41</sup> However, as we have seen above, this appeal failed to register with Nehru whose reply of 6 March 1940 was even more curt and dismissive.

Gandhi's reaction to the Latif scheme was also one of uncompromising rejection. After reading *The Muslim Problem in India* he wrote: "There are such fundamental differences between us that argument becomes useless. God will dispose of us and decide what is good for us."<sup>42</sup>

Rajendra Prasad's remarks on Latif's "Constitutional Plan for India" of May 1941 were evasive in the extreme. First he said that he could not say anything "because I do not possess any status to speak on behalf of any group or party or community". Then he was doubtful if "the discussion which you are initiating will lead to any result". Then came the general platitude repeated by every Congress leader on every occasion: "The Congress has never refused to discuss any scheme and any proposal for bringing about a settlement of the Communal Problem." After these general observations he went on to raise certain objections to the proposals.<sup>43</sup> But when Latif replied to these objections in some detail,<sup>44</sup> Rajendra Prasad's answer was a letter of eight lines saying that "I do not feel like carrying on a discussion through correspondence on a question like this. I do not see that correspondence between you and me is likely to lead to any result."<sup>45</sup>

Other expressions of Hindu disapproval can be mentioned more

briefly. *The Indian Annual Register* devoted four large-size pages to condemning Latif's suggestions contained in his *The Cultrual Future of India*.<sup>46</sup> In later years it was a common practice with Hindu polemicists to refer to Latif as the originator of "Pakistan theory", and that was considered to be enough of a judgement. One such writer called him "one of the original inventors of the Pakistan theory"<sup>47</sup>; while another conceded that he could "justly claim to be the originator of the Pakistan idea".<sup>48</sup>

The Congress Muslims, as was their wont, went further than their Hindu colleagues in attacking Latif and imputing to him ulterior motives. One example of this kind of writing will illustrate the approach of this school. "We believe that there are other motives behind the scheme of Dr. Latif", said one Rezaul Karim from Bengal. "Otherwise, he would never have dared to think of partitioning India on such flimsy pretexts of cultural differences . . . . The motive that is working behind Dr. Latif's scheme is too obvious to need any mention."<sup>49</sup>

The one feature common to all Hindu criticisms is the absence of any constructive suggestions. The scheme is condemned or ignored, but never examined. The author is called reactionary and medieval minded, but his ideas evoke no answer. The Hindu mind was closed to every scheme, plan or proposal which did not echo the Congress point of view. So tightly were the doors shut that even outspoken opponents of the Pakistan solution could not gain entry. Ultimately it was this resolve not to consider any alternative to the Congress solution which made a partition of India inevitable.

### Asadullah's Amendments

In April 1939, one Asadullah, a lawyer of Calcutta, presented his own plan which was inspired by Latif. In fact, it was an attempt to improve the Latif scheme. Its significance lies primarily in the fact that it is the only plan, or an alternative to a proposal, suggested by a Bengali.

In a letter to the *Star of India* of 4 April he suggested: "It will be in the best interest of the Muslims of India if we form the Provinces of Bihar and UP into a Muslim Block, instead of the Delhi-Lucknow Block and the Deccan Block of Dr. Lattiff's scheme. The formation of the Deccan Block will be of very little

good to the Muslims, except the advantage of getting a sea-port either on the coast of Madras or of Bombay, which is of course of very great value from the commercial point of view. But this Block will ever remain isolated from the rest of the Muslim zones; and the formation of a Hindu Block with Bihar and the Eastern half of UP creates a barrier between the North-West and the North-East Zones, and this absence of a connecting link between the two great Muslim Blocks cannot be so easily left out of consideration. Moreover, a compact body of 3 crores of Muslims in Bengal and Assam should not be made to cut off all connections with the rest of the Muslim World . . . . Dr. Lattiff's scheme proposes the possibility of the transference of population from one province to another and so plans the transfer of the Muslim population of Madras, Bombay, CP and Berar, and probably Orissa also, into the Deccan Block. But why not let the Muslim population of the above-named provinces and Hyderabad shift to the UP and Bihar, for if the entire people move at all, it is all the same whether they are made to move 100 or 500 miles . . . . He has himself made the suggestion that some districts of the Northern Punjab may be given over to the Maharaja of Kashmir in exchange for the Western part of his territory which he wants to take away into the Muslim zone. But I say, why not let the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Maharaja of Kashmir exchange their respective territories. . . . So I again hold that the entire Muslim population of India living outside of the North-West and the North-East Blocks should migrate to the UP and Bihar. Then we could form a Federation of the Provinces: Baluchistan, Sind, the North-West Frontier, the Punjab, the United Provinces, Bihar, Bengal and Assam, together with Kashmir, and thus form a compact body of Muslims from West to East."<sup>50</sup>

When I contacted Mr. Asadullah in 1969 and asked him what had made him suggest this change in the Latif scheme, he told me that in fact his idea was not an amendment of the Latif proposal but an independent scheme which he had put before the people in a letter to the *Star of India* of 22 March 1939. As this letter was not available to me, he sent me a typed copy, from which the following is taken. "With the introduction of the All India Federation the position of the Indian Muslims will be much more serious, nay positively dangerous. The Congress will certainly accept and work the Federal plan. The Congress, which has captured

practically eight provincial governments, is puffed up with its newly-assumed power and will be out of reach of all appeal with the assuming of the control of the Central Government. Consequently, it is high time for the Indian Muslims to chalk out a plan for their salvation. The existence of the Muslims of India as a distinct community and national entity is at stake. Is there no way out of this impending calamity and national catastrophe? I have myself thought out a plan for the solution of this most difficult problem that ever faced the Muslims of India. The Muslims are in an absolute minority—possibly negligible minority—in Bombay, Madras, Orissa, Central Provinces, Bihar and United Provinces. I would like to suggest that all the Muslims (the entire population) living in Bombay, Madras, Orissa and Central Provinces should migrate (possibly) in equal numbers to Bihar and United Provinces. Of course there are great difficulties—economic, political, geographical and financial—in practically working out a plan like this. The few Muslims of Bombay and Madras, who are engaged in sea-borne and international trade, may shift their abode to Karachi or somewhere near in Sind. It is obvious that the solution of such a serious problem can never be expected to be easy. In short, my suggestion is that all the Muslims in India should live within the space of land bounded by the Himalayas in the North and the Vindhyas in the South, or in other words no Muslims should live below the Vindhyas Range. Then we should form one Federation of the provinces—Sind, North-West Frontier Province, Punjab, United Provinces, Bihar, Bengal and Assam together with Baluchistan and Kashmir. Another federation of the four provinces of Bombay, Madras, Central Provinces and Orissa may be formed separately. The idea will be clear if you have before your eyes a map of India. We must, in the meantime, push on vigorously our missionary activities in Bihar and UP and also Assam. May I hope that all the leading Muslims of the land will give my humble suggestion the deep consideration that it deserves?<sup>51</sup>

Whether offered as an original idea or as an amendment to Latif's proposal, Asadullah's suggestion was more logical than Latif's and would have given the whole of north India to the Muslims; but it was equally impracticable. It would not have pleased Latif because it ran counter to his plan to retain Hyderabad as a Muslim region. Both men prescribed a huge transfer of population across vast distances. Of course, Asadullah's scheme would have

brought much advantage and satisfaction to the Muslims by giving them nearly half of India in one large, contiguous whole. With so much territory under their occupation, and with the entire Muslim population living in it, perhaps the federal centre would have taken a shape more acceptable to the Muslims, for it would have corresponded to a meeting-ground of two equals rather than an uneasy alliance between two unequal communities. But there was no chance of its acceptance by the Congress or the British. Confronted with the question if this was really too great a price to pay for the unity of India, the Hindus would probably have replied that their strength and numbers were enough to guarantee the continuing unity of the country without the necessity of making any concessions to the Muslims. The suggestion for an exchange of Kashmir for Hyderabad made sense to some Hindus,<sup>52</sup> but otherwise Asadullah's plan did not attract any attention from Muslim or Hindu circles.

## NOTES

1. Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography with Musings on Recent Events*, London, 1936. Chapter LVI deals with the Hindu-Muslim problem
2. All quotations in the above paragraph are from the Prefatory Note by Nawab Nazir Yar Jung Bahadur to his *The Pakistan Issue*, Lahore, 1943, pp. xix-xxiv. I have also taken the basic facts from him, but not his opinions. Nazir Yar Jung uses extravagant language in praise of Latif, e.g., "who has, from his seclusion in Hyderabad, powerfully affected and indeed given a new turn to Muslim political thought in India" (p. xix); he was regarded by "the Muslim intelligentsia all over the country. . . as a scholar and critic of outstanding merits" (p. xx); his address to the Muslim Culture Society "created a stir in every political circle, and raised in the Muslim mind a sense of dignity and pride and of new hopes and new aspirations" (p. xxii); *The Cultural Future of India* "caught the imagination of the Musalmans in particular as nothing else had done before" (p. xxiv); "he has established his position in the country as an institution by himself" (p. xxxv).
3. S.A. Latif, *The Cultural Future of India*, Bombay, 1938, pp. 1-18.
4. Haji Sir Abdullah Haroon, Introduction to S.A. Latif, *The Muslim Problem in India*, Karachi, 1939, p. iii. This is wrongly quoted in Nazir Yar Jung, *op. cit.*, pp. xxiv-xxv.
5. Full text was pub by *The Statesman* and *TSI* of 30 March 1939; a brief summary had already appeared in *CMG*, 19 March. *IAR* 1939, Vol. I, pp. 366-370, also carried the full text. Latif replied to some of the outstanding criticisms of his plan in a statement issued from Hyderabad and pub by *CMG*, 7 May 1939.
6. S.A. Latif, *The Muslim Problem in India*, pp. 1-3.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-9.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-12. Italics in the original.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-18. Latif's italics.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-22.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-29. Emphasis in the original.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-38.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-50.

14. S.A. Latif to Rajendra Prasad, 12 January 1940, Nazir Yar Jung, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-36.
15. Abdullah Haroon to S.A. Latif, 5 January 1940, *ibid.*, pp. xxv-xxvi.
16. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. xxvi.
17. H.J. Fells, "Indian Moslem Plans", *The Empire Review*, July 1939, p. 38.
18. Nazir Yar Jung, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-72. Latif does not mention the date on which this note was sent to the Foreign Committee.
19. *Ibid.*, "A Broad Outline of the Union or Commonwealth of India", pp. 50-57.
20. *Ibid.*, Nazir Yar Jung's introductory note to Section V, p. 101.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
22. S.A. Latif to M.A. Jinnah, 16 May 1941, *ibid.*, pp. 102-103. Italics in the original.
23. *Ibid.*, "Constitutional Plan for India: Dr. Syed Abdul Latif's Circular addressed to Select Leaders of the Congress and the League", pp. 104-107. Italics in the original.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
25. Rajendra Prasad to S.A. Latif, 22 May 1941, *ibid.*, pp. 107-110.
26. S.A. Latif's statement issued from Hyderabad Deccan, 2 October 1942, *ibid.*, pp. 144-146. The word "sovereign" bears italics in the original. The date is not correct because the statement is supposed to be a commentary on a speech delivered at Caxton Hall, London, by L.S. Amery, Secretary of State for India, on 29 October. One of the two dates given is certainly wrong.
27. Foreword by S.A. Latif, *ibid.*, pp. vii-xvii.
28. *TMM*, editorial, 6 October 1938.
29. *The Statesman*, editorial, 30 March 1939.
30. J.L.C., letter, *ibid.*, 31 March 1939.
31. Our Indian Observer, "Political Comments", *ibid.*, 2 April 1939.
32. M.R.T., letter, *ibid.*, 20 April 1939.
33. Shamsuddin Ahmed Mumtaz, letter, *TSI*, 4 May 1939.
34. *TSI*, editorial, 5 May 1939.
35. Alakh Dhari, "Moslem Plan for Federation viewed from a

- Hindu Standpoint", *The Statesman*, 16 May 1939.
36. Syed Sajjad Husain, letter, *ibid.*, 26 May 1939.
  37. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, "The Muslims of India, the War, and the Political Field", *Asiatic Review*, April 1940, pp. 226-239.
  38. F.K. Khan Durrani, *The Meaning of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1946 rep, pp. 120, 121, 122.
  39. Jawaharlal Nehru to S.A. Latif, 25 December 1939, Nazir Yar Jung, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-23.
  40. Jawaharlal Nehru to S.A. Latif, 6 March 1940, *ibid.*, pp. 37-38.
  41. S.A. Latif to Jawaharlal Nehru, 10 January 1940, *ibid.*, p. 26.
  42. Quoted in S.A. Latif to Rajendra Prasad, 12 January 1940, *ibid.*, p. 36.
  43. Rajendra Prasad to S.A. Latif, 22 May 1941, *ibid.*, pp. 107-110.
  44. See S.A. Latif to Rajendra Prasad, 11 June 1941, *ibid.*, pp. 110-112.
  45. Rajendra Prasad to S.A. Latif, 9 July 1941, *ibid.*, p. 113. However, Rajendra Prasad had actually made a detailed criticism of the Latif Scheme before writing this letter; see his *Pakistan, Bombay and Calcutta*, September 1940, pp. 41-50. He again studied the scheme in his *India Divided*, Bombay, 2nd ed June 1947, pp. 192-194.
  46. See *IAR 1938*, Vol. II, pp. 48-52.
  47. B.G. Kaushik, *The House that Jinnah Built*, Bombay, June 1944, pp. 117-118.
  48. Virendra, *Pakistan: A Myth or A Reality*, Lahore, 1946, p. 8.
  49. Rezaul Karim, *Pakistan Examined*, Calcutta, 1941, see pp. 7-17; this passage is on p. 12.
  50. Asadullah, letter, *TSI*, 4 April 1939.
  51. Asadullah, letter, *ibid.*, 22 March 1939, as enclosed in his letter to me of 3 November 1969.
  52. On this Gulshan Rai commented: "If I were in the position of the Maharaja of Kashmir, I would at once accept this exchange of territories. It would be more advantageous to the Hindu Maharaja than to the Muslim Nizam" ("Communal Zones in India", *CMG*, 23 April 1939).

# 10

## THE GOAL MARKED OUT: 1939

In order to deal together with all the schemes put forth by Sayyid Abdul Latif we traversed several years in the last chapter. Now we must get back to 1939 to maintain our chronological continuity. However strange it may appear, we do not hear a general debate about partition even in 1939, when so many proposals for a partition were produced and when the Lahore Resolution was only months away. Let us look very briefly at the climate of opinion in these twelve months.

### The Year 1939

The fear of Hindu rule was, as ever, the theme of all talk. These fears were difficult to put into words, said the *Statesman*, but "at bottom we think what Moslems are resolutely opposed to is a purely democratic Constitution based on majority rule".<sup>1</sup> An anonymous Muslim columnist of Lahore went further and demanded the creation of two Muslim states in the north-west and the north-east. These "separate national States" would be "far stronger numerically than any other existing Muslim State and likely to develop in course of time into first-class powers". He added that "no true Muslim, however great and tempting the allurements the Congress may offer him, will ever agree to accept the Congress political system and to lose his separate political and religious identity for the sake of a bigger India where Hindu interests will flourish at his expense".<sup>2</sup> Another Muslim, writing in a non-Muslim League paper, told his readers that the only right step to take was for them to declare themselves a nation (*qawm*) and then to demand an independent state on the basis of the right of self-determination.<sup>3</sup>

But the Hindus were not prepared to listen to any talk about

partition. Some of them suggested changes in the boundaries of Muslim provinces, but no more. For example, Gulshan Rai of Lahore was in favour of joining the Sylhet district of Assam with the Bengali Divisions of Chittagong, Dacca and Rajshahi, and making this area into a separate autonomous province. In the north-west, he advocated the separation of Ambala and Jullundhur Divisions from the Punjab, and the amalgamation of the Rawalpindi and Multan Divisions and a major portion of the Lahore Division with the NWFP to form a separate Muslim province. This would solve the Hindu-Muslim problem in Bengal and Punjab.<sup>4</sup>

This was far from what the Muslims wanted. For them the issue was to save the Muslims from being submerged in the Hindu majority from which they differed in culture, civilization, language, script, beliefs and traditions. In the existing circumstances, once they were sucked into Indian nationalism they would no longer remain Muslims.<sup>5</sup> Even some British observers agreed that the two greatest obstacles to the making of an Indian federation were the Congress attitude to the native states and Muslim fears of a Hindu rule.<sup>6</sup>

Muslim ambitions were described by a Hindu chronicler in these words in the spring: "The dreams of recovering the reigns of authority in the State in India which had slipped from Muslim hands are in the consciousness of many Muslims, modern-educated Muslims, realities of today, within the grasp of resolute men. It would be foolish for Indian public men and publicists to shut their eyes to the sinister possibilities of the schemes of federations outlined by Muslim thinkers and public men. These have revived ambitions, provoked particularistic conceits, and stimulated aggressive activities that would result in breaking up the unity and integrity that have been India's from beyond recorded times. Reformers and reactionaries among the leaders of the Muslim community in India appear to be helpless instruments in the hands of forces that are almost elemental in their sweep and violence."<sup>7</sup>

A *Times of India* commentator summed up the Muslim thinking on what he called the "Pakistan scheme" as follows: "The talk of a confederacy of culturally homogeneous units is the direct outcome of the community's state of mind. There is little new in it. It is just a revival of an old idea. The name of the late Sir Muhammad Iqbal was at one time associated with the *Pakistan*

scheme as it was called. The idea is to carve out for the Muslims regional units in which they will be masters of themselves, free to develop their cultural inheritance. Virtually it amounts to a secession of Muslims from present-day India and their formation into autonomous units willing to work together with similar independent Hindu units for common purposes . . . There is, however, little support for the scheme at the moment outside the Muslim League leaders. It is still in an academie stage, as far as the Muslim leaders are concerned, while others describe it as fantastic, unpatriotic, extra-territorial in outlook and so on."<sup>8</sup>

A Bihari Muslim student leader announced that "a division of India is now the only means left for the Muslim community to live an honourable life in this country where they were rulers for eight centuries".<sup>9</sup> He did not mention any particular scheme, but the newspaper published his statement with the headline "Pakistan the Only Solution".

H.V. Hodson, who played an important part in behind-the-scene constitutional decisions in these years, analysed the Muslim predicament in the May issue of the *Fortnightly Review*. If the Congress-dominated federal centre materialized, he said, the Muslims would see "looming ahead that rule of the Congress which the Muslim League stalwarts identify with the detested 'Hindu raj'". They said they would fight it, but it was not clear on what front they would fight, or how literally the threat was to be taken. "If physical fighting is to be understood, then the Muslims might do any of three things: they might incite the Muslims in the army to mutiny, or they might stage a general armed uprising among the Muslim population of northern India, or they might plot with tribesmen beyond north-west frontier or with foreign Powers to let down the barriers against the invader (the third alternative would obviously imply the first also). It is extremely doubtful whether the Muslims are determined enough or desperate enough or well enough organized to attempt any of these methods, though they might perhaps invoke sporadic and isolated outbreaks of trouble. Nor is it out of the question that when the Hindu *raj* was once established, and British power had melted away from India's internal affairs, the Muslim areas in the north-west might attempt a forcible secession from the federal State. Indeed, some people think this highly probable."<sup>10</sup>

The Viceroy seemed to be ignorant of the facts known to his

advisers and assistants. On 19 May he wrote to the Secretary of State for India that Muslims would not be able to do anything and would join the federation. Zetland remarked on this: "I found the Viceroy's view, that the Muslims were in no position to torpedo the Federation scheme, not a little surprising. This was in fact the one major issue on which throughout our association as Viceroy and Secretary of State our judgement was at variance."<sup>11</sup> On 27 June, he wrote to the Viceroy: "... it would be difficult to contemplate with satisfaction a Federation which did not include let us say the Punjab and Bengal. Indeed what I had in mind . . . when I spoke of the Muslims making Federation unworkable, was the possibility that the Muslim Provinces might declare that the safeguards provided for their community in the Federation were wholly unsatisfactory and that they were not prepared therefore to enter the Federation on the present terms. I do not see how we could force the Governments of the Punjab, or of Bengal, to enter the Federation if they were determined not to do so."<sup>12</sup>

In May the Pakistan Association of Lahore demanded a separate Muslim federation.<sup>13</sup> Regular Muslim publicists were still coy and shied away from mentioning partition. "Shahed", who wrote a regular column for the *Statesman* and was generally credited with an up-to-date knowledge of the opinions of Muslim leaders, wrote on 16 June: "The Moslem League is pledged to secure the Moslems the fullest protection for their political, cultural and religious rights. If in an 'Independent' India, with the British out of the picture, those rights are in jeopardy, Moslems cannot regard it as independence but worse bondage than the domination of 'imperialist' Britain. Such independence the Moslem League is bound to oppose."<sup>14</sup> What form this opposition would take and what would then be the goal of the Muslims were things which he kept to himself.

In spite of this hesitation to commit themselves on the part of the leaders and their official and unofficial spokesmen, the scheme-makers were busier than ever. Nineteen thirty-nine was truly the year of proposals for a partition of India. As Muslim public opinion veered more and more towards a solution by separation, schemes and suggestions and plans came pouring in from Muslim intellectuals and writers. The fact that the League, far from having a definite scheme of its own, had been asking for suggestions since October 1938 gave a fillip to this search for a

solution. As the year progressed it became clear to everyone that the federal part of the 1935 Act would never become operative and to most observers that the federal constitution was already obsolete. Therefore the conviction grew that a completely new constitutional arrangement would have to be found which fitted the Indian case and dealt once and for all with the Muslim problem.

Re-distribution, re-arrangement, a loose union or alliance, division, partition—these were the directions towards which the scheme-makers now turned their attention. The idea of Muslim separation was an old one and, as we saw in earlier chapters, many proposals had been made in the past on which new recommendations could be based. But so far only Rahmat Ali had put forward a concrete and practicable scheme which stood for a clear division of India. His plan had had immense influence, and the name he gave it quickly won universal currency. In a strange, undefinable, but definite way the Muslims were asking for a Pakistan long before the Lahore Resolution was passed and even longer before the Resolution came to be known as the Pakistan demand. After Rahmat Ali, it was Latif who presented a distinct plan, or rather a series of plans, but his objective was at odds with the current trend towards separation. His insistence on retaining the unity of India and his consistent opposition to the League policy guaranteed that in the circumstances of the time his suggestions would not be acceptable to majority Muslim opinion.

So the search continued. It was as if everyone knew that the sands of time were falling too quickly to afford a long respite. If a solution was to be found, this had to be done without further delay. It was common knowledge that the Muslim League was in the process of reaching a decision. Those who wanted to avert a partition hastened to air their views in order to influence the League. Those who believed that a division alone could lead to freedom were also quick to put their opinion on record, and this with a double purpose. They wanted to throw their weight on the side of the partitioners lest the League might choose anything less than a division; they also wanted to prescribe a solution in the hope that ultimately the League would select *their* scheme for adoption.

This background gives much historical interest to the alternatives which came in quick succession in 1939. But these plans

also possess an inherent significance of their own. They certainly exerted an influence, in some cases positive and in others negative, on the minds of the League leaders. Some of these scheme-makers (like Latif and M.A.H. Qadri) were members of the special Muslim League committee which was charged with the task of examining the various proposals which aimed at bringing security to the Muslims. Others, like Sir Sikandar Hayat, were front-rank statesmen whose ideas could not be rejected out of hand. There is no doubt that collectively these proposals moulded the Lahore Resolution; had they not been made, the League's official demand would certainly have been different from what it actually turned out to be.

Finally, we have another important reason for making a close study of these proposals. They open a unique window on the Muslim thinking of this period. If we were to set out to study the Muslim mind of these days we would not get much information from the public activities of the Muslim League; nor would the public statements of Muslim leaders be very illuminating. Jinnah's negotiations with Congress leaders during 1938 and 1939 were bogged down in controversial, but in the long run significant, details like the representative status of the League and the Congress treatment of Muslim minorities in Hindu provinces. On the other side, his talks with the Viceroy concerned themselves with the severely short-term questions of an indefinite postponement of the application of the federal part of the 1935 Act and with League's involvement in the making of any constitutional plans for the future. These were important issues, and it was imperative that the League views were made clear to other parties. But they gave no clue to what the Muslims were planning for their future. From a long-term point of view, therefore, if there is anything that throws light on contemporary Muslim thinking, it is these proposals and schemes. They reflect the agitation and agony of the Muslim mind. They show that a new spirit was abroad, anxious to find fresh solutions to an old problem. They demonstrate that the search for a secure future was not limited to the followers or sympathisers of the League. They attest to a general and sharp awareness that the conventional moulds of thought had to be broken before a reasonably sure avenue to freedom was discovered.

## Muhammad Sharif Toosy (February)

The first scheme to appear with the opening of the year came from a school master of Wazirabad in the Punjab. *The Tribune* (a Hindu daily of Lahore) of 23 January had carried an article by Razaul Karim, arguing for the merger of all Muslims in the Indian nation and the abandonment of the idea of a separate political existence of the Muslims. Toosy replied to it in the *Eastern Times* of 10 February. India was a heterogeneous sub-continent, inherited by different races and communities, and could not become a single national state. "It must be split up into separate, compact geographical parts where the Muslim minority of 90 millions may be able to hold its own and develop in its own way." The "final solution" of the problem was to divide India into three distinct parts: north-west, comprising the Punjab, Kashmir, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan; north-east, comprising Eastern Bengal and Assam; and Hindu India, comprising the remainder. In the first two areas, out of a total population of over 80 million, Muslims would number over 66 million or over 75%. Separately each of the two areas would contain about 40 million people, of whom not less than 75% would be Muslim. The rest of India would have a population of 240 million, of which Muslims would number 20 million or less than 10%. "Thus the question of Muslim minority will in this way be reduced to its proper limits and Muslims will find two separate States where they will have unhampered chance of developing their own culture and civilization."<sup>15</sup>

On 24 March, in another article in the same paper, he added: "If the Muslim provinces are reconstituted into Pakistan and Eastern Bengal and Assam and are granted full autonomous powers with the right of secession, the Muslims may agree to join [a] federation at the centre in a transitional period."<sup>16</sup> It will be noticed that in the first article he does not name the two states to be created in the north-west and the north-east; in the second, he calls the north-west state "Pakistan" and the north-east one Eastern Bengal and Assam (the title by which the eastern part of Bengal was known from 1905 to 1911).

## Abdus Sattar Kheiri (February)

In February Dr. Abdus Sattar Kheiri presented his own scheme

for dividing India. He prefaced it with the statement that "it can be said without fear of contradiction that the Indian Muslims are the most compact and harmonious group of persons living anywhere on the face of earth. . . . They have one language, Urdu, understood not only by all the Muslims of India, but also by the large portion of population in Afghanistan, Iraq, Muskat, Aden and Hedjaz". (This was a gross exaggeration). They shared a common early history, a common list of heroes, a common code of morality, common principles of social intercourse, a common feeling of solidarity and unity, and the consciousness of a common aim and a common destiny. "If all these common ties and bonds do not make of the Muslims in India a true nation, what other things do?" Rights of a nation were never safe except in their own hands. The Muslims should be grateful to the Congress for doing its best to create among them the will to form their own state. No agreement or understanding was conceivable between the Congress and the Muslim League. Now nothing was left for the Muslims but to demand their right of self-determination in the provinces and the states where they were in a majority. There should be a separate federation for these areas.<sup>17</sup> No details were mentioned, and no name was given to the projected federation.

### Asadullah (March)

On 22 March came the proposal from Asadullah (already discussed in the last chapter) for dividing India into south and north and handing over the entire north to the Muslims so as to make a compact, large federation of provinces, whose population would be made predominantly Muslim by large-scale migration of Muslims to it from the rest of India.<sup>18</sup>

### Choudhry Khaliquzzaman (March)

Another suggestion made in the same month for a partition of India on religious lines and the creation of two Muslim states was brought to public notice for the first time in 1961, when Choudhry Khaliquzzaman related in his autobiography how he had come to propose it in the course of a conversation at the India Office in London.

Khaliquzzaman and Abdur Rahman Siddiqui were in London in March and on the point of returning home when they read in the daily press that Col. Muirhead, the Under-Secretary of State for India, had just come back from an Indian tour. Khaliq wanted to know the official's impressions, specially about the strength of the Muslim League and the Muslim policy in general. On their request an interview was arranged, and they met on 14 March. On Khaliq's inquiry, Muirhead said: "Yes, I have met your leaders and have heard their case. We have got great sympathy with you but we do not know how to help. You say that the British democracy does not suit you and I see that it does not, but we do not know of any other kind of democracy. We apply the same principles in India which we apply in our own country, and you do not suggest any alternative."

In the words of Khaliquzzaman, "as soon as he finished this sentence, I went up to the map of India which was hanging in his room, and pointed out the two areas, north-west and east, which were Muslim areas and which might be separated from the rest of India. When I returned to occupy my chair he said with a smile: "Yes, that is an alternative. Have you talked about it to Lord Zetland?" They had not met the Secretary of State, but now, on Muirhead's assurance that a meeting could be arranged before they left the country, they wrote to Zetland and got an appointment for 20 March, the day before they were to return to India.

The proceedings of the interview should be reproduced as reported by Khaliquzzaman. "Lord Zetland was very cordial and after a few preliminary exchange [sic.] of views about the weather I started by giving him a brief survey of the Muslim relationship with the British Government extending over one hundred and fifty years and brought it down to the Government of India Act, 1935. Thereafter I said, 'Now that you are transferring more powers to India, you are doing it in such a manner that one hundred million Muslims might find themselves the slaves of the majority when you have completed the task'. At this stage he interrupted me and made the same remark which was made by the Under-Secretary, namely, 'But you do not suggest any alternative'. It did not require any searching of my brain for I had already suggested the alternative to Col. Muirhead. Therefore, as soon as Lord Zetland raised the question of an alternative, I immediately replied, 'You may partition the Muslim areas from the

rest of India and proceed with your scheme of federation of the Indian provinces without including the Muslim areas which should be independent from the rest.'

Lord Zetland: What would happen to the States?

I: They ought to follow their geographical situation. If they are in the Hindu Zone, they must go with them and if they are in the Muslim Zone they must go with that Zone.

Lord Zetland: What about Defence?

I: For what period, my Lord? If you want to know for the period that you are associated, in some form or the other, with the administration of India there would be no difficulty in the defence of India, because you can use the armies of both these areas, according to your needs. But if you want to know for the period that you are not in any way connected with the administration of the country, then I beg to your Lordship not to put that question to me, for God only knows what would happen to us then.

Lord Zetland: Do you want an answer from me?

I: It would be presumptuous on my part to ask for an answer to this big question just after mentioning it to you. I have brought it to your notice that this is going to be the stand of the Muslims in the next session of the Muslim League. There is ample time for you to think about it."<sup>19</sup>

Zetland's account of this interview, as given in his letter of 28 March to the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, confirms Khaliq's narrative. He wrote: "They talked a little vaguely about the Palestine problem and then turned to what they obviously wished to discuss with me, namely, the position of the Muslim community in India in the event of a scheme of federation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1935 coming into existence. They spoke very strongly on the question and told me that they did not think that it would be possible for the Muslims to acquiesce in the introduction of the scheme. I asked them whether in these circumstances they had any alternative suggestion of a constructive character to put forward? They replied that they had, and that what they would propose would be the establishment of three or four federations of Provinces and States which would be co-ordinated by a small central body of some kind or another. The whole object of the scheme was, of course, to give the Muslims as great a measure of control at the centre as the Hindus. They were very vague when they came to the details of the scheme, but, I rather

gathered that what was in their minds was a federation of the Muslim Provinces and States in North-West India, a further federation of Bengal and Assam and possibly Bihar and Orissa in the east, and a further federation, or possibly more than one, of the other Provinces and States in the remaining parts of India. It was clear that they had failed to consider the practical difficulties in the way of such a scheme; but, I gathered from them that many Muslims were thinking on these lines, and what they told me confirms to some extent the view which I expressed to you not very long ago to the effect that we should probably have greater difficulty in bringing the Muslims into the Federation than the Congress."<sup>20</sup>

Khaliquzzaman returned to Bombay on 12 May, and he and Siddiqui saw Jinnah in the evening of the same day. They narrated to him the talk that they had had with Muir and Zetland, and "gave him our impression that the British would ultimately concede partition". Khaliq also "gave him my view as to why I had opposed to use the word Pakistan for the scheme. He carefully heard every word of the talk, at times asking me to repeat certain words, and thereafter he said, 'Have you weighed the consequences?' I replied, 'There being no alternative open to us we cannot go on talking on the old basis without any result'. He assured us that he was not opposed to it but it had to be examined in all its bearings."<sup>21</sup> Jinnah's evasive reply will be discussed in chapter 13, when we examine the Muslim League's approach to the idea of Pakistan.

### "A Punjabi" (July)

By far the most comprehensive and far-reaching scheme aimed at furthering and elaborating the idea of Pakistan was published in July 1939 in a book entitled *Confederacy of India*, written by one who chose to call himself "A Punjabi".

First, a few words about the author and how he came to write the book. The pseudonym belonged to Mian Kafayet Ali, who was born in 1902 in a middle-class Rajput family of Batala in district Gurdaspur, now in the Indian Punjab. After taking his B.A. degree from Islamia College, Lahore, in 1926, he joined the Law College in the same city, but was soon compelled to give up his legal studies by the death of his father who was a tahsildar in the Punjab.

In 1928 he secured a subordinate appointment in the office of the Punjab Legislative Council. Sir Fazli Husain, who was his father's first cousin and at this time Revenue Minister in the Punjab, tried hard to get him nominated as a tahsildar, but the British officials in the revenue department postponed matters until Fazli Husain had gone to Delhi as Education Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council. Some time later Kafayet Ali once again tried to get a job in the Punjab civil secretariat with the help of a letter of recommendation from Fazli Husain. He was again disappointed, and was forced to continue in his position in the office of the Legislative Council. During this period, and it was then that he wrote the *Confederacy of India* and other works of the same kind, he was much influenced by the ideas of Iqbal, the debates in the Punjab legislature, his close association with Fazli Husain, the Punjab politics of those days, and the arrogance of the English civilians which had entered his personal experience. He remained a bachelor until 1941 when he married, through the efforts of Hamid Nizami (a journalist of Lahore), a niece of Fatima Begum, a well-known Muslim League worker of Lahore. In 1942 he joined the Inter-Services Public Relations Directorate at the Indian military headquarters in New Delhi, and worked there until 1947. He continued in a similar appointment with the Pakistan armed forces for about a year, and was released in 1948 at his own request. At the time of release he held the honorary rank of a Major.

Between 1936 and 1942 he wrote seven books and pamphlets on the Muslim problem in India and on separation. The earliest book, *Hindustan awr Milliyyat*, was published in 1936; then came five pamphlets between 1939 and 1942: *Pakistan*, *Pakistan: The Critics' Case Examined*, *Sir Sikandar's Regional Scheme under Searchlight*, *Separation, Socialism and Islam*, and *Separation: A Reply to its Critics*. All these appeared under the pseudonym of "A Punjabi". It was necessary to hide his identity because he was in government employment and could not have been permitted to publish political literature. He borrowed his *nom de plume* from Fazli Husain who had written his pamphlet on *Punjab Politics* under the same pen-name.

After many years he once again put his pen at the disposal of political controversy when in 1955 he wrote several pamphlets in English and Urdu in favour of One Unit, i.e., the decision of the

government of Pakistan to consolidate all the areas of West Pakistan into one province. These were: *West Pakistan: Its Political and Administrative Integration*, *Wahdati Nizam-i-Hakumat, One Unit: Palladium of Independence*, *Pakistan in Retrospect and Prospect*, *Consolidation of West Pakistan*, *Financial Advantages of One Unit*, *Nazni-o-Nasq ki Wahdat*, *Pakistan's Defence Potential and Security Problems*, *A Review of the Report of States Reorganization Committee of India*, and *Political Background of Pakistan and its Provinces*. After a silence of 12 years, in July 1967, he again entered the political lists by writing *Shaikh Mujibur Rahman's 6-Point Formula X-Rayed*.

The background of the writing of the *Confederacy of India* is given by Kafayet Ali himself in these words: "Sir Fazli Husain died in 1936. Dr. Iqbal died in 1938. Their deaths caused a dangerous gap in the ranks of Muslim leadership. The loss was acutely felt by the Muslim intelligentsia all over India. It perturbed me too. In that melancholy state of mind I had a dream. I dreamt I was in the company of Dr. Iqbal in the Barkat Ali Islamia Hall, Lahore. In fact it had been converted into a hall of the dead. In it only myself and Dr. Iqbal were alive. A number of dead bodies were laid in two parallel rows and among them I also saw certain Unionist leaders who were still alive. To reach Iqbal who was sitting at the other end of the hall, I had to walk through those two rows of the dead. I sat down by his side on a wooden chair with a wooden seat in front of a wooden table. Without a word to me he placed on the table before me two *tannuri* loaves wrapped in a piece of coarse cloth and a bowl of gravy of potatoes and meat. While I ate he sat silently looking away from me. That was my first and last meeting with Iqbal. During life I had seen him frequently but had never met him. It was perhaps [because] I was in the opposite camp.<sup>22</sup> Strangely enough after that dream Pakistan became an obsession with me. Until then my ideas about it had been nebulous but now they acquired a new lustre and lucidity. The urge they released found expression in *Confederacy of India* and the six pamphlets which followed it. I also became a sworn enemy of the Unionists. I laid aside all my past associations with them and started a campaign of invective against them in a Lahore weekly, *Monday Morning*, edited by Mr. Bedi and Mrs. Freda Bedi jointly. The same dream was also responsible for my dedicating *Confederacy of India* to Dr. Iqbal jointly with Sir Fazli Husain".<sup>23</sup>

On my inquiry about who first suggested the writing of the book and whether anybody had actually asked him to do so, Kafayet Ali wrote to me: "The book *Confederacy of India* was not written on anybody's instance. It was my own initiative and urge which produced it. Nawab Sir Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot had agreed to foot the bill of its publication and to distribute it to the public free. I am grateful to him for his generosity. The book was ready for publication by the middle of 1938. The idea was suggested to me by the late Ch. Rahmat Ali's writings and I developed it to an extent to which no one had done earlier."<sup>24</sup>

When the book was ready in manuscript, Kafayet Ali approached some leaders for help in its publication and free distribution. In certain quarters his appeal met with an insolent response. One gentleman, who later became an important personage in independent Pakistan, "pushed a waste-paper basket with the toe of his shoe towards me to consign the manuscript of the *Confederacy of India* into it when I called upon him to request him to arrange for its publication".<sup>25</sup> After several such rebuffs, finally Seth Abdullah Haroon of Sind and the Nawab of Mamdot offered to bear the cost of the publication. Though the first offer had come from Haroon, Mamdot's argument that "the Punjab had a preferential right to the honour of serving the Muslims in this respect" prevailed, and the book was financed and published by him. Throughout the writing of the book Kafayet Ali had received *much moral support from Haji Rahim Bukhsh, Dr. Muhammad Din Taseer and his wife revised the manuscript. Ghulam Rasul Mehr and Dr. S.M. Akhtar (later Professor of Economics at the University of the Punjab and at that time on the staff of the Islamia College, Lahore) made valuable suggestions, while Mrs. Akhtar outlined the maps contained in the book.*<sup>26</sup>

When the book had been printed, copies were sent out with the compliments of the Nawab of Mamdot and with a covering letter from him dated 2 July 1939. The contents of this letter deserve some notice because Mamdot was at that time the most prominent Muslim League leader of the Punjab and one of the few men of his day to have the complete confidence of Jinnah.

Mamdot declared a complete rejection of the constitution laid down by the 1935 Act, and expressed his belief that its non-acceptance by the Hindus was "only a stunt to force the British Government to make such changes in it as may remove the few

safeguards that exist under the present scheme for the minorities". The native states, too, were opposed to the federal constitution. This led him to think if there could be a scheme which would appeal to the British Government, the Muslims and the princes. He saw no point in trying to please the Congress or the Hindus in general, because "no scheme, howsoever reasonable, would be acceptable to them so long as it does not promise to establish absolute Hindu Raj in India". He commended the scheme propounded in the book by saying that "by such a partition the Muslim provinces and the Indian States will become immune from the crushing political influence of the all-powerful Congress at the centre". He added that "such a Confederation will safeguard the interests and rights of all parties without breaking the geographical unity of the Indian sub-continent". He saw two main advantages in the suggested arrangement. It would remove the domination of the Hindus at the confederal centre, thus making for Muslim security. Moreover, the re-adjustment of some of the boundaries of the Muslim provinces would, on the one hand, reduce the communal problem to manageable proportions and, on the other, decrease the political influence which the local non-Muslim minorities unduly exercised. In the end, in an obvious effort to win the sympathy of the Muslims of the Punjab Unionist Party, the Nawab reminded the readers that the views expressed in the book had had the blessings of the late Sir Fazli Husain, the founder and guiding spirit of the Unionist Party.<sup>28</sup>

During and after the writing of the book, Kafayet Ali expressed his views in several articles published in Muslim English-language newspapers.<sup>29</sup> In one of these, published in February 1939, he summarized the evolution of the idea of separation. He said that all schemes aimed at creating a single Hindu-Muslim nation and instituting lesser control by the centre would ultimately prove failures. The Muslims would have to seek refuge in separation. "This is the only harbour which is open to them. They should better enter it at once instead of wandering into it after a criminal wastage of national time and energy." The idea of separation was not a new discovery made in the heat of the moment; it went back to the time of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. "The ideal of seeking union with the Hindus is a physical impossibility, for the Hindus seek unity and not union with the Muslims. By unity they understand complete oneness with them, that is complete absorption of

the Muslims by the Hindus.”

Iqbal had read the Indian political situation in its true perspective. “He alone arrived at the right conclusion, namely, their complete separation, and not their union, was the proper remedy of the complicated political situation in India. He suggested this remedy to the Muslims but they criticized him harshly and called the ideal of separation as presented by him as impracticable and unsound. They little realized, at the time they were criticizing him, that they were not finding fault with the ideal but only doubting their own ability to achieve it. This ideal is not a physical impossibility. It is neither abstract nor unsound. It is also not a logical incongruity. If to some Muslims it appears impracticable, it is not because of any inherent defect in it but because of their own debility as a nation. This ideal has developed regularly through various stages, and we find that all through the period of Indian political history of modern times, the Muslim thought has been subconsciously working up to it and evolving it. In itself it is perfect. What is required is that an intellectual revolution must precede it among the Muslims”.<sup>30</sup>

### Confederacy of India

After this general background, we can now proceed to give a summary of the arguments and suggestions put forward in the *Confederacy of India*. Throughout this section I have tried to convey Mian Kafayet Ali's views in his own words and, in order to make the account readable, quotation marks and footnotes have been avoided as far as it was possible.

The fundamental question is: what is the aim of Muslim politics in India? The answer is twofold: to maintain the integrity of the Muslims as a separate community and to ensure their economic welfare. The first depends upon keeping intact the four constituents of their separate existence: their faith (that is, Islam), their civilization, their culture, and their languages. The second can be secured by legislation, and pacts between Muslims and non-Muslims, with a view to checking the latter from accumulating all the wealth and the means of production of the country in their own hands. But ultimately the securing of economic interests serves merely as a means for the achievement of cultural ideals. After a community has satisfied its primary needs, it tends to seek

self-expression through the realization of cultural and religious ideals dear to it. The main object of Muslim politics is, therefore, to safeguard the separate existence of the Muslims as an independent community for the sake of their cultural and religious values.

Legislation and pacts may help an economically weaker community in securing its economic interests against an economically stronger community, but they can never become a guarantee against the subtle influence which the culture of the latter continuously exercises on the former. So far the Muslims have been trying to secure their economic position as well as cultural interests through legislation and pacts concluded with the Hindus. But these methods have failed. They do not hold out any prospects for success in the future. After this failure the only alternative left to the Muslims is that of separating themselves from Hindu India.

So far four schemes have been formulated by different Muslim individuals, all to a greater or lesser degree based on the principle of separation. The first is the Latif scheme, which from the theoretical point of view is perfect but on the practical side is open to serious objections. It involves an exchange of population which will affect at least two-thirds of the total population of India. It ignores the fact that, India being climatically so diverse, the climate of one region may not suit the migrants from another. Indian revenues will not be large enough to finance this exchange of population. By retaining the identity and status of the native princely states and by contemplating a transfer of population between British Indian areas and native states, the scheme creates a morally dubious situation in which a people so far governed by the democratic principle would have to pass under autocratic rule. It includes certain Hindu-majority areas in the proposed Muslim zones, which is not only against the principle of democracy but against the reality of the situation in so far as the Congress and other Hindu parties will never agree to it. By a complete withdrawal of the Muslim population from Hindu zones, it will stop the further spread of Islam in India. In the north-west zone, the line of demarcation drawn in the scheme will leave the canal heads of some important irrigation projects of the Punjab in the adjoining Hindu zone. Thus some features of the Latif scheme are not practicable, while others have no moral justification.

The second scheme is the one generally known as the Regional Federation scheme and usually attributed to some dignitaries of

the Punjab Unionist Party. It includes the Muslim-minority tracts of the Punjab in the north-western regional unit. This will mean the retention of a permanent element of friction within our body-politic. Further, it is apologetic in nature and fails to remove or even reduce the difficulties which are facing the Muslims at present.

The proposal brought forward by Asadullah assumes a large-scale exchange of population which is not a practical proposition. Like the Latif scheme, it is "aggressive" and lacks moral justification.

The fourth scheme is a combination of the tripartite confederation of three federations (proposed in the *Confederacy of India*) and the improvement upon it suggested by the Nawab of Mamdot. This will result in the creation of five federations in India: the Indus Regions' Federation, the Hindu India Federation, the Rajistan Federation, the Deccan States' Federation, and the Bengal Federation. To translate this scheme into reality, only some provincial boundaries will have to be altered. It has several merits. It is simple and can be carried out without much difficulty. It involves no injustice to any party. It promises to restore the balance of communal powers without being in any way aggressive. It ensures Muslim cultural and economic interests against all dangers at the hands of the Hindus. And it simplifies politics on both sides.

The principle of a confederation of federations may be novel and unprecedented in history, but it is not impracticable. Strange maladies yield to stranger remedies. The political problem of India is unique, and therefore the solution must also be unique.

But confederation depends upon the will of the parties concerned. If one party does not agree with the confederation plan, it has no moral right to stand in the way of the others if they seek complete separation of their regions. Self-determination in their own regions is the birth-right of the Muslims. Constitutionally and morally no power can deprive them of this right. If the Hindus object to the confederation scheme, the Muslims will have no alternative to demanding complete separation. And if the Hindus oppose such separation, the Muslims will be within their rights in going to all extremes and in trying all methods open to them to achieve it.

The scheme of confederacy is based on the principle of

separation. yet it avoids the disintegration of India. It is a defensive measure. not an offensive step against the Hindus. It does not mean breaking up the geographical unity of the sub-continent by tearing it up into pieces and assigning them to the communities on population and cultural bases. It simply means an internal partition. effected between the various members of a joint family without breaking their mutual bond of relationship. Consequently, separation means assigning different parts of the sub-continent to different communities on a cultural basis and their reunion in a confederacy. The purpose of separation in this sense is not division but union. to be achieved by simplifying the present complicated political situation, in which each community is too much in the way of the other's cultural and economic progress.

But if the scheme of a confederacy fails because of Hindu opposition, Muslims should demand complete separation as their right and not as a favour that may depend on the good wishes of anybody. In that case they should be prepared to separate their regions without maintaining any link between them and Hindu India.<sup>31</sup>

All attempts to build up a national India rest on a wrong assumption, namely, that India constitutes one country and Indians form a single nation. The very presence of communalism shows that Hindus and Muslims are not one nation, but two nations. And since all past and present attempts to suppress communalism have miserably failed, we cannot expect that some future day shall see the communities united into a single nation. Communalism is the violent expression of the general will of the two communities that they are two different entities and that they must separate.

The accident of the conquest of India by the British cannot be pleaded as an argument for the existence of one Indian nation. Subjugation of two or more nations to another nation can never make them a single nation, even if the conquering nation, for its own convenience, may call them as one people. European precedents should open British eyes to this truth. Austria and Hungary had remained united under the Hapsburgs from 1526 to 1918. The statesmen who decided to break up the political unity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire knew very well that the various races which inhabited it had lived together for centuries as one people, and were also uniform in respect of the system of laws which governed them and the culture and religion which they followed.

These different races had in fact more in common with one another than Muslims and Hindus have in India. In spite of this Austria-Hungary was dismembered in order that each of the races might have a separate home. Similarly, in the Baltic block, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Lithuania became independent national states after the first World War, although prior to it they were treated as mere minorities.

The Muslims fail to understand why such European precedents, well known to British statesmen, were not followed in the case of the Muslim north-west and Muslim Bengal at the time of deciding their destiny and linking them with Hindu India in an all-India federation. Why was the democratic principle of self-determination, so much applauded in the West, not adhered to in the East when the future of the Muslim regions of India was at stake?

Of course, the British could not do much for the minorities scattered all over India. But the extension of the federal scheme to regions which were definitely Muslim in population and character is incomprehensible. The Muslim regions of the north-west and of Bengal could easily have been constituted as separate states. It was forgotten that in each of these regions the Muslims formed separate nations, and that in respect of area and population they stood comparison with some of the biggest states in Europe and Asia. There is no precedent in the modern world of a nation that has been converted into a minority community by its inclusion in another nation numerically stronger than it.

In the past Hindus and Muslims lived together in India in the same way as the English are living with them today. Does the Englishmen's living together with the Hindus and Muslims in India make them nationally one with the latter communities, or will it make all three of them a single nation if India happens to be conquered by another nation, say the Japanese or the Germans? Similarly, if the British were to annex Afghanistan to their Indian Empire, it would not make the people of that country a single nation with the Hindus of India. There are several examples in the history of the modern world where minorities, even smaller than the Muslims of north-western and north-eastern India, were provided with homelands and granted the right of self-determination. The myth of a single Hindu-Muslim nation in the Indian sub-continent is unprecedented in the history of the modern world.<sup>32</sup>

A study of the principles of nationalism in their application to India shows that every element that goes into the formation of a nation is missing, except a common country and the yoke of foreign rule.

The racial differences in India are so glaring as to need no comment. A Bengali, a Punjabi and a Marwari cannot be put into the same category, however loosely we may define race. Ethnologically the Indian population is so diverse that the general claim of the Indians that they are pure Aryans cannot be admitted. Racially India is anything but one.

At present three civilizations prevail in India: Hindu, Islamic, and Western. Each of them is hostile to the other. Some educated classes among both Hindus and Muslims have adopted Western values and mores, but it is evident that the influence of the West is only skin deep. Hindu culture is based on the Hindu social system, the most prominent feature of which is the institution of caste which does not admit of equality between man and man. On the contrary, the underlying principle in both the Islamic and Western cultures is the equality and brotherhood of man. The culture of the West is very near to that of Islam, but it has become too materialistic to attract the Muslims. Hindu culture finds nothing valuable in the Islamic or Western. In any case the Western system of values is an importation in India, and is incapable of serving as a link between Hindus and Muslims. And neither of the Indian communities is in a position to go over to the cultural *milieu* of the other. Thus cultural unity is not only non-existent in India, but is a dream which will remain unfulfilled.

The language problem is even more serious in India. Almost every province has a tongue of its own. This not only presents difficulties so far as Hindus and Muslims are concerned, but also poses a grave problem among the Hindus of different provinces. The Bengali Hindu is not ready to accept Hindi as the state language. The Madrasi Hindu has already formed an Anti-Hindi Language. The diversity of opinion regarding the question of an Indian *lingua franca* is creating divisions and disturbances among the socially and religiously homogeneous Hindus. The problem is absolutely insoluble as far as the Hindus and the Muslims are concerned, for there is nothing common between their religions and cultures.

The Hindi-Urdu controversy may on the surface appear to be

one about scripts. In fact it goes much deeper. Hindi literature, which is the expression of Hindu culture, is published in the Nagri script with which the Hindus have cultural and historical associations. Urdu literature, which is the expression of Islamic culture, is published in the Persian script. The adoption of one script against the other will help the cause of the culture it represents. The decision of the Congress to recognize both scripts does not settle the question: in fact, it amounts to an admission that the two communities are in reality two different nations and that their cultural differences cannot be obliterated.

Above all there is the clash between the two religions. Islam and Hinduism are so far apart that the principles of one are a negation of the other. Whereas Hinduism is flexible, conciliatory and vague, Islam is rigid, uncompromising and clear-cut. There cannot be any "approach" between the two. Hinduism has been able to absorb other religions of Indian origin whose followers were culturally similar to the Hindus. But it cannot accommodate any religion of foreign origin, like Islam or Christianity. Moreover, the numerical strength of the followers of these two religions is so large that no solution can be found in the wholesale conversion of one group to the other.

Some people think that Hindu-Muslim relations will improve by the spread of education. By this they mean either of two things. Education will remove the ignorance of the common man, and with it the chances of his being exploited by the interested persons with the object of straining his relations with the followers of another religion. Or, education will mean complete Westernization, so that the communities will sink their differences and become uniform; the factors which create discord between them, namely, their religions and cultures, will disappear. The argument assumes that adherence to religion and culture amounts to ignorance, so that education, in the sense of making them non-religious and weaning them away from their particular culture, will improve their relations.

On the other hand, complete Westernization is physical impossible, and no hope of improvement can be put in this development. No matter how much the Hindus are Westernized, they will continue to be Hindus. The present tendencies among them show that they want to adopt only the political ideas and creeds of the West and nothing else. Different cultures, creeds and

religions have swept over India in the past without bringing about any change in the outlook or values of the Hindus. As far as the Muslims are concerned, further Westernization will in the beginning create among them a revulsion against Islam, which will in reality be against the Islam of the *mulla*, for in real Islam there is nothing which could be said to be against the ideal human nature or nature in general. This superficial wandering away from Islam will in reality be their discarding the Islam of the uneducated *mulla* class. Education will be able to help to deepen their understanding of true Islam. And the more they understand the Islam of the Quran the more they will try to keep away from the Hindus. Hence the hope that the spread of education or the influence of the West will bring the two communities closer is illusory.

The Islamic conception of nationality (*millat*) is quite different from that current in the West. It rests on certain definite beliefs about the ultimate end of life and the nature of the universe, participation in the same historical tradition, and the sentiment of fraternity based on the idea that all Muslims, wherever they happen to be, are members of the society founded by the Prophet. They are in relation to one another equal as brothers, and, in relation to their God, His servants. This conception is non-racial and non-spatial. The bond of Islamic nationality is further strengthened by Islamic civilization, which is a product of cross-fertilization of the Semitic and Aryan ideas and represents the characteristics of both the parents. Islam produces a particular type of individual. The stamp of Islam on their character is borne by all Muslims and distinguishes them from all non-Muslims. The Muslims all over the world are therefore a single nation, just as the Jews are a single nationality whether they be German, Russian or English. The concept of forming a common nation with the Hindus or any other non-Muslim people is, therefore, quite alien to the Muslim mind.

Both Hindus and Muslims have participated in making the history of India for the last one thousand years. Yet their traditions and heroes have always been different. The defeats of one have been the victories of the other. What one has registered as a wrong against the other, the other has recorded as its brilliant success. The strength and tenacity of this antagonism are reflected in the fact that the periods of their friendly relations have been forgotten while the incidents of mutual hostility are remembered.

Shivaji and Awrangzeb always remain in their minds, while Akbar and Todar Mall are figures that only exist in history books. This is an index to the ineffaceable enmity existing between the two communities.

In spite of living side by side for so long in the same country their economic interests are not the same. In the north-west, the Hindus are the capitalists and the Muslims wage-earners. The interests of the Muslims are mainly agricultural, and those of the Hindus mainly industrial and commercial. The Muslims are chiefly the consumers, while the Hindus are either middlemen who sell foreign goods or mill owners who market their finished product. A protectionist tariff may be ruinous to the Muslims of the north-west, but very helpful for the Hindu industrialists of the south and the south-east.

There are people who believe that strained Hindu-Muslim relations are due to particular class interests in the communities, and that a unification of India on an economic basis will eliminate this discord. But, will the disappearance of class interests and the achievement of an economic unity bring the two communities to an equal footing in the economic sphere? How will the Muslims achieve this economic parity with the Hindus in the face of so many handicaps and disabilities? Will the Hindus show so much generosity as to allow them to come up to their own standard? *Will socialism provide the solution? The fact is that keeping intact our integrity as well as seeking economic equality with the Hindus as members of the same nation are two contradictions which no logic can reconcile.* In the process of economic levelling up or down (as the case may be) of the communities, at last a stage will intervene when one community will be the master and the other the subordinate, and no one can say how long this stage will last.

The only thing which is common to the two communities is India, which is wrongly supposed to be one country. The very size and extent of India are an argument against the development of a mutual-understanding or a sentiment of nationalism. All efforts of Hindu and Muslim social and religious reformers have been as futile in making one country out of this sub-continent as the political propaganda and endeavour of the Congress during the last fifty years.

One could say that the two communities had at least one common cause to bind them together, viz., gaining freedom from

foreign domination. They have in the past attempted to form a united front against the foreign rulers. But it has been proved that this one uniting factor lacks the force to counteract the influence of disintegrating tendencies caused by other disruptionist elements. Their common grievance against British rule has failed to bring them together.

Histories of other countries may illustrate the principle that subject people always join on the issue of winning freedom, but Indian history proves an exception to this rule. When India was under Muslim rule, the Hindus never made a united effort to become free. There were always Hindu princes who sided with the Mughals or the Afghans in suppressing Hindu rebellions. One reason for this was that the Hindus of one region had no sympathy with the Hindus of another region. One could almost say that the various Hindu regions considered themselves to be separate countries and not parts of the same country. The reality about India is, therefore, that it is not a single country but a sub-continent comprising many countries. As it is not a single country, it does not allow the establishment of that close contact among its people which is possible in other countries. Lack of close contact has resulted in want of mutual understanding and sympathy among the inhabitants of various parts of India. With the development of modern communications and increased intercourse among the various provinces, the Hindus and Muslims have developed separate unities, so that today India contains two different nations instead of one united nation.

The failure of the Hindus and Muslims to stand together against the British becomes easily understandable against this background. The present is determined by the past. When the British conquered India, the Hindus of the regions which had been under the Muslims were happy to get rid of their Muslim rulers. The Muslims of the parts which had been under the Hindus were jubilant on having been saved by the British from the humiliation of living under a people whom they had conquered and ruled for hundreds of years. It is well known how the Muslims of the southern and central India welcomed the British as rescuers from Maratha rule, and those of the Punjab and the frontier applauded the British for vanquishing the Sikhs. With such mutual jealousies, how could the two communities combine against the British? Had there been more occasions like the Jallianwala Bagh, where they were made to

suffer jointly, perhaps their union against the British might have been possible. But as the British seldom give a common cause of complaint against themselves at the same time, it is not possible that the shared cause of gaining freedom would ever erase from their memory the fears which they entertain of each other on account of their past animosities. Foreign rulers of every community-ridden country are always shrewd enough to select only one community at a time for slapping. While slapping one community, they pat the other on the shoulder.

In these circumstances there are only two methods by which the communities can hope to achieve independence. One is to forget the sufferings which they caused to each other in the past and remember only the ills done to both of them by the foreigner. This is impossible because it requires a very long period of inter-communal harmony undisturbed by any outbreak of communal animosity to keep their mind fixed on the common object of driving out the foreign ruler. The other method is that of separation. Let the two communities separate in different regions assigned to them so that they may mutually feel secure against each other. Separation will also help them to forget their past rivalries. The absence of the other community will make for peace.

If separation is not effected, the Hindus and Muslims will either have to submit to perpetual enthraldom to a foreign power or, in the case of their acquiring freedom, to remain under the strain of an unpleasant, everlasting condition of communalism, marked by intrigues and counter-intrigues against each other and a consequent state of fear of once again passing under a foreign rule.<sup>33</sup>

Indian "nationalists" lay much stress on the necessity of separating religion from politics, and on the certainty of achieving Hindu-Muslim unity if this advice is heeded. To the Muslims such counsel is not only unacceptable but disagreeable. They cannot divorce their religion from their politics. In Islam religious and political beliefs are not separated from each other. It speaks of this world as well as of the world to come. Muslims cannot be first Indians and then Muslims or *vice versa*. They are born into a system. The system is not thrust upon them. Therefore Hindu-Muslim unity, signifying homogeneity between them in all non-religious matters, is unimaginable. The idea of a common state with heterogeneous membership is alien to Islam, and can never be fruitful. An all-India federation, no matter how many safeguards and con-

cessions it may carry with it, cannot be a permanent basis of settlement. Unity between the communities will be impossible in a federation, because one of the parties to it cannot separate religion from politics and the other is very strict with regard to matters which relate to its social system. Hence, in their own interests, the two communities will have to separate.<sup>34</sup>

Independence of India means different things to the Hindus and the Muslims. To the Hindus it is a national necessity. They want it for the restoration of national self-respect, and all the other national, social and economic benefits which accrue from it. To the Muslims independence is a religious necessity. It will lead to the achievement of the spiritual and worldly benefits which Islam promises. They want it for the sake of their religious and cultural ideals, for these cannot flourish under foreign rule. Under an alien state or even in a state formed in alliance with a non-Muslim community, the individual's Islamic personality cannot develop because there are no opportunities of self-expression. Only an Islamic state can provide these opportunities.<sup>35</sup>

Separation can be justified on several other grounds, too. The right spirit of Islam cannot be developed or allowed to flourish without hindrance until the Muslims are their own masters. The integrity of Islam will not be safe in India unless the Muslims wield *unimpaired political power in those regions which are theirs* by numbers.

Nor can the Muslims depend on the Hindus for the protection of their cultural interests. A community which could for centuries enforce untouchability on the Muslims even when the Muslims ruled the land cannot be expected to respect the integrity of the Muslim faith after coming into power. Even today Islamic culture is being endangered by such subtle but powerful means as Hindu-produced films which propagate Hindu cultural values. Apart from this the very contact with the Hindus has produced undesirable effects on Islam. The influence of Hinduism has tainted the beliefs and practices of the Muslims. Three historical factors have combined to produce this outcome—the close contact of the Muslim civilization with the Hindu civilization; the natural affinity which developed between them as a result of this contact; and the fact that Islam won a large number of its followers from Hinduism, who brought with them certain elements of Hindu civilization and who were permitted to retain some of the Hindu usages, customs, traditions and associations.

All the constituents which make the Muslims a separate entity in India have lost their true quality. It is feared that the more Hindu culture is revived the more Muslim culture will become modified and merged into Hinduism. The first to revert to the fold of Hinduism will be the Hindu converts to Islam. In a federated India the Hindus will be able to damage Muslim culture even more seriously than they have so far done. The culture of a politically superior nation often dominates other cultures in the country. The masses unconsciously copy the customs and habits of the dominant community.

In the economic field, too, the Hindus have such a grasping control over every economic activity that the Muslims find it impossible to enter this closed society. All trading and industrial concerns are Hindu. The banks, and the insurance companies from whom they borrow capital, are Hindu. The middlemen who control the marketing of goods are Hindu. Even the great majority of the petty shopkeepers is Hindu. Hindu companies and firms employ only Hindus, just as Hindu mills and factories give jobs to Hindu hands alone. Thus so closely do the Hindus control economic enterprise of every variety that no Muslim efforts to improve their economic position will ever succeed. The Hindu monopoly will continue to flourish, and the Muslim will be permanently relegated to a situation of economic slavery.

In the public services Muslim representation is pitifully inadequate. Efforts have been made to set things right, but little has been achieved. Even in Muslim provinces government employment is almost a monopoly of the non-Muslims. Senior Indian officials, most of whom are non-Muslim, have evolved such techniques of appointment, recruitment, promotion, fixation and revision of salaries, transfer, annual reports, and preparation of seniority lists, that the few Muslims who stray into government service find a bleak future before them.

To sum up, at present the trade and industrial interests of the Muslims are but nominal. In a federated India dominated by Hindu capitalists and industrialists it will not be possible for them to have their proper share in the economic life of the country. Their representation in public services is meager. Their agricultural interests are in danger. In short, no economic or cultural interest of the Muslims is safe. All their interests can be safeguarded only by a separation of their regions from Hindu India.<sup>36</sup>

From the Muslims' point of view the ideal solution of the Indian problem will be one in which their territorial loyalties and their allegiance to their faith find a happy compromise, and their economic and cultural interests are fully ensured through the exercise of absolute political power. This will remove the present division among their ranks, and also the chaos from which their politics have suffered during the last three hundred years. Only the separation of their regions from Hindu India can fulfil this ideal. The proposition is sound and practicable. It is their legitimate heritage to enjoy full state power in all those parts of India where they are in an overwhelming majority. The revival of Islamic culture and orthodox Islam, the betterment of the Muslim masses, and the restoration of their self-respect depend upon their having separate states of their own, whether within or without the Commonwealth of Nations.

The causes of Muslim demoralization and repeated failures of the past can be traced to their loss of power. The one great need of the moment is to focus all attention on the real problem, which is the recapture of political power, at least in their homes. Had they successfully isolated their homes, the north-west Muslim block and Bengal, from alien interference after their downfall in India, they would not have been a disorganized and undisciplined people. There would not have been any clash between their religious and political ideals. Their extension of the conception of motherland even to Hindu parts of India, simply because a small population of their co-religionists happened to live there, has been responsible in a large measure for the confusion and complications of their politics. If they had considered only the far eastern province of Bengal and some portions of Assam and the north-western tract of India as their motherland, and had successfully reserved these parts for themselves, their position would not have been what it is today, and the clash of ideals and loyalties, which dissipated their energies and contributed towards their failures, would not have occurred, and today they would not have found themselves in a cleft stick.

The Hindus and Muslims are two absolutely different entities. Their civilizations are opposed to each other. Their habits and customs, social systems, moral codes, religious, political and cultural ideals, traditions, languages, literatures, architectures, arts and outlook on life are completely different from, nay, hostile

to, one another. Their basic differences, their memories of the past, and their present rivalries form an unbridgeable gulf between them. The only thing common between them during the last few centuries has been the yoke of a foreign rule. As soon as the cord which binds them in common allegiance to a foreign state snaps, they will disintegrate. These factors, as also the experience gained from the failure of unity talks and attempts at concluding pacts, point to the serious necessity of separation.

An all-India federation is bound to be a failure because it is based on the wrong assumption that Hindus and Muslims are one nation. It can never be the solution of the internal problem of India. To agree to be linked with the Hindus in a common federation dominated by the latter for the sake of the Muslim minorities in Hindu provinces, will ruin the cause of Islam and Islamic culture in the Muslim parts of India. It will not guarantee the safety of the Muslim minority and of Islamic culture in Hindu provinces. It may also adversely affect the programme of the Hindus in reviving Hindu culture even in the definitely Hindu provinces, for every attempt by them in this direction will evoke strong protests from Muslims in all parts of India.

Homogeneity is an essential condition for the development of a parliamentary system of government. If we look at the opposing interests and uncompromising elements of which the proposed federal government shall be composed, we can anticipate its failure as certain. Self-government will always remain a distant dream for both communities: if the governor general interferes too much to save minority interests, the majority will have no self-government; if he allows the majority to have its way on all issues, the minority will be deprived of it. Hence it will not be a democratic government, but a despotic one, depending upon the powers of interference of the governor general to save the minorities from the majority. The same will be true of all provincial governments. The Muslims will soon discover that the autonomy of their provinces has been vitiated beyond recognition.

India will never achieve self-government until a new constitution is made based on the real facts of the sub-continent, viz., that it consists of many countries inhabited by various nations, whose interests are 'opposed to one another'. The parts inhabited by homogeneous people should be allowed to set up their own states.

The idea of separation has not been moulded in the heat of disappointment; it has developed over a considerable period of time. The principles of separate electorates and weighted representation indicated a parting of the ways. The logical conclusion to which their acceptance and long practice lead is the complete separation of the communities in different states. Iqbal was perfectly right in arguing that their complete separation was the only proper remedy of the existing political situation.

The idea of separation has been present in the Muslim mind throughout the modern period of history. If to some Muslims it appears impracticable, it is not because of any inherent defect in it but because of their own debility as a nation. In itself the ideal is faultless. What is required is an intellectual revolution which should bring it to the consciousness of every Muslim.<sup>37</sup>

A consideration of the question of possible British reaction to the Muslim demand for separation leads to five conclusions. First, the demand for separation should be made at once without any future delay. Secondly, separation should take place while the British are still ruling India. Once they are gone, the Hindus will never agree to it. Thirdly, the risks of a civil war should be avoided, for an internal upheaval of that proportion will probably throw India into the arms of some new expansionist power. Fourthly, the British will lend their support to the idea of separation with ulterior motives, for their interests demand that they should keep India under their control, whether as one country or as two countries. Lastly, the Muslims should not try to make an alliance with the Congress in order to achieve independence first and demand separation afterwards; for it is possible that the Congress may never wish to sever the imperial link, or it may sever it when it has become strong enough to suppress the Muslim separatist tendency by militarizing Hindu India and reducing the Muslims to an impotent entity half-absorbed by Hinduism.<sup>38</sup>

The Congress will certainly oppose all Muslim demands for separation. It will not like Hindu India to be sandwiched on all sides by Muslim states, even if they happen to be member states of an Indian confederation. It will naturally prefer to have all Muslim zones under its direct control and authority in order to reduce to a minimum the dangers to Hindu India.<sup>39</sup>

The implications and consequences of the formation of a Muslim federation in the north-west should be made clear to the

Muslims of this area. It will be a Muslim state, not the usual Western-style state to which Indian Muslims have become accustomed. It may be a state governed by Islamic law as contained in the Quran. It may mean that the Muslims shall have to purge themselves of all un-Islamic influences which they have contracted during their close association with non-Muslims. It may well require Muslim agriculturists to forego the protection which the Land Alienation Act provides them in the Punjab and the NWFP against expropriation at the hands of the non-agricultural tribes. It may require some Muslim communities of Sind, like the Khojas and Kachi Memons, to give up the Hindu law by which they are at present governed, and some communities of the Punjab to discard customary law in favour of the Muslim law of inheritance. Such things must be told to the Muslims, not to terrify them but to put before them an honest picture of what the future may be like.<sup>40</sup>

It is obvious that the creation of Muslim states in the north-west and north-east will not completely solve the problem of Indian Muslims. After excluding the Hindu areas of eastern Punjab, the Muslim population of the north-western federation will be about 25 million. About twice that number of Muslims will be left in Hindu India. It may well be asked if it will be in the interests of the Muslims as a community that 25 million of them in the north-west should enjoy self-government, while 50 million of their co-religionists should continue to live under Hindu rule. The answer to this is that, in the first instance, we want to separate from India because we are anxious to save as much of the Muslim population and their interests from the danger of Hindu domination in India as may be possible by the method of separation. In the second instance, separation not only denotes the separation of the north-west Muslim block alone but also the separation of all those parts which happen to be predominantly Muslim. It also implies an exchange of population.

The exchange of population between the Muslim western Punjab and the Hindu eastern Punjab will bring over one million Muslims from the eastern part into the north-western Muslim state. Similarly, an exchange between Muslim Bengal (plus some parts of Assam) and Assam, Bihar and Orissa will bring nearly 35 million Muslims into the north-eastern Muslim state. In all, therefore, separation will be able to save about 62 million Muslims

out of the total Indian Muslim population of about 77 million. This will leave nearly 15 million Muslims in central and south India whose withdrawal into Muslim regions is not a practical proposition.

These figures show the huge scale on which the exchange of population will have to be effected if a great majority of the Muslims is to be saved from Hindu rule. Obviously such a gigantic project cannot be undertaken. Therefore separation will have to come without any exchange of population. In that case, with a divided Punjab and a divided Bengal (with the districts of Goalpara and Sylhet of Assam), the two Muslim regions will accommodate over 48 million Muslims: 25 million in the north-west and 23 million in Bengal. This will leave nearly 29 million Muslims in Hindu hands, as compared to 15 million if populations are exchanged. Apart from the fact that this cannot be helped, the presence of such a large Muslim minority in Hindu India will have two desirable results: it will help to restore a balance of communal powers in India, and it will allow Islam the prospects for further proselytism.<sup>4 B</sup>

It is hoped that the Muslims living in Hindu provinces will understand the situation, and will not try to hang round our necks merely in order that they should be kept company in the vortex of a federated India under the domination of the Hindus, who are our rivals culturally as well as economically. They must understand the difference between British rule and the nominal British rule combined with internal Hindu domination or complete Hindu domination. They must realize the dangers to the whole Muslim community and to Islam in an India dominated by the Hindus. With them, in a common federation, we shall be as helpless as they. While out of it, we shall be strong and able to exert our influence in their favour, ready to exchange courtesy with courtesy and ill turn with ill turn.<sup>42</sup>

What will be the attitude of the neighbouring Muslim countries to Indian Muslim separation? Afghanistan alone may pose a problem. It had not welcomed the 1935 reforms for India for it feared that the more India became self-governing the more the subsidies paid to Afghanistan by the government of India would be reduced. When a new state is established in the north-west of India there will be no justification for paying any such subsidy. For this reason Afghanistan may not like the idea of Muslim separation in India.

On the other hand, the fact that the new state will be a Muslim state may persuade the Afghans to surrender their self-interest to the cause of Islam in India. They may also derive other advantages from the creation of a Muslim state at their door-steps. The people of Afghanistan should be jubilant at the prospects of a new Muslim state in their close neighbourhood in place of the present non-Muslim colony.

Similarly, the tribal leaders of the frontier who have been in receipt of political allowances from the government of India may not approve of the new state, but their Muslim followers are sure to welcome it.

The other Muslim states, like Turkey, Egypt, Arabia and Persia, will regard the establishment of the north-west Muslim state as the first practical step towards the liberation of Asia from European rule. It will mean to them the dawn of the long-cherished ideal of pan-Islamism.<sup>43</sup>

However excellent the arguments in favour of separation, the ultimate question is whether the Muslims will have the ability and courage to reach the objective. Who is going to achieve this ideal for a community which is showing all the signs of exhausted national energy and a defeatist outlook? Can the morale of the Muslims be restored to them? Can they be reclaimed as a people with all the qualities of a progressive nation?

The history of the Muslims during the last 150 years shows that every political movement started by the community was a failure. The Wahabi movement of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the *jihad* undertaken by Sayyid Ismail Shahid, the mutiny of 1857, the protest about the Cawnpore mosque issue, the Lucknow Pact of 1916, the Khilafat movement with the *hijrat* fiasco, the Mopla rising, the agitation against the Kashmir durbar, the Shahidgunj campaign, the pro-Arab campaign for the liberation of Palestine—all these proved to be futile movements. But it is a fact that on all these issues the Muslim masses gallantly responded to the call of their leaders, supplying funds which they could ill afford, sacrificing their comfort, and courting imprisonment and death. A people who could show such fortitude in bearing the strain of a series of failures with magnificent courage cannot be said to be decadent and past all hope of reclamation. What is required for the flowering of their latent abilities as a people and as a nation is a less complicated political situation; an atmosphere in which their

national energy may work unhampered in moulding their destiny in the way best suited to their national genius. In order that they may go forward, new paths in Indian politics must be discovered and old ones abandoned. It is baffling for any people to be confronted with a multiplicity of problems, like representation in services, clash between agricultural and industrial interests, friction between capital and labour, separate and joint electorates, reservation of seats in legislatures and other elective bodies, preservation of language and script, protection of personal law, etc. This simplification can be brought about only by putting before them one single issue of separation.

To achieve this separation it is also necessary that Muslim leadership should be overhauled so that it springs from amongst the people instead of being thrust upon them from above. The leaders should have no personal interests as distinguished from public interests. They should be able to create among the Muslims a feeling of self-respect and self-importance so as to release them from the pernicious effects of the oppression and defeatism which have been their lot during the last few centuries. They should be able to form a habit of success in the nation. To acquire political power, the masses will have to be trained, organized and disciplined. Further, such Islamic institutions as were set up to make Islam a living force and a successful social, political and economic system will have to be revived.

Such a leadership should not find it difficult to demonstrate that separation is the only solution of our complicated problems. This is the only way in which politics and religion can be assigned equal places in a state, and the division of allegiance between a country and a faith avoided. So far Muslims have been divided over this question. Some have been giving priority to the preservation and propagation of Islam, others to the freedom of the country. This clash between their loyalty to their religion and allegiance to their country has been causing a good deal of confusion in Muslim politics, dissipation of their national energy and disruption in their ranks. The new leadership will bring about a revolution by presenting to the masses the ideal of separation which is a happy compromise between these two schools of thought.

The outlook is not as discouraging as a contemplation of past history makes it appear. The dark clouds on the national horizon are showing a silver lining. The Muslims have begun to realize

that the present complicated situation will but lead them to a blind alley. They want a simple solution to get them out of this predicament. There is a strong desire among them for a saviour. The number of their intelligentsia is on the increase: this will not only raise the standard of their culture but also facilitate their organization and reform. Instead of being disheartened by past failures, the leadership should take courage from the new spirit of the present. The soul of the Muslims as a nation is not dead. It is alive, and only a little exhausted. Once resuscitated, it is capable of volcanic energy. Once organized and disciplined, the nation can be led into the toughest battles. In the past it has never failed; it is the leaders who have failed them. With new leaders in the van and a new ideal to beckon them, there will be nothing that they will find impossible to achieve.<sup>44</sup>

Now about the details of the areas to be claimed for the two Muslim states. The north-west region will be called Indusstan, after the river Indus, and will contain Sind, Baluchistan, NWFP, Kashmir and a major portion of the Punjab. Here the only item needing attention is the line of demarcation separating Muslim western Punjab from Hindu eastern Punjab.

There is a difference of opinion on this point among the Muslims. Some regard the river Jumna or the ridge separating the plain of the Indus from that of the Ganges as a natural boundary. Others believe in excluding all the eastern Hindu tracts of the Kangra district, some portions of the Hoshiarpur district and the whole of the Ambala division. The first view will of course increase the area of Indusstan, but by bringing into the Muslim state a large number of Hindus it will not really solve the communal problem. The considerable rise of Hindu percentage in our population will be detrimental to our own interests. Such a boundary will not allow us to seek cultural isolation from Hindu India. The sympathy of these Hindus within our frontiers will always be with Hindu India. For these reasons it is safer to accept the second alternative and not to include in Indusstan any area which is overwhelmingly non-Muslim in population.

The existing communal balance in the Punjab is artificially maintained by the make-weight of the Ambala division. Before the British occupation of the Punjab, this division did not form part of the province. In fact, it never ought to have been included in the Muslim province. It is this unnatural link-up which has been

at the root of all communal troubles of the Punjab, making it an Ulster of India.

Another factor should also be kept in mind. Communalism is more rampant in those parts of India where the communities are more or less evenly balanced than where one of them happens to be in an overwhelmingly large majority. It is surprising why the Muslim delegates to the RTC did not ask for such a re-adjustment of the boundaries of the Punjab as would have given them an overwhelming majority instead of the present marginal majority. Perhaps, in view of the promised provincial autonomy, they believed that by maintaining the existing boundaries they would be keeping the Hindus of the province as hostages in their hands for the safety of the Muslim minorities in Hindu provinces. But this was a serious mistake. In all the Hindu provinces the Muslims are weak, economically and numerically, and cannot raise their head against the Hindu majorities. On the contrary, the non-muslim minorities in Muslim provinces are not only numerically strong but also economically superior to the Muslim majorities. Therefore, the non-Muslims in the Muslim provinces can never be treated as hostages against the security of the Muslim minorities living in Hindu provinces. Thus, the exclusion of the eastern tracts from the Punjab will make the position of the Punjabi Hindus in Indusstan to some extent similar to that of the Muslim minorities in Hindu provinces.

The total Hindu population in the Punjab is 5,763,164, out of which 3,171,004 live in the eastern tracts. The total Muslim population is 14,000,000, out of which 1,262,970 live in the eastern tracts. By the exclusion of these areas the population percentage of the Muslims will increase from the present 56.7 to about 66, that of the Hindus will decrease from the present 24 to about 14. The Sikh percentage will actually rise from the present 12.9 to about 15. This small increase will be of no great consequence to the Muslims, though it may bring considerable advantage to the Sikhs.

The present area of the Punjab is 99,265 sq. miles. The area of the eastern tracts comes to 20,196 sq. miles (made up as follows: Ambala division 15,113, Kangra district 3,882, and Una and Garhshankar 1,201). After their exclusion the Punjab will have an area of 79,069 sq. miles.

Some people may argue, now or in the future, that an exchange

of population should take place between the Punjab and the separated Hindu tracts. This will save the Muslims of that area from Hindu domination. Another healthy result will be a further rise in the percentage of Muslim population in the Punjab, which may be from 66 to 70. But exchange of population is not in the interests of Islam and should not be favoured.

One objection that may be raised against this fixation of boundaries is that it would leave Muslim historic buildings of the Delhi area in Hindu India. But, as has been stated above, the expansion effected by extending Indusstan to the Jumna will be disastrous to the consolidation of the Muslim north-west. By retaining the root-cause of communalism, such an arrangement will mean the loss of the real purpose of separation. It is much better to forego our claims to Delhi and its suburbs than to accept such an evil as may lead to dire consequences. Moreover, many other buildings of world renown, like the Taj Mahal, cannot be included within our boundaries, and for their sake we cannot agree to delay the fulfilment of Islamic ideals. In order to possess a few historic buildings we should not try to weaken our majority, and consequently our power, at home.

With the question of the Punjab boundary settled in this way, the Indusstan federation will be constituted by the following regions: the Punjab (minus the eastern tracts), NWFP, Sind, Baluchistan (with its agency and state territories), Kashmir, Bahawalpur, Khairpur, the northern states of Amb, Dir, Swat and Chitral, Kapurthala, and Malerkotla. The total area of Indusstan will be 398,838 sq. miles. The total population will be about 33,000,000; the community-wise percentage being, Muslims 82, Sikhs 6, and Hindus 8. The total length from north-east to south-west will be about 1,400 miles, the greatest width from south-east to north-west about 700 miles, and the smallest width about 300 miles. The total coast-line will stretch to nearly 900 miles.<sup>45</sup>

In Bengal the following sub-divisions are predominantly Muslim: Dinajpur, Rangpur, Malda, Bogra, Rajshahi, Murshidabad, Pabna, Mymensingh, Nadia, Jessore, Faridpur, Dacca, Tippra, Noakhali, Bakargunj, Khulna, and Chittagong. Their combined area is about 50,472 sq. miles. The adjoining districts of Goalpara and Sylhet in Assam, which are predominantly Muslim, stretch over 9,292 sq. miles. The total area of these two comes to 59,764 sq. miles. Tripura, other native states in political relation with

the Bengal States Agency, Eastern Bengal and the predominantly Muslim Assam can set up their own federation. The total area of this federation will be about 70,000 sq. miles, and its population will be nearly 31,000,000. In the provincial unit of Muslim Bengal there will be 20,500,000 Muslims and 10,100,000 Hindus.

In case it is found necessary to effect an exchange of population between Muslim Bengal and the neighbouring Hindu provinces, it will not present any insurmountable difficulties because the distances intervening between them are not prohibitive.

It is hoped that the Bengal and Assam Muslims, realizing the gravity of the situation, will try to stand on their own legs and themselves find the way of escape from Hindu supremacy. We can only suggest to them the way to escape, and if it suits their purpose, as it does ours, both of us can join hands and fight for it. If the Muslims of Bengal and Assam feel that separation will help them they should press its necessity on the attention of those who happen to be in control there. Instead of trying to make a common cause with the Muslims of the Indus region (separated from them by two thousand miles) against the Hindus in a common federation, it would be better and more practical for Muslim Bengal and Assam to fight their own battle and demand their exclusion from an India federated under the 1935 constitution. There is no reason for their not trying to establish a state of their own, separately from Hindu India. Their case is almost analogous to that of the Muslim north-west, except that they lack contiguity with Muslim States, unlike the latter. (The meaning of this is not clear. Is the reference to Muslim princely states, like Kashmir and Kalat and Las Bela, or to independent Muslim neighbours, like Persia and Afghanistan?) But they are at the same time not bound on both sides by Hindu regions. They have a good sea-coast and a first class harbour. In minerals they are richer than the north-west.

Thus the north-eastern region has some clear advantages if it makes up its mind to separate from Hindu India. It will not lose anything by secession. But, on account of our limited knowledge of the local conditions, we are not in a position to discuss questions relating to its separation. It is the business of the Muslims of that area, who have first-hand information of the circumstances obtaining there, to explore the possibilities of their exclusion from Hindu India.<sup>46</sup>

There is little doubt that the existence of the Muslims in India

as an honourable and self-respecting people is impossible without separation. To achieve it they will have to fight without getting dismayed by the difficulties that stand in the way.

The first thing to do for the realization of this ideal is to organize themselves strongly under the aegis of a political party which should have a two-fold policy. It should safeguard the present position of the Muslims, whether economic, cultural or religious; and it should aim at the establishment of a federation of the north-western Muslim block. The latter part of the programme should have five main items: to popularize the idea of separation among the Muslim masses by lectures, speeches, debates and literature; to establish centres all over the Indus region which will undertake the task of popularization; to assist the Muslim separationists in England to carry on the propaganda of separation there, for the constitutional battle for separation has to be fought more in London than in India; to agitate for a re-adjustment of the eastern boundary of the Punjab so as to exclude Hindu tracts from the province; and to send deputations with a view to promoting this point of view to all the provincial governors in the north-western region, the governor general of India, the king, the heads of various native states situated in the north-west, all the Muslim countries of the world, and Japan and other non-Muslim countries who may be sympathetic to Muslim aspirations.

If the Muslims of Bengal and Assam agree to the necessity of separation, they can join hands with the Muslims of the north-west in carrying out a similar programme in respect of their own areas.

It must be made clear that the separation of Muslim regions from Hindu India is not an end in itself, but only a means for the achievement of an ideal Islamic state. Separation will undoubtedly lead to our emancipation from the economic slavery of the Hindus, but as our object is the establishment of an ideal Islamic state, it also denotes complete independence. After independence has been achieved, it will be impossible for us to maintain for long, in an un-Islamic world, our ideal of an Islamic state. Therefore we shall have to advocate a world revolution on Islamic lines, and that must be considered our ultimate ideal.

It has to be realized that while other backward nations are burdened with only political slavery, the Indian Muslims are suffering from a double servitude: political slavery of the British

and economic slavery of the Hindus. In addition they are intellectually backward and are dominated by a severe class system. In the past all their efforts at self-improvement were frustrated by the absence of a middle class among them. Now such a class has come into existence and revived the expiring embers of hope. The masses, who constitute the bulk of the nation, cannot be dragged into line with other nations with a jerk. They have to be raised little by little with patience and perseverance. The first step is to awaken them intellectually, and this can be done only by imparting sound political education. This all-important means of national development has so far been neglected, and it is high time that energies were devoted to this. We should organize a band of selfless political workers with a crusading spirit to undertake this task. Without depending upon public funds, each of these workers should earn his own living so that the group works as an order of political ascetics.

This group should divide itself into three categories according to the duties to be performed. The first should be of writers who will produce literature; the second of preachers who will disseminate the literature among the masses; and the third of organizers who will organize the nation and, by removing decadence, make it a healthy social and political unit.<sup>47</sup>

### Some Minor Misunderstandings

Before scrutinizing the salient features of the Punjabi scheme, it is advisable to remove certain minor misunderstandings.

As the *Confederacy of India* was published pseudonymously, its real authorship has confused several historians. Some ascribe the scheme to the publisher, the Nawab of Mamdot; others make no effort to seek the man behind the pen-name. As the Nawab of Mamdot had a scheme of his own, which was an amended version of the Punjabi scheme and was made public along with it (it is discussed in the following chapter), some writers have failed to distinguish between the two schemes.

Sir Reginald Coupland was the first important historian to recall the Punjabi scheme and connect it with Mamdot in an otherwise remarkably well-informed book. "In the summer of 1939", he wrote in the second part of his Nuffield College report on India, "Nawab Sir Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan, an eminent

Muslim of the Punjab, published on his own account a booklet entitled *Confederacy of India* and anonymously ascribed it to 'A Punjabi'.<sup>48</sup> Other commentators also confused the publisher with the author. For example, a Hindu author on Muslim politics relied on his imagination and nothing else in saying that "Sir Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan who in his *Confederacy of India* carved India into five separate states. . .".<sup>49</sup> Another Hindu historian of the Indian Muslims attributed the Punjabi scheme to Mamdot.<sup>50</sup> A recent academic study by an Indian Hindu makes the same mistake.<sup>51</sup>

Muslim references have been no less inaccurate. The revised published version of a doctoral dissertation states that "Mamdot, President of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, published his scheme, *The Confederacy of India*, in the summer of 1939", and repeats it in the second edition.<sup>52</sup> Another doctoral thesis on the years 1928-40 presents the Mamdot scheme of five federations as the Punjabi scheme.<sup>53</sup> Other writers, including text book authors, attribute the *Confederacy of India* to Mamdot.<sup>54</sup> Foreign experts repeat the inaccuracy.<sup>55</sup>

It is a little surprising to find that no attempt has been made by these students of the Punjabi scheme to identify the man behind the pseudonym. The Pakistani scholars in particular should not have met insuperable difficulties in this search. As far as I can recall, it was in the early 'fifties that *Mah-i-Naw*, an Urdu monthly published by the Government of Pakistan from Karachi, carried an article by Major Kafayet Ali in which he stated that he was "A Punjabi" who had produced a scheme for separation in 1939. Apparently no notice was taken of this by the historians, for in 1964 Waheeduzzaman referred to him as "an unidentified writer"<sup>56</sup>, and in 1968 a newspaper article called him "somebody under the name of 'A Punjabi'".<sup>57</sup> It was not until March 1968 that Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada mentioned his real name among the makers of the various schemes of 1939.<sup>58</sup>

To add to the general confusion, at least one Pakistani author has given an incorrect date of the publication of the Punjabi scheme. He says that it appeared in 1936.<sup>59</sup>

The only serious Hindu criticism of the Punjabi scheme came from Rajendra Prasad, and from his objections to it appears that he completely misunderstood the recommendations. "It ultimately aims", he wrote, "at the disruption of the country,

and an Islamic revolution which means establishment of Islamic rule over the whole country under the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal. This is not likely to be accepted by the country as a whole, and it is doubtful if even the Muslims in other provinces will submit to this."<sup>60</sup> Punjabi had made it clear that he stood for a confederation, a sort of an internal division, and not for a disintegration of the country. He had also stated that the Muslim states might be Islamic in character, and for this and other reasons he had insisted on excluding all Hindu areas from them. Rajendra Prasad's curious interpretation of an Islamic revolution as the establishment of Islamic rule over the whole of India under the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal shows how hysterical was the reaction of even intelligent and well-informed Hindus to any proposal which came from Muslim separatists.

### Strong Points of the Punjabi Scheme

Anyone who has read the *Confederacy of India* with some care will agree that Punjabi's proposals occupy an outstanding place among the schemes contemplating Pakistan. On almost every aspect of the Muslim problem he has a detailed and reasoned case to present. He does not avoid or ignore sensitive issues like the future of the Muslims of the Hindu provinces; nor does he pursue impracticable plans in an attempt to protect their interests, as the Aligarh dons were doing at this time. His firm resolve to reject any exchange of population, howsoever small, shows a grasp of the realities of the situation. His insistence on excluding all Hindu areas from the proposed Muslim states, and particularly from the Punjab, attests to the inherent soundness of his approach; his arguments on this make an effective reply to Latif's objection that the advocates of partition had to face the Hobson's choice between a large but not fully Muslim Pakistan and a small, fully Muslim but far from viable Pakistan. His scheme is also an improvement on other proposals in as much as it emphasizes the economic necessity of avoiding Hindu rule. It also proves itself to be more farsighted by anticipating the post-1947 debate on the desirability or otherwise of making Pakistan into an Islamic state. On some other points, too, like the fear of Afghanistan's hostility to the creation of Pakistan, he shows himself to have been very

well acquainted with the contemporary political situation and its implications. Some mistakes in his treatment of history are unfortunate,<sup>61</sup> but we must remember that he was not writing a piece of historical scholarship. It is possible to have a few dates and facts wrong and still possess an insight into the broad problems and movements of history. Punjabi's analysis of the Lucknow Pact and his severe criticism of Muslim delegates to the RTC for having failed to demand a partition of the Punjab demonstrate his understanding of the Muslim problem and raise him above the level of his contemporaries. By and large, therefore, the Punjabi scheme makes a most valuable contribution to the history of the idea of Pakistan, and a close study of some of its features will repay the effort.

One of the great merits of the scheme is that it starts on the right foot. The whole case for separation is constructed on the foundation of the two-nation theory. He stresses the general Muslim desire to be rid of the fear of Hindu rule, as most Muslim intellectuals and politicians were then beginning to state. He also does not ignore the cultural factor, but does not make it his sole concern, as Latif had done. He knows that Muslim separation is essential if the community wants to live and practise Islam; Iqbal had said so in his letters to Jinnah. But he goes beyond and deeper than all this in rooting the demand for separation in the context of nationalism. The Muslims want to separate on the simple but comprehensive ground that they are a separate nation.

Before Jinnah began to expound the two-nation theory two persons had set out its main arguments. Rahmat Ali was the first to point to this new feeling among the Muslims, and he based his concept of Pakistan on Muslim nationalism. Without going into too many details he covered the ground quite thoroughly; he even used words which Jinnah himself was to repeat at the Lahore session of the Muslim League and so often afterwards. But it is in the *Confederacy of India* that we meet the fullest exposition of the theory. Every ingredient of modern nationalism is taken up and its relevance to the Muslim position established. Culture, economics, political independence, historical background, religion, civilization, language, literature, law, moral code, social custom—every item which goes to make a nation is considered, exemplified and proved to distinguish the Muslims from other Indians. All the earlier efforts, and particularly the 1935 federal scheme, to

solve the Indian problem on the assumption of one Indian nationhood were bound to fail because they were based on an historical flasehood. Once you concede that there are two nations in India, the problem solves itself. By demanding separation on the ground of nationhood, Punjabi forestalls all the objections that could possibly be raised against his solution. Practical difficulties were there, and they would remain, but by giving his demand the sanction of an intellectual and generally accepted concept he imparted to his cause a strength which mocked the minor inconveniences of a radical solution.

Once the case for Muslim nationhood was established, the next logical step was to demand its political and constitutional manifestation, viz., separation. As two nations, like two kings, could not live in one state, another state must be created to house the other nation. As nations separate, so do their territories. Here again the Punjabi scheme has the great advantage of spelling out to the smallest detail the areas demarcated for the Muslim nation and the reasons for drawing the said boundaries. Several pages are devoted to settling the question where the frontiers should lie. Alternative suggestions and possibilities are considered, but are rejected for practical or ideological reasons. A smaller area is accepted because it is judged to be more in consonance with the needs and interests of the nation, and also because the Hindus cannot have any objection to such a rightful division of territory. Several more pages are written to prove the economic and financial viability of the areas demarcated for the new state in the north-west. This was in reply to those who thought that a smaller Muslim state which did not coincide with existing provincial boundaries would not have enough material resources.

Punjabi's acceptance of a division of the Punjab and of Bengal not only brings his solution nearer to what was actually done in 1947 but also shows a realism uncommon among the scheme-makers of his time. However unpalatable this prospect might have been to the Muslims whose enthusiasm looked forward to as large a realm as could be had, it was a rational solution. We cannot run away from the fact that the demand for separation was made on the ground that Muslims were a separate nation and did not want to live under a different nation in the same state. From this it logically followed that the Muslim nation could not want such areas as had a large non-Muslim population. If the Muslims

wished for a separate world of their own where they could live as Muslims, under their own laws and social principles, it was desirable that this new world should contain the least possible number of non-Muslims. Both logic and justice favoured this conclusion. Another important consideration led to the same solution. One of the major reasons for séparation was the economic slavery of the Muslims. If a large number of Hindus were included in the Muslim state they would continue in some measure to control the economic life of the Muslims, and with their history of economic activity and enterprise it was doubtful if their stranglehold over the economic life of the Muslim state would ever be broken. In any case, you cannot hope to establish an Islamic state and at the same time insist on including large Hindu areas in that state. For these reasons it was quite proper and natural for Punjabi to reject all proposals for including eastern Punjab in the north-west Muslim state and western Bengal in the north-east Muslim state.

Another feature which distinguishes the Punjabi scheme from other contemporary plans is its sensible treatment of the problem of the future of the Muslims living in Hindu provinces. These Muslims are told that no practicable solution of the Indian problem can help them as it can help their co-religionists in their own provinces. Their small number scattered among a multitude of Hindus does not lend itself to any feasible alternative. They have to realize that the future does not, cannot, hold out any prospect for them except that of a minority in a Hindu land. The sooner they understand this the better. This is not done to break their spirit, but to bring them face to face with the brutal reality. Far-fetched, even fantastic, schemes could be drawn up which promised some protection to them; but this was a futile exercise. Once a settlement on the national and country-wide level was reached and carried out, no matter what suggestions had been made by Muslim planners and what promises given by Hindu politicians, the fact was that their future would be in the hands of the new Hindu India. The Muslim League or any other party or individual could not do anything for them. This was a great misfortune for Indian Islam, but it was a fact which wisdom said should be recognized and accepted.

In adopting this approach Punjabi was expressing a point of view which was as different from that of Rahmat Ali and of Iqbal as from that of the planners belonging to the Hindu pro-

vines. This difference is significant. Schemes enunciated from Hyderabad and the United Provinces were naturally deeply concerned about the Muslims of the minority provinces, and made sincere but generally impracticable suggestions for safeguarding their position in the new dispensation. Latif was so much carried away by the need of protecting these Muslims that he opposed the freedom of the Muslim provinces out of the fear lest this might leave the areas like his own at Hindu mercy. The Aligarh dons (to be studied later) laid down a long list of do's and don'ts for the Hindus on the future treatment of their Muslim minority, as if their inclusion in a scheme would be enough guarantee of their execution.

Some planners from the Muslim-majority provinces, on the other hand, pretended completely to relieve themselves of all responsibility for the Muslims of Hindu provinces. Iqbal is a good exponent of this school. In 1930 he was advocating the convening of a separate conference to deal with the affairs of the Muslim north, believing that the interests of the Muslims of that area were different from those of the Muslims of other areas. This was not an unreasonable point of view, but it came oddly from the lips of a president of the All India Muslim League. In his letters to Jinnah, however, which he wrote towards the end of his life, he had made the startling suggestion that the Muslim League should cease to concern itself with the Muslims of any area except the north-west, and confine its efforts to bringing freedom to the north-western Muslims. For reasons which have already been given Jinnah did not find this advice to be reasonable and ignored it; though ultimately Iqbal's word came true and in the 1947 decision the Muslim League could do nothing for millions of Muslims living in Hindu lands.

Rahmat Ali, who also came from the Punjab, went to the other extreme and, in addition to laying claims to the whole of the Punjab and the whole of Bengal, wanted to set up sovereign Muslim "strongholds" and "national homes" in Hindu India, so that Muslims of the minority areas could be brought together and given complete freedom. This was an impossible suggestion, but it appealed to the planners from Hindu provinces because it appeared to give them a hope; though a little reflection should have told them how remote and unrealizable his hope was. The influence of Rahmat Ali on the Aligarh scheme illustrates this.

Punjabi was also impressed with Rahmat Ali's ideas and wrote the *Confederacy of India* under their inspiration. But he had the sense to see that Rahmat Ali's suggestions about Hindu areas lay beyond practical limits. Therefore he accepted his Pakistan and Bang-i-Islam schemes, but firmly rejected the rest of the proposals. On the other hand, he did not argue, like Iqbal, that the Muslim League should have nothing to do with the Muslims of Hindu areas.

He also set his face against an exchange of population as a complete or partial solution of the difficulty arising from the fact of leaving behind the Muslims of the minority provinces in Hindu India. He was not in favour of migration, even on a much smaller and perhaps manageable scale in the Punjab. His opposition to exchange was absolute and unqualified. It is true that he said that an exchange in the north-east *might* be feasible, but this was vague speculation, not a definite suggestion. And he added that he did not possess enough first-hand or comprehensive information on that area to be able to make firm proposals. This resolute rejection of the exchange of population was dictated by two factors. Experience had shown that it was a costly and inconvenient operation, bringing much misery to the people involved. Moreover, a complete withdrawal of Muslims from Hindu India would be against the interest of Islam, which was essentially a proselytizing religion.

One exceedingly valuable point made by Punjabi concerned the use of the idea of separation in simplifying the Indian problem and uniting the Muslims. So far all attempts to solve the Indian problem, and the Muslim problem which lay at its heart, had failed because the multiplicity of solutions had created a barrier of confusion between the problem and its understanding. Moreover, the prescribed solutions were in the most part superficial and mechanical devices which did not touch the real issue. Loose federation, close federation, strong centre, provincial autonomy, provinces with residual powers, separate electorates, weighted representation, adequate share of public services, special powers for the government to protect the minorities, safeguards in cultural matters, minority representation in provincial and central executives, one-third Muslim strength in the federal parliament, composite cabinets, special legislative procedure for communal law-making, etc.—the passing years had piled safeguard upon safe-

guard and provision upon provision until the real problem had disappeared under a heap of proposals and counter-proposals. Everyone was lost in this constitutional maze, above all the Muslim who was the first cause of this colourful patch-work. Instead of finding any comfort in the existence of so many dispensations, concessions and compensations, he saw only a mist of confusion which turned thicker with every new recommendation.

How to get out of this labyrinth? The solution was easy and breathtakingly simple. Let the Muslim forget everything about concessions, safeguards, protective measures, the goodwill of the majority, and the generous promises of a constitution. These were all mirages or snares which would bring nothing or sore disappointment. Let him proclaim that he belonged to a separate nation which demanded nothing less than a separate territory of its own. No constitutional tricks, contrivances or devices will satisfy him. No political promises will meet his wishes. The issue is plain and simple: the demand of a nation to be free. The demand is just: no nation can be forced to be a slave to the other. Put in these stark terms the situation simplifies itself. Freed from his confusion, the Muslim will know what he is aiming at. The clearing of the mind will create unity. Individuals may differ on the right safeguard or dispute the correct constitutional solution to be demanded. But the force of nationalism will dissolve all differences and will bring to the nation a solidarity which will guarantee the achievement of separation.

This is how Punjabi argued, and there was a strong element of prophecy in it. In a great measure the secret of Jinnah's success lay in his single-minded devotion to the ideal of Pakistan. He built up the Pakistan campaign on one single issue which ruled out all ambiguity, misunderstanding, contention or hesitation. There was but one fact which needed to be stated: the Muslims are a nation. That the nation wanted to be free followed from the first premiss. The strength of this strategy lay in its simplicity. For the first time the Muslims realized where they were going, and they chose to go there as a united people. The clarity of the ideal had produced unity among its seekers. Anyone who has the slightest doubts about the spectacular results of this approach should compare the disunited crowd that was the Muslim community in the mid-'thirties with the solid phalanx that was the Muslim nation from the late-'thirties till independence.

In another respect, too, Punjabi foresaw a coming change. To formulate, follow and achieve the new ideal Muslims must have a new leadership. Partly by political convention and partly by the social tradition of a powerful class system, Muslims had so far been led by their aristocracy. A great majority of their political leaders had been members of the feudal class: the Bengali landholders, the Punjabi nawabs and the rajas and taluqdars of the United Provinces, with the immensely rich Aga Khan always in the reserve for important occasions. This was probably unavoidable in an age when Muslims could not boast of a middle class, and the "natural" leaders of society emerged on the top in every field by a natural process. Two new developments made this scheme of things out of date. The Muslims had now a middle class which, though not so numerous as among the Hindus, was beginning to expand and assert itself. The nucleus of a new kind of leadership was now available and should be allowed to come forth and take over the management of national affairs. Of course, that did not mean that all upper-class leaders should be retired or disowned. They had their uses and must continue to work. But real power should be transferred to others who were better qualified to understand and lead the community.

The other factor was the increasing strength of the Muslim League. It was fast becoming a mass party, and this kind of party does not easily accept class leaders. In the past, politics were mainly a game between the British authorities and the Indian politicians. In this game the class leaders were useful, for they belonged to the same world as did the governors, the viceroys, the higher civil servants and the London politicians. British politics were then a class affair, too, in which a few ancient families, inter-related by matrimony, ruled the country irrespective of the party in power. But this also was beginning to change, and the process of social levelling-up and the rise of the Labour Party held promise of a new kind of British politician who would in all likelihood prefer to talk to an Indian of an equivalent class. The changing ideals of the Muslim community also demanded a new leadership. The age of petitions, appeals and respectful requests addressed to the British rulers by the leaders of a minority community was gone. The politics of safeguards, concessions and protective legislation were a thing of the past. With the new changes in its policy, now the Muslim League would have to

address its own masses instead of the British rulers. For this purpose a different leadership was required which could communicate the spirit of the age to the people, and to whom people would listen because they found an affinity with it.

How prophetic Punjabi's emphasis on the need for new leadership was is shown by Jinnah's ascendancy in Muslim politics. It was finally a middle-class leader who overthrew the traditional aristocracy from its entrenched positions of power, re-created a new Muslim League out of its own dying embers, gave a new ideal to the nation, and went on to achieve it with a triumph unparalleled in the history of Indian Islam.

Some other elements in the later policy of the League were also successfully foreseen by Punjabi. For instance, he was quite sure that the issue of the separation should be settled and the actual operation carried out before British withdrawal, instead of the League uniting with the Congress in winning independence for the whole of India and then relying on Hindu goodwill to effect a partition. Once the British left, the Hindu would never agree to divide the country. This was precisely the point on which the Gandhi-Jinnah talks of 1944 were to break down. Gandhi was prepared to *consider* the Pakistan demand after India was free, while Jinnah told him that the Muslim wishes must be met before independence came, for the simple reason that if the Muslims had as much confidence in the Hindus as to rely on their promise of conceding Pakistan after the British had withdrawn they would not, in the first place, have asked for separation.

Another example is Punjabi's assertion that the ultimate aim of the Indian Muslims in demanding separation was an Islamic world revolution. The creation of Muslim states and the freedom of Indian Islam were not an end in themselves, but a means to a world-wide re-vitalization of Islam. Here again Rahmat Ali's influence was at work. The movement for the independence of Indian Muslims was to be considered as a part, or rather a harbinger, of the urge to freedom among the world community of Islam. The final ideal remained pan-Islamic. Not much was said about this by the League in the pre-1947 days, partly because the hectic activities of that period left it no time to formulate a long-term policy. But soon after independence it began to cast a wider net and, under the presidency of Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, a serious effort was made to bring together a large number of

Muslim countries on an Islamic platform. The attempt was a failure, but it was a reminder that the League had not given up the hope of bringing about, or at least participating in, a world-wide renaissance.

Finally, the Punjabi scheme stands apart from other proposals in as much as it chalked out a detailed future programme. Far from contenting itself with drawing an outline of a settlement which would satisfy the Muslims, it went on to show how the nation was to be prepared for the coming struggle, how the ideal of separation was to be popularized and what changes in leadership had to be brought about to suit altered conditions. In this respect the proposals amounted to much more than a mere scheme and took on the shape of a long-term plan, a programme of action, which covered most aspects of the problem.

### Weaknesses of the Punjabi Scheme

In spite of the care which Punjabi took with the details, or perhaps because of it, his scheme suffered from some weaknesses. A few words about them will help us to form a balanced view of his proposals.

There are clear hints in his treatment that he envisaged the Muslim state or states to be Islamic, but he preferred to use such qualifying words as "might be", and did not lay it down as a *definite recommendation*. Either he was not sure in his mind if the Muslim masses would insist on this, or he wanted to leave the final choice to the decision of League leaders. But his personal preference seems to have been for an Islamic political system. If that is so, he should have given some attention to a related problem. If the Muslim state was going to be Islamic and if all non-Muslims were not made to leave it through an exchange of population, how was this state to deal with its non-Muslim citizens? This was a question as important for the state as for the non-Muslims who chose to live in it. It is true that the concept of an Islamic state is highly controversial and agreement even on its essentials has rarely been obtained in Islamic history.<sup>62</sup> Yet the argument for separation would have gained in strength had Punjabi given his readers a clearer picture of the proposed Muslim state in case it decided to follow the Islamic principles of statehood.

In talking about the attitude that the Congress might adopt

towards the Muslim demand for separation, Punjabi is more optimistic than past history or contemporary circumstances warranted. Several suggestions for a partition of India had been made before his time, and he must have known how resolutely, almost savagely, the Hindus and the Congress had reacted to them. Of course, he tried to soften the blow of his proposals by calling them by the name of "confederacy", but, as we will see, this was an after-thought and did not change the fundamental character of his solution. The Hindus could not have been taken in by the transparent veil of confederation which covered the (to the Hindus) ungainly face of partition. On the whole, he does not consider properly the possible and probable Congress opposition to separation. The fact which overwhelmed all political thinking was the Congress determination to rule all India. Any Muslim move towards autonomy or freedom had to be an obstacle to the realization of this ambition. Punjabi omitted to mention the sober truth that the Congress did not want the Muslims to be free.

Punjabi's hope that when the time came to give India her independence the British would favour separation did not indicate a correct reading of the British mind. He underrated British obsession with the concept, however imaginary, of a united India. They knew that it was their rule which had for the first time given to India a semblance of unity, and they were anxious that when they withdrew this unity should be left behind intact as the only permanent legacy of imperialism. The unity imparted by them was a mere facade concealing gaping cracks, but so tenaciously did they hold to their illusion that any Muslim suggestion for partition evoked their immediate and total disapproval. If Muslim aspirations could be satisfied only by a division of the country, a British alliance with the Hindus in opposition to it was to be taken for granted. The policy of the British Labour government and the way in which the partition of 1947 was carried out bear this out.

Yet there was an element of truth in Punjabi's argument that if the choice lay between keeping a divided India in the Commonwealth and losing a united India to the Commonwealth the British, in the interests of their Commonwealth, would prefer the former course. That was the only contingency in which they would support partition. This explains the bargain struck between Mountbatten and Nehru and Patel, by which the partition plan prepared by the Viceroy and sent to London for final approval was scratch-

ed out and a new plan drawn up by V.P. Menon was adopted which retained India as a dominion on the Hindu condition that the new plan did not divide India but allowed certain areas to secede.<sup>63</sup>

One major weakness, if it can be called that, of the Punjabi scheme was the cursory way in which it treated with the future of the north-east Muslim India. In the main the future of the Bengali Muslims was considered to be their own business. No detailed case was presented on their behalf. It was merely suggested that they too might be interested in separation, like the Muslims of the north-west, and might want to start a campaign on that basis. It was frankly confessed that the author had scant knowledge of their area and was therefore unable to present more than a broad outline of how they should begin to think of separating themselves from Hindu India. Punjabi's main interest lay in the future of the north-west, and he made no secret of it. In this he was following in the footsteps of Rahmat Ali and Iqbal. Rahmat Ali had advocated an independent north-west in 1933, but had not extended the same principle to Bengal till several years later. Iqbal, too, in his letters to Jinnah had talked of the north-west and had mentioned Bengal almost as an after-thought.

It would not be fair to attribute this exclusively regional interest to parochialism or to an indifference to the future of Bengal. This attitude explains itself if we look at three contemporary developments. Of all the schemes and proposals made for a re-distribution of India and involving autonomy, regional independence or complete freedom for the Muslims, only one had emanated from Bengal; and that too was so brief and casual that it could hardly be called a scheme. This could reasonably be taken as an indication of a want of interest in separation among Bengali Muslim leaders and intellectuals. If the Muslims of the rest of India gathered from this that Bengal should better be left out of their calculations concerning Muslim separation, they could hardly be accused of ignoring Bengal or failing to consider it a part of Muslim India. This impression was strengthened and raised to the level of conviction by the absence of any separatist sentiment among the Bengali Muslims. If their politicians had failed to give a lead in that direction, public opinion could have made its preference known through newspaper articles and other means. But Bengali Muslim public opinion in the 'thirties seems to have showed no interest at all in separation. With the Bengali reaction, or rather the lack of it,

to the concept of separation so unmistakably reflected in their political thinking and public feeling, the advocates of separation would well have considered it presumptuous to include Bengal in their schemes. A third factor encouraged this policy. The separatists, all of whom belonged to the north-west or to the minority provinces, were not completely familiar with the conditions obtaining in the north-east. In order to draw future boundaries and to consider if exchange of population would be practicable or desirable, it was necessary to have full and up-to-date information about the geography, the population statistics, the communal strength and the economic conditions of the area. Without this knowledge, schemes of division were liable to become an academic exercise in frontier making.

A more serious weakness of the Punjabi scheme is to be found in its failure to indicate the precise nature of the separation it advocated. Throughout the *Confederacy of India* the word used for the Muslim objective is "separation", not "partition" or "division". The title of the book, which should and usually does sum up the point of view of the writer, shows that the solution being suggested is a confederation of India consisting of two Muslim federations and one Hindu federation. In the body of the book also we find references to a confederal centre and to statements, made to assure the Hindus, that the Congress would be well advised to accept such a confederation rather than see India partitioned. A careful reading of the whole book shows that Punjabi was really asking for a division of India on Hindu-Muslim lines and envisaging two sovereign Muslim (and probably Islamic) states in the north-west and north-east. As an after-thought he inserted a few sentences which proposed a confederation between these two Muslim states and the rest of India. At one or two places he clearly says that if the Hindus do not accept this confederation, Muslim regions will break away and form their own independent states. His language shows that he himself had no hope of the confederation materializing, and therefore what he was really suggesting was an outright partition. If that was so, and if, as he says, he was doing this under Rahmat Ali's influence, why did he not use the word "Pakistan" for the proposed north-western Muslim state?

In other words, we have to ask two questions to clarify the meaning and nature of his scheme: Why was the scheme called a "confederacy", when in reality it was a proposal for partition?

Why was the name "Pakistan" not used for the Muslim state to be created in the north-west?

The answer to both questions lies in Jinnah's opposition to the original scheme prepared by Punjabi. The title Kafayet Ali had given to the book was *Pakistan*, and it contained no reference to a confederation. After having agreed to finance its publication and free distribution and to act as its publisher, Mamdot sent a typed copy of it to Jinnah. This step might have been taken for several reasons. Jinnah was the supreme leader, and it was but proper that all important schemes should be sent to him. The League was then inviting suggestions on constitutional alternatives to the 1935 Act, and Mamdot might have forwarded Punjabi's manuscript to Jinnah as the president of the AIML; though strictly speaking in this case it should have been sent to Haroon, who was the chairman of the special committee dealing with these suggestions. Mamdot was president of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, and possibly he thought it wise to send to Jinnah an advance copy of a book which was going to be published by him.

Whatever the reasons, the fact is that the typescript went to Jinnah. In the meantime the book had gone to the printers (the Ripon Printing Press of Lahore). Before printing was finished, Mamdot received a telegram from Jinnah saying that he did not want the book to be called *Pakistan*. "Just to give it another name", explains Mian Kafayet Ali, "I prepared an outline of a confederal constitutional scheme for the sub-continent and incorporated it in the Introduction to the book. Hence the name *Confederacy of India*. In fact I had been told to present my spade as a spoon. But I took care to give even the spoon a sharp edge. In the scheme I proposed to split up India into five federations to be linked together by a confederal centre. The seven Hindu majority provinces, the Congress provinces, were put in the Hindu federation. The Muslims had two federations, one in the north-west and the other in north-east. The Princely Indian states were formed into two federations. The provinces put in the Hindu federation lacked contiguity with each other. They were given access to each other by narrow strips of land which could be cut asunder or occupied easily in the event of any trouble with the Congress."<sup>64</sup>

A part of the mystery is solved by this explanation. The original scheme was for a clear partition of India into a Hindu India and a

Pakistan. To meet Jinnah's wishes, it was at the last moment changed into a confederal plan of five federations. The change was mainly embodied in the Introduction of the book, and a few sentences were inserted into the body of the text mentioning confederation as the desired solution. The title of the volume was changed from *Pakistan* to *Confederacy of India*.

But two problems still remain. One is that in the Introduction Punjabi attributed the 5-federation scheme to Mamdot, clearly distinguishing it from his own 3-federation scheme. In his communication quoted above he told me that it was he himself who had made this change in order to make the proposals acceptable to Jinnah. Probably it is this confusion which has led some scholars to present the 5-federation scheme as the real Punjabi scheme, ignoring the fact that the original plan contained in the body of the book was that of a 3-federation partition. They have chosen to present what Punjabi himself calls the Mamdot scheme as his own scheme.

The second problem concerns the word "Pakistan" and its rejection by Punjabi. This was done under Jinnah's instructions, who did not like the name, and did not accept it till some time after the adoption of the Lahore Resolution. But Punjabi's explanation for not using this word does not carry conviction. In the Introduction to the *Confederacy of India* he writes: "We should also make it clear to those Muslim separationists, who want separation in order to link their destinies with states outside the Indian sub-continent, that in demanding separation we should not be inspired by any such extra-territorial ideals, ambitions, or affinity. We should be separationists-cum-confederationists, and if the Hindus disagree with the idea of a confederacy of Hindu India and Muslim India, then we should be simply separationists, demanding secession of our regions from Hindu India without any link between them. . . . The foreign element amongst us is quite negligible and we are as much sons of the soil as the Hindus are. Ultimately our destiny lies within India and not out of it. And it is for this reason that we have abstained from using the word 'Pakistan' and have instead used the word 'Indusstan' to denote the North-West Muslim Block. 'Pakistan' is a term which has somehow or other gathered round itself some unwholesome and alien associations which are far from our mind."<sup>65</sup>

Evidently Jinnah, in the brevity of a telegram, could only have

asked for the dropping of the word "Pakistan" from the title of the book, and not given detailed reasons for it. The above explanation should therefore be taken as Punjabi's own. His objections to the word are hard to reconcile with his claim that he was inspired by Rahmat Ali's ideas. Further, which and whose concept of Pakistan is he talking about? If, as he says, the ultimate destiny of the Muslims lies within India and not out of it, what kind of separation is he advocating? In the body of the book, as set apart from the Introduction, he has been consistently arguing in favour of a two-nation theory and asserting that two such different nations cannot co-exist in one state, and further that the Muslim states would probably be Islamic states. In the Introduction he adds the vital rider that if the Hindus do not accept confederation, the Muslim regions will in any case have to separate and go out. If separation is his ultimate ideal, and the whole argument of the book sustains this view, how does it differ from Rahmat Ali's proposal, except in a few details about the boundaries to be fixed? And, what were the unwholesome and alien associations of the word which make him reject it?

Is he indirectly quoting Jinnah or trying to read his mind? In a later letter he told me. "The title *Pakistan*, as was originally conceived for the book under discussion, was later given up at the instance of the Quaid-i-Azam. By 1939 the word 'Pakisttan' had become a red rag to the Hindu press and public. They called it 'vivisection of the sacred cow', a phrase highly provocative to the Hindu mind. It would have been highly impolitic to incite and enrage the Hindu masses against Pakistan at a time when it was too weak to meet the Hindu challenge to it."<sup>66</sup> This does not answer the question of why Jinnah was against the use of the word.

Let us, for a moment, suppose that Punjabi was here arguing against a clear partition merely to please Jinnah. But that does not bring our difficulties to an end. In 1939 Jinnah was not in favour of declaring that the Muslims wanted nothing less than sovereign independence. If Punjabi was just trying to meet Jinnah's wishes, he should have, after 1940, given up this expediency of presenting his objective of separation in the guise of a confederation, for by that date the Muslim League itself, under Jinnah's unquestioned leadership, had put in a claim for complete separation. But in 1941 Punjabi was still arguing for a confederation in India. He was

writing: "Moreover, division of the Indian sub-continent into smaller states will not amount to a vivisection of the country, because a co-ordinating centre of a representative character, based on a multilateral agreement among the Hindu and Muslim States, will have to be set up to uphold the unity of the Indian sub-continent as against any third power and to look after any other subjects of common interest to the States."<sup>67</sup> This time, as far as we know, there was no outside pressure on Punjabi to alter his views or to present them in an amended version. Therefore it must be taken as his genuine position that, at least up to 1941, he preferred a confederal, or some other co-ordinating, centre to a clear partition of India.

This insistence on a confederation and opposition to partition are incompatible not only with the general tone of his *Confederacy of India* (where, apart from the Introduction which was added later, he was arguing for separation) but also with his political activities and associations. He was closely affiliated to the Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan, a society established in 1938, under the inspiration of Rahmat Ali and the patronage of Mamdot, to propagate the Pakistan movement. Barring the *Confederacy of India*, all the books and pamphlets written by Punjabi during these years were distributed by the Majlis.<sup>68</sup> On most points the Majlis's stand was the same as Rahmat Ali's, particularly on the creation of a sovereign Pakistan in the north-west. Other members of the Majlis were writing and speaking about an independent Muslim state. Punjabi stood alone in this group in advocating a confederation for India. Only one explanation comes to my mind. The Lahore Resolution itself was worded so confusingly that Punjabi might well have believed that Jinnah still did not want a clear separation.

## Conclusion

In the end, we must recognize that, if the contents of the *Confederacy of India* are interpreted as a case for complete separation, the Punjabi scheme comes very close to the Lahore Resolution. Waheeduzzaman is quite right in saying that "in effect his solution differed but little from that proposed by the Muslim League in March 1940".<sup>69</sup> Though the Lahore Resolution did not speak of a division of the Punjab and Bengal, which is an essential

feature of the Punjabi scheme, yet the exact words of the Resolution—“geographically contiguous areas are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary”—can have no meaning except a division of these two provinces. One minor difference between the two may be noticed. The Punjabi scheme explicitly dealt with the native states, enumerated the ones which would form parts of the north-west Muslim State, and specially mentioned Kashmir. On the other hand, though the Lahore Resolution did not distinguish between provinces and states and used the comprehensive word “areas”, which may be interpreted to cover both entities, League policy from 1940 till 1947 was one of scrupulous non-interference with the autonomy of the states, which did not allow the consideration of the question of their inclusion in Pakistan or Hindustan. I have called it a minor difference because, in spite of the official League policy of aloofness from the states question, in the popular mind it was clearly understood that the states falling within the Pakistan territory would be a part of Pakistan and Muslim states lying on its borders and having Muslim majorities, like Kashmir, would join Pakistan.

## NOTES

1. *The Statesman*, editorial, 16 January 1939.
2. A Muslim Correspondent, "What Muslim India Thinks: Are the Muslims a Minority in India?", *CMG*, 3 February 1939.
3. Baybak (fearless) (pseud.), in an article in *Medina*, 21 February 1939, p. 225, quoted in Waheed Qureshi, *Pakistan ki Nazryati Bunyadain*, Lahore, 1973, pp. 142-143.
4. Gulshan Rai, "The Muslim Minority in India", *CMG*, 22 February 1939.
5. Baybak, in an article in *Medina*, 28 March 1939, pp. 252-253, quoted in Waheed Qureshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-144.
6. "Obstacles to Indian Federation", *Round Table*, March 1939, pp. 352-364.
7. *IAR 1939*, Vol. I, p. 66, "India in Home Polity" by Suresh Chandra Dev.
8. Candidus, "Indian Political Notes: Muslim Outlook on Country's Future", *TTI*, 5 April 1939.
9. M. Nasim, Vice-President, Muslim Students Federation, Motihari (Bihar), *TSI*, 17 April 1939.
10. H.V. Hodson, "The Struggle for Power in India", *Fortnightly Review*, May 1939, pp. 556-557.
11. Marquess of Zetland, "Essayez": *The Memoirs of Lawrence, Second Marquess of Zetland*, London, 1956, p. 250.
12. Zetland to the Viceroy, 27 June 1939, *ibid.*, p. 251.
13. *CMG*, 23 May 1939.
14. Shahed (pseud.), "Dar-el-Islam", *The Statesman*, 16 June 1939.
15. Muhammad Sharif Toosy, "Misreading of History of Turkey: Real Lessons for Indian Muslims: Salvation in Separation from Hindu India", *TET*, 10 February 1939.
16. "Are the Muslims a Minority in India?", *ibid.*, 24 March 1939. The author's name printed in the newspaper is "M. Abdullah Khan, President, Municipal Committee, Wazirabad". On the clipping of this article in the Rahmat Ali Papers a line in red ink has been drawn across the author's name and address, which have been substituted by the following written in black ink in Urdu: "az Muhammad Sharif Toosy, Headmaster, M.B. High School. Wazirabad" As Rahmat Ali was in touch with all prominent Muslim

leaders and intellectuals of the Punjab and regularly received newspapers and letters from them, it is quite possible that the author of this piece was Toosy. It may be mentioned here that Toosy later compiled or wrote two books under the pseudonym of "M.R.T."

17. Abdus Sattar Kheiri, "90 Million Muslims Form Biggest Nation in India", *TSI*, 25 February 1939.
18. A Muslim Lawyer (Asadullah), letter, *ibid.*, 22 March 1939. See last section of the previous chapter.
19. Choudhry Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Lahore, 1961, pp. 204-206. Khaliqzaman got this confirmed from London. In 1953 he wrote to the Deputy High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Dacca to try to check with the British Government to confirm the substance of this talk from their records. The Deputy High Commissioner did so, and in his letter to Khaliqzaman of 5 September 1953, he said that the Commonwealth Relations Office confirmed that after the said talk Zetland had "recorded the main points of his talk with Mr. Siddiqui and yourself in a letter which he subsequently sent to the Viceroy". In this letter to the Viceroy, Zetland had reported, among other things, the following: "(iii) that in response to Lord Zetland's request for alternative suggestions of a constructive character you replied that you would propose the establishment of 3 or 4 federations of Provinces and States which would be co-ordinated by a small Central Body, the object of this scheme being to give the Muslims as great a measure of control at the Centre as the Hindus. (iv) that Lord Zetland gathered that the idea in your minds was of a federation of Muslim Provinces and States in North-West India; a further federation of Bengal and Assam, and possibly more than one further federation of the other Provinces and States in the remaining parts of India. (v) that you reported that many Muslims were thinking on these lines."

Commenting on this report, Khaliqzaman writes: "He also rightly reported that, on this occasion, I talked of more Federations than two. It was necessary for me to do so at that stage, because I wanted to bring in Assam and Bengal in one Federation and NWFP, Punjab and Sind in another

- and to leave the rest of India for the Congress to decide. Now it becomes clear from the document that Lord Linlithgow knew before the Pakistan Resolution was passed what next step the Muslim League was likely to take. My own impression, after the talk with these two British officials, was that they would not oppose the demand seriously because it was in itself a democratic right of particular areas to keep themselves out of a Federation to which they were opposed. I could not help being thankful to Col. Murhead for having given me encouragement to discuss the question with Lord Zetland who in his turn was quite sympathetic." (*ibid.*, pp. 206-208).
20. Zetland to Linlithgow, 28 March 1939, Zetland, *op. cit.*, pp. 248-249.
  21. Khaliqzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
  22. Being a nephew of Sir Fazli Husain, Mian Kafayet Ali was naturally considered to be a Unionist, while Iqbal was a Muslim Leaguer; and there was no love lost between the two camps.
  23. The information on which this and all preceding paragraphs are based was sent to me by Mian Kafayet Ali on my request. I am grateful to him for this help.
  24. Mian Kafayet Ali's letter to me, dated 5 September 1968.
  25. Mian Kafayet Ali's letter to me, dated 10 October 1968.
  26. See A Punjabi, *Confederacy of India*, Lahore, 1939, Preface, pp. vi-vii.
  27. About 10,000 copies were printed (a large number in those days); Mian Kafayet Ali's letter to me, dated 10 October 1968. An Urdu summary of the book, entitled *Talkhis*, was issued a little later by the Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan; see inside back-cover of A Punjabi, *Pakistan: The Critics' Case Examined*, Lahore, 1941.
  28. "Covering letter by Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan, Kt., M.L.A., Nawab of Mamdot, 2 July 1939". It is in my private Collection.
  29. See his articles on "Hindu-Muslim Relations: Pakistan the Only Solution" in *The New Times*, 8 November 1938 (reproduced in full by *TSI*, 10 November 1938), 3 February, 8 and 14 November, and 4 December 1939.
  30. A Punjabee (variant spelling in the original), "The Hindu-

- Muslim Problem", *TSI*, 20 February 1939.
31. *Confederacy of India*, Introduction, pp. 1-20.
  32. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-60.
  33. *Ibid.*, pp. 63-85.
  34. *Ibid.*, pp. 88-90.
  35. *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99.
  36. *Ibid.*, pp. 119-141.
  37. *Ibid.*, pp. 147-171.
  38. *Ibid.*, pp. 173-179.
  39. *Ibid.*, pp. 179-180.
  40. *Ibid.*, pp. 198-199.
  41. *Ibid.*, pp. 201-205.
  42. *Ibid.*, pp. 212-213.
  43. *Ibid.*, pp. 213-214.
  44. *Ibid.*, pp. 222-230.
  45. *Ibid.*, pp. 243-266.
  46. *Ibid.*, pp. 208-211.
  47. *Ibid.*, Appendix, "Programme", pp. 267-272.
  48. Reynald Coupland, *Indian Politics, 1936-1942*, London, 1943, p. 203.
  49. B.M. Chaudhuri, *Muslim Politics in India*, Calcutta, 1946, p. 60.
  50. Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims*, Bombay, 1959, p. 271.
  51. N.N. Gidwani, "Genesis and Growth of Pakistan", in S.P. Varma and Virendra Narain (eds), *Pakistan Political System in Crisis*, Jaipur, 1972, p. 4.
  52. K.B. Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*, Karachi, 1960, p. 119; 2nd ed London, 1968, p. 110.
  53. Waheeduzzaman, *Towards Pakistan*, Lahore, 1964, pp. 165-168.
  54. Some examples: Zafar Ahmad Ansari (Assistant Secretary, AIML, 1942-47) ("Pakistan: Mazi, Hal awr Mustaqbil", *Cheragh-i-Rah, Nazrya-i-Pakistan Number*, December 1960, p. 212); Rashiduzzaman ("Demand for Pakistan", *Pakistan Observer*, 14 August 1968); Muhammad Rafi Anwar and Hasan Askari Rizwi (*Tahrik-i-Qyam-i-Pakistan*, Lahore, 3rd ed 1974, p. 209 fn; a text book); M. Reza Khan (an old Muslim Leaguer) (*What Price Freedom*, Madras, 1969, p. 56).
  55. For example, Craig Baxter, "The People's Party vs. the Punjab Feudalists", in J. Henry Korson (ed), *Contemporary*

*Problems of Pakistan*, Leiden, 1974, p. 18.

56. Waheeduzzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 165; in the bibliography, his note on the *Confederacy of India* runs "author not identified", p. 239.
57. Akhtar Waqar Azim, "Tasawwur-i-Pakistan, Manzil be Manzil", *Imroz*, 14 August 1968.
58. S.S. Pirzada, *The Pakistan Resolution and the Historic Lahore Session*, Karachi, 1968, p. 11.
59. A.S.M. Abdur Rab, *A.K. Fazlul Haq*, Lahore, n.d., p. 101.
60. Rajendra Prasad, *Pakistan*, Bombay and Calcutta, September 1940, p. 34, and his *India Divided*, Bombay, 2nd ed June 1947, pp. 179-181.
61. For example, "Muslims co-operated with the Hindus wholeheartedly when the All-India National Congress came into existence in 1885" (p. 25); the Simla Deputation saw the Viceroy "in 1908" (pp. 26, 167); in 1908 the Congress "endorsed the point of view of the Muslim League in demanding separate representation for the Muslims" (p. 27); all page references to the *Confederacy of India*.
62. For this problem see *Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to inquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953*, Lahore, 1954 (Munir Report); H.A.R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam*, Chicago, 1947; Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939*, London, 1962; I.H. Qureshi, *The Future Development of Islamic Polity*, Lahore, 1946; H.K. Sherwani, *Studies in Muslim Political Thought and Administration*, Lahore, 1942; W.C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, Princeton, 1957; Manzooruddin Ahmed, *Pakistan: The Emerging Islamic State*, Karachi, 1966; T.W. Arnold, *The Caliphate*, London, 1924, rev ed 1965; E.J. Rosenthal, *Islam in the Modern National State*, Cambridge, 1965; Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, Brekeley and Los Angeles, 1961; Z.H. Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan*, London, 1963; Freeland Abbott, *Islam and Pakistan*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1968; K.K. Aziz, *Party Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1958*, Islamabad, 1976; G.E. von Grunebaum, *Modern Islam*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962; Muhammad Asad, *The Principles of State and Government in Islam*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961; Abul Ala Mawdudi,

*Islamic Law and Constitution*, Lahore, 1955, 2nd ed 1960; Muhammad Iqbal, *Six Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, London, 1934; W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Political Thought: The Basic Concepts*, Edinburgh, 1968; Syed Ramadan, *Islamic Law: Its Scope and Equity*, London, 1961; Kenneth Cargg, *Counsels in Contemporary Islam*, Edinburgh, 1965; Mufti Muhammad Shafi, *Basic Principles of the Quranic Constitution*, Karachi, 1953; Donald E. Smith (ed), *South Asian Politics and Religion*, Princeton, 1966; and relevant articles in *The Middle East Journal*, *Muslim World*, *Islamic Studies*, *Islamic Review*, *Islamic Culture*, *Studies in Islam*, *Islam and the Modern Age*, *Middle Eastern Studies*, *Islamic Quarterly*, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, *Revue des Etudes Islamiques*, *Revue de Monde Musalman*, *Studia Islamica*, *Orient*, *Die Welt des Islams*, *Der Islam*, and other specialized journals.

53. For details of this see Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj*, London, 1961, pp. 125-126; Lord Ismay, *The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay*, London, 1960, p. 421; V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India*, Calcutta, 1957, pp. 390-394; H.V. Hodson, *The Great Divide*, London, 1969; K.K. Aziz, *Britain and Muslim India*, London, 1963, pp. 177-181; and *The Transfer of Power, 1942-47: The Mountbatten Vicereignty: Princes, Partition and Independence, 8 July-15 August 1947*, London, 1983.
64. Information supplied to me by Mian Kafayet Ali in writing. He added that in the early 'sixties, when he tried to find out more about Jinnah's telegram to Mamdot, he was told by Nawab Iftikhar Husain Khan, Sir Shah Nawaz's son, that all correspondence between Jinnah and Sir Shah Nawaz "was no longer available". Hearing this, I made an attempt to contact the Mamdot family and make inquiries about the existence and availability of the Mamdot papers; nothing came out of these efforts.
65. *Confederacy of India*, Introduction, pp. 17-18.
66. Mian Kafayet Ali's letter to me, dated 12 April 1976.
67. A Punjabi, *Pakistan: The Critics' Case Examined*, Lahore, 1941, p. 18.
68. Mian Kafayet Ali's letter to me, dated 26 May 1976; see

also the inside back cover of *Pakistan: The Critics' Case Examined*. The date (1939) for the establishment of the Majlis given by Muhammad Baqir ("The Pakistan Movement—In Retrospect", *TPT*, 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1961) is incorrect. It was founded in 1938.

69. Waheeduzzaman, *Towards Pakistan*, Lahore, 1964, p.168.

# 11

## A COMPROMISE FROM ON HIGH: 1939

### The Mamdot Scheme (July)

During our examination of the Punjabi scheme in the last chapter we saw that several contemporary and later commentators confused it with what was considered to be a different plan proposed by the Nawab of Mamdot. It is open to considerable doubt if there ever was a scheme which we can call the Mamdot scheme. Both Punjabi and Mamdot contributed to this confusion.

In the Introduction of the *Confederacy of India*, in the course of considering some of the schemes already before the public, Punjabi mentions one which he attributes to Mamdot. "The fourth scheme which claims our attention", he says, "is the result of the combination of our proposal of a tripartite confederation of three federations, namely, the Muslim North-West, the Muslim Bengal and the Hindu India, and *the improvement suggested upon it by Nawab Sir Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot*, which is to the effect that two more federations, one comprising the Rajistan states and the other constituted by some of the Deccan states, may also be created in addition to the three federations mentioned above so that there may be a quinquepartite instead of a tripartite confederation."<sup>1</sup> From this it is clear that it was Mamdot's own idea, based of course on an attempt to improve the Punjabi scheme.

But then later Punjabi tells us that when Jinnah's telegram of disapproval arrived, he amended his original tripartite confederal scheme and prepared a new version of it which was put in the Introduction. "In the scheme *I proposed* to split up India into five federations to be linked together by a confederal centre."<sup>2</sup>

These two statements cannot be reconciled. The reference to Jinnah's telegraphic instruction makes the problem more

difficult to disentangle. According to Punjabi himself, Jinnah had merely objected to the use of the word "Pakistan" in the title of the book Punjabi could have changed the title without altering his recommendations. Why did he substantially change his proposal? And then why did he attribute the amended scheme to Mamdot? We have no information on which these questions can be answered. It is possible that Mamdot, after having read the manuscript of the book and before or after hearing from Jinnah, suggested a 5-federation confederation in place of Punjabi's 3-federation scheme. But this is mere speculation.

In the covering letter which accompanied copies of the book Mamdot used words which helped to deepen the confusion. After a brief statement of the political situation then obtaining in India, he wrote: "This has *led me to think* that there can be such a scheme as may appeal to the British Government, the Muslims and the Rulers of the Indian States". About the book and its author he said: "In the accompanying book 'Confederacy of India', which *I am submitting* for your careful perusal, *our author* has discussed the Indian political situation from various points of view and shown the need of dividing the Indian sub-continent into various regions. . .".<sup>3</sup> This is vague language and does not make it clear, as it should have done, that the scheme contained in the book is the author's and that it was neither inspired by himself nor owed anything to his own suggestions.

In these circumstances it was not very far-fetched for some people to conclude that Mamdot was the real author of the scheme and that he had merely used a pseudonym in order not to commit the Muslim League, of which he was the president in the Punjab, to the solution suggested in it. Some historians have chosen to adopt this position and to ascribe the Punjabi scheme to Mamdot.<sup>4</sup> Apart from the contents of the book (especially the Introduction), the name of its publisher and the covering letter by Mamdot, there was also a contemporary news item in a Lahore English daily which attributed the scheme to Mamdot without any doubts or reservations.

Mamdot's covering letter bore the date of 2 July 1939. But it seems that copies of the book were released to the press a few days earlier, or perhaps an enterprising reporter on the staff of the newspaper had managed to secure an advance copy. Anyhow the *Civil and Military Gazette* of 29 June carried a prominently-placed

5-column report, with a double-column headline, with the titles: "Five Federations Proposed: Scheme of Nawab Sir Mahomed Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot".

After putting the following passage from the Introduction of the book in clarendon type: "Self-determination in their own regions is the birthright of the Muslims. Constitutionally as well as morally no power can deprive them of this right. In the case of there being unreasonable opposition even to the separation of the Muslim Regions from Hindu India, the Muslims will be within their right in going to all extremes and in trying all methods open to them to achieve it"<sup>5</sup>, the report went on to say: "With these striking words, Nawab Sir Mahomed Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot, a leading landlord and a member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, has forwarded a scheme of 'redistributing India on religious, cultural and linguistic affinities' to the Constitution Sub-Committee of the All-India Muslim League, which will meet in Bombay on July 2 to discuss and finally to adopt one of the various schemes, which have been proposed as alternatives to the federal scheme contained in the Government of India Act." Next it reproduced two more paragraphs from the book, and then misquoted a paragraph from Mamdot's covering letter (which it called a "note attached to this scheme" by the Nawab).

It prefaced a description of the scheme by saying that "the original scheme, prepared by a 'punjabi', contemplated a tripartite confederation of three federations", and that "the Nawab of Mamdot suggests what he considers an improvement in so far as he advocates the creation of two more federations. . . so that there may be a quinquartite instead of a tripartite confederacy". Then the report went on to describe the scheme by reproducing pp. 10-13 of the Introduction to the *Confederacy of India*. The rest of the report, running to over a column and a half, quoted revenue and expenditure figures from the book in support of the contention that Sind would be self-supporting, NWFP would be no burden on the new federation as its deficit would be shared by all the states in the confederation, and Indus-tan as a whole would be financially sound. Throughout this part of the report Mamdot was made out to be the author of whatever was being quoted or stated. Again and again we come across the phrases "the Nawab suggests", "the Nawab of Mamdot has taken the figures of expenditure", "states the Nawab", and "the Nawab

of Mamdot has worked in round figures".<sup>6</sup>

Thus there was no doubt lurking in the mind of the person who wrote this report that Mamdot was the author of the scheme. In this way the myth or half-myth of a Mamdot scheme was created. Unfortunately there are no means of discovering the truth about the exact part played by Mamdot in the emergence or alteration of the scheme propounded by Punjabi, or about the precise contents of the telegram received by him from Jinnah, because, according to Sir Shah Nawaz's son, the Mamdot papers are not available. As far as my own information, derived from usually reliable sources, goes there are no such papers in existence for the simple reason that the Nawab did not preserve them.

In spite of the big question mark which the foregoing facts put against the existence of a separate Mamdot scheme, it may be useful, for the sake of completeness of record if for nothing else, to give a short account of its contents.<sup>7</sup>

The five federations suggested by Mamdot were to be: The Indus Region Federation, with the Punjab (minus its eastern Hindu tracts), Sind, NWFP, Kashmir, Baluchistan, Bahawalpur, Amb, Dir, Swat, Chitral, Khairpur, Kalat, Las Bela, Kapurthala and Malerkotla as its federal units; the Hindu India Federation; with the United Provinces, Central Provinces, Bihar (with some portions of Bengal), Orissa, Assam, Madras, Bombay, and the native states other than the Rajistan and Deccan states included in the States' Federations, as its federal units; the Rajistan Federation, with the various states of Rajistan and Central India as its federal units; the Deccan States' Federation, with the Hyderabad, Mysore and Bastar states as its federal units; and the Bengal federation, with the Muslim tracts of Eastern Bengal and Goalpara and Sylhet districts of Assam as its provincial units, and Tripura and other states lying within the provincial unit or cut off by its territories from Hindu India as its state units.

The consequent reshaping of India would involve the following six steps: either the creation of a new province consisting of the Hindu areas excluded from the Punjab and the chief commissioner's province of Delhi, or the inclusion of all these areas in the United Provinces; the inclusion of the Hindu parts of Bengal in Bihar or Orissa; the inclusion of the districts of Goalpara and Sylhet of Assam in Muslim Bengal; the creation of a corridor in the north of the present district of Goalpara of Assam in order

to connect the Hindu province of Assam with the Hindu India Federation; the creation of a similar corridor to the Deccan States' Federation through the Hindu India Federation in order to provide a link between Hyderabad and Mysore; and, finally, the creation of a corridor in the Rajistan Federation so that it could be connected with its federal units of Patiala state, half of this corridor to be taken from Hindu India Federation and half from Indusstan.<sup>8</sup>

Each of the five federations would have a governor general supervising the work of the governors of its provincial units. He would be responsible to the "central confederal" authority in relation to the confederal subjects and matters relating to the rights and obligations of the Crown in respect of the native states lying within this federation. The confederal authority would be vested in the viceroy, assisted by a confederal assembly consisting of members drawn from the various federations. Representation in this assembly would be determined by the importance of a federation to the confederacy "as regards its geographical situation in the sub-continent", population, area, economic position and other factors. The governor general would be vested with powers over subjects like foreign relations, defence, water supply from the common natural resources, and rights and obligations of the Crown in relation to the native states. The federations could either directly contribute to the revenues of the confederacy or assign some portions of their revenues for certain specific heads towards its expenditure.

But under no circumstances was the Muslim north-west to consent to assign customs as a source of the confederal revenue. This for an obvious reason. Such an assignment would mean that Indusstan would have no control over tariff policy. This would permanently ruin its future prospects for industrialization, and would otherwise adversely affect its economic interests.

Such a quinquartite arrangement could have several advantages. "A reduced Hindu minority and Kashmir state with a Muslim population and a Hindu Raja in the federated North-West, will form a guarantee, for the security of the Muslim minority and Hyderabad State with Hindu population and a Muslim Nizam in Hindu India and *vice versa*." It would also hold out an assurance of safety and autonomy in the native states, which were then hesitating to join the federation as envisaged under the 1935

Act, because the confederation would remove their fear of too severe a control by the centre.

Perhaps because it was prepared in much haste, this scheme suffers from at least four weaknesses from which the original Punjabi scheme was free. It provides three corridors whose existence would have complicated the proposed federal and confederal arrangements. Agreement on the dimensions and status of the corridors would have been difficult to procure. The political and constitutional status of the people living in the corridors would have added another difficulty: unless the corridors were envisaged as highways connecting certain areas and covering no other territory.

The shape of the Hindu India Federation was, as Punjabi admits with an unholy glee, deliberately distorted. It was given six regions separated from one another by other federations. Did the maker of the scheme, whoever it was, seriously believe that the Congress would look twice at this plan? A party which refused to consider the most reasonable proposals for separation could not be expected to give a second thought to a scheme which split up Hindu India into arbitrary units which were not even contiguous.

The act of balancing a Muslim Kashmir with a Hindu ruler with a Hindu Hyderabad with a Muslim ruler was meaningless. What security could the Nizam afford to his negligible Muslim minority in the overwhelming Hindu population of his dominions? In any case, the setting up of two separate federations for the princely states had neither the warrant of democracy nor the sanction of common sense. It could only have been proposed with two motives: to discomfit the Hindus by destroying the unity of Hindu India, and to maintain the existence and entity of some prominent Muslim native states like Bhopal and Hyderabad. It is difficult to see how the second object would have been achieved unless the princely system was considered an eternal dispensation. This part of the scheme shows a not disinterested concern with the future of a set of reactionary regimes.

Finally, the scheme does not appear to contemplate independence for India or any part of it. Its constitutional machinery is assembled on the conventional lines of a viceroy, a few governor generals and several governors. The Crown figures as of old in its rights and obligations in relation to the native states. Even the status of a dominion looks beyond its calculations.

## The Summer of 1939

In this rich year the summer was particularly productive. In March, when the Indian summer is already in, Asadullah had presented his scheme of a Muslim north. In June-July came the Punjabi and Mamdot schemes. Mid-July saw two more proposals: the Eastern Afghanistan and the Pakistan Caliphate. July was not yet out when Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan came out with his plan. August began with a suggestion from the Faqir of Ipi and ended with another from two Aligarh dons. By the end of August the high tide had passed, though some trickles still came in and continued to contribute to the stream until the Lahore Resolution, by making the final momentous decision, put a stop to this meandering search.

### Abdul Wadud (July)

It was reported in the middle of July that Mawlana Abdul Wadud of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Sarhad (Frontier Society of Divines) envisaged an independent Muslim state to be called Eastern Afghanistan. The *Tarjuman-i-Afghan*, a weekly paper published from Peshawar, claimed that his scheme had found support among many tribes on the frontier: the Mohmands, Afridis, and Waziris. Various tribal areas had elected their Amirs who were to meet in August to take a final decision on their attitude towards this proposal. A number of *ulema* and chieftains in the trans-border area and parts of the NWFP were also stated to have given their approval to the scheme. The Red Shirt<sup>9</sup> leaders were, however, strongly opposed to this movement. They were taking the line that it was meant to keep India in perpetual slavery.<sup>10</sup>

No details of this suggestion are now available. Apart from the newspaper report from which the above is taken, only one other reference has come to us, and that is nothing more than a sentence-long summary of what we already know.<sup>11</sup> I have not been able to find the Peshawar weekly in which the plan was originally published.

Such scant knowledge rules out useful comment. So many questions come up for an answer. Who was Abdul Wadud? How strong was the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Sarhad? Was it in touch with or under the influence of the Muslim League? What did the scheme

amount to? Why was it given the name of "Eastern Afghanistan"? How much real support did it enjoy in the province and on the tribal border? These are important questions, but we have no evidence on which they can be answered.

About one thing, however, we can be sure. There is much significance in the fact that this scheme came from the Frontier Province. It is the second proposal for separation to emerge from the land of the Pathans; but even more important is the fact that at this time, as for many years in the past, the Frontier Province was the stronghold of the pro-Congress Red Shirt organization of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahib. The Muslim League was so weak in these parts as to be practically non-existent. Not many people shared the general anxiety of the Indian Muslims about their future in a Hindu-controlled India. The Pathan's own traditions of freedom and the overwhelming Muslim majority in the province made him laugh to scorn the possibility of Hindu rule. He had always looked after himself very well, even in the face of the mighty forces of British imperialism; he was confident of his capacity to deal effectively with Hindu domination if and when it arrived. That explains the ascendancy of the Red Shirts in the province, and also the fact that the Congress dared not act in that area in its own name but used a Muslim, Pathan organization to do its work.

In these circumstances it is a little remarkable that a separatist sentiment should have shown itself in the Frontier Province. It would not be unreasonable to take this as a testimony of a new feeling among the Pathans. Even the cocksure frontiersman was beginning to see some sense in the League claim that independence without some special arrangements for the Muslims could only be a change of masters from the British to the Hindus. This was the beginning of the end of Congress influence in the north-west corner of India, which was to lead by stages to the culmination of 1947 when, in spite of the Red Shirt instructions to the contrary, the Pathans were to vote themselves into Pakistan.

Why was the scheme called "Eastern Afghanistan"? Why did Abdul Wadud not use the word "Pakistan" for his state? It may be possible to explain this. Though nearly every scheme-maker was to a greater or lesser extent influenced by Rahmat Ali, none from Iqbal to Mamdot had called his solution by the name of Pakistan.

For reasons which we will discuss later, Rahmat Ali's ideas exerted more power than his terminology; though in the end his designation for the Muslim state triumphed despite the opposition of the League leaders. So the Mawlana's failure to call his state after Rahmat Ali's suggestion is understandable. But the name he chose is still in need of explanation. In all probability, he wanted a word which would have the greatest appeal for the Pathans. "Afghanistan" could do the trick, for the people of the frontier called themselves Afghans, and should have welcomed a term which underlined their racial origin. But as there was already a country of that name, it had to be qualified in some way. Therefore it was called "Eastern Afghanistan". The name might have caused some suspicion that he wanted to take the frontier areas into Afghanistan so that all the Afghans could have a common homeland and country. But this would have had no foundation, for both reports agree that what was suggested was an "independent Muslim State". So there was to be no merger with Afghanistan; the two states, Afghanistan and Eastern Afghanistan, were to live side by side.

We are not told anything about the areas intended to be included in this state. It is safe to assume that, in spite of the name adopted for it, the new state was not going to be confined to the NWFP and the tribal belt, and perhaps Baluchistan. The area was too small and its resources too meagre to make a viable state. Nor did it solve the problem of the future of the Indian Muslims, not even of the Muslims of the north-west. We may be justified in concluding, though we have no evidence to prove it, that the Wadud scheme aimed at making the north-west of India into an independent Muslim state, like most other schemes of the time, but chose to call it by a new appellation. Further, coming from an association of divines, it is probable that the proposed state was meant to be an Islamic state, not merely a Muslim one.

### **The Pakistan Caliphate Scheme (July)**

Simultaneously with the Wadud scheme there appeared another proposal prepared by the Punjab Muslim Students Federation. After Rahmat Ali, this is the first scheme on our list to use the word "Pakistan" for the state it wanted to see established.

In fact, the idea of such a state goes back to 1937 when Ibrahim Ali Chishti founded the Tahrik-i-Khilafat-i-Pakistan and in the same

year published his scheme and a map to go with it. The Punjab Muslim Students Federation adopted it in 1939 as its goal, and presented a detailed scheme of Khilafat-i-Pakistan to the Muslim League Constitution Committee. A Pakistan Khilafat Conference was held by the Federation in 1940.<sup>12</sup>

The Federation claimed that the Muslims of northern India had a birth right to their "homelands". Declaring themselves arch enemies of geographical nationalism and western democracy, the framers of the scheme believed in establishing the sovereignty of the *shariyyat* in northern India and in other parts of the sub-continent where Muslims were in a majority. Pakistan Caliphate, their name for the proposed state, was to be ruled by a spiritual dictator, who would be the shadow of God on earth in accordance with the injunctions of the Quran. He was to be both the spiritual and the temporal head of the state. The "unbelievers" living in Pakistan Caliphate were to be treated as *zimmi*s; they would pay the *jizya* in lieu of military service.

Pakistan Caliphate was to consist of Sind, Baluchistan, NWFP, Kashmir, the Punjab, and parts of the United Provinces, the Central Provinces and Bihar; the boundary was to run along the Ganges right up to Bengal and Assam. The flag of the state was to be a rectangle divided into four equal portions, each coloured differently, with the pole as a palm tree in green. The four colours were white, green, red and black. A crescent in white was embossed on the two portions (green and black) nearer the pole. Across the whole flag, in two equal lines, was ascribed the first declaration of Islamic creed in Arabic: "I testify to the fact that there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His apostle".

It was reported that the Federation was enlisting supporters, and planning to give military training to all Muslim students. The idea was to form a body of *mujahids* which would fight for the creation of the new state and, when that had been achieved, serve as its protectors and guardians.<sup>13</sup>

As the students of the Punjab were the most enthusiastic supporters of Rahmat Ali in India, it is quite natural that their proposal should show a deep imprint of his ideas. It accepts and adopts his name of "Pakistan" for the Muslim state, and makes it even more Islamic than he had indicated. But on two points the students show their own mind. The country is to be called Pakistan Caliphate (*Khilafat-i-Pakistan* in Urdu), not merely Pakistan,

probably in order to emphasize its Islamic character. The territories demarcated for the new state are not the same as found in Rahmat Ali's plans for India. The area of his Pakistan is extended to cover parts of three Hindu provinces. This was unmistakably aimed at the creation of a corridor linking Pakistan Caliphate with Bengal and, in the bargain, saving a fair number of Muslims of these areas from Hindu rule. The idea of the corridor might or might not have come from the quinquepartite scheme of Punjabi (or Mamdot). In 1947, just before the actual division of India, Jinnah too was to make a demand for a corridor connecting West Pakistan and East Pakistan.

It would be a mistake to deem this scheme less important than others because it was the work of students. For a number of reasons—the early influence of Rahmat Ali, Iqbal's hold on the youth of the province, the strong national spirit inculcated by and at the Islamia College of Lahore, the presence of a large number of intelligent and patriotic young men with the ability to organize the students, the failure of the Congress and the Unionist Party to influence or tempt the Punjabi youth, the size and quality of the Muslim Urdu press in the province, the large number of schools and colleges, the rather frightening seriousness with which the Punjabi intelligentsia took itself, the fact of Lahore being the intellectual and literary centre of Muslim India, and the incredible regard and deference which Jinnah enjoyed among the Punjabi students long before the province as a whole went over to the Muslim League—the students of the Punjab played a much more significant part in the Pakistan movement than is generally appreciated. Had they not identified themselves with the Pakistan idea so wholeheartedly and at such an early stage, it is doubtful if the League movement of the 'forties would have captured the imagination and votes of the north-western Muslims as easily and completely as it did.

In issuing this scheme the PMSF was not merely adding one more plan to the swelling list, but sending a signal to Jinnah that, no matter what other groups and leaders said or thought or planned, the young among the nation had decided where they desired to go, and wanted him to lead the way. In the history of the idea of Pakistan and the movement for its realization this was a major development. In a way it was the Punjabi student who forced Jinnah to adopt the idea of Pakistan and subscribe it on the

League charter as the goal of Muslim India.

### Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan (May)

If a scheme be judged by the reputation and high office enjoyed by its maker, then the most important of all these proposals appeared at the end of July. It was the work of Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, the Prime Minister of the Punjab, the leader of the Unionist Party in the province, and a prominent member of the Muslim League.

The Sikandar scheme was issued to the press on 29 July<sup>14</sup>, but Sikandar must have been thinking for some time about the issues involved, and we know that by early May he had come to certain broad conclusions which were to form the basis of his proposals. Obviously he was convinced in his mind of the validity of these conclusions because he referred to them in a public speech. No man holding such a responsible and sensitive office would have announced a set of new suggestions and radical views unless he was quite sure of their abiding value or relevance to current issues and problems.

It is therefore necessary to look at certain passages of his presidential address delivered before the Bombay Presidency Muslim League Conference at Sholapur which clearly foreshadow his later scheme. He firmly rejected the federation contained in the 1935 Act, emphasized the necessity of finding an alternative to it, and enumerated the requirements which a new solution ought to fulfil. "Speaking personally", he said, "and In the light of the experience of the past two years, I am convinced that the scheme of Federation as embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, has ceased to be suitable, having regard to the rapidly changing circumstances and requirements of the Indian people. I am equally convinced that some sort of Federation suited to the peculiar needs and conditions of India, is essential for the ordered progress of our country. But to be acceptable and workable it must *inter alia* fulfil the following basic conditions: a) that it secures to India the unfettered right of rising to its full political stature, b) that the autonomy and integrity of the units is [*sic.*] effectively guaranteed and that neither the centre nor any unit nor any outside subversive movement shall be allowed to interfere with the internal autonomy and the integrity of individual units, c) that the financial provisions

of the proposed federation shall have free scope for the development of the units, d) that the important minorities and interests in the country shall be effectively guaranteed the fullest possible protection and unhampered development of their political and cultural rights, and their due share in the governance and the administration of the country, and e) that the powers of the Centre shall be confined to a few essential subjects and functions and that the residue shall vest either in the individual units or groups of units as they may desire."<sup>15</sup>

These five principles became, so to speak, the terms of reference within which he prepared his scheme. Therefore they merit some notice. But first the remarkable nature of the whole statement must be recognized. It is true that in 1935 and 1936 both the Congress and the League had rejected the 1935 constitution,<sup>16</sup> and the Congress had pledged itself to "break the constitution from within", whatever that meant. Leaders of all parties were going up and down the country declaring their opposition to the new federal scheme and promising the public that it shall never be implemented in full. Yet, the premiers of Congress provinces expressing such views was one thing, the spectacle of the prime minister of a Muslim province, who did not head a League government and whose loyalty to and sympathy with the British were well known, so utterly rejecting the constitution under which he held his office was another. Such events prove that apart from other factors—like the failure of a required number of native states to enter the federation, and later the outbreak of the war—the 1935 constitution had made itself unacceptable to every one in India, though for different reasons.

Coming back to Sikandar's five principles, the first looked forward to a day of complete independence for India. This is rather important because he was generally criticized for sacrificing the thought of independence at the altar of his loyalty to the British. The popular image of him, as of his other colleagues in the Unionist Party<sup>17</sup>, was that of a formidable supporter of the British *raj* for whom imperial favours carried more weight than public approval or national interest—a picture as unkind as it was untrue. But it must be acknowledged that under this principle independence was not judged to be an immediate objective: the new order of things should be such as would give India the right of "rising to its full political stature"

Secondly, provincial autonomy and integrity were to be jealously safeguarded and no compromise or bargain made that would barter them away. Thirdly, this autonomy was to be made secure by giving to the units sufficient financial freedom and material resources. Fourthly, the "important minorities" were to receive guarantees that their political and cultural rights would be fully safeguarded, and further that they would receive their due share in government and administration; the latter assurance obviously resulting in composite executives and communal representation in public services. Lastly, the new federal centre was to be a weak one with only a few powers, the residue to belong to the units. The suggestion that some units might decide to combine in order to exercise the residue opened the possibility of a three-tier structure (as was later prescribed by the Cabinet Mission). It might also be construed as a hint that the Muslim provinces of the north-west would come together to form one large unit in the Indian federation, which had been Iqbal's solution in 1930, or a sort of sub-federation in federal relationship with the centre.

### The Sikandar Scheme (July)

After having worked for some months on a scheme embodying these principles, Sikandar put the finished product before the public on 29 July, and most Indian newspapers carried a very full summary of the proposals in their issue of the following day. The scheme was contained in a 35-page pamphlet entitled *Outlines of a Scheme of Indian Federation*, published by the author himself and printed at the Mufid-i-Am Press of Lahore.

What follows in this section is a summary of this pamphlet, as far as possible in the words of the author. I merely add or omit a few words to provide connecting links. The language throughout is Sir Sikandar's, though to bring out the special significance of certain phrases or sentences I may put them in quotation marks.

The scheme opens with a brief statement of reasons which render it necessary to frame a new federal plan to replace the one prepared by the British in 1935.<sup>18</sup> Without going into details, the fact is recognized that the 1935 constitution is unacceptable to a vast majority of the people in India. At the same time it is admitted by every one that a federation of some kind is not only desir-

able but indispensable for the order and peaceful progress of the country. Any alternative scheme to be generally acceptable, must be so devised as to allay the reasonable doubts and apprehensions of the minorities and the native states, and at the same time meet the criticism levelled on the score of inadequacy of political power which it is proposed to transfer to the representatives of the people under the present scheme. The problem is undoubtedly difficult and complex, but it should not be beyond the ingenuity of British statesmen to plan a revised federal scheme which, if not universally acceptable, would at least command a much larger measure of support, and be free from some more serious defects which have shown themselves in the working of the 1935 constitution in the provincial sphere. It is my fixed conviction that any scheme which does not rigidly and specifically circumscribe the authority of the centre to matters of all-India concern is not likely to work. Both the minorities and the native states have made the point that the present scheme does not afford adequate protection against interference from the centre. It is feared that a domineering central government might undermine the authority and independence of the units and reduce provincial autonomy to a farce. The safeguards contained in the constitution would prove ineffective in curbing such a tendency. The operation of the provincial part of the constitution has already demonstrated the hollowness of the claims made on behalf of these safeguards. In my opinion, any federal scheme to be successful in India must take into account the legitimate desire of the minorities to safeguard their religious, political, cultural and economic rights and interests, and must secure complete autonomy to the provinces, and complete immunity to the princely states from undue interference by the centre or by the British Indian provinces. In the absence of such guarantees willing co-operation will not be forthcoming, and the federal machinery will not be able to work smoothly or successfully.

The salient features of the scheme I am going to recommend may be mentioned here. First, instead of bringing British Indian provinces and native states into the federation as two distinct components, it will provide for their entering it together on a regional basis. This will be conducive to the solidarity of the country and the stability of the central government. Secondly, it will encourage collaboration among contiguous units, whether

they be provinces or states, on grounds of geographical proximity, common language, and affinity of economic and other interests. Two examples of this collaboration may be given. In administrative matters, and particularly in the fields of law and order, it will encourage the various units in a zone to make reciprocal arrangements and, when necessary, to devise a common line of action. In the economic sphere it will enable the units to share in common arrangements for the establishment of institutes for industrial and agricultural research, for experimental and demonstration farms and other similar matters. Thirdly, such collaboration will tend to reduce causes and occasions for friction between provinces and states which would be inevitable if the two kinds of units are kept separate in watertight compartments.

Fourthly, by confining the jurisdiction of the centre to a few specified subjects of common concern, it will enable both the provinces and the states to enter the federation on a uniform basis. At the same time it will also allay the apprehensions of the units by eliminating the possibility of undue interference by the centre in their internal affairs. Fifthly, it will ensure the willing and loyal co-operation of the units with the centre and thus avoid the growth of fissiparous tendencies among the units. Sixthly, it will effectively safeguard the integrity and autonomy of provincial and state units. Lastly, it will give to the minorities a greater sense of security.

The first step in the formation of the new federation will be the demarcation of the country into the following seven zones:

• Zone 1: Assam and Bengal with Bengal states and Sikkim. One or two western districts of Bengal will be excluded in order to reduce the size of the zone.

Zone 2: Bihar and Orissa, with the area transferred from Bengal to Orissa. This will benefit Orissa which at present has limited resources and a small area.

Zone 3: the United Provinces and their states.

Zone 4: Madras, Travancore, Madras states and Coorg.

Zone 5: Bombay, Hyderabad, western Indian states, Bombay states, Mysore, and the states of the Central Provinces.

Zone 6: Rajputana states (but not Bikaner and Jaisalmer), Gwalior, Central Indian states, Bihar and Orissa states, the Central Provinces and Berar.

Zone 7: the Punjab, Sind, NWFP, Kashmir, the Punjab states,

Baluchistan, and Bikaner and Jaisalmer.

The composition of the zones suggested here is only tentative, and can be altered if necessary in consultation with the various interests concerned.

Each zone will have a legislature of its own, containing representatives from both the provinces and the states included in the zone. The share of each unit in the zonal legislature will be the same as allotted to it in the federal assembly under the 1935 Act. (Sikandar calls the zonal assembly "regional legislature"; for the sake of clarity, in this summary it is throughout called "zonal legislature"). This legislature will deal only with the subjects included in the zonal list. But if two or more units of the zone make a request to that effect in the interest of uniformity and facility of administration, it may legislate on subjects falling in the provincial list. With a view to giving additional security to the smaller units, it is provided that no measure relating to a subject included in the zonal list shall be considered to have been passed unless two-thirds of the house vote for it. The zonal legislatures can authorize the federal legislature to legislate on subjects included in the zonal and provincial lists, but at least four out of seven zones must ask for this to make the authorization effective. Yet, unless this is done by all the zones the enactments passed under this provision shall have force only in those zones which have expressly asked for such legislation. Moreover, any law passed by the federal legislature at the request of the zones and by the zonal legislatures at the request of the units shall be repealed if in the case of the federal legislature at least three zones and in case of the zonal legislatures at least half the units in that zone ask for its repeal.

The federal legislature shall not be a separately elected body. All the members of the various zonal legislatures shall collectively constitute the "Central Federal Assembly", which will consist of 375 members: 250 from the provinces and 125 from the states. One-third of this total strength shall be Muslim. The other minorities will be allotted the share apportioned to them in the federal assembly under the 1935 Act.

Zonal legislatures will be elected in the following manner. In the case of the provinces, the procedure will be the same as laid down by the 1935 Act for the election of provincial representatives in the federal assembly. The method for the native states is a little

complicated. During the first ten years from the date of inauguration of the new constitution, three-fourths will be nominated by the Ruler and one-fourth "selected" by the Ruler out of a panel to be elected by the State Assembly or other similar institutions. During the next five years, two-thirds will be nominated by the Ruler and one-third "elected" as laid down above. After fifteen years, one-half will be nominated and one-half elected. After twenty years and thereafter, one-third will be nominated and two-thirds elected.

The federal legislature will be unicameral. If it is desired that room must be found for "special interests", which were given seats in the Council of State by the 1935 Act, then the strength of the house may be increased to accommodate them. In case this arrangement is agreed upon, the additional seats should be equally distributed among the seven zones, say, 14 for each zone or 98 in all. Of these, 60 should be reserved for provinces and 38 for states, provided that the distribution is so arranged as not to affect the over-all one-third representation of the Muslims and the fair representation of other minorities.

The federal executive will consist of the Viceroy and Governor General and a Council of Ministers. The membership of the Council will, as far as possible, not exceed eleven or be less than seven, including the prime minister. The Viceroy will be the representative of the King. The prime minister will be appointed by the Viceroy from among the members of the federal legislature, and the other ministers also from among the assembly in consultation with the prime minister. But four qualifications will govern this procedure. Each zone shall have at least one representative in the cabinet. At least one-third of the ministers shall be Muslim. At least two, if the number of ministers is nine or below, and at least three, if the number is more than nine, shall be chosen from among the representatives of the states. During the first fifteen or twenty years, the Viceroy may nominate two of his ministers either from the assembly or from outside, and entrust to them the portfolios of defence and external affairs.

A tentative allocation of portfolios and designation of ministers will produce this list: prime minister, minister for defence, minister for external affairs, minister of finance, minister of interior (home), minister of communications, minister to look after minority interests, minister of co-ordination (to arrange co-ordination

and uniformity among the zones in matters of common concern), and minister of commerce and industries. The minister for external affairs may also be in charge of the "affairs of the Indian States".

The normal term of office of the ministers will be the same as the tenure of the federal assembly, i.e., five years. They will retain office "at the pleasure of His Majesty's representative, i.e., the Viceroy and Governor General". A minister will be removed if he loses the confidence of the majority of the representatives of his zonal legislature. The ministers as a body will resign if a vote of no-confidence in the ministry is carried in the federal legislature.

The Federal Railway Authority, first created by the 1935 Act, will be so constituted as to include at least one representative from each of the seven zones. In addition, the constitution will contain effective safeguards on the following subjects: protection of the legitimate interests of the minorities, prevention of racial discrimination against British-born subjects, violation of treaty and other contractual rights of the native states, protection against interference by the federal executive or legislature in the internal affairs of the provinces or states, safety of India against foreign aggression and the peace and tranquillity of the country, prevention of subversive activities by the citizens of a unit or zone against another unit or zone, and protection of the culture and religion of the minorities.

The community-wise composition of the Indian Army as it stood on 1 January 1937 shall not be altered. If its peacetime strength is to be reduced or increased, the 1937 proportion of the various communities will not be disturbed. This condition may be relaxed in the event of a war or other grave emergency.

As regards the division of powers between the centre and the units or zones, only those subjects the retention of which is essential in the interests of the country as a whole and for its proper administration shall be allocated to the centre, e.g., defence, external affairs, communications, customs, coinage, and currency, etc. The remaining subjects which are at present included in the federal list will be transferred to the units or zones. All powers not specifically mentioned in the federal list "shall vest in the units, and, in the case of the subjects allocated to zones, in the regional legislatures". The concurrent list of the 1935 Act will be revised, and legislation under it limited by two conditions: that

the federal legislature will not undertake legislation on any subject in this list unless at least four zones have applied for it, and that any legislation so enacted will apply only to the zones which have asked for it. On all points of doubt or difference of opinion about the meaning or contents of the federal, concurrent, zonal, provincial or state lists, the decision of the Viceroy "in his discretion" will be final.

Adequate and effective machinery shall be set up both at the centre and in the provinces to look after and protect the interests of the minorities. One way of doing this may be to create statutory committees consisting of representatives of the minorities.<sup>19</sup>

### Defects of the Sikandar Scheme

The weaknesses of the Sikandar scheme are too obvious and too many to be missed by the reader. Space does not permit a detailed examination of each, and we must be content with a brief reference to an average reader's first reactions. More points will emerge when we deal with the reception accorded to the scheme by the Indian press and the various political groups.

Sikandar's premisses and conclusions were not in alignment. He started with two propositions which gave no cause for quarrel. The 1935 constitution had become totally unacceptable to nearly every section of public opinion in India. A new constitution was required which must, above everything else, fulfil two requirements: it must provide a weak centre, and it must afford full protection to the minorities. In general terms this was the Muslim position. But the constitution he produced did not follow the principles which he had adopted at the outset. The centre was made weaker but not weak enough to give satisfaction to the Muslims. The scheme also did not contain any special or effective suggestions for the protection of minorities; it merely laid down a few general statements which were no more convincing than oft-heard platitudes, and a few provisions which were too vague to bring any change.

Ignoring the minority problem for the moment (though that was the very *raison d'être* of the scheme), the suggested plan is not even a passable exercise in constitution making. So many loose ends are left hanging in the air that it is almost impossible, and certainly improbable, that it would have worked in practice. A

few examples will show this.

The federal ministers are held accountable to three different, and possibly mutually antagonistic, authorities: the Viceroy who represented the British Crown, the federal legislature which spoke for the whole country, and the zonal representatives in the federal legislature who would reasonably be expected to consider the zonal interests above the federal. The result would be an exceedingly complicated situation, which would be further aggravated by the communal composition of the cabinet and the Hindu-Muslim clash inevitable in a composite government. In a government split like this both horizontally and vertically the Viceroy would always have an upper hand. Similarly, the provision for the division of subjects between the centre and the various kinds of units is so confused that no clear picture emerges of what the position would be like in practice. Further, the suggested constitution contains no provision for its revision and amendment.

A more serious objection to which the scheme generously exposes itself is its refusal to contemplate an independent future for India. The "viceroy and governor general as representing His Majesty the King" is cheerfully placed at the head of the federal executive. And far from being a constitutional or formal head of state, he is armed with some very real powers. The ministers are going to be in office at his pleasure. The external affairs minister will also act like the old foreign secretary of the Government of India. On all differences of opinion about the division of subjects the Viceroy will have the final word "in his discretion". According to one provision, the Viceroy will appoint his external affairs and defence ministers from outside the legislature "during the first 20 (or 15) years". Not to speak of complete independence, even dominion status is ruled out for many years to come. India is declared firmly to be a colony and judged confidently to continue as such for a long time.

After British India it is the native states which are put in their place. There is a paradox here, but one to be easily resolved. The native states are given much importance. Zones are created so that states may associate themselves with the federation on an equal footing with the provinces. Their representation in the zonal and federal legislatures is subjected to a number of safeguards. Their quota of the federal executive is protected by a constitutional provision. But all this is to help and protect the ruler, not his

people. Even at the end of twenty years, when the constitution will be fully democratized, the representatives of the states are not to be fully elective. One-third of them would be forever nominated by the ruler. Democratic elections in one part of the federation were thus ruled out for all time to come. That an association of democratic provinces and half-democratic states in the same federation might create strange and difficult problems did not occur to Sikandar.

By retaining a powerful Viceroy, protecting the rulers of the native states, borrowing the system of elections from the 1935 Act and following the "unacceptable" old constitution in so many other ways, Sikandar justified the taunt of his critics that his scheme was no more than a set of amendments to the Act of 1935, and therefore beneath notice.

Sir Sikandar had apparently presented his scheme in an attempt to solve the Muslim problem. And judged by this standard it is a complete failure. He might well have been sincere in his intentions, but from the contents of his pamphlet it is clear that he had misunderstood the situation. We look in vain for a practicable solution of the communal problem. Like other problems, this one too had its phases. By 1939 it had travelled beyond the reach of ordinary safeguards and conventional protective measures. The talk was no longer of separate electorates and adequate share in political power. The central issue now was the fact of Muslim fear of Hindu rule. This Sikandar did not even touch. People were now thinking of separation, and the idea of Pakistan, in its various forms, had been before them for nine years. Sikandar failed to say a word about it. If one reads his pamphlet without the context of what was going on in 1939 and what had gone before, one is carried back to the 'twenties when the League, and particularly Jinnah, had first begun to think of an Indian federation with the residue vested in the provinces and with some special safeguards for the Muslims. It seems as if for Sikandar time had stood still, and the future of the Muslims presented no new problems. His only acknowledgment of changed conditions is his suggestion for the creation of zones. This could hardly be a solution, for it did not add anything to Muslim security. The north-west zone had already figured in nearly every scheme, and Sikandar's failure to exclude the eastern Hindu areas from the Punjab ignored the dangers so well expressed by Punjabi. The Bengal and Assam zone in the

Sikandar scheme did not exclude the whole of the Hindu area of eastern Bengal or the Hindu districts of Assam, and brought in a curious partner in the body of Sikkim. No rational principle or practical consideration lay behind the creation of other zones.

Apart from zones, every other recommendation of the scheme had been suggested or considered at the RTC. It could have had some value had it been presented in mid or late 'twenties, or, at the latest, during the RTC discussions. Even in the early 'thirties some Muslims might have considered it too conservative and inadequate to their purpose. Now that separation was the major issue, it could not excite any interest among the Muslims. Even for those outside the Muslim community who appreciated the grave problem posed by the Indian situation it brought no new message, either of hope or despondency. In short, it was out of date.

### Non-Muslim Reaction

It is reported that Sikandar sent a copy of his proposals to the Viceroy one week before they were released to the press, before Lord Linlithgow left Simla on his tour of Orissa. It seems that he had not sent copies officially to the Marquess of Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, or to other men at the India Office. But the pamphlet was dispatched to "certain friends in London who are likely to bring it to the notice generally of all those who are likely to be interested in the scheme".<sup>20</sup>

We do not know what Linlithgow thought of the scheme, or with what comments he forwarded it to the British government. We know, however, that the "friends in London", or at least those among them who recorded their opinion for the public, did not receive it with enthusiasm. A few words of mild approval marked the short review which appeared in an unimportant London journal.<sup>21</sup> In a much longer study Sir Louis Stuart, who was quite familiar with India, pointed to one of its chief failings. "The retention of the present form of provincial administration will create difficulties", he wrote. "In the first Zone non-Congress Bengal with a complete majority is to work with Congress Assam. In the seventh Zone the Congress NWFP will be in a minority against the non-Congress Punjab, and Sind. There will be further friction as between Provinces and States. In the fifth Zone the

Bombay Congress province will be controlled by States, as will be the Central Provinces and Berar in the sixth Zone. The United Provinces States may object to the control of the Congress Province in the third Zone as may Travancore to the control of the Madras Congress Province in the fourth Zone. Homogeneity will be obtained only in the second Zone.”<sup>22</sup>

Professor Sir Reginald Coupland, who wrote a most perceptive analysis of modern Indian politics, fully understood Sir Sikandar's insistence on a weak centre, and characterized it as “a striking illustration of the extent to which the prospect of a Congress Raj had undermined the conception of Indian unity”. He acknowledged that this kind of centre, which he called “Agency Centre”, was “a new constitutional idea”. But he doubted if even a centre of Sikandar's conception would be acceptable to the Muslims as creating complete security. “However ‘minimal’ the scope of the Centre's authority, would the Muslims in their present mood tolerate its exercise by so great a Hindu majority? Would they tolerate *any* Hindu majority in *any* Centre? In other words, was any form of federal union, however tenuous, now practicable, or must the knot be cut by sheer Partition?”<sup>23</sup>

It is true that this was written in 1945 or 1944, when the course of Muslim politics had become unmistakably clear and its objective firmly fixed at complete separation. There might have been an element of hindsight in this criticism of Sikandar's federal centre, but the different schemes appearing in 1939 showed that even then the prospect of a centre with a permanent Hindu majority was becoming a nightmare for the Muslims. Coupland put his finger on the one feature of the scheme which made it utterly unacceptable to them. Of what comfort could it be to the Muslims to possess a one-third share in the federal assembly when the entire machinery of government, legislative, executive, administrative, local and judicial, would be dominated by an unalterable Hindu majority?

The Congress leaders and the generality of Hindu observers saw nothing good in the scheme. The weak centre was not to their liking. The demarcation of zones earned their disapproval. The safeguards for the protection of minorities won only qualified support. The governmental machinery provided in the scheme was rejected: it was either unworkable in practice or merely a copy of the hateful 1935 Act. Sikandar was not complimented on his

efforts to save the unity of India or on his refusal to go over to the separationist Muslim camp. It is amusing to find some Hindu critics calling him a "Pakistani"; while the Muslims were puzzled at his failure to understand, or provide for the solution of, the Muslim problem.<sup>24</sup> He received the treatment reserved for those in politics who point to the middle way and to the follies of embracing the extremes. But practical politics are not the same thing as *philosophical speculation*; and in the *peculiar Indian* situation of that time it is very doubtful if the middle way could command the virtues of either practicability or acceptance.

The Indian press gave wide coverage to the scheme, devoting many columns to its description and editorial and other commentary. But notice is not approval. As the Simla correspondent of *The Times* reported: "The scheme has had a lukewarm reception. The attention it has attracted is traceable to respect felt for the man who inspired it rather than the merits of the project, which is generally regarded as impracticable."<sup>25</sup>

It is instructive to look at the reaction of some of the better-known Indian newspapers of different shades of thought, for it provides a faithful, though journalistic, picture of contemporary public opinion. Let me take two of the British-owned and British-edited English language newspapers to illustrate the views of this sector of the press. The *Times of India* of Bombay asked why Sikandar should have evolved a scheme which he knew had little chance of being seriously considered and almost none of being accepted. Disputing his premiss that the 1935 constitution was not acceptable to any major party in India, the paper believed that if "some concessions of detail" were offered the Princes would accept the federation, that the Congress was now "by no means eager" to oppose the federation, and that it was only the Muslim community whose antagonism was likely to be stubborn and which, therefore, would be most inclined to consider this alternative proposition. Was the new plan reasonable or workable? The regional arrangements implied in the creation of the zones were not likely to appeal to either states or provinces. Zonal assemblies would create the same suspicions as were earlier created by a fully federal centre. The zonal machinery would, in practice, if not in original purpose, threaten provincial autonomy. The Congress and the Princes would probably oppose the scheme. It would be interesting to see if it was officially adopted by the Muslim League.

Alarmed at the possibility of finding themselves a permanent opposition party at the centre, the Muslims "may understandably be attracted by a plan which insists on three Muslims in the federal cabinet and would appear to ensure, at least for some time, Government by a coalition ministry". Some critics saw a possible birth of Pakistan in the creation of the seventh zone in so far as, if the Muslims were dissatisfied with the working of federal government, the administrative nucleus would be already at hand upon which to build up a separate political unit. "Although we are reluctant to read so much into Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan's scheme, there is no doubt that until a more convincing explanation has been given of why it was produced at this late and critical time, controversy will continue to fasten on to the motives for its introduction rather than upon the intrinsic merits of the plan itself."

After having devoted one full column to rejecting the premisses on which the scheme was based and questioning the motives for its presentation at that particular time, the leader-writer finally condescended to examine the contents of the plan. By aggravating communal and regional divisions, it struck at the essential unity of India, "which is the ideal everyone should have in mind". It was merely the work of one man. On the other hand, the 1935 constitution was evolved by representatives of all communities and of British India, the native states and Great Britain; "its position as an agreed plan is therefore unassailable". The goal of a federal India outlined by Sikandar was "fundamentally sound and practicable"; his method of achieving the goal was neither.<sup>26</sup>

It would be criminal to let such ignorance pass without comment. To say in the middle of 1939 that the Princes were almost ready to join the federation, and that the Congress's rejection of the 1935 constitution was only a "show" in order to maintain its bargaining power, shows how grossly misinformed the leader-writer was. The possible connection between the setting up of a north-western zone and the ultimate creation of a Pakistan was bound to strike anyone who was aware of the different schemes then being propounded by the Muslims. No question of motives was involved in this: Sikandar was merely trying to present a compromise between the conventional federal solution and the Muslim demand for complete separation. The attempt might have been clumsy and inapt, but that was no reason to doubt his good

faith. The paper was perturbed by the timing of the scheme, and that was either ignorance or hypocrisy. This was the time when Muslims of different schools of thought were looking for a solution and the League was soliciting advice on possible alternatives to the 1935 federal arrangements. The writer of the editorial should have been aware of the other schemes in the field. If he was not, he was letting his ignorance suspect the motives of Sir Sikandar: an inexcusable practice. Nor did he explain how the plan aggravated communal divisions.

Obsessed, like all Englishmen, with the "essential unity of India", he prescribed it as the ideal that everyone should keep before himself. Repeating this advice might have been a motion which every upholder of British rule had to go through, but it turned a blind eye to a lot that was then going on around him in the country. To call the Sikandar scheme the work of one individual was correct. To call the 1935 constitution "an agreed plan" was not; for it was an Act made and enacted by the British Parliament without much regard for what had been talked of at the RTC. To say that the 1935 constitution was not unacceptable to the Congress was a palpable falsehood, for the party had officially pledged itself to "break it from within". As a whole the editorial was a typical example of the British habit of closing their eyes to all realities which were unpalatable, and opening them when it was just a little too late to do anything about them.

The *Civil and Military Gazette* of Lahore was more understanding and better informed, though it, too, rejected the scheme as practical politics. Sikandar's proposal demanded consideration for two reasons: the maker held "an eminent position in the Islamic world of India" and was the prime minister of the premier Muslim province in the sub-continent; it must, presumably, be a synthesis of the good points of all similar schemes which had gone before. The reasons given by Sikandar for the rejection of the 1935 constitution were sound, and his view that no imposed federation would work smoothly was correct. The paper was "fully in accord" with the suggestion that more powers should be delegated to the provinces by the centre.<sup>27</sup> It was also significant that Sikandar had "very carefully graduated the increase of influence of the States' peoples in the affairs of the zonal assemblies and the federal legislature". Time might well prove that the scheme "contains the seeds of that mutual confidence between States

and provinces which is essential to the success of any all-India federation and which is so conspicuous by its absence at present". The Congress would certainly reject the scheme because its plan is "definitely anti-national". It glorified the units and the zones at the expense of the federation. "It is on the rock of Congress opposition that Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan's plan will be reeked, but it may be that it will force the Congress to come into the open with some constructive plan as yet another alternative to the Act of 1935." It was obvious that the scheme's adoption would mean a large rewriting of the 1935 Act, and "the British Government would not venture to place it before Parliament save on the urgent representation of the Government of India that it had secured the unanimous support of all parties and interests in this country. In our view that is a forlorn hope; and for this reason, while we welcome the scheme as a constructive effort to solve many of the problems with which India is beset, we must relegate it to the sphere of academic discussion rather than of practical politics."<sup>28</sup>

The Hindu-cum-Congress press reacted with unreserved condemnation. Apart from criticism of details, the general approach was that it was an insidious attack on federation, that Sikandar was in reality playing Jinnah's game, and that it was a subtle attempt to create a Pakistan. The *Amrit Bazar Patrika* asked whether the almost simultaneous publication of the scheme and of Jinnah's statement on federation was a mere accident or part of a pre-arranged plan of attack on the federation. The *Hitavada* drew attention to the fact that Jinnah had left it to Sikandar to provide an alternative to a scheme (the 1935 federation) which the former had roundly condemned. "One is almost tempted to think", it wrote, "that the two almost simultaneous gestures of the Muslim league spokesmen can only be treated as a bargaining counter".

It was widely believed that Sikandar's object was to improve the position of the Muslims at the centre by a regrouping of the constituent units. This charge was levelled not only against Sikandar but also against Jinnah and all the leaders of the League who were expressing lack of faith in the principles of democracy and majority rule in their application to India. The *Tribune* of Lahore, for example, announced that if India was to have a democratic *swaraj* she must for ever shed her communalism. "The worst

thing about Sir Sikandar's scheme", it said, "is that it entirely ignores this sovereign truth and contains no provision for the development of a democratic nationhood in India. . . . The sole drift of his scheme is on the one hand to perpetuate communalism in British India and autocracy in the States and on the other to place in the hands of a party combining in itself the evils of communal obscurantism and princely autocracy and reactionaryism the supreme authority for the government of India." The *Amrit Bazar Patrika* saw the League as "out to convert the Hindu majority for all-India into a minority and raise the Muslims to the status of a privileged majority". In an angry comment that revealed the Congress mentality it said: "If anything is calculated to make the acceptance of the Federation scheme by a large body of Hindus or even by the Congress a possibility, it is the attitude of the Muslim communalists." In the same vein the *Sind Observer*, spokesman of the Hindus of Sind, considered the zonal legislatures of the Sikandar scheme as serving no other useful purpose than "that of introducing the Raj of the minorities", but did not explain how this would come about.

The most devastating condemnation came from the *Hindu*. It lamented that the operation of the scheme would prevent the emergence of a united India. It called it an obsession of Sikandar that the 1935 federal constitution did not provide for the protection of the minorities; on the contrary, it was so excessively solicitous for minority susceptibilities as to make democratic government impossible. It described the zonal legislatures as "a fifth wheel to the coach", and firmly believed that the creation of the zones would lead to the achievement of Pakistan. The country would be parcelled out into seven zones among whom there would be at least three dominated by the Muslims. "It would be obviously impossible to frame a reasonably satisfactory scheme under the influence of the strange political mathematics that would convert a majority into a minority"; and this was the main purpose towards which the scheme was directed.

Sikandar's overwhelming anxiety to establish a supreme position for the Muslims and the princes was underlined by several Hindu papers. The *Searchlight* thought that he had been more anxious to provide for the British power and for the minority and the princes than for the people and the country as a whole. The *Tribune* regretted that he had placed the Hindu community, which con-

stituted 68% of the population of India, into a position of subordination to the minorities and the princes. "If the persons claiming to represent 80 millions of people make a deliberate and unblushing attempt, in association with the Princes claiming to represent another 64 millions, to impose their political yoke upon the large majority of the people. . . is it any wonder if a few of the majority community should lose their heads and claim for the majority community the right to rule over the minorities?"<sup>29</sup>

The *Partap*, an Urdu Hindu paper of Lahore, asserted that Sikandar's aim was nothing but to strengthen the Muslim position, and to protect the rulers of the native states against any democratic demand or tendency from among their subjects. The *Milap*, another Hindu Urdu paper of Lahore, called it "another form of the Pakistan Scheme"; the only difference between these two was that while the Pakistan scheme was "like a crude carving knife which repelled India at the outset", the Sikandar scheme was like "a sharp and invisible sword which will cut India into several pieces, but the cutting will be painless".<sup>30</sup>

We have looked in some detail at the Hindu reaction not because the scheme deserved so much notice but because the attitude of the Hindu press was indicative of the way in which the Muslim problem was being viewed by Hindu public opinion. Any proposals aimed at ameliorating the Muslim condition were suspect in Hindu eyes. It would have been understandable if the Hindu press had turned its guns against a plan which contemplated a disintegration of India or the creation of a Muslim state in the sub-continent. But Sikandar had, as it were, gone out of his way to placate the Indian (Hindu) nationalists by retaining a federal framework for India and definitely rejecting a separation or secession of Muslim areas. He had, in fact, done this with so much emphasis that he had lost Muslim sympathy.

But the Hindus had a case. Sikandar's federation was a poor facade covering a strange mixture of federal, confederal, zonal, regional, provincial and other arrangements. He might have thought that this would make Muslim life easier; only time would have showed its efficacy. But he made sure that the Hindu provinces should be so cut up and their different portions attached to a number of native states in such a way that no Congressman or Indian nationalist would agree to read his scheme twice. Therefore, the Hindus had some justification for adopting such an attitude.

On 1 August, the *Star of India* said that it had not studied the scheme in detail "but at the first glance it appears to be a revolutionary scheme". One of its good points was that it planned to bring about "a greater cohesion between culturally contiguous tracks [*sic.*] and people in various parts of the country, although from a Muslim point of view, we have some misgivings as to its desirability". Sikandar should be congratulated on his "constructive effort". "We may not see eye to eye with some aspects of his scheme but, as we have said, there is something very substantial to build up between the Latif and Sikandar schemes although one is based on cultural zones and the other on regional zones."<sup>33</sup>

The *Ehsan* of Lahore deplored that there was no provision for the complete separation of Muslim India from Hindu India. "We are, however, of the opinion that Muslims should accept this scheme as an alternative to the Government of India Act."<sup>34</sup> The *Inqilab* believed that it could not effect any beneficial change in the condition of the Muslims. It failed completely to protect their rights. Therefore "Muslims cannot accept it".<sup>35</sup> The only thing that the *Eastern Times* of Lahore had to say was that "it has a value all its own".<sup>36</sup>

Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan supported the scheme in very lukewarm terms. Sikandar "occupies a unique position in Muslim India, and his authority, influence and prestige in his own community are undoubted". In expressing his views on provincial autonomy he had "interpreted the Muslim view-point with great lucidity and clarity". The scheme "should be examined with the greatest care and attention, coming as it does from a person who wields considerable influence in his community and holds a position of great responsibility". On Pakistan, Shafaat Ahmad was curt and dismissive: "Whatever sentimental regard one may have for the so-called Pakistan scheme, all experienced men must dismiss it as impracticable."<sup>37</sup>

Sikandar received strong condemnation from a Punjabi journalist. Ahmad Bashir was dismayed that his scheme did not allay the doubts and apprehensions of the Muslims. Judged "only from the Pakistanian point of view", it was entirely opposed to the cultural and economic interests of 30 million "Muslims of Pakistan". It struck at the root of the Pakistan National Movement. Coming to details, he asked Sikandar how he would serve the

agricultural interests of the Indus region by handing over the main activities of distribution of wealth and the modern means of economic development such as communications, coinage and currency to the centre. "So, there is every likelihood of the entire economic structure of Pakistan tottering to its fall." Pakistan would never be economically viable until it was completely separated from India; any link with the sub-continent would doom it to the position of "a mere serf of industrial India". "The Pakistanis cannot for ever remain ignorant of the heavy burden already imposed on them, or of the causes of the continued low prices of their produce and of the removal of markets from their reach; it is difficult to visualize how, when realization comes, India will be able to escape from the demand for secession."<sup>38</sup>

An enthusiastic member of the Punjab student community compared the Sikandar scheme with what he called the Mamdot plan and raised a number of objections against the former. Sikandar's north-west zone would actually increase the non-Muslim population percentage by 16. Among the seven regions to be created by the plan, there would not be even one where "the strength of the Muslim majority will be fully reflected". Sikandar had ignored the fact that the Muslims rejected the 1935 federal scheme not only to escape the excessive control of the centre but also to reduce the influence of the non-Muslims to a minimum in their own areas. If the subject of communications were handed over to the centre, this would reduce the importance of Karachi as a key port and the benefit accruing from it by the exclusive control of customs.<sup>39</sup>

Only one Bashir Ahmad came out in support of the scheme. But he prefaced his study with a statement on the two-nation theory which put him more on the "Pakistani" side than on the federal or confederal side. "It would be too much of a truism to say", he began, "that the Hindus and the Muslims, owing to their basically different cultures, have never been able to unite themselves into a single nation; and if we keep in view the realities of the present situation it is clear that the ideal of a common single nationality materializing in the future is an impossibility." The Sikandar scheme embodied the latest development of Muslim political thought, namely, a desire "to have at least two separate homelands for the Muslims, the one, Pakistan on the north-west, and other, what may be called Bengasam (Bengal plus Assam) on

the north-east". The scheme went a long way "to answer the aspirations of the Muslims, though it falls short of their ultimate goal of completely independent Pakistan and Bangasam, having no association with Hindustan at all".<sup>40</sup> This and the two previous comments testify to Rahmat Ali's influence.

A south Indian observer felt that the scheme lacked completeness, and the safeguards were not clearly formulated. "To my mind there is nothing like complete separate Federation for the Muslims wherein they can play their part in an efficient manner with treaty rights with the Hindus on the type of confederation. . . . The Muslims cannot realize their mission unless they form a separate State."<sup>41</sup>

F.K. Khan Durrani, writing later, expressed his dislike for a plan which "could not look beyond 'Dominion Status' which he [Sikandar] regarded as the highest stage of political development possible or even desirable for India", and which, by giving the Viceroy the authority to determine all controversies about the division of powers, put "the federating units effectively under the thumb of the Centre". Further, the structure proposed for the zones "would have the effect of diluting Muslim majorities in the North-West, without in any way affecting the power of the provinces of Hindu majority". His final verdict was that "the scheme offers no solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem".<sup>42</sup>

Muslim League spokesmen made no secret of their opposition from the day of its publication.<sup>43</sup> In a carefully-worded statement, whose diplomacy did not conceal disquiet of the mind, Malik Barkat Ali, a member of the AIML Working Committee and a leading lawyer of Lahore, tried to defend Sikandar against his Hindu critics without coming out in support of his scheme. He said that it required careful study. He was not prepared to commit himself on its merits at this stage. But he was unable to appreciate the outcry raised by Hindu communalists against it, as many of the facts bearing on Hindu-Muslim relations mentioned in the prefatory note by Sikandar were too substantial to be controverted. In one respect it was a definite improvement on the 1935 Act: it sought to put an effective curb on the power of the centre to interfere in provincial matters. But there were seamy sides, too. However, Sikandar deserved credit for having applied his mind to the wider question of federation, and his contribution, original as it was to a degree, should be carefully studied by all those who

were interested in the unity of India and the progress of its people.<sup>44</sup>

Whether this qualified disapproval (or approval!) was born of a natural hesitation to condemn a fellow-Punjabi and a personal friend who was doing so much for the Muslims in his province or was caused by genuine doubts about the scheme's merits, other League leaders shared neither the hesitation nor the doubts. Sayyid Ali Muhammad Rashdi of Sind, who was then secretary of the Muslim League Foreign Committee, at once issued a statement condemning the scheme and declaring its inability to solve the Muslim problem. As his Committee was engaged in collecting and examining the various proposals aiming at solving the problem, he ought to be quoted in full. "We have to bear in mind as to what were the basic considerations which actuated the Muslims to devise alternative schemes of reforms. They were that the opportunities of exploitation which the Hindu majority will have at the Centre should be minimized and the concurrent list of powers to legislate should be curtailed and these powers should be vested in the provincial legislatures; secondly, that the democratic constitution in the provinces should be so altered that the majorities do not oppress the minorities; and, lastly, that the two major 'nations' of India should have separate homelands of their own where they should develop and progress independently of others as the final solution of the Hindu-Muslim tension in India. Although it [the Sikandar scheme] foreshadows a distinct improvement on the present situation, I am afraid it does not satisfy any of these basic considerations. Under the Scheme the Centre would continue to be in the hands of the Hindu majority, and although efforts have been made to break the Hindu majority by bringing its position at par with the Muslim States, yet when there is anything involving a common interest of the Hindus the Muslim minority will not be able to escape a hostile verdict. The question of separate homelands being assigned to Muslims, which has now taken the shape of a definite Muslim demand, has not been solved in the scheme. The Muslim League will take no official cognizance of such a scheme in view of the fact that it is essentially at variance with its creed. Nor do I think that the Muslim League, constituted as it is today, can subscribe to many of the statements and views expressed by the author in the introductory chapter of his scheme."<sup>45</sup>

Thus statement was issued in the course of an interview given by Rashdi at Lahore on 31 July. On the following morning the press interviewed Ghulam Rasul Khan, secretary of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, and during this exchange Ghulam Rasul enumerated the defects of the scheme and used strong language laced with sarcasm in rejecting it. He said that he was particularly concerned with the lowering of the League's political ideals which envisaged the establishment in India of full independence, while the scheme proposed Dominion Status. This was a retrograde step. It ran counter to the creed of the AIML. It ill-suited Sikandar who was a "pillar of the All India Muslim League". Another objection was that the multiplication of legislatures which it proposed did not tend to solve any of the problems it had set out to discuss. The zonal legislatures without the executives were constitutional innovations, serving no useful purpose. They would neither allay the fears of the princes nor satisfy the provincial minorities in any way. They seemed to have been designed to promote a better combination between the capitalist and the aristocratic landed classes of the different units, and to thwart the democratic aspirations of the masses. The claim made that the proposals would entail very few changes in the 1935 Act was untenable. As a matter of fact, the Act would require complete re-writing if the proposals were to be embodied in it. He concluded with a taunt: "The different Muslim knights were producing new schemes at a rapid speed. It was strange that they had kept silent during the long and tortuous constitutional discussions of the Round Table Conference. Perhaps the object was to frighten the Congress into an acceptance of the original scheme."<sup>46</sup>

The Muslim League also found fault with Sikandar for his alleged "disloyalty" to the party. It was maintained that he was a member of the AIML Constitution Sub-Committee which was charged by the Working Committee with formulating a scheme as an alternative to the all-India federation suggested by the 1935 Act. But, instead of submitting his scheme to the Sub-Committee, Sikandar first got it published in an Indian newspaper and then got it issued in pamphlet form and circulated it among a large number of prominent Hindu, Muslim and British figures. All this was done without the Sub-Committee's permission, knowledge or information. That was not all. Without telling Jinnah or the Sub-Committee, he took his scheme to Gandhi and tried to

convince him of its rightness. But Gandhi spurned him contemptuously.<sup>47</sup>

More League criticism was contained in a collection of articles representing the party's opinions. It was pointed out that the scheme did not meet "the party's view-point", and was "ambiguous" as to the proper role of the centre. "If the Centre is merely to exercise the agency functions of the autonomous units, it should better be left to the discretion of the latter what matters of common interests they want to assign to it. Such a Centre cannot be entrusted with important problems like defence, foreign affairs and railways. It is just like asking Germany and Italy to have a co-ordination Committee for the protection of their common interests. The very fact that the Centre should not dominate over the units but be subject to their control obviates the necessity of having any Centre at all."<sup>48</sup>

Such downright and widespread condemnation by League leaders of a scheme prepared by a member of the AIML Working Committee is a matter of some significance. It shows that Sikandar had produced his proposals purely in his personal capacity, neither as a League leader nor as the prime minister of the Punjab. He must have made this clear to his colleagues in the League, otherwise the party, which had not yet taken an official stand on what should replace the 1935 Act, would certainly have expressed its displeasure in a formal statement reprimanding him and disowning his plan. No such step was taken.

Choudhry Khaliqzaman<sup>49</sup> has asserted that the AIML Working Committee rejected the Sikandar scheme in its meeting of 4 February 1940. This statement is surprising as Khaliqzaman was at this time in the centre of things. There is no record of any such decision in the official published proceedings of the Muslim League.<sup>50</sup> The AIML Council passed a resolution on 27-28 August 1939, saying that "the opinions and sentiments expressed by the Hon'ble Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan in his statement to the press on the 25th of August 1939 in no way represents the views of the Musalmans of India".<sup>51</sup> But as the Sikandar scheme was published on 30 July, this resolution could not have related to it. On the other hand, the Working Committee meeting of 3-4 February 1940 appointed a delegation, consisting of Fazlul Haq, Khawaja Nazimuddin, Sir Sikandar and Choudhry Khaliqzaman, which was to visit England "as soon as possible in order to put the

case of Muslim India before the British people, the Parliament and His Majesty's Government".<sup>52</sup> Here is clear proof that Sikandar continued to enjoy the fullest confidence of the League after having made his proposals.

But this does not mean that the scheme had the tacit approval of the League. The party did not take official notice of it, just as it took no notice of other schemes appearing at this time. Or, strictly speaking, we should say that the party had left the business of taking cognizance of these schemes to its Foreign Committee to which they were usually submitted by the authors. Instead of passing judgment on each plan as it came out, the League waited for the final report of the Committee. Nevertheless, the views expressed on the Sikandar scheme by men like Ali Muhammad Rashdi and Ghulam Rasul Khan are a pointer to the party's thinking at this time. Their criticism of the centre proposed by Sikandar and their references to separate Muslim homelands show how strongly the current flowed in the direction of separation, and how swiftly the idea of Pakistan was approaching the stage of a formal acceptance by the Muslim League.

A Punjabi, *Confederacy of India*, Lahore, 1939, Introduction, p. 10. My italics.

Mian Kafayet Ali's communication to me. I have added the emphasis.

"Covering Letter by Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan, Kt., M.L.A., Nawab of Mamdot, 2 July 1939"; my italics.

Among others, see Aziz Ahmad, "Remarques sur les origines du Pakistan", *Orient*, no. 26 (1963), who says that "Nawwab Shah Nawaz Khan Mamdot qui preconisait la division de l'Inde en cinq zones", p. 24.

*Confederacy of India*, Introduction, p. 16.

CMG, 29 June 1939. *The Islamic Culture* (M.A.C., "North-West India", October 1939, p. 500) also called it the "Mamdot Scheme".

These are taken from the *Confederacy of India*, pp. 10-15. Most of these were reproduced in the CMG report under the name of the Mamdot Scheme.

There is a map facing page 12 of the *Confederacy of India*, showing the "distribution of India on the basis of quinquepartite confederacy".

The Red Shirt or the Khudai Khidmatgar movement was a Pathan organization, which first functioned as a close ally of the Congress and later became a part of it in fact, but not in theory. For its history and programme see S. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin, 1926-1931*, Oxford, 1957, pp. 68-69; John Cumming (ed), *Political India, 1832-1932*, Oxford, 1932, pp. 243-246; W.C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis*, London, 1946, pp. 220-224; J.S. Bright, *Frontier and Its Gandhi*, Lahore, 1944; Abdul Qaiyum, *Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier*, Bombay, 1945, pp. 26-45; Muhammad Yunus, *Frontier Speaks*, Lahore, n.d. (a very full account); Muhammad Mujeeb, *The Indian Muslims*, London, 1967; Arthur Swinson, *North-West Frontier: People and Events, 1839-1947*, London, 1967; Pyarelal Nair, *A Pilgrimage for Peace*, Ahmedabad, 1950; D.C. Obhari, *The Evolution of the North-West Frontier Province*, Peshawar, 1938; S. Mitra, "Ghaffar Khan", in E.A. Brown (ed), *Eminent Indians*, Calcutta,

1946, pp. 91-100; and Yusuf Meherally, *Leaders of India*, Bombay, 5th ed 1944, pp. 45-50.

10. *CMG*, 16 July 1939.
11. See M.A.C., "North-West India", *Islamic Culture*, October 1939, p. 500.
12. Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi, *Khalifat-i-Pakistan* (in Urdu), Lahore, February 1970, pp. 25-26. The 1937 pamphlet is not available to me, nor the 1939 one. According to Dr. Ziaul Islam, a former president of the Punjab Muslim Students Federation, the scheme was written up by Niazi; his letter to me, dated 13 August 1970.
13. *CMG*, 16 July 1939, which also carries a map issued by the scheme-makers, showing the areas demanded for the new state, and its future flag. See also *TTI*, 18 July 1939, and *Islamic Culture*, October 1939, p. 500.
14. It "was published in the Indian press on the 30th of July 1939", *IAR 1939*, Vol. 1, p. 67.
15. Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Presidential Address, Bombay Muslim League Conference, Sholapur, *CMG*, 7 May 1939; also available in *IAR 1939*, Vol. I, pp. 378-381.
16. For Muslim League see *IAR 1939*, Vol. I, pp. 293-299; for the Congress, P. Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress, Vol. II, 1935-1947*, Bombay, 1947; in general, Shafaat Ahmad Khan, *The Indian Federation: An Exposition and Critical Review*, London, 1937, N. Gangulee, *The Making of Federal India*, London, n.d., and G.N. Joshi, *The New Constitution of India*, London, 1937, 2nd ed 1940.
17. For the Punjab Unionist Party see A.B. Rajput, *Punjab Crisis and Cure*, Lahore, 1947, pp. 13-39; Humayun Kabir, *Muslim Politics in India, 1906-1942*, Calcutta, 3rd ed 1944; Sajjad Zaheer, *Light on League-Unionist Conflict*, Bombay, July 1944, pp. 3-9, 29-35; and above all Azim Husain, *Fazli Husain: A Political Biography*, Bombay, 1946. The party still awaits an historian; a fascinating subject long ignored.
18. Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, *Outlines of a Scheme of Indian Federation*, Lahore, 1939.
19. The reader who wants an exposition of the scheme by the author himself will find it in Sikandar Hayat's speech deliver-

- ed in the Punjab Legislative Assembly on 11 March 1941, see *Official Report of the Proceedings of the Punjab Legislative Assembly*, Vol. XVI, No. 8.
20. Report in *CMG*, 1 August 1939.
  21. See L.F. Rushbrook Williams, "Alternative Federal Schemes", *Great Britain and the East*, 17 August 1939, p. 181.
  22. Louis Stuart, "An Alternative Scheme", *Indian Empire Review*, November 1939, pp. 425-432.
  23. Reginald Coupland, *India: A Re-Statement*, London, 1945, pp. 190-191. Italics in the original.
  24. For Hindu (and Congress) criticism, or rather condemnation, see Gulshan Rai, "Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan's Scheme", *CMG*, 3 August 1939; A Hindu Correspondent, "Sir Sikandar's Scheme of Federation", *ibid.*, 4 August 1939; a general report on initial Hindu and Congress reaction, *ibid.*, 14 July 1939; Rajendra Prasad, *Pakistan*, Bombay and Calcutta, 1940, pp. 51-57, and his *India Divided*, Bombay, 2nd ed June 1947, p. 199; K.T. Shah, *Why Pakistan and Why Not*, Bombay, n.d., pp. 180-183; and Gulshan Rai, "Punjab Premier's Pakistan", *CMG*, 27 March 1941. For the "nationalist" Muslim viewpoint see Rezaul Karim, *Pakistan Examined*, Calcutta, 1941, pp. 24-27.
  25. Simla Correspondent's dispatch, *The Times*, 2 August 1939.
  26. *TTI*, editorial, 31 July 1939.
  27. *CMG*, editorial, 6 July 1939.
  28. *Ibid.*, editorial, 30 July 1939.
  29. This account of Hindu editorial comments is based on Candidus, "Indian Political Notes: Reactions to Punjab Premier's Scheme", *TTI*, 9 August 1939.
  30. Both quoted in *CMG*, 2 August 1939.
  31. Cf. a recent comment. It "was anything but the model of a democratic constitution. It retained much power in the hands of the viceroy, who would head the executive and serve also as an arbiter among the various communities in India" (Craig Baxter, "Union or Partition: Some Aspects of Politics in the Punjab, 1936-45", in Ziring, Braibanti and Wriggins (eds), *Pakistan: The Long View*, Durham, N.C., 1977, p. 50).
  32. Candidus, *op. cit.*
  33. *TSI*, editorial, 1 August 1939.

34. Reported in *CMG*, 2 August 1939.
35. *Inqilab*, editorial, 13 August 1939, quoted in Ashiq Husain Batalawi, *Hamari Qawmi Jidd-o-Jehlad: from Janwari 1939 to Dasamber 1939*, Lahore, n.d., p. 162.
36. *TET*, editorial, 4 August 1939.
37. Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan, statement to the press, Simla, 10 July 1939, *CMG*, 11 July 1939; also carried by *TMM*, 11 July 1939.
38. Ahmad Bashir, "Sir Sikandar Hayat's Scheme", *CMG*, 5 August 1939.
39. A.S. Khurshid, letter, *ibid.*, 10 August 1939.
40. Bashir Ahmad, "Sir Sikandar's Federal Scheme", *ibid.*, 27 August 1939.
41. Syed Nazir Ahmad, "80 Million Indian Muslims are a Nation by Themselves", *TSI*, 1 September 1939.
42. F.K. Khan Durrani, *The Meaning of Pakistan*, Lahore, March 1944, rcp March 1946, p. 125.
43. For a set of questions raised against the scheme (and the Latif and Punjabi schemes) see Tajuddin Pir, letter, *CMG*, 21 July 1939.
44. Malik Barkat Ali, statement to the press, 1 August 1939, *ibid.*, 2 August 1939.
45. Sayyid Ali Muhammad Rashdi, special interview, Lahore, 31 July 1939, *ibid.*, 1 August 1939; a summary of it was carried by *TSI*, 4 and 10 August 1939.
46. Ghulam Rasul Khan, interview, Lahore, 1 August 1939, *CMG*, 2 August 1939; see also *TSI*, 10 August 1939.
47. See Ashiq Husain Batalawi, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-156; this is confirmed by a letter from Sardar Patel to Jawaharlal Nehru, see Jawaharlal Nehru, *A Bunch of Old Letters*, Bombay, 1958, 2nd ed 1960, p. 377. It was reported that Ashiq Batalawi had planned to introduce a motion of censure in the autumn 1939 meeting of the AIML Council against Sikandar for circulating his scheme which was "contrary to the declared policy of the League", see *CMG*, editorial, 11 August 1939.
48. M.R.T., *Pakistan and Muslim India*, Bombay, 2nd ed 1946, p. 62.
49. Choudhry Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Lahore, 1961, p. 234.

50. See *Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from December 1938 to March 1940*, Delhi, n.d., Text of Resolutions of the meeting of the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League held at Gul-i-Rana, Hardinge Avenue, New Delhi, on the 3rd and 4th of February 1940 under the Presidentship of Mr. M.A. Jinnah, pp. 33-35. None of the eleven resolutions passed contains any reference to the Sikandar Scheme.
51. *Ibid.*, Text of Resolutions passed at the meeting of the Council of the All India Muslim League held at Delhi on the 27th and 28th of August 1939 under the Presidentship of Mr. M.A. Jinnah, Resolution no. 9, p. 20.
52. *Ibid.*, Text of Resolutions of the meeting of the Working Committee. . . held on the 3rd and 4th of February 1940 . . . , Resolution no. 6, p. 34.

# 12

## THE END OF THE TETHER: 1939-1940

### The Climate of Opinion: August - December 1939

The leading article in the *Star of India* of 25 August declared that "the concensus of Muslim opinion is that in the complete cultural and political, if not zonal, separation between the Hindus and Muslims lies the only hope of peace in India". After dilating on the cultural differences, it proclaimed that "a division into separate entities for political purposes is the natural step, the only step. . . . Therefore Muslim India rejects Federation and will no longer tolerate Democracy. Hindus and Muslims must part company and dwell apart. Only then can they be friends. Hindu India and Muslim India must divide to unit."<sup>1</sup> This was the first time that the paper had opted for a clear division. The cue was now taken by others, and we find a number of people in India and Britain pointing towards the impending separation.

"We are going to unite and have a home for ourselves where we can live an honourable life", wrote one Anwar Bakhsu from Jullundhur at the end of August.<sup>2</sup> A Punjabi Muslim declared that "the Muslims throughout India represent no doubt a single religious, cultural and social entity. They may even be called a single nation".<sup>3</sup> The *Round Table* was now convinced that the Muslims sought a different kind of federation. They "wish to link all the Muslim areas into a federation and associate them with some sort of central government in a way that has never been clearly explained".<sup>4</sup>

The Hindus continued to offer opportunities to the Muslims to justify their fear of Hindu rule and their determination to separate. In the Central Provinces Legislative Assembly J.J. Kedar claimed that constitutionally the majority community alone had the right of framing a constitution, and that if a minority comm-

unity carried its patriotism beyond India it had no *locus standi* in formulating the constitution of the country.<sup>5</sup> As if in answer to this challenge the *Star of India* thundered: "We, speaking for the Muslims of India, emphatically state today that there can be no question of India's political advance within or outside the British Empire without a settlement of the communal question."<sup>6</sup> The *Civil and Military Gazette* put the same thing in softer accents: 'Until the Congress has abandoned its extravagant claims to speak for the whole of India and to mould single-handedly the destiny of the country in the future, there will not be found either a solution of the problem of the Muslims and the minorities or an atmosphere favourable for India's advance towards its goal of Dominion Status.'<sup>7</sup> The analysis of *The Times* was not very different. Congress policy had consolidated the Muslims in opposition to the Hindus, and "the scheme which Muslims have propounded for creating a Pakistan of their own has been given a fillip out of all proportion to its value". Muslim leaders now asserted that their community was a nation 'directly affiliated with their Moslem brethren from Delhi to Istanbul'. "To ensure a contented Moslem community the Congress Party must come to terms with the Muslim League."<sup>8</sup>

When Gandhi wrote in the *Harijan* that the Indian Muslims were not a separate nation but a part of a composite Indian nation, and strongly deprecated their ideal of their own free and sovereign states, a group of Aligarh dons gave him the Muslim reply. "We want to assure Mr. Gandhi and our Hindu brethren that the ideal of having free sovereign Muslim states in India, which now inspires a very large number of Muslims, is not actuated by a spirit of hatred or revenge. It is initiated by an earnest desire of solving the Hindu-Muslim problem on an equitable basis and epitomizes the natural desire of the Muslims of India to determine their future independently in the light of their own culture and history . . . . The political experience of the last fifty years, more especially of the last two years, has strengthened the faith of the Muslim in the above ideal which is now their paramount national resolve. Neither the fear of the British bayonets nor the prospects of a bloody civil war can discourage them in their will to achieve free Muslim states in those parts of India where they are in majority."<sup>9</sup>

The *Round Table* returned to the question in December. "There is indeed", it wrote, "a tendency for Muslims to exercise a right

to veto any constitution that may be devised. While Congress still aims at a unified India, which will associate British India with the Indian States, the Muslims are moving more and more towards separation and the creation of a Muslim Ulster in the country as a means of protecting Muslim interests and culture. It is clear that the Congress will have to do something to meet the Muslim case, otherwise the vision of a unified India will evaporate."<sup>10</sup>

When Sir Stafford Cripps came to India in the same month, his exploration of Indian opinion and sentiment showed him that "there were great difficulties in the way of such a constitutional advance as Congress wished". Though he was certain that an attempt should be made to bring the Congress and the League into co-operation, current communal rioting and his talks with Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan "had led him towards the idea that some separation of Hindu and Muslim dominions might be necessary".<sup>11</sup> On his return he expressed the belief that partition would be "a necessary part of a new Indian constitution".<sup>12</sup>

At the same time, the Pirpur Committee, which had been appointed to inquire into Muslim grievances in Congress-ruled provinces during 1937-39, spelt out the Muslim fear of Hindu rule in these words: "The Indian National Congress conception of nationalism is based on the establishment of a national state of the majority community in which other nationalities and communities have only secondary rights. The Muslims think that no tyranny can be as great as the tyranny of the majority and they believe that only that state can be stable which gives equal rights and equal opportunities to all communities no matter how small. They attach great importance to this principle, which alone can safeguard the rights of the Muslims and other minorities."<sup>13</sup>

It is clear that by late 1939 "people who had earlier laughed at the first suggestions for some kind of Pakistan were now earnest proponents of the idea".<sup>14</sup> This is the estimate of T.G.P. Spear, the Cambridge historian. Other contemporary British observers of the Indian scene have recorded similar impressions.<sup>15</sup>

### **The Faqir of Ipi (August 1939)**

We can now turn our attention to the rest of the schemes presented in 1939, and thus complete our survey of the idea of Pakistan up to the time of the passage of the Lahore Resolution

in March 1940.

In the month of August the NWFP made its third contribution to Muslim scheme-making. Unfortunately, the information available is so scanty that nothing can be said about it beyond what appeared in a brief news-item in a Lahore English daily.

Sayyid Ali Muhammad Rashdi had been touring the frontier on the instructions of the League to study the repercussions of Gandhi's recent visit to that area in so far as they related to the trans-border tribes. On his return to Lahore he told a representative of the *Civil and Military Gazette* that "the Faqir of Ipi has organized a network of jirgas within the tribal area in order to be able to enforce more effectively on an organized basis his scheme for the constitution of a Muslim State in North India".<sup>16</sup> No more details are given, and I have not come across another reference to an Ipi scheme elsewhere.

It may be that Ipi was in touch with Abdul Wadud and was organizing the *jirgas* in support of the plan launched by the latter a little earlier. It is also possible that Ipi's efforts were directed towards creating among the border tribes a sympathy for the idea of a separate Muslim state in the north which, according to most people, was soon bound to become the proclaimed objective of the Muslims. Or, it may be that he was really working for the establishment of an independent Pathan state, which had nothing to do with any Pakistan plan; for this is what he tried to do after 1947 with the blessings of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Afghanistan and the support of India.<sup>17</sup> No definite or even plausible conclusions can be drawn from the little we know about Ipi's programme as described by Rashdi.

### The Aligarh Scheme (August 1939)

On the 15th of August 1939 (exactly eight years before the creation of Pakistan) the last major scheme appeared from Aligarh. Prepared by two dons of the Muslim University of Aligarh, Professor Sayyid Zafrul Hasan and Dr. Muhammad Afzaal Husain Qadri, and published by the university press, it has always been known as the Aligarh scheme.

At the outset the authors laid down five principles on which their plan was based and on which, they said, every Indian Muslim "must insist persistently and strenuously".<sup>18</sup> The first was that the

Muslims of India were a nation by themselves. "They have a distinct national entity wholly different from the Hindus and other non-Muslim groups." The second stated that they "have got a separate national future and their own contribution to make to the betterment of the world". The third said that their future "lies in complete freedom from the domination of the Hindus, the British" and of "any other people". The fourth stipulated that the Muslim majority provinces could not be permitted "to be enslaved into a single all-India Federation with an overwhelming Hindu majority in the Centre". The fifth laid down that the Muslims living in Hindu provinces "shall not be allowed to be deprived of their separate religious, culture and political identity, and that they shall be given full and effective support by the Muslim majority Provinces".

A practical application of these principles could produce only one result. partition. The Muslim nation in India could only be saved by a "repartition" of the country carried out on the "only fundamental and valid principle", viz., nationality. This meant a division of India into a Muslim India and a Hindu India. As such a division would split the Muslim nation, it logically followed that the interests of "our nationals living in Hindu India" must be properly safeguarded.

To attain these ends the authors suggested a division of British India into three "wholly independent and sovereign states". The first they called North-West India, and it was to cover the Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan. The second called Bengal was to consist of the presidency of Bengal (excluding the south-western districts of Howrah and Midnapore and the north-western district of Darjeeling), the Purnea district of Bihar, and the Sylhet division of Assam. The third was Hindustan, comprising the rest of British India.

In order to afford as much protection as possible to the Muslims left behind in Hindustan two suggestions were offered. First, two new autonomous provinces were to be created in Hindustan: Delhi province, including Delhi, Meerut division, Rohilkhand division, and the district of Aligarh of the Agra division; and Malabar province, consisting of Malabar and the adjoining areas on the Malabar coast. Secondly, "all the towns of India with a population of 50,000 or more shall have the status of a borough or free city".

ituations arising from a partition of British India, and provinces or both. The states lying inside the boundaries of any of the three proposed States or exclusively on the frontier of one of them would be attached to that State. Those bordering on more than one of these States would have the option of joining any one of the adjoining States. But one exception was to be made to these arrangements. Hyderabad was to be a sovereign state with its old dominions of Berar and Karantac restored to it.

The North-West Muslim State was rather vaguely given the name of "Pakistan"—"with the inclusion of Kashmir it may well be called 'Pakistan' as it has been for some years past". (The inclusion of Kashmir, the "k" of Pakistan, was to take place on the above-prescribed principle that any native state situated "exclusively on the frontier" of one of the three proposed States shall be attached to that State). This "Pakistan Federation" would include a large number of native states in addition to Kashmir, e.g., Kalat, Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Patiala, Jindh, Nabha, Kapurthala, Malerkotla, Faridkot and the Simla Hill States. Thus constituted, it would contain about 25 million Muslims, i.e., more than 60% of the total population of the area. "Pakistan will form the north-western wing of Muslim India." The Hindu and Sikh minorities of Pakistan would have the same cultural, religious and political safeguards granted to them as the Muslim minorities would have in Hindustan.

Bengal would also be a Muslim State, containing more than 30 million Muslims, i.e., 57% of the whole population of the area. As it would have no component provinces, it would not be a federation. It would constitute "the eastern wing of Muslim India".

Hindustan would be a Hindu State, with a population of 245 million. It would include about 23 million Muslims, i.e., a minority of about 10%. The protection of this minority would, as was indicated above, take two forms. They would enjoy all necessary safeguards. But, more important, the creation of two new provinces in Hindustan would bring them much benefit. In the Delhi province there would be more than 3.5 million Muslims. This would make them a minority of only 28%, but three factors would strengthen their position. Their number would not be so small that the Hindu majority could sweep them aside. They would be highly cultured and educated with the Aligarh university as their promi-

ment educational centre and intellectual fount. Geographically their province would lie close to Pakistan, a situation which should give them much moral support and satisfaction. The Malabar province would have a Muslim population of 27%. Their numerical strength, their large trading interests, their eminent cultural position, and the virility of their race should count in favour of self-reliance and confidence.

That still left millions of Muslims living in Hindustani towns and villages. Could anything be done to improve their lot as a scattered minority? Most of them were to be found in cities and large towns. "All that can be done for them at present is to eliminate the undue interference of the Provincial and Central Hindu Governments." This could be done by giving the status of free cities or boroughs to large towns of a population of 50,000 or more. These towns would have their own police and magistracy, and they might be given wide powers of legislation and execution on local matters. This arrangement would protect the interests of about 1.25 million Muslims of Hindustan.

In the rural areas of Hindustan the problem would have to be tackled in a different way. The Muslims living in villages would have to be "induced to aggregate in villages with a preponderant Muslim population". This was the only way to stop them from continuing to be negligible minorities, and to protect their cultural and economic interests.

The three States of Pakistan, Bengal and Hindustan would enter into a "defensive and offensive alliance", which would contain five stipulations. First, all the three States would recognize each other on a basis of reciprocity. Secondly, Pakistan and Bengal would be recognized as the homeland of the Muslims and Hindustan as the homeland of the Hindus. Each nation could migrate to its own homeland if and when it desired. Thirdly, "in Hindustan the Muslims are to be recognized as a nation in minority and part of a larger nation inhabiting Pakistan and Bengal". Fourthly, the Muslim minority in Hindustan and the non-Muslim minority in Pakistan and Bengal would have representation according to population and under a system of separate electorates, together with effective religious, cultural and political safeguards guaranteed by all the three States. Other "considerable" minorities, like the Sikhs and the untouchables, might be given separate representation in proportion to population. Finally, "an accredited Muslim

political organization will be the sole official representative body of the Muslims in Hindustan”.

Further, the three States would have separate treaties of alliance with Great Britain and, if need be, separate Crown Representatives. A Joint Court of Arbitration would be set up to settle disputes that might arise among the three States or between them and the Crown.

The scheme concluded with some arguments in favour of the sovereignty of Hyderabad. It was a special ally of the British Government. Its ruler enjoyed exceptional powers and titles. “In truth it is a sovereign state by treaties”. By the restoration of Karnatic, Hyderabad would get a sea coast and a port. “Now when the British are giving the control of India to its rightful owners, they must return to Hyderabad its territories, and recognize Hyderabad expressly as a sovereign state, at least as sovereign as Nepal.” Hyderabad would become the southern wing of Muslim India.

Here we have quite a different picture from Latif's. In fact, the Aligarh dons went further than even the later Lahore Resolution. The influence of Rahmat Ali is clearly indicated in the general trend of the scheme. Let us once again go over the major provisions of the plan and see what we can make of them in the light of contemporary developments and earlier suggestions made by other people.

The five principles on which the scheme stands break new ground and reflect the League thinking more closely than any other proposal made during this period. This is the second proposal after Rahmat Ali's (the first was Punjabi's) to be based on the two-nation theory. In doing so it actually forestalls the League, for the League had yet not started expounding a separate nationhood for the Indian Muslims, though some of its leaders, particularly Jinnah, had just begun to make statements to this effect. The assertion that the Muslims of India had “a separate national future” flowed from the prior claim that they were a separate nation, and prepared ground for the demand for complete political separation. This separate national future was then defined as complete freedom from the domination of the Hindus, the British and any other power. Such freedom was impossible in an all-India federation, where a Hindu-dominated centre would have nullified provincial autonomy. So far the argument concerned the Muslim provinces,

for whom alone it was relevant in practical terms. But the scheme was equally anxious to protect the interests of the Muslims of Hindu provinces, who would not be in a position to share the sovereignty claimed by other Muslims. It will be noticed that a good part of the scheme is devoted to the problem of the future of these Muslims of Hindustan. It is to be remembered that the authors of the scheme belonged to the United Provinces, a Muslim-minority province, and their deep interest in the question is therefore understandable.

The outcome of all these assertions is the demand for a partition of India on the principle of nationality. The details of the proposed partition are significant in so far as they differ from what the League was going to demand in the following year. The Aligarh scheme, unlike Rahmat Ali's proposal and the Lahore Resolution, accepts a division of Bengal on religious lines and adds to the Muslim part one district from Bihar. Similarly, it does not lay claim to the whole of Assam, but only to one administrative division (Sylhet) of it. The suggestion for the creation of two new provinces (Delhi and Malabar) in Hindu India is a novel one; probably an inspiration from Rahmat Ali's proposal for the establishment of a number of "national homes" for the Muslims of the minority areas. The provision made for solving the problem of native states sounds quite reasonable; it will be recalled that this principle was later made a part of the June 1947 partition plan, though its equitable application and operation were vitiated by Mountbatten's partisan initiative and India's actions in Junagadh, Kashmir and Hyderabad.

As for the two Muslim States demarcated by the scheme, their boundaries follow neither those of the Lahore Resolution (which did not specifically provide for a division of Bengal or the Punjab) nor those of the actual division of 1947. But what is of greater importance is the Muslim strength in these States. In Pakistan it was to be only 60%, and in Bengal only 57%. This is the point where the criticism of Latif's scheme appears relevant and valid: that a large Pakistan would contain so many non-Muslims that it could hardly be called a Muslim state.

On Hyderabad the scheme follows Rahmat Ali and Latif in demanding a sovereign status for it, and in discarding democracy or nationalism as a basis for the claim. The arguments advanced are, however, different. No mention at all is made of its alleged

cultural importance for the Muslims of India, or of the historical background which was supposed to make it a part of the Muslim "tradition" on the sub-continent: points which had first been made by Rahmat Ali. Nor do the authors base their claim on the ground that the creation of a sovereign Hyderabad was the only way to save and protect the Muslims of south India: the main argument propounded by Latif. However, irrespective of the details of the case, the fact that everyone was looking forward to an independent Muslim Hyderabad in the south bears out the general Muslim attachment to the Nizam's dominions and the general Muslim concern with their future. That also explains why in 1948 the government of independent India was so anxious to break the Nizam and to incorporate his state into India by the force of arms, and why this action evoked so much resentment and bitterness in Pakistan.

The least defensible part of the Aligarh scheme is that which deals with the future of the Muslims left in Hindustan. Practically every step recommended for their protection militates against the sovereignty of Hindustan. The government of Hindustan is asked to do a number of things which it may or may not like to do. The creation of Delhi and Malabar provinces is stipulated as if Pakistan and Bengal would have the right or the power to influence the making of the constitution of Hindustan. The provision for granting the status of free cities or boroughs to all large towns is as one-sided as it is constitutionally outrageous and administratively undesirable. In any case, this innovation would have been of no use to the Muslims at all: there were few cities in which they were in a majority, and where they could have profited by this concession. It is difficult to see how the widest possible local autonomy given to cities like Bombay and Madras could have brought any protection or comfort to their small Muslim populations. Similarly, the Aligarh recommendation for the bringing together in large villages of the scattered rural Muslim population of Hindustan would have involved considerable uprooting and migration, and even if effected could not have made much difference to those in whose interest it was prescribed.

But the most serious weakness of these efforts to protect the Muslims of Hindustan is their one-sidedness. All these responsibilities were put upon Hindustan, without any reciprocal obligations on the part of the Muslim States. If the Muslim minority of

Hindustan, a mere 10% of the total population, was in need of so many far-reaching provisions, it was only reasonable to expect that Hindustan would also be interested in the vastly larger non-Muslim minorities living in Pakistan and Bengal.

There is still the further problem of how the government of Hindustan was to be persuaded or compelled to carry out these recommendations. Once the partition of India had been effected and the sovereign states established, who was to guarantee that the sovereign state of Hindustan would do such and such a thing to please the people of Pakistan and Bengal? Even if some outside authority could be discovered and then persuaded to provide this surety, what power and sanction would it possess to get its will translated into action? Even if an agreement to take these steps was to be made a part of the general settlement at the time of partition (a remote assumption), the question of guarantees would still remain. It is one of the essential attributes of sovereignty that a state has the authority to repudiate any agreements made or guarantees given. Once sovereignty has been achieved, power politics take over and promises of goodwill and written undertakings lose their validity unless the other state is big or strong enough to force compliance with superior armed resources. This is a fact of political life which the makers of the scheme should well have kept in mind.

The final part of the scheme contains more elements of unreality. The three States were to enter into "a defensive and offensive alliance" on certain bases. What happened to Hyderabad here, for it does not figure in the alliance? What is an "offensive" alliance? Under the alliance Pakistan and Bengal were to be recognized as the "homeland" of the Muslims. Why homeland in the singular? There is no indication in the scheme that Pakistan and Bengal were to unite in a federal or some other arrangement; then, how can two independent, sovereign and distant states be called *one* homeland of a nation? Further, in Hindustan the Muslims are to be recognized as "a nation in minority and part of a larger nation inhabiting Pakistan and Bengal". It is difficult to find any sense or meaning in this proviso. Why should Hindustan agree to such a recognition? And even if it does, what responsibilities and obligations does that incur? In any case, what is "a nation in minority"? And, once again, no corresponding duty is placed upon Pakistan and Bengal to recognize their Hindu population as "a nation in minority"

and part of a larger nation inhabiting Hindustan.

The last provision of the alliance is impossible to defend on any principle, not even one of unashamed selfishness. According to it, "an accredited Muslim political organization will be the sole official representative body of the Muslims in Hindustan". Not only constitutional but even political decisions are to be imposed upon Hindustan. The provision has a topical background: the Muslim League's insistence that the Congress should recognize it as the only authoritative and representative Muslim organization in India. But how this insistence could be carried over to a sovereign Hindustan is a point which the authors of the provision do not care to explain. Nor do they stipulate a reciprocal status for the Indian National Congress in Pakistan and Bengal. Further, such a provision assumes that for all times to come the Muslims of Hindustan would consent to be organized in one political party. Conditions might change, new political creeds might attract them, their own interests might demand alliance or merger with other bodies—but they must always continue to be members of one party because the alliance said so. What moral authority Pakistan and Bengal had to determine the political will of the Muslims of Hindustan in the times to come is not explained. Such foolish ideas make one doubt the sincerity of the makers of the scheme. Did they really believe that a partition on their conditions would be possible?

Again and again we find the impress of Rahmat Ali's ideas on the scheme; though it must be pointed out that the irrational and wanton methods employed to protect the Muslims of Hindustan owe little to the Cambridge movement. Among the major points where Rahmat Ali's influence is evident are: the declaration that Indian Muslims are a separate nation; the demand for a clear partition of India on the principle of nationality; the creation of certain new provinces in Hindustan for the comfort and protection of the Muslims of that country; and the establishment of a sovereign Hyderabad in the south.

The authors of the Aligarh scheme accept the name of "Pakistan" for their Muslim State in the north-west. but surprisingly they do not do so in a definite and straightforward way: "it may well be called 'Pakistan' as it has been for some years past". Here was an unmistakable borrowing from a single individual whose authorship of the name was uncontested. Yet the adoption

of the name is suggested in the form of a mild recommendation; it is not laid down finally and firmly. At the same time they do not accept Rahmat Ali's designation for Bengal. Instead of calling it Bangistan or Bang-i-Islam after him, they retain the traditional name, though the state they propose was to cover only a part of the presidency and was to include some areas from Assam and Bihar.

The influence of Rahmat Ali is easy to explain. One of the authors of the scheme, Afzaal Husain Qadri, was a member of Rahmat Ali's Pakistan National Movement, and since his return from England to India in 1938 he had been working as a lieutenant of Rahmat Ali among Indian Muslims. It seems that he tried to incorporate into the Aligarh scheme as many of the ideas of his mentor as he could, but as he was not the sole author he could not make the plan as fully reflective of his own views as he would have liked. He was conscious of this and wrote to Rahmat Ali on 8 March 1940: "in the interests of truth and for welfare of 'Iman', and with a view to removing any possibility of misapprehension, I deemed it imperative to place these few lines before you in such a manner that nobody, neither now nor in the future, could think that the issuance or the publication of the pamphlet was, in any way, done by me in my personal capacity or that I was responsible for evolving its contents".<sup>19</sup>

This repudiation is astonishing, not only in its disingenuity but also in its completeness and firmness. The Aligarh scheme was not prepared by the Aligarh University, or by any other institution or organization. It was the joint work of two teachers who signed and published it in their names. Therefore, Qadri's denial that he did this in his personal capacity is as puzzling as his assertion that he was not responsible for its contents. These repudiations are difficult to sustain, because they do not fit in with the confessed authorship of the scheme, and also because they were made in a private letter which came to be published by chance three years later. Qadri was working as a representative of the PNM in India. He had issued a scheme under his name which borrowed several features of Rahmat Ali's plan and used the word Pakistan for the Muslim state in the north-west. He did all this without Rahmat Ali's knowledge or consent. When Rahmat Ali read the pamphlet and protested to Qadri and demanded an explanation for this act of disloyalty to the Movement of which he was an accredited

spokesman in India, Qadri replied by repudiating his role in the making of the scheme. Even this repudiation was not honest, for till his death he took credit for having proposed the creation of Pakistan in his 1939 scheme.

The significance of the Aligarh scheme lies in the nature of its recommendations and its influence on the shaping of the Lahore Resolution. It was the only important proposal made at this time which stood for a partition of India without any links between the Muslim states and Hindu India, and based the proposal on the simple but yet not generally accepted proposition that Indian Muslims were a separate nation.<sup>20</sup>

### Ranjee G. Shahani (1939)

By August or September 1939 Muslim planners of the future of India had apparently reached the end of their tether. No more detailed schemes appeared after this date. Everyone now sat back and waited for the League to choose from the feast spread before it, and to make up its mind on what it was going to adopt as its final and agreed objective. However, this silence was broken by a few rather muted voices, which should be noticed in passing.

Sometime in 1939 Ranjee G. Shahani, a Hindu journalist, suggested in passing that "regionalism" was the only solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem of India. It would not destroy the unity of the country and would at the same time minimize Muslim fears of a Hindu-dominated and Hindu-controlled supreme government of India. But he offered no details and made no concrete proposals.<sup>21</sup>

As he was visiting India after an interval of many years the impact of her new politics on him is revealing. He realized the extent to which the unity of India was being put in jeopardy by Congress insistence on a strong central government, and the Muslim anxiety to escape such permanent domination of one community. His suggestion of regionalism indicates his awareness of the gravity of the problem. As his book was published in London in 1939, it is reasonable to suppose that it was written in 1938 or, at the latest, in early 1939. This is significant because it means that his regional solution was proposed before the various Muslim schemes of 1939 were made public or even put together.

## The Climate of Opinion: January-March 1940

The general contours of the Muslim problem during the first three months of 1940 were not very different from those of the earlier period. There was the same general talk about Muslim fear of Hindu rule, the same occasional references to the possibility of separation, and the same Hindu refusal to assure the Muslims that their apprehensions were unfounded.

On 9 January, the *Civil and Military Gazette* wrote: "After all the basic influence at work in Indian politics today is the deep-rooted suspicion of the Muslims (as of other minorities). . . as to what the Congress, with its overwhelming Hindu membership and its Socialist tendencies, would do with any constitution which they were enabled to impose upon India. . . . Yet every statement made by Congress leaders. . . is tending to enhance that suspicion instead of removing it."<sup>22</sup> On 22 January, the *Madras Mail* drove home the same point. "The minorities would not be fearful did they not apprehend that the majority would use the power given to them by the introduction of further constitutional reforms for the purpose of suppressing or thwarting minorities."<sup>23</sup>

At this time some leaders were trying to bring about a Congress-League rapprochement, and one of the suggestions made by the Muslims related to the desirability of creating coalition ministries in all provinces so that the minorities might be assured of their participation in the administration and governance of the country. The Congress leaders spurned the idea as if any sharing of power was an anathema to them. In a statement issued from Madras on 30 January, a leading Congress politician and member of the central legislature, S. Satyamurti, gave the opinion that coalitions were against the principle of democratic government. "Now I should like to know", he said, "how a coalition government is consistent with any democratic government. . . . The Congress cannot, and even Great Britain cannot, accept this theory of coalition governments because it goes entirely against the theory of responsible democratic government."<sup>24</sup> Gandhi agreed with this, and told the Viceroy on 5 February that he did not think that there was any hope in that direction. Coalitions would mean satisfying office-seekers and place-hunters.<sup>25</sup> It may be mentioned here that in 1946 the Congress entered into a coalition in the Punjab with a handful of Unionist landowners in order to keep the

Muslim League out of office, though the League had won an overwhelming victory in the election and had been cheated of an over-all majority by the mechanism of the Communal Award which did not give the Muslims the number of seats warranted by their percentage in the population of the province.

In early February, a professor of economics at the Islamia College of Lahore reiterated the Muslim desire to separate. "If a common state does not ensure them these elementary necessities of existence [due economic and political power, separate electorates, proportional share in the administrative and economic machinery] they would be absolutely justified in demanding even territorial separation."<sup>26</sup> But there was no further reference to separation in the article.

*The Times* reported on 10 February that the Congress demand for a British declaration about the future of India had given a "distinct fillip to the Pakistan scheme, long cherished by those Muslims who aim at segregating their community into self-contained areas of their own"<sup>27</sup> Four days later the *Civil and Military Gazette* underlined the Muslim fear of Hindu rule which sprang from Congress policy. "It is impossible to resist the conclusion", it wrote, "that the stress laid by the Congress and political organizations championing the cause of the Hindus on the rights of the majority has, to a large extent, persuaded Mr. Jinnah and a considerable section of the Muslim population in India that the Hindus are employing democracy only as a means to gain political mastery over all other communities. The insistence of the Congress on the acceptance by the British Government of its formula of the constituent assembly as the solvent of all India's political problems has further confirmed the suspicion of Muslims and other minorities of a deep-laid Hindu plot to establish Hindu rule in India."<sup>28</sup>

Congress leaders continued to make statements which proved that such an estimate of their mentality was correct. A former chief parliamentary secretary of Madras, A. Kaleswara Rao, told an audience in Kurnool that "Mahatma Gandhi should be the sole leader of India as Hitler is in Germany and Stalin in Russia".<sup>29</sup>

Three days before the League opened its annual session in Lahore and five days before the Lahore Resolution was passed, Abul Kalam Azad delivered his presidential address at the Congress annual session at Ramgarh. The whole of India was by now talking (hopefully or fearfully, depending on who was talking)

of separation and division, but the Congress president did not even mention such a prospect in his lengthy speech. In reply to all Muslim statements of fear of Hindu rule the only thing Azad could say from the official platform was: "The thousand years of our joint life has moulded us into a common nationality. This cannot be done artificially. Nature does her fashioning through her hidden processes in course of centuries. The cast has now been moulded and destiny has set her seal upon it. Whether we like it or not, we have now become an Indian nation, united and indivisible. No fantasy or artificial scheming to separate and divide can break this unity."<sup>30</sup> He brushed aside all Muslim fears in one sentence: "Can such a vast mass of humanity have any legitimate reason for apprehension that, in a free and democratic India, it might be unable to protect its rights and interests?"<sup>31</sup>

### The Toosy Scheme (January 1940)

The first scheme to appear in 1940 was that of Muhammad Sharif Toosy, whom we have met before. He began by saying that if final independence was the goal of India and the severance of the British connection was a possibility, then the Muslims had every right to demand "a full and equal share in the distribution of ultimate political power". It was for them to judge whether their interests could better be served by remaining a minority under a future Indian government or by "forming independent sovereign states in the North-West and North-East where they constitute compact areas with distinct geographical limits". Muslims living in the Hindu-majority areas were a real minority and had no alternative but to accept Congress assurances of goodwill, but other Muslims were not bound by any such consideration to leave their ultimate political and economic interests in provinces where they were in a majority to the mercy of a hostile Hindu majority at the centre.

The Muslims numbered 28 million in the north-west out of a total population of 42 million. This proportion in the areas of the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, NWFP and Kashmir could be raised further by a re-adjustment of the eastern frontiers of the Punjab. If Ambala division and eastern Hindu and Sikh states were excluded from the Punjab, its population would be reduced from 28½ million to 21 million, but the Muslim percentage would go up from

55 to 70. This Muslim percentage "will further be raised if the entire Muslim North-West is taken together as a whole".

In Bengal a similar re-adjustment of boundaries would raise the Muslim proportion in population to 80% or more. At present the Muslims formed an overwhelming majority of 75% in eastern Bengal and the Goalpara and Sylhet districts of Assam. They were also in a majority in some districts of western Bengal which were contiguous to eastern Bengal. If this Muslim population was to come together under a new province of "Eastern Bengal and Assam", Muslims would be placed in a permanent majority of 80% in a total population of 40 million.<sup>32</sup>

The details of this plan came very near to what actually happened in June 1947.

### Abdullah Zakaullah Khan (January 1940)

In its issue of 10 January the *Star of India* carried a long article by one Khan Bahadur Abu Abdullah Muhammad Zakaullah Khan. The editorial by-line said that it was a "paper" originally entitled, "Hindu-Muslim Relations and the Future Constitution of India"; it did not indicate where it was first published or delivered and at what date. Nor did it provide any information about the author. From his name and the fact that the article was reproduced in a Calcutta paper we may with some confidence judge him to be a Bengali.

He began by saying that it was the duty of both Hindus and Muslims to put forward some alternative scheme (to the 1935 Act) which would carry with it the approval of the bulk of the members of the two communities. This had not been done. It was true that some plans of division or zonal distribution had been presented but "these have been characterized as fantastic and impracticable". His own scheme was not of partition, but of parity. "I can say, without fear of contradiction, that if any scheme for the future constitution of India can be devised which will ensure equal partnership of Hindus and Muslims in the future governance of India that will be wholly acceptable to the Muslims and it is for the Hindus to say whether such a scheme would be acceptable to them." He was clear and firm on the impossibility of the Muslims acquiescing in a Hindu domination. "We do not want to help in the framing of a constitution which will enable the majority

community to dominate over us for all time. We do not want to help in forging the chains that would keep us down for ever."

He suggested as follows. The autonomous powers of the provinces with the weightage for minorities as given under the 1935 Act would continue. "There should be no need for division of India into Hindu or Muslim zones or for any exchange of population which in a country as thickly populated as India with the present level of the education of the masses is not a practical proposition." There was every hope that Hindu-Muslim differences would "adjust themselves in course of time", provided that "*the majority community in a Province is not backed and supported in its misbehaviour towards the minority community by its majority in the Centre and thus can only be secured if Hindus and Muslims are given equal representation in the Centre*". The scheme, therefore, was that "*after allotting a certain number of seats, with a certain weightage if necessary to smaller communities such as Parsees, Indian Christians, Sikhs and others, divide the remaining seats at the Centre between the two main majorities—Hindus and Muslims—leaving the representation in the Provinces as it is at present*". If the Hindus opposed such an arrangement that would mean that they mistrusted the Muslims. And "if the majority party can be justified in mistrusting the Muslim parity at the Centre, are Muslims very much to blame if they cannot trust the Hindu majority at the Centre?"<sup>33</sup>

This was perhaps a sensible way of solving the problem short of a partition, but it had its own weaknesses. It would not have been acceptable to the Hindus. How could they give up their majority right for all times to come? The fact is that if they were given only two choices—a division of India or a permanent parity at the centre—they would have preferred division to any arrangement under which they were to be politically and constitutionally the equals of the Muslims who formed but a quarter of the total population. And for good reasons. Nor would the British have agreed to put such a formula in any constitutional plan drawn up under their aegis. From the Muslim point of view, too, the scheme did not solve all the problems. It did not touch the myriads of major and minor difficulties cropping up in the administration and politics of the provinces. For example, how could equal representation at the centre help the Muslims of Bengal and the Punjab, who had demographic majorities which were not reflected in the legislative

representation, or of the United Provinces and Bihar, where their number was small but their ambitions large?

### C.R. Reddy (February 1940)

On 3 February 1940, the *Madras Mail* carried a short, almost telegraphic, article by a Hindu leader prescribing a confederation for India to solve the Muslim problem.

He made six "reconciliatory" suggestions:

1. The 1935 constitution had to be replaced both in its central and provincial parts by a "new type".
2. The central government would have to be a confederation "with sovereign status vesting in the states and provinces" which would be its members.
3. "Government with a fixed tenure and irremovable by vote of the Legislature should take the place of the present Unitary party Cabinets."
4. Party executives should be replaced with composite cabinets.
5. Government would not be wholly based on population. The provincial basis would supplant the population basis, at least in the executive.
6. The central executive would be as follows: (a) Hyderabad would have a permanent seat to be filled according to its constitution or by nomination of the Nizam. (b) Baroda, Mysore, Kashmir and Travancore would have two seats between themselves by rotation. (c) One representative of minor states would be elected by the Princes' Chamber. (d) One member from each province would be appointed by the Viceroy on the recommendation of the provincial government concerned.<sup>34</sup>

Reddy did not elaborate his scheme, which rules out informed criticism. His description is confined to the executive he visualizes; it leaves unexplained the details of the more important and complicated legislative structure of the centre. Was he aware of the difficulties inherent in running a confederation? Were all provinces and states, irrespective of their size and resources, to be equal members of this set-up? How was the communal problem to be solved in the constituent units? Were the native states to be democratized? Who was going to fill in the details of the confederal system and prepare the constitutional draft?

## Adbullah Haroon (February 1940)

Writing to the Aga Khan in November-December 1938, Abdullah Haroon had pointed out that the League circles had begun to drift in the direction of "a separate federation of Muslim States and Provinces so that we are free, once and for all, from the Hindu molestation".<sup>35</sup> Now in February 1940 he circulated a scheme of his own which "envisaged the division of India into two separate Federations, each drawing its major support from one of the major communities. . . . The Muslim Federation was to comprise the North-Western part of India and Kashmir".<sup>36</sup>

We have no further details of the proposal. Obviously it was different from what has sometimes been called the "Haroon Committee Scheme", i.e., the scheme prepared for the League by its Foreign Committee which had Haroon as its chairman, for according to the Committee Scheme there were to be two Muslim States, one in the north-west and another in the north-east. What Haroon is reported to have proposed was nothing but what Rahmat Ali had said in his first leaflet in January 1933.

## Three Vague Reports (Undated)

Three more Muslim proposals were made in early 1940, but to these our reference must be bare and brief because of lack of information.

Mawalana Abdul Qadir Azad Subhani of Cawnpore was in favour of a separate Muslim state which he called "*Hakumat-i-Rabbani*" (divine government). Afzal Huq Kashmiri proposed the same thing under a different name, "*Hakumat-i-Ilahiyya*" (God's government).<sup>37</sup> Sayyid Rizwanullah, a Muslim League politician from the United Provinces, suggested a division of India into a Hindu and a Muslim state, but the division was not to be complete as the two states would be joined at the top in some sort of relationship;<sup>38</sup> probably he had a confederal solution in mind.

## Zafar Ali Khan (March 1940)

On 8 March, Mawlana Zafar Ali Khan, a well-known Punjabi leader and editor of the famous Urdu daily *Zamindar* of Lahore, speaking in the Indian Legislative Assembly, suggested the creation

of a buffer state running from the Makran coast right up to Chitral. He did this in the course of his speech while moving a cut in the estimates in order to discuss the "forward policy" of the Government of India on the north-western frontier. He made a rapid survey of the frontier history up to the beginning of the operations then being carried out in the Ahmadzai salient. He criticized the official forward policy, and declared that the only wise course to follow was "to carve out this buffer state which had a population of 3,000,000 and would be India's defence against a march by Russia to the south".<sup>39</sup>

Apparently, he was not suggesting an independent state in the north-west, but provincial status for the tribal belt running along India's frontiers with Afghanistan and Persia. It had little to do with the communal issue or the creation of Pakistan.

### Abdullah Yusuf Ali (March 1940)

On the eve of the passing of the Lahore Resolution, Allama Abdullah Yusuf Ali prescribed a new remedy for the communal ills of India. The interesting aspect of his suggestion was, that it neither envisaged radical political changes nor necessitated territorial alterations. It was a plea for the creation of a new party system which would cut across communal differences and thus solve the main problem of Hindu-Muslim rivalry.

Claiming that this approach would achieve a "permanent and radical solution of the minority problem", he recommended a two-party system for India "in which individuals can and do change over from one party to another at different times". He knew that this was impossible as between Hindus and Muslims as communities, but it was practicable as between the Congress party as such and a coalition of groups opposed to the Congress. The largest and most important group in this coalition would be the Muslims. Some Muslim individuals, like Abul Kalam Azad, might follow the Congress, and some Muslim groups, like the Khaksars, the Ahrars, the Red Shirts and a part of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, might pursue their own independent ends. But the great majority of the Muslims would stand together.

On the other hand, among the Hindus, taking the word in its widest generic sense, there were groups which were opposed to the Congress. The most numerous among them were the untouchables.

Another group, not unmerically strong but containing men of the highest standing and education, was that of the National Liberal Federation. Then there were Congressmen who belonged to extreme sections at either end and held views essentially opposed to the will of the party as a whole. The "extreme Socialist (or Communists)" thought that the Congress was bourgeois. The conservative elements in the Congress ranks would, when their allegiance was subjected to a practical test, find themselves more at home with the Liberals than with the Congressites of the school of Subhas Chandra Bose.

What did this analysis show? "The upshot of this analysis is that there are many incipient lines of cleavage in Indian politics, which can be appealed to for the formation of true political parties, as opposed to purely religious or communal groups. And I look to the Muslims—with their past history, their political experience, and their present insecure position—to take the lead in evolving a composite party which will safeguard legitimate interests and be available—when the need arises—for forming an alternative government. . . .The formation of federations of parties, each federation being of sufficient cohesion to be a possible alternative government with a definite programme, is the only way that I can see of solving the minority problem in India. Without it there can be no modern constitution, no democratic assemblies, no progressive legislation, no really effective road to self-government."<sup>40</sup>

This was a perfectly sensible and reasonable solution. But time and political events have a way of making many sensible things impossible and reducing reason to incoherent hysteria. This was the solution of a competent political scientist working in his study from dead figures and lifeless statistics. The moving facts of the realities of politics did not bear out the calm, cool academic analysis made from a distance. Yusuf Ali forgot the one overwhelming fact of Indian politics: that religion ruled the political impulse. However excellent the two-party system which gave enviable stability to the British political machinery, however commendable the advice for confronting the Congress with a powerful coalition of opposing forces, however correct the diagnosis which discovered common ground between the Muslims and some non-Muslim groups, however virtuous the ultimate ideal of replacing communal groups with true political parties, and however true the final warning that without such a step all talk

of democracy and self-government was but empty words—the overpowering fact remained that in India neither the premisses nor the conclusions of this argument held water.

Religious politics were not a symbol or result of Hindu-Muslim rivalry but a condition of Muslim existence in India. Similarly the Hindu basis of Congress politics was not a consequence of Hindu-Muslim competition but of the unalterable circumstance that a Hindu was a Hindu. By no other argument could we explain the past developments of Indian politics—Congress opposition to separate electorates for Muslims, communal riots on music before the mosque and cow killing, Hindu movements of shuddhi and sangathan, Muslim counter-movements of tabligh and tanzim, Gandhi's proud statement that he was asking the Hindus to support the Muslim Khilafat movement because this was the only way to save the cow from the Muslim knife, Congress provincial governments' treatment of the Muslim minority, and so many other things which had gone into the making of the minority problem. Yusuf Ali's own experience of Indian administration and politics should have told him how unreal and obsolete was his analysis of the situation. He had spent several years in the ICS and seen the maddening difficulties of district administration as an eye-witness. He had been the president of the All India Muslim Conference and fought the case of Muslim safeguards before the Joint Parliamentary Committee.<sup>41</sup> He had also been a president of the All India Tanzim Conference,<sup>42</sup> and had, in his utterances, asked the Muslims to counteract the dangerous Hindu movements of shuddhi and sangathan. Did his own experience hold out any hope for the possibility of the emergence of "true political parties" and the disappearance of religious groups? Or, had his long stay in England made him so unfamiliar with Indian conditions that he could recommend such unrealistic measures to deal with a situation which was now beyond any remedy but the most revolutionary?

His picture of the Congress party as an alliance of divergent elements was only superficially true. Of course there were men and groups in the Congress which did not agree with everything that the party did or decided. But that applied to all parties and political movements. The unanimity of the Congress in its dealings with the Muslims and the British was a more important factor (in fact, the only important factor) than its internal difference on details of programme. The only thing that interested the Muslims

was whether the Congress as a party was or was not prepared to give reasonable assurances, backed with action, that they would occupy an honourable place in the future free India, and whether its present conduct was or was not in keeping with its proclaimed policy of toleration and reasonable co-operation. On both these points they found its behaviour to be at odds with its claims. It was no consolation to them to be told that there were differences within the Congress, or that there were outside it some small, ineffectual groups which might be more amenable to a satisfactory solution of the communal problem.

In any case, Muslim politics had gone far beyond the stage where such gentle idealism and pleasing optimism could have any appeal or attraction. For many years now the Muslims had been contemplating the cheerful prospects of separation and independence. Within a few days of Yusuf Ali's lecture they were to take the final leap and declare for Pakistan. At the best of times his plan would have been difficult of fulfilment; at this hour it was painfully irrelevant.

## Conclusion

*At this stage I may be allowed to make a few brief observations on the proposals recorded and examined in this and the previous two chapters, postponing a fuller analysis of the idea of Muslim separation to the chapters that follow.*

The first thing to strike us in these proposals is that most of them (the Sikandar scheme being the only major exception) were influenced by Rahmat Ali's ideas. This was quite natural, as Rahmat Ali's plans had been the only detailed and clear-cut attempt to divide India on Hindu-Muslim basis and create Muslim states in the sub-continent. The idea of a partition and the concept of a separate Muslim nationalism were far older than Rahmat Ali's exposition of them, but he was the first to argue the two-nation theory, to tackle the practical aspects of its application, to provide details of the proposed division, and to give a name to the north-western Muslim state. Anyone coming after him could hardly escape his influence or ignore his arguments and conclusions. It may not be an exaggeration to say that had there been no Rahmat Ali or had he not presented his ideas at the time when he did, the proposals examined in these three chapters would have been

neither so many nor so detailed nor so emphatic.

Thus the deep and pervasive influence of the Cambridge movement is clear, but the acknowledgement of it is not. It is odd that over a dozen schemes should have been presented in the course of three years under the direct or indirect influence of Rahmat Ali, and yet not one of them should refer to him or acknowledge the debt owed to his ideas. It is possible that one or two of these scheme-makers were unfamiliar with his plans and the affinity between their proposals and his was a coincidence, or a matter of two separate but similar manifestations of a feeling which was then current in the Muslim community. This, however, will not explain the unanimous silence on the point of mentioning his name. In two cases we have definite and certain knowledge that the planners were not only fully aware of his ideas but also loyal to them. Punjabi was not a member of the Pakistan National Movement, but he was so deeply impressed by its message that he spent several years in spreading and popularizing it in the Punjab. He also borrowed the word Pakistan for his own scheme, but was disallowed by Jinnah to use it. One of the two Aligarh dons was not only a follower of Rahmat Ali since his student days at Cambridge but one of his important and trusted lieutenants in India. Yet neither mentions Rhmat Ali or acknowledges his lead or inspiration. In fact, Punjabi refers to "Pakistan" in rather derogatory terms and argues against the adoption of the name. Even if the name "Pakistan" was rejected out of respect for Jinnah's views there was no occasion for denigrating it on grounds which were neither true nor reasonable.

It is hard to find a satisfactory explanation of the failure of these Muslim planners to mention Rahmat Ali. It may have been due to a natural human infirmity: the wish to sound original, to win credit for presenting new ideas, but suppressing the source of one's influence or knowledge. Rivalry in the art of drawing up schemes, for that is what the whole operation had nearly come to be, particularly in 1939, and the jealousy which so often enters all competitive efforts, may also have played a part. It is possible that some of the schemes deliberately omitted any reference to Rahmat Ali in order not to frighten the Hindus too much, for they knew exactly what he stood for. It is also possible, even probable, that the planners did not want to offend the League which was at this time (and in fact in all later years) not sympathetic to the

Cambridge movement or was at least reluctant to be seen to follow its ideals.

As for the name "Pakistan", only two schemes accept it for the proposed Muslim state in the north-west. Even this is done with qualifications. The Punjab Muslim Students Federation adopted the name with an amendment of its own. Its state was to be called "Pakistan Caliphate". But this is not a significant departure from Rahmat Ali's idea, because in Urdu it read as "Khulafat-i-Pakistan", meaning that Pakistan would be an Islamic or Muslim state. The Aligarh scheme stated that the north-western Muslim state *might* be given the name of Pakistan. It was no more than a suggestion and the final decision was left to the Muslim League.

As we will see later, the Muslim League did not want to use or adopt the name Pakistan for its objective. In 1939 Jinnah had asked the Nawab of Mamdot to tell Mian Kafayet Ali not to use the word in the title of his book *Confederacy of India*. Thus it was at Jinnah's instance that the Muslim League avoided the use of the word at the time of the passing of the Lahore Resolution, and abstained from mentioning it in any official declaration or public statement. Later, of course, the popular appeal of the name and the fact that the common man referred to the partition scheme as Pakistan forced the League to accept the title and incorporate it into its constitution and programme.

Other features which mark these schemes may be noted here in the form of questions to which we will try to find answers when we come, in the following chapters, to analyze the whole story of the idea of separation.

With one or two exceptions Bengal stayed firmly outside this long and intense search for a solution of the Muslim problem. This raises many questions. Were Bengali Muslims not interested in their future? Did they feel that in their geographical and demographic circumstances any move towards separation was bound to be futile? If so, what were these circumstances, and how did they differ from those obtaining in the north-west? Did they give any thought to separation at all? Was their sense of separateness from the Hindus not so well marked because of the deep imprint of Hindu culture on them? Did the old idea of a Bengali nationality transcending religious differences—a Hindu idea of which much use was made during the agitation against the partition of the province during 1905-11 and again briefly in March-August 1947

and once again in 1970-71—have such a strong appeal for them as to dissuade them from thinking on separatist lines?

A majority of these schemes came from the Punjab. Why? Was it because there was a greater sense of separateness in the province in spite of, or probably because of, the evenly mixed population of Muslims and non-Muslims? Is it true that while there was greater political awareness among Bengalis there was greater intellectual awakening among the Punjabis? Or, were the Punjabis more attached to Islam than the Bengalis? Islam had come to the Punjab several centuries earlier and time had moulded a tradition which could not be resisted. Was it Rahmat Ali's influence which gave shape to the Punjabi Muslim opinion in favour of separation, while his name and ideas were less known in Bengal? Had Iqbal's poetic message worked a spell and given a new turn to Punjabi thinking? Was it the Punjab's contiguity to Afghanistan and the north-west's proximity to Muslim countries running through vast spaces till the European frontiers of Turkey which made the province more keen to support the idea of Muslim separation from Hindu India?

If we look at the background of the authors of these schemes, we see a new avenue of approach opening before us. A majority of them were intellectuals rather than politicians. Why was it so? Because the intellectuals have more imagination? Because they always lead the politicians—or should? Because Muslim politicians of the 'thirties were divided among themselves, and at least some of them were ready to compromise with the Hindus if a reasonable measure of security for the Muslims could be procured, while the intellectuals, unencumbered with narrow and short-term political considerations, were willing to explore different possibilities?

Another important clue to the changing aspect of Muslim politics is provided by the fact that at least two of the schemes came from the NWFP. This was very significant, because the province was ruled by the Congress, its Muslim League branch was virtually non-existent, and the influence of the Red Shirts was supreme. The province had such a large Muslim majority that the communal problem as such had no meaning for the Pathan. If in spite of this there were people who were thinking of a separatist solution to the Indian Muslim problem, it indicated that neither the strength of Congress control and propaganda nor the absence of communal rivalry could keep the Muslims away from the idea of separation.

The only important proposal in our list which does not speak of separation at all (cultural or political or territorial) as a contemporary issue is the Sikandar scheme. Is it because Sikandar, as the leader of a party which had the support of all communal groups in the Punjab, did not want to sound a separatist note lest he forfeited the loyalty of his non-Muslim followers? But then he was also, since October 1937, a Muslim Leaguer, and the Muslim members of his party were, under the terms of the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact, also members of the provincial Muslim League. Was he anxious to please, or at least not to offend, the British whose influence on him was considerable and for whom his party had much sympathy? Was he trying not to alienate the Congress by prescribing a federal rather than a separationist solution? For, there is not a word of criticism of the Congress in his proposal. But, then by suggesting a weak centre he was putting himself in direct opposition to the Congress, though perhaps he did not realize how strongly the Congress was wedded to the idea of a close federation. On the other side, Muslim opinion had by now travelled so far on the road to separation that his scheme was out of date before it was published. If he believed that in the conditions obtaining in 1939 his proposal would win the general approval of any side, he was out of touch with the situation in the country.

The strong criticism which his scheme encountered at the hands of the Muslim League is a pointer to the growing League sympathy for a separationist solution and to its reluctance to consider any suggestions falling short of it. It seems that by August 1939 the League had almost made up its mind that a federal India, particularly one of the Congress design, was out of the question as a solution of the Muslim problem, and that it must be ready for a much more radical approach. Some of its spokesmen had now begun to talk of "homeland" or "homelands" for the Muslims, and to reject the necessity or desirability of a centre. Anyone who observed this current of thought and looked for the signs of new times could have seen the future without the help of a crystal-ball. The whole course of Muslim political thinking, which had begun with certain hazy glimmerings in the mid-nineteenth century, was coming to fruition; the idea of separation was now mature enough to command the allegiance of the biggest Muslim political party in the country; and the popular feeling in favour of Pakistan was soon to emerge as the formal demand of a nation.

The importance of these schemes in the growth of the idea of Pakistan is therefore undeniable. And yet it is surprising that most historians have treated them with an indifference which is hard to justify or even explain. They have either neglected them or dismissed them with a short reference which gives a misleading and distorted picture. For example, Palme Dutt, the half-Indian leader of the Communist Party of Great Britain who wrote much on Indian politics without letting his Marxism-Leninism weaken his Hinduism, attributed these schemes to "the activities of these communal organizations", and summarized them as "the demand . . . for the State separation of the Muslims by the establishment of a Confederation of Muslim States to cover four main areas— a North-Western Group, a North-Eastern Group, a Delhi-Lucknow Group, and a Deccan Group, including parts of Hyderabad State".<sup>43</sup> Both his comments are untrue. The authors of the schemes did not belong to "communal organizations"; in fact, most of them did not belong to any party, communal or otherwise. Nor did they suggest a confederation of Muslim states. Anyway, what does "State separation of the Muslims" mean? In another work, which represents the official Soviet view of Asian history, two modern historians have indulged in the sweeping generalization that the authors of all the 1939 schemes "did not want full independence and urged that the Indian states of the future should remain part of the British Empire".<sup>44</sup> So much for foreign comment.

Pakistani historians could not have given such misleading accounts for the simple reason that they did not take any notice of these schemes. With the exception of Sharifuddin Pirzada whose pioneering effort first drew the attention of the historians to this vital chapter in the making of Pakistan,<sup>45</sup> and Waheeduzzaman who was obliged to treat with them in his doctoral research covering the years 1928-40,<sup>46</sup> I know of no other Pakistani scholar who has made a careful study of these plans or appreciated and assessed their importance for and relevance to the evolution of the idea or the demand of Pakistan. In recent years there have appeared two major works on the history of Indian Muslims and their gradual political and national separation from the Hindus. Both neglect these schemes. I.H. Qureshi mentions the Sikandar and Latif schemes in a footnote and does not refer at all to the others.<sup>47</sup> Abdul Hamid, who is dealing specifically with Muslim separatism,

gives a detailed account of Muslim fear of Hindu rule and of Congress refusal to consider the Muslim sentiment, but provides no analysis of the various schemes born of this fear.<sup>48</sup>

An attempt will be made to answer these and many other questions in the rest of this book

## NOTES

1. *TSI*, editorial, 25 August 1939.
2. Anwar Bakhshi (from Jullundhur), letter, *CMG*, 30 August 1939.
3. A Punjabi Muslim, "Sidelights on Muslim Politics-II", *ibid.*, 10 September 1939.
4. *Round Table*, no. 116, September 1939, p. 773.
5. For this and the debate on it see *CMG*, 9 November 1939.
6. *TSI*, editorial, 6 November 1939.
7. *CMG*, editorial, 14 November 1939.
8. *India Correspondent*, "India and the War: Congress Demand: The True Way to Satisfaction", *The Times*, 5 December 1939.
9. Joint statement issued by Dr. Muhammad Afzaal Husain Qadri, Dr. Zakiuddin, Dr. Burhan Ahmad, and Ubaidullah Durrani, from Aligarh, *TSI*, 12 December 1939.
10. *Round Table*, no. 117, December 1939, p. 161 E.
11. Colin Cooke, *The Life of Richard Stafford Cripps*, London, 1957, pp. 255-256.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 288 fn.
13. *Report of the Inquiry Committee appointed by the Council of the All India Muslim League to inquire into Muslim Grievances in Congress Provinces*, Delhi. n.d., p. 3. (Pirpur Report).
14. T.G.P. Spear, "Public Opinion in India, 1924-45: Some Personal Impressions", A Paper read at the Study Conference on the Partition of India, 1947, held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, July 1967 (Mimeo).
15. For example, Sir William Barton, *India's North-West Frontier*, London, 1939, p. 13.
16. Reported in *CMG*, 9 August 1939; see also *TSI*, 17 August 1939. The *CMG* wrote an editorial on it on the same day, 9 August.

For the Faqir of Ipi see G.T.G. (probably G.T. Garratt), "The Faqir of Ipi", *CMG*, 3 September 1939, and the obituary notice of him in *The Times*, 20 April 1960. A rather good, full-page photograph of Ipi may be seen among the plates following p. 140 in J.G. Elliott, *The Frontier 1839-1947: The Story of the North-West Frontier of India*, London, 1968. One aspect of his wartime activities is referred to in U.S. Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Series D, Vol. XIII, Washington, D.C., 1964, pp. 136-137; for the Italian efforts to recruit him to create trouble on the north-west frontier of India, see Pietro Quaroni, *Il mondo di un ambasciatore*, Milan, 1965, pp. 120-128. The only scholarly and detailed, but congress-oriented, study of the politics of the province is Erlend Jansson, *India and Pakistan or Paktunistan: The Nationalist Movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47*, Uppsala, 1981.

18. Syed Zafrul Hasan and Muhammad Afzaal Husain Qadri, *The Problem of Indian Muslims and its Solution*, Aligarh, 1939. All quotations are from this pamphlet. The title page bears no date. The printer's colophon contains the date 14 August 1939, and this is repeated by Qadri in his letter to Chourhary Rahmat Ali of 8 March 1940 (see Khan A. Ahmad, *The Founder of Pakistan: Through Trial to Triumph*, London, n.d.? 1942, p. 24). In the footnote on the same page Ahmad says that the date of the covering letter issued with the pamphlet was "September 1939", which should mean that it was printed in August and circulated in September. An Urdu summary of the scheme is available in *Jadid Science*, August-December 1978 (special Afzaal Husain Qadri issue), pp. 137-141.
19. Muhammad Afzaal Husain Qadri to Chourdhary Rahmat Ali, 8 March 1940, Khan A. Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 24. The letter which was in Urdu is reproduced in photostat in this book (pp. 22-23), and the English tr given in full. I have quoted Ahmad's tr.
20. For Hindu criticism of the Aligarh Scheme see Rajendra Prasad, *Pakistan*, Bombay and Calcutta, September 1940, pp. 13-14, 35-40, and his *India Divided*, Bombay, 2nd ed June 1947, pp. 183-184; and K.T. Shah, *Why Pakistan*

- and Why Not*, Bombay, n.d., pp. 172-177. For a Muslim reference see F.K. Khan Durrani, *The Meaning of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1946 rep. For a contemporary British-Indian comment see *CMG*, editorial, 27 September 1939.
21. See Ranjee G. Shahani, *Indian Pilgrimage*, London, 1939, pp. 209-211.
  22. *CMG*, editorial, 9 January 1940.
  23. *TMM*, editorial, 22 January 1940.
  24. S. Satyamurti, statement to the press, Madras, 30 January 1940, *CMG*, 31 January 1940.
  25. V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India*, Calcutta, 1957, p. 77
  26. S.M. Akhtar, "Communalism or Nationalism?", *CMG*, 2 February 1940.
  27. India Correspondent, "India's Many Voices", *The Times*, 10 February 1940.
  28. *CMG*, editorial, 14 February 1940.
  29. Quoted in *TMM*, editorial, 26 February 1940.
  30. Abul Kalam Azad, Presidential Address, INC, Ramgarh, 19 March 1940, *IAR 1940*, Vol. I, p. 300.
  31. Quoted in *TMM*, editorial, 19 March 1940.
  32. M.R.T., "Protection versus Separation: Alternatives before Muslims in Independent India", *TET*, 5 January 1940, reproduced in full in *India's Problem of Her Future Constitution*, Bombay, n.d., pp. 33-38.
  33. *TSI*, 10 January 1940. Italics in the original.
  34. C.R. Reddy, "A Confederation of India: Essentials of a New Constitution", *TMM*, 3 February 1940.
  35. Mian Ahmad Shafi, *Haji Sir Abdoola Haroon: A Biography*, Karachi, n.d., pp. 138, 140, quoted by K.B. Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*, Karachi, 1960, p. 120.
  36. K.B. Sayeed, *op. cit.*, p. 120.
  37. *Cheragh-i-Rah*, Pakistan Number 1960, p. 212, cited in S.S. Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1963, p. 193.
  38. *Ibid.*, p. 193
  39. *The Statesman*, 9 March 1940.
  40. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, "The Muslims of India, the War and the Political Field", *Asiatic Review*, April 1940, pp. 226-239. It was a lecture delivered by him in London in March.
  41. See "Memorandum on behalf of the All India Muslim Con-