

The Partition Motif in Contemporary Conflicts

Editors

Smita Tewari Jassal

Eyal Ben-Ari





Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2023 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation

The Partition Motif in Contemporary Conflicts

EDITED BY

Smriti Tiwari-Jindal

and

Eyal Ben-Ari

The Partition Motif in Contemporary Conflicts

EDITORS

Smita Tewari Jassal

and

Eyal Ben-Ari



SAGE Publications

New Delhi ■ Thousand Oaks ■ London

Copyright © Smita Tewari Jassal and Eyal Ben-Ari, 2007

Copyright © Elia Zureik, 2007, for 'Constructing Palestine through Surveillance Practices'

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

First published in 2007 by



Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd

B1/I1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area

Mathura Road

New Delhi 110 044

www.indiasage.com

Sage Publications Inc

2455 Teller Road

Thousand Oaks, California 91320

Sage Publications Ltd

1 Oliver's Yard, 55 City Road

London EC1Y 1SP

Published by Vivek Mehra for Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, typeset in 10.5/12.5 Bembo by Star Compugraphics Private Limited, Delhi and printed at Chaman Enterprises, New Delhi.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data available

ISBN: 10: 0-7619-3547-9 (Pb)

10: 81-7829-705-1 (India-Pb)

13: 978-0-7619-3547-6 (Pb)

13: 978-81-7829-705-7 (India-Pb)

Sage Production Team: Mala Ramamoorthy, Roopa Sharma, Sanjeev Sharma, Sandeep Bankhwal and Santosh Rawat

In memory of our teachers

Reuven Kahane

and

S.D. Badgaiyan

Contents



List of Illustrations 11

Acknowledgements 13

INTRODUCTION

Udavastu Jibaner Kabya—The Rhyme of Refugee Life
Namita Chowdhury 17

The Partition Motif:
Concepts, Comparisons, Considerations
Smita Tewari Jassal and Eyal Ben-Ari 19

BORDERS, SPACES, AND MAPS

1. Partition as a Challenge
to the 'Homogeneous' German Nation
Ina Dietzsch 55

2. De-partitioning Society: Contesting Borders
of the Mind in Bangladesh and India
Kathinka Sinha-Kerkhoff and Ellen Bal 75

3. The Cartographic Imagination:
British Mandate Palestine
Efrat Ben-Ze'ev 98

4. Constructing Palestine through Surveillance Practices
Elia Zureik 122

NARRATIVE EXPERIENCE AND DISPLACEMENT

5. Partition Violence in Memory and Performance:
The Punjabi *Dhadi* Tradition
Michael Nijhawan 145
6. Memories of a Lost Home: Partition in the Fiction
of the Subcontinent
Alok Bhalla 167
7. A Homeland Torn Apart: Partition in a Palestinian
Refugee Camp
Nina Gren 196

SOCIAL STRUCTURES, CONSTRUCTIONS, AND IMAGES

8. Partition and Partings:
The Paradox of German Kinship Ties
Tatjana Thelen 221
9. Partition of Bengal or Creation of a 'Nation'?
Memories of Difference
Habibul Haque Khondker 243
10. The *Surang* (Tunnel) of Madanpura:
Partition Motif in Banaras
Vasanthi Raman 260
11. Living in the Shadow of Emergency in Palestine
Honaida Ghanim 283
12. Partition in Contemporary Struggles over Religious
Spaces in Bhopal
Ursula Rao 297

HEALING, RECONCILIATION, AND COMPARATIVE DIMENSIONS

13. Collective Memory and Obstacles to
Reconciliation Efforts in Israel
Zvi Bekerman 323

14. North Korea South Korea: One Korea
and the Relevance of German Reunification

John Borneman 344

About the Editors and Contributors 364

Index 369

List of Illustrations



FIGURES

3.1: British cartographic preoccupation with boundaries in the 1: 20,000 scale series of topo-cadastral maps of Palestine 108

3.2: Benyamina— a Zionist Jewish settlement. Note how the coloured area extends beyond the built area and gives the impression that the settlement is larger. 109

3.3: The area east of Caesarea, dried of swamps and owned by PICA—the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association 112

11.1: Palestinian Refugees, 1948: Journey to the Unknown 284

TABLE

12.1: Proportion of Hindu and Muslim population in Bhopal city 302

Acknowledgements



This book would not have been possible without the support of the third member of our team, Burkhard Schnepel—meticulous co-organizer of the conference on ‘Memory and the Partition Motif in Contemporary Conflicts’ in July 2005, on which this volume is based. Not only was his enthusiastic support critical in the early stages of the project’s inception, but he also played a key role in organizing the conference, identifying contributors, facilitating conversations, and eliciting a range of viewpoints with great skill and sense of humor. All the chapters in this volume bear his critical and interrogative stamp. His choice of the historical setting of Halle for the conference, added a rich and fascinating dimension to our understanding of partition societies. We thank Burkhard for his organizational skills, intellectual support and the warmth of his friendship.

We gratefully acknowledge the contributions of all participants at the conference. It is hard to do justice to the wonderful spirit of camaraderie that prevailed throughout the proceedings. Individually and collectively, the participants facilitated an atmosphere within which the richness of cross-cultural exchanges could be explored. The conference served to underline the close and important links that exist between amity, collaboration and intellectual exchange.

More formally, we thank the following institutions for assistance in holding the conference: The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Institute of Social Anthropology, Martin-Luther-Universitaet Halle-Wittenberg and the Max Planck Institute for Anthropology, Halle.

Special thanks go to Frau Manuela Schmidtke for administrating the conference in a sociable and efficient manner and to Connie Schnepel for her unique support. John Eidson, Chris Haan and Farrukh Khan

14 *Acknowledgements*

deserve our warmest appreciation for their contributions to the conference. For his inputs on the Introduction, we are grateful to Suvir Kaul.

We thank the anonymous reader at Sage for his/her insightful comments. Mimi Choudhury and Anamika Mukharji, former editors at Sage, deserve appreciation for their efforts during the early stages of the publication process. During the final stages we were truly glad to have Roopa Sharma in charge. The usual disclaimer holds.

Smita Tewari Jassal
Washington D.C.

Eyal Ben-Ari
Jerusalem

Introduction



Udavastu Jibaner Kabya— *The Rhyme of Refugee Life*



NAMITA CHOWDHURY

I do not recall, I have only heard
That one day, long ago, Ma and
Baba
Gathered together all my
Brothers and sisters
And waited at the railway
station
Thinking constantly of the
uncertain future
Baba ultimately arrived with
us
At a reluctant relative's house
There in mixed shades of black
and white
The days hobbled along like
handicapped individuals
Then
conjured by our intoxicated desire
to pluck
Pretty white flowers from the
fragrant forest,
creating by our obsessive longing
to paint colourful pictures of paper,
Like the Sri Lankan island of
Cinnamon, before our eyes
Arose a piece of land

Which at long last signified
 The beginning of our life
 in the Refugee Colony
 Confined to the circumference of
 Two and a half kathas of land given to us.
 I do not remember, yet I do.
 A slowly but surely withering
 father as he
 In the effort to bring us up well
 Knocked from door to door
 And went around from place to place
 Half like a beggar
 Secretly nursing a broken heart.
 Close to which he carried
 carefully his
 property papers and documents.
 Even today I can see
 Once in a while, clearly before my
 eyes
 Innumerable figures of old men
 like my father
 Which even while gradually
 wasting away, I find are
 still eager to press forward.
 In the hope of survival
 They want to search out
 Just even so small
 A secure haven.

(Cited in Gargi Chakravartty, *Coming out of Partition: Refugee Women of Bengal*. New Delhi: Bluejay Books, 2005, translated by Nandini Guha pp.102–103)

The Partition Motif

Concepts, Comparisons, Considerations

SMITA TEWARI JASSAL AND EYAL BEN-ARI

...to explore the meaning of Partition in terms of the new social arrangements, new consciousnesses, and new subjectivities to which it gave rise (Pandey 2001: 50).

Even while receding into a past of over half a century, Partition remains a reality, more so as it becomes a concentrated metaphor for violence, fear, domination, difference, separation, and the unsatisfactory resolution of problems; a metaphor, in one word, for the past, one that goes on making the present inadequate (Samaddar 2001: 22).

At once an event of the past and a sign of the present time, Partition lives on in post-colonial times to such an extent that we should truly prefer the phrase 'partitioned times' to the more common 'post-colonial times' (Samaddar 2003: 21).

Partition and its repercussions continue to shape societal contours and concerns within the context of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Using a broader perspective, this volume explores the fruitfulness of a comparative analysis of partition. Specifically, the implications of events and processes that began during those crucial years after World War II in three regions—India/Pakistan, East/West Germany, and Israel/Palestine—are traced out. It was during this period that the Cold War emerged and each of these three areas saw the forced separation of groups and societies. We also go beyond these three cases to suggest the wider utility of using concepts and ideas related to partition.

Our three cases represent fundamental differences stemming from the diverse logic and rationales that propelled them as solutions, as well as the diverse sets of conditions which rendered them either permanent, ongoing, or reversible. Modern-day partitions arrived at during the

process of decolonization have many similarities, but each is also a product of local histories that need foregrounding when making comparative analyses. In situating the partition motif in the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and in post-cold war Europe, we find that in the former British colonies, the end of imperial rule culminated in the breakup of the colonial state and in the case of Germany, which was in fact occupied by four military powers when it was partitioned, a similar structural logic prevailed. While colonial political partitions, despite individual variables and specific circumstances, display elements of a common structural logic, they typically seem to occur in circumstances of imperial decline or contraction, described as the time when an imperial state comes into conflict with the induced antagonistic nationalism of minority vis-à-vis the majority communities within the colony (Cleary 2002: 4).

The experience of partition has indefinitely prolonged conflicts. While borders are drawn around mixed populations, they lead to ethnic cleansing, often leaving in their wake 'beleaguered enclaves without contested borders' and 'inciting ancient hatreds rather than settling them' (Kumar 2003: 5). The partitions of India–Pakistan and Israel–Palestine have provoked greater strife than contained it. India's first partition of Bengal was first proposed as early as 1905 and until 1940 it continued to be debated intermittently, until the final separation in 1947. In Palestine, the partition was proposed in 1937 by the Peel Commission and then again by the UN in 1948, but the period is also associated with wars and large-scale expulsion of Palestinians from the region that is now Israel. One of the consequences of such long-term states of flux is the recurrent eruption of conflict and continued instability, occasionally leading to the ushering in of undemocratic states.

The Indian partition, an example of limited containment rather than a lasting solution to ethnic conflict, worked as an exit strategy since it was the price paid for independence. In other parts of the world too, self-determination movements accepted partition as a necessary evil in the greater interests of statehood. On the other hand, after the Cold War, Germany's partition like that of the Koreas and Vietnam, as a means of containment or delineation of spheres of influence, was qualitatively different (Kumar 2003: 5–7). Radha Kumar has argued that in the post-colonial and post-Cold war world, since ethnic partition can no longer be viewed as the price of independence, partition fails to provide international institutions with an exit strategy (*ibid.*).

Partition is commonly understood as the violent territorial and political separation of groups, including forced eviction and migration of populations, and the communal and personal price paid by people undergoing these events. Partition refers to much more than processes of forced separation and the creation of distinct political entities. It also forms the basis for long-term practices such as identity, work, memory, and inspiration, and the very bases on which different societies are organized. For example, in all three cases, partition and conflict with the 'separated other' became an organizing principle on which a variety of exclusions and inclusions were based. Moreover, like large-scale wars or disasters, while partition is a historical event with its own specific sets of conditions for each of the contexts explored, it is also one that has far-reaching sociological implications for communal patterns, generational dynamics and individual life courses. As it is these long-term consequences and commonalities rather than the specifics of partitions in various geographical contexts that we are interested in, partition is used here in the lower case. Indeed, the terms and images used to depict partition are very similar in the cases under discussion: 'trauma', 'disaster', 'break', 'disruption', 'dislocation', or 'rupture'. Underlying such depictions is a strong assumption of an essential fracture or break that has to be grappled with.

While the governing imagery of partition is taken from the context of India and Pakistan, the analytical perspectives or theoretical concepts developed within one case may illuminate other instances. Hence, despite the fact that these cases are different from each other in size, historical circumstances and overtness of conflict, placing them in a comparative framework may elucidate the special characteristics of the partition motif. Comparative analysis includes both the classic sense of teasing out differences and similarities in an explanatory mode, and the use of one case in order to think through another. Indeed, we propose that analytical frames developed within this volume may illuminate other cases where partition has figured prominently: the two Koreas, China and Taiwan and Hong Kong, Vietnam, Yemen, Cyprus, Ireland, and Yugoslavia for example. Thus, for instance, Borneman (this volume) uses what he terms 'anticipatory reflection' in an analysis of the German case to think through the implications for the partition, and future unification of the two Koreas. Along these lines, our volume's examination of the shared theme of partition becomes a search for cross-cultural

resonance designed to facilitate 'listening for echoes' that connect the diverse settings being explored.

Two purposes are thus served by our analysis: First, the development of a comparative perspective that is long overdue, as it also refutes the stress on the uniqueness or peculiarity of the Indian subcontinent; and second, an exploration of how partition continues to influence social processes and phenomena in some contemporary societies. With these concerns at the heart of this exercise, the salient issues raised in the chapters and the significant themes generated by the volume as a whole are outlined.

Analytical Uses of Partition: Some Conceptual Clarifications

PARTITION AS OUTCOME AND CAUSE

One of the most common images of partition just mentioned is that of trauma, disaster, or catastrophe. Analytically speaking, these characterizations are used to refer to partition both as an outcome and as cause. These kinds of usages are found, however, not only in the characterization of partition as rupture or adversity. In its most simple rendition, partition is seen as an outcome of certain historical, political and social forces. This guise of partition as outcome has been at the center of many studies in history, political science, and political sociology. For example, the assertion that in India the association of local territory with group is an achievement of partition, has exemplified this kind of thinking (Hasan 1994; Jalal 1985; Talbot 1988). In transferring the history of the event into a history of its causes and origins, distance is created from the fearful moments of the past—a disciplinary device widely adopted by historians (Pandey 2001: 45). Moreover, while partition historians in India have remained overwhelmingly concerned with causes, it is not suffering nor issues of nationalism and nation-building, but questions of India's unity that have motivated these concerns (ibid.: 51). It has been convincingly argued that in the 'real' history of India of the late 19th and 20th centuries, the history of partition appeared as an intrusion. No wonder then that Indian post-colonial historiography, driven by the need to demonstrate the unity of India's diverse peoples and traditions, placed undue emphasis on causes.

The counterpart of the claim about partition being a result, is the one about it being a trigger or instigator. Such a claim phrased in causal terms, is that the *al-Naqba*—the so-called disaster of 1948—created a Palestinian diaspora (Lindholm and Hammer 2003), as it did a whole set of border zones and contact areas between Israel and its neighbors (Ghanim, this volume). Yet by far the most common contention is that partition produced other problems—at national, communal, and personal levels—that have to be grappled with. In India, scholars have tended to speak of the violence and riots that ‘accompanied’ partition in 1947, thus making a separation between the ‘partition’ that was history and the violence that was an aberration. The battle against communalism was Indian historiography’s reason for ‘making the emphatic distinction that it makes’ (Pandey 2001: 52–53). Take the chapter by Bhalla (this volume; also Bhalla 1994) which contends that partition was such a traumatic event that it produced a set of troubles and questions that much of the literature, arts, and film of the subcontinent have been trying to grapple with. Thus they are a reminder of how ‘partition cruelly displaced millions, divided India’s past, wrecked its civilizational rhythm and unity and left behind a fractured legacy’ (Hasan 1997). Along these lines, the chapter by Nijhawan (this volume) focuses on a community of singers/storytellers that adapt traditional genres about Punjabi folk heroes as a means to come to terms with partition and its implications. This has also been emphasized by Das (1997) as she traces out the ways in which partition-related matters have brought about violent riots or altered kin relationships.

Underlying these kinds of understandings is the idea of partition as *constitutive experience*, the proposal that partition creates a different experiential reality. Indeed, this idea is at the base of the chapter by Ghanim (this volume)—part personal, part scholarly testimony, about the meaning of life in a border village where she was born. Her contention is that existence in this Arab village on the border of Israel can only be understood as living in a permanent state of emergency. To be sure, the peculiarity of partition as such a constitutive experience is related to the question of whether violence or its imaginaries have taken place in a certain locality or not (Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal, this volume). But ethnographic and literary portrayals of life, especially during the initial period of partition where violence did occur, underscore the unique experience it engendered.

PARTITION AS MEMORY AND FORGETFULNESS

Thus history works 'to produce the "truth" of the traumatic, genocidal violence of Partition and to elide it at the same time' (Pandey 2001: 45).

In the Palestinian and Israeli arena, the war of 1948 has been 'the' event constituting respectively Palestinian identity and the epitome of Israeli independence and survival. Israel's culture of remembering through memorial days, commemorations, museum exhibits, media and textbooks, including the methodical collection of personal testimonies, serves to systematically preserve and forge a collective memory. In Israel, the collective memory of both the Holocaust and the ancient siege of the Masada fortress in antiquity, for instance, have undergone significant transformations from tragic narratives of defeat, to those of heroism and survival in situations of extreme persecution and helplessness (Zerubavel 1994: 87). Both, however, are related to the war of 1948: the Holocaust as the precursor of Israeli independence and Masada as a reminder that Israelis shall not fall again.

In Israel then, the word 'partition' does not have the same connotations as in the case of India and Pakistan. For Israeli Jews, the war of 1948 does not evoke the sense of division and fissure as in the Indian subcontinent. For Jewish-Israelis this was the 'War of Independence' understood as a constitutive event for the very notion of Israeli nationhood and peoplehood. Yet the war in 1948 does evoke this sense of forced eviction and separation for Palestinians. The *Naqba* for the Palestinians, epitomizes the deep fracture it created in their society and is remembered as such an event. Indeed, perhaps as restorative measure for what they had lost, Palestinians in Lebanon imposed their cognitive maps of space and names on the spaces of their refugee camps thus 'crafting a geo-social space of Palestine in exile' (Peteet 2005: 159). By inscribing Palestinian places onto the space of Lebanon, they transformed them into 'knowable' places and constant reminders of their home in Palestine.

The relationship between testimony, memory, and witnessing, which in many ways has informed the core of discourse on the Holocaust and *al-Naqba*, leads to questions about the absence of such connections in the case of the subcontinent's partition. Why, for instance, has there not been a more systematic exploration of the kind demanded by this historic experience, particularly as Indians 'continue to live in a

polity that compulsively reenacts that original divide'(Kaul 2001: 4)? As partition issues define not only our past but also our collective future, an enquiry into the sociology of partition with a history that is continuously evolving, seems clearly long overdue.

The German case may be instructive in this regard: here we may conjecture that memories of the partition were effaced because of the terrible catastrophe that Germans wreaked on others. In other words, the suffering of Germans caused by partition took second place to reflections about their national role in the World War II and the Holocaust. In India, Hasan rightly points out that it was the Babri Masjid–Ramjanmabhoomi dispute in the 1980s that became the defining moment for interrogating the recent past to understand the contemporary turmoil over religion (Hasan 2000: 12) and to question 'why we didn't set up a museum to preserve the memory of partition' or 'why we chose to live with communal hatred, rather than to objectify it' (Krishna Kumar quoted in *ibid.*).

In the Indian case, silence as active forgetting is partly explained as a result of family dynamics. With reference to women who suffered great violence, feminist writings have brought to light the enormity of complaints that the governments of India and Pakistan received in the aftermath of partition about 'missing' and 'abducted' women and the Indian state's involvement in efforts to 'recover' them (Menon and Bhasin 1998). While the 'material, symbolic and political significance of the abduction of women was not lost either on the women themselves', or on their families and communities, due to the problem of forcible conversions, the state also departed from its impartial position and by assigning values to legitimate family and community 'honor', reconstituted the multiple patriarchies at work in women's lives (*ibid.*: 125). Das (1997: 84) writes:

Family narratives abound on men who were compelled to kill their women to save their honor. Such sacrificial deaths are beatified in family narratives while women who were recovered from the abductors and returned to their families or who were converted to the other religion and made new lives in the homes of their abductors hardly ever find a place in these narratives, although they occur frequently in literary representations.

Yet more widely in the Indian case, the near denial or erasure from public consciousness of the trauma of partition and the frenzy of violence that accompanied it, continues to remain a puzzling fact. How the

memory of groups is conveyed and sustained becomes significant since control of a society's memory largely conditions the hierarchy of power (Connerton 1989: 1–3). Contemporary Hindu–Muslim violence in the Indian nation cannot be understood in isolation from Pakistan as

...partition was integral to the emergence of the nation-state. However, silence on the theme of this violence in official discourses of nationhood legitimizes the state's claims to represent the entire Indian populace. Therefore to speak of Partition is an acknowledgement of the presence of groups, events or experiences that remain historically displaced within the boundaries of the nation (Kumar 1999: 207).

Ironically, even the self-congratulatory emphasis of Gandhi's non-violence and the euphoria of Independence became a contributory factor in reinforcing the stance of silence about partition violence.

More complicated is the link between partition as forgetting and as cause. Here we refer to what may be thought of as partition as something festering underneath daily reality. Halbwachs contended long ago that the past 'serves' the needs and interests of the present. Barry Schwarz (1982), by contrast, argues that in many cases the past has its own power to define or delimit the kinds of issues dealt with in the present. Here Raman's contribution (this volume) is important. She shows that while Muslims of north India reacted to partition by denying it, their aim was to get on with the business of living. But the periodic violence that shakes their lives does not allow them to deny or forget because every such act reverberates back to the partition. Stigmatization and demonization of 'mini-Pakistans' and the labeling of their residents as possible traitors are indicative of this process. Rao's findings (this volume) about the redrawing of social and territorial boundaries in a conscious effort to efface the Islamic past of Bhopal, a city formerly characterized as predominantly Muslim, offer an illustration of such processes.

Germany provides another interesting case of partition *fester* underneath the public rhetoric of unity and the everyday life of 'one' country. Describing the initial response of most East Germans to the opening of the Wall for instance, Borneman found 'a meeting with the Other that was a resurrection of the repressed past that was not challenge but flight, away from the murderous pasts and uncertain futures into a consumers' fleeting and slightly drunken present' (Borneman 1991: 7). Consumer behavior as a sort of collective forgetting was expressed in

its busy rituals of getting and spending that could 'repress the troubling reflective moment that follows upon remembering' (Borneman 1991: 8). In a twist on this theme, the psychiatrist Maaz (cited in Bleiker 2005: 30) observes that the demands of the market economy were virtually the opposite of what people from a Communist socialization brought with them. Rather than submission, adjustment and restraint, they suddenly needed to be critical, creative and full of initiative. As a consequence, many felt overwhelmed and many experienced psychological problems such as anxieties or depression. Underneath repressions and collective forgetting, partition remains an open issue for present-day Germans.

PARTITION AS TEMPLATE FOR NARRATION

At least where Partition history was concerned, there was a contradiction in the history we knew, that we had learnt, and the history that people remembered (Butalia 1998: 350).

In the case of Israel and Palestine two very different master narratives, as Peteet (2005: 155–56) observes, are formulated in and around the events of 1948. In the Israeli narrative, a small besieged and brave group of Jews faced and overcame a massive coordinated Arab assault. In the Palestinian one, well-armed, well-trained, and well-supported military and state institutions faced a disorganized, ideologically disparate, underarmed, and leaderless group of Palestinians. A comparable disparity in narrative contents can be found elsewhere. For instance, partition literature was not written by immigrants from West to East Bengal (today's Bangladesh) while the Hindus moving to West Bengal did create such texts. This point suggests that the partition narrative centers primarily on suffering and hardship. In this way, Bhalla (this volume) explores representations of partition in the subcontinent within which partition provides an overarching story—often organized according to tragedies and traumas—within which different authors place their particular accounts.

Folk understandings of the partition of the subcontinent emerging from booklets and pamphlets available at fairs and rural settings are a rich source material to investigate the multiplicity of voices in which partition is narrativized in the semi-literate rural settings and small towns which appear to 'underline the pluralist view in which religious

community is just one rather than the sole source of identity' (Hasan 2000: 13) In the Bhojpuri-speaking belt, for instance, the splitting of a family is the metaphor symbolizing partition in the folk imagination, the causes being traced to jealousy of the younger (Muslim) towards the elder (Hindu) brother. Folk poets and dramatists, whose creations have become part of the folk 'conscious collective', portray the politician (*neta*) as the chief culprit in the partition of 1947, and this image, in turn, is now understood within folk consciousness as the source of all strife and separation taking place in the name of religion. The patriotic components of the night-long vigils at folk festivals in the Bhojpuri-speaking region hence increasingly underline the need to be wary of political vested interests that seek to divide the country on the basis of religion, as at partition (Tiwari 2002).

While in both Arab and Jewish culture, active remembrance is seen as a guarantee of cultural survival, each has evolved a distinct set of narrative codes to transform individual memory into public history (Slyomovics 1998: xiv). Palestinian grand narratives interact in diverse ways with the lived experience of Palestinians as in the large and imaginative literature—a sort of folk history and folk ethnography—in which destroyed Palestinian villages are remembered and celebrated. Palestinians use 'memorial books' to commemorate villages, towns, and districts, and document their destruction through creating a narrative discontinuity arising from war, dispersion, and traumatic loss. Kanaana (2003: 41–42), adding a gender perspective contends that after 1948, men's narratives disappeared while women's narratives became stronger. In the refugee camps, it is women who tell stories about the 1948 war and the

...good old days in the lost country. They do not relate long, highly structured stories but rather anecdotes from the personal lives and the lives of members of their families, illustrating the destruction, dispersion, injustices, and oppression that fell upon their people... There are differences among these narratives according to the age, education, and political orientation of the female narrators, but they are all told in the style and structure of the women's traditional folktales (ibid.: 42).

Kanaana echoes observations on feminist perspectives in partition research by Butalia who 'found the tools of feminist historiography to be enormously enabling because it allows you to listen to that most

unheard of things, silence, and to understand it, to work with it' (Butalia 1998: 351). In reclaiming voices from the margins, the publication of two separate and influential sets of women's testimonies and memoirs in 1998, also first brought to light in stark, startling, and path-breaking ways, some of the darkest truths about India's partition (Butalia 1998; Menon and Bhasin 1998). While it has not been possible to foreground insights from gender perspectives in the present volume, feminist research promises rich potential for future cross-cultural comparisons. The recording of historical memory in such cases seems to approve and sanctify both what has been lost in the past and as it is present in contemporary life. As Priya Kumar puts it with regard to the Indian context, it may be apt to describe the 'past-in-present-ness of partition as a history that is not done with, or refuses to be past' (Kumar 1999: 204).

The diverse understandings of the war in 1948 or the partition in 1947, in turn, efface or erase traces of the perspective of lower status groups within each society. The dialog between memory and community touches on questions of whose memories have been suppressed in shaping the mainstream 'national' narrative. The particular plight of the Bedouin tribes within Israel has been effaced by the strong national narrative of Israeli independence.

In post-colonial India, the nationalist discourse aimed at creating a singular narrative, ended up silencing other voices except those with a majoritarian orientation, thus marginalizing the Muslims and Dalits. For instance, how Dalit autonomous politics was appropriated to make Hinduism the foundation of the emergent Indian national identity is an aspect conspicuously underplayed in officially sanctioned narratives of the subcontinent's partition (Chatterji 1999). The extent to which such understandings are eclipsed by mainstream narratives of partition is underscored by the distinction made by Pandey between history, that is 'national', 'rational', and 'progressive', in contrast to the 'local', 'inconsequential', and 'particular'—that which can be neither narrativized nor theorized (Pandey 2001: 119). It is precisely the concern with negotiating a relationship with the nation by reconstructing a new memory of the past that informs the proliferation of Dalit newspapers and journals in north India (Tiwari 2005: 123–40). Through interrogating received histories, a Dalit sphere aimed at effecting Dalit awakening is gradually coming into its own (ibid.).

Next, take the writing of textbooks that reach more people than most kinds of literature because they are state-mandated and disseminated through the educational system. Textbooks are the means by which nation-states naturalize their power over populations and territories and thus, once internalized, they become repositories of 'truth' and taken-for-granted assumptions about reality. States where partition has taken place, seem to offer a unique view of such processes. In the Indian subcontinent, an understanding of borders was a result of the geopolitical imagination that lay at the heart of partition. As Samaddar suggests, in this area, the hour of partition was marked as the beginning of a territorial consciousness (2001: 29). Indeed, for 'both India and Pakistan, it was partition, far more than Independence from Britain, that irrevocably fixed the territorial definition of the nation-state as the colonial era ended' (Gilmartin 1998: 1089). Among Jewish Israelis, to take another example, the mental geography of people sometimes associates partition with the year 1967 rather than the conventional one of 1948. And in Bangladesh, as Khondker (this volume) underscores, it seems that the war of 1971 is more significant in people's self-understanding than the event of 1947. These were the kinds of imaginings, in turn, that were inscribed in school texts.

After partition, Pakistani textbooks were used to create a nation—and indeed attempt unity between the two parts of the country—but the problem was how to create a textual beginning for a nation created out of the violence of partition. Muslim nationalism became the official ideology and the country was depicted as one united nation bound together by Islam and the Urdu language. However, since official nationalism was limited to the military-bureaucratic élite, notions of cultural difference could not be accommodated, which led to the persistence of identity politics, the distinctive identities eventually asserting themselves in the language and linguistic movements (Samad 1999: 375–79). In Pakistan the meaning of the Pakistan ideology, and in India distinctions between secular and communal perspectives, informed debates on history textbooks. Further, in Pakistan the sphere of 'social studies' was complicated and diluted by the introduction of Pakistan studies. In India, the teaching of social sciences has been increasingly critiqued in recent years by Hindu-revivalist efforts to replace the pluralistic vision of curriculum policy (Kumar 2001: 242). This is also supported by the findings of Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal (this volume). Clearly reminds us

that the task of establishing social distance between the newly-divided state units proceeds over several generations. Hence, states that wish to defend and maintain partition will usually attempt to occlude the historico-cultural connections that tie them to the wider territorial unit from which they separated and further, states attempt to construct partition as a lamentable national tragedy if the opposition to it was strong (Cleary 2002: 93). Similarly, both Korean states have gone to considerable lengths to promote historical narratives in school texts that legitimize their own regime while discrediting that of their rivals:

Central here are understandings of the origin of the Korean War. No other event on the peninsula has shaped the past and present as profoundly. Each side sponsors an entirely different narrative, one that remains dominated by pain and death, as well as a desire to overcome this trauma through an annihilation of the other side (Bleiker 2005: 101).

But given the ubiquity of textbooks and their power, we could also ask questions about the place of popular culture and academia in depicting partition. For example, Bollywood films figure as part of new attempts at dealing with partition. The master narrative of the regrettable 'inevitability' of partition and the glorious role of the Indian nation's founding-fathers found in school textbooks, have gone hand in hand with an unstated ban on explicit reference to Partition violence, a fact that 'discouraged attempts to make connections between the past events and the present' (Ravikant and Saint 2001: xxi). Despite Bollywood's recent interest in the collective trauma of partition (*Gadar*, *Hero*, *Sarfarosh*), Indian cinema has yet to challenge received narratives in any serious way. As Ravikant and Saint point out (2001), in many Bollywood movies, 'the vivisection of the subcontinent becomes a metaphor for the separation of lovers in the wake of communal tension' (*Pinjar*). This echoes Sommer's insights about Latin American novels where the 'obstacles that hinder the union of the lovers are also those that hinder the consolidation of the nation-state' (Cleary 2002: 112). Here, Cleary's observations that in traditionally antagonistic communities, the erotic and patriotic desires come together in 'narratives that imagine the reconciliation and assimilation of different national constituencies cast as lovers destined to desire each other' (ibid.) applies also to Bollywood's interest in exploring the partition theme.

The power of national narratives also reaches into academia. Tamari (1999) for example, states that while Arab secular historians tend to create a portrait of exaggerated harmony between Arabs and Jews in pre-1948 Jerusalem, Zionist historiography tends to suggest that the conflict is perennial. Thus, grand narratives of partition influence the ways in which scholars depict these same events. This complex process is important because of what Giddens (1984; also Zureik this volume) refers to as a 'double hermeneutic' in which academic theories about society feed back into society and constitute the very phenomena which these theories purport to study. In the context of India and Israel's first few years, academic scholarship often took on a consensual guise in terms of national narratives. Thus, for instance, the post-Independence vision of sociology as a science of society in the service of the Indian nation, was informed by a consensus on nation-building which could only be achieved by securing a respectable distance from the trauma, the pain and guilt—the 'underside' of independence. Moreover, in the interests of ensuring 'objectivity' and 'neutrality', the underpinnings of a 'value-free' sociology, the emotive violence of partition, appears to have been sacrificed as a subject worthy of sociological study. In Israel's first few decades, social scientific studies of the state and the military were also based on such a consensus, which meant that critical work began to appear only during the state's third and fourth decades (Ben-Ari and Lomsky-Feder 2001; Maman et al. 2003).

PARTITION AS (RE)SOURCE FOR CLASSIFICATION AND MATERIAL GAIN

In India, partition lingers in the collective imagination and has entered and shaped discourses of nation-building and secularism, caste and religious identities, ideas about majority–minority relations and a range of issues touching upon refugees and trans-border migrations. Processes of 'othering' at the societal level—the Hindu versus its Other, the Muslim; the Forward Castes versus the Backward Castes—have acquired normative status, legitimized in society's *conscience collective*, in part, by the 'event' of partition. Along these lines, Raman and Rao (this volume) respectively trace out the main social boundaries in Banaras and Bhopal which are based, as they (also Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal, this volume) explain, on assumptions about Muslims and Hindus as

homogeneous groups inherently in conflict. Consequently, the spatial separation of Hindus and Muslims carries over today into the phenomenon of 'mini-Pakistans', a 'hostile' term for Muslim neighborhoods, particularly in the riot-affected towns of the country.

While not termed 'partition', in Germany the division (Teilung) following World War II provided a framework for articulating contrasting memories, and particularly for discussions of 'fascism', 'totalitarianism', 'capitalism', and 'communism' (Dietzsch, this volume). In other words, through discussing specific regions or territories—and their attendant qualities—people constantly advanced or denigrated certain visions of what Germany was like and what it should be like. Such classifications, however, often map onto older schemes: The East/West dichotomy as expressed in the dichotomy of the two countries is older than that engendered by the Cold War for it reverberates with the twofold idea of Western and Eastern Europe (and correspondingly higher and lower status, more and less civilized, and more and less democratic). It is for this reason that Borneman (this volume) explains that unification of the country involved a claim about civilizing East Germans who were expected to adopt the etiquette, work ethic, and modes of behavior suited to the West.

Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal's chapter raises another issue. Empirically, they state, in 1948 the majority of people of their research area 'stayed put' and looked to borders as signs of security rather than as barriers to movement. But while created by states, the borders were then internalized to become 'taken-for-granted' assumptions about social placement. To put this point by way of example, a group's diaspora use the very same classifications to define who they are allowed to identify with—India or Pakistan. While certain classes may not accept state-mandated borders, it seems that such 'natural' boundaries are nevertheless templates invoked by them in different circumstances. Accordingly, while the label 'Hindu' may not be entirely relevant for the tribal Garos as a way to place them socially, it does become pertinent in the case of communal violence, when it can protect them from aggression.

Partition involves other kinds of gains. Thelen's chapter (this volume) underscores some material advantages that East Germans achieved despite their forced separation from the West through receiving parcels from Western German relatives. Conversely, after unification when they

thought that they had received 'cheap' goods, their relations with Western kin were devalued. Through these material exchanges 'Wessies' (West Germans) and 'Ossies' (East Germans) underwent a process of discovery and rediscovery that placed them in opposing camps. Similar processes of discovery and reframing took place among Palestinian citizens of Israel and their kin in Jordan and Egypt after the war in 1967. Moreover, during the two *Intifadas* (Palestinian uprisings), Palestinian citizens of Israel collected money and goods for their 'brothers and sisters' in the West Bank and Gaza. Here, concrete contributions and gifts may be seen as attempts to create imagined communities using kinship metaphors across boundaries.

Furthermore, we need to recognize the culpability and agency of nationalist leaders who were deeply involved in the creation of classifications based on partition (Chatterji 1999: 186). Kaul (2001: 9) even goes so far as to observe that states may constantly need the discourse on partition and the fear of future partitions to justify their authority and maintain their investment in externally and internally repressive regimes. Similarly, Berlin in its divided state was useful to all parties and the fall of the Wall marked the collapse of a symbolic system (Borneman 1991: 10). Yet, as Sinha-Kerkhoff (personal communication) suggests, while partition is used by élites to create a nation, the experiences of those who go through it may differ radically from the intentions of politicians and decision-makers. In fact, what partition meant for communities and for the fabric of social life, that is the terrain of social anthropology, remains relatively less-explored.

As we saw, classifications based on partition are not 'neutral' but rather create socially-defined grades and hierarchies. Bekerman (personal communication) suggests that in the Palestinian case, claims as to who is more of a 'legitimate' Palestinian, an authentic victim of partition, are based on one's (or one's family's) proximity to the events of forced migration in 1948. In this sense then, partition forms the basis for the creation of a hierarchy of suffering or victimhood (who has suffered most?). Dietzsch (this volume), for instance, explains that because of what it underwent under Communist rule, in some cases East Germany is now treated as a region to which special resources are allocated by the government. We could, along these lines, continue to ask the same question about the India/Pakistan divide: given the pride of place

attributed to suffering in today's world (Kleiman and Kleiman 1997), how have partitions formed part of a moral economy of suffering?

The post-partition field is also marked by interests and potential material gains. One aspect that has been studied (Thelen, this volume; Zureik this volume) centers on land rights and ownership. Another less noted one involves what, in Israel and Palestine, is sometimes referred to cynically as the 'peace industry'. Within this social field, donors, NGOs, foundations, grant-giving bodies, research circles, study centers, dialog groups, or social movements are active in preparing the ground for, or actualizing the crossing of barriers. In Germany, the ecological movement and ecumenical movement were important during partition (enabling easterners to go to the West). After unification, it was the pro-peace and co-existence groups that became active while others were marginalized and, later, much of the business of unification was taken over by political actors. In fact, it seems that such fields have been developing elsewhere, such as between the two Koreas (Bleiker 2005). This field, then, becomes a 'business' complete with its own corporate logic: how to compete for the tens of millions of dollars expended each year and (for some institutes and associations) how to fight for organizational survival. Another aspect involves tourism. Berlin, for example, offers tours of the route of the Wall, much like the tours along Hadrian's Wall separating England from Scotland.

PARTITION AS ONGOING AND CONTINUING SET OF PROCESSES

Take the idea of partition as an 'event'. The very name of Thelen's chapter 'Partition and Partings', evokes the idea that partition is a never-ending story. Partition, in her rendition, undergoes permutations within concrete historical circumstances. She shows how kin relations held the two Germanys together, despite the partition of the Cold War but ironically served to separate families after the Wall came down. Yet her chapter contains wider import. Recent scholarly research cautions against viewing the partition of the Indian subcontinent as a single definitive act, a clean-cut vivisection. As Chatterji (1999: 186) observes, it was, in fact, a messy, long-drawn-out process which remains 'still unfinished today'.

The division of territorial sovereignty between states is most explicit at the point where the fields of power meet: there must be no overlap and no uncertainty about the borders of the territory (Neocleous 2003: 411). Yet as Ghanim's chapter (this volume) shows, borders and border zones are much more processual than is commonly understood. Partition, in her depiction, is constantly produced and negotiated through migration and infiltration. Echoing and developing many of these ideas, Gren (this volume) sees partition as a process rather than a one-time event: despite partition, Palestinians still have an ambiguous attitude toward borders and toward home, as many have undergone multiple forced migrations. Take the separation barrier recently erected between Israeli and Palestinian territories as an extension of the partitions of 1948 and 1967. Today, one cannot speak of partition without speaking about the mobility regime Israel had instituted and within which the movement of Palestinians is severely curtailed. In fact, the very 'never-endingness' of the partition between Israelis and Palestinians is expressed in the constant efforts of the Israeli state to 'fix' or regularize the border through the separation barrier. As Zureik (this volume) underscores, the erection of the barrier is related to the area between Israeli and Palestinian territories being more of a frontier than a border: a zone where there is constant interpenetration between two distinct societies.

PARTITION AS SET OF ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES

Against the background of the above analysis it may now become clear how partition may form a set of principles for organizing societies and states. We stress that these are organizing principles and not only cognitive classifications because they imply concrete relational and material consequences. To be sure, our aim is not to create a new sub-discipline called 'partition studies' and in that way, to separate it off from the humanities and the social sciences. We do think, however, that it is fruitful to think about partition societies or states. This kind of conceptualization allows us to rethink our understanding of what constitutes an entity such as society or state. Thus, to put this point by way of example of Israel, Ehrlich (1987) suggests that textbook renderings of this society must take into account how the conflict with the

Palestinians and other Arab groups seeps into the very way that Israel is organized. This goes for the constant war preparation and mobilization that goes on, as it does for internal exclusions and inclusions. Thus, people in Israel live in a segregated society in which place of residence, the educational system, or marriage patterns are set apart. No less importantly as Zureik (this volume) shows, the very logic of state surveillance through the gathering of statistics or monitoring of movements of Palestinians are predicated on the idea that Palestinians within the boundaries of the state are somehow linked to Palestinians outside of it. In this sense, we would argue, Israel belongs to what may be termed a family of partition societies or states where partition becomes constitutive of social organization. In such societies, groups define themselves in terms of each other: the link between external and internal dynamics of societies is then part and parcel of the way they are organized. As Borneman (this volume) suggests, during the Cold War, East and West Germany created the effect of being outside of each other but were actually involved in a mimetic relationship of devouring—conquering—each other. Or, as Hart (cited in Bleiker 2005: 101) contends, following the Korean War, a process of the incorporation of a ‘national other’ has become an integral part of identity politics on each side.

The geographer Paasi (1998: 76) suggests that,

A boundary does not only exist in the border area, but manifests itself in many institutions such as education, the media, memorials, ceremonies and spectacles. These are effective expressions of narratives linked with boundaries and border conflicts and serve as reference to the Other.

These are understandings that may be relevant to all of the cases we are dealing with. Using the example of Christians, Gren (this volume) shows how partition in the Israeli and Palestinian case is a principle organizing the allocation of resources. Members of this group who—because they are defined as less of an ‘enemy’ than Muslims—tend to get preferential treatment from Israeli authorities (like permits to go to Jerusalem during Christian holidays). Alternatively, partition also limits their marriage opportunities by barring access to certain groups located within and outside the border of the Israeli state.

Current trends in India suggest that the logic of partition—the tensions between multiple identities and the search for moral community that was itself at the heart of partition, continues to influence the fabric of Indian society. Take the way in which representations of collective pasts are transmitted across generations and have contributed to the construction of violence in India (Brass 2003: 20). One example is the collection of testimonies of Indian women affected by partition (Butalia 1998; Das 1997; Menon and Bhasin 1998). Violence against women was shaped on the basis of seeing women as ‘repositories’ of their communities or as ‘territories to be occupied’. Hence, this kind of violence became an expression of domination over another community and underlined its humiliation. In the case of women, ‘murder, abduction, conversion, and forced migration became signs of the moral appropriation and purification of territory and incorporation into a new state’ (Gilmartin 1998).

Recent research into riots shows that while people address caste, class, and gender inequalities by rioting, their violence deepens distrust between Hindus and Muslims (Basu 1996: 79). A legacy of the way partition violence has been understood in the subcontinent is the tendency to see riots as the unplanned action of crowds and as conflagrations ignited by a ‘spark upon a bed of combustible material’. This approach fails to focus on the dynamism of riots and factors such as historical timing and the roles of individuals and groups that contribute to converting events into full-scale riots (Brass 1996: 7). The perpetuation of communal disharmony and maintenance of the very conditions that ensure the persistence of riots by vested interests; the anonymity provided by riots; the multiplicity of narratives about causal events; and, most importantly, the seeming inability of the judicial system to identify culprits and deliver justice, parallels the horrific events of 1947 and their aftermath. In this manner, periodic riots mimic the form of partition riots and conflict with Pakistan continues to reverberate throughout Indian society.

Thelen’s chapter underscores other issues. As she shows following Dietzsch (this volume), what emerged between the two Germanys were ‘exchange communities’ in the context of inequality. Partition brought about the construction of two kinship systems centered on the conjugal family with the cross-border exchanges between them creating the parallel existence of the extended family. Yet it is the category of the

‘private’ that enabled individual Germans to cross formal state boundaries: this category, ostensibly opposed to the ‘public’, was actually a state-mandated one. This ‘private’ sphere allowed private links that traversed borders created by partition but also necessitated state surveillance and gathering of intelligence by the two states created by the very same process of separation. The ultimate irony, perhaps, shown by the German case, is that during the post-partition phase, partition continues to provide a set of organizing principles: for the allocation of resources, for self and other identification, and for political allegiances.

PARTITION AS OUTCOME OF MODERNITY

John Eidson (personal communication) suggests seeing partition as part of wider processes, in the 20th century, of creating mono-ethnic states. Indeed, with the consolidation of the international state system during the 20th century, the territorial state became ‘the’ political form adopted by all nations, an ideal that many groups aspire to (Anderson 1991; Neocleous 2003: 411). If sovereignty ‘implies a space against which violence, whether latent or overt, is directed—a space established and constituted by violence’ (Lefebvre in Neocleous 2003: 412), then the ideal type of nation-state can fruitfully be examined through partition, as the contributions to this present volume make clear. Whether through forced migration, the creation of exclusionary narratives or mapping of territories, this volume clarifies the processes by which a ‘founding violence, and the continuous creation by violent means, are the hallmarks of the state’ (Neocleous 2003: 412).

This point is related to the characteristics of maps as brought out by Ben-Ze’ev’s chapter (this volume): the systematic, standardized recording and charting of data in visual form that represents space, resources, and populations. This systematicity of maps is part of the very power of states in their administrative guise to control populations, construct classifications, and allocate desired resources. What makes cases of partition so worthy of study, as Zureik (this volume) claims for the case of Israel and Palestine, is that the construction of citizens and links between population and landownership are contested. They are thus open for investigation.

Indeed, the massive population transfers in Europe and the Indian subcontinent after World War II all went well with the idea of the nation-state. Chris Hann (personal communication) suggests that a similar logic

underlay the example of Turkey with the population transfers that took place during the last days of the Ottoman Empire: millions of Greeks left for Greece and the Turks came back 'home' to Anatolia.

The language and phraseology of the Lausanne Protocol of 30 January 1923 is indicative of the intentions and perceptions of those who signed it. The protocol refers to the persons to be exchanged as Turkish subjects of the Greek Orthodox religion residing in Turkey and Greek subjects of the Muslim religion residing in Greece. Lewis explains that the individuals to be transferred were identified according to two categories, as adherents of a religion and as subjects of a state. (Lewis 1998: 10–17)

These developments were part of the creation of the Turkish nation-state with its assumptions about territorial separation and homogenization as part of modernity. As Borneman (this volume) suggests in another context, the modern nation-state seems to inevitably politicize the cultural nation by assuming that a nation needs a unified state for representation. The peculiar uniqueness of partition-states, however, is the centrality of a threatening minority in constituting national identity. While such entities as the Ottoman and Austrian–Hungarian empires present alternatives to the nation-state in terms of workable ethnic relations, the separation between discrete nation-states implied by partition is often understood as a 'good', 'natural', and 'ideal' (in the sense of being sought after) way of solving conflicts or potential conflicts between groups. In this sense, partition should be seen as something very modern, a product of the modernity project.

By raising such issues, this volume extends and develops inquiries into notions of space that have been published during the past two decades or so. Recent studies well underline the contested—essentially labile and political—nature of spatial identities (Bendix 1992). According to this set of approaches, such identities are no longer conceptualized as a given, but rather as an assortment of typifications and images that are constantly negotiated and struggled for. The thrust of such studies has been to question the distinctiveness of societies, nations, and cultures as based on some kind of unproblematic division of space; to interrogate the 'fact' that they occupy naturally discontinuous spaces. Indeed, it is

...so taken for granted that each country embodies its own distinctive culture and society that the terms 'society' and 'culture' are routinely simply appended to the names of nation-states, as when a tourist visits India to understand 'Indian culture' and 'Indian society' (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 7).

Indeed, partition as a product of modernity makes problematical the very 'naturalness' of the nation-state. Two kinds of naturalisms are challenged in this respect (Bilu and Ben-Ari 1997; Malkki 1992): the first is the anthropological convention of taking the association of a culturally unitary group (the 'tribe' or 'people') and 'its' territory as natural. Borneman (this volume; also Dietzsch this volume) using the case of Germany suggests that when the two Koreas face unification, they will be motivated by a deeply emotional fiction that they are uniting two peoples that are already the same, two peoples who can substitute for one another. The second is the practice of taking the association of citizens and states and their territories as natural (see Handler 1988). All the contributions in the present volume essentially question these taken-for-granted assumptions. Thus, characters that resist the imposition of migration because different religions demand different citizenship, constantly appear in the partition literature analyzed by Bhalla (this volume). In a similar way, Bhalla shows that by depicting the viable, integrated and meaning-making communities in which many people lived in pre-partition times, fictional texts expose and question the assumptions at the base of the grand narratives of communal politicians. Francisco's powerful usage 'nationalist fratricide' extends the lessons of partition to not only understand the conflict between people of a common cultural heritage but also common subjects of foreign domination 'in competition as "nations" for political control of land and government' (Francisco 2000: 372). In this sense, it is the psychological and emotional complexity and density of partition literature that raise disturbing ethical and political questions that need urgent answers—questions such as who the losers of partition were and who the gainers. Thus,

the reason we so badly need the literature is to defeat the urge to lay blame, which keeps animosity alive. Only the literature truly evokes the suffering of the innocent, whose pain is more universal and ultimately a vehicle for more honest reconciliation than political discourse (ibid.: 392).

PARTITION AS SOLUTION

Given the wide acceptance of the nation-state as 'natural', it may be understood how partition is often seen as a necessary, natural and desired solution to actual or potential intergroup conflict. In the case of

Palestine and Israel where many groups perceive the conflict as a demographic one, partition is seen by a vast majority of the population as the solution. While not to be confused with the understanding of the Israeli colonial project in the area, Ghanim (conference proceedings) suggests that for many Palestinians the political solution is that of partition.

With reference to the state's political calculations, there are important links between the partition of the Indian subcontinent and colonial policy in Palestine. Dasgupta points to the 'supposed' impact of Muslim opinion in the Middle East which weighed heavily on British deliberations in the Indian subcontinent.

'Britain's abandonment of the Palestine mandate and the emergence of the State of Israel had inflamed Arab nationalist sentiments. As a result British strategic interests in the region had been put in jeopardy. Prone to confuse national with religious sentiment in Asia, British policy makers drew the conclusion that their middle-eastern policy demanded a pro-Pakistan stance (2002: 160).

Raman (this volume) mentions an off-the-cuff comment she heard while doing fieldwork. With reference to Hindu-Muslim relations in Banaras, one of her informants mentioned the 'line of control' which is used to refer to the India/Pakistan border as a possible solution to the city's inter-religious woes. Such a vision encapsulates in exaggerated form the ideal state solution of a clearly monitored boundary between Muslims and Hindus as homogeneous groups in inherent conflict. Khondker's chapter (this volume) further underscores this point. By emphasizing that Bengal has experienced three partitions (see also Chatterji 1999), he suggests that we look at partitions as constant attempts by authorities to order or manage conflicts between social groupings through strict territorial divisions. At the same time, Raman (this volume) sounds a caution. She talks about two main images of solutions to Hindu-Muslim relations that are found in Banaras. The first echoes with partition. Thus when Hindus claim that Muslims have built tunnels in the city, they are using the same kind of demonic imagery that many leaders used during the period of partition. For them the ascription of tunnel-building includes such dichotomies as unseen as opposed to seen, below versus above, dark against light, or sinister in opposition to benign beings. Such has been the imagery in much of

the subcontinent. Yet the other representation found in Banaras is that of *tana-bana*, the intertwining of the two communities like the warp and weft of woven cloth. Here the idea is not the creation of some kind of homogeneous entity based on sameness or likeness, but the intermingling of separate groups. As Raman shows, these are competing views of possible solutions. The wider lesson for us is the realization that sometimes partition is not perceived as natural or desired.

Linking these ideas back to the image of partition as an ongoing process complicates things further. For many Jews, the idea of 'return' to Israel has long been part of prayer and longing over the centuries. Indeed, the idea of return for many Jews is related to their diasporic existence and very survival as a people. For the Palestinians the 'right of return' is implicated in being refugees and as very basic to their peoplehood and nationhood (Klein 1998; Lindholm 2003: 1). Indeed, for Palestinians it is assumed that 'return' is the only ultimate solution to contemporary predicaments. Just like 'loss' and 'struggle', 'return has become part of Palestinian identity' (Lindholm 2003: 7). But as time has passed and new generations have been born and have grown up outside Palestine, return has become increasingly abstract, and placed in a distant tomorrow. For newer generations, return does not necessarily signify a longing for a homeland as much as a feeling of nothingness, liminality, and the vacuum of not having a home in the countries where they reside (ibid.: 9). Thus 'return' is not a monolithic discourse but differentiated according to generation and (as we have seen) gender and place of residence.

In this sense, the chapters by Bhalla (this volume) and Bekerman (this volume) depict attempts to go beyond partition, to create alternative worlds, other solutions to intergroup conflict. In his contribution Bhalla argues with those who contend that it is only through complete secularism that a reconciliation or toleration (as enabling and acknowledging the other) will come about. His contention is that, paradoxically, memory may form a hope for the future. The partition stories he describes are about loss of religious sensibility, yet in order to overcome ruptures there is a need to find redemptive ways: not to think about the violence but about non-revenge histories that seek commonalities. Bekerman (this volume) analyzes the religious ceremonies that take place at schools, aimed at strengthening coexistence between Jewish and Palestinian groups in Israel through egalitarian educational efforts.

He cautions us, however, that reconciliation was never an openly declared aim of these schools. In general, there has been little discussion of reconciliation in Israel because from the perspective of the Jewish majority, such a concept would imply the open recognition of misdeeds towards the Palestinian Israeli minority, a rather difficult acknowledgement given present ideological stances among Israeli Jews. Yet in analyzing the special ceremonial events in these schools, he explores their potential to challenge hegemonic canons and alleviate interethnic tensions. Both Bhalla and Bekerman suggest that cultural and religious ceremonies or bases of faith have a potential for renewal that national ones do not.

In the Indian case, it is rather the notion of *akhand Bharat* (unbroken India), an emotive concept signifying uninterrupted, unbroken civilizational continuity since times immemorial that continues to inspire and arouse patriotic fervor. It also evokes the notion of homeland and its soil as holy. Even better known is the notion of *Bharat Mata*, a metaphor for the land and people of India as a whole, epitomizing the culture's feminine values of grace, wisdom, and civilizational depth. Yet, since this icon of the post-colonial Indian nation is derived from the Hindu iconography of the all-nurturing Mother goddess, with even a temple dedicated to the nation in Varanasi, the city of temples, it remains a problematic concept as it may be seen as exclusive of other faiths. The sense of discomfort these imaginings of the nation arouse, are likely to be compounded in school assemblies when the secular patriotic songs derive from, or are based upon the Hindu devotional (*bhakti*) traditions. How inclusive such imagery can be needs to be questioned especially where commitment to secular inclusive traditions is claimed.

Among examples of reconciliation is Zochrot. Founded by Israeli Jews who believe that by overlooking the Palestinian catastrophe of 1948 the Arab-Israeli conflict is prolonged, the initiative seeks Jewish acknowledgement of this historical tragedy. In addition, it actively attempts to develop a sense of responsibility for Zionist property confiscation as essential for bringing about an end to the conflict, and promoting true reconciliation. Zochrot organizes visits of refugees and their descendants, and invites Israeli Jews interested in learning about their histories and expressing solidarity with them. As the Zionist discourse conjures up images of a violent memory, invariably exclusive and masculine, leaving little space for the (Palestinian) 'other', Zochrot strives towards reconciliation in inclusive and compassionate ways and

attempts to create a space for the memory of women in the Palestinian *Naqba*. For the Palestinians involved, the tour is a journey in memory, to places they lived in, or from where members of their families came. For the Jews who sympathize with them, the experience uncovers a kind of memory that was deliberately and systematically hidden from them. An alternative culture to the predominant, hegemonic collective memory which oppresses the Palestinians and suppresses their *Naqba* is thus created (Bronstein 2004).

The Gujarat harmony project stands out as an important example of restorative justice in the face of the failure of the retributive justice system. It brings together ten diverse development organizations and endeavors to help them share their diverse skills. Restorative justice helps a society to live with a violent past, not by forgetting but by understanding the reasons for the transgressions. And while retributive justice is offender-specific, the latter helps rebuild relations through processes of reconciliation aimed at transforming society. The principle of forgiveness underlying restorative justice involves a social transaction between a person who forgives and person who is forgiven: In other words, reconciliation is based on a social transaction between perpetrators and victims (Ahmed 2004: 101). In this respect, some women's groups working on income-generating opportunities and marketing support, have responded to the mounting criticism in development circles about the alarming de-politicization of micro-credit societies that remained mute spectators during the Gujarat violence of 2000 (Batiwala and Dhanraj 2005). As Ahmed (2004: 97) concludes, 'restorative justice needs to be supported by activities which build people's skills, knowledge and social networks, and rebuild livelihoods harmed by the conflict'.

Along these lines, Bekerman's contribution (this volume) raises another set of issues related to the future development of partitioned societies—the theme of school assemblies and ceremonies, which provides a rich entry-point for cross-cultural comparisons. In the case of India, while the range of school types is heterogeneous with diverse orientations, by and large, the vast majority of schools is committed to a combination of secularism and patriotism, both associated with modern states. School assemblies emerge as significant sites in understanding how the values of patriotism are produced. Many schools require the pledging of loyalty to the school, the flag, and the nation. The singing of the national anthem, followed by other patriotic songs

and the atmosphere of *deshbhakti* (loosely translated as reverence for the nation), often characterizes school assemblies. In recent years these ideas have been accompanied by a marked Hinduization of the public sphere. The daily rituals of school assemblies appear to borrow liberally from the language of devotional worship where the nation appears to substitute for the deity.

The intertwining and blurring of religious and secular motifs are such that schools also emerge as 'temples' of learning. Hence, while secularism is ideally defined as the separation of religious from political power, the universalization of certain concepts make for considerable ambiguity in the attempt to reconcile vernacular with western notions. The meaning of secularism as 'tolerance of all creeds' rather than their 'disappearance' is one case in point (see Benei 2006, forthcoming). Unfortunately traditional approaches to peace and reconciliation are few in that the reality of the nation-state is not sufficiently accounted for by disciplines which claim to have some knowledge about social identity and by scholars who try to contribute to our understanding of identities in conflict.

Thus a central question we should ask is: Can change really be achieved without first exposing and overcoming the structures and practices which have established the present conflictual situation and their functional categories? A nation is always in the process of elaboration, a process which holds national culture in its most productive position, as a force for unity through subordination and the creation of new memories. Working towards emancipation from present national formations might sound utopian, but is worth a try. The secret of the persistence of discursive resources is their banality, which in turn is responsible for our non-reflective experience. 'Aqua' is not the stuff of which fish are most aware (when they swim unreflectively in it). Similarly, the recursive practices inscribed in the banality of the nation-state blind us to the discursive resources that establish, drive, and produce it. Inevitably, we are far more likely to describe ourselves and our circumstances with the discursive resources, including their hidden ideologies, that our present contexts offer us freely, rather than approaching the issue reflectively so as to uncover the building blocks of our present consciousness. While so doing we fall prey to that which holds us true to those patterns through which we endure unwelcome experiences.

Social scientists critically approaching these issues need to shift their focus of analysis from the categories left vacant in the discursive resources that our context offers us, to the unveiling of the resources available and their shaping forces, thus engaging them in a critical dialog. In education decodification, Freire's (Freire and Macedo 1995) metaphor for literacy learning might be the right process through which to start to dis-inscribe the nation-state's latent hegemonic power. A critical pedagogy (Apple 1982) might be the way to discern a world of relationships which has the potential to create both essentialist and dynamic identities and cultures. Any other choice will continue to obscure the distortions of the ideology which sustain the world and the reified categories we seek to change. Still, we need to proceed with care. Critical approaches tend to place too much faith in the powers of reasoning and might dangerously guide us back into the creation of new meta-narratives, this time perhaps the ones of our preference, yet equally misleading in their homogenizing power. To approach the discursive resources of nation-state critically, does not necessarily mean doing away with them but, rather, to show how their authority is constituted and constituting. It is always to the participants in the critical inquiry that we owe the choice to integrate and/or reject oppositional knowledge. Hopefully, future studies will work in this direction.

Conclusion

Cross-case analysis may illuminate elements that a focus on only one instance obscures. By deploying the comparative imagination, comparative perspectives and the set of approaches comparison involves, the chapters in this volume seek to stretch our understanding of partition as a phenomenon of modernity as well as a set of organizing principles. In placing the three distinct experiences explored here 'side by side' with each other to generate dialogs between partition societies, the contributions also serve as interventions in contemporary and ongoing debates entailing citizenship and social identities; states and nation-building; borders and boundaries; the nature of contemporary conflicts; social and collective memory, and issues of remembrance and forgetting.

Such comparisons allow us to go beyond an emphasis on the uniqueness of the set of 'events' called partition in specific historical

contexts and concentrate instead on themes and processes of particular interest to sociologists and social anthropologists across national divides. The limited vision that arises from studying one's own society and seeing it as unique is broadened and enhanced in adopting approaches that illuminate both commonalities and differences with other societies. Thus, as we have shown in this introduction, the lens of partition serves to focus our gaze on how societies that have experienced breaks and traumas are organized and constituted, and the ways in which they deploy their understandings of the past, and reformulate and reconstruct themselves, thereby also evolving new traditions. Our focus also allows for enquiries into ways in which local communities as well as wider national entities use their knowledge of the past and ways in which multiple voices are narrativized. This book answers questions about the diverse ways in which partition continues to work as a reference point.

Besides adding to our ethnographic understanding, each of the chapters in this volume offers a unique perspective, illuminating the long-term consequences of one or other aspect arising from partition. The richness of the data along with vital and fascinating details, while associated with cultural specificities and particular contexts, also point to the range and complexity of analytical challenges for the disciplines of social anthropology and sociology. As Butalia points out, 'in any such exploration of the past, the aspects we choose to illuminate are determined not only by the present we live in, but the future we wish to work towards' (Butalia 1998: 351). And it is ultimately the future of partition and partitioning that this volume as a whole underscores.

REFERENCES

- Ahmed, S. 2004. 'Sustaining Peace, Re-building Livelihoods: The Gujarat Harmony Project', *Gender and Development*, 12(3), Nov.: 94–102.
- Anderson, B. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Apple, M. W. 1982. *Education and Power*. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Batliwala, S. and D. Dhanraj. 2005. 'Gender Myths that Instrumentalise Women: A View from the Indian Frontline', *IDS Bulletin*, 35(4).
- Basu, Amrita. 1996. 'Mass Movement or Élite Conspiracy? The Puzzle of Hindu Nationalism', in D. Ludden (ed.), *Contesting the Nation, Religion, Community and the Politics of Democracy in India*, pp. 55–80. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

- Ben-Ari, Eyal and Edna Lomsky-Feder. 2001. 'Introductory Essay—Military, Identity and War in Israel: Cultural Constructions', in Edna Lomsky-Feder and Eyal Ben-Ari (eds), *The Military and Militarism in Israeli Society*, pp. 1–36. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Bendix, Regina. 1992. 'National Sentiment in the Enactment and Discourse of Swiss Political Ritual', *American Ethnologist*, 19(4): 768–90.
- Benei, Veronique (forthcoming). *Nationalizing Children: An Ethnography of Schooling, Gender and Violence in Western India* (provisional title).
- Bhalla, A. 1994. 'Introduction', in A. Bhalla (ed.), *Stories About the Partition of India*, pp. xv–xviii. Delhi: HarperCollins.
- Bilu, Y. and Eyal Ben-Ari. 1997. *Grasping Land: Space and Place in Israeli Discourse and Experience*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Bleiker, R. 2005. *Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Borneman, J. 1991. *After the Wall. East Meets West in the New Berlin*. New York: Basic Books.
- Brass, P. (ed.). 1996. *Riots and Pogroms*. New York: New York University Press.
- Brass, P. 2003. *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Bronstein, E. 2004. 'The Nakba in Hebrew: Israeli-Jewish Awareness of the Palestinian Nakba and International Displacement', (unpublished paper). Available on www.zochrot.org.
- Butalia, U. 1995. 'Muslims and Hindus. Men and Women: Communal Stereotypes and the Partition of India', in T. Sarkar and U. Butalia (eds), *Women and the Hindu Right. A Collection of Essays*. New Delhi: Kali for Women.
- . 1998. *The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India*. New Delhi: Penguin.
- Chatterji, J. 1999. 'The Fashioning of a Frontier: The Radcliffe Line and Bengal's Border Landscape, 1947–52', *Modern Asian Studies*, 33(1), Feb.: 185–242.
- Cleary, Joe. 2002. *Literature, Partition and the Nation-State: Culture and Conflict in Ireland, Israel and Palestine*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Connerton, P. 1989. *How Societies Remember*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Das, V. 1997. 'Language and Body: Transactions in the Construction of Pain', in A. Kleinman, V. Das, and M. Lock (eds), *Social Suffering*, pp. 67–93. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Dasgupta, C. 2002. *War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947–48*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Ehrlich, A. 1987. 'Israel: Conflict, War and Social Change', in C. Creighton and M. Shaw (eds), *The Sociology of War and Peace*, pp. 121–42. London: Macmillan.
- Francisco, J. 2000. 'In the Heat of Fratricide: The Literature of India's Partition Burning Freshly (A Review Article)', in Mushirul Hasan (ed.), *Inventing Boundaries Gender, Politics and the Partition of India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Freire, P., and D. P. Macedo. 1995. 'A Dialogue: Culture, Language and Race', *Harvard Educational Review*, 65: 377–403.

- Giddens, A. 1984. *The Constitution of Society: Outline of a Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Gilmartin, D. 1998. 'Partition, Pakistan and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 57(4), Nov.: 1068–95.
- Gupta, A. and J. Ferguson. 1992. 'Beyond "Culture": Space, Identity and the Politics of Difference', *Cultural Anthropology*, 7(1): 6–23.
- Handler, R. 1988. *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Hasan, M. 1994. *India's Partition: Process, Strategy, Mobilization*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- . 1997. *India Partitioned: The Other Face of Freedom*. New Delhi: Roli Books.
- (ed.). 2000. *Inventing Boundaries: Gender, Politics and the Partition of India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Halbwachs, Maurice. 1992. *On Collective Memory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Jalal, A. 1985. *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kanaana, S. 2003. *Half a Century of Palestinian Folk Narratives*. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of International Relations: Bir Zeit University.
- Kaul, S. 2001. *The Partitions of Memory. The Afterlife of the Division of India*. New Delhi: Permanent Black.
- Kleiman, A. and J. Kleiman. 1997. 'The Appeal of Experience, The Dismay of Images: Cultural Appropriations of Suffering in Our Times', in A. Kleiman, V. Das, and M. Lock (eds), *Social Suffering*, pp. 1–23. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Klein, M. 1998. 'Between Right and Realization: The PLO Dialectics of the Right of Return', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 11(1): 1–19.
- Kumar, Krishna. 2001. *Prejudice and Pride. School Histories of the Freedom Struggle in India and Pakistan*. New Delhi: Viking.
- Kumar, Priya. 1999. 'Testimonies of Loss and Memory: Partition and the Haunting of a Nation', *Interventions*, 1(2): 201–15.
- Kumar, Radha. 2003. 'Settling Partition Hostilities: Lessons Learnt, the Options Ahead', in G. G. Deschaumes and Rada Ivekovic (eds), *Divided Countries, Separated Cities: The Modern Legacy of Partition*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Lewis, B. 1998. *The Multiple Identities of the Middle-East*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Lindholm, S. H. 2003. 'Return', *Refugees and the Collapse of the Peace Process between Israelis and Palestinians*. Department of Peace and Development Research: Goteborg University.
- Lindholm, S. and J. Hammer. 2003. *The Palestinian Diaspora—Formation of Identities and Politics of Homeland*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Malkki, L. 1992. 'National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity Among Scholars and Refugees', *Cultural Anthropology* 7(1): 24–43.

- Maman, D., Z. Rosenhek and E. Ben-Ari. 2003. 'The Study of War and the Military in Israel: An Empirical Investigation and Reflective Critique', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 35: 461–84.
- 'Memory and the Partition Motif in Contemporary Conflicts', Conference, Max Planck Institute for Anthropology, Halle, Germany, 14–17 July 2005.
- Menon, R. and K. Bhasin. 1998. *Borders and Boundaries Women in India's Partition*. New Delhi: Kali for Women.
- Neocleous, M. 2003. 'Off the Map: On Violence and Cartography', *European Journal of Social Theory* 6(4): 409–25.
- Paasi, A. 1998. 'Boundaries as Social Processes: Territoriality in the World of Flows', *Geopolitics* 3(1): 69–88.
- Pandey, G. 1993. *The Question of Identity in India Today*. New Delhi: Viking.
- . 2001. *Remembering Partition. Violence, Nationalism and History in India*. New Delhi and Cambridge: Foundation Books and Cambridge University Press.
- Peteet, J. 2005. 'Words as Interventions: Naming the Palestine–Israel Conflict', *Third World Quarterly*, 26(1): 153–72.
- Ravikant and T. Saint (eds). 2001. *Translating Partition*. New Delhi: Katha.
- Samad, Y. 1999. 'Reflections on Partition: Pakistan Perspective' in Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh (eds), *Region and Partition. Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Samaddar, R. 2001. *A Biography of the Indian Nation 1947–1997*. New Delhi: Sage.
- . 2003. 'The Last Hurrah That Continues', Deschaumes Ghislaine Glasson and Rada Ivekovic (eds), *Divided Countries, Separated Cities. The Modern Legacy of Partition*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Schwarz, Barry. 1982. 'The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in Collective Memory', *Social Forces*, 61(2): 374–402.
- Slyomovics, S. 1998. *The Object of Memory—Arab and Jew Narrate the Palestinian Village*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Talbot, I. 1988. *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of the Muslim League in North-West and North-East India, 1937–1974*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Tamari, S. 1999. 'Jerusalem 1948: The Phantom City', *Jerusalem Quarterly Profile*, Volume 3.
- Tiwari, B. N. 2002. 'Partition Memory and Popular Culture', in S. Settar and I. Baptista Gupta (eds), *Pangs of Partition. The Human Dimension. Vol. 2*. ICHR, New Delhi: Manohar.
- . 2005. 'DomiNation: How the Fragments Imagine the Nation: Perspectives from Some North Indian Villages', *Dialectical Anthropology* 29: 123–40.
- Zerubavel, Y. 1994. 'The Death of Memory and the Memory of Death: Masada and the Holocaust as Historical Metaphors', *Representations*, 45(Winter): 72–100.

Borders, Spaces, and Maps





Partition as a Challenge to the 'Homogeneous' German Nation

INA DIETZSCH

Borders, both as cause and effect of partition, simultaneously initiate and support processes of inclusion and exclusion. We know of three different but interwoven dimensions of these processes: geographical, cultural, and social. In this chapter, I show that in the case of German partition and unification, these dimensions are interrelated. I argue that through the German partition after World War II, a system of symbolic differentiation had been produced, that not only maintains and continues to effectively maintain borders, but also works across the entire German society as a flexible organizing principle for national belonging and social classification. Influenced by current public discussion on the social integration of East Germans into a unified Germany after 1989, I take a closer look at how Germans came to terms with the border during partition and after unification. I argue that during the period of partition, through the existing symbolic systems, a border between the East and West was constructed by using two different, though interconnected, methods of creating meaning. Based on their cultural or territorial affiliations, objects, actions, values as well as people, were assigned to the categories of 'East' or 'West'. These cultural and territorial assignments continue to determine perceptions of how Germans, especially East Germans, are defined today.

Personal Letters as Research Resource in Sociological Enquiry

In Germany, the period after 1945 was one of intensive correspondence between relatives and friends living in the two separated parts of

the country. In my doctoral thesis, I examined correspondences as a special form of everyday interaction (Dietzsch 2004). The bulk of my source material came in response to my request for letters in announcements of the research project, printed in several regional newspapers in 1994.¹ Different reasons appear to have encouraged people to hand over their letters to me. Some were trying to dispose of their past; others were dismantling their households to move elsewhere; some were renewing their apartments and simply needed more space at home. Many were intrigued at the possibility of taking part in a documentary project that would sometime perhaps bring their individual experiences to public attention. In some cases they explicitly hoped to contribute their voice to the process of rewriting German history after unification.

The result of the research announcement was a collection of more than 2,000 letters exchanged between the eastern and the western part of Germany from 1948 to 1989. At first I was amazed at the extent of the response and the openness of people.

Retrospectively I would explain both by the sense of a new era about to dawn. People appeared to still believe in and hope for a future similar to the situation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) before unification. At the same time they also began to realize that their individual life stories and experiences were not reflected in the official discourse about the German Democratic Republic (GDR). That discourse was clearly dominated by a West German view and a political as well as a scientific perception of the GDR as a dictatorship, sometimes even seen as comparable to the Nazi regime.

Another scientific view saw the Eastern part of the new unified Germany as the less developed one, that would have to 'catch up' with new styles of democracy as well as increasing flexibility in market behavior. The much discussed stereotype of that time was that of the lazy East German, who still had to learn what work, freedom, and democracy really meant. In all such depictions and descriptions, most former GDR citizens could not find their individual stories represented. Rather, despite the remarkably better levels of income and consumption, they felt devalued as second class citizens.

On the other hand, many researchers understood the time after unification as a unique period of transition which had to be documented in as much detail as possible. However, a methodological problem arose in that researchers themselves were involved in the transformation

process and were often even personally affected by the unequal power relations between East and West. The resulting lack of distance meant that while today East Germany is considered to be the most examined region of Europe, very few new theoretical insights of the processes of cultural transition have emerged from within Germany.²

During the mid-1990s, the intention of my work on letters was to reconstruct everyday life in East and West. Only after reading them together did I become aware of the worth of these sources. Reading correspondences without the interruption of sending and receiving, offers a totally new perspective. What perturbed me, however, was the tone of mutual misunderstanding and hurt that pervaded the correspondence. The experience of the first reading completely changed my research interest. From this time onwards, the central focus of the research shifted to the question: What did people do to maintain their correspondences, despite the possibility of grave lack of understanding, the inability to comprehend each other's viewpoints, and situations sometimes leading to the taking of offence on both sides? The situation was complicated even further by GDR policies of mail censorship. Since I was especially interested in how relationships were evolving over a long time period and how they were sustained and developed under the conditions of partition, to get the needed distance (by generation) from the corpus, I chose only the long-term correspondences for deeper analysis.

The next problem I was faced was the meager methodological literature on personal letters as source material for sociology and social anthropology. Thomas and Znaniecki's classic 'The Polish Peasant in Europe and America' (1918–1920), the masterpiece based on collections of personal documents, first brought personal letters into the realm of scientific methodological debate.

Unfortunately, however, in the German speaking context there has been little critical perception of this work³ (Fischer-Rosenthal et al. 1995; Fuchs 1984; Kohli 1981). The Swedish ethnologist, Knut Djupedal, has outlined the characteristics of personal letters as follows: First, they are written sources that can be read like other historical documents and analyzed in terms of content or style. Second, as letters are elements of communication processes without mutual face-to-face perception, a special common frame of reference is needed. We may ask: How do people arrive at that common frame and what are their sources of reference? Third, letters are a medium of autobiographical writing.

They may give interesting insights about how people construct their biographies. Finally, letters are an omnipresent part of everyday life as they are artifacts that initiate special behavior in connection with writing, reading, receiving, or sending (Djupedal 1989). Personal letters are thus a rich source to learn about different dimensions of a newly constructed border at the level of individual action.

As an introduction to the material, the following lines from a woman of the GDR to her uncle in Stuttgart (in the south of West Germany) in 1969 convey the complexity of living with borders:

When we told our Fabian [little child], that the West is behind the Brandenburg Gate, he looked again and again hoping to get a glimpse of Uncle Karl and Aunt Gudrun. Because for him you are in the West and he's not yet well versed in geography. It is hard and it continues to be hard to explain to the children why we aren't able just to visit you and you don't want to visit us [30.9.1969].⁴

The letter hints at the complexity of grappling with the reality of the new border dividing Germany after World War II. First, the perception of the wall as an inhuman product of Cold War politics is foregrounded. Second, it relates the partition to concrete places and attempts to localize it while searching for new bearings in a post-war world, which, in a socio-geographical sense, has fallen into total disarray. Third, it betrays incomprehension and then reflects on the levels of understanding required to ascertain the meaning of the division for people who had formerly perceived each other as members of a shared German community. In relation to the special conditions of partition and in addition to Djupedals' useful set of analytical principles, at least two other basic qualities of letter exchanges are worthy of mention: the 'fiction of reality' and the function of being part of a community project. I use the term 'fiction of reality' outlined by the German psychologist Jens Brockmeier, as the impulse among correspondents to search for reality reflected in everyday communication. (Brockmeier 1999). In other words, people who exchange letters normally believe that what they read about is the reality of others they are not able to see owing to geographical distance. This does not mean that there is no reality in the letters, but that this form of interaction creates its own reality, and allows for other self-images in ways that face-to-face contact does not.

The notion of letters as a part of a community project is based on the understanding of personal letters by Thomas and Znaniecki.

Especially through their concept of 'bowing letters' the authors strengthened the character of community-building practice of personal letters that were written in migration contexts. (Dietzsch 2000: 273) According to Thomas and Znaniecki, 'The bowing letter is normally written by or to a member of the family who is absent for a certain time. Its function is to manifest the persistence of familial solidarity in spite of the separation' (Thomas and Znaniecki 1918–1920: 303). Further they pointed out that persons usually maintained their social status even in absence, for instance fathers who make decisions for the family through letters from abroad.

The letters pertaining to this research are also part of an exchange that is inclusive of various family members, reflected in the salutation phrase or in the forms of address used. Hence the 'fictionality' of the exchanges is limited by the fact that entire communities partake in reading them, which in turn has a bearing on what the letter-writer chooses to express. The self-images constructed in the letters were therefore limited by the necessity of mediation with attributions and assignments of other relatives, friends, or other community members. This special ambiguity of the 'fiction of reality' makes the letters especially dense for analyzing the construction processes of the German East/West border.

As the political border traversed and encroached upon former social and political boundaries after the war, individuals were forced to deal with contradictory demands that define Germans across the border, on the one hand, as part of the national community, but, on the other, also as the 'other', and in certain instances, as 'foreign' people. A significant finding of my research was that letters were preoccupied with concerns about community-building and practices which permitted differences and inequalities to recede into the background, until, over time, they disappeared from the perspectives of the correspondents altogether. To mention only some examples: They wrote about seeing the same TV programs, they imagined themselves spending holidays together and eating cake that was made with ingredients from the West, based on recipes from the East. Above all, this was observed in cases where correspondents defined their relationship in terms of friendship, a concept that implies not only reciprocity, but also a high level of equality.

By hiding or ignoring misunderstandings and differences, the understanding of being German (especially in the sense of speaking

the same language and a shared easygoing understanding) became a form of individual expression. At the same time, correspondence between friends or acquaintances acquired national meaning. The 'imagined community' on the one hand, provided individuals with a perception of solidarity strong enough to absorb differences and misunderstandings that developed during the period, without endangering the relationship. On the other hand, the correspondence trained participants to cope with hierarchical differences and finally led them to understand that such differences were everyday challenges that could be overcome. The letter-writers successfully bridged the distance between East and West by juxtaposing the political partition of Germany with an imagined everyday community of East and West Germans. In the context of individual relationships and the willingness to maintain them under conditions of national partition, such meaning-production must be interpreted as an appropriate strategy to deal with the contradictory demands mentioned above—to define Germans across the border, on the one hand, as part of the national community, and, on the other, also as 'other' or 'foreign'.

As a result, these differences also became self-evident and ceased to be accessible by reflection. So they could be even more effective than before. I argue that in the form of a tacit knowing (Polanyi 1958)⁵ the Germans at the time of unification were familiar with a system of classification by which objects and people could be divided in 'East' and 'West' and so set into a hierarchical relationship.

Finally, with regard to the limits of this kind of database, it must be pointed out that the correspondences were very rarely completely handed over. Furthermore, my data source was limited to my particular research interest in only long-term correspondences. This restricted me to persons who belonged more or less to one generation. From this point of view, much cannot be said about the transmittance of symbolic systems from one generation to the next. This question could be crucial to obtain new insights into the mechanisms or ways in which symbolic power reproduces itself over decades and, perhaps, centuries. This would require more investigation and additional, more recent data, especially from the partition period, when younger people, who had grown up within divided Germany, began to write to each other across the border.

Two Ways of Constructing Difference between East and West

The tendency to divide Europe culturally into eastern and western parts is not new. Objects, peoples, or 'cultures' which are regarded in such a way are quite clearly influenced by almost tangible stereotypes. The Western fraction is seen as strong, clean, and—in a capitalist sense—effective and democratic; the Eastern as weak, dirty, ineffective, and despotic. It is a construction which elaborates the description of the East and sets the West as the unmarked counterpart, a construction which eliminates all negative properties from the West and attributes them to the East (Elias 1992a,b; Jahr et al. 1994; Stutzinger 1993; Wielacher 1993). Erhard Stölting even termed Eastern Europe as an invention of Western Europe that makes Eastern Europe integrate this assignation into its self-definition. Stölting gives references from the 18th century for the creation of a dichotomous East/West division of Europe with an inscribed symbolic hierarchy. He works out four basic characteristics for this kind of constructing difference:

...an orderly, moral, and modern West looking down scornfully upon a disorderly, amoral, and pre-modern East; an East that accepts this negative view and hopes to overcome it by Westernization; a moral, poetic, harmonious, and warm East, looking scornfully upon an amoral, cold, egoistic, formalistic, and decadent West; a formalistic, cold, and decadent West sentimentally and mimetically identifying with a pre-modern, graceful, and dignified East. (2000: 26)

The cultural classification of East and West acquired distinct connotations through the partition of Germany which divided it geographically into a western and an eastern part. Augmented by the differing economic systems of capitalism and socialism, which also divided not just Germany but all of Europe, the partition also had economic relevance. The differences in cultural and economic systems supplemented and strengthened the division into East and West, supporting the effectiveness of the symbolic hierarchy.

Analyzing the cultural dimensions of the European East border, a crucial point in the complex constructing processes of difference seems to be the fact that the borderline between the two parts is flexible. In different contexts it can move geographically. In the letters I examined,

the old European border implied either the borderline of pre-war Germany or the state frontier of the GDR. People coming from the West sometimes attributed an Eastern-ness to their correspondence partners. In some cases, the latter confirmed that attribution themselves by emphasizing their specific Eastern characteristics. However, the cultural eastern border at times also crossed over into the Federal Republic of Germany (in the following FRG). In such cases, it was mainly used to separate native inhabitants from displaced persons, those who had come over from the East and those who came from an East much farther away. For instance, a refugee born in Stettin (in present Poland) who fled in 1948 from Leipzig (East Germany) to West Germany maintained an extended and long correspondence with her schoolmate in Leipzig. In the 1950s she wrote:

I'm now writing something, that you mustn't be angry about. Our family can understand it quite well, because we also went through camp life and such. Only the people, who live here, put the refugees from the East down sometimes. However, on the other hand, it is to be understood. For the most part it's also right. Sometimes those families just arriving from the East instantly get a flat, work, social support, and, in the case of older people, also a pension. The things, which take a lot of time for other people to gain, are instantly organized for them. Naturally, that causes riots, because it is nearly impossible for local people and those who have just gotten married to get an apartment. Forget the number of expellees from the East who still are living in bunkers. They already have become a minor consideration a long time ago. Since this other action has began. Sometimes I have gotten angry, too, because Friedhelm [her husband] never would have gotten an apartment, and me, I don't count as a refugee any more and the document we have is of almost no use. At work, we have a couple of really nice girls, who just came; I guess from Saxony, too, I don't know exactly. But there are companies, which don't employ refugees from the Eastern partition, because they have already had some bad experiences. And the employment office also doesn't procure them for housework, because the 'Schwabe' don't want to have them anymore [17.10.1958].

By different examples the letter-writer illustrates what she had to learn through hard lessons. Although she was a German with all rights of citizenship enshrined in the Constitution, she was not equal to other Germans in the western part. This is also an experience to be found after unification, metaphorically transformed in the expression of 'second class citizen'. This expression is often used to stress feelings of discontent

of East Germans in unified Germany.⁶ Here the cultural system of differentiation became even more socially relevant. Beyond constitutional rights, the partition and the resulting difference between those who had origins in the East and those who did not, had given meaning to a system of classification that assigned marginalized social status and legitimized social inequality.

The same woman added in one letter, that she would always be the *Reingeschmeckte* (local expression for newcomer). After her initial impression of the West described metaphorically as the land of milk and honey, immediately upon arrival, she had difficulties dealing with the isolation she experienced, as did her whole family. By marrying a West German, the woman attempted to attain the status of a native. But it took her over 30 years to partially reach that goal. During the long period of transition, she had to hold her own among newcomers from the East who were seemingly placed on a social hierarchy based on the distance from where they came and dates of arrival: those expelled from the former East German territory; refugees from the Eastern part of post-war Germany; *Reingeschmeckte* (diffused word for all kinds of newcomers in Baden-Württemberg in South Germany) and *Schwaben* (local natives). She described her own social status as still stigmatized due to her origins from the East, but unable to claim support because of having been in the West for too long. As a citizen of (West) Germany, she was considered to be formally integrated, though culturally and socially she was not. In another letter, she wrote that one of her new acquaintances declared her Polish. She rejected such an attribution and distanced herself from former acquaintances, including her friend in the GDR. With this she also cast off her former identification with the East and took an active part in the marginalization of the East. She defined herself as the 'real' German and participated in the marginalizing process through every remark that illustrates that her friend still lives in the East. This example shows the high degree of flexibility involved in the cultural Eastern border construction process.

In the letters I analyzed, there is also to be found a second mechanism of creating a border which works in a different way. In contrast to the geographical flexibility involved, this form assumes a territorially fixed border, which had to be integrated into a new understanding of what it means to be German and to live in Germany. The frontier between FRG and GDR was territorially fixed and represented a border between

two political and economic systems. However, it remained a matter of negotiation as to what was actually divided. Did it divide two different German cultures? Taking into consideration the concept of nationhood at that time, it seems to have been very difficult to conceive two different kinds of 'German-ness' in those days. I argue that such an idea could not be accepted during the whole period of the German partition. The GDR side of Germany remained a symbolically ambivalent arena, where people—depending on the particular context—could define themselves as belonging to the eastern part of Europe as well as to the western part. Like their western neighbors, GDR citizens could relate to all Germans, but they also at times emphasized the shared cultural experience of everyday life with their eastern neighbors under conditions of socialism, identifying themselves with either the activists or the victims of the socialist system and soviet cultural power.

The letter exchanges are documents of a permanent maneuvering between both. In the snowy winter of 1969, a priest from GDR wrote to his friend in the FRG the following story:

On Sunday I got stuck on the way to an isolated village...Planning to pick it up on the next day, I left the car behind...I was given a lift in the car of one of the elders, but we got stuck again in the middle of a field. It was impossible to proceed on the street—even the snow ploughs got stuck. It was hard to decide what to do. The press arrived by car to report on the tremendous snow removal operation using tanks and racked vehicles, but they too returned. Much exertion was expected directly in the village. We were freed through the exemplary and selfless efforts of the comrades. They towed the car and we became friends. The mayor was quite surprised, seeing me getting off the tank and supervising the others. I didn't speak a word of Russian, but we understood each other. I said something like 'domus' and pointed at the village, where we would like to go. Then the officer got into the car and I directed the tow truck. No one wanted anything in exchange for their help, neither schnapps nor money or cigarettes. They wanted us to understand, that it had been a friendly turn, which went without saying. Upon returning home, I had to repeatedly retell all these adventures for quite a time [18.3.1969].

The story contains several layers that need analysis. I focus on the denoted perceptions of 'us' and 'the others'. On the one hand, the letter highlights the prejudices against 'Russians' that the priest shared with the majority of Germans at that time (Naimark 1999). On the other, it demonstrates how viewpoints changed as a result of this encounter.

The excerpt is part of an extended story about an unusual experience, which the person even refers to as an adventure. The encounter with the Red Army came to an unexpected but happy end, friendship with the 'Russians', in turn brought forth a new understanding about Russians in general: their behavior was correct, contrary to all Russian stereotypes. Although he did not understand the language, the priest could accept them as a part of the western civilization. 'Domus' was one word they both understood because of its Latin origin.

One question remains: How did his friend in the West react to these new perceptions? What did he think about the usage of the word 'comrade' for Soviet soldiers? As a soldier during World War II, 'the Russian' had been the enemy both for him as well as for his friend in the GDR. The friend in the West however, had no opportunity to have similar encounters and readjust his perspective. The anecdote reveals the fragility of the correspondences and vulnerability of collective perception constructed through the letters; it shows an example of a concrete situation in which perception of Russians changed and blurred their clear identification with East or West.

Community Building Practices to Avoid Hierarchical Difference

During the time of partition, the letter partners tried to maintain an equal relationship between East and West. They wanted to avoid the possibility of political divisions also becoming social ones. Only in this context is the reaction of the friend from West Germany to be understood. He did the only thing he could do, so as not to endanger the friendship. With one short answer he transformed the story about the 'Russians' into a relatively harmless one about the snow. He wrote: 'Your accounts of the snow were quite shocking. In the north (of Germany) it was similar. Here in the south at least no snow was left' (24.3.1969). Then he turned his attention to another topic. This example clearly shows how perceptions about differences, controversial details, and the resulting differences in opinion were, in a sense, switched off or side-tracked. Thus great tact was required to maintain and even forge a perception of sameness.

In order for the interaction to last, correspondents had to keep alive the perception of sameness, or at least a modicum of balance within the relationship. However, those who defined themselves through the descent community or close kinship ties in general, were less vulnerable to power conflicts and accepted inherent differences more, than in cases where the concept of friendship was the defining feature of the relationship. In relationships defined as kinship, powerful roles like 'head of family' exist. The power of this head is usually accepted by other members of the family and it is part of that role to push different opinions through, in some cases even against the will of the others. This pattern of family interaction in one letter-exchange for example, allowed the uncle from the West to criticize the behavior of his niece. The matter of discussion was that she, as a mother of a little child, wanted to continue working. He was angry about that and in a long passage reminded her, what, according to his view, the 'real' task of young mothers should be. Had this been a case of friendship, this clearly was a situation that would have endangered the relationship. In the case of kinship it did not because of the uncle's powerful status as head of family.

As shown elsewhere (Dietzsch 2000), the described reaction of the priest to the story about the Russians was not the only strategy to balance out the relationship. Other strategies were: the tendency to generally ignore the East/West context in dangerous situations; under special circumstances to ignore the fact that the mail traffic was controlled by the security service of the GDR; or to prevent everybody from discussing political questions in connection with personal issues like party membership or commitment of GDR citizens in the trade union. Besides this, the most effective strategy to stabilize the relationship of the correspondence partners in East and West was to evoke feelings of a community which transcended the border, and to consider themselves as members who had been equally hurt by the political division. This sense of community was underlined by stories about shared former times and even shared meals and social interaction at several levels. As one woman in 1963 wrote: 'Since we cannot drink the coffee at the same table, let us at least drink the same brand. We here and you over there' (1.11.1963).

In conclusion it can be said that many people were successful in bridging the lack of comprehension that emerged through the new

political border separating the Germans from 1945 onwards. However, at the same time they also actively participated in the process of furthering those differences. People who kept up the correspondence with friends or family on the other side, had to work hard to maintain the project of a national community of all Germans, while living conditions, background, and experiences were moving in the opposite direction, causing them to drift apart. The more the difference generated, the more was the effort required to prevent them from surfacing in specific interactions. However, by actively ignoring differences, the border could also become 'natural' and self-evident. Moreover, people on both sides gave rise to the new divisive mechanism.

The Surviving Mechanism of Social Classification

In 1989, the Wall came down and by the unification in 1990, the political frontier also disappeared. From this time onwards, most of the correspondence between the East and West lost its special significance for the persons who were thus communicating. For the woman introduced above, for instance, who got married to a West German to become culturally integrated, the letters exchanged with her schoolmate between the 1950s and the 1980s had given her a space to write her own story of successful integration into West German society. She appears to have needed the friend on the other side of the Wall as a counterpart to convince herself that despite all difficulties involved, going West had been the right choice.

At this point in my argument it seems necessary to stress another key result of the research. Most of the letter exchanges were based on the partition but in unexpected ways. It was not the maintenance of especially close family ties or those of friendship that had priority, but rather that most of them only acquired significance through the situation of the divided country. The willingness of maintaining letter exchanges during the time of partition was determined more by individual, biographical contexts. In that sense it also cannot only be seen as resistance against an inhuman border built by political authorities. I would argue that the more interesting result is to understand the phenomenon of correspondence in another way: Only the political situation of a divided Germany gave legitimization to letter exchanges. It offered the space

to negotiate personal items, which hardly found other spaces for discussion in the society of the time. Thus by writing letters people were expected to stay within a special distance. Such items of contact included, for instance, war experiences of men after World War II, individual experience of ageing or, as described here, problems of integration. The new political situation in 1989 brought a fundamental change and the special space between the two parts of the divided country was eroded. This development had a considerable impact on the relationship of the correspondents. The relationship of the two women, for example, was affected by this fundamental change. The questions of cultural belonging in the newly unified Germany introduced new ways and the special biographical reason, at least for the woman on the western side, disappeared.

The corresponding priests died before the Wall came down. Their wives continued to write to each other. Nevertheless, they did not visit each other once this became possible. It was not their intention to make new friends in the other part of Germany. Rather it appears that their correspondence had served the function of keeping alive the memory of their husbands. Their communication mainly focused on the past, provided an opportunity to mourn together for their husbands and to remember the time when they still were living. All these examples demonstrate the high significance of special biographical contexts in the processes of shaping the relationship between correspondents.

Nevertheless, on the more general level the cultural system of social classification survived, while the official political dimension of the border disappeared. The unification was connected with a complex web of transformation processes: (a) The 'dual organization' as John Borneman calls it elsewhere in this volume, had to be brought together. The principle that shaped that process was the so-called transfer of institutions—the transfer of the complete institutional system of the old FRG to the East German society, regardless of all specific local or regional features or those which resulted from the GDR history. (b) Social change in East Germany was and still is part of a wider process of post-socialist transition and growing globalization.

This new situation also required new definitions of national belonging and social status. For the former GDR citizens who came from the symbolically ambivalent arena, two ways to define German identity had been possible. The first was a conservative national one: The demand

of turning back to the homogeneous imagined national community of Germans and finally to have an equal status in it. The development of neo-Nazism and the increase of extreme-right activities can be interpreted in this context. The second method of finding one's own cultural and social place in the unified German state was to create a variety of (trans-)national identifications and to use them flexibly in different contexts. As can be seen in public statements or new literature, many young people from East Germany feel marginalized by their designation as East Germans. In general they reject this in order to get the power of a self-determined usage of their Easternness.

Concerning the first strategy, it may be added that the construction of the cultural border now shifted to another level and acquired new functions. Above all, it was the rung of newcomers from the East, socially placed according to distance from place of origin and date of arrival that gained further acceptance. This was supported by another mechanism of cultural exclusion that Frank-Olaf Radtke describes as existing in the FRG long before the unification. In the context of labor migration in West Germany during the time of partition, he observed in political and public discussion a tendency to divide into *Fremde* (foreigners) and *Allzufremde* (foreign people who are too alien to assimilate) (Radtke 1996). Foreigners in the former sense included all people coming from the member countries of the European Union (EU, at that time European Commission, EC), while people from beyond the EU were treated as 'alien'. Now, at a time when the borderline of the EU is traveling eastward the mechanism of the territorially flexible cultural East border as described above gains new significance, and has, in the future, to be observed very carefully.

Turning back to processes inside Germany it can be concluded that the period of the Cold War had established the symbolic system of dividing East and West in Germany as a cultural resource that can, among others, be used even today to arrange people, objects, and regions into a hierarchal relationship. This symbolic system had also prepared the ground for the invention of the now so-called East Germans and their counterparts, the West Germans. According to the working of the mechanism of East/West division, the image of the East German is more developed and all the characteristics which Stölting mentioned may be observed. The creation of social inequality with the aid of the symbolic East/West system, that only partially asserted itself during the time of partition, has a far greater impact today.

While during the time of partition people tried to ignore differences to avoid giving social relevance to the division, since 1989 the (self-) description 'East German' has developed into a virulent term that implies coping with socialism and its collective memory and, more recently, also the future vision of the unified Germany. In everyday life experiences, a clear hierarchal distinction between the designation of East and West German can be perceived. For those who grew up in the GDR, to be marked as East Germans is perceived as something that has to be rejected. For people who grew up in West Germany, and by mistake labeled as East Germans, it often serves as an additional 'qualification' or acknowledgement of something special. (Bereswill 2005, Schäfer 2005).

In addition, the territorial dimension of the border was reactivated. In some (scientific, political, and European) contexts, East Germany is now treated as a region. This perspective also leads to the establishment of new differences and borders by connecting people with a territory while at the same time hiding its other powerful effects. It can be called an 'identity trap'. While immediately after the unification, former GDR citizens themselves tried to assimilate, now there can be observed a special pride in being 'East German'. On the one hand this can be interpreted as a sign of more self-confidence. On the other, the construction of the 'East' Germany remains involved in a dichotomous relationship—the East–West couple. It nurtures a tendency to homogenize all people living in the territory of the 'Neue Bundesländer' (eastern part of Germany) and declares them all as former GDR citizens—with the experience of having lived under the conditions of dictatorship and so on.

However, some indications also exist for the second way, especially at the level of discourses about the socialist past. As Dietrich Mühlberg pointed out, the creation of collective memory at least in the 1990s, only took place in insignificant places (Mühlberg 2001). Thus it earned no place in the hegemonic discourse and, in some cases, was never even discussed. Thomas Ahbe came to the conclusion that *Ostalgie* (a new after-unification word that brings together both 'East' and 'nostalgia') could be the only appropriate strategy for 'lay people', (that is those who are not professionally engaged in discourse-production processes) to regain the power of meaning over their lives. He termed this as 'productive self-empowerment' (Ahbe 1997: 619).

In a recent analysis, I have examined the development of discourse since 1989 focusing on the gendered and gendering construction processes of different German identities. Turning to contemporary German society, I asked how the two well-established European symbolic systems (gender and the East/West dichotomy) are working together today and to what extent new boundaries or spaces of freedom were created. At the level of discourses and concerning the East/West difference, it is shown that despite a dichotomized difference during the last few years, a pluralization of versions and representations of the GDR may be observed. This pluralization may be interpreted as an important step toward empowerment, since it contributes to a new appropriation of people's own stories and history. However, it has to resist permanent re-homogenizing or dichotomizing tendencies. These are especially strengthened by a unified Germany represented as a heterosexual couple, as was regularly seen in newspapers and journals. This allows differences and inequality to be expressed so convincingly that this imagery appears to occur again and again. Unification for example is often illustrated as a wedding, or its course narrated as the story of the marriage between East and West, the earning husband and the dependent wife, with all their marital problems (Wierling 1994).

Conclusion

The above examples and arguments lead to the conclusion that partition in the sense of drawing a political border which has to be legitimized by cultural arguments has far-reaching effects. Especially in official political contexts, it is sometimes forgotten that newly established political borders not only divide people who were previously 'one nation', had belonged together and can later easily be re-unified. Partition in Germany resulted in a complete reshaping of the society at the level of cultural order, social classification, and individual belonging or identification. It basically challenged the former idea of a common German nation. Although people in their individual interactions tried to avoid it, both societies were completely reorganized with the help of the old European dichotomizing principle of cultural divisions into East and West. In today's context this dichotomizing has gained unexpectedly high social relevance. The historical reorganization does not mean that

thereby people did not fall back on well known and familiar depictions and mechanisms of meaning-production. On the contrary, they were appropriated in new ways and worked more effectively than ever before. It may even be argued that the cultural construction of difference between East and West Germans is actually a phenomenon of the period after 1989.

However, as has been pointed out, the process of dichotomous construction of difference, while seeming to be very contemporary, is not the only one. Other developments are parallel and sometimes contradictory. One illustrative case is the debate about a common memory of the GDR. In the 2000s, after many fierce discussions on the status of the East German experience in a unified Germany, a new pluralization of opinions as well as depictions of the GDR, are both being negotiated. This pluralization indicates the impossibility to come to *one* common German memory of the GDR. This phenomenon has a subversive capacity, since it promotes a variety of different historic narratives instead of one master narrative. This demonstrates the potentiality to resist a singular discursive homogenizing tendency of 'the East', thereby reducing the power of the symbolic system of dichotomous classifications.

NOTES

1. *Leipziger Rundschau*, *Hallo*, *Kreuzer*, *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, and *Badische Zeitung*.
2. On this I agree with the current assessment made by Michael Thomas in his article about the development of the after-unification society in Germany (Thomas 1998).
3. As yet there is no German translation of the work.
4. All quotations here presented are my translations.
5. Michael Polanyi, a medical scientist and philosopher first used 'tacit knowledge' to express the idea that certain cognitive processes or behaviors are accompanied by operations not inaccessible to consciousness. In the 1990s Polanyi received new attention especially by Science and Technology Studies (STS) researchers.
6. This phenomenon is described at length by John Borneman in this volume.

REFERENCES

- Ahbe, Th. 1997. 'Ostalgie als Selbstermächtigung. Zur produktiven Stabilisierung ostdeutscher Identität', *Deutschlandarchiv*, 1997(II): 614–19.
- . 2001. 'Ostalgie' als Laien-Praxis in Ostdeutschland: Ursachen, Psychische und Politische Dimensionen', in H. Timmermann (ed.), *Die DDR in*

- Deutschland: Ein Rückblick auf 50 Jahre*, pp. 781–802. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
- Bauman, Z. 1995. *Moderne und Ambivalenz. Das Ende der Eindeutigkeit*. Frankfurt/M.
- Bereswill, M. 2005. 'Fragile Selbstverteidigung. Umkämpfte Männlichkeit im Spiegel einer ost-westdeutschen Forscherbeziehung', in E. Schäfer, I. Dietzsch, P. Drauschke, I. Peinl, S. Scholz and S. Voelker (eds), *Irritation Ostdeutschland. Geschlechterverhältnisse nach der Wende*, pp. 122–34. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.
- Breckner, R., D. Kalekin–Fishman and I. Miethe (eds). 2000. *Biographies and the Division of Europe. Experience, Action and Change on 'the Eastern Side'*, pp. 23–38. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Brockmeier, J. 1999, 'Erinnerung, Identität und Autobiographischer Prozeß', *Journal für Psychologie*, 7(1): 22–42.
- Chiot, D. (ed.). 1989. 'The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe. Economics and Politics from the Middle Ages until the Early Twentieth Century'. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Classen, A. 1993. 'Das Fremde und das Eigene. Neuzeit', in P. Dinzelbacher (ed.), *Europäische Mentalitätsgeschichte. Hauptthemen in Einzeldarstellungen*, pp. 429–50. Stuttgart: Kröner Verlag.
- Demandt, A. (ed.). 1990. 'Deutschlands Grenzen in der Geschichte'. München: Beck.
- Dietzsch, I. 2000. 'The Construction of Cultural Difference between East and West Germans in Bowing Letters', in R. Breckner, D. Kalekin–Fishman and I. Miethe (eds), *Biographies and the Division of Europe. Experience, Action and Change on the 'Eastern Side'*, pp. 271–82. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- . 2004. *Grenzen überschreiben? Deutsch-deutsche Briefwechsel 1948–1989*. Köln/Weimar/Wien: Böhlau Verlag.
- . 2005. 'Die Erfindung der Ostdeutschen', in E. Schäfer et al. (eds), *Irritation Ostdeutschland. Geschlechterverhältnisse nach der Wende*, pp. 92–106. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.
- Dinzelbacher, P. (ed.). 1993. *Europäische Mentalitätsgeschichte*. Stuttgart: Kröner Verlag.
- Djupedal, K. 1989. 'Personal Letters as Research Sources', *Ethnologica Scandinavica*, 19: 51–63.
- Elias, N. 1992a. *Studien über die Deutschen. Machtkämpfe und Habitusentwicklung im 19. und 20. Jh.* Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.
- . 1992b. *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen*. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.
- Fischer-Rosenthal, W., William I. Thomas, and Florian Znaniecki. 1995. 'The Polish Peasant in Europe and America', in U. Flick, E.v. Kardorff, H. Keupp, L.v. Rosentiel and S. Wolff (eds), *Handbuch Qualitativer Sozialforschung*. Weinheim: Beltz Psychologie Verlags Union.
- Fuchs, W. 1995. [1984]. *Biographische Forschung*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Halder, F. 1998. 'Geschichte und Kultur Ostmitteleuropas in Vergleichender Absicht', *Comparativ. Beiträge zur Universalgeschichte und Vergleichenden Gesellschafts Forschung*, 5 May.

- Jahr, C., U. Mai, and K. Roller (eds). 1994. *Feindbilder in der Deutschen Geschichte. Studien zur Vorurteilsgeschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*. Berlin: Metropol Verlag.
- Kohli, M. 1981. 'Wie es zur »biographischen Methode« kam und was daraus geworden ist. Ein Kapitel aus der Geschichte der Sozialforschung', *ZfS*, 3: 273–93.
- Mühlberg, D. 2001. 'Beobachtete Tendenzen zur Ausbildung einer ostdeutschen Teilkultur', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Wochenbeilage Das Parlament*, B11: 30–38.
- Naimark, N. M. 1999. *Die Russen in Deutschland. Die sowjetische Besatzungszone 1945–1949 (originally 1995: The Russians in Germany)*. Berlin: Ullstein Propyläen Taschenbuch.
- Polanyi, M. 1958 (1964). *Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy* (revised edition with a new preface by the author). New York: Harper & Row.
- Radtke, F.-O. 1996. 'Fremde und Allzufremde. Zur Ausbreitung des Ethnologischen Blicks in die Einwanderungsgesellschaft', in H. R. Wicker, J. L. Alber, C. Bolzman, R. Fibbi, K. Imhof, and A. Wimmer (eds), *Das Fremde in der Gesellschaft: Migration, Ethnizität und Staat*, pp. 333–52. Zürich: Seismo Verlag.
- Schäfer, N. 2005. 'Zusammengewachsen sind wir (ost- und Westdeutsche) noch nicht—Außer die Paare. Zur Selbstpositionierung ost-westdeutscher Paare im vereinigten Deutschland', in E. Schäfer et al. (eds), *Irritation Ostdeutschland. Geschlechterverhältnisse nach der Wende*, pp. 107–21. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.
- Stöltig, E. 1995. 'Das Chaos, der Tod und die Moderne. Der westliche Blick auf Osteuropa', *DEAE, Nachrichtendienst* 1: 1–5.
- . 2000. 'The East of Europe: A Historical Construction', in R. Breckner et al. (eds), *Biographies and the Division of Europe. Experience, Action and Change on the 'Eastern Side'*, pp. 23–38. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Stutzinger, D. 1993. 'Stichwort: Das Fremde und das Eigene, Antike', in Peter Einzelbacher (ed.), *Europäische Mentalitätsgeschichte. Hauptthemen in Einzeldarstellungen*. Stuttgart: Kröner Verlag.
- Thomas, M. 1998. 'Transformation in Ostdeutschland—Aufschlussreiche Paradoxien eines Idealfalls', *Berliner Debatte Initial*.
- Thomas, W. I. and F. Znaniecki. 1918–20. *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*. Boston: University of Illinois.
- Wielacher, A. (ed.). 1993. *Kulturthema Fremdheit: Leitbegriffe und Problemfelder Kulturwissenschaftlicher Fremdeheitsforschung/mit einer Forschungsbibliographie von Corinna Albrecht*. München: Iudicum.
- Wierling, D. 1994. 'War die DDR eine Frau?', *Berliner Debatte Initial*, 5: 165–73.

De-partitioning Society

Contesting Borders of the Mind in Bangladesh and India

KATHINKA SINHA-KERKHOFF AND ELLEN BAL

Introduction

This chapter argues that the establishment of new nation-states after the partition of British India in 1947 not only required new geographical boundaries but also a cognitive map with mental borders that informed who were included and excluded. It is shown how ideas of exclusion and inclusion are played out through the material implications they have for different sets of people. Borders of the mind are created by states that sanction and guide the functioning of exclusion and inclusion. While created by states, these borders are then internalized or adopted by the populace and go on to become taken-for-granted assumptions about their social placement. In many cases however, we find that people are not willing to accept these state-mandated borders (lower-caste Hindus in Bangladesh, former East Pakistan and Muslims in Jharkhand, India for instance). It can be argued that state-mandated borders form cognitive maps that link up with other models to create partitioned societies. This chapter therefore allows us to explore different memory regimes and offers the chance to see how partition creates a different experiential reality according to where it occurs.

Though the way in which events are interpreted and remembered changes according to the paths nations choose to follow, nationalism tends to promote widespread identification of nation-states with a particular kind of mass memory, that is narratives about the nation embodied in state-supported rhetoric. Most contemporary nation-states benefit

from the sanctioning of a particular rhetoric. In this chapter we suggest that the rhetoric associated with the partition of India in 1947 serves the nation-state in the process of nation-building. The enactment of this rhetoric sustains partitioned societies in both Bangladesh and India.

Common to all 'partitions' is the redrafting of geographical borders. Hence, people who shared territorial space are redistributed over two or more, and often renamed, places. Yet, while this involves movement for many, people also just remain where they were before. Moreover, while borders provide 'security' to some, they form a 'threat' to others. They divide people into those who look upon the new borders as 'lines of security' and those who want to leave but cannot. In this chapter we concentrate on the special category of those who 'want to remain' but for whom 'mental borders' of others makes it difficult to do so.

The redrafting of geographical borders is always accompanied by sets of ideas, indeed ideologies, or rhetoric that tells people if they belong 'here' or 'there'. Moreover, the 'invisible' mental borders divide populations within nations into those who really belong (often labeled as 'majority') and the 'others' referred to as 'outsiders' (often labeled as 'minority') (Ahmed 2002: 26). Mental borders imply a 'symbolisation of differences' (Van Houtum and V. Naerssen 2002: 125). Though these are often not institutionalized, their effects are real, in that they cause insecurity among those who are supposedly protected as citizens, by geographical borders that circumscribe the nation-state in which they reside. These mental borders even have the potential to expel 'outsiders' from the nation, symbolically and literally. Most importantly, they are embodied in state rhetoric used for nation-building.

Such 'borders of the mind' that are incorporated in the rhetoric of nation-states to understand the 'narrative regime' that exists within nation-states, need to be evaluated (Radstone and Hodgkin 2003: 11). While certain partition narratives are included in state rhetoric, others are ignored or omitted. Such state rhetoric and the partition narratives may be located in textbooks, public memorial functions, museum exhibits and media representations of partition. Yet, as mental borders are generally not institutionalized, it is often difficult to identify and comprehend them. Nevertheless, as they are real in their workings, they may be recognized by analysing people's subjective perceptions. People interviewed suffered under the burden of this partition rhetoric but

their own narratives of independence (rather than of partition) nevertheless constituted 'counter-narratives' (that is alternative cognitive maps). In this chapter we investigate these counter-narratives as the 'untold stories of partition'.

Narrative Regimes: Partition Narratives and Counter-Narratives

Apart from narratives included in state rhetoric, this chapter focuses on narratives of:

- (a) Muslim Bengalis in East Pakistan;
- (b) Lower-caste Muslims (Ahmad 2003: 4886–91) in the state of Jharkhand (India);
- (c) Scheduled-Caste Hindus in Bangladesh;
- (d) Tribal-Christian Garos of northern Mymensingh in Bangladesh.

Scholars have explored partition narratives from various locations, especially of those who experienced the partition through new geographical borders which caused sudden and violent flows of migration (Mehdi 2003). This chapter focuses on people who lived either in regions where most people stayed put, or on people for whom 1947 did not signify 'partition' at first. It was through the narratives of these four groups that we could extract the 'partition rhetoric', which, though perceived as dominant, disabled our informants from identifying with it fully. In fact, these groups experienced the 'burden of other people's histories' (Sinha-Kerkhoff 2006: 33) through the 'borders' they imposed which made them feel as 'others'. These 'dominant' narratives also prescribe, censure, and punish behavior. On the other hand, the mental borders of our informants, unlike the official partition rhetoric, tended to unify rather than divide. These ideas are more inclusive of 'minorities' in the nation and appear to aim at de-partitioning society.

Hence, while the official state-supported partition rhetoric prevails in India and Bangladesh the 'other stories' that are the focus of this chapter, aim at unification rather than separation. For instance, Muslim Bengalis rejected the borders of official Pakistani partition rhetoric based on the 'two-nation theory' that pitched them as 'Muslims' on

one side of the international border against 'Hindus' on the other. Instead, these Muslims united as 'Bengalis' and demanded new geographical borders that would separate them from Pakistani Urdu-speaking Muslims.

In India, lower-caste Muslims in the state of Jharkhand also reject the borders embodied in official partition rhetoric that separate them from the local population, in particular the *Adivasis* (tribals). Their alternative mental borders unite them with these *Adivasis* and separate them from other Muslims, in particular 'upper-caste' Muslims residing in the neighboring state of Bihar and from 'those educated Biharis who had chosen migration to Pakistan'. Significantly, they had supported the separation of the region, Chotanagpur, where they live, from the state of Bihar and had proposed new geographical borders that now circumscribe the state named Jharkhand.

In post-1971 Bangladesh, Scheduled-Caste Hindus also spoke of suffering from the impact of mental borders, set up by Bengali Muslims after the nation gained independence. Yet, in turn, they emphasize similarities that they perceive had existed between Hindu and Muslim Bengalis in 'pre-liberated Bangladesh'. Lastly, though the tribal Garos in Bangladesh unlike Bengali Hindus, accept the borders that separate them from the majority of Muslim Bengalis, they do this for different purposes. In these partitioned societies, official partition rhetoric separates them and this provides the potential for their exclusion from the nation. Yet, Garos accept such a separation since it actually allows further internal unification and permits them to claim the soil on which they live as 'indigenous people'.

Though there is variation in the narratives of various groups in India and Bangladesh, all these are, unlike state-supported partition narratives in both nations that delegate these 'minorities' to the realm of 'outsiders', narratives of 'rooting' rather than 'uprooting' in shape as well as intention (Sinha-Kerkhoff 2004b: 149–68). We therefore define them as 'counter narratives' or alternative cognitive maps with borders, that allow them to stay put in the country of their birth. In conclusion we reflect on the hierarchical play of narratives, that is these 'contested pasts' which provide the key to our understanding not only of the continuation or dissolution of the newly created geographical borders but also of when and why people cross international borders.

NATION-BUILDING, PARTITION RHETORIC, AND MUSLIMS IN INDIA

Noorani (2003: 9) states that, 'the partition inflicted as grave a wound on the Hindu psyche as it did on that of the Muslims'. Though Muslims are officially included in the Indian nation, state-supported partition rhetoric separates Muslims from 'Indian Hindus', labeled as 'the majority'. The nation cannot exist without this rhetoric and Indian Muslims do not exist beyond it. Besides, particular narratives remind 'Hindus' of the losses the nation sustained due to the behavior of the 'Muslims' since their 'invasion' in India. Therefore, these narratives suggest that 'Muslims' are 'outsiders' and cannot fully be trusted and therefore could be excluded from the nation. Narratives that recount the beginning of the demand for Pakistan, since the so-called Pakistan Resolution of 1940 are the continuation of other (colonial) narratives that describe Muslims as the 'alien invaders' of India who subsequently demanded partition.

Narratives that constitute partition rhetoric make Muslims visible as part of a religious minority community only. Besides, as a minority, they are linked to Pakistan. Official state rhetoric in India also sanctions views and practices other than 'Muslim bashing'. Yet, these narratives embody mental borders that make 'Muslims who stayed', unlike 'Hindus', visible as 'the Other' (Chaturvedi 2002: 149–59), sometimes as 'victims' (Ismat Chughtai quoted in Chakrabarty 2003: 104) but also as potential enemies (of Hindus) who can not (always) be trusted and might have to be excluded from the nation in order to safeguard the interests of the 'majority'.

In short, Hindus, who constitute the legally recognized majority in India, can use this partition rhetoric for nation-building and can thus 'order and border' society. This rhetoric, institutionalized symbolically and witnessed in tales, is also found in political orations and textbooks (Kumar 2001: 49–65), or incorporated in policies. Besides, during so-called communal riots, this rhetoric is not only reproduced orally, but also incorporated in official reports. After 1947, the geographical borders that include the Muslim minority as equal citizens in the nation, have been challenged by the mental borders of the self-appointed 'guardians of the nation' (the claimants, makers, and managers of the nation-state). The mental borders through their regular enactment

(as reflected in rules, regulations, media, and official government reports, laws, textbooks, and so on), have changed the event of partition into a process that sustains a partitioned society. In fact, in India, these borders reflect the 'two-nation theory' that led to partition and 'continues to play important roles in the constitution of collective identity and thinking' (Kaul 2001: 3).

COUNTER-NARRATIVES OF MUSLIMS IN JHARKHAND

In the rhetoric, Muslims are perceived as an undifferentiated category without sub-divisions. In fact, however, we found during fieldwork in the Indian state of Jharkhand, that not only were Muslims internally differentiated, but many among our informants also questioned the truths replicated by political guardians of the nation-state.¹ The disinterest, irritation, sadness, and even anger we encountered when people were asked to recount memories of the partition of 1947, became only fully comprehensible when we analyzed peoples' own stories from several places in Jharkhand. Requests for a free-wheeling narrative of their pasts, resulted in vivid descriptions of political and everyday life in Jharkhand. These narratives demonstrate that in Jharkhand, Muslims situate themselves in space, time, and society, by relating to the set of narratives, defined here as 'state supported partition rhetoric' with mental borders that divide rather than unite citizens in India.

Stories by informants narrate the history of their ancestors' involvement in India's freedom struggle, their support for Pakistan or for an independent Jharkhand state, but also dwell on the day-to-day interaction with Adivasis and other residents in the region. The narratives are extremely diverse and apparently do not have much in common. Whereas one Muslim informant observed that Muslims in the state had supported the Muslim League due to their 'exploitation' by both the colonizers and upper caste Hindus, and that there was, hence, a need of a state of their own, another narrated his grandfather's fondness for Gandhiji as he 'had not wanted partition'. A recurrent theme, though variously formulated, was that 'our pasts are different from theirs'. These narratives countered official partition rhetoric that excluded them on the basis of their Muslim identity alone.

The official partition rhetoric portrays Muslims as homogeneous but our informants identified themselves first as Pathans, Shaikh, Saiyid,

Kalal, Kunjra, Dhuniya, Darzi, Idrisi, Halalkhore, Dafalli, and Ansaris. The Ansaris² identify themselves variously as Muslims, Julahas, and Momins. Often, memories revealed not a Muslim identity but rather a sub-caste one. Importantly, these sub-castes had their own history that differed from the history of 'other Muslims'. For instance, to illustrate his momin identity, Haji Hanif Ansari showed us a Hindi-language leaflet dated 29 September 1947 that urged the 'Momin brethren of Chotanagpur' to join the Chotanagpur Momin Union (CMU) and 'strengthen the cry for Jharkhand.' In this leaflet, Shaikh Mohiuddin, the CMU's general secretary, and brother of our informant reminds his fellow Momins:

You know that people of our community have been living in Chotanagpur and Santhal Parganas for a very long time. This is our home. Our people have been living here in close intimacy with adivasis and other Hindus. Adivasis have a very large population in Chotanagpur and Santhal Parganas and in these places our Momins also live in great number. Today it is the demand of the adivasis and also of other people living in Chotanagpur, that a separate Province of Jharkhand be constituted. When this Jharkhand Province is made, it will be for the benefit of all sects living here, the revenue derived from the Province would be spent for the people in the Province and the administration of the Province will be at the hands of the adivasis, Hindus, and Momins jointly who live here. Under the circumstances we Momin brethren should join adivasis in their Jharkhand demand, because we always have to live here with them and have with them all our dealings. These adivasi brethren wear our handloom cloth and therefore I appeal [...] to prove their centuries old friendship to the adivasis and others of Chotanagpur [...] and improve the low status of the Momins.³

Our informants generally conveyed that they felt 'different' from those Muslims portrayed in the state-sanctioned partition rhetoric. Most of them identified as Muslims but also as Momins or Ansaris and felt they belonged to any other groups generally labeled as 'backward' or *sadans* (natives). Most informants rejected the mental borders separating them from other groups in Jharkhand and identified instead with groups cutting across religious divides, including associations based on family, neighborhood, village, and nation, as well as gender, class, caste, and language. Common regional and class identities ('we are all poor Jharkhandis') seemed more important than those based on religion. In short, class and regional identity tied these Muslims together and united

them with Adivasis and *sadans* and also rooted them in the soil of their birth. Clearly, these narratives expressed group memories in the context of social relationships in a present where partition narratives were regularly enacted, especially during communal disputes and riots.⁴

The close links of the Muslims with the Congress and details of struggle for an independent India in which they now lived as Indians, along with their fellow freedom fighters, formed the content of narratives of Jharkhand Muslims. They had been oppressed and exploited by colonial rulers and now, freed from that burden, had been filled with hope. They acknowledged that they would need to work hard, uplift their status and emphasize education and employment. They expected to be rewarded for the sacrifices they had made while they struggled as a *majority* of 'exploited' for the freedom of the country.

Ansaris in Jharkhand emphasized the great differences between Bihari Muslims and themselves. Their memories of the period that followed immediately after 1947 in Jharkhand varies sharply from what partition rhetoric tells us. Rafique Ansari, for instance, had heard about the 'killings in Bihar' and about 'flows of people leaving for Pakistan,' but he told us that this was not his past. These, he maintained, were the memories of the 'Bihari *sharif* [élite]' and not of the '*razil* [laborers] Jharkhandis' among whom he counted himself. He said:

When I was eighteen years old in 1946, there were many riots in Bihar. It was a ghastly scene at the time. Many Muslims were killed and a great number fled to Bengal. In this area it was very peaceful however. Nothing happened here in Hazaribagh. Actually, the lower classes of Muslims never supported Jinnah. The richer sections were Muslim Leaguers. They mostly lived in Bihar. They shouted: 'Le ke rahenge Pakistan. Qaide Azam Zindabad' (Take Pakistan and stay in it. Long lives Jinnah!) Those who left really suffered. At present, Pakistan does not even accept the Bihari Muslims. They differentiate between Sindhis and Punjabis; and in Bangladesh it is the same.

Muslims in Jharkhand rarely remembered any relatives or friends who had left for Pakistan. In fact, the whole idea of migrating appears never to have occurred to them. In addition, partition for those residing in Jharkhand was associated with memories of another partition, namely, the battle for bifurcation of Bihar and the establishment of a new Jharkhand state. Through their narratives we also came to know that even the Muslim League had wanted the partition of Bihar in order to establish, in Chotanagpur, a separate homeland for Bihari Muslims.

We learned from interviews that staying put had been the first priority for Muslims in Jharkhand. Though Abdul Khalid, a *dafalli* (low 'caste' Muslim street singers and vendors), had opted for the Muslim League and had also supported partition, he had never thought of moving. He had actually guessed that Jharkhand would become part of East Pakistan. He recalled:

My father was known as Pundit Maulvi Abdul Shakoor. He was very gentle, like a cow. That is why one marwari [businessman] gave him this name. He also wore dhoti and kurta and was very close to Hindus. Many Hindus actually knew Urdu at that time. We were poor moolvasis [people with roots in the area]. I never thought I should go anywhere. But there was this election in 1946 where people had to cast their votes. It was clear to me that time that the Pakistan area would be up to Purulia. So we thought that this area would also go to Pakistan and therefore voted for Pakistan, i.e., for the Muslim League.

Abdul Hammed Asar told us: 'My boss told me that he would take care of me in Pakistan but I refused to go there. I am born here so I will not go anywhere'. M.D. Musa, a member of the Communist Party, stayed put because he did not want to leave his family. He maintained that, 'Muslims never did follow Islam. If they had, there would not have been partition'. He added, 'I did not like any of the so-called leaders, neither Jinnah nor Gandhi'.

In short, theirs were narratives of hope, power, courage, regional unity, and, most of all, their roots. Instead of a traumatic memory, the event of 1947 promised them a new beginning. It was the first step in a process of nation-building in which, as Muslim Indians and part of the majority of people who had stayed put, they would play a fundamental role.

NATION-BUILDING AND PARTITION RHETORIC IN PAKISTAN

Pakistan was a novel experiment in the history of nation-building. With its two wings separated by 1,500 km of foreign territory (India), it was obvious that its first governor-general, Quad-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, would have a tremendous task to forge a nation. During the 24 years that the nation existed in this way, Pakistan was presented as the embodiment of the unity of the Muslim nation (Nauriya 1999: 98). Though the partition rhetoric embodied the violence that constituted partition in narratives of trauma, anger, loss, and despair, the event of

partition was also remembered as the beginning of a new and better future for Pakistani Muslims. Accordingly, though the violence was regretted, it was only logical that Hindus left Pakistan and Muslims left India. Used as a legitimate incentive to induce Hindus to leave the country, partition rhetoric became the grand narrative of the new nation-state and it was hoped that it would unite all Muslims (that is Bengali speaking as well as Urdu speaking) within the two wings that constituted Pakistan.

COUNTER-NARRATIVES OF MUSLIM BENGALIS IN EAST PAKISTAN

After 1947, a process of rooting had begun, in which new mental borders were formulated that sanctioned the geographical partition of Pakistan and the creation of a third nation, Bangladesh. Muslim Bengali nation builders between 1947 and 1971, refuted the two-nation theory embodied in Pakistan's partition rhetoric, on which the idea of a united Pakistan rested. Instead of abandoning this rhetoric, however, Muslim Bengalis began to use partition rhetoric as a means to forge unity among themselves on the basis of region, language, ethnicity, class, and religion. These counter-narratives were intended to replace those that supported the two-nation theory and formed another rhetoric that could now be used by Muslim Bengalis to legitimize a demand for their own nation.

Though Muslim leaders of Bengal later also proposed the so-called two-nation theory, they had vehemently tried to avoid the partition of Bengal in 1947 (Ahmed 2004: 120, note 119). They had formulated alternatives such as the plan for a United Bengal as a third independent nation along with India and Pakistan (ibid.: 280–87). When they finally lost this battle and became part of a truncated Bengal in Pakistan, they nevertheless rejoiced as partition was seen as a new beginning for a better future for the Bengali Muslims who would gradually evolve into Muslim Bengalis.

A quest for an intrinsically secular 'Bengali concept' had started after 1947, during which narratives about the 'differences in aims, aspirations, perspective, and awareness between the Bengali of West Bengal and the Bengali of Bangladesh' continued to simmer and the majority 'refused to bifurcate the common history that preceded 1947' (Dasgupta 2002: 22). Starting with the so-called language movement in 1952 during which both Muslim Bengalis and Hindus Bengalis in East Pakistan

demanding that Bengali should become a national language (Umar 2000: 89–135), the demand for more autonomy and independence from West Pakistan (Samad 1995) finally culminated in the extremely violent ‘liberation war’ of 1971 (Mascarenhas 1986). Though fiction demonstrates that the traumatic aspects of the partition of 1947 were not forgotten (Bagchi and Dasgupta 2003: 261–68), many Muslim Bengalis also remembered 1947 as the new beginning of a better future and started asserting themselves as Muslim Bengalis.

Many Muslim Bengalis remember the partition of Bengal in 1947 as a ‘turn of fortune’ as it had meant the end of British rule and the creation of Pakistan. Yet, this partition is also remembered as liberation from the Bengali Hindus who had ‘exploited us for centuries’. Indeed, though some regret that Suhrawardy’s plan of a United Bengal was ‘quashed by opposition from the Congress under the leadership of Nehru’ (Ahmed 2004: 5), it had involved the out-migration of an enormous number of Hindu upper castes and classes who had acted as a majority in a region where Muslims outnumbered Hindus. ‘For too many if not most of the Muslims of East Pakistan, 1947 was not only about partition, but also about freedom, from both the British and Hindu ruling classes’ (Chakrabarty 1996: 2143). In 1947, not only did the British leave East Bengal but so did a great number of Hindus. Bengali Muslim memories of this exodus also implies their own rooting.

THE WORKING OF MENTAL BORDERS AMONG HINDU BENGALIS IN BANGLADESH

In Bangladesh, new laws enacted after 1974, clearly discriminated against non-Muslims and repeated amendments in the Constitution of Bangladesh brought Islam back into politics (Riaz 2004). The military regime of General Ziaur Rehman (1975–81) ended up scrapping the principle of secularism. The Islamic phrase, *Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim* (in the name of Allah, the Beneficient, the Merciful) was inserted into the Constitution and in 1975, Islam was declared a state religion (Samad 1999: 81).

The new partition rhetoric, now sanctioned by the state in Bangladesh and found in textbooks (Rosser 2004: 78–103), teaches new ‘lessons’ to the ‘majority’ and ‘minorities’. Whereas the trauma of partition is remembered, narratives about unity and the common struggles

of the two religious communities before and after 1947, are replaced by tales of exploitation that Muslims masses had to endure under Hindu and British Raj, and during partition. There are also tales of the final liberation in 1947, when their former 'masters' left the region to them.

More than the legal framework that excludes the Hindus and other non-Muslims from the nation, new mental borders came along with Bangladesh's new geographical borders, causing 'low intensity violence' (Samad 1999: 87–91) against ethnic and religious minorities, and causing their 'internal displacement' (Banerjee et al. 2005). These mental borders after the partition of 1947, influx until the 1990s, therefore constitute a greater burden for non-Muslim and non-Bengali citizens in Bangladesh than the geographical borders that separate Bangladeshis from Indians.

In the form they have been drawn after 1971, these borders legitimate all sorts of discriminating policies towards non-Muslims and/or non-Bengalis that force them to leave or sell their land and other property (Barkat 2000, Barkat et al. 1997), forbid them to withdraw substantial amounts of money in cash from commercial banks; exclude them from sensitive positions and various civil and military jobs, and exclude them from business and trade, bank loans, and credit (Bhowmick and Dhar 1998: 31–40). Though the continuous enactment of these borders on a daily basis might bring about the desired results, they consciously or unconsciously also divide the Bangladeshi population. At times they exclude certain groups such as Bengali Hindus and non-Bengalis from the nation.

According to the Census of 1941, the last census before the 1947 partition, the Hindu population in East Bengal was 28 percent and immediately after partition it came down to 25 percent. According to the 1991 Census, Hindus number 12.5 million and represent (only) 10.5 percent of the total population (Tajuddin 1999: 107). Importantly, those Hindus who 'stayed put' were not upper caste and rich Hindus who had formerly dominated trade, commerce, administrative services and profession. Of the Hindus who now reside in Bangladesh, few are upper caste and most are Scheduled Castes. Today the socioeconomic differences between the Muslim and the Hindu communities, in particular in rural areas, are 'much less marked than it was earlier' (Samad 1999: 76). Nevertheless, the majority of Bengali Muslims separate Bengali Muslims from these relatively poor and sometimes landless cultivators, potters, weavers, peasants, fishermen, school, and college

teachers, musicians, priests, village doctors, milkmen, writers, clerks, lawyers, share-croppers, shopkeepers, and other small businessmen, librarians, and social workers.

COUNTER-NARRATIVES OF BENGALI HINDUS IN BANGLADESH

A puzzling finding of our oral history project in Bangladesh⁵ was the recurring opinion of Hindu informants that 'things had been better during Pakistan times' and that only after the dismemberment of Pakistan 'things became really difficult for us'. We could not reconcile this with our readings of the period between 1947 and 1971. We found a few memoirs of Scheduled-Caste politicians and of other Hindus 'who stayed put' after 1947. It appears that due to the continuous enactment of Pakistan's partition rhetoric, they had not only resigned from their posts but had also opted out of the nation.

It was surprising to hear our informants' statements about the time they had lived under the Pakistani flag. In Pakistan, Bengali Hindus identified Pakistanis and other 'outsiders' as the main 'trouble-makers'. They had indeed faced problems but they felt that they had shared these problems with other Bengali 'downtrodden (but Muslim) peasants' like them. They therefore struggled along with them for a better deal from the Pakistani state. It was this belief in a common struggle and common interests between Hindu and Muslim Bengalis that enabled them to stay put while others around them had left. Yet, the new borders of the mind that were implemented after new geographical borders shaped Bangladesh, threatened their position.

In short, through the assiduous enactment of state rhetoric, the nation-state and those who worked on its behalf after the establishment of Bangladesh in 1971, subjected these Hindus to a 'regional and religious demarcation' (Vasavi 2001: 137) by identifying Scheduled Castes (Bandyopadhyay 1994: 115) as Hindus whose roots were in India. In this way, this 'Hindu minority' that is officially not recognized in Bangladesh was marginalized, oppressed, and deprived of its position as citizenry of Bangladesh. As they reconstituted themselves, these Scheduled Castes or poor Hindus deployed a range of narratives with which they sought to re-position themselves vis-à-vis the narratives of 'others' (that is upper caste and relatively richer Hindus who now mostly live in India). They formulated alternative pasts, and partition memories, accompanied with alternative identities.

Since partition rhetoric denies Hindus a place in the Bangladeshi nation, it has made them feel like outsiders or even refugees, who have only India *to come back to* and where they can find a home. Yet, a majority of the Hindus we interviewed had 'opted' (Van Schendel and Zürcher 2001: 1–13) for Bangladesh and expressed a strong sense of national identity. Though many of them had left their homes temporarily during the extreme violence that constituted the Bangladesh liberation war, many had returned with hopes. Though most of them returned only to find their houses burnt, possessions looted, land occupied, or crops stolen, theirs were nevertheless stories of 'people fighting to cope, to survive and build anew' (Pandey 2001: 187). In fact, they clung to the soil not because they were left behind but because they had opted to stay put. Haldar, a cultivator in Khustia, narrated that though in his village only Hindus lived:

We had good relations with Muslims living in neighboring villages. We used to attend each other's festivals and come over to each other's houses. We all ate fish, meat, chicken, vegetables but the only thing we did not take was beef. Actually, we all got our land here after the landlords left during 1947 when India and Pakistan were created. Many landlords gifted the land to local people here when they left. Some also sold the land and even poor people could buy some, as during that time the land was very cheap. We bought the land in small quantity like two to three katha. We all [Hindus and Muslims] have equal quantity of land and cultivate it. The only difference between Hindus and Muslims is that generally Muslims marry more than once.

Haldar recounted, however, that problems started in 1964 when 'we were harassed in a different way'. Yet it was only after 1971 that Haldar finally realized the full impact of partition:

That time we were very afraid because many people had been killed. We faced problems in 1971 not in 1947. The landlords shifted to India in 1947 and never came back. We also went to India in 1971 and stayed in Malda District in West Bengal for nine months. We returned because we had land and houses here. Besides, our economical condition was very bad in India and how could we leave our motherland? When we returned, our land had been captured and Muslims were cultivating our land. But they returned our land and most of our goods that had been looted. We felt good in Bangladesh in comparison to India. Yet, Muslims asked me: 'Why have you returned?' I replied: 'We are now all Bangladeshis and now we will live together'. But they replied 'if you will live here all your prestige and moral values will be destroyed. This is not a place for you to live in'.

Saha, another cultivator from Rajshahi, could clearly remember what had happened to him after he experienced a riot during 1962 in Rajshahi District. It had been during his matriculation exam that he had been advised to go home immediately as some people expected problems. On his way home he saw people bringing their womenfolk to safer places and others painting their houses with mud. People told him that looting was going on and that several houses had been set on fire. He also came across a Kali temple where Muslims had shouted *Allah O Akbar* and Hindu women and men had been running away. Some persons had stopped him on his way, however, and had asked him whether he was a Hindu or Muslim. He had answered that he was a Muslim. They however refuted this and remarked that his whole behavior showed he was a Hindu. Yet their attention had been diverted as they saw some Hindu women approaching and he managed to escape. When he had finally reached his parental home, he saw that people of the village were extremely afraid and they talked about Muslims coming to attack houses of Hindus. Saha recalled:

I became desperate when I saw all these people running away. At that moment an unknown person came from Tanzimpur. He was surprised to see that I had not run away. He told me to come along with him and he said that Muslims would give me shelter. But then something very strange happened. I suddenly ran away one side and that other person the other side. At that time it was impossible to know who was your friend and who your enemy so I ran away.

But Saha's story did not finish here:

I reached a nearby village and a person approached me with the intention to kill me. At that time I had a bamboo stick in my hand and I started beating him till he fell down. But he rose again and cried: 'O re baba re' and I realized he was a Hindu. Then I also recognized him. I carried him on my shoulders and kept him for shelter in a Muslim house. I am talking about Pakistan time. That time there were very kind Muslims and Muslims who were real villains.

Haldar from Kamargah said:

Some land [of our] was confiscated under the Vested Property Act but [what could we do?] Already the river took so much of our land. Some people have gone to India. Yet, we have no relatives there and no land. What can we do there? Muslims here also suffer. We all [Hindus and Muslims] used to go for fishing

too yet there is no water in the ponds anymore so what can we do? Government should do something for us because we are illiterate and backward.

Furthermore, official partition rhetoric in Bangladesh, or rather the mental borders it embodies, has divided the population not only into 'Muslims' and 'non-Muslims' but also into 'Bengalis' and 'non-Bengalis'. The cognitive map of Bangladeshi rulers depicts Bangladesh as the country of (Muslim) Bengalis, with Bangla (Bengali) as the national language and Islam as the national religion. Yet, Bangladesh is by no means a mono-cultural society. Apart from the above-described Hindu Bengalis, there are other minorities such as those commonly known as 'tribes'. The history of these 'other peoples of Bangladesh' is, like that of Hindu Bengalis, marked by exclusion. Garos are one of these 'other peoples of Bangladesh'.

COUNTER-NARRATIVES OF GAROS IN BANGLADESH

In this section we present the counter-narratives or cognitive map of the Garo of Bangladesh who are but a tiny ethnic, mostly Christian minority, in a country that is overwhelmingly dominated by Bengalis.⁶ Though Garos may be found all over Bangladesh, we conducted extensive fieldwork among groups of Garos who inhabit the lowland of northern Mymensingh, bordering the Garo Hills region of the Indian state of Meghalaya. At the time of the birth of Bangladesh these Garos not only constituted a separate ethnic group but were also identified as such (Bal 2000: 43–64). This increased unification was to some extent also the result of the continuous enactment of the official partition rhetoric that separates the Garos as a tribal minority, from the Muslim and (Hindu) Bengali majority.

Though Garos from Mymensingh had fought for the amalgamation of their 'tribal territory' (commonly referred to as Partially Excluded Area during British rule) with the Garo Hills, the new geographical border separated the Garos and consequently, hill Garos and lowland Garos came to live in two separate (nation) states. Yet, the two Garo communities had always been somewhat different from each other, the lowland Garos being influenced by contact with Bengali culture and environment of the plains in which they lived and worked. Besides, '[i]t was, at first, a quiet border, for it escaped the ghastly violence and

exchange of population that occurred in West Pakistan and western India, and it remained relatively easy to cross' (Robbins 1997: 65).

More than the new geographical boundaries, the mental borders enforced by the new (Muslim) Pakistani leaders during the 1950s and 1960s brought partition into Garo homes. It made them aware of their tiny minority status in a Muslim Bengali dominated country, separated from other Garo tribals as well as other minorities. Only a few lowland Garos who stayed put in Bangladesh had clear ideas about new international borders. Increasingly, the mental borders of state-supported partition rhetoric created fear, as these borders not only separated them from the 'Bengalis' but also forced them out.

Others who stayed put remembered the fear induced by the mental borders and confirmed that the lives of Garos had fundamentally changed after 1947. Our informant Kubinath, for instance, remembered that one day Garos would have to leave Pakistan, which had discouraged them from taking work seriously. Monendra, another Garo informant, confirmed this:

They were no longer interested in cultivating their lands. They were always talking about their future, and some *Mandis* [Garos] sold their lands to leave for India. Earlier, Mandis had been working hard in their fields. There had been joy everywhere. But after the partition they almost gave up (Bal 2004: 258).

While many Garos stayed put, as a distinct ethnic community they felt separated from Bengali Muslims and sometimes the feelings of insecurity were strong. Feeling marginalized and like a minority in their own land, many left for India.

When Bangladesh was born after a bloody liberation war, Garos who had at times joined the struggle for freedom from the Pakistani masters, now hoped that the new mental borders created by the Bangladeshi leaders would include them in the nation. Very soon, however, they realized that they did not appear in the heroic stories about the struggle for freedom. This exclusion remains and has led to further internal unification among those Garos who stayed put in Bangladesh. Indeed, Garos have set themselves apart from other Bangladeshis, with their own language and culture. Hence the mental borders delineated by the state has created borders that separate Garos from the majority of Muslim Bengalis. Besides, Garos have their shared (imagined) history

that recount stories of young Garo who joined the *Mukti Bahini*, the Freedom Force, in 1971. Arthur Drong, who joined the freedom fighters at the age of 17 narrated:

We wanted an independent country. The Pakistanis had exploited us. We wanted to live in this country with the dignity of citizens of a free country. In those days, they [Pakistanis] did not recruit the adivasis in their army or in the police force; they totally ignored the adivasis. Another thing was that we wanted to prove our feelings for the country, that we also loved the country. In that way we wanted to show other people that we were also citizens of this country (Bal 2004: 272–73).

Yet, the hopes of Garos who stayed put in Bangladesh or returned to the newly established nation, were shattered within a few years as they realized that the mental borders of the new rulers did not differ much from those set during Pakistani days. The only difference was that instead of being forcefully pushed into unison with Muslim Pakistanis, Garos now were urged by the borders set by the new rulers in Bangladesh to unite as ‘Bengalis’. The Garos rejected these boundaries, however, and created their own which united them as Bangladeshi tribal *Mandis* but separated them from Bengali Muslims in the country. Samuel, our informant reported:

Again we came back. There was no rehabilitation programme of the government. Only Caritas and some other organizations helped the people. Some Garos went to see Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. They told him: ‘We are tribals so we need special care from the government’. They presented him *millam-spie* [Garo shield and sword] as a souvenir. Sheikh Mujib said to them: ‘All people here are Bengali’. The Garos told him that they needed special protection, but he refused. He told us that we are Bengalis, and said, ‘You do not need any special privileges’ (ibid.: 274–75).

Another young Garo of northern Mymensingh narrated:

I think that the unity among the Mandis is becoming stronger. The Bengalis realize that. That is why they do not dare to do anything against the Mandis. I think it is because of our experiences in the past. We have seen that our people fled in 1964 because there was no unity among them. For this reason we lost many of them. The young generation is aware of the situation. There is no scope to flee; we have to stay in this country. Therefore, unity is very important. In the past people fled because they got scared, just because of rumours.

They left behind hundreds and hundreds maunds of rice and many valuable things like their houses, cattle, everything. And, actually, nothing happened to them. But the young people are different now. They would die, but not leave the country (Bal 2004: 275–76).

Such narratives demonstrate that Garos can live in Bangladesh as they have created their own demarcations, which position them against other Bangladeshis and provide them with a sense of unity and security. Garos thus attempt to root themselves in the nation as different but full-fledged Bangladeshis. These borders are different from the state-supported mental boundaries in Bangladesh that are deployed to expel the minorities from the nation.

Conclusion: The 'Memory Regime' and Possible Outcomes on Geographical Borders

We have shown that in the aftermath of the 1947 breakup of the Indian subcontinent, processes were initiated in which the symbolic meaning of geographical borders between India and Bangladesh got translated into mental borders embodied in the partition rhetoric that functions as a cognitive map. These 'borders of the mind' demonstrate the separation of non-Muslims from Muslims and Bengalis from non-Bengalis in Bangladesh, and Hindus from Muslims in India with the result that these separated and constructed groups have become 'minorities by force' (Kabir 1980: 9–11). Through the continuous enactment of partition rhetoric, members of the self-appointed majorities in both nation-states continuously, or at regular intervals, deploy these mental borders to separate minorities from the majority and at times even to exclude minorities from the nation. We have also seen that the narratives of 'minorities' in both nation-states counter this partition rhetoric. Many reject this 'process of minoritization' (Gupta 1995: 2207) caused by the enactment of partition rhetoric that marginalizes them as second-grade citizens in the country which they call their homeland.

Instead, these constructed minorities have formulated their own borders of the mind that legitimize their stay in their countries of birth. Yet, as 'forced' migration, or the threat of it continues in both nations, the strength of state-sponsored borders may be understood.

With the processes of Islamization and Hinduization on the rise in Bangladesh and India, the cognitive maps supported by the two states will, in all likelihood, not change fundamentally and in all probability the marginalizing of the minorities will continue. More likely, however, is that minorities may demand changed geographical borders. In that case, the mental borders that are now still characterized by 'dynamic fluidity' (Vasavi 2001: 137) will cease to be porous.

Our study shows that partitions neither provide long-term solutions to (ethnic-religious) conflicts nor do they prevent further conflict (Kumar 2003: 3–19). The route to solutions must start with a change in the hierarchical structure of the state-supported narrative regimes in both countries. This implies changes in the mental borders of present political leaders, and other (self-appointed) nation builders. These changes can only be brought about through the inclusion of alternative and contesting narratives that de-partition society through emphases on inclusion rather than exclusion. Such changes will, ultimately, also solve Indo-Bangladesh international border conflicts.

NOTES

1. Jharkhand was a part of the state of Bihar until 15 November 2000 when Bihar was divided into two and the new state of Jharkhand came into existence (Prakash 2001). By August 2001, Sinha-Kerkhoff had collected narratives of 90 Muslims in Jharkhand and these were first processed. During the years 2002 and 2003, however, she continued the research in Jharkhand and apart from two larger surveys in Ranchi city conducted among 200 Muslims, Sinha-Kerkhoff also had in-depth interview sessions with another 23 Bengali-speaking Muslims in Pakur district.
2. According to Syed Shahabuddin (2002: 12), this category constitutes the majority among the Muslims in Jharkhand.
3. This is an English translation of the Hindi leaflet that was found in File No. 270(3) 1947, *Political Special* (Patna: Patna State Archives).
4. It should be realized that in the present power constellation of the new state of Jharkhand it has become extremely important for those who 'have nowhere to go to' to show, by writing their own histories, that they are 'local'. It has become equally important, however, for others, by writing other histories, to define 'non-Jharkhandis'. Muslims in Jharkhand form a minority and feel discriminated in several ways observable, for instance, through Muslim protest against certain laws concerning reservation. Job reservation and reservations in educational institutions are, among others, provided to the 'indigenous' or

'natives' of Jharkhand and 'Muslims' are excluded from this category. Another instance of protest is the language issue, where so-called 'tribal languages' such as Santhali and even languages such as Bengali are recognized as official languages in the state but where Muslims struggle for the same recognition to Urdu in Jharkhand.

5. We interviewed 80 people in the rural and urban districts of Sylhet, Dhaka, Bagerhat, Pirojpur, Khustia, Khulna, and Rajshahi. They all identified themselves as Hindus and many were believers in *Vaishnavism* and identified as *Sudras*. They worshipped among others God Krishna, his beloved Radha and Goddesses Durga and Kali but also Lakshmi and Saraswati. Most of them (around 80 percent) said they were Scheduled Castes such as Mahishyas, Pods, Kaibartas, Rajbansis, Jaliahs, Haris, Rishis, Jalo Das, and also Namasudras. We also interviewed Brahmins, Kayasthas, and Kaishabs. Yet caste, they felt, was not much of consequence for them as 'we all are poor'. Besides in Bangladesh, unlike in India, there is no reservation for such *malauns* as they are often called.
6. No one knows for certain how many Garos presently live in Bangladesh. While the 1991 census reported 64,280 Garos, Garos themselves often mention a total of 100,000 or more. Based on church registers and other sources, we estimate a number of about 80,000.

REFERENCES

- Ahmed, I. 2002. 'The 1947 Partition of India: A Paradigm for Pathological Politics in India and Pakistan', *Asian Ethnicity*, 3(1), March: 9–28.
- . 2003. 'Ashraf Hegemony', *Economic and Political Weekly*, xxxviii (46), November 15–21: 4886–91.
- Ahmed, S. 2004. *Bangladesh. Past and Present*. New Delhi: A.P.H. Publishing Corporation.
- Bagchi, J. and S. Dasgupta. 2003. *The Trauma and the Triumph. Gender and Partition in Eastern India*. Kolkata: Stree.
- Bal, E. W. 2000. 'They Ask if we eat Frogs'. Social Boundaries, Ethnic Categorisation, and the Garo People of Bangladesh. Delft: Eburon.
- . 2004. 'An Untold Story of the Partition: The Garos of Northern Mymensingh', in I. Ahmed, A. Dasgupta and K. Sinha-Kerkhoff (eds), *State, Society and Displaced People in South Asia*, 245–79. Kolkata: The University Press Limited.
- Bandyopadhyay, S. 1994. 'Development, Differentiation and Caste: The Namasudra Movement in Bengal, 1872–1947', in S. Bandyopadhyay, A. Dasgupta and W. van Schendel (eds), *Bengal. Communities, Development and States*, pp. 90–120. New Delhi: Manohar.
- Banerjee, P., S. Basu Ray Chaudhury, and S. K. Das (eds). 2005. *Internal Displacement in South Asia. The Relevance of the UN's Guiding Principles*. New Delhi: Sage.

- Barkat, A. (ed.). 2000. *An Inquiry into Causes and Consequences of Deprivation of Hindu Minorities in Bangladesh through the Vested Property Act*. Dhaka: PRIP Trust.
- Barkat A., S. U. Zaman, A. Rahman, and A. Poddar. 1997. *Political Economy of the Vested Property Act in Rural Bangladesh*. Dhaka: Association for Land Reform and Development (ALRD).
- Bhowmick, N. C. and B. Dhar. 1998. *Samprodaik Boisomya kar Swarthe? (In who's Interest is Communalism?)*. Dhaka: Sasatta Prakashan.
- Chakrabarty, B. 2003. 'Fluidity or Compartments. Hindus, Muslims, and Partition', in B. Chakrabarty (ed.), *Communal Identity in India. Its Construction and Articulation in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 75–109. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Chakrabarty, D. 1996. 'Remembered Villages. Representation of Hindu–Bengali Memories in the Aftermath of the Partition', *Economic and Political Weekly*, August 10, xxxi: 2143–51.
- Chaturvedi, S. 2002. 'Process of Othering in the Case of India and Pakistan', *Tijdschrift voor Economische and Sociale Geografie*, 93(2), May: 149.
- Dasgupta, S. 2002. 'Imagined Authenticity and State Formation: Afghanistan and Bangladesh', *Mainstream*, (26) 22 Jan.: 19–23.
- Gupta, D. 1995. 'Secularisation and Minoritisation. Limits of Heroic Thought', *Economic and Political Weekly*, xxx (35), (2 Sep.): 2203–7.
- Kabir, M. G. 1980. *Minority Politics in Bangladesh*. New Delhi/Dhaka: Vikas Publishing House/Nawroze Kitabistan.
- Kaul, S. (ed.). 2001. *The Partitions of Memory: The Afterlife of Partition*. Delhi: Permanent Black.
- Kumar, K. 2001. *Prejudice and Pride. School Histories of the Freedom Struggle in India and Pakistan*. New Delhi: Penguin.
- Kumar, R. 2003. 'Settling Partition Hostilities. Lessons Learnt, the Options Ahead', in C. G. Deschaumes and R. Iveković (eds), *Divided Countries, Separated Cities. The Modern Legacy of Partition*, pp. 3–19. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Mascarenhas, A. 1986. *Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood*. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
- Mehdi, S. S. 2003. 'Refugee Memory in India and Pakistan', in C. G. Deschaumes and R. Iveković (eds), *Divided Countries, Separated Cities. The Modern Legacy of Partition*, pp. 85–96. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Nauriya, A. 1999. 'Some Portrayals of Jinnah: A Critique', in D. L. Sheth and G. Mahajan (eds), *Minority Identities and the Nation-State*, pp. 73–113. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Noorani, A. G. (ed.). 2003. *The Muslims of India. A Documentary Record*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Pandey, G. 2001. *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Prakash, A. 2001. *Jharkhand. Politics of Development and Identity*. Hyderabad: Orient Longman.
- Radstone, S. and K. Hodgkin (eds). 2003. *Regimes of Memory*. London and New York: Routledge.

- Riaz, Ali. 2004. *God Willing: The Politics of Islamism in Bangladesh*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
- Robbins, Burling. 1997. *The Strong Women of Modhupur*. Dhaka: University Press Limited.
- Rosser, Y. C. 2004. *Indoctrinating Minds. A Case Study of Bangladesh*. New Delhi: Rupa & Co.
- Samad, Y. 1995. *A Nation in Turmoil. Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan, 1937–1958*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- . 1999. 'Bangladesh. State of Minorities in Bangladesh', in S. Banerjee (ed.), *Shrinking Space: Minority Rights in South Asia*, pp. 75–96. Kathmandu: South Asia Forum for Human Rights.
- Shahabuddin, S. 2002. 'Jharkhand Muslims', *The Milli Gazette*, 1–15, Dec.: 12.
- Sheth, D. L. and G. Mahajan (eds). 1999. *Minority Identities and the Nation-State*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Sinha-Kerkhoff, K. 2003. 'Left Behind or Staying Put? Muslims in India and Hindus in Bangladesh after the Partition of India in 1947', *Indian Journal of Secularism*, 7(3), Oct.–Dec.: 27–44.
- . 2004a. 'Voices of Difference. Partition Memory and Memories of Muslims in Jharkhand, India', *Critical Asian Studies*, 36(1): 113–42.
- . 2004b. 'From "Displaced Person" to being "a Local": Cross Border Refugees and Invisible Refugees in Ranchi', In I. Ahmed, A. Dasgupta and K. Sinha-Kerkhoff (eds), *State, Society and Displaced People in South Asia*, pp. 149–68. Kolkata: The University Press Limited.
- . 2006. *Tyranny of Partition: Hindus in Bangladesh and Muslims in India*. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House.
- Tajuddin, M. 1999. 'Minorities in Bangladesh: A Conspectus', in S. Banerjee (ed.), *Shrinking Space: Minority Rights in South Asia*, pp. 97–199. Lalitpur, Nepal: South Asia Forum for Human Rights.
- Umar, B. 2000. *Language Movement in East Bengal*. Dhaka: Jatiya Grontha Prakashan.
- Van Houtum, H. and T. Van Naerssen. 2002. 'Bordering, Ordering and Othering', *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 93(2): 125–36.
- Van Schendel, W. and E. Zürcher. (eds). 2001. *Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World. Nationalism, Ethnicity and Labour in the Twentieth Century*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris.
- Vasavi, A. R. 2001. 'Narratives in the Reconstitution of Communities', in S. S. Jodhka (ed.), *Community and Identities. Contemporary Discourses on Culture and Politics in India*, pp. 126–39. New Delhi: Sage.

The Cartographic Imagination

British Mandate Palestine

EFRAT BEN-ZE'EV

For a few years now, my daughters' prime school task in geography has been to fill in the names of regions, cities, and towns on what is termed 'a mute map' (*mapa illemet*). The outer contours are given as well as the internal regional divisions. The 'proper Hebrew names' are to be filled in by the diligent student and the school curricula is to make sure that this map of Israel is engraved in the mind of every child. As is inevitable, many details retain their muteness in this mute map such as disputed borders, the pre-1967 borderline that for the last four decades indicates the areas of the Occupied Territories, or Arabic names of towns and places. The salient phase of this map is the initial muted form, offering a simple icon of 'who we are'. The details further elaborate the nation's geographical body. Together they form an icon that each child is expected to evoke when thinking of the homeland.

The aim of this chapter is to inquire how this cartographic icon was consolidated during the British Mandate in Palestine¹ (1920–48) and which landscape components were implanted in it. In other words, beyond tracking the emergence of the geographical entity entitled 'British Mandate Palestine', an entity that both Zionists and Arab–Palestinians came to see as their homeland, this chapter considers the characterizations that were chosen for the landscape.

Once cartographic 'data' is sketched, it influences peoples' relationship to the landscape in ways that could not necessarily be envisioned by the administration or the cartographers. The British Mandate maps were initially meant to serve the state's institutions such as enabling the exploitation of resources, controlling the population, and serving military aims. However, the cartographic project had a determining

effect not only on these 'state-making' mechanisms but also on 'nation-making'. It sketched external national borders, thus creating a logo-like entity for the emerging national movements (Anderson 1991; Winichakul 1994); it registered and emphasized certain populations (such as the sedentary ones) while paying little or no attention to others (such as nomadic ones); it highlighted certain historical sites (primarily of the Biblical and Crusaders' period); it gave legitimacy to certain place names over others. This study dwells on the specificities of Palestine's case study: Which signs were chosen to be registered on the map and its legend, and which were absent? Which boundaries were applied, both of localities and between international, inter-colonial territories? How was the landscape standardized? Which names were used—Arabic, Hebrew, English, Ancient? And how did 'Mother England' come into play in the map of Palestine?

The British cartographic project was part of a sensibility that had a decisive effect not only during the British Mandate period but way beyond it. The maps influenced the way the Zionists envisioned Palestine's landscape and the 1948 war enabled the Jewish population of Palestine to create a geo-body for the nation. Yet this geo-body existed only on parts of the area that previously was under the British Mandate. Therefore, perhaps it was not mere chance that by 1967, Israel's conquests had taken on a geographical shape similar to the one prior to 1948, especially after the handing over/back of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt (by 1982). Moreover, for many Israelis, the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza was merely a return to Biblical Palestine, and Biblical Palestine took on the form of British Mandate one. In this chapter I will try to show how this geographical entity—expanding from the Mediterranean to River Jordan, and from the Lebanese border to the border with Egypt, came to be seen as predestined, logical, and almost natural.

The chapter begins by reviewing map-making and geography-making of Palestine before the Mandate period. Although the rule was an Ottoman one, the British were the prime cartographers of the Holy Land. It then considers the emergence of a geo-body, and makes some comparisons to other budding post-colonial nations, touching on the ways maps construct 'realities'. Next is the section entitled 'Signs, Symbols, Categories', analyzing 1:20,000 scale topo-cadastral maps of Palestine. It considers their characteristics by examining the usage of colors, size, categorizations, naming, and omissions. The intention is to show how the British cartographic project laid the foundation of the

entangled Palestine/Israel entity. A step toward understanding current political affairs is to deconstruct the cartographic process that helped to produce it.

The 'Prehistory' and Logic of Modern Maps

By the early to mid-19th century, the era of map ornamentations, lack of scale, and enlargement of 'important sites', characteristic of earlier maps of the Holy Land, had passed. Mapping had become part of a greater project of what Matthew Edney defined as 'the Enlightenment's encyclopedic mentality, which produced massive tomes intended to present all available knowledge to their bourgeois readership in a systematic manner' (1997: 5). Modern cartography emerged as a new science, registering, emulating, and unifying distant terrains into a coherent picture. Despite the illusion of an undisputed scientific product, these changes of method were far from introducing an objective map; maps remained structured by the inclinations, confabulation, and omissions of their creators.

From the 1990s there has emerged a growing body of literature on how maps emphasize what is of interest to those who commission them and de-emphasize that which is deemed irrelevant by them (Lefebvre 1991[1974]; Monmonier 1991; Wood 1993). In *The New Nature of Maps*, J.B. Harley examines maps as part of a 'persuasive discourse', aimed at a targeted audience (2001: 37). Harley links maps to imperialism and the emergence of nationalism, noting that, 'In modern times, the greater the administrative complexity of the state—and the more pervasive its territorial and social ambitions—than the greater its appetite for maps' (ibid.: 55). Maps did not merely pre-date and anticipate the emergence of empires; they also supplied retrospective legitimacy. Hence, following Harley, the British maps will be understood here as means towards reifying power, reinforcing a status quo, and fixing social groups and interactions within clear categories and charted lines (ibid.: 79).

'Modern maps' fix the viewer's gaze at a bird's-eye view; the conditioned gaze is a vertical one. From above, one grasps a broad picture with each element receiving roughly the same focus, hence giving an impression of equal prominence to all the objects. But, in fact, prominence is achieved by other cartographic means—color, font, size.

Moreover, all the details together form a panoramic picture, whereby the small details are overlooked in favor of a unified whole. While on the one hand it is an encompassing overview, on the other hand it has to be defined, parceled, and delimited by boundaries. This vertical gaze was accentuated when aerial photography was introduced, primarily from the World War I.²

Any account of British mapping of Palestine should refer to the Survey of Western Palestine, conducted by the Palestine Exploration Fund (PEF), established in London in 1865 by a group of distinguished academics and clergymen.³ Although an independent organization, through its prominent members it was closely bound to the British Imperial Administration. The PEF's main survey of 'Western Palestine', carried out between 1871 and 1876, was published between 1880 and 1884 in ten large volumes (on archeology, demography, hydrology, names, fauna, flora, and so on) and included 26 map sheets. The maps introduced new cartographic methods that changed the field dramatically—a grid system, mapping based on trigonometric principles, absolute identifiable locations set on the ground (known as trig points) and a fixed scale of one inch to a statute mile.⁴

The head of the commission for the bulk of the survey was Lt. Claude Conder, later joined by Lt. Horatio Kitchener. Kitchener was to have a distinguished military career, leading up to his being appointed Secretary of State for War shortly after the outbreak of World War I in 1914. The fact that both men were professional army officers is but one indication of the military aspirations that motivated this grand project (Moscrop 2000).⁵ Expanding the empire, if not by direct rule than at least by commanding information, was part of the survey's agenda. Indeed, the topographic maps that the PEF produced, formed the basis for the maps used in the World War I conquest of Palestine.⁶

Beyond the political–military drive that motivated the production of these PEF maps, there was the British preoccupation with Biblical Palestine. Special attention was dedicated to ruins and the identification of ancient sites as well as to the portrayal of the local inhabitants as the descendants of Biblical figures. George Adam Smith's influential book, *The Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, published in 1894, lent further prominence to 'Biblical Palestine' along with other travelers' accounts of the Holy Land.⁷ Smith (a personal friend of John George Bartholomew, known as 'the prince of cartographers'), opened another avenue towards

the creation of 'scientific' geographical maps of the Holy Land with a strong Biblical twist.⁸ When General Allenby conquered Palestine in 1917 he read George Adam Smith's *The Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, as did many of his soldiers.⁹ Smith's book explained Palestine's landscape with terms borrowed from the British terrain. When writing of the Galilee, he noted that it is 'almost as wooded as our own land (1966[1894]: 273). When describing valleys, he occasionally named them 'glens'. When describing the descent to Lake Tiberias, Smith noted that one comes across two 'moors' (ibid.: 284). Moreover, Smith offered comparisons to illuminate certain points, as in the following passage:

Do we desire a modern analogy for the difference between Judea and Galilee in the time of our Lord, we find one in the differences between England and Scotland soon after the Union. But Galilee had as much reason to resent the scorn of Judea as Scotland the haughty tolerance of England (ibid.: 276).

This way of seeing Palestine through a British prism we may call Anglicization. Altogether we can conclude that the 19th century cartographic inclinations—selectively unveiling the Holy Land's past, collecting topographic information, and constructing landscape representations that replicate British ones—were to remain a dominant in Palestine's cartography of the century to come. Map authority Kenneth Nebenzahl sums up the fundamental role of the PEF maps: 'This project...produced the basis from which all the modern mapping of Palestine developed, resulting ultimately, in the present day Survey of Israel, the national mapping agency' (1986: 155).

Setting Boundaries

When the PEF embarked on the survey, they had planned to map the entire area of Palestine, west and east of the River Jordan. However, the survey east of the Jordan was delayed and never fully completed. This was a first indication of the molding of Western Palestine as a separate new entity. The boundaries of the PEF maps were as follows: The clearest boundary, as always, was the western one, set along the Mediterranean. The eastern boundary was the River Jordan. The less obvious boundaries were the northern and southern ones. The southern

uneven boundary ran from Masada in the east, through Beersaba (in a southwest direction), and then (northwest) to the area south of Gaza. During the British Mandate period this southern border was pushed a little further south. However, even during the British Mandate there was no series of maps that covered the area south of the 31 degrees latitude. Only much later, after the southern region known as *al-Naqab* was captured by Jewish forces in 1948 and became part of the new State of Israel, did the Israeli Department of Surveys undertake as one of its first missions to map the *Naqab*/Negev (Szancer 2001: 27–42) and confer upon it Hebrew names (Benvenisti 2000).

The northern boundary was set on the PEF maps along Naher al-Kasimiyeh (also known as the Litany River), flowing into the Mediterranean north of Tyre. Following World War I and the 1916 Sykes–Picot agreement, Palestine was first destined to be under an international government. Yet by the end of 1920 it came under British Mandate and was cut off from Syria and Lebanon, which were to be part of the French protectorates. The concerns of both the French and the British when drawing the boundary were primarily political, military, and economic, rather than historical or preoccupied with the good of the local inhabitants (Brawer 1988: 104). At first, this northern border of Palestine was outlined on a general low-scale map. The exact physical boundary was to be defined by a joint committee.¹⁰ It took two years to finish the work, with another year needed for the approval from the governments (ibid.: 120). Despite seeming agreement between the French and the British, problems of access arose along the border and a new committee and agreement were established in 1926, the ‘Bon Voisinage Agreement’. Hence, this northern border emerged gradually, finally adding up to 157 km, from the Mediterranean in the west to River Yarmuk in the east. It was marked by 71 piles of stone, 1.5 m high, located on high platforms so that one could see the adjacent piles (ibid.: 118). Consequently, the process of map-making also marked the physical landscape. The boundary between Israel and Lebanon/Syria today runs along this borderline.

An evident feature of the imperial preoccupation with this border is the passion for a palpable boundary. This passion, as Benedict Anderson argued, is closely associated with the emergence of nationalism. Maps, Anderson noted, shape ‘the way in which the colonial state imagined its dominion...the geography of its domain’ (1991: 164). It was via maps

that colonial powers constructed a history, thus proving 'the antiquity of specific, tightly bounded territorial units' (Anderson 1991: 174–75). Moreover, the imperialist world map looked like a jigsaw puzzle with each colony taking the color of the empire that ruled it. These invented entities were turned into logos, reproduced and circulated in textbooks, journals, seals, and stamps, on and on (*ibid.*: 175).

Although the colonial powers led the intensive project of modern cartography, the first to adopt these 'colonial imaginings' were the local nationalists of emerging nations (*ibid.*: 163, 174–78). In other words, the colonial setting, as Mary Louise Pratt's work showed, was molded at the contact zones. In these contact zones 'subjects are constituted in and by their relations to each other'. These relations should be understood 'not in terms of separateness or apartheid, but in terms of co-presence, interaction, interlocking understandings and practices, often within radically asymmetrical relations of power' (1992: 7). The locals adapted to, and adopted, colonial ideas and one such idea was the clear-cut border that formed the imagined framework that contained the nation (when, in fact, these borders enclosed a variety of groups).

Contact zones can be sites of converging interests. In Palestine, the Zionists, eager to purchase land, demanded from the British very early on participation in a legal land registration procedure (Gavish 1991: 38–40). Already in 1918 the Zionist Commission decided to hold a survey of Palestine's resources, including a legal and technical land survey. Brigadier General Gilbert Clayton, the British political officer, prevented this Zionist initiative. He clarified that such a survey must be carried out by the British government and not by a sectarian movement like the Zionist one. Yet at the same time the British had their own reasons for carrying out a land survey: They needed to control the population, to raise taxes, and to gain military supremacy and altogether aspired to a rule of law and order.

The survey became one of the first Mandate government tasks, inadvertently serving the Zionists. The Zionist needed maps for various reasons: Topographic maps were used by Jewish youth movements and hikers 'rediscovering' the land, as well as by the Zionist armed resistance force, the Hagana. Cadastral maps were used by the Zionist administration, primarily for purchasing land. Maps were part of the school curricula and the media. In contrast, the Arab population, mostly rural and less organized administratively, was less exposed to the maps.¹¹ Thus, it is clear that British map-making had a greater direct impact on the

Zionist population of Palestine than on the Arab one. It certainly influenced the Arab population as well, but in more subtle and indirect ways.

A Comparative Outlook on the Geo-body

In *Siam Mapped*, Thongchai Winichakul described how the people of Siam, not directly colonized but strongly influenced by their surrounding colonial context, gradually adopted a new kind of national identity through the drawing of new maps. Winichakul's endeavor was 'to illustrate how even the most "natural" element constituting the presence of a nation has been culturally constructed by a certain kind of knowledge and technology' (1994: 16). He named these supposedly natural elements that constructed a national consciousness the 'geo-body'. The geo-body is the outcome of modern geographical discourse and its prime technology is the map. It is through the map that members of a nation envision themselves as a cohesive community. The geo-body, he noted, 'is neither strict nor conclusive' (1994: 17). Due to this flexibility the geo-body takes on different forms in different contexts.

As the idea of a geo-body emerged in Palestine, and its contours were created by those who had the power and resources to draw maps, it became an entity for negotiation and determination. Within this process, some of the British colonial geo-body traits were adopted, often mechanically and automatically.

Winichakul showed how a definite, clear-cut border was imposed on Siam. As the British waged their first war against Burma (1824–26), being political allies of the Siamese court they were eager to demarcate the boundaries between their newly captured Burmese colony and the kingdom of Siam. At first, the Siamese court ignored British requests for the clarifications of border as it was unnecessary from the court's point of view. The court noted that borders in certain remote regions could not be established. However, if the British insisted, they noted, they should go and inquire from the local inhabitants what their understanding of the border was. 'It is clear that a "boundary" as understood by the British on the one hand and their Siamese counterparts on the other' wrote Winichakul, 'was a similar thing but not the same' (1994: 64). Finally, the Siamese conformed to British expectations and stated that what was desired by the British would be approved, as long as it was fair.

The imposition of boundaries in India, Britain's 'Jewel in the Crown', is also intriguing. Mapping India, showed Matthew Edney, often preceded British interests rather than followed them. The British began by mapping the maritime 'Indian' cities for the sake of the East India Company free trade. Later, the maps 'expanded' inland and British trade followed. In parallel, interests of trade led to gaining political power at strategic zones. Finally, the British controlled the entire half peninsula, a process that occurred hand in hand with the Great Triangulation Survey. 'Over the course of the 19th century', wrote Edney,

[T]he British mapping of India further consolidated 'India' in its modern image. Rennell had to take great care in defining what he understood to be the regions which constituted Hindustan/India. A century or more later, such care was no longer necessary. The geographical rhetoric of British India was so effective that India had become a real entity for both. [...] The triumph of the British empire, from the imperialist perspective, was its replacement of the multitude of political and cultural components of India with a single all-India state coincident with a cartographically defined geographical whole (1997: 15).

India, argued Edney, was a British creation. Yet as soon as such a geo-body emerged, locals embraced it and further circulated the idea. In Palestine, some of the senior cartographers were aware of the role of the map in establishing a geo-body in peoples' imagination. For instance, Frederick John Salmon, head of the Palestine's Department of Land and Surveys, noted that a 'good topographical survey should be looked upon as a national monument of the first importance' (Gavish, 1991: 62, 209).¹² Therefore, it is worth taking a step beyond Winichakul's generalized geo-body and examining what constituted the features that surfaced from the maps.

Signs, Symbols, Categories

There is a relative abundance of synonymous and analogous words for boundary in English: words such as border, margin, rim, edge, limit, delimit, demarcate, delineate, and so on. Neither Arabic nor Hebrew are linguistically so rich in this field. British cartographic preoccupation with boundaries in our 1:20,000 scale series of topo-cadastral maps

comes across as an obsession. Considering the map-legend, we find the following categories for types of boundaries: 'international boundary', 'district boundary', 'sub-district boundary', 'municipal boundary', 'Triangulation Point boundary', 'quarter boundary', 'village boundary' (there are two types here—'defined' and 'undefined'), 'fiscal block boundary' (again 'defined' and 'undefined'), 'qit'a' boundary (qit'a being the local Arabic term for a block of land), 'undefined limit', as well as a special symbol showing change of boundary.


As was noted above, 'modern maps' in general and modern British maps in particular rejected ornamentation and adopted a minimalism associated with scientific accuracy and a utilitarian philosophy. The British Mandate maps were not only bereft of ornaments, they were also almost bereft of color. When color did appear, it had a strong impression. While in the maps of the 1920s the only color to appear were green patches, indicating dense agricultural and forested areas, in the 1930s red was added to indicate the built environment.

The green patches for agriculture give the impression that there are plantations only where the green appears. However, a close look at the legend tells us that some of the uncolored area also had fruit trees, palms, and coniferous trees. These plantations were not colored green because they were scattered. How scattered we do not know but the general impression of such a representation is that the bulk of the land was fallow. That was not necessarily the case on the ground. Many of the local trees grow scattered on the mountains (figs, for example) or in small terraced patches (olives, almonds), but those would hardly be evident on the map. The role of these 'scattered trees' is further played down by including in the non-green area the following categories: 'bushes', 'cropping rock', 'uncultivated land', and 'scrub'; as if scattered trees are not tended and have no owners. The green agricultural patches contrast with the otherwise colorless map, creating an evident binary representation of the landscape—the 'cultivated' and the 'uncultivated'.

In a similar vein, grazing land is also not mentioned. We should bear in mind that raising goats and sheep was a vital component of the Palestinian rural economy. Most peasant families owned a few 'heads' of goats and sheep, and wealthy families would be in the possession of tens and hundreds. However, pastures and pasture animals are absent from the maps.¹³ Hence, when one examines these maps the impression is of a great deal of fallow terrain. When one becomes acquainted with

Figure 3.1

British cartographic preoccupation with boundaries in the 1: 20,000 scale series of topo-cadastral maps of Palestine



Source: Map titled Caesarea, Geography Map Room, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel.

Figure 3.2

Binyamina—a Zionist Jewish Settlement. Note how the shaded area extends beyond the built area and gives the impression that the settlement is larger



Source: See Figure 3.1.

the landscape only through the map, one might think that it is relatively vacant, awaiting development. Both the British Mandate government, and more so the Zionist institutions, were in search of such unoccupied land. This does not necessarily imply that the absence of grazing land or scattered trees from the maps was intended to create this impression of emptiness.

The plantations that are mentioned by name in the legend are: Citrus (abbreviated as C.), Banana (B.), Olive (Ol.), Vineyard (V.), Orchard (O.), Palms (P.), Coniferous Plantations, and Deciduous Plantations. The outcome of such categorization is that although there were other plantations such as almonds, figs, pears, plums, and mulberry, the map lumps the fruit trees into a few categories. There was also a large variety of vegetables and grain crops that pass unmentioned (chickpea, sesame, black-eyed pea, pumpkin, squash, wheat, barley, and others). Maps, of course, necessarily omit, and preserve, but through these choices the actual variety is obscured.

Maps, by their very nature, are synchronic. Hence, unless we look at series of updates that refer to newly introduced agricultural categories, we cannot detect changes of agricultural patterns. In addition, plantations were not high on the agenda of topo-cadastral maps. Thus, even if one could compare the 1920s maps to the 1940s maps, one would not detect such changes. These maps reflect an Orientalist approach to the East as backward in terms of agricultural innovations and in its ability to change; the East was portrayed as 'immovable'.¹⁴

Inadvertently, a map also has a unifying effect by applying a small group of categories to a variety of localities. Palestine has very different geographic features such as the mountains of the Galilee (reaching over 1,000 m), the coastal plain (including sand dunes and marshland), the Judean desert (with little or no rain), or the long and deep Jordan valley (fertile and hot). These localities differ dramatically in topography, soil, rainfall, plantations, and so on. However, the same legend was used in British cartography for all localities, giving the viewer an impression of a unified geo-body. Hence, in a map entitled Tel Hordos, depicting the semi-desert area southeast of Bethlehem, the legend still lists 'Citrus' and 'Banana Groves' although there is not a single citrus or banana there. At the same time, the map of Tel Hordos does not introduce categories of seasonal plantations fit for semi-arid areas nor the category of grazing land, although both are central means of livelihood


in the area. Through the unified legend, diversity is ignored and an impression of a single entity, 'Palestine', is imparted.¹⁵

Another conspicuous absence in British maps is that of the marshlands. The British encouraged projects of drying these areas, often with Zionist collaboration (Kedar and Furman 2003). The marshlands were popularly known as swamps, carrying a derogative meaning because of their association with anopheles mosquitoes and malaria. These areas were considered wasteland. The government, as well as the Zionist movement, had hoped to dry them and turn them into fertile agricultural land. In the British maps, even before these marshlands were dried, little was said about their utilization. The inhabitants that lived near the marshes made a living from growing water buffaloes (*jammus*) for dairy and meat, and produced mats from marsh reeds. Neither of these two agricultural products is mentioned. Their absence on the map was the first step towards the eradication of a lifestyle that existed in Palestine and ceased to exist during the Mandate period (Kabara marshland, Hula marshland, and the Ghor). It should be added that some of these drying projects were joint Zionist–British enterprises. For instance, the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association (PICA), the Jewish organization for land purchase in Palestine, became the owner of some of the land dried near Caesarea. The Zionists were also involved in drying the Hula. Hence, again, we see the convergence of interests of British and Zionist administrations.

Just as the population of the marshlands received scant attention in the British Mandate maps, so did the Bedouin population, which was much larger. The maps emphasized sedentary settlements by indicating built areas. In contrast, encampments were often disregarded. Some nomad populations were mentioned on the maps because they were in the process of settling in permanent dwellings, often due to government 'encouragement'. For instance, Arab al-Ghawarina, whose Kabara marshland was dried, were mentioned along the hill of their new land. Others, such as Arab al-Wushahi, who lived both in temporary dwellings east of Ijzim as well as in Ijzim itself, were not mentioned.¹⁶ If a community was not indicated on the map, it became difficult for its inhabitants to stay intact. To mention but one example: On the 3 and 4 May 1948, the Hagana organized an army operation entitled: Operation Broom. Its aim was to 'cleanse the enemy (*letaher meoyev*) from the area on both sides of the Tiberias–Metula road'.¹⁷ The Jewish forces arrived

Figure 3.3

The area east of Caesarea, dried of swamps and owned by PICA—the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association



Source: See Figure 3.1.

from the west and 'pushed' the population east (toward Syria) by way of scaring it. Because the population dwelled in tents and was perceived as nomadic, and because it was not even indicated on some of the maps, the operation seemed rather simple from the Jewish forces' point of view.

The maps also create a certain illusion regarding settlement sizes. While Arab villages are shown on the map as a single cluster, the new Zionist rural settlements, being pre-planned, have farms adjacent to the home and tend to occupy larger built areas. As a result, the map gives the impression that a Jewish settlement is as large as an Arab one, when in fact they differed considerably in population. Monmonier (1991) points out that the larger the 'object' is on the map, the more prominence it gains in the eyes of the viewer. Adding to this distortion are the colors: While in the 1920s the built area was indicated either in stripes of black and white or as black houses (thus fitting into the mildness of an entire map of black and white), in the 1940s the built area was painted red. This strengthened further the sense that the Jewish settlements were larger.

To maintain the minimalist style mentioned earlier, the maps have relatively few symbols, and those are often in the form of shorthand. The symbols that appear (60 in total) tell us more about the people who drew the maps than about the lives of the local inhabitants. One group of symbols relates to institutions such as Railway Station (STA), Post Office (P.O.), Police Station (P.S.), and School (Sch.). The first two, which were rather rare in Palestine, especially in the rural area, are imports of the British imagination; in England they mattered. Police Stations, the emblem of the Lords of the Land, probably served to impart a message of control. Schools, a source of pride to the British who considered themselves patrons of modern education, were, again, not many, and far less than what Sir Herbert Samuel had planned (Shepherd 1999: 57). At the same time, the British map symbols did not ignore local features such as Cisterns (•c), Limekilns (•LK.), Sheikhs' tombs (represented with a symbol of a circle topped with half a crescent) and Threshing Floors (TF). While in the maps from 1929 to 1930 all are huddled together on the same line, in the 1940s map they were given more prominence, each set on a separate line of the legend.

The unifying effect of the map is also maintained in the usage of letter fonts. Most of the fonts are regular and do not stand out as unique.

At times, they differ in size, make use of capital letters, occasionally adopt italics, or one in bold. However, one irregular font is more noticeable; it is the one used for some of the ruins. While some ruins are designated merely by a black square and the letter R., others are designated with this special font, known as Old English text. The effect of such an ornamental font is remarkable. Inadvertently, it also creates a parallel between old England and ancient Palestine, thus turning the ruins of the latter into part of the former's history an example of Old English font name on the map being Tall Mubarak or El Burj, for Dor in the case of the Mediterranean fort of 'Atlit, the caption is even longer. It appears as: 'Atlīt, Crusader's Castle (Ruins of)'.

Eitan Bar-Yosef (2001), who examined British propaganda during the 1917–18 conquest of Palestine, demonstrated the salience of two underlying discourses. For some members of the British upper classes, the conquest resembled 'the last crusade'. Drawing on the heroic imagery of the Middle Ages, the British aristocracy felt that they were pilgrims in the footsteps of their knightly forefathers. For the rank, the salient images were those of the Bible that they had encountered in school and in church. Both of these strands found their way into British cartography. The Crusaders' sites received explicit attention, while Judeo-Christian sites were also significant. Although one may argue that archeology was more prominent in the time of the Palestine Exploration Fund Survey (1880s), the 1930s maps show that it remained so during the Mandate Period as well. This centrality of archeological sites in maps was carried on into the era of the State of Israel.

The anglicization of the landscape was achieved not merely by focusing on certain archeological sites, by using Old English fonts or by indicating post offices and railway stations. It was most apparent in the fact that all the maps were in English. It should be noted that when the maps of Napoleon's delegation were published in 1812, known as Jacotin's maps, names were written in Arabic script alongside the French. However, almost all British Mandate maps were solely in English. The direct implication was that those who could not read English could not read the maps, including virtually the entire Arab rural population.¹⁸ In contrast, any Englishman around the world could read a map of Palestine.

In 1938, Hillel Birger, the topographic trainer of the Hagana, the largest and most prominent Zionist armed resistance force, wrote to

General Salmon, head of the British Department of Surveys, asking to publish the British topographical maps in the three official languages—English, Arabic, and Hebrew. Salmon wrote back, noting that:

It would, of course, increase the value of our maps very considerably if editions could be prepared in the three official languages and there is no doubt the Jewish community, who devote such time to the study and exploration of the country, would derive great benefit from Hebrew editions. It has been, however, sufficiently difficult with the staff and funds at the disposal of the Department to deal adequately with the cartography of Palestine in one language only. The maps have so far been mostly used for Government Departments, while over 30,000 copies were issued to the Troops, but your suggestion for issuing a key in Hebrew is one which might extend the usefulness of our maps very considerably.¹⁹

This letter clarifies that although all three official languages were supposedly considered, the primary audience was the English-speaking administration. Birger's request did not stem out of a naïve quest for knowledge. It should be understood as part of the Zionist attempts to command better information in order to be prepared for an armed struggle.

The British administration was willing to produce only two types of maps in languages other than English. One was the cadastral map sketching the block and parcel land settlement, published in English and Hebrew, or English and Arabic, according to the language of the population whose land was parceled. The administration wanted the maps to be comprehended by the local inhabitants for the sake of control and tax-raising. The second multilingual map was the road map.²⁰

At the same time, the great majority of the names on the British maps remained the local ones. For instance, *Umm ez-Zīnāt* is written as such and not translated into 'the mother of goodness' or *Ein Ghazāl* is not turned into 'the Spring of the Gazelle'. To maintain rule and order, the local names had to be comprehended by all sides. The British policy went beyond preserving the local names; many of the geographical features appeared on the map in the local language. The Palestine Index Gazetteer published a glossary with roughly 100 such terms. While 4/5th of these terms are derived from the Arabic (such as 'Ein, bir, hammam, khirba), 1/5th are derived from the Hebrew (such as *shekhuna(t)*, *sede*,²¹ *rama*, *po'alim*). A few geographical terms also appear in English.

For instance, the English term 'ruin' stands for a particular building, part of which at least remains standing, while '*khirba*', the Arabic term, stands either for an abandoned or a temporary site of habitation (Palestine Index Gazetteer 1945). The term *wādi* is used extensively, instead of its English parallel. The gazetteer explains it as 'a water-course, in which water flows periodically, during the rains' (ibid.). The English speaking map readers had to consult the gazetteer in order to grasp the terms that the map used.

Language choices were, nevertheless, employed in the process of registering names on these maps. Some places, often those of significance for the British, were anglicized or Latinized through naming. For instance, Caesarea, apart from including Roman and Muslim ruins, was the site of a village with a Muslim Bosnian population that arrived in Palestine during the Ottoman period. On the map, its name was written in Latin style. The city of Jaffa, whose Arabic pronunciation is Yafa, was written as Jaffa. Jerusalem did not appear with its Arabic name al-Quds. Some places received two names, mostly those associated with important archeological sites, for instance River Qishon (Nahr al-Muqatta'); the Crusader's ruin of Belvoir also taking in brackets the Arabic name (Kaukab al Hawa); Tel Hordos (Kh. Firdaus); Tiberias Lake (Sea of Galilee). Rarely, Arabic and Hebrew names appear side by side, for instance Shallala, Kh. Cf Ya'arot Ha-Karmel. Generally places were defined as either Arabic or Jewish through their names. As we have seen earlier, maps are intolerant towards blurred categorizations.

Concluding Remarks

The British Mandate Government invested a great deal in mapping Palestine, producing hundreds of new maps in varying scales—topographic, cadastral, combinations of the two, as well as on other topics. Such an investment would not have been undertaken unless cartography was understood to be a decisive component of efficient state control. Cartography was essential for military control, not only in times of erupting violence but also for regular policing; for the state bureaucracy, primarily enabling population control; for establishing the places from which the central authorities can demand payment for services; and for ethnic categorization that inadvertently served

nation-building—classifying ethnic groups and identifying them with certain spaces and symbols. Cartography made these divisions palpable, graspable, and circulatable.

What were the main characterizations of the British map of Palestine? First, they relied on existing myths and representations, drawing on past imagery and feeding back into them. The maps emphasized the Biblical and Crusader mythical worlds, while the long Muslim history of Palestine was downplayed. This type of emphasis via maps should be seen in relation to other parallel activities that have a bearing on landscape perception such as archeology (carried out extensively from the 19th century), painting (such as the pictures of David Roberts of Holy Places from the mid-19th century), reviving ancient names (Caesarea, Atlit) and establishing museums (such as the Rockefeller Museum).²²

A second strand that predominated in the British maps was the usage of terms, sites, and perceptions borrowed from the English landscape. Publishing the maps in English (rather than the local languages); highlighting post offices, railways, schools rather than local institutions such as the Arab village guest-houses; giving weight to large planted groves while underrepresenting other agricultural forms such as grazing and scattered plots. And, although not discussed in this chapter, the British also anglicized Palestine through the creation of the binary opposition between cityscape and villagescape; there were separate map series for towns and for villages. In addition, the British also imposed on the landscape many new boundaries and borders, both local and international.

The third trend apparent in the cartography was to apply similar categories to the maps of all of Palestine. By creating a unified set of maps and a unified legend, cartography solidified the basis of a new geo-body. The maps emphasized some populations (such as the newly-built Zionist settlements) while tended to disregard nomadic and marshland populations. That is to say, the maps clarified who was part of the geo-body and who was not. This geo-body was a contribution both to Israeli and to Palestinian nation-building because both Zionists and Arab-Palestinians began thinking of their homeland in terms of the geo-body that the British 'established'.

The overall power of cartography was that it was a fraction of a much greater enlightenment project that the modern world revered. Cartography was about systemizing, standardizing, charting, classifying, and converting data into a visual form, constructing the ways spaces,

resources, and populations will, can and should be represented. Maps were the final printed product of the above processes, reaching many and important hands, and were believed to be the real representation of the space that they denoted. It was this strong belief that gave maps their power as a resource. It was through maps that borders, names, categories, and lacunas were implanted in the minds as facts.

NOTES

1. As the focus of this chapter is on the British Mandate period, I apply the term then used in English, 'Palestine', although at times this usage is anachronistic.
2. In 1917–18, the Bavarian squadron 304 of the German army, assisting the Ottoman army, made 2,662 aerial photos of Palestine. Due to military needs, many of these photographs were taken from a very short distance, showing the contours of houses, trees, roads, dirt roads, fences and waterbeds. In 1991 B. Z. Kedar published over 100 of these photographs alongside photographs of the same places taken in the beginning of the 1980s. The comparison between the two points of time is telling. What stands out most is that most of the land that was previously inhabited by Arabs was taken over by Jews. Moreover, while in the beginning of the 20th century much of the land was populated by small villages, farms, and towns, the dramatic growth led to intense urbanization.
3. The contemporary website of the PEF states the following: 'The purpose of the PEF is to promote research into the archaeology and history, manners and customs and culture, topography, geology and natural sciences of the Levant the southern portion of which was conventionally named 'Palestine' (<http://www.pef.org.uk/index.htm>, 29 June 2005).
4. See *The Survey of Western Palestine*, conducted and published by the Palestine Exploration Fund, 1880–84. Some of these 'modernizing' principles, such as the triangulation method, were already applied by engineer Pierre Jacotin (1765–1827), Napoleon's cartographer, who accompanied the conquest voyage of 1799 and published a set of maps of Palestine. France played a leading role in the introduction of new cartographic methods (Shatner 1951:149).
5. The local inhabitants were well aware of the PEF military component. The survey was constantly under danger and could not proceed without armed guard. When camping near Safed in 1874 they were attacked and several members of the party, including Conder and Kitchner, were seriously injured.
6. A passage describing the map files of World War I kept at the Public Records Office notes: 'Many reproductions and revised editions of the Kitchener/Conder maps produced by the PEF and detailed topographic maps of the battle areas, (often identified in the catalogue as reconnaissance, route or operations maps), appeared as local productions of the 7th Field Survey Coy RE and the Survey of Egypt'. <http://www.catalogue.nationalarchives.gov.uk/displaycataloguedetails.asp>

7. Smith published many of his short articles in the *Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly* (Campbell 2005).
8. Ibid.
9. In a military history of the Jezreel Valley Eric Cline (2000) argues that Allenby imitated Thutmose III's battle tactics, which he learnt through George Adam Smith's book, among others.
10. The committee was headed by Lt. Col. Newcomb on behalf of the British and Lt. Col. Paulet on behalf of the French.
11. The collection and registration of place names was one arena that did create a contact zone between the British cartographers and the local Palestinian Arabs.
12. Salmon was the head of the Department of Land and Surveys between 1933 and 1938. For Salmon, the prime geographical motif of Palestine's landscape was the distinction between the desert and cultivated land (Gavish 1991: 216). Perhaps not surprisingly some of the Zionist writers adopted this image, and in 1950 Adolf Reifenberg, a Jewish archeologist and geographer, published in Hebrew a book entitled *The War Between the Sown and the Desert: A History of Agricultural Culture in Palestine and Neighboring Countries*. This division continues to loom as a central way of referring to localities in Israel.
13. Indication to farm animals should be checked in the British Ordnance maps. Are they absent in England as well or are they indicated through the reference to farms?
14. *The Immovable East* is the title of a book published by Philip James Baldensperger, son of a missionary sent to Palestine from Basel, and is based on his experience of growing up and living in Palestine.
15. If we take this argument a step further, a unification of the entire British Empire was achieved via cartography and the standard legend.
16. The process of dispossessing those who do not appear on the map is still applied in today's Israel. The state declares their place of dwelling a 'Green Area' and the inhabitants are not entitled to any services. In Israel there are many such unrecognized villages which together have thousands of people who live in dwellings which are not temporary, yet are not recognized as settlements (for example, Abu al-Heija).
17. <http://he.wikipedia.org/wiki>. Look under Operation Broom [in Hebrew].
18. The British education policy was to abstain from teaching English in Rural schools for fear of immigration from the country to the city (Shepherd 1999).
19. The letter was published in (Gavish 2004: 240). The origin is Colonel Salmon's collection of Legend Sheets, Royal Geographical Society, London.
20. The British produced a road map, known as the motor map, in all three languages—English, Arabic, and Hebrew.
21. The *Gazetteer* is somewhat mistaken here, writing *sede* which is the genitive form of the noun, *sade*.
22. On the construction of a sacred landscape see (Benvenisti 2000).

REFERENCES

- Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities* (revised edition). London: Verso.
- Bar-Yosef, Eitan. 2001. 'The Last Crusade? British Propaganda and the Palestine Campaign, 1917–1918', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 36: 87–109.
- Benvenisti, Meron. 2000. *Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land since 1948*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Brawer, Moshe. 1988. *Israel's Boundaries: Past, Present and Future* (in Hebrew). Tel-Aviv: Yavneh.
- Campbell, Iain D. 2005. 'In Search of the Physical: George Adam Smith's Journeys to Palestine and their Importance', [http://www.backfreechurch.co.uk/samuel/in search of the physical.atm](http://www.backfreechurch.co.uk/samuel/in%20search%20of%20the%20physical.atm) (28 July).
- Cline, Eric. 2000. *The Battles of Armageddon*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Edney, Matthew. 1997. *Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765–1843*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gavish, Dov. 1991. *Land and Map (Qarqa u'mapa)* (in Hebrew). Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Tsvi.
- . 2004. *A Survey of Palestine under the British Mandate, 1920–1948*. London and New York: Routledge Curzon.
- Harley, J. B. 2001. *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Kedar, B. Z. 1991. *Mabat veod Mabat al Eretz Yisrael (Looking Twice at the Land of Israel)*. Givatayim: The Ministry of Defence and Yad Yzhak Ben-Zvi.
- Kedar, Alexandre (Sandy) and Jeremy Furman. 2003. 'Colonialism, Colonization and Land Law in Mandate Palestine: The Zor al-Zarqa/Barrat Qisarya Land Disputes in Historical Perspective' *Theoretical Perspectives in Law* 4(2): 491–539.
- Lefebvre, Henri. 1991[1974]. *The Production of Space* (translated from French by Donald Nicholson-Smith). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Monmonier, Mark. 1991. *How to Lie with Maps*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Moscrop, John James. 2000. *Measuring Jerusalem: The Palestine Exploration Fund and British Interests in the Holy Land*. London and New York: Leicester University Press.
- Nebenzahl, Kenneth. 1986. *Maps of the Holy Land: Images of Terra Sancta through Two Millennia*. New York: Abbeville Press.
- Palestine Index Gazetteer. 1945. Compiled by Survey Directorate, General Headquarters, Middle East, Cairo.
- Pratt, Mary Louise. 1992. *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*. London: Routledge.
- Reifenberg, Adolf. 1950. *The War Between the Sown and the Desert: A History of Agricultural Culture in Palestine and Neighboring Countries*. Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik.

- Shatner, Itshak. 1951. *Mapat Eretz Yisrael VeToldoteiha* (The Map of Palestine and its History) (in Hebrew). Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik.
- Shepherd, Naomi. 1999. *Ploughing Sand: British Rule in Palestine 1917–1948*. London: John Murray.
- Smith, George Adam. 1966[1894]. *The Historical Geography of the Holy Land*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Survey of Western Palestine, 1880–1884. London: The Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund.
- Szancer, Carmela. 2001. 'Hamipui HaRishmi Shel Eretz Yisrael BaMa'avar Mishilton Briti LeMedinat Yisrael, Shanim 1945–1955' (Official Map-making in the Land of Israel in the Period of Transition between the British Mandate and the Israeli Government, years 1945–1955). Master's thesis submitted to Tel Aviv University.
- Winichakul, Thongchai. 1994. *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Wood, Dennis. 1993. *The Power of Maps*. London: Routledge.

Constructing Palestine through Surveillance Practices*

ELIA ZUREIK

Introduction

Citizen-construction, border-policing, and people-counting are essentially surveillance activities in which all states engage (Appadurai 1996: 189). These state activities consist of codifying and gathering statistical information about populations, sometimes rendered problematic due to the presence of certain groups such as minorities and indigenous people, whose definition, categorization, and incorporation into society challenge the overarching ideological framework of the nation-state (Garland 1997: 173–214). The problem is further compounded in cases where state-building by one group is challenged by another that lays claim to the same territory. The Israeli–Palestinian encounter is a case in point. For historical and political reasons, the Palestinians present an interesting case in the study of population surveillance. Notwithstanding their current attempts at state-building, for the most part the Palestinians have lived stateless for more than a century and during the last half-century have lived in exile as refugees and minorities—both in their occupied homeland and elsewhere.

Palestinian refugees, whose number approximates 4–5 million individuals, constitute the largest single national group among the more than 20 million refugees worldwide (UNHCR 2000). As minorities and refugees well into their fourth generation, the majority of the Palestinians have been living under constant surveillance. Their numbers

* This is an abbreviated version of an article that appeared in the *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 2001, 28(2): 205–27.

and demography are continuously discussed and debated, their movement across international borders is closely monitored, their activities are routinely scrutinized for political content, and their identity and citizenship status are a perennial topic of discussion. In short, the Palestinians have experienced social ordering of the highest degree. Using the Palestinians as a case study, this chapter explores three broad themes: the epistemological and theoretical problems associated with the use of quantitative measures such as statistics, population construction through administrative means, and spatial surveillance. Examples are drawn from the Israeli population census, the Palestinian and Israeli yearbooks of the contested city of Jerusalem, UN data on Palestinian refugees, and population movement at border crossings.

Statistics and Census

Hindess examines population classification used in the Indian census of 1951, immediately following India's independence from Britain (1973: 23). Adopting the classification criteria used originally by the British, the census showed that the dominant category of farmers, accounting for two-thirds of those who depended on agriculture for their livelihood in India, consisted of capitalist 'owner cultivators' at a time when protests by farmers and peasants over land reform in India attested to the concentration of landownership in the hands of the few. Hindess' point in explaining this seeming contradiction is that, by cutting across the various categories, the census classification did not differentiate sufficiently between the various types of owner cultivator, rent-receiver, farm laborer, and peasant, thus lumping together heterogeneous (capitalist) groups among those who depend on agriculture and land as the basic means of production. By using the twin concepts of commodity and non-commodity exchange relations, Hindess concluded that the extent of capitalist penetration of Indian agriculture was much smaller than estimated by the census. More importantly, the reason for inflating the extent of capitalist agriculture in India is due to the conceptual design of the census and choice of categories used, which made it impossible to take into account India's social formations in which pre-capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production coexisted simultaneously.

With regard to the Middle East, efforts at modern census-taking date back to the middle of the 19th century under the aegis of the Ottoman Empire, and, after the collapse of the Empire in the early part of the 20th century, Britain (in Iraq, Palestine, and Egypt) and France (in Syria, Lebanon, and North Africa) embarked on modernizing the Ottoman Census by carrying out their own population count.

The imprint of these occupying powers on population count of the Middle East remains to this day. In the case of the Palestinians, there is the added dimension of having experienced three separate occupation regimes during the last 100 years (Turkey, Britain, and Israel), as well as Jordan (West Bank) and Egypt (Gaza) for two decades from 1948 to 1967, and finally having to build in the 1990s, an administrative apparatus for census-taking as part of state-building. The use of statistics has special relevance in colonial and post-colonial societies. Anderson analyzes census construction in the Dutch colonial state of Indonesia as a form of 'feverish imagining' which relied primarily on the 'logic of quantification' and 'identity categorization' as means for controlling the population (1994: 169). Cohn describes in detail the need of the colonizing power (in this case the British in India) to develop 'investigative modalities' in order to facilitate the project of ruling. These modalities include

...the definition of a body of information that is needed, the procedures by which appropriate knowledge is gathered, its ordering and classification, and then how it is transformed into usable forms such as published reports, statistical returns, histories, gazetteers, legal codes, and encyclopedias' (1996: 5).

Palestine as Contested Terrain

Nowhere are the competing claims about Palestine—the land and its people—more visible than in the use of statistics. First, in accounting for landownership, the concepts (for example type of tenure and land usage) and classification methods (collective versus individual land-ownership) used in the census by the British during their occupation of Palestine, and prior to that by the Ottomans, and most recently by Israel, contributed to conflicting estimates about the magnitude and type of Arab and Jewish-owned land in Palestine (Fischbach 1997: 38–50; Hale 1982; Zureik 1979: 38–50). This is true with regard to the

population size of each group (Doumani 1994: 1–17; McCarthy 1990). Second, the debate over the accuracy of population estimates became more vociferous in the aftermath of the Oslo agreement of 1993, when international research organizations, the Palestinians themselves, and the Israelis, all resorted to survey research aimed at assessing, among other things, the demography, and ‘living conditions’ of the population in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza, and, in the process, yielded conflicting results (Zureik 1993: 418–25).

Categorization and ‘framing’ (Sibley 1988: 409–21) present one set of problems when interpreting quantitative data. In his extensive study of the Ottoman census in Palestine, McCarthy points out that political conflicts and cultural considerations played a prominent role in framing population debates. For example, women and children were routinely undercounted in the Ottoman census, as they were generally during 19th-century Europe and elsewhere. In the case of children, they were concealed from enumerators in order to avoid future conscription into the Ottoman army, while women were inaccessible due to the ‘difficulty of penetrating the sacredness and privacy of the home’ (McCarthy 1990).

Addressing a present-day phenomenon, Zacharia draws upon the writings of Foucault and observes that a state-sponsored census acts as ‘a mechanism for organizing and perpetuating state power’, where ‘the process of individualizing, categorizing, and disciplining corporeal bodies became a modern instrument of domination and liberation’ (1996: 2–3). Doumani’s reference to what he calls the ‘political economy of population count’ in 19th-century Ottoman Palestine underlies a similar concern:

People-counting, essentially was an exercise in hegemony that involved the (re)definition of the individual’s place in the Ottoman polity and the use of knowledge to facilitate greater control. In this sense, population counts, perhaps more than any other single administrative action of the Ottoman authorities during the Tanzimat period, had a dramatic effect in that they literally touched the majority of the local population in one brief but comprehensive sweep (1994: 1–17).

It is instructive to note that official population records are not only contested discursively but are also physically purged. For example, after invading Lebanon in 1982 and entering Beirut, the Israeli forces,

accompanied by military intelligence, headed straight to the Research Center of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), where official statistics and other records of the Palestinian national movement were kept, and transported wholesale the documentary record to Israel (Harlow 1987: 7). The record, some of which was eventually returned to the PLO, was made available to Israeli policy-makers and academics (Israeli 1983).

As is the case with Israel and the Palestinians in their efforts at census-taking, neighboring Arab states, where the majority of Palestinian refugees live, have chosen to deal with population count in ways which conform to state interests. Jordan, for example, in the wake of its 1996 census, did not release the population count broken down by Jordanian versus Palestinian, for fear that the figures would show that the majority of Jordan's population consists of Palestinian refugees and their descendants (Sabbagh 1996). Lebanon is another interesting example. In a country where census-taking has not been carried out since the 1930s, independent observers concur that a census taken now would reveal that the Muslim population is the clear majority, thus undermining Christian claims to numerical and political dominance. However, when it comes to the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, who are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim and numbering close to 350,000 according to UN sources, successive Lebanese governments have made a habit of inflating the size of the Palestinian refugee population so as to discourage their stay in the country, and justify their possible expulsion, for fear that their resettlement would upset the Lebanese confessional balance (Zureik 1996).

When faced with traditional social order exhibiting multiple loyalties and hybrid identities, as in the colonial Arab world, Mitchell and Owen remark that 'the colonial state sought to reconstitute them [identities] as fixed and singular categories by means of its control over certain means of enumeration, such as the holding of a census' (Anderson 1994; Zacharia 1996). Equally important, Zacharia (1996) points out,

...the post-colonial state had to reconstruct its national community upon and against the normalized categories constructed through colonialism. Resistant groups, according to Mitchell and Owen, were automatically considered 'anti-national' or 'primordial' and targeted demographically to be brought in line with state interests.

The importance of census-taking is most apparent in the initial phase of state-building when citizenship and identity boundaries are being established. Faced with a need to provide precise counting of both the Jewish and Arab populations immediately after the state was declared and in the aftermath of the 1948 war, the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) director suggested to the government the imposing of a curfew on the population so that they would be counted *in situ*. People who were not present in their homes were counted as absent, and did not appear in the census registry. This was subsequently taken to mean by the government that individuals absent from their residence during census-taking, even if staying elsewhere in the country, could not secure the right to return to their towns and villages and repossess their property. This was applied to the Arab but not to the Jewish population. Roughly 32,000 Israeli Arabs, at the time constituting 20 percent of the original Arab population that remained in Israel after the 1948 war, were classified as 'present-absentee' at the time of the first census, and their number 50 years later is in excess of 250,000. Up to this day, they are prevented from returning to their homes, and they continue to live in so-called unrecognized communities.

Notwithstanding claims of separation between scientific and political agencies, this is how Liebler described the alliance between the government and the ICBS in dispossessing the native Palestinians by creating the new category of present-absentee Arab citizens:

This separation, so adamantly upheld by Professor Bachi [first director of the ICBS], was able to 'whitewash' one of the major results of the first census, which with its attendant curfew became one of the mechanisms that permitted the state to appropriate Arab-owned land and property. Under conditions of curfew, only those found at home could be registered. However, because of the intensive battles fought at the time, a substantial proportion of the Arab population was not home. Nevertheless, perhaps for this very reason, orders were given that those absent from their homes would not be registered as citizens and that their ownership of goods, property and land was not to be recognized (1999 [1998]: 20).

The statistical category of 'absentee property owners'—Arab residents whose property rights were abrogated—was born, and this category would receive legal recognition a number of years later (*ibid.*). Israel, which proclaimed itself a 'Jewish' state and came into being in

the aftermath of the British colonial state in Palestine, adopted from the outset two main population categories in its census classification: 'Jews' and 'non-Jews'.

The residual category of non-Jews refers to the indigenous Palestinian population.

Personal identity cards, which are issued to every Israeli citizen, list national origin as an ethnic-national marker ('*qawmiyyah*' in Arabic or '*li'oum*' in Hebrew), by classifying the holder of the card as 'Jew', 'Arab', or 'Druze' (Goldscheider 1996: 26–27). These ethnic markers have important consequences for citizenship rights, as for example in the debate over whether or not Israel is the state of its citizens or the state of the Jewish people. The label 'Jew', in both official and non-official discourse, carries with it a privileged status in terms of immigration laws (as per the Israeli Law of Return and the Nationality Law), landownership, state welfare benefits, and general treatment by the media, while the label 'non-Jew' denotes the converse situation, that is a disadvantaged status (Kretzmer 1990: 467–561).

Through an administrative decision taken in 1995, the ICBS decided to alter its main population classification by adding the category of 'other' which resulted in a new tripartite classification of 'Jews, Arabs, and others'. The rationale for this new amendment is to account for non-Jewish individuals and spouses among (Jewish) Russian immigrants who came to Israel during the 1990s, but did not divulge their religious background at the time of immigration or falsified it as being Jewish, and the presence of a sizable number of illegal foreign workers in the country. The outcome of this change in people-counting triggered a panic campaign led by the Hebrew media and certain right-wing politicians, who warned of impending lower Jewish-Arab ratio, particularly in the contested city of Jerusalem. When subtracting 'others' from the Jewish population count, it is argued, the proportion of Jews in the city declined slightly to below the so-called 'red line' of 70 percent, as set by successive Israeli governments since the capture of East Jerusalem in 1967 and its subsequent unilateral annexation. Thus in order to ensure 'optimal demographic ratio' of having 'three Jews for every Arab in Jerusalem' (Benvenisti 1999b), the Israeli government has all along advocated the building of new homes for prospective Jewish residents, while at the same time denying similar amenities to the Arab residents and gerrymandering the boundaries of Jerusalem so

as to increase the city's Jewish population count. According to Benvenisti, a former deputy mayor of the city:

So how many Jews and Arabs live in Jerusalem? No one knows for sure. In any case, it is a worthless statistic as everyone knows the arbitrary municipal boundaries were principally demarcated for the purpose of demographic manipulation. The annexation boundaries did not determine the city's demographic ratio. Rather, the 'optimal demographic ratio' has created the city's boundaries, leaving thousands of Palestinians outside (*ibid.*).

The correct demographic balance must be derived by adding those living in the densely built-up metropolitan area of Jerusalem, where demographic parity exists between Jews and Arabs, or there is perhaps an Arab majority.

If and when the stalled Middle East peace talks resume in an effort to reach a final settlement between the two sides, the Israeli-Palestinian contest over Jerusalem will again emerge as a key element in negotiations. This contest will find expression in the area of data production. By publishing special statistical monographs on Jerusalem, Israelis, and Palestinians appeal to science (in the form of professional institutional backing and statistical data) to garner legitimacy for their respective claims. While the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) published its first statistical yearbook devoted to Jerusalem in late 1999, the Israel Institute for Jerusalem Studies, a right-wing think tank, in cooperation with the Jerusalem municipality under the leadership of the then Likud mayor, Ehud Olmert, had been publishing statistical monographs devoted to Jerusalem since 1982.

An examination of both publications reveals the following. By presenting Arab and Jewish population count of the city as a whole, the Israeli yearbook, which relies primarily on data available through the ICBS and the Jerusalem municipality, naturalizes Israeli claims to a unified city. Even though the unilateral annexation by Israel of the eastern part of the city, where the Arab population lives, is illegal and not recognized internationally, the monograph treats the city as a unified entity by presenting data on both Arabs and Jews as if they were members of the same geopolitical space. In addition to incorporating the Arab population of East Jerusalem in its census count, the Israeli monograph includes several Jewish suburbs located outside the city's

1967 boundaries, as well as other Arab localities situated outside the Green Line. The outcome of this population-construction is that the Jewish population of Jerusalem numbers 429,000 and that of Arab 193,000 residents. Thus, by redesigning the boundaries of Jerusalem, advocates of annexation of the Arab parts of the city are able to show that, as capital of Israel, Jerusalem is predominantly a 'Jewish' city where the Arabs are a minority and Jews constitute a clear majority. The Palestinian yearbook of Jerusalem is published by the PCBS, the official statistical agency of the Palestinian Authority (PA). In addition to its stated scientific aim to provide data on the Arab population of Jerusalem for research and policy purposes, the yearbook questions Israeli claims to sovereignty over the Arab part of the city. The PCBS adopts a different definition of Jerusalem, by using the Ottoman division of the country into governorates. Thus, the governorate of Jerusalem refers to east Jerusalem and the suburbs which were annexed by Israel, as well as other parts located in the West Bank which constitute the remaining portions of the administrative unit known as the Jerusalem governorate. A comparison between the two monographs shows that the Palestinian count of the Arab population in the city is slightly higher than that provided by the ICBS—by around 15,000 people.

As stated by the director of the PCBS in the preface to the Jerusalem yearbook, 'Jerusalem and the provision of maximal statistical data on Jerusalem have special importance in this subtle and critical stage, namely the final status negotiations of which Jerusalem constitutes one of the core pillars and a pivotal axis of its agenda' (Palestinian Bureau of Statistics 1999). In addition to providing the usual statistical indicators, the Palestinian census included data on confiscated identity cards from Arab residents of the city, the number of residents detained by Israeli forces, Arab victims resulting from encounters with Israeli security forces, and the number of Arab houses demolished in the city of Jerusalem. As well, the Palestinian monograph makes a point of noting that the actual work of the PCBS in Jerusalem was hampered by the closure in 1995 of the PCBS office in the city in accordance with a special Israeli law to this effect, and was followed by the passage of another law in 1997 prohibiting the Arab residents of the city from participating in census-taking under the aegis of the PCBS (*ibid.*: 35). In other words people-counting, considered to be a scientific undertaking, has become part of the ideological war regarding sovereignty claims over Jerusalem.

What is characteristic of Israeli nationalist discourse, which is responsible for shaping population labeling, is the taboo it imposes on the use of 'Palestinian' when referring to the minority Palestinian population who are citizens of Israel. In the period 1948–67, the label 'Palestinian' was either cleansed from Israeli vocabulary (recall Golda Meir's often-quoted words 'that there is no such a thing as the Palestinian people'), or was used to refer to 'terrorists' among Palestinian refugees living in the neighboring countries who mounted attacks against Israeli targets. Nowadays the label Palestinian is reserved for those who live in the West Bank and Gaza. This consensus is not confined to official discourse, but also extends to Israeli social scientists who research the Palestinian minority in Israel. With very few exceptions, and until fairly recently, they too avoided the use of the term 'Palestinians' and preferred the term 'Arabs of Israel'. This categorization, which reflects the dominant ideology, has less to do with reality, or how the minority group feels about itself, and more with the politics of segmentation and de-coupling of the indigenous population from both the land of Palestine and the rest of the Palestinian people.

If at one level the census provides a means for the state to assert control over its population by defining the identities of its subjects, and who is to count as a citizen and who is not, at another level the census is used to assert a degree of representation hitherto denied to colonized people. The adage that 'there is power in numbers' underlies the urge of post-colonial nations and dispossessed minorities to assert their legitimacy through counting their populations. Census taking becomes the most symbolic act of state-building.

In the period after 1993, post-Oslo, the project of conducting a Palestinian census by the Palestinians themselves assumed political significance and was considered a sign of national empowerment. Edward Said, for example, saw the need for census enumeration as a vehicle for Palestinians to assert their presence on the world stage irrespective of their dispersal and the jurisdictions under which they happen to live. Thus for him a comprehensive Palestinian census, a representation of peoplehood, is one which records the numbers of the Palestinian people worldwide, and is not confined to those who are under the control of the PA in the West Bank and Gaza where only a quarter of the Palestinian people live (Zacharia 1996). In response to such criticisms, Yasser 'Arafat, then president of the PA, issued a decree in 1998, mandating the PCBS to record the number and location of the Palestinian people wherever

they reside, a practice which is identical to that carried out by the ICBS, which routinely presents in its reports data on the distribution of Jews worldwide. (Palestinian Bureau of Statistics 1999). What makes the Palestinian case worthy of sociological attention is that it provides an additional dimension to the usual debates about the politics of census construction by national governments. Here we have an instance whereby one government (Israel) is heavily involved in the construction of population parameters of another political entity (PA). As we have seen so far, because the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is essentially one involving people and claims to the land, Middle East peace negotiations have unavoidably had to deal with these issues in concrete terms.

Thus following the Declaration of Principles which was signed in 1993, the two sides concluded an Interim Agreement in 1995; it included, among other matters, detailed description of population issues. Article 28 of the Agreement, which is titled Population Registry and Documentation, specifies the manner in which transfer of population registry from the Israeli authorities to the PA would take place, and how, in the future, any changes in the status of the residents of the West Bank and Gaza would have to be reported to Israel. Identity cards issued by the PA to Palestinian residents under its jurisdiction would have to be turned over to the Israeli authorities. In the words of the Agreement, 'The new identification numbers and the numbering system will be transferred to the Israeli side', and 'the Palestinian side shall inform Israel of every change in its population registry, including, inter alia, any change in the place of residence of any resident' (Interim Agreement 1995: 114–15). Any changes in the information pertaining to passports or travel documents used by Palestinian residents will have to be reported regularly to Israel as well, and prior Israeli approval will have to be given before permits are issued to visitors seeking permanent resident status in the Palestinian territories. Thus, the Oslo Agreement becomes, among other things, a population monitoring instrument in the hands of Israel:

The Palestinian side shall provide Israel ... on a regular basis with the following information regarding passports/travel documents and identity cards:

- (a) With respect to passports/travel documents: full name, mother's name, ID number, date of birth, sex, profession, passport/travel document number, and date of issue and a current photograph of the person concerned.

- (b) With respect to identity cards: identity card number, full name, mother's name, date of birth, sex, and religion and a current photograph of the person concerned (Interim Agreement 1995: 115).

Refugee Count

Another area where population count assumes special significance is among refugees, who constitute around 50 percent of the global figure of around 8–10 million Palestinians. The size and composition of the Palestinian refugee population is a topic of debate with distinct political overtones, particularly in the post-Oslo period with final-status negotiations yet to be resumed between Israel and the Palestinians. As expected, Israelis and Palestinians produce their own divergent versions of refugee count, with the United Nations and other international organizations offering their own figures (Zureik 1996).

For the purpose of this discussion, and by way of example, I first concentrate on the efforts of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), an organization established in 1950 to cater exclusively to the needs of Palestinian refugees, to construct an administrative definition of who is a refugee and who is poor among the refugees registered with it, and how the latter definition has ramifications for family structure. In order to be considered poor and included in UNRWA's hardship cases, a prerequisite for receiving food rations from the Agency, a refugee family must not, among other things, have an adult male between the ages of 18–60 living in the household. Latte-Abdullah rightly points out that UNRWA's rather arbitrary definition of economic hardship is not determined according to employability and availability of work opportunities, but by the projected ability of the UNRWA to deliver food rations (1998). Thus, budgetary and administrative needs to reduce the number of hardship cases on the part of the Agency led to the splitting up of extended households (by having adult males leave the extended household), increasing the number of nucleated households, early marriages (and divorces), and the number of female-headed households.

Second, and more importantly, the administrative definition by UNRWA of who is a refugee to begin with has resulted in conflicting estimates of refugee count. For example, UNRWA defines a refugee as any person who resided in Palestine at least two years prior to the

establishment of Israel on 15 May 1948, and 'who lost both his home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 war' (Zureik 1996). However, not all those who became refugees in the long protracted conflict with Israel eventually registered with UNRWA, whose estimate for 1999 hovers around 3.57 million refugees (UNRWA 1999). Well-to-do Palestinians, who also became refugees but did not need immediate assistance, did not register with UNRWA. Refugees who ended up in places other than UNRWA's so-called five areas of operations (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the West Bank, and Gaza) did not appear in UNRWA's registry. Similarly, those who were internally displaced (present-absentee) in Palestine during the fighting in 1948 and 1949, and remain displaced to this day in what became Israel, do not appear in UNRWA's refugee count, even though UNRWA did include them initially until Israel terminated the Agency's jurisdiction over them in 1952. Moreover, UNRWA's registry does not cover those who were displaced in the 1967 war, or those who, because of Israeli occupation regulations, lost their residence status on account of being absent from the occupied territories beyond the allowed period. Altogether, this adds more than 1 million people to the total refugee count of UNRWA (Zureik 1996). Finally, it should also be mentioned that gender discrimination is built into UNRWA's administrative procedures for census count. The offspring of Palestinian refugee women married to non-refugees, lose their refugee status with the Agency (Cervenak 1984).

A telling example of the interplay between demography and politics surfaced more than once during the Middle East peace negotiations between Israel and Palestinians on the issue of family reunification, and the return of displaced Palestinians as a result of the 1967 war. In discussing the modalities of return, a key definitional problem cropped up which remains unresolved to this day, that is, what constitutes a 'family'? Israel, for example, insisted that 'family' implies a nuclear-type family, and for the purpose of family unification the children must be below the age of 16, whereas the Palestinian negotiators stressed that according to Arab culture and practice, a family encompasses immediate and extended members. It is clear that each definition impacts the number and category of displaced family members, if and when they are allowed to return home (Tamari 1996).

Counting the Palestinians becomes a political act laden with controversy. Depending on who does the counting and the categories

used, there is dispute over how many Palestinians there are, their geographical distribution, the type of citizenship they can claim, whether they can be classified as refugees or non-refugees, whether their claim to landownership in Palestine is legal or not, whether they have the right to return to their homes (the physical house from which the refugees were displaced) versus homeland (the entire country with which they identify and to which they belong), and so on. These disputes are not settled by appealing to the truth. As ethnomethodologists remind us, the production of official data and records reflects the intentions of the official agency in the first instance (Ashforth 1990: 1–22).

What the above discussion highlights are the problems encountered by minorities in their representation in national censuses. However, the Palestinians are constantly striving to differentiate themselves from the surrounding society, and strive towards numerical parity relative to the dominant group, but in the process present administrative regimes with the rationale for subjecting them to further surveillance measures and population classification.

Borders, Frontiers, and State Construction

SURVEILLANCE OF BODIES

People-counting and border-construction are but two of several practices by states to manage their citizens. States also lay claim to, or 'embrace', their citizens in order to provide them with social services, monitor their activity, collect taxes from them, and track their movement (Torpey 1998: 239–59). Giddens expresses a similar view and argues that there is a correspondence between citizenship rights and surveillance. Using Marshall's threefold typology of rights, Giddens associates policing, a form of surveillance, with social rights, whereas 'reflexive monitoring' by the 'State's administrative power' is connected with political rights, and, as a third form of surveillance, the 'management of production' relates to economic rights (Giddens 1987: 206). There are two additional rights, which are not discussed by Giddens, but which are becoming increasingly important in the context of globalization. These are cultural rights, and the right of movement within states and across international borders. In order to avoid diversion in the discussion, I shall not deal with the debate surrounding cultural rights other than

to say that they can be subsumed under social rights, although they are distinctive in being based on ensuring group rather than individual rights.

Right of movement, that is the right to travel and leave one's residence and be able to return to it unhindered, however, falls within the purview of social and political rights (some would argue human rights) where the state exercises surveillance through a combination of administrative power and policing. Torpey makes a useful contribution in this regard, remarking that

systems of registration, censuses, and the like—along with documents such as passports and identity cards that amount to mobile versions of the 'files' [in Max Weber's sense] states use to store knowledge about their subjects—have been crucial in states efforts to embrace their citizens (1998: 245).

An individual is considered citizen if he or she appears in the population registry. If Weber described the state in terms of exercising 'monopoly over the legitimate means of violence', and Marx saw capitalism as monopolizing the ownership of the means of production, Torpey goes one step further and singles out the state's role in 'monopolizing the legitimate means of movement' of its subjects, both internally and across national boundaries, as a crucial feature of the modern nation-state and the creation of national identities.

It is important to underscore the two-sided nature of surveillance. While its main objective is to monitor and control, it has an empowering dimension as well. This is apparent in the linking of rights to surveillance as delineated above by Giddens, and more generally through his concept of the 'dialectic of control'. By the same token, Torpey's concept of citizen 'embrace' by the state is justified on the basis of delivery of all sorts of services. The issuing of identity cards to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, while undoubtedly the symbol of surveillance par excellence, has an empowering effect as well. Holders of identity cards can lay claims to certain rights vis-à-vis the occupation authorities, and in East Jerusalem vis-à-vis the Israeli legal system itself. In both cases, holders of Israeli-issued identity cards can exercise certain rights, albeit of limited and circumscribed nature. As a matter of fact, the identity card is one of the most coveted documents sought after by the highly monitored Palestinian population.

Mitchell conceives of the state as essentially the outcome of co-production efforts, and argues that the state project should be thought of as a 'metaphysical effect', constituted by Foucauldian disciplinary practices and the institutions which they create. 'The state', according to Mitchell, 'should be addressed as an effect of detailed processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance, which create the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society' (1991: 95). The frontier, which he equates with boundary, constitutes one element of the nation-state:

One characteristic of the modern nation-state, for example, is the frontier. By establishing a territorial boundary and exercising absolute control over movement across it, state practices help define and constitute a national entity. Setting up and policing a frontier involves a variety of fairly modern practices—continuous barbed-wire fencing, passports, immigration laws, inspections, currency control and so on. These mundane arrangements, most of them unknown two hundred or even one hundred years ago, help manufacture an almost transcendental entity, the nation-state (ibid.: 94).

In deeply divided societies, like former South Africa and Israel, control of space and people is paramount. The elaborate system of passes and identity cards, which was used at one time in South Africa's apartheid system, and until 1966 by Israel's military rule over its Palestinian citizens, but remains the corner stone of Israel's treatment of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, regulates spatial locations and movement of people; it is based on race (in South Africa) and ethnicity, religion, and national origin (in Israel). Unlike the old South African system which was based on racial superiority, Israel's use of identity cards with ethnic markers is linked to a differentiated conception of citizenship where rights and obligations are regulated according to state policies determined to a large measure by a Zionist ideological framework. Central to this ideology is Israel's law of return which invites Jews living anywhere in the world to immigrate to Israel, yet denies Palestinians 'the natural right of citizenship granted a person by virtue of his being an ancient resident of a given territory' (Rabinowitz 1999).

Three examples of spatial control will be offered, each with a bearing on the Palestinian-Israeli encounter. The first is a commentary on the efforts of an Israeli tourist company to advertise Gaza as an 'exotic'

destination for Israeli tourists. Bear in mind that until recently, and as a result of the Oslo accords, occupied Gaza was considered part of 'greater Israel' by many Israelis, but shunned by most Israelis as a dangerous place to visit. The creation of borders and checkpoints between Israel and the fledgling PA, according to Benvenisti, bestowed an identity, an objective dimension:

...[b]orders and sovereignty over territory are not necessarily the reflection of a separate national identity. In most cases, they create this identity rather than express it. Geopolitical facts, however artificial and absurd, cause people to detach themselves emotionally from territory they once considered their homeland. Post a 'Border Crossing' sign and place uniformed guards near it and anyone walking past them is bound to feel that he is abroad (1999a).

The second example involves the monitoring of movement by Palestinian laborers across the border between Gaza and Israel. Israel has been reported to regulate the movement of Palestinian workers into Israel by introducing biometric monitoring system which relies on genetic and retinal identification. This genetic surveillance system will be augmented with the use of smart identity card carried by each Palestinian worker crossing the border on which detailed background information of the card holder will be stored, and will be instantaneously matched with genetic data (Kalman 1999). A similar system is being prepared in order to screen foreign workers entering Israel, and Palestinian citizens traveling through the newly agreed upon passage between the West Bank and Gaza. Here too Israel will be in charge of installing and operating the technology (Fishbain 1999). Moreover, Israeli army personnel control (behind one-way mirror) Gaza's airport which is ostensibly located in Palestinian territory, and Israel will be responsible for monitoring Gaza's sea port, if and when the port is built.

Finally, the third example of control technology governing border crossing comes from the Jordan River's Allenby Bridge separating Jordan and Israel. It offers what one commentator called 'a dazzling apparition, the ultimate phantasmagoria' in virtual reality (Levy 1999). At issue here is the manner in which the movement of incoming Palestinians, who are about to cross the Allenby Bridge from Jordan, on their way to the West Bank and Gaza, is regulated by Israel and the PA. Levy describes in minute detail how the presence of border control

by the PA conceals the exercise of real power by Israel. The Palestinian border police operate in what Levy calls 'virtual spaces' where only Palestinian officials in charge of passport control are visible and come in contact with the Palestinian population. After receiving the travel documents from Palestinians crossing the border, instead of carrying out the usual inspection before returning the documents to their bearers, the Palestinian police pass on the passports to be processed by Israeli border inspectors who operate incognito behind one-way mirrors. It is the Israelis who have the ultimate decision in allowing or not allowing Palestinians to cross the border. According to Levy, the reasons for this 'virtuality' are due to three factors: the Oslo accords, which stipulate that there be no contact between Palestinian travelers and Israeli police; Israel's insistence that as the wielder of power in this equation, it should remain in charge of the border for security reasons; and being conscious of the need to maintain a modicum of dignity for the Palestinian personnel at the border crossing, the Israelis concede to the Palestinians a symbolic role of authority by removing themselves from public view. It must be pointed out, however, that in discussing the matter with Palestinians who routinely cross the Allenby Bridge, it was pointed out to me that travelers were fully aware of the 'apparition' practiced on them. It was pointed out that the silhouette of the Israeli border police behind the one-way mirror is transparent to the traveler during the evening and late hours of the day. One can argue that in the long run, the so-called concern for maintaining the dignity of the Palestinian police, through the use of a Goffmanesque (Goffman 1959) form of front- and back-stage management, might in the long run exacerbate the situation by deepening the disrespect and cynicism which the Palestinian population show toward the PA.

Conclusion

Land and demography are at the heart of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the attempts by each side at state-construction. This chapter has outlined several aspects of state-construction, from discursive practices involving population count to the use of surveillance techniques in the control of space—both internal and external to the State. Several examples were offered bearing on population and refugee estimates,

categorization of people, population movement, and spatial control. A Palestinian-Israeli dialectic of state-construction is at play here, a dialectic which began more than a century ago and is still unfolding. This chapter shows how the Israeli state-construction is inextricably bound up with the Palestinian project. The fact that these are two asymmetrical projects in terms of power relations does not alter the nature of the process. By being the weaker side in this encounter, the Palestinian effort has aimed at adopting practices in population count which are aimed at countering Israeli designs. As the Palestinians embark on state-construction, it is evident that population management, in addition to the now familiar spatial control, will emerge as an area where contest will loom large, but it is an area where Israel will use its sheer military and economic power to effect Palestinian containment through both discursive and non-discursive practices.

REFERENCES

- Anderson, Benedict. 1994. *Imagined Communities*, pp. 169–70. London and New York: Verso Press.
- Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Ashforth, Adam. 1990. 'Reckoning Schemes of Legitimation: On Commissions of Inquiry as Power/Knowledge Forms', *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 30(1).
- Benvinisti, Meron. 1999a. 'Gaza as an Exotic Place', *Haaretz*, 26 March (English Internet edition of Hebrew daily).
- . 1999b. 'Bikini on Jerusalem's Beach', *Haaretz*, 29 July (English Internet edition of Hebrew daily in Israel).
- Cervenak, C. M. 1984. 'Promoting Inequality: Gender-based Discrimination in UNRWA's Approach to Palestine Refugee Status', *Human Rights Quarterly*, 16(2): 300–74.
- Cohn, Bernard S. 1996. *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge. British Rule in India*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Doumani, Bishara, B. 1994. 'The Political Economy of Population Counts in Ottoman Palestine: Nablus, Circa 1850', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 26: 1–17.
- Fischbach, Michael R. 1997. 'Settling Historical Land Claims in the Wake of the Arab-Israeli Peace', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, xxvii(1): 38–50.
- Fishbain, Einal. 1999. 'All New Workers to Get Magnetic ID Cards by 2000', *Haaretz*, 6 October (English Internet edition of Hebrew daily).
- Garland, David. 1997. "'Governmentality" and the Problem of Crime: Foucault, Criminology, Sociology', *Theoretical Criminology*, 1(2): 173–214.

- Giddens, Anthony. 1987. *The Nation-State and Violence. Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, p. 206. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Goffman, Erving. 1959. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Goldscheider, Calvin. 1996. *Israel's Changing Society. Population Ethnicity and Development*, pp. 26–27. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Hale, G. 1982. 'Diaspora versus Ghourba: The Territorial Restructuring of Palestine', in D. Gordon Bennett (ed.), *Tension Areas of the World*. Delray Beach, FL: Park Press.
- Harlow, Barbara. 1987. *Resistance Literature*. New York and London: Methuen Inc.
- Hindess, Barry. 1973. *The Use of Official Statistics in Sociology. A Critique of Positivism and Ethnomethodology*. London: Macmillan.
- Interim Agreement. 1995. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1995, pp. 114–15. Ramallah, Palestine: Palestine Liberation Organization, Department of Negotiations Affairs.
- Israeli, Raphael (ed.). 1983. *PLO in Lebanon. Selected Documents*. London: Weindenfeld and Nicholson.
- Kalman, Mathew. 1999. 'Israelis Use High Tech to Track Palestinians', *Globe and Mail*, 30 March: A-19 (Canadian daily).
- Kretzmer, David. 1990. *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Latte-Abdullah, Stephanie. 1998. 'Refugees' Family Structures and UNRWA in Palestinian Camps in Jordan', Paper presented at Annual Conference of the Middle East Studies Association of North America (December), Chicago.
- Levy, Gideon. 1999. 'Twilight Zone. More than Meets the Eye', *Haaretz*, 3 September: p. 7 (English edition of Hebrew daily, magazine section).
- Lieber, Anat A. 1999[1998]. 'Statistics as Social Architecture. The Construction of Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics as an Apolitical Institution' (mimeograph). Tel-Aviv. (See also under the same title the author's M.A. thesis (in Hebrew). Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Tel Aviv University, 1998.
- McCarthy, Justin. 1990. *The Population of Palestine. Population History and Statistics of the Late Ottoman Period and the Mandate*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Mitchell, Timothy. 1991. 'The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their Critics', *American Political Science Review*, 85(1): 95.
- Palestinian Bureau of Statistics. 1999. *Statistical Yearbook, Jerusalem, 1998*. Ramallah, Palestine: Palestinian Authority.
- Rabinowitz, Dan. 1999. 'Addressing the Balance from Within', *Haaretz*, 28 July (English Internet edition of Hebrew daily).
- Sabbagh, Rana. 1996. 'Jordan Keeps Secret Palestinian Population's Rate', *Reuters World Report*, 27 January.
- Sibley, D. 1988. 'Purification of Space', *Society and Space*, 6: 409–21.
- Tamari, Salim. 1996. *Palestinian Refugee Negotiations: From Madrid to Oslo II*. Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies.

- Torpey, John. 1998. 'Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate "Means of Movement"', *Sociological Theory*, 16(3): 239–59.
- UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 2000. (Cited by United States Department of State, Website, <http://www.usinfo.state.gov/topical.refugees/chart.htm>.)
- UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency). 1999. Registration Statistical Bulletin for the First Quarter 1999. Amman, Jordan: UNRWA Department of Relief and Social Services.
- Zacharia, Christina. 1996. 'Power in Numbers: A Call for a Census of the Palestinian People', *al-Siya`Sa al-Filastiniyya*, 3(12): 2–3.
- Zureik, Elia. 1979. *The Palestinians in Israel. A Study in Internal Colonialism*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- . 1993. 'Palestinian Society in Gaza, West Bank and Arab Jerusalem: Review of the Norwegian Study (FAFO) of the West Bank, Gaza and Arab Jerusalem', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 6(4): 418–25.
- . 1996. *Palestinian Refugees and the Peace Process*. Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies.

Narrative Experience and Displacement



Partition Violence in Memory and Performance

The Punjabi Dhadi Tradition

MICHAEL NIJHAWAN

Recent anthropological work has brought into sharp relief the tremendous impact of partitions on the everyday world of people and the social fabric. There has been, of course, a long-standing anthropological and historical interest in processes of border-formation and the everyday lived reality of borderlands (see Wilson and Donnan 1998). But only recently, stipulated by Gloria Anzaldúa's (1987) work in which she carves out the subjectivity of border experience—and more generally the critical revision of anthropological writing and methodology (Rosaldo 1989)—has there been a broadening of perspectives on borders and partitions. At stake in new scholarly approaches today is the formation of subjectivities, the remaking of moral communities as well as the question of shared language/culture as opposed to nationalist constructions of exclusive borderlines that are often enforced with violent means.

Research on India and Pakistan's partition in 1947 with its massive consequences in human loss, gendered violence, and migrant displacements has been at the forefront of this research (Butalia 1998; Das 1997; Menon and Bhasin 1998; Pandey 2001). However, recent studies on Northern Ireland (Aretxaga 1997; Feldman 1991; Racciopi and O'Sullivan 2000), Israel and Palestine (Bowman 1993; Rabinowitz 1998), or Germany (Borneman 1992) have kept pace with these developments and helped to bring out the whole complexity of partitions and border realities in comparative perspective. In this chapter, I briefly

touch upon some of the issues, and further expand the focus to an area of inquiry that, to my knowledge, has so far not been considered extensively: the impact of partitions on performative genres and the capacity of these genres to narrate and translate the partition event into languages of memory. In a region like Punjab, with its predominantly rural population, performative genres have played a major role in shaping the way people remember the past and come to terms with experiences of violence and displacement. Studying the relationship between social experience and narrating the past, one has to take caution not only to highlight the constructed character of memory and remembering, but also the ways in which (his)stories have been forgotten or erased from memory through conscious efforts.

This chapter, therefore, raises questions about the politics of forgetting and not just about remembering past events through a performative tradition. I should note at the outset that, due to the influence of the new media industries, many of these traditions have been marginalized or fused with other forms of popular music and visual culture, an issue that has come back with vigilance in the diasporic setting where for instance, new forms of popular music have been appropriated by supporters of the Khalistan movement (Kalra and Nijhawan 2007). As scholars in Middle Eastern Studies have recently demonstrated however (Stein and Swedenburg 2005), the linkage between song and nationalism is only one side of the coin as it is precisely in those presumably marginal forms of popular culture and music that we can locate different narrations of inter-communal relations and border-crossing in contexts where such an alternative imagination seems to be preempted by the daily renegotiation of boundaries through violent means. I shall come back to this issue in the concluding part of this chapter.

I have dealt with these issues in my work on the Punjabi *dhadi* tradition (named after the little drum used by the performers) that can be traced as far back as the 14th century religious movements in North India (Nijhawan 2006). In a nutshell, the *dhadi* genre is performed by men (and recently also by women), who sing historical ballads and heroic martyr histories at the occasion of religious festivals and martyrs' and saints' anniversaries. One way by which this genre comes to be entailed in the history of partition is through the communalization of *dhadi* narratives. There is evidence of large-scale transitions not only in the make-up of the performers' social and religious affiliation

(formerly mostly Muslim, today almost exclusively Sikh) but also in the way modern patronage claims exclusive rights on certain ideological narratives that must be performed (Sikh martyr texts) while others are relegated to the field of folklore performances. I have discussed this issue at length elsewhere (Nijhawan 2004), showing that the history of fabricating two separate blocs of 'Sikh' on the one hand as opposed to 'Sufi' or folk *dhadi* groups on the other, is to a large extent the immediate consequence of partition migrations and patronage politics in post-partition contexts. Low-caste Muslim performers residing on the Indian side of the border, for instance, are no longer allowed to perform in Sikh gurdwaras, and the recognition of the shared language of emotions and piety as it is expressed in traditional *dhadi* songs has been replaced by a renewed interest in heroic narrative and song on the part of Sikh audiences.

There is obviously a politics of forgetting at work here, as historical events become refashioned in accordance with normative and highly selective images of historical agency. Furthermore, evidence of partition atrocities is absent for it seems that *dhadi* performers, despite being receptive to recent political events, have sidelined this complex issue completely. That there is silence on the question of perpetrators and violators when it comes to narratives about one's own community is not astonishing. Some of these issues have been poignantly analyzed in the context of partition studies in the work of Veena Das (1997), Urvashi Butalia (1998), or Gyanendra Pandey (2001). Why a performative tradition characterized by translating contexts of violence and suffering into narrative forms has been silent on the partition event is not so clear, even if we acknowledge that the absurdity and enormity of partition violence worked against such modes of narrativization.

My concern in this chapter is to explore where partition has a resonance in the *dhadi* performative scene: I want to ask in what ways the partition event has shaped subjectivities and performative languages in the post-colonial situation. Instead of an inquiry into existing *dhadi* texts on both sides of the border (say, for hidden traces of partition narratives), I propose a somewhat different approach: exploring narrative genres that have been authored by an eminent Sikh *dhadi* performer of the 20th century, Sohan Singh Seetal. By focusing on a selected poem, a partition chronicle, a novel, and some of his autobiographical writings, I argue that the language of loss and mourning that is inherent in the

partition experience carves its way through the interstices of different genre forms. I am not suggesting here that these other genres—mostly literary writings—function in the same way as other partition literature (Bhalla 1994; Hasan 1995). Historians working on partition have long argued that the division of labor between ‘fiction’ and the ‘historical facts’ has led to a distortion of the historical representation of this past. Even though they are written from a Sikh normative position, Seetal’s texts do not subscribe to this compartmentalization of collective memory and history. The choice of different genres and styles of expression is also not restricted to the domain of elite writers. Seetal was a learned and literate man, but his entire lifestyle and commitment to rural Punjabi vernacular culture indicate his rooting in the countryside, where he also cultivated different religious and cultural traditions that later distinguished him as a *dhadi* performer. The mastery of different genres and its associated esthetics are a necessary component according to which a performer’s reputation is evaluated. It is important to remember in this context that the knowledge of these genre distinctions and the flow between them is both reflexive and habitual knowledge for a performer like Seetal. While there are partially unacknowledged expectations that guide a genre’s framing in terms of ‘play’ or ‘historical fact’, such boundaries can also become fluid and much of an artist’s creativity lies precisely in cutting across these boundaries. The question for me has been to explore if such a pluralization of generic expression tells us something about the possibilities of other discourses and the formation of subjectivity that might have hitherto escaped the attention of partition researchers. Instead of looking at uniform partition narratives, therefore, would it make sense to trace the tremendous impact of the partition event in such moments when the traces of one genre lapse into the dominant framework of another? I begin by addressing these questions in the light of Seetal’s partition chronicle *The Devastation of Punjab*.

A Vernacular Chronicle of Partition Violence

Sohan Singh Seetal’s *Panjab da Ujara* (*The Devastation of Punjab*) is an approximately 350-page-long chronicle of partition violence that was published in 1948. In this vernacular text, altogether ignored by

historical research so far, the *dhadi* performer and author compiles story after story about atrocities that occurred during partition. In the style of a history textbook, the book narrates the major political developments that led to the splitting up of Punjabi territory, highlighting the names of political actors and commissions in separate boxes. The main part of the text consists of a long narrative in the form of a chronicle on incidents of violence. Each and every district is carefully listed by *zilas*, *tehsils*, and villages. The author indicates in his preface that this comprehensive account is the result of oral history. Uprooted from his former home in a village near Qasur, Seetal moved from place to place, visiting various refugee camps and dwellings that were put up for the border crossers. Visiting these places, he heard the stories of those who had reached the Indian side of the newly-demarcated borderline and recorded some of their stories.

It seems that people were certainly willing to tell and there was an immediate economic dimension involved. Accounting for lost property and lives was certainly a widespread practice during this period. People had an interest in getting their names listed so that later claims to territory and property could be legally secured. First Information Reports (FIRs) were produced in the various administrative units in which criminal attacks as well as the names of perpetrators and victims were reported. These documents were not only useful in putting together documents such as Gopal Das Khosla's account *Stern Reckoning* (1948), a book used frequently by historians to assess the damage of partition violence, they clearly had a formative role on post-partition history writing on this event. Seetal's compilation is produced in this period of documentary activity. It was a time, argues Gyanendra Pandey (2001: 74), in which the 'primary discourses' provided by people's testimony and rumor about communal violence 'carrie[d] over very easily into the secondary discourse produced by political commentators and memorialists'. *Panjab da Ujara* takes part in this process of translation into communitarian and nationalist narratives with their prejudiced attitudes toward the religious other. At the same time, the Punjabi vernacular offers a perspective that distorts this clear-cut picture.

It is interesting to observe that Seetal's chronicle does not offer a single frame in terms of a secondary discourse on partition violence. It is better to speak of a multilayered account. The text is characterized by different vehicles of expression: testimony, chronicle, and historical

analysis that blend into one another. The opening paragraph of the book is noteworthy as it mediates between the eyewitness report of Seetal's family leaving the village and the reflexive voice of the historian who, in 1948, has in mind an audience to be instructed about the actual contexts of partition migration and violence. At first it seems that the narrator's voice is prejudiced, posing 'our' loss against those of 'the Muslims.' The reference to the 'good Muslim' of the village that poses no threat as against the unknown 'Muslim as rioter' resonates with much that has been written about such first-hand partition accounts. Seetal, however, does not stop here. His frustration about partition is directed against politicians and against the lack of solidarity within his own community. Family members who have been unwilling to accept the displaced are similarly mentioned along with comments on patriarchal norms that have put an extra burden on abducted women. Seetal criticizes how actors at the official level take advantage of the situation by making claims on property, but more than that he is bitter about a widespread attitude among Sikh and Hindu refugees to increase the suffering by either not accepting abducted women back into their families or by refusing to accommodate relatives in search of a new place. Irony is a common trope through which this situation is assessed in the narrative. Considering that the narrator has been displaced from his village, it is significant to note that he sees the circumstances of this displacement through similar lenses. Thus, in a long footnote he articulates how partition restored historical justice to the Muslims of his village Qadivind who, about two centuries ago, had been expelled from the territory. Hence, by historical circumstance they were able to reclaim the place, if only violently so. So it can be discerned that he invests the account with a sense of reflexivity and distancing which stands in clear continuity with the voice of the historical commentator or what Pandey (1999) called a 'tertiary discourse' of historical reflection.

As I have pointed out, the main thread of the book is that of a chronicle on the disturbances in the various districts of Punjab. Parts 2 and 3 list single localities in which riots have taken place, many of them occurred prior to 15 August 1947. The last two parts consist of a listing of Punjab's major districts (*zilas*). Each section is further compartmentalized into different localities on which the author could gather information. The compilation is both systematic and episodic, following, I assume, a structure of bardic memory that has over the centuries

formed Punjabi collective memory as a topography with numerous localities and sites having their particular history to be performed in *dhadi* song.

Take for instance how he describes the disturbances in the district Lyallpur (Faisalabad). It begins with a report on riots in Chaniut where Sikhs and Hindus were attacked on 27 August followed by accounts on Lyallpur's Khalsa College and school camp where similar incidents occurred, Gojra, Toba Tek Singh, Samundari, Kamalia, Janjhawala (Seetal 1948: 208–9). The description proceeds in the way in which violence is seen to spread like a cholera epidemic from one district to the next. In an almost literal manner it duplicates the structure of the rumor of violence, thus fabricating what Pandey (2001: 91) has called the 'rumored histories' of 1947. While the narrative proceeds by accounting for incidents of murder and looting, it is clearly oriented at historicizing the event, mentioning the loss on both sides of the border. In West Punjab, where Sikhs and Hindus were forced to leave, perpetrators are usually the mass of rioters and the political leaders of the Muslim League as actors behind the scene. Different is the situation in the accounts of the many 'little' incidents of communal hatred and murder in East Punjab's villages. The brief listing of incidents that occurred in villages in district Ludhiana, captures the tone of these accounts:

Jagraon. People who lived in the many little hamlets around Jagraon were called to assemble. When the Muslims gathered in Jagraon to confront the Sikhs, 3 Sikhs (one of them Kapur Singh) and 350 Muslims were killed. *Hathur*. In Hathur lived the Rangars [converted Rajputs]. They thought themselves to be a martial race. When they met the assembled Sikhs, they attacked in a cowardly way. One Sikh and 30 Muslims died. Others left their houses to gather in a camp in Raekot [...]. *Ghalib*. There was a fight in the village Ghalib where only about 300 Muslims were killed. Others converted to Sikhism; later they all left with the military to Pakistan (Seetal 1948: 319).

While the loss on the side of Punjabi Muslims clearly outnumbers the casualties suffered by the Sikhs, the former are still held accountable for the violence. This is not the case for other reports where Sikhs and Hindus are held directly responsible for the death of large numbers of Muslims. When on the Pakistani side, the agent is the mass (*vahir*) of looters; on the Indian side we find a similar mass phenomenon, as the narrator refers to the collective body of the *jatthas* who would launch

their attack (*hamla*) on the Muslims. Localities, casualties, and numbers are important, only seldom do we find names such as Kapur Singh of Jagraon, who—I assume—must have been well known to the author. In this way the narrative clearly departs from the language of the FIRs. It is not oriented toward legal issues; it rather speaks to the emotional fabric of the local Sikh community.

If on an overall plane of analysis the narrative considered here is historicist and prosaic, it has discernible points where the evaluative language of Sikh sacrifice and Muslim otherness erupts in the narrative in the form of fantastic imagery. Consider for instance, the following section on an incident in the hamlet Toba Tek Singh:

There was an attack on Toba Tek Singh, while Sikhs and Hindus gathered there. Some Sikhs were killed on the bazaar and the gurdwara. I heard about a particular painful incident there. A Sikh boy of about 6 years of age was caught by Muslims. Capturing his lower limb they beat him so severely against the edge of a mansion that his scalp was blown off. When Muslims killed children in this fashion, they uttered the crusading cry of 'Long lives Pakistan' (ibid.: 314).

In the long narrative, violence is normalized as a feudal exchange between the three communities. The killing of children, however, is considered transgressive, a pathological instance in which the 'true character' of Muslim aggressors comes to the fore. The language used in the section discussed above betrays the claims of writing a neutral account of partition violence. The narrative spills over into the imagery of Sikh sacrifice that has been prevalent in Sikh *dhadi* texts. As I have argued elsewhere, the storytelling genre allows for a dramatization of such imagery in an almost infinite manner. The framing of *dhadi* performance as a storytelling event on the heroic past enables the production of these images, which in their poetic quality seem to generate an experience of their own. The situation here is different. In the narrative framework of a vernacular chronicle that covers a contemporary rather than distant past, evocations of sacrificial acts are limited. There is no talk about martyrdom whatsoever. If there is reference to sacrifice such as is indicated in the conclusion and the dedication of the book to 'those who left their lives for the country's freedom' the word used is *qurbani* and not *shahid*. This is not just a linguistic nuance, but a crucial departure from a prevalent normative model of martyrdom that runs through the *dhadi* texts.

Epic imagery of the vicious other consequently also acquires a different place. This imagery lapses into the dominant narrative of recollection as a fragment, a presence of that other genre of commemoration that has become subdued at the moment of partition. And yet it constitutes a potent force in producing this narrative of such enormous length. It invests the text at critical points with social energies through which the 'rumorous history' (Pandey 2001) of partition is translated into evaluative categories and conceptual frames that strike a familiar chord with listeners of *dhadi* narratives.

Time has Taken a Turn: From Chronicle to Novel

We have seen that in Seetal's partition chronicle, the border village Toba Tek Singh constitutes a place of transgression, an instance of cruel otherness that is captured in monumental imagery. The image of transgression and absurdity resonates with the metaphorization of partition in north Indian literary discourse, albeit with the difference that the figure of madness and absurdity in the no man's land does not allow any *recursion* to ideological narrative. Saadat Hasan Manto's short story 'Toba Tek Singh' epitomizes this other imaginary of partition that, rather than entangling itself in naturalistic languages of sacrifice and otherness, carves out a disillusioned space of loss and mourning that cannot be reconciled with the gesture of historicist recollection. Manto's 'Toba Tek Singh' along with his other partition stories have been widely recognized for their evocative power in investing the memory of partition with a subtle voice that lacks verbal pathos. In this section I argue that through a turn from the genre of the chronicle to that of the novel, Seetal saw a similar potential to verbalize the experience of partition. Turning to his novel *Jug Badal Gaya (Time has Taken a Turn)*, I am interested in understanding how the prose narrative accommodates themes that have remained excluded from the chronicle and *dhadi* text.

Time has Taken a Turn plays out in a small village, Varn, somewhere near the contemporary Indo-Pakistan border. The story begins with an account of the low-caste and physically-handicapped Duda, who made his way as a herdsman into the house of the Sikh landlord and unofficial village headman. The novel depicts in fine detail the complex

net of social relations that defined the place in which the Jats were dominant. Village life in the pre-partition years is harsh and does not seem to take pity upon the socially marginalized figures that populate the story. Beside the low-caste Duda who features in the first paragraphs of the book, the other main character of the novel is introduced with Sardar Lakha Singh, the Jat proprietor and ruling landlord of the village, who has control over a big household, land, and tenants. His alliance with the moneylender Dhane Shah is portrayed as a decisive factor in allowing him access to material and human resources. Ironically called 'Shah', Lakha Singh is the patriarch and manager of kinship affairs that expand from his own kin to the arrangement of marriage alliances of his dependent working class which is required to exchange agricultural work for the gift of family alliances. For Lakha Singh, the control over reproductive ties allows him to claim the womenfolk he desires. In addition to his first wife Basant Kaur, who is introduced as the nurturing mother, the role model of the virtuous and selfless Punjabi woman, he enters into a second marriage with Swarni, the young and beautiful. People in the village call her Heer. Her sudden death at a young age evokes the fate of the folk heroine who chooses to die rather than be forced into an unwanted marriage. The 'illicit' affair with a third woman, the low-caste Rajo, whom Lakha Singh has himself arranged to be married to his herdsman Duda, functions as a turning point in the narrative. From there on, in the narrator's voice, 'Lakha Singh's chariot began sliding downward'. Giving birth to her son Jarnail that Rajo had conceived from the landlord, the low-caste woman secures her position in the Shah's household, even though she remains formally married to Duda. Unlike Duda, who is completely subservient to Lakha Singh's demand while having a clear perspective on his dependent position, Rajo ruminates and grumbles about village gossip relating to her 'illicit' offspring. With the event of partition, however, she is brought into a position to reclaim debts and force Lakha Singh to acknowledge his low-caste bonds. This happens after the entire family is forced to flee across the new border to Amritsar in India. Upon arriving on the other side of the border, Basant Kaur dies of exhaustion and sorrow. Duda is killed after Lakha Singh has sent him back to the deserted house to secure some precious jewels that they forgot to take with them. Rajo survives and her son Jarnail secures a position as *patwari*, an official in the new administration. Thus, taking charge of the allocation of property

on the basis of the partition agreements, Jarnail succeeds in preventing Lakha Singh from receiving the acres of land that the latter had thoughtfully recorded in his name before they left the village. The novel ends on a conciliatory tone when Lakha Singh finally gives in and pledges to live with Rajo and Jarnail.

At first sight, partition is not the central plot in Seetal's novel. It rather functions as an epilogue, a brief succession of episodes in which major characters with whom the reader has identified before, depart from the scene, leading up to the end of the novel. I claim, however, that the death of the two heroines and the adopted low-caste son Duda is an allegory for the loss that meant partition, the partition motif therefore constituting the core of the novel. The three characters are lucidly developed in their own individuality and their mutual bonding. Nevertheless, they are also role models, almost archetypal figures that epitomize the valued side of Punjabi rural culture. Basant Kaur appears as the loving mother—vulnerable to the rules of a patriarchal household, yet enduring in her capacity to embrace even those who have made her own life as first wife miserable, she is portrayed as the soul of the household. She ties people to herself through her compassionate attachment and forbearance. The process by which she is shown to accept the demands of her husband's choice of a second and third wife is depicted without any pathos. The narrative's most impressive sections are those in which the reader comes face-to-face with inner torments of Basant Kaur who must perform the ritual obligations during the wedding ceremony of Lakha Singh and Swarni. In the course of the marriage ritual, the female barber's voice can be heard to tease the landlord through witty speech: 'With a woman like Heer already in the house, you have another one like Sahiban. Manage another wife for lambardar. No harm even if at the cost of double the jokes' (Seetal 1972: 85). Allusions to the folk heroines are frequent. Swarni in particular meets all the requirements of the Heer figure. She incorporates the virginal beauty, the young woman who is forced to marry Lakha Singh while promising herself to the love of another. The inner fabric of the tormented female heart, finally, is the meeting point of these women characters. In the proceeding narrative 'only a character has changed. She had left the stage and another heroine had taken her place.' Basant Kaur's pain is replicated in Swarni's torments, her death on the Muslim bedstead foretold in Swarni's tragic passing away.

The heroines' deaths are allegories for the loss of partition. They demarcate a before and after, a time of love and hardship in the Punjabi village household followed by what seems as the temporal erasure of the community's moral fiber. There is a 'good side' and a 'bad side' to this loss, as Duda and Rajo's story testifies. In contrast to the two heroines, Duda's death represents the absurd theatre of partition violence. By historical circumstance he followed his master's order to secure some of the landlord's belongings and is killed in this seemingly nonsensical act. If the comic tragedy of this death shows the low-caste subject to be the arbitrary victim of communal violence, partition is given a different, even positive, stance in restoring justice to the formerly dependent low-caste subject in the figure of Rajo. With the loss of family, property, and political influence, the patterns of alliance have become reversed. Lakha Singh has become dependent on Rajo and his 'mischievous-incarnate' offspring Jarnail. He is manipulated in a similar way in which he used to strategically 'care' for his servants and tenants.

The social criticism that comes to the fore in this final scene is fully in line with the narrative as a whole. It clearly replicates the social-reformist idiom of the Hindi and Urdu progressive literature in the early 20th century. In the same manner in which Premchand articulated his critique, in Seetal's novel social criticism is not couched in religious idioms but expressed bluntly in the language of bonded labor and caste hierarchy. To give another example, the introduction of the term Harijan in public discourse is depicted as a mere charade that cloaks the continuing forms of exploitation in the village. The transformative potential to change the position of the low-caste subject lies in the rupture of social and economic relations that are brought about with the event of partition migration.

The Memory of Chenab: Recovering the Poetic Voice

The polyphonic character of the novel has facilitated the return of folk idioms and motifs of Punjabi composite culture that right until the reformist movements in the late 19th and early 20th century formed the core of *dhadi* repertoires. In this section, I will move from the analysis

of the Punjabi novel and its polyphonic dimension to yet another genre of narrativization in which we may locate transgressive moments, or slippages through which the voice of the witness can be heard. Most notably, these are autobiographical and poetical accounts that need to be taken into consideration. Autobiography and poetry, of course, assume different audiences and the accuracy of their constructions of narrative truth varies significantly. While autobiography entails a conscious reformulation of life experience and thus constitutes a mode of remembering that is directed toward specific goals in the present, the poem creates its own reality. On the reception side this implies that reading a poem is an event different from reading a performer's autobiography. The poem's openness to subjective evaluation and its power to touch the emotional self makes it unique. Instead of constructing a life course in linear progression of time, it tends to rupture time, temporally propelling the reader/listener out of his sense of time. What I am interested in this section however, is the intertextual dialog between poetry and autobiography, indicated in the recovery of the poetic voice through the autobiographic voice as a function of reckoning time through a mode of displacement. Partition is entailed in this autobiography to the extent that territorial tropes and modes of internalization—alien to the expressions in his *dhadi* compositions—evoke a melancholic loss that goes otherwise unnoticed.

The post-partition narrative *Vekhi Mani Dunya* (Seetal 1983) bears the unmistakable marks of a self-reflexive reordering of historical time. The life story is set against the background of particular historical referents that are deliberately chosen. It needs to be emphasized in the first place that in the words of the author sincerity in narrating the past was a crucial issue. It is stated cunningly in the preface to his autobiography, where he differentiates between the different 'truths' that have to be taken into consideration by the writer. The author is critically aware of the contested and plural character of truth. Certain ruptures in the lifespan, however, notably those related to the partition event, tend to be flattened out in the narrative recuperation. The interesting point in reading the performer's autobiography, therefore, is not to simply follow his life episodes step by step, but rather to read the text against the grain of its author's own narrative gesture.

As a cumulative history of the self, the textual structure of *Vekhi Mani Dunya* offers a significant juncture in the middle of the narrative,

where he completes his account of his partition migration and post-partition resettlement. In the previous chapters, Seetal provided the reader with a fair account of how his family had to depart, in a last-minute decision, from their home village in late August 1947, when it became evident that the land (being very close to the border) would be assigned to Pakistan. Departure from Qadivind had to be made in a hasty manner, but without threats from the local Muslim community whose relationship to the Sikhs is described in terms of friendship and tolerance. The author narrates that during this time he was in a strange state of mind and that even prayers would bring no relief. Subsequently, he portrays the difficulties of finding a new home and income in India and of being confronted with yet other hostilities. Throughout this paragraph, we find Seetal in a reflexive pose with respect to partition and the kind of personal transformation it required to build up a new life.

In the course of this narrative, it seems that something more essential has been lost. Something that is later captured in a scene of remembrance. The scene departs in significant respects from the rest of the narrative. Coming to talk about the progress of his *dhadi* group after partition, the narrator embarks on an imaginary journey across the border to West Punjab, the landscape of his former travels as a *dhadi* performer—a landscape that after partition was now inaccessible to him. In this journey, he traces ruins of a past that are difficult for him to reconcile. Images of Takshila and Harappa (two famous ancient historic sites) and the popular Panj Sahib shrine are stitched together to an itinerary of remembering. The images he describes are real and unreal at the same time; they are his memories and yet are not owned by him. Seetal is attached to tiny details, such as the little bracelet that, he remembers, helped archaeologists to relocate the house of the dancers in Takshila. The approximately three page-long section develops its own temporal and narrative structure, and thus creates a mood of melancholia. One paragraph I found particularly remarkable (Seetal 1983: 183):

Remembering those places from which we have departed (*vicar jana*), which we would not be able to see a second time, sometimes torments my mind. Whenever I come to think of 'Panj Sahib' Vaisakhi, Katak Puranashtmi at Nankana Sahib and Jor da Mela in Lahore (commemorating Guru Arjun Dev's martyrdom) my soul wriggles in pain (*tarap uthana*). ... Once, the Panj Sahib committee called us for the Vaisakhi *mela*. We left with a feeling of happiness. On this journey, I crossed the river Chenab for the first time. The water hardly

reached to the knee of a person. Small children played in the riverbed. The breast of the river was spotted with little sandbanks. It looked like leucoderma (*phulbahiri*). . . . Repeatedly it came to my mind that it was this river Chenab in which Sohni drowned. Sometimes the sentiments get out of control. Although I was seated in the disorder and noise of a third class train compartment, I was immersed in loneliness and began to write a poem that is published in *Vāhinde Hanju*. I believe that one's (solitary) place rests in one's interior (*man de andar*), not in the outer world (*bahar dunya*).

What is being talked about in this section is a scene of traveling and discovery. Phrased in memory scenes of a lost landscape, the section tells us about a man who returns to his interior self, which allows him to write a poem amidst a turbulent world—a world that causes astonishment. Two tropes used in this section suggest how interiority and the sensual experience of the outer world had been mediated. The first image suggests a metaphorization of time in the river trope. The dangerous flow of time is covered by a deceptive dry riverbed of voiceless memory that Seetal poignantly terms the *phulbahiri*, a pathological image of skin disease and yet a strangely beautiful image for the world Seetal finds himself in. The allusion of the whole section, however, is a movement from this surface image to the real and incomprehensible depth of the past. Thus, it is the allegorical space of memory itself that is at stake here. With the imaginary crossing of the river Chenab, Seetal remembers the heroine Sohni who drowned in the river. And he remembers all the festive occasions in which he participated. Memory comes back in the form of icons of the traditional scenery of Punjabi performative culture. It hurts. Seetal describes his state of mind, using a trope of inner torment and longing that is comprised in the word *tarap*, the connotations of which are captured in proverbs and idioms that indicate wriggling in pain, intense longing, and the pain of separation suffered by lovers. It thus epitomizes an extraordinary form of subjection to painful loss. In Seetal's reckoning the past lives through his own telling, as a painful reminder of the past as an inaccessible object. It is the reminder of what has been lost with the event of partition, but on a more encompassing level it also marks a change in his attitude toward the past as such. The memory scene is sunken in melancholic stupor; this is completely different from his imaginary journeys as a *dhadi* subject. Here, his melancholia is paralleled with a new vision of moral reinforcement in interior religion, cast in the

language of Sikh and Sufi devotionism. If we look again at the paragraph above, we find that Seetal refers to an earlier written poem called after the river, 'Chenab', that comes to his mind while writing this autobiographical section. We can read this poem 'back into the future', like a dream that is translated into words whose meanings are yet to be discovered.

Chenab

Au nadi'e prem-prit di'e!
 Ajj kyo cup kiti vahindi'e?
 Chale ji'u bhari'a dil tera
 Par munho kuch na kahindi'e
 Ajj kyo tu bhar ke vagda nahi?
 Kuch apna ap vikhandi nahi
 Lahira nahi, ghuman-gheran nahi
 Ko'i kandhi banni dhandi nahi
 Joban nahi, Joban-masti nahi
 Masti di'a shokh taranga nahi
 Vidhva ji'o tere dil andar
 Sha'id ajj uh umage nahi

(translation)

Tell, you love-stricken river!
 Why are you running silently today?
 As if your heart is full
 But not a single word would you utter from your mouth
 Why are you not bursting with water today?
 Not revealing your real nature
 Neither waves, nor whirls
 Not the eroded shore
 Not the youth and its vivacity
 Not the playful, energetic waves
 Like a widow that in her heart
 Knows no more of those desires

The opening verses draw an image of deception. The theme is that of love and betrayal. Chenab is addressed in the first person's voice as hiding its real depth and dangerous undercurrent. Several lines describe the dangerous currents and the sheer force of the river as it is described in so many popular stories. The association here is with female *shakti*. This image is then contrasted with the image of the widow, the female

person that is without desires because of her loss and social sanctions. In the fourth paragraph, the motif of the river carries an allusion to a well-known epic motif.

Tuhe hai jisdi'a thatha vic
 Dhubi si ik muti'ari ni
 Tere hi kandhe vasda si
 Prita da shokh bapari ni
 Us din tu apne joban vic
 Vagdi sau bhar asgahi ni
 Jad tere kandhe ashak ko'i
 Bharda si baitha ahi ni

(translation)

It is you in whose strong waves
 The beloved drowned
 Who used to dwell at your shore
 Your naughty dealer in love
 On that day, in your youth
 You ran without effort
 When at your shore some
 Desperate lover was sighing and waiting

Seetal's composition has a wonderful flow and in its refined Punjabi vernacular it comprises a high poetic quality. He evokes the drowning of the heroine in the oral epic *Sohni Mahiwal*, who because of betrayal, crossed the river to her beloved with an earthen pot that was sun-dried and, thus, dissolved in the strong waves of Chenab, in which she drowned. He also names the heroine in his autobiography, but the measure of betrayal and tragedy is comprehensible only after reading the poem he refers to. In the verses that follow, the author further elaborates on the theme of drowning and eternal love in the last paragraph. Then, at the end of the poem he says:

Jadu ki ihde pani vic?
 Jira vi gurti leinda e
 Chadd gaddi takht hazare nu
 Ranjhe di mandi painda e
 'Sital' Ji, jot muhabbat di
 Dil mandir de vic jagdi rahi

(translation)

What is the magic in this water
 Whoever was initiated by tasting it
 Renounced the inherited world
 And entered Ranjha's universe
 Seetal Ji, the flame of love
 Continues to burn in the inner sanctum of his heart

The voice of yet another cultural hero is brought up, with the figure of Ranjha, whose tragic love affair with Hir is known to almost every Punjabi child. The meaning of the Hir–Ranjha plot, which allows for a plurality of possible readings stretching from allegories of Sufi mysticism to popular perceptions of the romantic love theme, is rendered in a particular way in this poem. In my reading, the renouncement of Takht Hazara (the historic site where Ranjha's family resided) that I have translated as 'inherited world' carves out an inner landscape of the poet-bard that is both melancholic—a continuation of the loss that meant partition, displaying a sense of alienation from the vicissitudes of the outer world—and self-consciously traditional in its delving into spiritual imagery.

Conclusion

In my search for the partition motif in a Punjabi performative genre, I have traversed different modes of narrativization in the Punjabi vernacular. While the experience of partition has become subdued or inarticulate in contemporary *dhadi* repertoires, the *dhadi* subject has obviously been touched by the partition event, even if it speaks through a fragmented discourse, through multilayered voices, and unforeseen turning of events as they are developed in fictional and autobiographical narratives. It is not so much a particular text or episode that stakes out in this regard, but rather the movement between different generic frameworks where emotive images of everyday love, friendship, and inter-communal sociality in village life emerge as the subdued memory of partition. These images are distinctively different from contemporary *dhadi* songs with their many allegories on the heroic spirit of Sikh sacrifice. Post-partition *dhadi* songs have been influential in mobilizing supporters of militant resistant movement in the 1980s Punjab

(Pettigrew 1992), and are still current in the diaspora setting, where there is little censorship of assertive Khalistan rhetoric (Kalra and Nijhawan 2007).

Songs about political struggle, especially in the context of nationalist movements, where they take on an assertive function in portraying clear-cut enemy horizons have also been very influential in the Middle East. As Joseph Massad (2005) points out in his study of popular songs on Palestine's liberation, the study of the production and consumption of popular song is significant for it shows how political élites used this vehicle to get their message across and mobilize the masses; at the same time, however, the complexity of the new media with its hardly controllable forms of dissemination, indicates a pluralization of consumption patterns and modes of reception. This is further increased, as Massad demonstrates, as even highly ideological forms of martial music, for example indicated in the Arab song *Watani Habibi* about the Palestinian homeland, reveal an internal hybridization of the cultural format used, for despite its emphasis on Arab nationalism, 'the orchestra lacked a single Arab instrument' (ibid.: 179). As Amy Horowitz (2005: 220) argues in the same volume, 'music provides a particularly fertile ground for exploring porous boundaries, insofar as it recognizes that the map is not the territory and that soundscapes do not conform to either historical legacies or political landscapes'. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere (Nijhawan 2006), that the disparity between ideological message and cultural hybridity that is historically entrenched in *dhadi* soundscapes can be similarly explored to rupture the legacy of communalized memory, though it must be observed that the history of cross-cultural and inter-religions fertilization has not been ruptured to the same extent in Punjab as might currently be the case for Israel–Palestine.

The relationship between *dhadi* as a cultural form and processes of political identity formation in the colonial and post-colonial situation is a complex issue that cannot be fully explored in this chapter. Generally, post-partition *dhadi* song and narrative cater to an exclusive focus on Sikh identity, whereas the complex interweaving of voice, genre, and memory that I have demonstrated for Seetal's texts, are less frequent. In my view, the historiography of these popular forms is all the more important, for despite its ruptures and inconsistencies, it is precisely through such a fine-grained analysis that the work of culture in the aftermath of violence can be understood more adequately. The alternative narration of partition history that such an approach allows for

is indicated in the recovery of voices that question the established boundaries of social and religious identities, even if they seem to fit those boundaries at the surface level. It is a matter of irony, of course, that *dhadi* performers like Seetal participated in a reformist and political agenda aimed at reconciling the boundaries of the Sikh community in the pre-partition years. Yet, in that regard Seetal is not alone. In his study of personal memoirs left behind by the early 20th century Jerusalem musician Wasif Jawhariyyeh, Salim Tamari makes a similar observation when he argues that despite the colorization of his narrative 'by retroactive memories of clashes during the 1920s and 1936–39 between Palestinian Arabs and the Zionist movement' (Tamari 2005: 38) as well as the allusions to the 1948 war, his memoirs construct a communitarian identity of Jerusalem that is erased from official history. Here we find a portrayal of the old city in which the ethnic neighborhoods are not so segregated, where musicians take part in each other's cultural events (Arab musicians performing at Jewish weddings) extending to the popular involvement of the other at religious events such as shrine veneration (ibid.: 47; see also Bowman 1993). All of this is highly reminiscent of the late colonial period in Punjab and it seems a strong case can be made here for the continuing importance of popular cultural practices in the light of rising nationalist movements and elite reformism.

India's partition was unique insofar as for some time to come it brought to a halt certain forms of popular engagement and cross-boundary participation, specifically in border areas between Amritsar and Lahore that witnessed some of the most horrendous forms of violence. For Seetal, who was an eyewitness to these events and had to flee from his village at the dawn of independence, his former political beliefs were essentially shattered and it was in those circumstances that a new telling paved its way through his Punjabi vernacular writing. In Seetal's work, the heroines' voices fulfilled the purpose of translating the loss that has meant partition in popular idioms. These idioms manifest themselves at an esthetic level that encompasses modes of poetic and musical evaluations, closely tied to emotional patterns as they are commonly evoked in the realm of Punjabi performative media. In that sense it almost seems as if the recovery of Hir's voice in the Punjabi poem resonates with the feelings and tone of certain forms of traditional *dhadi* music—that what goes unsaid at the discursive level is recaptured in poetry and music, and it is at this non-discursive level that,

as an aural creation and mode of cultural production, *dhadi* singing might have demonstrated its most potent force in the wake of violence and suffering.

In the light of this discussion and with the help of Americo Paredes' (1993) coinage of the term, I call *dhadi* a 'border genre'. I use the term in a slightly different manner than Paredes in his influential work. As I have argued, I am less interested in literal representations of partition discourses, but more concerned with the resignification of the performative tradition as a whole, as well as the eruption of partition and border issues at unexpected places. From a contemporary perspective, it is certainly necessary to pay attention to these largely forgotten texts and narratives, simply because they allow for a different reading of the work of Punjabi culture and language which, in the course of post-partition politics, cross-border antagonism, and militarism, have been strongly communalized (Purewal 2003). There are evident signs for an opening of the Indo-Pak border in the years to come, and the cultural exchange between people on both sides of the border has been rejuvenated. Yet it remains a question to what extent Punjabi cultural traditions can respond to this situation by reconciling some of the losses that were generated through the partition event.

REFERENCES

- Anzaldúa, G. 1987. *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza*. San Francisco: Spinsters/Aunt Lute.
- Aretxaga, B. 1997. *Shattering Silence. Women, Nationalism, and Political Subjectivity in Northern Ireland*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bhalla, A. (ed.). 1994. *Stories about the Partition of India*. Delhi: Harper Collins.
- Borneman, J. 1992. *Belonging in the Two Berlins*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bowman, G. 1993. 'Nationalizing the Sacred: Shrines and Shifting Identities in the Israeli Occupied Territories', *Man: The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, xxviii(3): 431–60.
- Butalia, U. 1998. *The Other Side of Silence*. Delhi: Viking Press.
- Das, V. 1997. *Critical Events*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Feldman, Allen. 1991. *Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Hasan, M. (ed.). 1995. *India Partitioned*. Delhi: Lotus.
- Horowitz, A. 2005. 'Dueling Nativities: Zehava Ben Sings Umm Kulthum', in R. Stein and T. Swedenburg (eds), *Palestine, Israel, and the Politics of Popular Culture*, pp. 202–30. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

- Kalra, Virinder and Michael Nijhawan. 2007(forthcoming). 'Cultural, Linguistic, and Political Translations: *Dhadi* Urban Music'. *Sikh Formations*, 3(1).
- Khosla, G. D. 1989 (1951). *Stern Reckoning*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Massad, J. 2005. 'Liberating Songs: Palestine put to Music', in R. Stein and T. Swedenburg (eds), *Palestine, Israel, and the Politics of Popular Culture*, pp. 175–201. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Menon, Ritu and Kamla Bhasin. 1998. *Borders and Boundaries: Women in India's Partition*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Nijhawan, M. 2004. 'Shared Melodies, Partitioned Narratives? An Ethnography of Sikh and Sufi *Dhadi*-Performance in Contemporary Punjab', *International Journal of Punjab Studies*, 10 (1&2): 47–77.
- . 2006. *Dhadi Darbar. Religion, Violence, and the Performance of Sikh History*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Pandey, G. 2001. *Remembering Partition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Paredes, A. 1993 [1978]. in R. Bauman (ed.), *Folklore and Culture on the Texas-Mexican Border*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Pettigrew, J. 1992. 'Songs of the Sikh Resistance Movement', *Asian Music* (Fall 1991–92): 85–118.
- Purewal, N. K. 2003. 'The Indo-Pak Border: Displacements, Aggressions and Transgressions', *Contemporary South Asia*, 12(4).
- Rabinowitz, D. 1998. 'National Identity on the frontier: Palestinians in the Israeli education system', in T.M. Wilson and H. Donnan (eds), *Border Identities*, pp. 142–61. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Racioppi, Linda; see Katherine O'Sullivan. 2000. 'Ulstermen and Loyalist Ladies on Parade'. *International Feminist Journal of Policies*, 2(1): 1–29.
- Rosaldo, R. 1989. *Culture and Truth*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Seetal, S. S. 1948. *Panjab da Ujara*. Amritsar: Mastar Sher Singh, Khazan Singh.
- . 1962. *Vahinde Hanju*. Ludhiana: Seetal Publishing House.
- . 1972. *Jug Badal Gaya*. Ludhiana: Seetal Publishing House.
- . 1983. *Vekhi Mani Dunia*. Ludhiana: Seetal Publishing House.
- Stein, R. and T. Swedenburg (eds). 2005. *Palestine, Israel, and the Politics of Popular Culture*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Stokes, M. 1998. 'Imagining the south: hybridity, heterotopias and Arabesk on the Turkish-Syrian border', in T. M. Wilson and H. Donnan (eds), *Border Identities*, pp. 263–88. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tamari, S. 2005. 'Wasif Jawhariyyeh, Popular Music, and Early Modernity in Jerusalem', in R. Stein and T. Swedenburg (eds), *Palestine, Israel, and the Politics of Popular Culture*, pp. 27–50. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Wilson, T. M. and H. Donnan (eds). 1998. *Border Identities. Nation and State at International Frontiers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Memories of a Lost Home

Partition in the Fiction of the Subcontinent*

ALOK BHALLA

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. In the first part, it offers an analysis of the idea of 'home' in fictional texts about the partition of the Indian subcontinent. In the second part, it suggests that the idea of 'home' in partition narratives reaffirms Gandhi's notion of 'swaraj' and his life-long attempts to define the variety of complex ways in which freedom, ethicality, and 'home' are linked.

One of the most unexpected and tragic consequences of the political decision to divide the Indian subcontinent was that millions of people were forced to migrate, leave their homes which they thought of as their nation (*watan*), and undertake a difficult and sorrowful journey, often against their desires and better instincts, to strange cities and villages. A majority of the migrants were simple, ordinary, and helpless people who were indistinguishable from each other as Hindus, Muslims, or Sikhs. The migrants did not choose to leave their homes or see themselves as makers of new nations. Indeed, there is very little historical evidence to indicate that, apart from a few, the migrants had left their homes because they were tempted by visions of a new selfhood and a new country, a promise, and a hope.

The plight of everyone caught in the middle of the casual brutality of the partition days was, perhaps, summed up by a refugee who told

* This chapter is an adapted version of the Introduction in the book *Partition Dialogues: Memories of a Lost Home* by Alok Bhalla, published by Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2005.

an interviewer with the austerity of those who have suffered far too much: '*Kaun ujjardana chahta tha?*' ('Who wanted to be uprooted?') See Bhardwaj 2004: 81). By 1947, however, many Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs were convinced that they had no other option left but to migrate. Some abandoned their homes because their neighborhoods had become undependable, and others because their religious beliefs had become a danger to themselves and a threat to others.

Partition Fiction

Partition fiction records that when the refugees arrive at the camps, or find shelter in schools, evacuee properties, temples, mosques, old forts, gardens, railway stations, or footpaths, (Datta 2000) they understand that, far from being participants in 'pilgrim time' who have at last realized their spiritual and national home, they are merely poor players trapped in civil, political, and religious nightmares enacted to satisfy the egotism of some and the powerful ambitions of others. Threatened by unrelenting and remorseless violence, their journey across the new borders has no moral glamor attached to it and no religious sanctity. And, as if to darken the irony of their migration, they discover that those who had urged them to leave their homes have no social or economic vision of a future to offer them, no politics which will give voice to their anxieties, and no theories of law, freedom, or modernity, which will serve them as a guide. They find themselves stranded, in spaces which are neither social and political, nor moral and religious.

Confronted by mercilessness of the politics of religious identities, migrants in partition narratives fail to understand how they will ever find their way back to an ordinary place called 'home'. The events of 1947 not only violently uproot them, but also suddenly estrange them from those simple words like 'friendship', 'neighborhood', 'peepul tree', 'parrot', 'well', '*imambara*' (Shia religious hall), 'hope', 'love', 'god', which they had used to craft their life-world. If earlier the noise of families engaged in the daily processes of living had filled their streets, now they are surrounded either by unhappiness and silence, or rage and murder. It is intriguing to note that all notions of human associations and religiosity, disappear from partition fiction after 1947. There are no

fictional characters who think that their neighbors are trustworthy because they belong to the same religious community. Even more curious is the fact that after migration, no characters, in any partition novel, find it in their hearts to go to temples or mosques to pray with genuine devotion and offer thanks for their deliverance from an iniquitous past lived amidst *kafir* (unbeliever), *malichha* (outcaste), and *nastik* (atheist). They discover that the new bastis where the refugees settle are hostile and strangely godless places. These settlements have no sacred spaces and no devotees. They are either infected places or are so utterly barren of human affections as to make life a graveyard of lamentations. Martin Buber was, perhaps, right when, in an open letter to Gandhi, he wrote, 'That which is merely an idea and nothing more cannot become holy...' (Buber 1957: 142). And, then, added that 'only through working on the kingdom of man', is it possible to work 'on the kingdom of God' (ibid.: 137).

There are some characters in partition fiction who believe, at least initially, that the partition can offer them a chance to be in *jannat*—paradise. For example, when Habib Bhai, in Badiuzzaman's novel, *Chhako Ki Vapsi*, first reaches Dhaka, he writes to his family back home in Gaya, 'Truly, Pakistan is not less than a paradise on earth' (Badiuzzaman 1975: 21). Only later does he realize that he should have paid more attention to Amma's advice that God cannot be restricted within invented boundaries, and that any place where human beings act ethically can become a site of hierophanies. When he first informs her of his decision to migrate so that he can pray alongside people of his own religious faith, she asks him: 'Is the God present here different from the one over there?' (ibid.: 20). In almost every fictional text migrants discover, once their enthusiasm or their rage subsides, and the need to find shelter and work replaces their concerns with religious identities, that they are nothing more than exiles and aliens. Their recollections of pre-partition life, almost invariably cast in nostalgic terms, are full of regret over a lost culture and a betrayed tradition. If the word 'nostalgia' is derived from '*nostos*' (return home) and '*ailos*' (pain; sickness), then the need of the migrants, to reenact their days lost in pre-partition time, is simultaneously a sign of 'home-sickness' and of despair about their present situation and their future prospects (Cavell 1988: 75–76).

There are many other characters in partition fiction who recognize that the advocates of religious politics have pushed them into some

'despised corner of indignity' (Tagore 1988: 74), and that their religious affiliations do not automatically confer upon them the same sense of belonging they once had. When they meet each other by chance somewhere, their conversation always begins with: 'Listen...do you remember the day when...', or 'Have you really forgotten...', or 'Has the memory of those ponds where we hunted in our childhood, become dry? Have those trees burnt to ash?' (Ashraf 1994 [in Bhalla Vol. 1]: 15–17). Then the voice falters and fades into silence. They had shared a past which was personal; it was far removed from religion and politics—and emotionally always more satisfying than the present. Before parting, they invariably ask each other the question that haunts nearly every migrant: 'I was going to ask you if, after migrating,...you had ever thought of going back home?' (ibid.: 16). In these exchanges 'home' is always identified as the place left behind and a place of hopeless yearning.

It is not surprising that in partition fiction migrants are unwilling to acknowledge that the villages they had left behind were marked by a long history of communal violence. In their despondency they confess that in pre-partition India their religious selfhood was never threatened. They know, of course, that in moments of folly there had been strife between religious communities and sects as is often the case in any civil society. But, they also understand that it was the very heterogeneity of religions in the Indian subcontinent which had made it historically possible for all of them to survive and to enrich their own particular religious heritage. Each religion or sect had defined its finest qualities in the presence of the other without any serious attempt to negate it or erase it. Thus, in *Adha Gaon* when Chikuriya is told by a pundit in school that his father, who had been hanged by the British, was a martyr in the cause of freedom. Chikuriya objects vehemently: 'Don't say all these things, Master Sahib, if the imam hears there'll be hell to pay' (*Adha Gaon*: 169). For him Imam Hussain is the only one who deserves to be called a martyr.

Reflecting, perhaps, on the possibilities of religiosity in the political life of India signalled by characters like Chikuriya, Gandhi always referred to God as '*Khuda-Ishwar*', (Gandhi 1984, vol. 10: 2) and maintained, till the day he was assassinated, that the very notion of 'warring creeds' (ibid., vol. 49: 327) was a blasphemy. It was obligatory, he said, 'not merely to respect all other religions' but also 'to admire and assimilate whatever may be good in the other faiths' (ibid., vol. 25: 166–67).¹

In contrast to their nostalgia about the past, the migrants in partition fiction find that their present civil spaces have lost coherence, their time has become fragmented, and they do not know how to retrieve their lives again and remake their homes. They are left with a few belongings—one or two goats, a bicycle, a steel trunk, a cot, a few pots, and pans, the tattered clothes on their backs—which are as unimportant in the making of their new lives as they themselves are in the making of a new nation.

Despite the assertions of later-day political commentators, from I.H. Qureshi (1965) and Ayesha Jalal to Patrick French, there is very little writing which suggests that prior to the partition, there were many who self-consciously thought that the 'religiously informed cultural differences' (Jalal 2001: 79) between communities were so deeply fissured that each group 'naturally' required distinctive nation-states to realize its distinctive virtues and its special holiness. Indeed, there is more reason to believe that the historical experiences of India's diverse religious communities had taught them that political ambitions, which are ignited by passions for separate religious identities, are always intolerant, pitiless, and mean. And, since the daily life of small communities was neither communally charged nor scarred by a history of religious riots (Bayly 1998), they were unprepared for the rage and the violence which swept through their villages.

When the Indian subcontinent was divided, the tolerant, inter-religious way in which ordinary people in urban areas and villages conducted their lives was violated. People forgot their shared life-worlds and became Hindus and Muslims and Sikhs—merely ideological and self-serving. And as the violence increased, their imaginative resources became narrower and meaner; they ignored their holy books and their friendships, and became nastier. Identity politics made them, as it always makes people, paranoiac, resentful, and vengeful. Raging to protect the *iman*, (honor), of each of their particular gods against various *kafirs*, they closed their ears to the call, the *kara*, the Koran of the moral thinkers they had commonly inherited. They forgot that *duragraha* (sufi shrine), *tanha* (destruction), or *tamas* (darkness) create their own inescapable history, for by choosing affliction for others, one also chooses affliction for each of us. Only later, as they fell out of their habitat of culture into barbarity, did they understand how grievously they had been betrayed by the communally-charged politics of their days.

Partition fiction is concerned with the fate of those ordinary characters—Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs—who do not feel, at any time prior to the country's division, that they are aliens living in unreal places which have neither the sanction of history or God, and amongst people who are intolerant, bigoted, and contemptuous of each other. For a majority of them their customary homes, where they try to realize their common hopes and mundane desires, are utopian enough. Only the fool, they think, can be tempted by distant political horizons, and only the pilgrim is addicted to a traveling life. Sometimes, in their minds, the pilgrim, and the fool are the same. For as long as they can remember, they have lived side by side in settled communities. They resist the pressures of the theological bully-boys and ideological thugs, and refuse to migrate. But once they do give in, they spend the rest of their lives as dispirited moral and spiritual exiles in their new countries, unable to recognize in any bird-song, or leaf-fall, or crossroad, signs of home. One of the saddest sources of irony in any of the fictional texts about the partition is that, while the division of the country was carried out in the name of religious and political redemption, there are no characters who cross the borders and find themselves in realms of religious grace or social liberty. There are no migrants in partition fiction who are able to pray again with the fervency of faith they had in the pre-partition days. For them, the partition is the end of their life story, not the beginning of a new one or a pilgrimage toward the divine.

Perhaps, the most poignant lament in partition fiction over the loss of the idea of the religious as a result of the partition is in the work of a man who was, in his own life, scornful of all religiosity. In '*Dekh Kabira Roya*', for example, Saadat Hasan Manto records through the eyes of great saint-poet, Kabir, the spiritual ruin of Lahore after 1947 (Manto 1993, vol. 4: 255–58; translations from Manto are mine). As Kabir wanders through the city, he weeps not only over the vandalism of the past and the corruption of the present, but also at the signs of a merciless future the exiled migrants will have to face in Pakistan and India (Bachalard 1964: 10). Kabir believed that his songs were ecstatic dialogs with other men and God. In the fictional text, however, the people Kabir meets in Lahore obscure the distinction between words and daggers, and confuse their passion for slogans with thought. Kabir regrets that beauty is no longer an attribute of God and that language no longer honors man.

One day, Kabir sees a street vendor tearing pages from a book of religious poems by Surdas to make paper bags. Tears begin to flow down Kabir's face. When the vendor asks him why he is weeping, he says, 'Poems by Bhagat Surdas are printed on these pages ... Don't insult them by making paper bags out of them'. The vendor replies: 'A man who is named Soordas can never be a bhagat'. The vendor's taunt is made up of a foul pun on the words 'sur' and 'soor'. In Sanskrit sur means melody and harmony as well as angel and god, but when slurred over, soor is the word for pig in Punjabi (Manto 1993, vol. 4: 255).

Spiritual Desert

The notion that the partition had created a spiritual desert is also the moving force behind Intizar Husain's *Basti*. The narrator of the novel, Zakir, his mother, and his poet-friend, Afzal, wonder why the landscape and the seasons of the country to which they have migrated fail to capture their moral and creative imagination or produce in them the same 'bliss of Nirvan' (Husain, *Basti* 1995: 97),² as it once had in Rupnagar, the *basti* (village or settlement) that was once their home:

'Afzal', I [Zakir] asked casually, 'aren't there any neem trees here?'

'Why not? Come on, I'll show you'.

He took me around the park. Then he brought me beneath a tree and stopped me: 'Here's your neem tree'.

I looked at it closely. 'Yar, this is a Persian lilac'.

He was embarrassed. 'Well, it doesn't matter... There's a neem tree here, I'll have to search for it'.

'But we never had to search for neem trees... their greenness always proclaimed their presence' (ibid.: 96–97).

In Rupnagar, Zakir's sympathy with the things around him was not a matter of will, but was born of the habits of familiarity through a long and cherished relationship. In his new country, he sees the world around him through different eyes—through the eyes of a mohajir who is forced by circumstances to look at someone else's sense of reality.

Indeed, once the fabled cities in *Basti* are torn apart by social and political cunning, they are quickly transformed into places of decay,

humiliation, and endless betrayals. In Intizar Husain's bleak vision, ancient consecrated spaces are transformed into cities of sorrow, and those who are trapped in them can never again find in anything at hand a remedy for their bewilderment. In a brilliantly-imagined moment of dark epiphany in the novel, Zakir meets Maulvi Matchbox after a night of violence in the lanes of Lahore. The Maulvi rarely speaks to anyone, but sits in agonized silence before empty and half-open matchboxes spread around him on a cloth. He does, however, make a few cryptic responses to Zakir's questions:

'Maulvi Matchbox, what are these boxes?' [Zakir asked] 'Sir, these are towns'.
'Maulvi Matchbox, they don't even have matches in them, they are all empty'.
'Sir, the towns are empty now' (Husain 1995: 128).

The pun on the Maulvi's name is simultaneously bitter, witty, and full of sympathy over his present state of bewilderment. Once the priest of incendiary politics who could ignite rage and passion in the hearts of men, he realizes, albeit too late, that the fire in the hearts of men can also burn cities down.

Appropriately, as the novel ends, Zakir imagines that the whole city is 'burning' (ibid.: 254). He finds refuge from the 'Doomsday chaos' (ibid.: 253) around him in the cemetery where his grandparents are buried. And in a hallucinatory instant, when fragments from the Buddha's Fire Sermon, sounds of breaking vessels from the Ecclesiastes, images of Lanka burnt to ash by Hanuman from the Ramayana, lamentations of those who were betrayed at Karbala and echoes of Gandhi's assassination surge through his memory in a strange frenzy, he finally admits that the partition has not brought him to a more trustworthy country, but to a place of conflagrations prophesied by the inherited religious traditions of Islam, Hinduism, Christianity, and Buddhism. Standing in the graveyard, he confronts the question all partition fiction asks, but admits that he no longer has the strength and courage to seek an answer: 'How did we come to this sorry plight?'

The site of action in Basti is marked by fabled places—variously named Rupnagar, Danpur, Ravanban, Brindaban, Shyamnagar, Sravasthi, Karbala—which are mythic spaces untarnished by history, and where each object of the common day is saturated with the sacred (Eliade 1959). These mythic sites together form an allegoric map of the Indian

civilization in which the wisdom-lore of Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, and Christians is richly intermingled. The fictional map of the novel defines the common cultural ground on which an encyclopedic range of things achieve form (*nup*—form and beauty), are poetically named (*shyam*—evening, *dan*—charity), and are recognized as good and beautiful (connected are they are with Rama, Krishna, Buddha, and Imam Husain. In these fabled place names there is a plurality of gods and demons, human beings and animals, who talk to each other in their infinitely varied dialects, about things that matter. Consider the tone and the idiom of the opening paragraph of *Basti* in which Zakir, who has migrated to Pakistan, recalls his ‘mythic’ (Husain 1995: 36) childhood in Rupnagar:

When the world was still all new, when the sky was fresh and the earth not yet soiled, when the trees breathed through the centuries and ages spoke in the voices of birds, how astonished he was, looking all around, that everything was so new, and yet looked so old. Bluejays, woodpeckers, peacocks, doves, squirrels, parakeets—it seemed that they were as young as he, yet they carried the secrets of the ages. The peacocks’ calls seemed to come not from the forest of Rupnagar, but from Brindaban. When a little woodpecker paused in its flight to rest on a tall neem tree, it seemed that it had just delivered a letter to the Queen of Sheeba’s palace, and was on its way back toward Solomon’s castle. When a squirrel, running along the rooftops, suddenly sat on its tail and chattered at him, he stared at it and reflected with amazement that those black stripes on its back were the marks of Ramachandraji’s fingers...’ (ibid.: 3).

In a novel that strives to break out of prosaic time and aspires toward allegorical truths, it is important to note that the narrator’s name Zakir, in Shia rituals, implies a man who bears witness to the betrayal of Imam Husain by the Umayyids, as well as one who laments the Imam’s martyrdom at Karbala (in the novel Zakir is a teacher of history, and the word ‘zakir’ in Urdu means ‘the one who remembers’. (see Memon 1991). Zakir, in the novel, plays an analogous role both as a historian who keeps a record of contemporary times, and as a moralist who passes judgment on our failure to find in them a meaning and coherence. It is not surprising, therefore, that Zakir first crafts the idyll of his childhood in Rupnagar in pre-partition India, as he tries to make a desperate effort to understand the complex historical and

personal processes which have left him, more than a decade after his migration to Pakistan feeling 'homelessness and houselessness' (Husain 1995: 101). And every time life in Pakistan takes yet another downward turn in the spiral of frustrated hopes and armed rage, Zakir recalls his days in Rupnagar.

Some critics have accused Intizar Husain of nostalgia. They accuse him of sentimentalizing his childhood and youth, and visiting those sites in the past where he had once been happier in an attempt to overcome 'homesickness'. To them Rupnagar is yet another nostalgic fabrication—a fable which has no basis either in history or in experience. Crafted out of stories, songs, the changing nuances of seasons, on one level, Rupnagar is a description of the moral experience of ordinary life in pre-partition India. As Intizar Husain confessed in his conversation with me, it is an idealized remembrance of actual life offered as a counter to the communalized histories of those times:

Yes, the opening section of *Basti* contains descriptions of an ideal community. I can't say how much of the novel is based on memories of real experiences and how much of it is imagined. It does, however, describe the years I spent as a child in Dibai in the pre-partition India. I can say that it was during the years I spent as a child there that I experienced what a genuine community could be like. Indeed, I can assert that the foundation of everything I was to learn later was laid during those years; everything that I was ever to experience was experienced then. It still seems to me that in Dibai, I lived through the experiences of a lifetime.

In the novel, Intizar Husain's evocation of Rupnagar as a city of beauty is more complex than his detractors make it out to be. The word 'nostalgia', in addition to signifying '*nostos*' (longing for home), also contains, as Stanley Cavell (1988) reminds us in an important book, the notion of 'acknowledgement' (Cavell 187). Zakir turns back to pre-partition India because he is skeptical of ever finding meaning and purpose in Pakistan. His memories offer a frame of reference within which we can critically examine those historical accounts which retrospectively argue that the everyday practices of the Muslims in India were only scripturally derived (Sheikh 1994), and that there was a systematic and grievous attempt by the Hindu society to efface the social and economic existence of the Muslims (Ahmad 1947: 11). Intizar Husain's audacity in using nostalgic memory lies in giving to

his pre-partition life history a moral and civilizational priority over the contemporary demand that he surrender his imaginative self to the needs of the new religious state. To do so, he thinks, would lead to the extinction of his imaginative and religious being. More importantly, the act of looking at the past repeatedly enables him to 'know' and interpret his Indo-Islamic heritage continuously in the hope both of 'forgetting' or 'foregoing' the recent history of violence, and of finding thereby some means of evading the circle of sorrow in which he finds himself entrapped. Nostalgic remembrance is for him a form of retrieving knowledge about those modes of living from the past which could be used for the redemption of a future time.

That is why it is important not to dismiss Zakir's personal understanding of what constitutes the 'good' either as nostalgia or as the ineradicable sorrow of a Shia. According to the Hindu and Muslim mythographers in the novel, Rupnagar is, and always has been, an 'imaginative realm of tolerance' (Kundera 1988: 164). As its name suggests, it is not only a place of beauty crafted by the imagination of the divine, but is also a *basti* in which each of its religious communities came into being at the same time. The Hindus and the Muslims who live there can neither claim priority over each other, nor can each claim to be more ancient and, hence, the rightful moral and political inheritors of Rupnagar. Indeed, whenever Zakir is distraught by the hallucinatory world of strikes, slogans, and riots in Lahore, memories of life in Rupnagar come surging up from some deep and abiding core of his self as a form of thanksgiving. Zakir's Rupnagar is simultaneously a vision of a civilization of pre-partition India, a repudiation of all forms of identity politics, and a prophecy of the culture we must aspire toward for our sanity and salvation.

Zakir remembers that the origin myths he had heard from Bhagatji, a Hindu merchant (a character based largely upon the friend Intizar Husain's father admired and trusted the most), and his grandfather, an orthodox Shia Muslim, were never agonistically ranged against each other by either of the storytellers. Their tales were different, of course, because each of them organized, narrated, and explained his life-world and its relation to the divine in his own unique way. For Bhagatji, since there was no transcendent God who existed outside the process of world-making, it did not matter if the creation of the world was *ex nihilo nihil fit*; his God was a participant in the world; he was both its creator

and its creation. In Bhagatji's mythic world, God entered the narrative of creation *in media res*, even as the world was already in the process of moving through countless yugas as they were created, dissolved and begun again. For Abbajan, Zakir's father, there was an unambiguous sense of a holy creative being who existed before the world came into existence, in a moment prior to time. Both Bhagatji and Abbajan, however, considered themselves commemorators and narrators of an unarmed habitat—men who saw in their basti, so splendidly named 'Rupnagar', the beauty of the divine unveil itself (Husain 1995: 63; also see Eliade 1959).

Paradoxically, his new home in the neighborhood of Shyamnagar (a *basti*, as the name implies, of darkening shadows—*shyam* means both evening and black) is neither a sanctified place of worship nor a consecrated ground for burial. And as he is pushed out of one refugee shelter and into another by his fellow Muslims, he realizes that Shyamnagar is not the telos he had been promised. It is, instead, an unbounded and ambiguous space, where 'the days are filled with misfortune and the nights with ill-omen', (ibid.: 92), and the earth seems more 'soiled and dirty' (ibid.: 89). He understands the moral consequences of forcing men from their homes, for it is written in the Koran, the novel reminds us, 'You murdered, then you were murdered. You exiled, then you were exiled' (ibid.: 207). As a religious man he intuitively knows that no bastis can be founded on a ground which has not been bounded by rites and consecrated, and that 'homes are finally derived from the primary experience of the sacred'. Indeed, no graveyard, too, can be a final abode of the body if it has not been sanctified by the presence of one's ancestors. That is why Zakir empathizes with Hakimji who refuses to leave Vyaspur because he can not carry his ancestors with him even though his entire family has migrated to Lahore:

I asked him, 'Hakimji, you didn't go to Pakistan?'

'No, young man'.

'And the reason?'

'Young man! You ask the reason? Have you seen our graveyard?'

'No'.

'Just go sometimes and take a look. Each tree is leafier than the next. How could my grave have such shade in Pakistan?' (ibid.: 139).

Many years after the partition, Zakir, who is still tormented by grieving memories, begins to recognize that even if Rupnagar was the city of beautiful forms, it was never immune to change or the possibility of moral fault. If it had been remote from time and contagion, it would not have become part of any historical or political narrative. Indeed, Zakir recalls the sudden days of plague in Rupnagar and the offer of refuge from the neighboring village of Danpur. Considering that the novel seeks its meaning through the analogical relations between the present horrors in profane time and the *itihasic* (historical) and religious literature of the subcontinent, the name Danpur can either be literally translated as the place of charity and generosity, or metaphysically as the city of commiseration or *anukrosa*, a notion which, along with *ahimsa* and *anrsamasya* (non-cruelty), is as central to the dharma of the Mahabharata and the Ramayana as it is to the Buddhist, Christian, and Islamic scriptures the novel draws upon.³ In Zakir's reconstruction of his pre-1947 life the two bastis, Rup and Dan, together create an ideal space for all the 'good-making' and 'grace-giving' impulses necessary for the making of a civilizational habitat.

Zakir notes with approval that Abbajan had refused to leave home during the plague and move to Danpur. Abbajan's moral objection, so full of Gandhian echoes for those who are not deafened by sectarian noise, was derived from the Koranic admonition, which he repeated often, that 'Those who run from death, run towards nothing else but death' (Husain 1995: 13). He had stayed back in Rupnagar, the plague had finally subsided and he had survived. But Rupnagar had changed permanently.⁴

Something new began to shape the social existence of Rupnagar. One day electric poles arrived in the village. Slowly they became part of its landscape. After a long time, they were erected along the roadside and eventually people became used to their presence. Sometime later, the poles were connected with electric wires. Birds began to perch on them and monkeys swung from them. Then one day, a monkey sitting on the electric pole was singed to death. Lanterns were replaced by electric lights, torches by light bulbs. With the coming of electricity, the moral world of Rupnagar was transformed. Its lanes lost some of their romance; its mosques some of their mystery. Abbajan refused to go to the mosque to say his prayers ever again. And, then, in a moment of inattention perhaps or panic, he forgot the prophetic warning against

abandoning one's home when the times are bad, and decided to leave Rupnagar. If only he had remembered the following story he used to tell his children:

A traveller, passing through a forest, saw that a sandalwood tree was on fire. The birds who had been sitting on the branches had already flown away, but a wild goose still clung to a branch. The traveller asked, 'Oh, wild goose! Don't you see that the sandalwood tree is on fire? Why don't you fly away? Don't you value your life?' The wild goose replied, 'Oh traveller! I've been very happy in the shade of this sandalwood tree. Is it right for me to run off and leave it in its time of trouble?'... 'Do you know who it was?'—The Buddha told this story, then looked around at the monks, and said, 'Oh monks! Do you know who that wild goose was? I myself was the wild goose' (Husain 1995: 158–59).

He moved to Vyaspur, a city, as the name suggests, reminiscent of the fratricidal wars for power in the Mahabharata, and closer in time to *Kaliyug* than Rupnagar was. That was the first migration, and as he later saw it, the beginning of his permanent exile from home. Abbajan had once understood that Rupnagar was the historical product of a long civilizational process, and that Bhagatji and he were its legitimate representatives and inheritors. But under the stress and violence of the politics of religious and social assertion, he had forgotten what they had often told the children through their cosmogonic myths, that the good, as it negotiates its way through profane time, or tries to find an anchorage in social reason, is so fragile and vulnerable that it needs continuous reaffirmation. Like many others, Abbajan knew through his experience of life in Rupnagar that one's religious selfhood acquires its compelling significance only when its worthiness is acknowledged in the eyes of others. Yet, he allowed his anxieties about the security of his family to overwhelm his reasoning self. He left Rupnagar and drifted slowly into exile. He moved first to Vyaspur, and then to Shyamnagar, the city of twilight shadows, in Pakistan. But once he reached Lahore, he recalled again and again, and with an ever-increasing sense of panic, the Koranic adage that only folly can persuade anyone to leave home in the hope of finding a sanctuary in another place beyond the horizon. 'Zakir's mother', Abbajan said gravely, 'Death is everywhere. Where can a man go to flee from it? It is a saying of the Prophet's that those who run from death, run towards death instead' (ibid.: 168).

Zakir records how Abbajan, unable to make a secure home for himself and his family in the new city, is forced to acknowledge that his

migration to Pakistan was not a *hijrat* (exile/migration); that it was not part of some necessary rite of passage toward a place of sacred longings. Ruefully, Abbajan is forced to concede that there was no religious, social, or historical reason for him to have undertaken the journey. After all his Karbala was back in Rupnagar, his mosque was still there and his gravesite was there too. He could have completed his pilgrimage on earth, his real *hijrat*, in Rupnagar.

Partition and Humiliation

Whether the main characters in partition fiction choose to migrate or stay, the division of the subcontinent leaves their moral, political, and social imagination utterly paralyzed. Instead of making life more secure for them amongst people of their own religious faith, the partition makes them feel both anxious and humiliated. Take the case of Hari, the *mali* (gardener), in Bapsi Sidhwa's English novel, *The Ice-Candy Man*. Hari chooses to stay back in Lahore where he has spent all his life. In the tolerant and relaxed civil society of pre-partition Lahore, his name—which evokes both the God Vishnu and the color of grass—makes ironic reference, not to only to his religious identity as a Hindu, but also to his professional incompetence as a gardener. Together with his friends like Imam Din, the Muslim cook, Shanti, the Hindu *ayah* or servant, Sher Singh, the Sikh zoo keeper—whose names (there is in most partition fiction a marked allegory of proper names) signify 'religious faith', 'peace', and 'courage' respectively—Hari is part of the cosmopolitan lexicon of Lahore in the early 1940s which is free from the virus of communal politics. When he meets his friends in the park, the *dhaba* (tea-shop), or the marketplace, he establishes a human immediacy with them because their coming together in these public, visible, and agnostic spaces has no political intent or religious design. Their words are not charged with the certainties and justifications of their separate metaphysical beliefs, but carry with them the entire range of contingent, tentative, or sensuous meanings which point our attention to the variety of forms ordinary human life takes. That is why the *ayah*, who is the center of sexual attraction of all the friends, can sit with them in the park and brush aside 'with impartial nonchalance' all the things that love to crawl under her sari—'ladybirds, glow worms, Ice-candy man's toes', the masseur's hands, and the gardener's words.⁵

The ayah and her admirers know that in a 'normal' and human world, the erotic is unconditional and knows nothing about religious differences.

It is not as if the Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh friends live together under the dull shadows of harmony and perpetual agreement. They are worthy of comment because, like other ordinary human beings, they are sometimes willing to forgive, excuse, or forget bitter arguments, grudges, sexual jealousies, and insults (Bruner 1990: 95). And their actions do not suggest that they have either paid heed to the partition demand or are tormented by the consciousness that they continue to share, as they always have, their living spaces with people of different religions. The partition of 1947 shocks them at first and then diminishes them as human agents; it bewilders them, reduces their moral worth, and transforms them into ciphers of separate Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Christian, or Parsi communities: It is sudden. One day everybody is themselves—and the next day they are Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Christian. People shrink, dwindling into symbols.

Ayah is no longer my all-encompassing Ayah—she is also a token. A Hindu...

Imam Din and Yousuf, turning into religious zealots, warn Mother they will take Friday afternoons off for the Jumha prayers...

Godmother, Slavesister, Electric-aunt and my nuclear family are reduced to irrelevant nomenclatures—we are Parsee (Sidhwa 1988: 93–94).

Lenny's (the protagonist of the novel) puzzlement about the nature and habitat of God, and the flint-heartedness of God's disciples, is echoed in every fictional work about the partition. Like her, other characters in partition fiction intuitively understand that once the politics of dogmatic religion and the ideology of cultural difference 'pitch their evil' in human spaces they inevitably degrade, mock, and fatally ruin the realms of friendship, love, work, and language. They wonder, as Lenny does in her childlike way, that if God, in his impartiality watches over all, then why human beings do not imitate God's charity by ensuring that religious dogma always yields to friendship, and the erotic somehow always tricks ethical law into renouncing its claim over the bodies of lovers? Instead of defending the word 'God' in the name of all that is imaginatively and inexhaustibly conceivable, as many morally upright men have done in every age of atrocity, why do people

imprison God either in the language of politics or the vocabulary of sterile theology or the idiom of the most vulgar aspects of culture? Why do they behave, in God's name, like fiends? Unable to comprehend either the nature or the cause of the cruelty she witnesses, Lenny, breaks down, and cries: 'I have never cried this way before. It is how grown-ups cry when their hearts are breaking' (Sidhwa 1988: 254).

It is not surprising, therefore, that when there are riots in Lahore, Hari, and his friends do not turn to religion as guide or as source of consolation. Unnerved by violence, Hari chooses to convert to the faith of the religious gang which threatens his immediate survival. He cuts off his tuft of hair, gets circumcised, becomes a Muslim, changes his name from Hari to Himat Ali (a courageous follower of the Imam Ali). Re-baptized, he is not, as his new name might suggest (*himat* = courage), one of the courageous avatars of the faithful, but only a broken and weary incarnation of a Hindu gardener in a Parsi family. In the days of communal peace in Lahore, proper names, along with styles of dress, caste marks, or rhythms of speech, were ways of defining each human presence within an agnostic civil space historically created out of a tolerant regard for each other. After 1947 each of these identity-markers became dangerous counters in a new political battle.

The irony of the Hari/Himat Ali's situation becomes more corrosive when he discovers the body of his friend the masseur, a Muslim, who cherished his love for the Hindu ayah, Shanti, more than his religious faith, dumped in the dust by the same Muslim gangs he had sought to appease by converting to Islam. As he kneels in the dust, with a bewildered Parsi girl beside him, and weeps for his slaughtered Muslim friend, Hari/Himat Ali becomes a horrifying emblem of the atrocities of the partition.

Despite Hari's conversion, the moral geography of the home which had seemed so trustworthy, durable, and secure in the pre-partition days, becomes hallucinatory. Surrounded by a mob looking for bodies it can rape, abduct, or kill, Himat Ali must strip so that everyone can gaze at his circumcized penis and affirm that he has at last become 'a proper Muslim' (ibid.: 180). Indeed, contrary to many political theorists of the partition, most novelists who have written about those days have suggested that the religious and cultural differences upon which the partition demand was based had little to do either with a better knowledge of the divine that any particular community had or with grievous fault lines in the society's organization of itself. The partition

is portrayed, instead, as the result of something as trivial and venal as that which made the bodies of Hari or Himat the sites of *jihadi* struggles.

Lenny, the child protagonist of the novel, is unsettled not only by Hari's decision to surrender to theologically-inspired hooligans, but also by the sniggering satisfaction of his Muslim friends who join the laughter of the goons as they wrong a simple man. As with many such incidents recorded in partition fiction, and in empathy with the horrified Lenny, one is left wondering why those who joined the mob and shouted religious slogans as they stripped Hari/Himat, did not feel ashamed that their religious side had won such a poor, scared, and forked creature. Didn't they know that a religious man is one who says, in every circumstance, 'I will have mercy, and not sacrifice?' Would they have even understood Gandhi's advice to the Muslims in a similar situation that, for the greater glory of Islam, if there was a lone Hindu girl in their midst, they should encourage her to unfurl the tricolour and recite *ramdhun* (song about Lord Rama)? (Gandhi 1984, vol. 89: 119). Why did they not understand that the narcissism of difference, (Freud 1961: 61) which can survive only by humiliating those who are outside one's group, inevitably provokes counter-violence and contempt? But, then, since they were merely the fools of time, how else could they have understood the notions of *dharma* and *adharma* except in terms of victory and defeat?

Questions of Identity

In partition fiction, ordinary human beings, never aspire to be part of some exceptional religious group. They are self-conscious about the fact they live within a network of people with different religious convictions whose right to a share in their living spaces has to be acknowledged. Beyond that they are quite content to let the gods and their acolytes look after themselves and their sacred places.

What many characters in partition narratives say about their identity has the full assent of their soul because it is said in the midst of a very difficult time of murder and hate. And when their religious faith fails them, which it sometimes does, or when told that the foundations of their homes are weak because they have been built on nothing more substantial than illusions, they stubbornly refuse to leave their homes, and prefer to die. The priests and the politicians may have argued that

their present lives amongst various non-believers were only strung together by a long series of contingent events which were both ephemeral and meaningless. The characters themselves are, however, convinced that it was precisely those passing instances which had helped them make their moral selves and earn their sense of human destiny.

Perhaps, that is why fictional texts about the partition often read like a series of undifferentiated anecdotes in which nostalgia and lament are deeply fused. Emotionally, the anecdotal form and the sentimental tones of their tales have the feel of experience. Narratives that are causally linked, which emerge from a knowable past and move toward a possible future, can only be crafted within coherent, ongoing, culturally stable, and confident societies. A secure culture is not dependent, as Jerome Bruner tells us in his important book, *Acts of Meaning*, on arriving at a consensus or achieving reconciliation between conflicting versions of reality. An integrated society, self-consciously asserts that different truth-claims demand our attentive consideration and not our scorn and rejection. Those who cannot live with varied ways of thinking and imagining cease to live a life of culture.

Since the partition was an unexpected and a traumatic break in the moral, social, and political continuity of the subcontinent's cultural history, it made the novelists unsure about the narrative traditions still available to them. Intizar Husain, for instance, told me how difficult it has been for him to find a narrative form which would give shape to his sense that he still belongs to a tradition in which Hindu and Islamic modes of being are inextricable woven. Like Intizar Husain, other writers too discovered that they had suddenly, and without reason, fallen out of the morally-coherent narrative traditions of a community within which they could imagine different ways of acting, being, and striving toward meaning. Thus, contrary to communal thinkers, who gracelessly predicted glorious futures emerging from the equally glorious pasts of their own religious communities, the partition actually erased all sense of an available past and a possible future for almost everyone. Yet, it is important to note for the sake of better historical understanding, that the personal experiences of life in pre-partition India recorded by the novelists, underscore the fact that, by and large, people lived in clearly visible, viable, integrated, and meaning-making communities. In so doing their fictional texts call to question the grand narratives of the communal politicians and expose the brutality of their assumptions.

Memory and Homelessness

The fictional characters who refuse to migrate are forced to live in communities of memories and images without figuring out how to conduct their lives henceforth in the new reality that is taking shape—build a new home and think of themselves as citizens. Unfortunately, they do not have a self-consciously articulated political ethic to help them confront the violent and unpredictable society which has come into existence after the partition. If they wonder at all about their future, they merely console themselves with the thought that in politics the times of adversity are temporary. A less sentimental understanding of the moral reality of the times would have informed them that the defeat of evil days is always followed by its return. They would not, then, have been content to wait passively for better days. Instead, like satyagrahis, they would have actively chosen to live according to codes of compassion, refused to give in to self-pity, and prevented others from acting in self-righteous anger. Like many well-intentioned nationalist leaders of the time, they choose to watch and wait in the hope that they will not be humiliated and their homes will not be destroyed.

Maulana Azad declared, after the partition plan of 3 June 1947 was accepted, that the division was ‘only of the map of the country and not of the hearts of the people’, and added, ‘I am sure it is going to be a short-lived partition’ (French 1997: 306). And Nehru later told Leonard Mosely that in 1947, ‘We expected that the partition would be temporary, that Pakistan was bound to come back to us’.⁶ Even though, in retrospect, both Azad and Nehru seem to have been hopelessly wrong, one cannot help but sympathize with them—particularly with Azad who was systematically vilified by people whose claims to decency and religiosity were not always as apparent as his own. It is, however, unfair to say, as some critics have, that people like Azad and Nehru were either ‘naïve’, (ibid.: 344) or suffering from ‘self-delusion’⁷ because they were not in touch with the grassroots. Both had, like countless others, based their assessment of the abiding bonds between Hindus and Muslims on their own experiences of life before the politics of religious identity was orchestrated with the help of infatuated mobs. They, however, forgot that minor resentments of excited groups often become so vicious and nasty that they obscure all reason and sense.

Ordinarily, and in our daily lives, there are multiplicities of claims upon the self which often act as barriers against iniquity. But the self in a mob sees no other face but its own, feels no responsibility toward anyone but itself. It is not surprising, then, that apart from condemning barbarism and bemoaning the loss of traditional amity, neither Azad nor Nehru had well-thought-out ideas about the kind of disciplined ethical action that may be necessary to set the time right again. One of the few who understood that nostalgia when it confronts hate and murder can be paralyzing, that sentiment alone cannot console those who suffer, and that prayer is not sufficient to heal the grievous wounds of the partition, was Mahatma Gandhi. He made a singularly courageous and sustained effort to think about the moral consequences of the partition and the ways of rebuilding our civilizational home again—a home he called *swaraj*.

Yet, one of the great ironies of 1947 was that Gandhi, who had spent a lifetime trying to give his vision of 'home' a historical reality, was rendered utterly homeless by the partition. He suddenly felt unwanted, marginalized, stranded. Thus, at a prayer meeting in Delhi on 21 September 1947, when the crowd refused to let him recite verses from the Koran, he said:

Let me tell you that if I cannot do what my heart desires, I shall not feel happy to remain alive...when one's efforts do not bring forth results, one must dry up like a tree which does not bear fruits...That is the law of nature (Gandhi 1984, vol. 89: 213).

Since Gandhi thought that colonialism was a form of 'homelessness', a kind of moral and political wilderness, it is not surprising that he felt that by demanding a religious division of the country, by wrecking the integrity of its being, the nation had failed once more in 'founding' its home.

One can imagine that as he sat amidst sullen crowds at his prayer meetings after 1947, and saw the faces of people who were deeply humiliated, ashamed, and broken, he must have felt a great loneliness and despondency gather within him. Confronted with rage and foul invectives, he must have had to remind himself that the first and strangest lesson a satyagrahi must learn is that people are reckless when it comes to resisting the good, but never 'reckless' enough when they are called upon to resist evil. Yet, as if to add to the accumulating ironies about

the partition, the same people who had thrown stones at him and had refused to let him pray, whose fate had so shocked him that he had become a homeless wanderer amongst them, also urged him to help them find ways of making a home for themselves again; to help them, somehow, recover their sense of fair judgement and compassion again.

The advice Gandhi gave them was based on a few basic moral and political propositions. His first and most important assertion, during the prayer meetings, was that it is impossible for anyone to imagine a God, any God, who did not, under every circumstance, urge the good and forbid all that was cruel, violent, and ugly.

Thus, at a prayer meeting he said that if his formulation that 'God was good and real' had any meaning, then it followed that the notion of a 'Hindu and a Muslim India', so loudly proclaimed by some politicians, was nothing more than a pernicious 'superstition' (Gandhi 1984: 73). Temples and mosques, he added, were not the measure of God's work, and never could be. God, he asserted, was nothing more remarkable than a man who abides by the good. Such an understanding, he said, was all that was needed to rebuild homes and cultural habitats.

The great idea behind all his urgings was that 'home' is not a place which cherishes God, nor is it a place where men seek God; 'home' is rather a place which God cherishes; it is a place where God seeks man because the good abides there (*ibid.*: 73). God can, therefore, never inhabit a home haunted by the ghostly presences of those who had been disinherited by force, by *adharma*, because the good no longer shelters there. Indeed, Gandhi's conviction that neither the Hindus nor the Muslims can ever have an identity, a culture, or a nation unless their conduct towards themselves and each other is so clearly marked by elementary norms of civility that God is tempted to search for the spaces they create and abide in them,⁸ is exemplified in a variety of fictional texts.

Gandhi's prayer meetings for the refugees were not sermons. Instead, they were supplications—pleas for action designed to help them give substance to the notion of the 'good'. As a first step, he urged each of them to turn away from their own suffering self and direct their attention toward others who had also suffered. If they could do so, they would surely understand the simple truth that Hindus and Muslims comprehend pain in the same way. They would, then, cease to exchange wrong for wrong, and try harder to save their neighbors from being

wounded and their *bastis* from being ruined: 'I do not believe in meeting evil with evil. He who indulges in evil words and deeds turns brutal; he becomes senseless' (12 September 1947, Gandhi 1984: 173). The decision not to seek revenge, he added, was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the making of *swaraj*; it was not enough to lay the foundations of home. They had to do more, much more, to be considered worthy of being the inheritors of a home. It was morally imperative, he said, that Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs, for their own salvation, should neither leave their homes out of fear nor urge others to go away. Dharma, he said, demanded that those who had fled or had been forced out of their homes had to be invited back so that they could re-inhabit the places they had left behind (*ibid.*: 81). That, he said, was 'the only honourable way of living among men' (*ibid.*: 81), otherwise it was better to die.

It is not surprising that a vast majority of the refugees, who had occupied evacuee property, refused to pay heed to his advice and abused him. And, given the failure of our moral imagination, it is also not surprising that most of those who had migrated continued to feel that when they had abandoned their old homes they had also abandoned their real selves, their inherited civilizational being. They knew, as Ismat Chughtai says, that henceforth they would live in sorrow, haunted by memories of their lost homes:

It wasn't only that the country was split in two—bodies and minds were also divided. Moral beliefs were tossed aside and humanity was in shreds. Government officers and clerks along with their chairs, pens, and inkpots, were distributed like spoils of war... Those whose bodies were whole had hearts that were splintered. Families were torn apart. One brother was allotted to Hindustan, the other to Pakistan; the mother was in Hindustan, her offspring were in Pakistan; the husband was in Hindustan, his wife was in Pakistan. The bonds of relationship were in tatters, and in the end many souls remained behind in Hindustan while their bodies started off for Pakistan.⁹

The idea of the partition may have carried fine intimations of telos for the religious and political ideologue. But for the fiction writers who based themselves on ordinary and common experiences, however, it was nothing more than a mean, ungenerous, and grotesquely inaccurate idea of separate and religiously-defined civilizational habitats; an idea that left behind millions of people who were broken and deceived, bewildered, and homeless.

Conclusion: Examining the Difference between the Indian Subcontinent's Partition and Other Partitions

The Indian subcontinent was unique since the violence unleashed here during the partition years from 1946 to 1948 was unprecedented and unexpected. The experience of the partition continues to haunt not only because it was accompanied by a kind of barbaric religious conflict which no one had ever witnessed before, but also because, prior to the beginning of the 20th century, there is little evidence of a history of genocidal hatred between the different religious communities living here. Instead, there was an unstated and unselfconscious sense of participating in a composite society where religious groups were so tightly implicated in the lives, manners, myths, and even the forms of rituals of each other, that it was nearly always impossible to separate them into sharply distinguished and agnostically divided communal units. There were, of course, occasional instances of tension but they never fell below the usual realms of nastiness and stupidity in any civil and political society. The experience of living together was sufficiently secure and rooted to enable the communities to have social mechanisms for containing tensions and even outrage.

That is, perhaps, why there are hardly any communally-charged fictional texts written in the Indian subcontinent either before or immediately after the partition. I have argued this in considerable detail elsewhere. I am therefore surprised to find historians like Jonathan Greenberg suggest that there are close parallels between the Indian experience of the partition and the ethnic and religious hatreds in Europe, Middle East, Africa, or the Americas. Greenberg's position is not quite sustainable since it is based on a rather thin veneer of historical and literary evidence.¹⁰

In Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas, there was an ancient history of animosity between different religious groups like the Christians, Jews, and Muslims, as well as between a variety of ethnic and racial groups. Through much of the Christian centuries, the Jews were regarded as pariahs by Christians and forced to live in ghettos that were distinct in every way from the living spaces of the Christians (One could, of course, show that during much of the Old-Testament centuries, the Jewish search for a homeland was also dependent upon

the forcible expulsion of indigenous populations from their habitations.) Similarly there was, after the 10th century, an implacable rivalry between the Christians and Muslims for religion-defined borders. Both Jews and the Muslims were outside the organized, the familiar, and the well-bordered life-worlds of the Christians. The Jews were the targets of different forms of persecution and exclusion from all forms of civil, legal, and political lives of Europe. Jewish spaces were barricaded (as were the lands of the native and original inhabitants of the Americas and Australia by the white settlers), and a perpetual vigilance was mounted against the Jews lest their 'pollution' seep into the communities of the Christians.

That is why, in a story ('Red Oleander') by the fine Czech writer, Arnost Lustig (1990) one of the characters says that every child born of a Jewish mother had 'a dream about a land without fear, where no human cheek will be bruised by barbed wire'. Every now and then, when the economic lives of different nation-states became precarious, persecution of the Jews was a useful way for rulers to enable the citizens to vent their resentment against the Jews and so assuage, through various rites of pain, their own frustrations (consider poems like 'Babi Yar,' by Yevgeny Yevtushenko or 'Fugue of death', by Paul Celan describing the horrors inflicted on the Jews in Russia and Germany). Acts of transgression, real or imaginary, by the Jews could invite wrath of the community and Jewish dwellings could be burnt with impunity, and the inhabitants killed with callous gruesomeness. Hence, unlike the works of writers of the subcontinent, where every story about acts of religious vandalism and violence during the partition is marked by a sense of bewilderment, and nearly all protagonists long nostalgically for the home across the border they were forced to leave, there is almost no fictional text by any Jewish writer which carries hints of longing for villages and cities left behind.

Consider the exiled Jews from Poland in the works of Isaac Bashevis Singer. From the security of their exile in America or Israel, they have no reason to recall with sentimental longing the labyrinths of Warsaw's ghettos to which they were confined. The same is the case with children in Elie Wiesel's memoirs (for example, *Night*); or women in novels like William Styron's *Sophie's Choice* and Cynthia Ozick's *The Shawl*; or the old in David Grossman's *See Under: Love*. They have memories only of German soldiers throwing Jewish children into trucks, or of sending

the old down the path to the gas chambers. All that the survivors of the holocaust in Europe can legitimately hope for is an international recognition of Nazi crimes as crimes against humanity whose immediate causes may lie in economic distress and political folly, but which become possible because there was a long history of anti-Semitism in Germany and Europe which made the holocaust possible, and intellectually and morally acceptable. There is, not surprisingly, no story about the holocaust which speaks of Jewish survivors nostalgic for their 'real home' in places like Germany, Hungary, Australia, Russia, or Poland.

The history of mutual suspicion in Europe between Christians and Muslims, especially after the Renaissance (when for a brief interregnum there was a respectful dialog between them as represented by Raphael's painting, *The School of Athens*, in the Vatican which shows the great Arabic scholar Averroes standing beside Socrates and Aristotle), is also the stuff of common history often used by novelists to bear testimony to their own times of intolerance and consequent genocides.¹¹ The same is the story of ethnic atrocities across Africa in recent times. (Philip Gourevitch, *We wish to Inform You that tomorrow We will be Killed with Our Families*).¹² In contrast, the partition of the Indian subcontinent was an aberration in a civilization which had rarely marked for torture and inquisitional fires, any of its people as heretics or Satan's minions. The civilizational virtue of India was its endless capacity to engage in dialog with all that was different and to listen to the difference with respectful attention. It assumed a moral world to which everyone belonged, independent of religious or ethnic identities. That alone explains why stories of the partition of India register the shock of the partition when it occurred and the greater sense of shame at the relentless violence which accompanied it.

NOTES

1. In, 'Equality of Religions', Gandhi strongly repudiated Maulana Mohammad Ali's formulation that 'a believing Mussalman, however bad his life, is better than a good Hindu' (Gandhi 1984, vol. 49: 19). Speaking about religious conversions to C. F. Andrews, Gandhi insisted that it was important not only to tolerate the other but to give him 'equal respect'.
2. Intizar Husain 1995: 97. All references to the novel from this English translation are included in the text. The novel was originally published in Urdu in 1979.
3. For a discussion of the term *anrsamasya*, see, Hildebeitel 2002: 177–213.

4. Imitating the symbolic patterns in Koranic literature, in Intizar Husain's fiction natural calamities are prophesies of moral collapse. See, for instance, his stories 'Platform' and 'Barium Carbonate', in Husain: 2002.
5. All subsequent references to the novel in the text are from Sidhwa 1988.
6. Quoted by Mushirul Hasan in Sattar and Gupta 2002: 173.
7. Ajit Bhattacharya quoted by Mushirul Hasan in *ibid.*: 173.
8. Simone Weil says: 'The idea of God going in quest of man is something unfathomably beautiful and profound. Decadence is shown as soon as it is replaced by the idea of man going in quest of God'. (Wiel 2003: 46).
9. Ismat Chughtai quoted by Mushirul Hasan 2002: 5–6.
10. Greenberg's evidemnce is largely based on an uncritical acceptance Ian Talbot's account of what the fictional works of Intizar Husain, Krishna Sobti, Bhisham Sahni, etc. contain (Talbot 1999).
11. Texts by writers as diverse as Washington Irving in the 19th century (*The Alhambra*) and Ivo Andrics in the later half of the 20th century (*The Bridge on the Drina* and *The Bosnian Story*) are commentaries and testimonies to the *longue duree* of distrust and complete lack of respect for the human in the relationship between the Christians and the Muslims. One could also point to the excellent work of the Greek film-maker Theo Angelopolous documenting this history.
12. The film *Hotel Rwanda* is partly based on this book.

REFERENCES

- Ahmad, Nafis. 1947. *The Basis of Pakistan*. Calcutta: Thacker and Spink.
- Ashraf, Syed Mohammad. 1994. 'Separated from the Flock', in Alok Bhalla (ed.), 1994. *Stories About the Partition of India*, vol. 1, pp. 15–17. New Delhi: Harper Collins.
- Bachelard, Gaston. 1964. *Poetics of Space* (trans. by Maria Jolas). New York: Orion Press.
- Badiuzzaman. 1975. *Chhako Ki Vapsi*. New Delhi: Rajkamal Paperbacks.
- Bayly, Christopher. 1998. 'The Pre-history of Communalism? Religious Conflict in India, 1700–1860', in *Origins of Nationality in South Asia: Patriotism and Ethical Government in the Making of Modern India*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bhalla, Alok (ed.). 1994. *Stories About the Partition of India* (3 vols.). New Delhi: Harper Collins.
- Bhardwaj, Anjali. 2004. 'Partition of India and Women's Experience: A Study of Women as Sustainers of their Families in Post-Partition Delhi', *Social Scientist*, 32: 5–6.
- Bruner, Jerome. 1990. *Acts of Meaning*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Buber, Martin. 1957. *Pointing the Way: Collected Essays* (trans. by Maurice Friedman). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Cavell, Stanley. 1988. *In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism*. Chicago: University Press of Chicago.

- Chugtai, Ismat. 2001. *My Friend, My Enemy: Essays, Reminiscences, Portraits* (trans. by Tahira Naqvi). New Delhi: Kali for Women.
- Cleary, Joe. 2002. *Literature, Partition and the Nation-State. Culture and Conflict in Ireland, Israel and Palestine* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Datta, V. N. 2000. 'Punjabi Refugees and the Urban Development of Greater Delhi', in Mushirul Hasan (ed.), *Inventing Boundaries: Gender, Politics and the Partition of India*, pp. 267–86. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Eliade, Mircea. 1959. *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion*. (trans. by Willard R. Trask). New York: Harper and Row.
- French, Patrick. 1997. *Liberty or Death*. New Delhi: Harper Collins.
- Freud, Sigmund. 1961. *Civilisation and its Discontents* (trans. by James Strachey). New York: W. W. Norton.
- Gandhi, M. K. *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*. Ahmadabad: Navajivan Press, 1984. Vol. 89.
- Hasan, Mushirul (ed.). 1994. *India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- . (ed.). 2000. *Inventing Boundaries: Gender, Politics and the Partition of India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Hasan, Mushirul. 2002. *Partition Narratives*, Academy of Third World Studies, Monograph no. 4, New Delhi: Jamia Millia Islamia.
- Hiltebeitel, Alf. 2002. *Rethinking the Mahabharata*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Husain, Intizar. 1995. *Basti* (trans. by Francis W. Pritchett). New Delhi: Harper Collins.
- . 2002. *A Chronicle of the Peacocks* (trans. by Alok Bhalla and Vishwamitter Adil). New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Jalal, Ayesha. 2001. *Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam Since 1850*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Kundera, Milan. 1988. *The Art of the Novel* (trans. by Linda Asher). New York: Harper and Row.
- Lustig, Arnost. 1990. 'Red Oleander', in Arnost Lustig, *Street of Lost Brothers*, p. 186. Evanston: Northwest University Press.
- Manto, Saadat Hasan. 1993. *Dastavez* (editors, Balraj Menara and Sarad Dutt). New Delhi: Rajkamal Prakashan.
- Memon, Mohammad Umar. 1991. 'Sh'ite Consciousness in a Recent Urdu Novel: Intizar Husain's *Basti*', in Christopher Shackle (ed.), *Urdu and Muslim South Asia: Studies in Honour of Ralph Russell*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- . 1995. 'Introduction', Intizar Husain, *Basti*. New Delhi: Harper Collins.
- Qureshi, I.H. 1965. *The Struggle for Pakistan*. Karachi: University of Karachi.
- Sattar, S. and Indira Baptista Gupta (eds). 2002. *Pangs of Partition*, 2 vols. New Delhi: Manohar.
- Sheikh, Farzana. 1994. 'Muslims and Political Representation in Colonial India: The Making of Pakistan', in Mushirul Hasan (ed.). *India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization*, pp. 81–101. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Sidhwa, Bapsi. 1988. *Ice-Candy Man*. New Delhi: Penguin.

Tagore, Rabindranath. 1988 (1922). *Creative Unity*. Madras: Macmillan.

Talbot, Ian. 1999. 'Literature and the Human Drama of 1947 Partition', in Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh (eds), *Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Weil, Simone. 2002. *Letter to a Priest*, trans. by A. F. Wills. London: Routledge.

A Homeland Torn Apart

Partition in a Palestinian Refugee Camp

NINA GREN

This chapter attempts to understand the experience of partition as an ongoing process rather than an accomplished fact. Since 1948, Israeli–Palestinian relations have been marked by a process of alternating distance and closeness between the two national groups. In the processual nature of the Israeli/Palestinian partition, land and belonging have become thoroughly disputed. If Israel/Palestine can be said to have undergone multiple partitions, it is worth exploring how grand narratives interact in diverse ways with the lived experiences of people. It should be noted that Palestinians do not use the word partition when relating to their experiences since 1948. They use words such as death, disaster, colonialism, occupation, to describe this process. The word partition is hence used for analytical purposes. The current separation wall may be seen as an extension of the process of partition such that it evokes notions of mobility and restrictions on movement.

This chapter raises a series of questions about partition in Israel/Palestine as an organizing principle. First, it argues that this oscillating process between partition and interaction leads to an ambiguous perception of borders and homeland among Palestinians. Based on field-work conducted in a Palestinian local community on the West Bank in 2003–2004, the chapter focuses on Palestinian perceptions and the political implications of this ambiguity. Second, the ways in which the perceptions of homeland and borders as well as local understanding of ‘rootedness’ affect social relations within the Palestinian nation, also need exploration. Ethnographic evidence illustrates how Palestinian grand narratives about land and borders, which are expressed in metaphors

and notions about dispersal and imprisonment, influence and interact in diverse ways with the lived experiences of the Palestinian refugees in the Dheishe camp, the fieldwork location outside Bethlehem.

The Dheishe Camp

Dheishe is situated on a hillside about 12 km south of Jerusalem on the occupied West Bank. It is the largest of three refugee camps in the Bethlehem area, both in terms of population and geography. The camp was established by the UN in 1952 and houses some 10,000 registered refugees. The majority of the population comprises children and youngsters, and the camp residents constitute four different generations. The people in Dheishe claim to originate from more than 40 different villages south of Jerusalem, inside today's Israel, reckoning 'original village' through the patriline. With other refugee camps, Dheishe initiated a new refugee movement in 1996, reiterating the right of return to their home villages at the other side of the border (Badil 2000: 17).

Dheishe has a long history of political activism and has frequently been depicted, by both camp residents and Israelis, as a hardcore camp that offers stubborn resistance to the occupation.¹ The camp has been described as having strong connections with the political left when Islamic parties used to be comparatively weak (Rosenfeld 2004). During fieldwork, the tendency was quite the opposite. Like in other parts of the occupied territories, Islamic parties were growing, the smaller Leftist parties had lost support, but Fateh, the leading party in the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), had also managed to consolidate its power base in the camp. During the latest Palestinian uprising, *al aqsa intifada* starting in September 2000, the camp residents have been subjected to mass arrests, house demolitions, and targeted assassinations by snipers and helicopters. Fear of the Israeli army and disillusionment with the Palestinian leadership has, moreover, diminished political activity.

For male residents in the camp, employment as construction workers across the Israeli border has emerged as an economic necessity. With this dependence on Israel, unemployment rose dramatically when the political situation prevented entry, as was the case during the fieldwork period. There was, also, a general decline in the local economy around Bethlehem due to diminishing tourism as well as restricted

movement between towns on the West Bank (OCHA and UNSCO 2004). Taken together, this led to severe economic hardship for many households in the camp. Although economic means differed, many families were observed to have difficulties in feeding their members.

Palestinian camp refugees have experienced the process of partition in a more direct personal way and for a longer period of time than many other Palestinians. Like other Palestinian refugee camps, Dheishe was politicized, violence-ridden, and economically deprived. It comprised a community where memories of loss and violence had been consciously fuelled over the years, and everyday life was understood and explained in political terms. Due to these experiences, Dheisheans' perspective on partition might be more relentless than other Palestinians', especially when it comes to a felt necessity to heal the country through the implementation of the right of return to their home villages.

In spite of the camp's grand rumor of housing fearless resisters, the most striking difference between Dheishe and other West Bank refugee camps was the frequent contact between residents in Dheishe and visitors, foreign journalists, peace activists, volunteers, tourists, or pilgrims. The fact that people in Dheishe were relatively used to meeting foreigners worked to my advantage during fieldwork, which was carried out for a total of 12 months in 2003 and 2004. During that period, I stayed with a family in the camp, which allowed me not only to interview the residents but also to observe daily interactions in Dheishe. The fieldwork period constituted a new and more militarized phase of the Palestinian struggle toward statehood. In such a situation, Dheishe as a politicized site was an interesting place to revisit. I had carried out an earlier minor field study in this camp before the new *intifada* erupted, and some contacts that had been established several years earlier proved to be essential in a situation that was frequently characterized by mistrust and fear.

The Politics of Partition

In 1947, the newly established UN presented a partition plan (*taqsiim*) for Palestine.² Since it divested the Palestinians of most of their land, it is not surprising that Palestinians refused to accept this plan, although in retrospect, the partition plan would have given them much more

land than they are likely to get in any peace agreement today. At the time, most Palestinians strongly opposed these plans and demanded national independence.³ The result of the war between Israel and its Arab neighbors in 1948 was indeed partition, although partition of another kind than the one the UN had envisioned. There was no independent Palestinian state, but a much larger Israeli state than suggested, and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were controlled by Jordan and Egypt respectively. The violent events in 1948, named *al-Naqba* or the disaster, by Palestinians, and the War of Independence by the Israelis, also meant ethnic cleansing in the words of Benvenisti (2000). Among Palestinian refugees, *al-Naqba* is remembered as a deeply traumatic event implying loss of land, livelihood, and social relations.

The Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, meant an 'opening up' in a way; for instance, it became possible for Palestinians to resume social relations with family and relatives inside Israel and to work for Israeli employers. This was due to a decision by the Israeli defence minister at the time, to integrate the newly occupied territories and to implement a policy of 'open bridges' (Gazit 1995: 176). This meant that Israel linked roads, electricity, water, and phone lines in the West Bank to the Israeli networks. Korn (2003) has described how return attempts by Palestinian refugees in the early 1950s became a political crime according to Israeli law that labeled such refugees as infiltrators. However, the occupation and the policy of 'open bridges' gave the refugees new opportunities to visit their lost homes. Slyomovics (1998: 14) describes such return visits as a 20th century variant of pilgrimage and as a way for exiled Palestinians to go 'from the visionary to the concrete'. Refugees who visit their lost villages have been known to want to touch and feel the ground or the stones of their razed houses; to eat the herbs that grow on their lands, and so on. Such return visits to original villages inside Israel have been a way to re-establish links with the land and with the past. In my experience, return visits are also an important pedagogic means to make younger generations of refugees aware of their history and to support the right of return.⁴ But for many Palestinians, the occupation meant not only closeness, but also implied extended control, including political oppression, imprisonment, and torture in Israeli prisons (Rosenfeld 2004). Moreover, as we shall see, the differences between people in the occupied territories and Palestinians inside Israel, have become increasingly visible over the years (Bornstein 2002a).

During the first *intifada*, starting in 1987, Bornstein (2002b: 207) describes how a partial border was re-established out of Israeli fear and altered Palestinian policies:

Despite continued Israeli settlement in the Occupied Territories, a renewed border was made by (a) a fear that kept most Israelis out, (b) an economic boycott that refused Israeli goods, and (c) an effort to create an internal unity through patriotism and the preservation of Palestinian culture.

Except for Palestinian efforts to boycott Israeli products that failed in the long run (the occupied territories are today filled with Israeli goods), the border and boundaries between Israelis and Palestinians are still the manifestations of fear and the attempts to create national unity on both sides.

Since March 1993, the Israeli state has been erecting checkpoints⁵ thereby creating a de facto separation between Israelis and Palestinians, ending almost 25 years of 'open bridges' (ibid.). This process towards partition was of course informed by the two-state solution envisioned in the Oslo agreements and has, moreover, been accelerating during *al aqsa intifada*. Partition has lately been further enforced by the building of a hotly-debated wall, along with problems for Palestinians to get work permits in Israel, fines and imprisonments for trespassers, and so on. Also, Israeli Jewish citizens are affected by the politics of partition of the Israeli state; it is now illegal for Israeli Jews to visit many parts of the occupied territories for 'security reasons'. During fieldwork, foreigners were occasionally forbidden to enter the occupied territories by the Israeli army. Recently, even Israeli Palestinians were denied entrance to the West Bank (Haas 2005). Today, partition or separation has for the Palestinians, and to a lesser extent also for others who try to move in the politicized landscape of Israel/Palestine, frequently come to mean immobility. Israelis and Palestinians have reached a situation where it is no longer possible to talk about partition and separation without also discussing issues concerning mobility.

The Homeland as a Prison: Controlled Life and Movement

The prison has frequently been used as a metaphor for the Palestinian condition (Lindholm with Hammer 2003: 92). The land itself is said to

be imprisoned and Israeli–Palestinian writers, that is Palestinians living in Israel, have been described as ‘captive writers’. The prison metaphor aptly describes the state of affairs for Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, implying that Israel is controlling life and movement. Also, camp life is often portrayed as a prison. Camps in area C that are under full control of Israel, still have military posts by their entrances. Dheishe was even surrounded by a fence in the first *intifada*. My informant Mustafa vividly remembered how as a young teenager at that time, he had climbed this fence while being chased by soldiers. His memories evoked different images of imprisonment, since he had also spent several years in different Israeli prisons. The use of the prison as a metaphor for life acquires this dimension considering the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who have been imprisoned in Israeli jails over the years.⁶ According to a study carried out in the early 1990s, 85 per cent of the families in Dheishe had experienced the political imprisonment of at least one family member (Rosenfeld 2004: 197). During fieldwork, I sometimes heard stories about former prisoners who at times locked themselves at home, which seemed to be a symbolic way to re-establish the isolation cell. According to Punamäki, 28 per cent of the Palestinian former prisoners reported withdrawal and avoiding association with people as a behavioral change after imprisonment (Punamäki 1988: 92). Accordingly, the ‘imprisoned homeland’ carries a number of different connotations in Palestinian society. Moreover, present Israeli politics of restricted movement, further reinforced experiences of imprisonment among Palestinians. Not only camp refugees, but all Palestinians in the occupied territories were affected by Israeli politics, although many camp refugees were particularly vulnerable owing to economic deprivation and problems with the Israeli security services.

Alongside the notion of imprisonment, it was common to hear Palestinians turn the argument around by claiming that Israel was imprisoning itself. Contrary to what one might think, the building of the separation wall or the apartheid wall by Israel, as well as many other restrictions on Palestinians’ mobility, did not automatically reinforce the camp inhabitants’ sense of being imprisoned. Although the occupied territories were literally becoming a prison, the claim by many camp residents was rather that the Israelis were the ones isolating themselves and that a Palestinian who wanted to go inside Israel would always find a way to do so. To my surprise, the prison metaphor was

frequently used for Israel. People with different political opinions seemed to agree on this point. Ahmed who belonged to the Leftist party PFLP said: 'I believe our culture is stronger than [the Israelis'] culture. [...] They live in a ghetto, they are closing'. Meanwhile, Abdalla, who tended to support the Islamic parties recounted another story confirming Israel's ongoing isolation:

A taxi driver was driving a Jewish guy while they were celebrating the Israeli Independence Day and this Jew was making fun of them and he said 'it was our borders in Lebanon, [in] Sinai we used to be and now we are putting up walls inside Israel and they celebrate the Independence Day'. [...] The Jews in [ancient times] they haven't built [their state] on the beach. [They] built in Jerusalem and on the hills of Nablus. [...] They are giving up these territories now and they have built a wall around them.

Abdalla here refers to what Segal and Weizman (2003) call the paradox of Zionist spatiality, that is while seeking return to the 'promised land', Israelis mainly inhabited the coastal areas and the plains instead of the Biblical Judean hills, thus reversing the settlement pattern of Biblical times. Segal and Weizman argue that the Israeli settlement project in occupied West Bank is trying to resolve this paradox. It is interesting to note that until recently, only a few Israeli mountain settlements were 'surrounded by walls or fences, as settlers argued that their homes must form a continuity with 'their' landscapes, that they were not foreign invaders in need of protection, but rather that the Palestinians were those who needed to be fenced in' (ibid.: 85). Indeed, the building of the wall seemed to increase already ambiguous understandings of homeland and borders among both Palestinians and Israelis.⁷

Shiriin, a 21-year-old student at the Open University in Bethlehem, was one of the camp inhabitants who seemed to deny the consequences of the checkpoints and the wall. Turning to a nationalistic discourse about the strong Palestinian fighter who will never be defeated, she explained:

This is what [the Israelis] believe, that with checkpoints, this will bring them security and peace. But for the Palestinians, no matter how many checkpoints there are, if they want to do something, they will do it. [...] I saw a picture in the newspaper, I don't remember very well, but I think it was in an Israeli newspaper, that at some place the Palestinians brought a caterpillar and they transferred the workers across the wall, very early in the morning, from this

caterpillar to another one [at the other side of the wall]. And they go and work. [...] [It is] just to give an example of how Palestinians can overcome and fight these things and the wall will not limit their movements. [...] I say that maybe this will limit our movements, but not completely. If a martyr wants to go he will find a way and go.

When my field assistant and I suggested that the consequences of the wall might actually be more serious than that, Shireen did not seem convinced. This way of arguing seemed to constitute a strategy of denial, or a way to ascribe political agency to Palestinians while diminishing the power of the Israelis. Other camp residents held the view that if the Israelis wanted security they would have built the wall on the Green Line, that is the borders after the ceasefire of 1948, which would have meant a separation into two states. They also said that the aim of the wall was to create a feeling of symbolic security for Israelis.

There were, moreover, gender differences in the way the camp residents dealt with immobility and the way Israeli politics affected different individuals. Dalal cynically said, 'I don't go anywhere anyway—let them finish the wall!' This comment reflects her own position as an unmarried woman in a family with quite traditional views about women's mobility. She normally did not leave the camp, except when she had a good reason to do so. When she had found employment in the neighboring town of Bayt Jalla, she went to work daily and afterwards returned straight to the camp. Dalal only occasionally went shopping or visiting a friend or her sister in Bethlehem. In addition, like many other camp inhabitants, she had not been to Jerusalem since the new uprising started in the year 2000, as she did not have a permit to pass the checkpoint. In this way, culturally imposed restrictions on women's mobility coexisted with politically imposed restrictions.

On the other hand, the view from both Palestinians and Israelis is that of Palestinian men, rather than women, as the main political fighters/terrorists. Despite the recent emergence of female suicide bombers, Israelis tend to fear Palestinian men more than women and Palestinians expect Palestinian men rather than women to fight for their nation. Because of these gendered political roles, women could move more easily within the restricted landscape of the West Bank. Some married women from Dheishe even managed to work illegally in Jerusalem, having taken over the main responsibility as breadwinners for their families.

The restrictions on movement also affected camp inhabitants of different ages differently. Some elderly camp refugees⁸ went illegally to pray in *Al aqsa* mosque in Jerusalem on a regular basis. It was clear that there was also a space for the elderly, who were not understood as a threat by Israeli soldiers at checkpoints. At the time of fieldwork, it was easy to observe that Israeli politics at border crossings and checkpoints often aimed to create insecurity, more than to uphold a strict control of the border. Since people never knew if they would get through or how long a journey would take, this arbitrariness managed to create much anxiety and fear.

Contrary to Shiriin and others like her, Suleiman, who sometimes tried to walk around the checkpoints to reach his work in Jerusalem and therefore kept abreast about the progress of the wall, said: '[I will] only [be able to go] with a permission. It will be over. After the wall [is finished] there will not be any [possibilities to go to Jerusalem]'. When my field assistant asked him where he would find food for his four children, Suleiman answered with resignation: 'God will help. I don't know'. More acutely than in many years earlier, the politics of partition was affecting livelihood opportunities in the daily existence of camp inhabitants.

The Notion of 'One Country'

Geographically, Palestinians tend to consider the 'historical Palestine', that is the area of the British Mandate, as their true homeland. An example of the prevailing perception of Palestine as corresponding to Palestine of 1948, is women's embroidered maps. In a Palestinian saloon, that is the room where guests are received, one may often find embroidered maps of Palestine on the walls, with the borders prior to 1948 and with Arabic site names on it. Israeli towns are strikingly absent on this kind of map. The notion of Palestine as one country has clearly been reinforced and maintained by the process of Palestinian nation-building.⁹

That Palestine corresponds to the British Mandate goes without saying in the Palestinian community, but has become more complicated since the Oslo process during the 1990s which clearly stated that a long-term peace must involve two separated nation-states on the territory of Palestine. This envisioned sharing of the land created cleavages

in the Palestinian community and was one reason for opposition to the Oslo agreement. One of my informants in Dheishe, Abu Amir, was a man in his early fifties and a member of the Palestinian Left, who had spent many years in Israeli prison. He commented on the complex issues of borders, homeland, and Palestinian statehood in the political situation in 2003–4:

I accept the Israelis or the Jews in this country. I accept a Jewish state in this country. But the idea is two states, two peoples. And our Palestinian state will be built [according] to [the] 1967 borders. But it is [gone], it disappeared this idea. Which state are they talking about? Can you imagine the borders of this state? It is funny, really.

According to Abu Amir, there is obviously only one country, but two people are disagreeing about whom this country belongs to, how it can be shared, or who will rule it. This reflects a more general view among both Israelis and Palestinians. For instance, a recent study (Weiss 2004: 73) shows that neither Israeli nor Palestinian schoolbooks distinguish between Israeli and Palestinian territories, illustrating that two nations claim the same geographical territory. Moreover, although Abu Amir could imagine himself living in a Palestinian state side by side with an Israeli one, during my fieldwork period, with all its restrictions on movement, it became more and more unlikely that a viable Palestinian state can ever be established.

Furthermore, people in Dheishe often pointed out that many Israelis also thought of the land as one country; camp residents would say that 'Israelis think of all our land as part of Israel'. In this view, Israel's real intention was to grab all Palestinian land. The desperation of my informants was evident when they told me that the ongoing Israeli politics was a 'hidden transfer', trying to make life in the occupied territories as difficult as possible so that the Palestinians would eventually give up and leave the country.¹⁰ In this way, Israel could take over all land without its inhabitants. This fear did not arise out of the blue, since there had been a reemergence of discussions about transfer in Israeli right-wing circles during *al aqsa intifada* (Lindholm and Hammer 2003). As proof of the real Israeli intentions to create a greater Israel, Palestinians sometimes showed me an Israeli coin of 10 agarot with a map of Israel, that not only includes the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but also parts of Jordan, Syria, all the way to the Euphrates river. For many people in Israel/Palestine, notions of homeland and statehood did not coincide.

The notion of the homeland as one has implications for Palestinians' everyday lives, and for how Palestinians perceive construction work for Israeli employers. For many men in the camp, employment as construction workers both across the Israeli border and in settlements in the occupied territories, has been an economic necessity, even if a dilemma in political and moral terms (Bornstein 2002: 49; Rothenberg 2004). To build Israeli houses is a way to help Israeli localizing strategies, a way to establish Israeli 'rootedness' and physical facts of presence and belonging to the land. According to Tamari (1981: 49), Palestinian workers were well aware of the resentment in nationalist circles against their employment in Israel, but still chose this work because the salaries were higher and the atmosphere was more relaxed. But is it considered worse and more politically dubious, to work at constructing a settlement in the occupied territories, that is an illegal settlement according to international law, than to build a house in the Israeli town of Tel Aviv? For many residents in Dheishe, there was little to choose between these options. They argued that both worksites are on Palestinian land, even though some might claim that there was a difference for strategic purposes; in order to get a Palestinian state in the occupied territories it was important to keep the distinction, by not working in a settlement. During fieldwork, unemployment in the camp had risen dramatically because the Israeli labor market across the border was more or less closed. Many households without income, could not feed their members and these families could not always afford to think about the political correctness of their choice. Some Palestinians were even building the wall between the West Bank and Israel.

The unity of the Palestinian nation had also been kept together by political organizations (especially through the PLO), by political ideologies, and by the struggle to regain the homeland. Struggle and suffering have been two key metaphors for the Palestinian condition. In Dheishe, people frequently recounted how they used to be 'like one hand' in the camp, especially during the first *intifada*. The camp refugees also described themselves as belonging to a 'community of fate' with shared experiences of suffering and struggle since *al-Naqba*. Sometimes this 'community of fate' was extended by the camp inhabitants to include all Palestinians who had suffered, although in different ways. This sense of unity is, however, consistently felt to be endangered.

A Homeland Torn Apart and Recreated

At the same time as the homeland is understood and politically pronounced as one country corresponding to the British Mandate, it is difficult to ignore the fragmenting effects of the process of partitions. The experiences of deprivation, violence, and occupation have further created differences among Palestinians. The Palestinian homeland is remembered as having been torn apart in 1948. There are, however, constant attempts to recreate the nation and bridge differences between Palestinians, for instance by marriage strategies between Palestinians with different legal statuses.

Moreover, in the political situation during my fieldwork, marked by hopelessness and the fear of violence, many camp inhabitants leaned toward religion and hoped for a healing of the homeland by heavenly intervention. Camp residents frequently referred to the Koran to underline their belief that Israel would vanish sooner or later. Layla expressed her hopes that Palestine would one day be united, and that unity also included the implementation of the refugees' right of return to their home villages:

The Koran says we shall return, there are proofs of that. [...] Even if you lose hope, but Palestine shall return. This is what the Koran says, and it also says 'Israel will grow and reach very high, but [its] destiny will be [to go] down'. There are proofs in the Koran that Palestine will return. Besides, what was taken by force will be regained by force.¹¹

The process of partitions implied social divisions, notably divided kin groups, dispersed villages, tensions between refugees and residents, between Christians and Muslims, and between diaspora and those who stayed behind. Palestine is perceived as an internally divided nation. As mentioned earlier, Palestinians refer to the flight in 1948 as *al-Naqba*, the disaster, which is remembered as a loss of social relations; loved ones being killed, and people from the same village or the same *hamuule* (patrilineal descent group) being spatially dispersed. My host family had, as a consequence of the politics of partition, lost contact with its kin group remaining inside Israel. At the same time, processes to counteract fragmentation were at work, the dispersed members of this *hamuule* who had ended up on the West Bank still constituted a

functioning kin group; for instance, when a relative living in another West Bank refugee camp passed away, the West Bank part of the hamuule collected money to support his family.¹²

Al-Naqba also created a Palestinian diaspora (see Lindholm and Hammer 2003). Most of my informants have relatives abroad, in Jordan and Syria, in the Gulf countries, or in Europe and the US. But 1948 was only the beginning of this dispersal of family and nation. The war and the occupation in 1967 forced a large part of the camp inhabitants to flee once more, this time to Jordan. Many refugees have also left the country to find work abroad over the years; most of those migrant workers have gone to the Gulf states. The remittances from the migrants have been an important financial support for many families in Dheishe (Rosenfeld 2004), but it is a diminishing phenomenon. During fieldwork, few people seemed to receive money from abroad. Facing increasing difficulties to get visas to other countries as well as permits from the Israeli authorities to pass the Allenby Bridge to Jordan (not to mention going through Israel proper), it was difficult for Palestinians to leave the country during *al aqsa intifada*. We might say that the restrictions on movement out of the country have halted the dispersal of Palestinians, even though many who had the possibility to leave, actually did so.¹³ Approximately one-tenth of Christian Palestinians from the Bethlehem area have left for various Western countries (OCHA and UNSCO 2004).¹⁴

The relations between Palestinians in the occupied territories and those in the diaspora are often ambiguous. For people in Dheishe, 'the diaspora' sometimes connoted betrayal, lack of suffering as well as loss of culture and roots (see Hammer 2005; Lindholm and Hammer 2003). Palestinians, who, after many years abroad forget the Arabic language or children growing up in exile who have difficulties feeling a sense of belonging to their parents' country, were often seen as tragic cases. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is also pursued in demographic terms; the number of members of the respective communities is therefore important in claims of 'belonging' to the land. Furthermore, to stay on in Palestine, to be steadfast, *sumud*, is part of the Palestinian effort to resist Israeli politics. On the other hand, condemning Palestinians in exile was not always easy, since many of them were my informants' relatives, and to say something negative about relatives is impolite in Palestinian society. Samar, a 33-year-old housewife whose younger brother had

left the country, also acknowledged that the purpose of a person's exile modifies the assessment of those who stayed behind:

When I run away because I'm bored here, bored with the fight, the soldier[s], or even if I can't find food to eat or water to drink, and all I think of is having a nationality other than the Palestinian nationality [that] is one thing. But when I go to study and bring back something that helps me and helps [...] to develop my country [that] is something else.

To leave 'Palestine' for a good purpose, such as accomplishing an education, was accordingly acceptable, at least if the person intended to return to develop the country. The financial investments from the diaspora, especially in the Ramallah area, were also positively recognized by some. So was the fact that many Palestinians tended to live transnational lives between Palestine and another country, going back and forth.¹⁵

Today there are Palestinians with different statuses and different rights; there are Palestinians living inside Israel with Israeli citizenship, Jerusalemites with Jerusalem ID cards;¹⁶ stateless refugees in the Middle East, Palestinians in the occupied territories with Palestinian passports; Palestinians in the occupied territories with foreign passports and Israeli tourist visas; Palestinians in exile outside the homeland carrying passports of their host country, and so on. These kinds of different legal statuses of Palestinians strengthen the notion of a homeland divided or torn apart. In Dheishe, there were a number of Palestinians who had returned from Jordan or other Arab countries with family reunification programs (*lamm shamel*), but also Palestinians who had returned illegally. Moreover, several women in the camp were not refugees, but had settled to live with their husbands' family in Dheishe, in accordance with the preferred patrilocal residence pattern.

The displacement and occupation resulting from the ambiguous politics of partition probably also reinforced divisions between Christian and Muslim Palestinians. The camp refugees who are Muslims, recounted that they had frequently encountered hostility from Christian local residents in the Bethlehem area in the 1950s. Prejudices about camp refugees were still common among my acquaintances in Bethlehem. Some inhabitants in Bethlehem asked where I washed my clothes or where I ate, since they supposed that refugees were not clean enough, assuming that this was the major obstacle for me living in the camp.¹⁷

Christian Palestinians also seemed to have fewer problems with Israeli authorities than Muslim Palestinians. For instance, Christians living in the Bethlehem area were given a collective right to go to Jerusalem during Christian holidays on a number of occasions during my fieldwork. On Muslim holidays, the Israeli authorities denied Muslims permission to go to pray in Al aqsa mosque in Jerusalem and tried to stop anyone who attempted to go there illegally (OCHA and UNSCO 2004). In addition to being Muslims, camp inhabitants had often experienced longer and more frequent prison sentences than other Palestinians; those sentences served as additional obstacles in obtaining permits from the Israeli authorities.

Another division in the Palestinian community is between people in the occupied territories and Palestinians inside Israel. The differences that have developed between these two groups encompass a broad range of areas of daily life, from socioeconomic conditions to dress codes. These distinctions often refer to a discourse of modern versus traditional¹⁸ but even though the lives of Palestinians in the territories and inside Israel do differ, this is also the case within each of these groups.

However, social bonds are also reestablished across the border, notably through intermarriages between Israeli Palestinians and Palestinians in the occupied territories. These marriages open up new opportunities socially and economically, especially in the current restricted situation. In the extended family I stayed with, there were several female in-laws from Jerusalem, with Jerusalem ID cards. For instance, Ghada, who was married to Uncle Marwan, came from a village outside Jerusalem.¹⁹ Ghada's status as a Jerusalemite meant that it was possible for her to bring her young children through the checkpoints on much-appreciated visits to Jerusalem and to her parents' village, or even to visit her siblings in other places inside Israel. Unlike other young children in Dheishe, her children went on a journey to Tel Aviv and the Mediterranean Sea, in the summer of 2004. Having access to the Israeli labor market, her family's economic situation also seemed better than her husband's; she happily returned back from visits to her parents' place with new clothes for herself and the children.

Bornstein (2002a) writes about the strategies of West Bank men trying to get married to women with Israeli citizenship that would give them access to the Israeli labor market.²⁰ However, in the prevailing

situation, marriages across the border were seen as disadvantageous in Dheishe, at least for women. My friend Dalal had several suitors with Israeli citizenship. Since these men were not willing to settle on the West Bank, Dalal's family turned down those proposals, arguing that if Dalal would have problems in her marriage, her kin would not be able to help her owing to the difficulties involved in visiting her inside Israel. In Palestine, as in many other societies, marriage is the concern of the couple's extended families and if a Palestinian couple has problems in marriage, it is customary for their families to intervene. The mother of the same girl turned down a suitor from Jericho since it would also have been difficult to reach out for Dalal in another town on the West Bank. Accordingly, Israeli politics of separation and restricted mobility clearly influenced people's marriage strategies.

The women from Jerusalem who were married to camp residents, sometimes commented on the way of life in Dheishe. When a violent fight broke out between two neighboring families, one of these women was apparently as scared as I was, and commented that the hot temper of the camp residents was really frightening and different from what she was used to. On another occasion, a woman complained about the car thefts in the camp, claiming that it was useless having a car since it was likely to be stolen anyway. Leila, whose husband is an Israeli Palestinian said:

[The Israeli Palestinians'] life is better than ours financially and psychologically, but they are not living better than us, because they are under oppression, they can't do what we can do [like] for example have demonstrations or resistance because [the Israelis] threaten them with the ID²¹ that if something happens they take the ID away from them, they are oppressed by Israel.

Ghada also claimed that the 'only' advantage with regard to her ID was that she could easily pass the checkpoints. Except from that advantage, the Israeli state imposed taxes and fined Israeli Palestinians.

The political situation in the early 2000s led to further fragmentation in Palestinian society. In Dheishe, the fear of collaborators, that is Palestinians working with Israeli security, is constantly threatening the unity of the community. In the summer of 2004, there were also several kidnappings and threats to officials in the Palestinian Authority by Fateh-related resistance groups and demonstrations were also held against the Palestinian leadership in Gaza. The lack of confidence and

trust in the Palestinian leadership was apparent. Political leaders were seen as powerless and unable, and according to some even unwilling, to challenge Israeli politics—a fact that further added to the sense of a homeland torn apart.

An Ideology of Rootedness: 'We are Connected to this Land'

In the narratives unfolding in the course of many partitions, rootedness recurs as a significant cultural theme. In a well known article from 1992, Malkki questioned the taken-for-granted notion of humans having 'roots' and the way these notions influence researchers' and policy makers' perceptions of refugees as uprooted, problematic people 'out of place'. However, place still matters for many displaced groups and it definitely does so for Palestinian refugees. Malkki moreover points out that it is common among sedentary agricultural peoples to have a sense of being rooted to the soil (Malkki 1992: 31). This is also the case of Palestinian camp refugees with rural backgrounds. Elderly camp refugees often elaborated on their everyday lives as farmers in the home villages before 1948. The experiences of displacement and restricted movement in space are clearly intertwined with local ideas about rootedness. Through family legends and clan names, it is often possible to trace a person's origin centuries back. Even though the refugees in Dheishe successfully established new homes for themselves in the camp, most grown-up camp refugees would argue that the camp is not their true home, not their natural or authentic place. Today, Palestinian refugees continue to look at themselves as anomalies and strangers in their place of exile, as people 'out of place'. This sense of the refugees as an aberration is also one reason for the stigmatization of refugees in Palestinian society, especially of those living in camps.

Uprooted people are frequently seen as problematic in political, medical, or moral terms (Malkki 1992). These views may also be expressed by the camp residents themselves. One of my informants, Khaled, a man in his early thirties, referred to a Palestinian proverb, 'whoever leaves his home, his honor will not be the same'. Khaled then explained that the meaning of the saying was that the one who leaves

his home or homeland, relatives, family and friends, is unlikely to receive the same respect as he did at home, in his proper place. For Palestinians, another connotation of 'uprooting' is loss of dignity and honor. A number of Palestinian proverbs underline the importance of protecting one's land and the notion of honor being intimately connected to land. In the prevailing situation on the West Bank, the humiliations the camp residents experience when encountering Israeli soldiers at checkpoints, for instance, are understood as continuation of the humiliation that has been ongoing since 1948.

According to this 'ideology of rootedness', the wounds created by uprooting can only be healed by return to one's rightful place. 'I want to be buried in my land' is frequently heard among the older generation of refugees. Since burying a refugee in his or her home village is not possible under the prevailing political situation, the practice today is to bury a refugee in his rightful social place, that is among his own people,²² at the site of the local graveyard intended for members of a specific village. A young man in a neighboring refugee camp told me about his uncle who had brought soil from his home village, since he wanted to be buried with at least some soil from his village, Bayt Jibriin. Moreover, as in the discourse of repatriation of the international refugee regime (Eastmond 2002), return for Palestinians is depicted as a vital component in the healing of the social body, torn by violence and exile.²³ With the refugees' return to their lost villages, as well as a possibility for Palestinians to move freely, the homeland torn apart and imprisoned would at least partly be free.

Concluding Remarks: 'Why Don't they Just Divide the Country?'

This chapter has explored the experiences of displacement and immobility arising from the process of partitions and the ways in which these inform and are informed by Palestinian narratives about land and borders. Partition in Israel/Palestine has not been a one-time event but rather an ongoing process, described by camp refugees as a homeland in the process of both being torn apart as well as imprisoned. The prison metaphor was also used for Israel as not only closing in on Palestinians but, also, itself. In today's context it is impossible to speak

of partition without reference to mobility and the restraints on it. Like Palestinians who experience restricted mobility both within Israel and between different parts of the occupied territories, Israelis are unable to move in parts of the West Bank and Gaza for 'security reasons', though they may be allowed to visit and live in the settlements. This chapter has raised questions about partition as an organizing principle with, for instance, Christians getting preferential treatment over Muslims from the Israeli authorities in the form of permits to visit Jerusalem during Christian holidays. Alternatively, we have seen how partition also limits marriage chances and opportunities.

Palestine was understood to be 'one country' corresponding to the British Mandate, a notion that has been reinforced and maintained by Palestinian nationalism. With regard to notions of homeland and borders, both centrifugal and centripetal forces have been at work. Rootedness is a central cultural theme in Palestinian society; an undercurrent running through the narratives of fragmentation as well as constant attempts to reunite the nation.

The political implications of these understandings are manifold. Taking as a point of departure the process of partitions and its implications, allows for a more complex and nuanced understanding of a future solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to emerge. The most frequently suggested solution is a continued process of partition, aiming at two states. As was evident during the 1990s, there are however, a number of practical problems with a two-state solution that remain to be solved, including such issues as citizenship, family reunification, freedom of movement between West Bank and Gaza Strip, and, not least, the control of international borders. Over and above these concerns, a two-state solution points at obstacles of a more symbolic kind.

A long-term political solution for the disputed land of Palestine/Israel needs to be accepted by large sections of both populations; with regard to Palestinians, notions of borders and homeland might deeply affect the possibilities of establishing a legitimate state. As Abu Amir stated earlier in this chapter, it is becoming increasingly difficult to imagine a two-state solution because of Israeli politics. On another less pragmatic and more symbolic level, to divide the homeland into two states, remains for many Palestinians a mediocre solution. For them, Palestine is perceived as one country and the refugees' right of return to their homes is the proper way to fully heal the nation. The right of

return is not only about letting Palestinian refugees return physically, but also about morals, about acknowledging the sufferings and injustices they have experienced. It should be underlined that this does not mean that there is no room for negotiations or pragmatic compromises, but it does signify that notions of homeland and ideas about rooted-ness should be taken into account. However far from the present political situation this might seem, an alternative and more sustainable solution could be one country with equal rights for everyone.²⁴ As the Israeli writer Benvenisti claims, 'a solution of separation on the basis of equality is not viable, since in reality there exists a *de facto* bi-national entity' (Benvenisti 2003: 187).

In an interview, a young Dheishean, Waliid, seemed to address all 'outsiders' thus, 'There is a little thing you have to know, by the way. Palestine is Palestine. West Bank or Gaza or Israel, it's Palestine'. Whatever the future might bring, these perceptions of the homeland need to be taken seriously.

NOTES

1. Most Palestinian refugee camps are highly politicized. It is therefore possible that the grand rumor of Dheishe as especially hardcore is somehow exaggerated. The rumor might well be related to the camp's strategic position, south of Bethlehem, on the road between Jerusalem and Hebron: a position that made clashes with the Israeli army inevitable. Its closeness to Jerusalem, which is the base of many news agencies and so on, also implies that both international and local media has often come to focus on Dheishe, making it one of the most well-known Palestinian refugee camps.
2. There was an earlier partition plan by the Peel Commission in 1937 during the Palestinian peasant revolt. See Swedenburg 2003.
3. Swedenburg (2003: 166) writes that it was only much later that the partition plan of 1947 was widely accepted among Palestinian Israelis because of the influence of the Israeli Communist Party that gained much support from this group.
4. In Dheishe, not only families have brought their children on such educational visits to village sites inside Israel but also a well-known youth organization named *Ibdaa*.
5. Military checkpoints were not a completely new phenomenon in the occupied territories, but had existed earlier (Swedenburg 2003).
6. BADIL (2004) mentions a figure of 600,000 Palestinians that have been arrested since 1967.
7. See also Burston (2005) for a discussion on the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.

8. These camp residents were normally in their late fifties or early sixties.
9. Many scholars would agree that a more widespread sense of belonging to a Palestinian nation developed with the loss of the homeland. I will not discuss this issue further but suffice it to say that in the memories of my informants Palestine was clearly one country also before 1948.
10. Others considered the possibility that the refugees might be forced to flee again as realistic and probable; in their view, the transfer would not be 'hidden'.
11. Most informants could not tell me where exactly you could read this in the Koran.
12. It is however true that this kind of patrilineal descent group has a tendency to fission with time; it is possible that this division would have occurred even without *al-Naqba*.
13. It was the opposite to an Israeli transfer. On the other hand, if someone managed to leave the country it might be easier for that person to decide to stay outside 'Palestine' because of these same restrictions on movements.
14. As was recently pointed out to me by Dr Malkki Al-Sharmani, when identity politics become increasingly Islamized, as they have partly been in Palestine, a Christian minority might not be able to feel a sense of belonging to the nation. In addition to a long tradition of Christian migration and well-established contacts with kin in other countries, the growth of the Islamic parties might therefore serve as a partial explanation for this Christian dispersal.
15. This acknowledged complexity partly contradicts the findings of Hammer (2005) whose returnee informants considered themselves to be stigmatized in the Palestinian society and had rarely encountered any positive evaluation of the Palestinians who had stayed in the occupied territories.
16. With the Israeli annexation of Jerusalem after the 1967 war, Palestinians who were physically present at the time were given the status of permanent residents of Israel. Jerusalemites carry not Israeli passports but Israeli travel documents, they have the right to vote in local elections but not in national ones (AIC 2004).
17. The Christians seemed to use well-known 'strategies of purity' to maintain boundaries between themselves and Muslim Palestinians (Douglas 1966). Bowman (2001) has written about conflicts between Christians and Muslims in the Bethlehem area.
18. As Bornstein (2002a: 109) points out, this axis of difference is flexibly used. In his material, the West Bank Palestinians frequently claimed to be more traditional or purer Palestinians, whereas inside Israel, Palestinians often put emphasis on being modern. This probably needs to be understood in the light of Israeli discourses about modernity and tradition/backwardness; to be included in Israeli society, any group should be modern (see Dominguez 1989).
19. Ghada comes from a village that lost about half of its land to an Israeli settlement built in the 1970s. The villagers had been given refugee cards as well as Jerusalem IDs in 1967.

20. During my fieldwork, Palestinians often talked about Palestinian men who wanted to marry foreign women only because these men wanted to settle in Europe or the US or get other advantages.
21. I'm not sure if she meant Jerusalem ID or citizenship.
22. For married women, it is more complicated since they might be buried at the grave site of their husband and if he is not from the same original village, she will be buried among her husband's people.
23. Research has shown that return processes are often complex. See for instance Hamner (2005) about the many tensions between Palestinian returnees and residents on the West Bank during the 1990s.
24. In my experience, how the Palestinians evaluate the possibilities of peacefully coexisting with Israelis depends on the political situation. For instance in 2000, before the extensive violence of *al aqsa intifada*, many Dheisheans claimed to be willing to live side by side with the Israelis. During my fieldwork that was for obvious reasons more difficult to envision.

REFERENCES

- AIC (Alternative Information Center). 2004. *Cleansing and Apartheid in Jerusalem—An Alternative Guide to Jerusalem*. Jerusalem: AIC.
- Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights. 2000. *Palestinian Refugees in Exile: Country Profiles*. Bethlehem: Badil.
- Benvenisti, M. 2000. *Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land since 1948*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press.
- . 2003. 'In the Light of the Morning After', in R. Segal and E. Weizman (eds), *A Civilian Occupation—The Politics of Israeli Architecture*. London: Babel and Verso.
- Bornstein, A. 2002a. *Crossing the Green Line Between the West Bank and Israel*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- . 2002b. 'Borders and the Utility of Violence—State Effects on the "Super-exploitation" of West Bank Palestinians', *Critique of Anthropology*, 22(2): 201–20.
- Bowman, G. 2001. 'The Two Deaths of Basem Rishmawi: Identity Constructions and Reconstructions in a Muslim-Christian Palestinian Community', *Identities—Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 8(1): 47–81.
- Burston, B. 2005. 'Is Gaza Truly Part of the Land of Israel', *Haaretz*, 25 April.
- Dominguez, V. R. 1989. *People as Subject, People as Object—Selfhood and Peoplehood in Contemporary Israel*. London and Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Douglas, M. 1966. *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo*. New York: Praeger.
- Eastmond, M. 2002. 'Repatriation and Notions of Home-coming: The Case of Cambodian Refugees', *Australian Journal of Human Rights*, 8(1).

- Gazit, S. 1995. *The Carrot and the Stick: Israel's Policy in Judea and Samaria, 1967–68*. Washington DC: B'nai B'rith Books.
- Hammer, J. 2005. *Palestinians Born in Exile—Diaspora and the Search for a Homeland*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Hass, A. 2005. 'IDF Bans Arab Israelis from Entering the West Bank on Road 557', *Haaretz*, 28 March. www.haaretzdaily.com/hasenlspages/557419.html
- Korn, A. 2003. 'From Refugees to Infiltrators: Constructing Political Crime in Israel in the 1950s' *International Journal of the Sociology of Law*, 31: 1–22.
- Lindholm Schultz, H. with J. Hammer 2003. *The Palestinian Diaspora—Formation of Identities and Politics of Homeland*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Malkki, L. 1992. 'National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity Among Scholars and Refugees', *Cultural Anthropology*, 7(1): 24–44.
- OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) and UNSCO (Office for the Special Coordinator for the Peace Process in the Middle East) Report. December 2004. *Costs of Conflict: The Changing Face of Bethlehem*.
- Punamäki, R. L. (1988), 'Experiences of Torture, Means of Coping, and Level of Symptoms among Palestinian Political Prisoners', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 17(4) (summer).
- Rosenfeld, M. 2004. *Confronting the Occupation—Work, Education and Political Activism of Palestinian Families in a Refugee Camp*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Rothenberg, C. 2004. *Spirits of Palestine—Gender, Society and Stories of the Jinn*. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books.
- Segal, R. and E. Weizman. 2003. 'The Mountain—Principles of Building in Heights', in R. Segal and E. Weizman (eds), *A Civilian Occupation—The Politics of Israeli Architecture*. London: Babel and Verso.
- Slyomovics, S. 1998. *The Object of Memory—Arab and Jew Narrate the Palestinian Village*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Swedenburg, T. 2003. *Memories of Revolt: The 1936–1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past*. Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press.
- Tamari, S. 1981. 'Building Other People's Homes', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 11(1): 31–67.
- Weiss, E. S. 2004. *Palestinian and Israeli Nationalism: Identity Politics and Education in Jerusalem, Cairo and New York*. Cairo: The American University Press.

***Social Structures,
Constructions,
and Images***





Partition and Partings

The Paradox of German Kinship Ties

TATJANA THELEN

It is 30 September 2005 in a sports club in West Berlin, and the women in the dressing room are looking forward to a long weekend because Monday will be 3 October, the 'German Unity Day', a public holiday. As two women leave the room, another one shouts 'Have a nice party'. The women on their way out look puzzled. One of them asks 'what is there to celebrate?', and the answer is: 'Unification'. Everyone in the room is laughing; obviously none of them is planning a celebration.

The so-called 'lack of inner unity' in Germany after unification has already drawn some scholarly attention. The German historian Jürgen Kocka (1994), speaks of elements of two different political cultures, and goes on to explain that communication, friendship, and marriage are still divided into East and West. American observers went even further in describing differences in terms of distinct national and ethnic identities in East and West Germany after unification (Howard 1995; Staab 1998). While this development has been studied mainly on the basis of data from opinion polls and elections, the sphere of kinship has remained relatively unexplored. In this chapter I seek to draw attention to kinship relations and their connection to the interpretation of partition in Germany. To return to the anecdote above: The question is, why is unity only celebrated by public agencies, and why is it not an occasion for formerly-divided families to come together and celebrate the overcoming of partition?

As the title of this chapter already indicates, I argue that kinship relations are one field within which the potential for new partings exists. In other words, the existence of the former border enacted and interpreted as an instrument of partition, was in fact holding them together

by strengthening kinship ties. A growing body of literature on borders and borderlands in the 1980s and 1990s has drawn attention to the fact that, although small and large communities use boundaries to define territorial limits and identities, borderlands themselves are places of intensive exchange and identity building (see for example Meinhof 2002; Roesler and Wendl 1999; Wilson and Donnan 1998). However, my concern here is not on exchange in the borderlands, but the influence of the motif of partition, especially after the building of the Wall, on kinship construction throughout Germany. Kinship is one way in which human beings construct and give meaning to their social relations. It is not the only mode, but a very significant one. Although most kinship systems entail some idea of biological relations, there are many different ways of including or excluding certain categories of people. Besides its ability to be used for defining community, kinship is also an important means to establish mutual obligations and to channel the flow of resources between relatives, most often between generations. In the case of kinship relations across the German–German border, exchange was promoted and became more inclusive through a political interpretation of partition. The motif of partition became constitutive of this exchange and entailed, at the same time, the conditions for its later decline.

While there exists some literature on exchange between East and West German kin during partition, this topic has not been incorporated into theories of kinship in Germany. Furthermore, what happened to kinship relations after partition ended, and the connection of this to identity construction has not been systematically analyzed. I argue that partition brought about the construction of two parallel kinship systems. Although in each separate state the most important relations existed within the framework of the core family, cross-border exchange connected distant relatives. However, with the end of partition, kinship relations often dissolved. It is my aim in this chapter to identify the reasons for this development and systematize East German interpretations of it.

Apart from an interest in specific phenomena of German–German family relations, an analysis of these developments in the use and definition of kinship can add to our understanding in other fields of social scientific research as well. As already indicated, this approach could strengthen our understanding of borders and the relationship between

nation-building and kinship. In addition, German kinship relations across the border exemplify the intricate dynamics of gift exchange heavily influenced by the political interpretation of partition. In the following section, I start with a description of the historical circumstances surrounding the shifting meanings of partition and how they influenced kinship practice. I then go on to explore what happened to the former kinship exchange after unification, as perceived by East Germans.

The Motif of Partition and Kinship Exchange before Unification

The word partition implies a preexisting whole divided into parts. In the case of nation-states this assumption is complicated if we accept at the same time, the idea of nations as imagined communities (Anderson 1999 [1983]). If all national identities are social constructions and not 'natural facts', then a historical starting point for partition has to be clarified. This is especially true in the application of the term partition to the case of Germany, where the implied separation of parts of a 'whole' almost automatically evokes the question about the presumable borders of that entity (Germany in the borders of 1871, 1920, or 1936?). However, we can argue that the motif of partition, that is the political interpretation of the existence of two German states, reflects a widely shared discourse that acquired powerful meaning as it influenced daily practices as well as strengthened the construction of Germany as an ethnic community.

The peculiar concept of German identity as an ethnic one, partly derives from its development within fragmented small states. Because of the late (if compared to other European countries) first unification in 1871, the idea of a German nation for long remained separate from a state territory. In addition, colonization had less influence in Germany than elsewhere in Europe. When the unified state came into being, the integration of people from other regions of the world was not a requirement. The first unification was based on ethnic-national ideas of common descent, language, and cultural heritage, at a time when Britain and France had already developed other concepts of citizenship (Brubaker 1994; see also Howard 1995: 123; Staab 1998: 127–28).

After the atrocities of the Third Reich, the glorification of ethnic attributes was largely discredited. Germany's defeat, however, also made it the new border in the emerging Cold War between western capitalism and Soviet socialism. During the early post-war years, the border existed only as a demarcation line between the eastern and western occupational zones and was still open for trade and cross-border contacts.¹ The political situation remained vague for quite a few years, but with the growing tension between East and West, a unification became more and more unlikely. Crossing the border was prohibited in 1952 and both sides took an active part in making the border insurmountable, often in contrast to their respective propaganda (Doering-Manteuffel 1993; Wieschiolek 1999: 211–12). Then, in 1961, the Berlin Wall was built and became the definitive symbol of partition. However, kinship relations were kept up across the border. In the following section, I highlight some political, economic, and emotional aspects of their construction.

The development of exchange between extended kin is connected to, and gained much of its meaning due to, shifting political interpretations of partition. In the first years after the two German states had officially been declared, propagating the unity of Germany was considered communist propaganda in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), because it was the terminology used by the Socialist Party (SED) in the East. It was only with the building of the Wall in Berlin and the strict partition it symbolized, that public interest shifted toward overcoming the constraints of the border through extended kin ties. The Wall became a visible expression of the socialist state as an unwanted political system that prevented its citizens from traveling. In the context of the Cold War, the West German state had a stake in proving itself to be the better system. In this constellation, the best evidence of unity was kinship as 'natural' expression of the nation. Kinship terminology in this context was expanded from concrete families to the whole country, as apparent in the phrasing, 'our (poor) brothers and sisters in the East'. By concentrating on the socialist enemy as the one responsible for an 'artificial' border, it could also be avoided to blame the fascist past as a reason for partition.

However obvious the concept of kinship might seem, it was not so 'natural', and in fact it required some effort on the part of the political powers to convince people in the FRG to keep up ties with their

relatives in the East. This meant first the creation or at least strengthening of obligation, which, for example, found expression in repeated campaigns calling on West German citizens to send letters and parcels to the East. Different state and non-state actors and institutions designed such campaigns. Charitable organizations and radio stations made regular Christmas and Easter campaigns and the still state-owned German mail launched thematic stamps. Besides, the so-called ministry for all-German questions gave financial and ideological support (Kabus 2000: 126–28). The aim was quite openly stated, as in one internal note:

‘The leading thought of this support is besides material help a political aim: The parcel as expression of solidarity should enforce human contact and strengthening responsibility of the citizens of the FRG for conservation of a feeling of belonging together’ (ibid.: 127).

With the advent of the so-called politics of detente (*Entspannungspolitik*), these campaigns no longer seemed politically appropriate. In fact, citizens in the FRG slowly began to define their national identity more in terms of economic success, or pride in their Constitution (Staab 1998: 15–16). Subsequently border-crossing decreased in the 1970s and 1980s, but kinship remained important and reinforced the image of an ethnic community comprising of both German states.

The idea of the German nation as an ethnic community worked in East Germany as well, perhaps even more than in West Germany. This became obvious during the protest movement of 1989 when, at the ‘Monday Demonstrations’ the slogan used in the beginning: ‘We are *the* people’ quickly changed into ‘We are *one* people’, indicating a shift in emphasis of the protest from reform of socialism to unification with West Germany.² Moreover, it expressed an identification with an ethnic community consisting of West and East Germany.

Up to that point, the governments of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in open contrast to those in the FRG had rather restricted kin exchange. However, their policies shifted also from a stricter phase in the beginning to more openness and later a kind of unwilling acceptance. One reason for restriction was the pervasive suspicion of political infiltration from the West. In addition, the obvious political character of West German parcel campaigns did not of course go unnoticed and the East German government rejected the western notion of its citizens being in need of western help (Kabus 2000: 129).

Shortly after the building of the Wall, mutual contact and exchange between relatives in East and West Germany became more difficult than in the preceding years. West Germans often had to suffer extensive border controls, and in 1967, a compulsory currency exchange was introduced, forcing travelers to the GDR to exchange a certain amount of their West German marks into East German marks (and to spend them there) when visiting the east. However, this already indicated a shift in East German politics as the government used the transfer quite openly for the acquisition of 'hard' currency.

Crossing the border in the other direction in the early years was nearly impossible. Initially, permission was granted only to pensioners and disabled persons. In the early 1970s, increasing international pressure made it somewhat easier to travel to West Germany especially in cases of so-called 'urgent family matters'. Such matters included birthdays, marriages, and marriage jubilees, serious illness and death among direct kin (grandparents, parents, children and siblings, including half-siblings). These regulations generally restricted kinship to consanguine kin and excluded affinal ties. It was only in the late 1980s, shortly before the Wall fell, that these categories were actually broadened to include brothers- and sisters-in-law.

Until now, politicians have interpreted the restrictions on traveling across the German-German border as an inhuman means effectively employed by the GDR government to break kinship ties. A newer example of this view is provided by Edda Ahrberg, the commissioner for former State Security Documents in Sachsen Anhalt (*Landesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen der Staatssicherheit der ehemaligen DDR*), who states that employees in state agencies working on travel applications, were responsible for families slowly drifting apart (Ahrberg in Gladen 2001: 2). This typical interpretation equates the state's supposed aims with what actually happened. However, the existence of kinship ties across the border did not cease. On the contrary, kinship networks persisted and sometimes even expanded through the partition period.

Mutual visits figured prominently as a means of upholding kinship relations despite (or because of?) restrictions and inconvenient controls before and after traveling, as well as at the actual point of border crossing. Despite the official regulations, East Germans increasingly mentioned affinal kin in their applications for visits from East to West Germany. For example, an internal analysis of travel applications by the police in

Magdeburg stated: 'Regarding travel reasons, the visit of more distant relatives (uncles, aunts, cousins, parents-in-law, brothers- and sisters-in-law, nieces, nephews) for birthdays as well as travels of couples together present the focus'.³

Apart from mutual visits, sending letters and parcels across the border continued and, as time went on, involved increasingly extended kin. At least in the beginning, parcels, and letters were often exchanged directly between relatives who still knew each other well from the period before the existence of two German states. Nevertheless, they were almost never directed to only one person, but sent to and received by whole families, including, for example, a sister's husband or distant cousins. Similarly, gifts were distributed by the older generation, and in this way, reached the younger generation as well. Hence, exchange communities, as Dietzsch (2000) calls them, developed, and sometimes included and reinforced more distant kinship ties, like those between third cousins. Given that one might expect conjugal families to be the predominant pattern in Germany, this existence of extended kin networks across the border is an interesting phenomenon.

Early family sociologists had been preoccupied with the size of families and an assumed shift from extended families to conjugal ones due to modernization (Mitterauer 1992: 149–50). This dichotomy has been criticized as being too simplistic and it was stated instead that in every complex society, several family types coexist (König 1970; Stack 2003). However, the phenomenon of the German–German kinship practice means that there are no different social or ethnic groups with a distinct kinship practice, but two parallel systems practiced by the same actors. Within each of the two countries, kinship concepts and practices centered on the conjugal family, while the existence of two German states, phrased as partition, resulted in the 'spontaneous emergence' (König 1970) and parallel existence of extended family support networks across the border.

The mere existence of two German states was not sufficient to enact this parallel practice of two kinship systems. It was the political interpretation, the motif of partition, together with the growing economic difference between the two German states, that was vital in this development. The exchange among kin across the border had a clear economic dimension at the state as well as individual levels. As indicated above, the East German state counted on the hard currency brought

by West Germans visitors and even on the counterbalancing of certain shortages by West German parcels, sent to citizens of the GDR (Lindner 2000: 36–37). On the level of the individual exchange circle, the parcels also had a dual function, both as gift and as symbols of obligation (Dietzsch 2000: 106). This character was achieved by the peculiar situation of partition in which the so-called *westpaket* (parcel from the West) had to be declared a gift and was subject to rigid custom controls. However, at the same time, its content consisted of more or less everyday consumer goods that were scarce in the East. Usually special brands (like Jacobs Krönung for coffee or Kinderschokolade for chocolate) were preferred. As the content was generally more or less standardized, the goods lost the character of an individual gift. Retrospectively, this constitutes one point of criticism on the side of East Germans, as will be shown below.

Before analyzing partings at the end of partition, the aforementioned elements of the exchange, namely the obligation as well as the actual contents, need to be briefly reviewed in the light of the rich anthropological literature on the nature of the gift as a form of exchange. Although, for instance, Mauss was working with an evolutionary model and therefore only touching peripherally on the subject of modern gift exchanges, his notion of gift as embedded in social and economic relations, and the concept of reciprocity, are important tools for understanding the phenomenon. For Mauss gift exchange consists of three obligations: the obligation to give, to take and to reciprocate. Mauss also demonstrates that there is no free gift and exchanges are also an important means of demonstrating status (Mauss 1990). These notions help clarify the underlying mechanism of the German–German kinship exchanges across the border.

Regarding the first obligation, i.e., to give, it was stressed, perhaps even created, in the repeated campaigns that used an openly moral language.⁴ For example, one stamp said: ‘Your parcel to the other side (*driiben*). They wait for it’. In addition, gift-sending was highly ritualized as they had to be labeled as such due to GDR custom prescriptions, and they were sent mainly on occasions of important family celebrations such as Christmas, birthdays, and so on. Obviously these gifts were heavily embedded in a moral–political discourse and were never ‘free’. The rhetoric of the campaigns made it quite clear that gifting to the East constituted a comparatively simple way for West Germans to do something ‘good’, which was (or at least was expected to be) rewarded

with gratitude on the receiving end. Thereby it reproduced the superior status of the West German giver.

This status-reproduction came into being, because East Germans could not adequately fulfill the inherent obligation to reciprocate the gift and this provoked ambiguous feelings.⁵ Because of the unequal economic situation in which the exchange was embedded, the relatives in the GDR did not have any desired goods with which to reciprocate. In an effort to reciprocate they also sent parcels, but even if they embodied great efforts, as they consisted of hard-to-get consumer goods in the GDR or hand-made objects, it was clear to both sides that they were evaluated differently. Many people in eastern Germany still remember the smell of the *westpaket* that symbolized, at that time, the better world of capitalism (see for example various descriptions in Härtel and Kabus 2000). So, even if it was not perhaps an individualized kind of gift and did not carry the *hau*⁶ of the West German donor, the exchange nevertheless evoked the spirit of his society, namely capitalism. The imbalanced reciprocity conferred on the East German recipient an inferior status. Thus, the circulation of gifts during the partition produced a certain level of stress, involving feelings of guilt and perhaps even inferiority (Borneman 2000: 145; Dietzsch 2000: 204–13; Merkel 1999: 289). This ambivalence of the former exchange communities added to the later dissolution of extended kinship—the partings at the end of partition. In the following section, I focus on this post-unification development and how the East Germans have experienced it.

Dissolving Kinship Ties after Unification

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and later the unification, travel between the former two Germanys was simplified. However, families most often did not reunite, as the West German political rhetoric might have made one think, but rather moved apart. While the extended kin networks had been one way to maintain a national identity during partition, the concept of being ‘one people’—which had figured so prominently during the protests—was soon cast aside after unification. Unification meant the imposition of West German political and economic structures in the former territory of the GDR, and despite huge monetary transfers from West to East Germany, economic inequality remained. Despite

large-scale improvements in infrastructure, housing, and general living standards, this imbalance constitutes a constant disappointment of the hopes of many, who expected a quick adjustment to West German conditions. In addition, public discourse, and the seeming involvement of large numbers of the East German population in activities for the former secret service, contributed to a degree of psychological exclusion from the now unified state. Against these dividing barriers, as Staab (1998: 159) phrases it, 'East Germans soon began to establish their own excluding boundaries which marked their identities off from that of Western Germany'. The dissolution of kinship ties is embedded in this general development.

The interpretations of dissolving kin relations introduced here are exclusively from an East German point of view.⁷ The majority of the data presented here stems from fieldwork done in Rostock.⁸ The focus of this research was not explicitly on East–West kinship ties, but on changing social security relations in general. During fieldwork, I concentrated on the legal successor of one former large socialist enterprise, but also had contact with different social projects and experts in the field of public social policy. In this chapter I include data from conversations on the topic of kinship that occurred unintentionally in the field or in biographical interviews, as well as some quotations from a web discussion.⁹

Since East–West kinship was, as described above, one source of social security for East Germans during the partition period, I expected this function to have changed after unification. That is why during a random sample of interviews in the enterprise, I explicitly asked whether people had relatives in the West and what had happened to these relations in recent times. Out of these 24 informants, 16 had relatives in the West; in one case there was no contact during partition. In another three cases, the relation had ended due to death or divorce before unification (note that despite the above-named legal restrictions in the GDR, kinship established through marriage was locally still counted as such).

Although I had been expecting some splits within families, I was nevertheless surprised to find out about the frequency of descriptions concerning a breakup, or at least deterioration of relations between East and West relatives in the accounts of my informants. I never came across a case in which the relationship had become more intense. Instead, most individual stories were about decline. In a few cases, people stated that the relationship had remained more or less the same. In one case,

a male informant tried to establish a new relationship with an aunt with whom he had had no contact during partition. He went to visit her, 'but she was a typical Wessi, and that was it'. They have not had any subsequent contact (No. 12, 19 September 2003).¹⁰

The informants of the sample who stated that their relationship to West German relatives had remained the same, and other people I met outside the sample who said the same about themselves, belonged to the younger generation or were active church members. In the first case they had maintained only casual contacts or contacts mediated by their parents and grandparents. This suggests that the loosening of contacts is to some degree a generational effect; many of those most responsible for maintaining contacts belonged to an older generation who had already established relations before partition. This older generation is simply dying out; and for the younger generations, the contacts were never as intense, or the contact had a different emotional significance during partition. In the latter case of active churchgoers, their contacts often also had different characteristics during the time of partition. In addition, active believers tended to interpret their lives differently because they were mostly embedded in political opposition to the socialist state. Although lacking systematic data on this topic, my impression was that this fact renders relations with their western relatives more stable, since some of the potentially conflicting matters described below are simply non-existent.

More interesting here are the cases of intense contact during partition that could have intensified, but did not. In the following three sections I explore the reasons for this development, as provided by my East German informants. Although they are interconnected, for reasons of systematization, I differentiate between three main categories of conflict between relatives after unification: inheritance; reinterpretation of help formerly received; and political conflicts.

Changing Meaning of Inheritance

The most prominent issue regarding property in German–German relations after unification was the large expropriated private properties in land. However, the cases I deal with concern only relatively small pieces of land and single houses. During fieldwork, conflicts over

property inherited after unification, mainly buildings, especially family houses, and sometimes smaller pieces of land, figured prominently in conversations about the reasons for the collapse of family relations. Agricultural lands as well as dwellings with more than one flat, were not very desirable inheritable objects during the socialist period. For land that was held in co-operatives, the received rent was extremely low, and the same holds true for rents for flats which often did not even cover the maintenance costs of the buildings.

Although these economic policies were guided by different aims, they had (unintended) consequences for kinship as well. Often heirs were quite happy to get rid of such tenement houses in one way or another. Inheritance, which in other places or times, constitutes an important feature of generational transfer between parents and children, lost its significance not only as a resource, but also as a source of conflict between, for example, siblings.

This situation changed dramatically with unification, when private ownership of real estate regained much of its former status. As in three cases of my informants in the structured interviews, this type of conflict frequently caused a breakup of lateral kinship relations. This happened among East German kin as well as among East–West German kin, but conflict between the latter had an additional quality. In the view of my East German informants, they had often acquired the right to a house by simply living there all their lives, or by caring for their respective parents who had owned the house. They had never thought about conflicting interests, but soon learned that their West German relatives saw things differently, and were better informed about the legal situation, and quicker in accessing legal institutions and lawyers.

In one case, a woman lived with her daughter and granddaughter and their respective families in the house in question. Another daughter was living in the former West Germany and during partition the contact was close, including regular visits and sending of parcels. But after unification, when the East German kin asked her to sign a document stating that she would not like to live in the house, she left in anger and turned to a lawyer. In the 11-year-long legal case, the West German sister got her part of the inheritance in money, but the two sections of the family do not speak to each other anymore and the grandmother transfers all her income (basically the pension) to her other daughters and her grandson to ensure that ‘at no point in time there is

more money in her bank account than what is enough to pay her funeral' (DN, 3 January 2006), as they await a continuation of the legal dispute after her death.

As John Borneman (1997: 324–25) noted, West German law, including civil law on inheritance issues, is much more complicated than the former East German law. In this case, the family felt unsure and helpless vis-à-vis the new legal system compared to the sisters who were well-acquainted with the West German rules. These processes often led to a total break in relations that had been previously friendly, similar to the case described by Daphne Berdahl, who discovered during her research in Kella, that property claims of West Germans 'often severed family relations far more drastically than the Wall ever had' (Berdahl 1997: 165).

Reinterpretation of Former 'Help': Parcels and Visits Revisited

The described forms of exchange or, more explicitly, the help received by the 'poor' relatives in the East from their West German kin, has undergone a major shift since unification. While it was always ambiguous, in retrospect it decreased even more in value. One aspect of this re-evaluation is that with unification, access to consumer goods that had once been highly valued, has changed. All products are now widely available and knowledge of prices and qualities has spread quickly. As a consequence, many informants reported that only after unification did they realize that the gifts they had received from their West German relatives during partition were in fact cheap: 'ALDI coffee and T-Shirts from mass production', as one informant put it (DN No. 7, 18 September 2003). If, like Berdahl (1997: 170) notes, learning appropriate consumer practices was a kind of initiation to West German society, it quickly became general knowledge that ALDI was a cheap supermarket chain. After unification many people were disappointed with the realization that the once eagerly desired goods were actually staples. As a consequence, not only did the perception of what the goods meant change, but so did the former process of exchange. First, the knowledge that in retrospect induce a feeling of shame for having been foolish enough all those years to want them. But that they were inexpensive, does not merely devalue the products themselves, but also

the gesture of gift-giving itself. Knowing that they were relatively inexpensive, retrospectively devalues the relationship as well. The realization after unification that 'our beloved in the West'—as one of the discussants of a web forum noted—'had not donated the shirts off their very backs, like we were always led to believe' (Karin, <http://www.zonentalk.de>), added to the ambivalent feelings of guilt and offence entailed in all the transactions during partition. Not that they themselves today would not buy their own consumer goods in such shops; the disappointment is more about reflecting that what they were so thankful for, something given to them with such flourish, did not actually cost their relatives very much. That West German relatives did not have to suffer for these gifts, in retrospect makes them less valuable, even devalues them, while casting suspicion on the attitudes of the West Germans in general.¹¹

Added to this suspicion is the often-quoted tax deduction granted to West Germans for parcels to the East.¹² Therefore, not only were these gifts largely mass-produced and inexpensive, they were further devalued through the government support which was extended to them. In a similar vein, are stories about parcels from the West that could be ordered at specialized shops, where the employees could put together coffee, chocolate, and the like, and even post the parcels. I am not sure whether my informants actually talked about Genex,¹³ the East German gift service, or other stores, but what is more important is that these stories underline a further devaluation of the kinship relations. Ordering prefabricated parcels added another component to the general disappointment, implying that parcels were not only cheap, but also sent without any individual effort, nor prompted by any special affection on the part of the West Germans.

Another aspect regarding the contents of former parcels that was sometimes noticeable during partition, but in an attempt to avoid conflict was not aggressively expressed, is now often recalled and re-evaluated. This aspect concerns stories about how West Germans overestimated the lack of goods and needs in the GDR. They expose West Germans as having been arrogant in making gifts which were actually not needed in the former GDR. Often East Germans feel that West Germans applied social labels which did not match their reality. This became especially apparent when West German kin sent items that were not in limited supply to their relatives in the GDR. For example, in a web discussion about Westpakete someone writes: 'My grandmother was a simple and

modest woman. But when our relatives from Bavaria filled their West parcels with sugar, flour, rice and instant soups, this old woman (84) got angry' (<http://www.zonentalk.de>).

Similarly, one of my informants in Rostock was outraged when he recalled how in 1988, they received used shoes in a parcel. He also recounted a visit in the late 1980s, with his wife to Sweden, where her cousin lived. The relatives of his wife offered them used clothing. He commented: 'Usually they send this to Africa. Later my wife took her cousin aside and said to her: "Look at me—do I look like [the people] in Africa?"' (DN, 22 February 2005).

He refused to be likened to people in Africa who supposedly are *really* poor as compared to him, a citizen of the GDR. He related this incident as proof of how uninformed westerners were about life in the GDR. He wanted also to make explicit that one could maintain a cultured lifestyle in the socialist past as well, and went on to describe his furniture that was, as he explained, the most expensive available in the GDR. With that story he also wanted to stress the quality of goods obtained in the GDR. This is another recurrent topic in such conversations. With much the same expression of pride, another female informant told me about her first visit to her sister in Cologne: 'our eyes were opened', and 'they put their pants on one leg at a time, like everyone else'. With this statement she wished to express that her sister was not as rich as she had always imagined during partition. She commented further that her West German family did not own their flat, but like herself, lived in a rented one. Regarding her sister's furniture, she insisted that despite having four children and the expense this entailed, she too 'could hold our own by comparison', meaning that they lived just as comfortably as their West German relatives. She, like the previous male informant, stressed the quality of goods made in the GDR, and at the same time devalued West German goods.

What is even more significant, is that like others, when recalling these incidents of 'eye opening', she in fact implicitly accused her relatives of having consciously contributed to the creation of an image of wealth in the FRG that did not correspond to reality. When I asked her directly whether her sister had previously given a different impression, she answered, 'Yes, they always were haughty' (DN, 24 February 2004). This interpretation is similar to that of the woman in the web discussion cited before, who wrote 'like we were always led to believe', which devalued the entire relationship retrospectively.

This attributed arrogance and instrumentality in the maintenance of relations by West Germans is then contrasted to the efforts of East Germans, who tried their very best to be good hosts for their visiting relatives. For example, one informant whose sister used to visit her regularly during partition, recalled how 'we always gave our very best' to make them comfortable, 'which was also not cheap'. With the opening of the border, and since they 'always invited them to the GDR', she expected to be hosted as well. Instead, she received a letter in which her sister advised her 'to first go and have a look around the surrounding area [of West Germany] or Berlin'. She remarked about her sister: 'She was afraid that all her relatives would come to visit her' (DN, 24 February 2005). Similarly, in one of the structured interviews, a female informant reported that during partition, the West German relatives frequently used the phrase, 'if only you could come to visit us', implying how great that would be; but after unification this invitation was never repeated (No. 7, 18 September 2003). While in the first case a loose contact still exists, in the latter case the relation dissolved entirely.¹⁴

In their reevaluation of prior exchanges, East German kin reject the guilt and inferiority felt before. By pointing to the quality of goods obtained in the GDR and recalling their own hospitality toward their West German relatives, they deny any obligation to gratitude, presumably expected from them by their western relatives. In addition to this rather inherent ambiguity in gifting, new conflicts added to the separation of East and West German kin.

Political Differences

An additional aspect of West–East German kin relations is connected to the interpretation of political transformation. Similar to data in national opinion polls, some of my East German informants expressed the experience of divergent values and political attitudes among kin. In the above-cited example of the woman whose sister lived in Cologne, yet another difference became obvious only after unification. As my informant recalled further the visit to her sister's place, 'And when we arrived, she asked us whether we were not afraid that something would happen to us. I said, no, why, we paid for our tickets'. Here she paused, as if this made it all clear, and only when I asked what she meant by

'happen', because I had obviously missed the point, she explained further, 'Well, she thought there still were interrogations at the border by the BND [West German secret service] or so. We had never made a secret of our opinions when she was here'. She implied having spoken positively about socialism during visits from her West German relatives, and said that her sister thought that her conviction would cause her trouble after unification. I asked further: 'And when you said something positive about the GDR, she never contradicted you?' 'No never'. Her obvious disappointment seemed to be partly induced by a feeling that her sister has been dishonest to her, because her first (indirect) remark came only after unification. Still not sure what she meant I questioned further, and she admitted that political differences only became obvious after the political turnaround (DN, 24 February 2005).

As Ina Dietzsch (2004) describes, exchange communities avoided potential conflicts during partition. There seem to have been illusions about each other's opinions too, that were a source of disappointment after the end of partition. As in the case of inheritance, which was virtually meaningless during partition, political differences became a new source of conflict.

In sum, West German relatives, like West Germans in general, are portrayed as uninformed, impolite, arrogant, and dishonest. The new boundaries between kin reflect the new identifications as East or West Germans, but they are also part of a general restructuring of kinship. Extended kinship loses its function, is retrospectively devalued, and new sources of conflict emerge.

Conclusion

In this chapter, by emphasizing the unifying power of the border that formerly divided Germany into two separate states, I have focused on the consequences of its removal on kinship relations. In this sense, this chapter is an ethnographic account of reevaluation of the former transgressions of the border and the cessation of exchanges after the border actually vanished.

During partition, extended kinship networks persisted and were created across the border. This exchange had a variety of reasons, functions, and consequences. From each side of the border individual actors

as well as political interpretation differed significantly. Furthermore, kinship exchange was enforced by the economic differences between the two German states, which at the same time made for some of the specific characteristics of the imbalance of exchange between kin.

This development of extended kinship exchange across the border can be seen as 'spontaneous emergence', as König (1970) calls it, of extended families in a complex society. Therefore, partition can be interpreted as one reason, besides migration and others, for the parallel existence of different kinship patterns in one nation-state. Additionally, these patterns were not tied to specific groups, but rather each group practiced both systems, one in the country they lived in, and the other across the border.

Regarding identity formation, the extended kinship practice served as proof of a unified German identity and the existing ethnic idea of one German nation in both states. In that sense the Wall served as a unifying factor and made distancing from the fascist past possible; furthermore it contributed to the German understanding of a nation, bound together by blood as well as the survival of the idea of the imagined community of Germany as 'one people'. With unification, this idea of a common identity bound together by blood, which was at least vividly upheld during the East German protests, became more and more insignificant in the face of apparent lasting divisions. The reinterpretation of kinship ties is partly a reaction to this development. In the context of the present, past relationships appear devalued and often irrelevant. This does not mean that this will necessarily be part of a new and lasting process of identity construction, as some American scholars (Howard 1995; Staab 1998) have suggested. However, at least for the time being, these differences have gained in significance.

At the same time, exchanges of gifts between relatives on both sides of the border can be seen as an example of in ambivalence mutual obligations. The feelings of guilt and envy this entailed, added to the demise of gift exchange at the end of partition. The border heightened the nature of interaction between extended kin and introduced a layer of ambiguity into kin relationships. The obligation of reciprocity at the core of gift-giving as a form of exchange, heightened already existing inequalities and the steadily growing asymmetry between East and West German kin. When the Wall came down, the fiction underlying these exchanges became increasingly apparent and families separated away

into more nuclear units. This paradox of German kinship, exemplified by the nature of exchanges also shows how sensitive kinship as a form of social organization can be to political endeavors, in this case the motif of partition.

NOTES

1. At first, Germany was divided into four different occupation zones after the war. Later, the different ideas about a future development of the country increasingly started to differ. The territory of the later GDR roughly corresponded with the territory of the Soviet army, and the territory of the FRG with those of France, UK and the US (for a more detailed description of the historical development internal German border, see for example Wagner 1990, or for the experiences of people see Schubert 1993).
2. Among the most prominent forms of protest during the political upheavals were demonstrations on every Monday with ever growing number of participants in Leipzig.
3. Landesarchiv Magdeburg—LHA—, Rep. M24, BDVP Magdeburg 1975–1990, Abteilung PM, Nr. 17105 (printed in Gladen 2001: 23).
4. One West German colleague once recalled how in his childhood his family was desperately looking for someone to send a parcel to and felt guilty that it had no one to send to. Some organizations, especially church-related ones, created artificial ties and sometimes persons in the GDR were quite surprised or even felt humiliated receiving such a parcel from an unknown person (Kabus 2000: 121).
5. Some examples of this literature with special emphasis on the obligation to reciprocate are Sahlins (1965), Gouldner (1973), and Mauss (1990). A newer compilation on the topic with a good introduction to the discussion is Osteen (2002).
6. Mauss refers to the maori word *hau* as 'the thing contains the person that the donor retains a lien on what he has given away (...) and it is because of this participation of the person in the object that the gift creates an enduring bond between persons' (quoted in Parry 1986: 475).
7. Although I came across some West German interpretations in personal communication, I never did any fieldwork in West Germany. For obvious reasons, I suspect that West German interpretations would differ from East German interpretations.
8. The research was supported by the Max Planck Society. Rostock is a city on the Baltic coast with about 200,000 inhabitants. Fieldwork included a more stable phase from February to October in 2003 and shorter subsequent visits lasting until end of 2005.

9. Informal talks were noted in diary form, biographical interviews were taped. The quotations from taped interviews are marked with dates and quotations from informal talks with diary note (DN), structured interviews with interview number and date.
10. Wessi stands for a person of West German origin and the term is, as is obvious from the quotation, negatively loaded.
11. For an approach more concerned with the topic of guilt and social justice in German transformation see Borneman (1997).
12. West Germans could deduct the costs of the gifts from their income tax.
13. On gifting through the East German gift service Genex, see Schneider (2000).
14. Borneman (2000) reports that already with some of the new regulations in the late 1980s, some West Germans were afraid of their East German relatives coming to visit them. Very similar remarks were also made in the presence of a trainee of mine during her research in East Berlin. Müller (2002: 158–62) also reports similar instances.

REFERENCES

- Anderson, B. 1999 [1983]. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Berdahl, D. 1997. *Where the World Ended: Re-unification and Identity in the German Borderland*. Berkely, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.
- Borneman, J. 1997. *Settling Accounts: Violence, Justice and Accountability in Postsocialist Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . 2000. *Belonging in the Two Berlins. Kin, State, Nation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brubaker, R. 1994. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Dietzsch, I. 2000. 'Geschenkpakete—ein Fundamentales Missverständnis. Zur Bedeutung des Paketaustausches in persönlichen Briefwechseln', in Christian Härtel and Petra Kabus Petra (eds), *Das Westpaket: Geschenksendung, keine Handelsware*, pp. 105–20. Berlin: Links.
- . 2004. *Grenzen Überschreiben? Deutsch-deutsche Briefwechsel 1948–1989*. Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau.
- Doering-Manteuffel, A. 1993. 'Die Innerdeutsche Grenze im Nationalpolitischen Diskurs der Adenauer-Zeit', in Bernd Weisbrod (ed.), *Grenzland: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Innerdeutschen Grenze*, pp. 127–40. Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung.
- Gladen, J. 2001. '“Man lebt sich Auseinander”. Von der Schwierigkeit, Verwandte Driüben zu Besuchen', Sachbeiträge 19, Die Landesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR in Sachsen-Anhalt, Magdeburg.
- Gouldner, A. W. 1973. *For Sociology*. New York: Basic Books.

- Härtel, C. and P. Kabus (eds). 2000. *Das Westpaket: Geschenksendung, keine Handelsware*, Berlin: Links.
- Howard, M. A. 1995. 'Die Ostdeutschen als ethnische Gruppe? Zum Verständnis der neuen Teilung des geeinten Deutschlands', *Berliner Debatte Initial* 4/5: 119–31.
- Kabus, P. 2000. 'Liebesgaben für die Zone. Paketkampagnen und Kalter Krieg', in C. Härtel and P. Kabus (eds), *Das Westpaket: Geschenksendung, keine Handelsware*, pp. 121–39. Berlin: Links.
- Kocka, J. 1994. 'Crisis of Unification: How Germany Changes'. In *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Winter 1994: 173–92.
- König, R. 1970. 'Old Problems and New Queries in Family Sociology', in R. Hill and R. König (eds), *Families in East and West. Socialization Process and Kinship Ties*, pp. 504–23, Paris: Mouton.
- Lindner, B. 2000. "'Dein Päckchen nach Drüben". Der Deutsch-Deutsche Paketversand und seine Rahmenbedingungen', in C. Härtel and P. Kabus (eds), *Das Westpaket: Geschenksendung, keine Handelsware*, pp. 25–44, Berlin: Links.
- Mauss, M. 1990. *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*. New York: Norton.
- Meinhof, U. A. 2002. *Living (with) Borders: Identity Discourses on East-West Borders in Europe*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Merkel, I. 1999. *Utopie und Bedürfnis: Die Geschichte der Konsumkultur in der DDR*, Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau.
- Mitterauer, M. 1992. *Familie und Arbeitsteilung: Historischvergleichende Studien*, Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau.
- Müller, B. 2002. *Die Entzauberung der Marktwirtschaft. Ethnologische Erkundungen in Ostdeutschen Betrieben*. Frankfurt a.M. and New York: Campus.
- Osteen, M. (ed.). 2002. *The Question of the Gift: Essay Across Disciplines*. London: Routledge.
- Parry, J. 1986. 'The Gift, the Indian Gift and the "Indian Gift"', *Man*, 21(3): 453–73.
- Rösler M. and T. Wendl (eds). 1999. *Frontiers and Borderlands. Anthropological Perspectives*, Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang.
- Sahlins, M. D. 1965. 'The Sociology of Primitive Exchange', in M. Banton (ed.), *The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology, ASA Monographs* 1, pp. 139–236. London: Tavistock.
- Schneider, F. 2000. 'Ein Loch im Zaun. Schenken über die Genex Geschenkdienst GmbH', in C. Härtel and P. Kabus (eds), *Das Westpaket: Geschenksendung, keine Handelsware*, pp. 193–212. Berlin: Links.
- Schubert, E. 1993. 'Von der Interzonengrenze zur Zonengrenze. Die Erfahrung der Entstehenden Teilung Deutschlands im Raum Duderstadt 1945–1949', in Bernd Weisbrod (ed.). *Grenzland: Beiträge zur Geschichte der innerdeutschen Grenze*, pp. 70–87. Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung.
- Staab, A. 1998. *National Identity in Eastern Germany: Inner Unification or Continued Separation?* Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger.

- Stack, C. B. 2003. *All our Kin: Strategies for Survival in a Black Community*. New York: Basic Books.
- Wagner, H. 1990. 'Die innerdeutschen Grenzen', in A. Demandt (ed.), *Deutschlands Grenzen in der Geschichte*, pp. 240–84. München: C. H. Beck.
- Wieschiolek, H. 1999. 'Separation through Unification. Changing Cultural Models in an East German Factory', in M. Rösler and T. Wendl (eds), *Frontiers and Borderlands. Anthropological Perspectives*, pp. 211–24, Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang.
- Wilson, T. M. and H. Donnan. 1998. *Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Partition of Bengal or Creation of a 'Nation'? Memories of Difference

HABIBUL HAQUE KHONDKER

Measurable or not, subjectivity is itself a fact, an essential ingredient of our humanity (Portelli 1997: 82).

Introduction

The region of Bengal has experienced three partitions in the past 100 years. The three partitions should not be viewed as three episodes in the history of Bengal; rather they may be seen as moments connected by a common theme of Bengali identity influenced by the interplay of religion, linguistic identity, class, and politics of necessity. Bengal was first divided in 1905 by the British colonial rulers, apparently to placate the Bengali Muslims who were ostensibly lagging behind their Hindu compatriots in various indices of socioeconomic development. It was assumed that under a protective geographical space they would do better, hence Dhaka was made capital of East Bengal. The arrangement surely pleased many Muslims but angered the economically powerful and educated Hindus who saw in that a devious 'divide and rule' motive. In the face of massive resistance, the partition was annulled in 1911. Then in 1947, the eastern part of Bengal based on the numerical majority of the Muslims became the eastern wing of Pakistan. The argument for creating Pakistan was advanced on similar justification that the laggard Muslim community needed space for development. In 1971 Bengali Muslims and Hindus, and others fought for the creation of a secular Bangladesh, a sovereign state. The western part of Bengal remained a province of the state of India.

In this chapter, I attempt to explore in a discursive manner the differences in remembering the partition of Bengal in 1947 which, viewed from another angle, was supposedly the birth of a 'nation', Pakistan, of which East Bengal became a part. This chapter raises questions such as why Muslim respondents, especially those who migrated from West Bengal to East Bengal (later East Pakistan), do not show such a sense of loss, yet were not excited over the gain either. This chapter does not provide any definitive answer to this puzzle. Based on a few interviews with a small number of cases, I hypothesize that their attitude can be seen as ambivalent. What does such a differential response tell us about the rationale for the creation of Pakistan and later Bangladesh, or the meaning of the division of Bengal? Could it be that the partition of Bengal initiated by Lord Curzon in 1905 was not really annulled as far as the psyche of the Bengali Muslims was concerned? And whipping up that psyche was the *modus operandi* of the creators of Pakistan. Commenting on the 1946 riots in Calcutta (now Kolkata), one observer noted that

...the cry 'Islam in danger' not only drew armed lungi-clad, drunk Muslims to the pavements of Park Street and Chowringhee in Calcutta or Islampur and Nawabpur in Dhaka, it also reverberated along the bamboo-hedges of rural East Bengal (Annada Shankar Ray quoted in Hashmi 1999: 30–31).

The remnants of such a sentiment, deeply embedded in the religious self, can be found even in present-day Bangladesh politics.

Method of Research

I draw upon memories of my respondents as well as facts that I can ascertain and what I have witnessed. My own subjectivity is pressed into service. I was witness to the birth of Bangladesh by the sheer historical accident of my birth and location. From the end of 1969 to 1975, I attended the University of Dhaka which was at the fulcrum of the independence movement that reached its crescendo in 1971. Some of my friends perished fighting the war of liberation, others were victims of political intrigues that followed. I was witness to the birth of a nation and the attendant problems of political and economic

dislocation. I am at once the author and subject of this study. I am using subjectivity in the sense of Alessandro Portelli, who defines it as follows:

By 'subjectivity', I do not mean the abolition of controls, nor the unrestrained preference, convenience or whim of the researcher. I mean the study of the cultural forms and processes by which individuals express their sense of themselves in history. Thus defined, subjectivity has its own 'objective' laws, structures and maps. They may be less tangible and universal than those of hard facts, but they can be reconstructed by means of the appropriate scientific tools – which include an open mind and a willing imagination (Portelli 1991: ix).

'History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer' (Nora 1989: 8). Although the tension between memory and history cannot be overcome, it is possible to recognize memory as a datum for a broadly conceived history, a history that is self-reflexive and painfully aware of its own limitations. Beyond the official narrative which is inherently biased and the deconstructions of meta-narratives there lies a terrain—contested, though it may be—for historical debates and expositions.

The present research began with interviews with the diasporic Bengalis in Singapore who had second-hand memories passed to them by their parents or grandparents. A number of my respondents asked me to talk to their parents in their 70s and 80s for details. The second-generation diasporic Bengali Hindus from West Bengal apparently left their memories and cultural baggage in Calcutta as in making themselves a new home, they underwent new experiences of loss and gain. The respondents from Bangladesh were not keen on revisiting the past either. In a span of three decades, even the memories of 1971, let alone those of 1947 were dimmed. Migrant communities were too engrossed in selective assimilation into their new abode to preserve the memories. However, the fact that the two communities lived in relative isolation from each other until a Bengali language teaching school brought them in closer contact suggests the power of national borders—artificial or not—in the construction of 'national identities' and communities. The middle-class professionals from Bangladesh were deeply committed to their sense of nationhood and preserved—sometimes romanticized—their memories of the liberation war of 1971. Globalization-induced migration helps people forget and remember at the same time.

The Partitions

The year 2005 marks the centennial of the first partition of Bengal in modern history. Exactly a century ago, the first partition of Bengal took place in 1905. Looking back one would think that the partition of Bengal was nothing more than the old devious colonial ploy of divide and rule. If we are somewhat charitable to the colonial rulers we could, perhaps, accept their rationale that this was to improve the administration of the huge province in terms of population and area. When Lord Curzon, the British viceroy, divided Bengal into two provinces: West Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa comprising one, and East Bengal and Assam the other, the Hindu élite nationalists drawn mainly from the *bhadralok* (educated gentry) class saw it as an attempt to divide and thus subterfuge the growing nationalist movement which was reliant on the unity of the Bengalis. Others saw it as an attempt to placate the Bengali Muslims who were not exactly opposed to the colonial rule but were pressing for autonomy from the domination of the Calcutta-centered Hindu élite. The popular perception that Muslims supported the partition and the Hindus opposed it is simplistic. The brother of the Nawab of Dhaka, Khwajah Atiqullah collected 25,000 signatures and submitted a memorandum opposing the partition (Jalal 2000: 158). The anti-partition movement was 'actively supported' by 'Abdul Rasul, Liakat Hassain, Abul Qasim, and Ismail Hussain Shirazi' (Ahmed 2000: 70). *The Moslem Chronicle*, organ of the Bengali Muslim middle class published from Calcutta, in its first few issues criticized the partition but later changed its position and gave wholehearted support to the government's move (*ibid.*).

The drama of colonial politics of India and its various subplots can only be understood as an intricate triangular game. Although we tend to look at Indian history in terms of opposition and collaboration among the three groups—the colonial rulers, the Hindus and the Muslims—each of these groups in turn represented a variety of positions. As Leonard Gordon, following Fredrick Barth's notion of ethnic boundaries, rightly points out, the dissolution of Pakistan in 1971 has suggested anew that national and ethnic identities are not fixed notions and the very categories of Muslim', 'Hindu', 'Bengali', 'Indian', and 'Pakistani' must be questioned (Gordon 1993: 274).

The partition of 1905 generated a huge outcry from the nationalist Hindus and Muslims alike, who saw in it an attempt to disrupt the

unity of the Bengalis. The Muslim community, especially the masses as well as a section of the élite, supported and even welcomed the decision of partition. According to Leonard Gordon (1993: 201),

The first partition encouraged the idea of Muslim-majority east Bengal and a Hindu-majority west Bengal, or the division of the province on the basis of community, though the British publicly insisted that the partition was made for administrative reasons only. This partition helped arouse Muslim political consciousness and extensive agitation led by Hindus against it'.

The partition was, however, revoked in 1911–12 as pressure against it gathered momentum, especially from the Hindu *bhadralok* class. Yet the division remained. The British rulers, in the opinion of one historian, 'set out deliberately to foster Muslim nationalism as a counter-force' to Bengali nationalism 'but in so doing they released in the sphere of politics a new current which was ultimately beyond their control' (Ray 1984: 185). The communal politics thus created had long-term consequences in the politics of not only Bengal but also the Indian subcontinent.

The partition we are immediately concerned with was the one that created Pakistan and India. The creation of Pakistan was greeted with a sense of jubilation and relief by the Muslim Bengalis in East Bengal (Kamal 2001: 13). Undeniably the Bengali Muslim peasants had a lot of grievances against the predominantly Hindu overlords and unlike the Hindu peasants had a possible escape route in the formation of Pakistan, but the grievances had to be articulated, and voice had to be given, by the Muslim *bhadralok* class. The creation of Pakistan was the result of successful mobilization of the masses by the Muslim *bhadralok* class. Analyzes based on socioeconomic factors alone will not do justice to historical understanding of this complex process. The number of penetrating analyzes notwithstanding, a definitive explanation of this event is as yet not available (Jalal 1996).

It is quite intriguing that the partition of 1947 remains immortalized in books, articles, films, songs, more than the other two partitions. Regarding the independence of Bangladesh which was not a new partition of Bengal, but a reinforcement of earlier historic partitions, there is precious little historical research on it. A good deal of work has been done on the memories of Bengali Hindus who migrated to the Indian side of Bengal in 1947 but not much after 1971. For the Hindus of

Bengal, the partition of 1947 was a loss both in material as well as cultural terms. They lost their material possession, landed property, status, power, and sense of community. They became alienated in their own homeland. After Pakistan was created, ostensibly as a homeland for the Muslims of the region, the Hindus became strangers in their own land. The common theme that runs through literary and cinematic representations is the theme of loss and nostalgia. The novels of Sunil Gangopadhyay (b. 1934), for example, take up the theme of partition of 1947, most notably in *Purbo Paschim (East and West)*, and the films of Ritwik Ghatak (1925–75) for example, continued to deal with the themes of partition well into the 1970s when another partition was superimposed on the earlier one. Little, however, can be found in the social memory of Bengali Muslims who crossed into East Bengal (present Bangladesh) following the partition of 1947. Could it be that the Muslims who crossed into the new country leaving behind their homeland found a new ‘homeland’? Their loss was heavily compensated by the ‘gain’ or the illusion of gain (as turned out to be the case).

The partition of 1947 was a historical fact; the memories of that momentous event vary from community to community. It is not only how people remember but how they preserve their memories; what kind of representations take place in their vocabulary is important. For example, compared to the Bengal partition, more representations and institutionalized memories in the form of books and films can be found on the Punjab partition. Bengal did not undergo the same level of violence for sure. But there was violence, though localized, mainly in Calcutta and Noakhali. Besides, tragedy cannot be simply measured by headcounts. Yet, documented history on the Bengal partition is conspicuous by its absence. It is only in recent years that this silence is being broken in historical research.

1947 as seen through Bengali Muslim Eyes

The murmurings of partition of India into two states, India and Pakistan, gained the status of *fait accompli* after the plebiscite of 1946 in Bengal. By July 1947 most people knew that in mid-August 1947, two states—India and Pakistan—would be created.

INTERVIEW WITH MRS KAMRUNNESA (AGE 80) IN 2005

Mrs Kamrunnesa's family split geographically as a result of the partition. She did not travel with her civil servant father whose job was transferable, and lived on a long-term basis with her uncle who was actively involved in the nationalist politics in India. Her uncle was a member of the Congress Party of India and went to jail for taking part in the salt satyagraha with Mahatma Gandhi.

In 1947, some of her relatives opted for Pakistan and settled in the western part, and some other members of the family went to East Pakistan which was adjacent to West Bengal from where the family hailed. In 1946 at the time of the Hindu-Muslim riots, Kamrunnesa was in her father's house in Salar, Murshidabad. Salar was a predominantly Muslim section of Murshidabad. In fact Murshidabad was a Muslim-majority district and was slated to be part of Pakistan but ultimately it remained part of India. At the time of partition, civil servants were given the choice of opting for either Pakistan or India. Kamrunnesa's husband, a civil servant, opted for Pakistan as it was the aspiration of all young civil servants to rise up in the bureaucratic ladder. A young Muslim officer aspired for career mobility in the independent Pakistan, the ostensible homeland for the Muslims. Her husband was given a posting in Morrelgong in the southern part of East Bengal bordering the Sunderban. Kamrunnesa stayed back at her ancestral home in Murshidabad with her son who was eight months old. Having lost two previous children in their infancy, Kamrunnesa was over-protective of the baby boy and was reluctant to go to an unknown place. Muslims of West Bengal who hailed from *bhadralok* families had their fair share of doubts about the quality of life in the backward regions of East Bengal. Kamrunnesa was also unsure of the medical facilities in the new place. According to her, her husband was very eager to move to Pakistan at the earliest opportunity. Many members of the Muslim *bhadralok* class saw new opportunities in the creation of Pakistan.

Kamrunnesa did not see any riots in 1946 as she was away from Calcutta and Salar. Murshidabad was a Muslim-majority area with almost no possibility of communal tension. As India became split into two new states, she was not affected, except that some members of her family opted for settling in Pakistan. Even before marriage she was

used to moving with Gholam Hossain, her civil servant father. For a young Muslim woman in West Bengal, who led a fairly sequestered life, changes in the political fortune were not of any great relevance. At her husband's insistence who, in her words, used to send 'telegram after telegram to her father' urging the latter to send her to his (husband's) place of work, Kamrunnesa was sent off to East Pakistan accompanied by her brother who was in the final year of college in Bahrapore. According to Kamrunnesa she and her brother took a train at Sealdah, Calcutta which took them all the way to Khulna, East Pakistan. From Khulna, they took a steamer to Morrelgong, a provincial town. Her life in Morrelgong was uneventful and she longed for the annual trip to her father's home in Murshidabad, a practice she continued until 1965 when a war broke out between India and Pakistan over disputes in Kashmir. The war disrupted the annual visits as new and stringent rules on travel were imposed by the governments of Pakistan and India.

The only visible advantage in the creation of Pakistan for Kamrunnesa was the opportunities the new state created for her children, all of whom got college education and decent jobs eventually. In the late 1960s, her mother, by then widowed, and the rest of the family migrated to Jamalpur in East Pakistan through an exchange scheme whereby a landed Hindu *bhadralok* family from Jamalpur migrated to India and took possession of the household in Salar, Murshidabad. Such exchanges were fairly common among *bhadralok* families in Bengal in post-independence Pakistan.

When the nationalist movement was emerging, Kamrunnesa was able to sympathize with the exploited people of East Bengal while her husband remained fairly committed to the idea of Pakistan because as a Muslim student in Calcutta he was associated with the movement for the creation of Pakistan.

INTERVIEW WITH MR BADRUDDOZA (AGE 79) IN 2005

Mr Badruddoza, a retired civil servant, was about 22 or 23 in 1947. A final year B.A. student in Bahrapore, his education in Calcutta was disrupted as a result of World War II. Having finished schooling in a small town, Labpur, in the district of Birbhum he went to study in Calcutta. During the closing years of the World War II, Japanese forces started bombing some of the targets in Bengal, including Calcutta.

This created a great deal of panic and many residents of Calcutta left the lure of a big city and settled for less exciting places such as Bahrapore. So in August 1946 when Hindu–Muslim riots broke out in Calcutta he was safely away in a small Muslim-dominated town. Badruddoza was aware of what was going on. According to his recollections, the riot was confined to Calcutta and later spread to Noakhali; the rest of Bengal remained unaffected. However, he told me that there were sporadic incidents; for example, there was evidence of rioting in a train that passed through Bahrapore. The fateful train carried two unidentified dead bodies.

Badruddoza had a clear recollection of what M.K. Gandhi or M.A. Jinnah said at that time. He quoted Gandhi from memory during the interview. ‘Cut me into two but do not cut India into two’. But Jinnah was unrelenting. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee who was the chief minister of Bengal allegedly said that this would involve separation of Bengal. Jinnah allegedly said: ‘A truncated Pakistan is better than no Pakistan’.

Then, as Badruddoza’s father was transferred to Labpur, he continued his secondary schooling there. One of his very good friends in Labpur was the son of the famous Bengali writer Tarashankar Bandopodhay. According to Badruddoza there was perfect amity among the Hindus and the Muslims. The relationship between them was one of friendliness and cordiality. It is the movement for Pakistan that created animosities. Most of his friends were Hindus. He gave me the names of his friends one by one. The very fact that he could remember the names of his friends after six decades told me a great deal about the intensity of his friendships. Mr Badruddoza who spent nearly four decades of his life serving the government of Pakistan in various capacities was nostalgic over the partition of Bengal in 1947.

INTERVIEW WITH MOSLEMA BEGUM (AGE 75) IN 2005

Moslema Begum was in Calcutta at the time of the communal riots in August 1946. She, like most other girls in her generation, was married off in her teens and was pregnant in 1946. Her first daughter was born months before the riots. She was homebound in the advanced stages of pregnancy. Her father was a clerk in the Ministry of Home Affairs at the Writers Building. Because of heavy monsoons that year she

could not be taken to hospital for her delivery and a doctor was called in. The doctor, Subodh Ghosh, a well-known author, recommended that a surgeon should be seen.

The family lived in Dhakuria, which was an island of Muslims surrounded by Hindu settlements. Her father Mr M.A. Gafur was a long-term resident of that place. At the onset of the communal riots, armed gangs of Hindus would come to the locality and on a number of occasions the Muslims were protected by a Hindu, Mr Shital Banerjee. Moslema Begum was recuperating from childbirth and with her infant had to join the rest of the family in a neighboring hideout where some Adivasis lived. Adivasis were domestic servants in the Muslim areas of Dhakuria. The woman who worked in the household of Moslema Begum had two sons, Ram and Rahim. Moslema Begum recalled that her husband used to tease this woman by saying 'You are safe, no one can harm you; if you are confronted by Muslims tell them you are Rahim's mother and to Hindu attackers identify yourself as Ram's mother'.

After this ordeal the family returned home when things cooled down. It was Shital Babu who came forth again to help. However, when the situation showed no signs of improvement, Shital Babu advised them to migrate to the Muslim-dominated sections of Calcutta where they would be safer. Mr Gafur sought the help of the police to take the family to the safety of Park Circus. Their new household was in Entally, near the Jora Girja. Subsequently, in another raid by Hindu goons, Shital Babu's own nephew, who was leading the Hindu goons in the attack on Muslim households, gunned down Shital Babu.

What is clearly evident in the narrative of Moslema Begum is her distrust of some Hindus who came to attack her family. Yet at the same time, she remembers the sacrifice of Shital Babu, an upper-class/caste Hindu. Moslema Begum was a supporter of Pakistan. Her family migrated to Dhaka almost penniless. Her husband rose from a humble background to become a lawyer in independent Pakistan, life chances made possible by the changed political situation.

BEGUM SHAISTA IKRAMULLAH

In the above narratives we can see that all the respondents shared a common ambivalence. There was no deep sense of loss or nostalgia over the partition of Bengal, nor was there a sense of jubilation. If you

were a young middle-class Muslim woman in Bengal in the 1940s, your ideas were filtered through the prisms of the menfolk in the household. The case of Begum Shaista Ikramullah was an exception. She came from a highly educated Muslim aristocratic family. She was the first Muslim woman to be appointed an ambassador for Pakistan. She wrote a number of important books and articles and left behind her memoirs. As sister of Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, who was the chief minister of Bengal in the mid 1940s and was blamed for Hindu-Muslim riots in Calcutta, she had to defend her brother. Her recollections, drawn from the biography of Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, which I quote at length, shed interesting light on that tragic event:

Throughout his political career Shaheed Bhai [H.S. Suhrawardy] had been blamed for many things. His personality was of the type that aroused great admiration or intense antagonism, but he suffered the most bitter attacks in connection with the Calcutta riots and was the target of calumny and lies. He was accused of planning and organizing the riots with the view of forcing the British to yield to the Muslim League demands, he was accused of neglect in putting down the disturbances once they had started, and he was accused of not providing adequate and sufficient protection for the Hindu areas.

The Calcutta riots of August 1946 were not caused by Shaheed. No one person or organization can be held responsible for them, it was the result of the mounting tension of years. The atmosphere by August 1946 was so charged with hatred that it was inevitable that it would explode into violence. What added to the tension was that the Viceroy who had not gone ahead with the formation of an interim government when the Muslim League had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan, now did so; and to add insult to injury it included Muslims whom the League did not accept as its representatives. All this added fuel to an already smoldering fire and a flare-up was inevitable...

On her return from Delhi during the rioting, Begum Ikramullah gave a vivid account of her trip from the airport to her house.

My house was in Park Circus, so I had to go to the other side of Calcutta and by the time the bus reached my house I was almost the only person remaining in it. As I had feared, anxiety had made my father's condition much worse. He was however greatly relieved to see me back. I was with him and as long as I was there it did not much matter what else happened. The riot in all its frenzy lasted three days, though its aftermath continued for weeks, in fact life and property ceased to be safe in Calcutta from then onwards.

The Hindus had an initial advantage of several hours for the Muslim men were away from their homes and so the slaughter of the women and children took place without any hindrance. That the Muslims retaliated in kind I do not deny, for I do not belong to that school of thought which thinks that its own community or its own nation is incapable of cruelty and brutality. Unfortunately, history has too many proofs to the contrary. Once animal passions of hatred and cruelty are aroused there is nothing to choose between nations and peoples. All I want to say is that the riot as such was not diabolically planned by Shaheed Bhai.

According to Begum Ikramullah, her brother did not even have time to see their ailing father.

It was three or four days after my arrival that Shaheed came one night to our house at about 1.00. He had come because he knew my father was very ill, but he was too tired even to ask how he was. I answered his unspoken question and then walked down the length of the long verandah with him, our arms around each other in silent sympathy for our separate ordeals. His face was grey and haggard and his eyes were bloodshot from lack of sleep for he had spent day and night round the clock doing whatever was humanly possible to stop the carnage. He had moved to the Lal Bazar Police Headquarters to be able to get information and direct operations better. He had a map of Calcutta, spread before him on which he followed the course of the riots in the ill-fated city. As the phone calls came through, aid was rushed to wherever it was needed, Shaheed went to the worst affected areas himself, and tried to get the crowd under control by sheer force of personality. I believe he engaged in hand-to-hand fights more than once, pulling bloodstained swords from the hands of hate-crazed individuals. Even his worst enemies have given him credit for complete fearlessness. This quality somehow had a salutary effect in calming a violent crowd. He was endangering his life all the time. One does not do so if one has planned the bloody orgy oneself. That Shaheed worked like a tiger to quell the riots is well known. There are enough people still alive, both Hindus and Muslims, who can bear testimony to it, but for me the greatest proof was the look on his face during those days. It was a look of anguish and suffering. No man who looked as stricken as Shaheed did, could have deliberately planned the riots. No one who knew Shaheed could believe it, for he was a most compassionate man and violence was abhorrent to him. Each time the turning point in his career came after violence. In 1926 he left the Congress after the first Calcutta riots, and twenty years afterwards, in 1946, the carnage of the second Calcutta riots led him to seek Gandhi's help in preventing a repetition of it and thus eventually cost him his future in the state which he had helped create.

As soon as the Bengal Legislative Council was in session, an adjournment motion to discuss the failure of law and order was moved and a few days later a no-confidence motion against the Chief Minister personally and the Ministry in general was moved.

The no-confidence motion was tabled on 21 September. The adjournment motion had been tabled in a hurry, but the no-confidence motion was a studied affair with all the guns aimed at Shaheed Bhai and the Muslim League. The Congress and the Mahasabha leaders literally tore Shaheed Bhai to pieces. He was accused of wilful murder, arson, and loot. Member after member got up and excelled each other in vilification. This orgy of hatred lasted for two days at the end of which Shaheed Bhai made a civilized, moderate, and humane speech. He explained what he had tried to do to stem the tide of violence. He began by saying, 'Before I say anything I want to express my heartfelt sorrow, sympathy and regret for the victims of this holocaust and their relations'.

The tone of his speech was in marked contrast to the tirade from his opponents. The Governor, Sir Fredrick Burrows, in his letter to the Viceroy makes a special mention of its moderation.

The motion against the Ministry was defeated by 131 votes to 87 and the motion against the Chief Minister by 130 to 85. The Opposition, though defeated, did not desist in its efforts. So persistent were they and so completely in control of the media, that these charges reverberated through the length and breadth of India. Though there had been riots before the Calcutta riots and there were riots later, which were as terrible as that of Gurmukteshwar and as devastating as the Bihar riots which were virtually genocide, they are not even remembered. But the Calcutta riots are stamped in the minds of the people as the Great Calcutta Killing. Such is the power of propaganda (Ikramullah 1991: 54-57).

It is quite interesting that the narrator here, the sister of the man blamed for Calcutta riots, resorts to comparisons and raises the possibility of unequal media attention as she contends that the other riots such as the ones in Bihar were even more horrific and did not receive as much attention.

Partition of 1971—Not-so-Distant Memories

The emergence of Bangladesh was not really a new division or partition of Bengal; it was a reinforcement of the 1947 partition. Bangladesh was the new name of East Bengal, a territory that was known as East Pakistan from 1947 to 1971. What is ironic about the creation of the

new state was that the *raison d'être* for creating Bangladesh was to build a secular state on the ashes of Pakistan, a professedly Islam-based state. Unfortunately within less than four years of the country's independence, a brutal military coup killed the symbol of Bengali nation and rolled back the history creating a quasi-religious state by effectively demonizing secularism.

I was born in the middle of the 20th century, in 1952, in Khulna, Bangladesh, in a migrant family from West Bengal. The same year the movement for establishing Bengali as a state language began. In the late 1960s when I was in school and was able to follow the political processes, the movement for provincial autonomy grew in East Pakistan under the charismatic leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. In the elections of 1970 when the Awami League won a landslide victory winning 167 of the 170 seats, I was in the freshman class of Dhaka University. In 1971, when the Pakistan military cracked down in Dhaka to stem the mounting protests, I, like many other students, fled Dhaka. Others were not so fortunate. Scores of students and teachers of Dhaka University were gunned down. The University was the center of political activism and thus became the first target of brutal repression.

Although Sheikh Mujib was arrested and taken away to a jail in Pakistan under the cover of darkness, he was very much present in spirit and inspired the liberation struggle. Bengalis who were painted as a passive, romantic, soft-hearted people proved these stereotypes wrong. With active support from neighboring India, they put up a war of resistance. Many young guerrillas, many of them my friends, fought fearlessly. I kept in close contact with some of them. However, after one of my guerrilla friend's mother was taken into custody and brutally murdered, I panicked. Along with my mother and younger siblings, I fled our home and retreated to a village. My older brothers and father were in other places. My family, like many others, became temporarily separated by the ravages of the war.

The liberation war ended with the surrender of the Pakistani armed forces to the joint command of the Indian and Bangladeshi forces in Dhaka on 16 December 1971. I retreated to the safety of my aunt's house. The next day, however, I braved my way to the stadium to see the legendary freedom fighter 'Tiger' Kader Siddiqui speak. Kader Siddiqui along with Air Cdr. A.K. Khondkar and Maj. Haider were the three Bangladeshis who were present at the surrender ceremony, as can be

seen in the ubiquitous photograph of the surrender ceremony at the Race Course from where *Bangabandhu* Sheikh Mujib gave his call for independence. What could not be seen was the presence of Major Shafiullah since he was not in the photograph.

Tiger Siddiqui spoke with passion and fire. He brought a man on the stage and said, 'Ladies and gentlemen, this man was being robbed but because of my intervention the attempt has been foiled'. Sensing some misunderstanding, he tried to clarify the situation. He said, 'Please do not misunderstand, this man was being robbed. He did not rob anyone. No the robber...I finished him on the spot'. He said that in such a matter-of-fact manner, his nonchalance sent a chill down my spine. This is what war does to the human psyche. Feelings are numbed. Emotions are deadened.

I remember the day my friend's father was executed in the early stages of the war of liberation. His only fault was that he was a Hindu. Of course, I never thought of him as a Hindu. On that fateful morning, I saw the son of a local *maulana*, accompanied by an accomplice heading for the house of Mr Bose with a gun in hand. A few days back I had helped my friend, Tapan, escape. I had not realized that Mr Bose's life was in danger too. Why should a cherubic personality like Mr Bose be a target? As the assassins approached his house, I returned to my room and turned on the radio to the maximum volume. I did not want my mother and my younger siblings to hear the report of the gun. I heard the report, nevertheless, as the birds fluttered away in fear.

The nationalist movement in Bangladesh (erstwhile East Pakistan) during the Pakistan period (1947–71) was defined as the movement for the emancipation of the Bangales, a movement that grew on account of the exploitation of East Pakistan by the upper classes—landed élite, newly emerging industrial class, and a military–bureaucratic oligarchy—in West Pakistan (mainly Punjab). The nationalist movement which started off as a movement for securing provincial and regional autonomy coined the phrase: '*Amra Bangalee*' (We are Bengalis). Bangladesh was born out of blood. On 7 March 1971, Sheikh Mujib called his people to stand up and fight for self-rule and for independence. He said: 'Once we have shed our blood, we will give more blood and earn our independence, *Inshallah*'. That was a defining moment in the history of Bengali nationalism. Bengali is the name of the language and those who use Bengali are generally called 'Bangalee' in the vernacular or 'Bengali' in the anglicized form.

And as the movement for autonomy and self-determination was graduating into self-rule, 'Joi Bangla' or 'Long Live Bengal' became the battle cry. In his landmark speech on 7 March 1971 the nationalist leader Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared, '75 million Bangalees cannot be kept subdued'. This speech had an electrifying impact on the Bengali audience. The struggle for self-rule led to the war of independence for Bangladesh. As the Pakistani army cracked down on 25 March 1971 there was no point of return. India provided both moral and material support—though initially, clandestine—for the independence war which was crucial for the defeat of the Pakistani military in less than a year's time.

The frustrations amassed as quickly as the expectations. The government was new, lacked resources and experiences, and was saddled with the gargantuan task of rebuilding a war-torn economy, and a ruptured society. Administration was not Sheikh Mujib's forte. Mistakes were made. However, his sincerity and love for his people were beyond any doubt. Bangladesh in the first three years had to go through a series of crises including serious food shortage. The famine that was predicted for 1972 eventually came in 1974. The government did its best to tackle the situation. Yet, its legitimacy was weakened (Khondker 1984).

The coup of 15 August 1975 took place at a time when things were beginning to get better. In the subsequent years, the political fortune of Bangladesh changed. The military regime gradually assumed a civilian rule. Yet, sadly, the murderers of Sheikh Mujib were not only not tried for their heinous crime, some of them were given diplomatic assignments. The impunity ended only after Sheikh Hasina, Mujib's daughter was elected the prime minister in 1996. It took almost 22 years before the killers of the nationalist leader were tried in a civil court under the existing laws of the country. But the change did not last, the secularist Awami League government too failed to restrain corruption and ensure its sustainability. In 2001, a coalition government comprising Jaamat-i-Islami and other pro-Islamic parties took office. Within days of their taking over the reins of political power, violence was unleashed against the Hindu minority and the political opponents (Rafi 2005: 76–83).

The Bengal partition of 1905 was annulled in 1911 and Pakistan, based on Islam, was created in 1947 and undone in 1971. Yet the ghost of Pakistan, that is the spirit of political space based on religion, continues to haunt Bangladesh.

REFERENCES

- Ahmed, A. F. Salahuddin. 2000. *Bengali Nationalism and the Emergence of Bangladesh*. Dhaka: International Center for Bengal Studies.
- Gordon, Leonard. 1993. 'Divided Bengal: Problems of Nationalism and Identity in 1947 Partition', in Mushirul Hasan (ed.), *India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Hashmi, T. I. 1999. 'Peasant Nationalism and the Politics of Partition: The Class-Communal Symbiosis in East Bengal 1940–1947', in Ian Talbot and G. Singh (eds), *Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab, and the Partition of the Subcontinent*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Ikramullah, Shaista Suhrawardy. 1991. *Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy: A Biography*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Jalal, Ayesha. 1996. 'Secularists, Subalterns and the Stigma of Communalism: Partition Historiography Revisited', *Modern Asian Studies*, 30(3): 681–737.
- . 2000. *Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam Since 1850*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Kamal, Ahmed. 2001. *Kaler Kollol: Bangladesh (1947–2000)* (in Bengali). Dhaka: Mouli Prakashani.
- Khondker, Habibul. 1984. 'Governmental Response to Famine: A Case Study of 1974 Famine in Bangladesh'. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pittsburgh, USA.
- Nora, Pierre. 1989. 'Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire', *Representations*, 26 (Spring): 7–24.
- Portelli, Alessandro. 1991. *The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- . 1997. *The Battle of Valle Giulia: Oral History and the Art of Dialogue*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Rafi, Mohammad. 2005. *Can We Get Along? An Account of Communal Relationship in Bangladesh*. Dhaka: Panjeree Publications.
- Ray, Rajat. 1984. *Social Conflict and Political Unrest in Bengal: 1875–1927*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

The Surang (Tunnel) of Madanpura **Partition Motif in Banaras**

VASANTHI RAMAN

The partition of the Indian subcontinent into the two nation-states of India and Pakistan continues to impact the lives of Muslims in India. Scholarly literature has confined the discussion of the impact of partition to an analysis of its causes, generally traced to the divisive policies of the British and/or the approach of the Muslim League under the leadership of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, which gave rise to the two-nation theory. It is only in the 1990s that the conspiracy of silence that characterized partition was broken, and simplistic understandings began to give way to more nuanced analyses.

The motif of partition continues to reverberate in the contemporary politics of India in subtle, ambivalent, and subterranean ways. We explore this ambivalence through the use of the metaphors of tunnel (*surang*), *tana-bana*, (the warp and weft), the line of control (LOC) and the phenomenon termed as 'mini-Pakistan'.¹ While the metaphor of the tunnel, symbolizing darkness and thereby mystery, denotes the element of 'conspiracy' often attributed to the motives of Indian Muslims, the metaphor of *tana-bana*, (from the Banarasi sari industry) refers to the actual experience of Hindu-Muslim relations and also connotes a desired ideal. Both metaphors refer to two kinds of social processes: one suggestive of ghettoization accompanied by stereotyping, leading to vilification of an entire community and therefore connoting separation; the other affirming integration/assimilation and coexistence. The phenomenon of 'mini-Pakistan' and the LOC are more recent metaphors to describe the two processes of separation and coexistence, the LOC being a more guarded and pragmatic response to the situation of the 1990s, compared to the more positive and affirmative one of *tana-bana*.

Partition continues to have an impact on the lives of Muslims in India in varied and complex ways. The response of the Muslims of north India has been broadly of two kinds; one is a refusal to openly discuss it since it happened over a half century ago and the generation that was affected is supposed to have passed on. It would seem, however, that while there is a simmering feeling of resentment, overtly, there is a desire to get on with the business of living. However, continued and pervasive communal discrimination periodically erupting into communal violence since independence/partition prevents Muslims from forgetting partition.

While there have been incidents of communal strife since the 1950s, the 1990s inaugurated a phase of violence which brought back the leit-motif of partition with a vengeance. Our attempt in this chapter is to explore the complex and contradictory nature of Hindu–Muslim relations in Banaras in the 1990s with a specific focus on the plight of Muslims. It is important to note that the overwhelming majority of Banaras Muslims are Momin Ansaris, originally known as *Julahas*, an artisan caste of weavers who converted to Islam at various points of time over the last 200 years. We focus on Madanpura in Banaras, a microcosm illustrative of processes whereby, despite the heroic and resilient efforts of Muslims to become ‘prosperous citizens’ of India, the area continues to be stigmatized as a ‘mini-Pakistan’ and the residents, by definition, traitors. Indeed, it is ironical that the Momin Ansari Muslims of Banaras are so targeted, given the fact that the All-India Momin Conference, an important organization of the Momin Ansaris, was staunchly opposed to the Muslim League and passed a resolution against partition in the 1940s.

We focus on four aspects: (a) the demonization of Madanpura; (b) the commonly used metaphor of *tana-bana* and the contradictory nature of Hindu–Muslim relations in the city arising out of the involvement of both Hindus and Muslims in the sari business; (c) the question of social boundaries—the term line of control or LOC, (used to refer to the border between India and Pakistan) piquantly used by Ateeq Ansari, our informant and journalist, to refer to relations between Hindus and Muslims in Banaras; and (d) the phenomenon of ‘mini-Pakistans’.

Stereotyping, demonization, and/or vilification is not a recent phenomenon; it has a long history going back at least a 150 years. We dwell

on this to trace its historical roots, though the essentializing and stereotyping of Muslims in the current period has its own specific features. Before discussing features of 'Muslim' Banaras, the manner in which 'Hindu' Banaras has been constructed needs to be foregrounded since this has an important bearing on the manner in which Muslims are represented today.

The Construction of Hindu Banaras

The construction and representation of Banaras as a sacred Hindu city has been its significant characteristic for the last 200 years. While this construction took concrete shape in the 19th century, it continues to influence the city's portrayal even today. Needless to say, the construction of Banaras as a 'Hindu' city, by definition blots out certain other features of the city.

The project of portraying Banaras not only as Hindu but at the core of the development of religion in the entire subcontinent from the earliest of times was encouraged by the British. The earliest British administrators relied on information on the city and its traditions provided by Brahmins (Cohn 1987: 44–76). Indigenous Sanskritic traditions melded with western colonial and orientalist perceptions to perpetuate the myth of the city as Hindu, and Hinduism as a centrally organized religion (Dalmia 1997: 52–55). On the other hand, the Imperial Gazetteer of 1909 also noted the plural and expansive character of Hindu religion (Nevill 1909: 90–91).

Thus the myth of Banaras grew, and as Dalmia pithily points out:

In this joint Orientalist-nationalist reconstruction the religion and culture sought to be fixed were not only clearly 'Hindu', they were clearly high-caste. Thus they were exclusive both of the lower orders within what came to constitute Varna Hindu society and, of course, the non-Hindu (Dalmia 1997: 431).

Thus, the great weaver philosopher Kabir and his illustrious teacher Ramanand, who challenged Brahmanical hegemony and propagated a casteless devotion, were marginalized. Needless to say, the tradition of the Buddha and the intellectually vibrant discourses and debates that challenged Brahminism find little place in this narrative of Banaras.

Buddhism has been 'assimilated' within Hinduism and the Buddha is just another *avatar* (incarnation) in the Hindu pantheon (Raman 2002: 325).

An important element in the construction of 'Hindu' Banaras and in a sense parallel to it, has been the portrayal of the supposed inherent and unrelenting hostility between Hindus and Muslims. Corresponding to this is an assumption regarding the homogeneous character of both of these communities which elides over the internal differentiation within them. While scholarly work on Banaras has focused on the analysis of 18th and 19th century Banaras society (Dalmia 1997; Freitag 1990; Pandey 1991), it is however the period of the 1920s and 1930s that has been regarded as crucial for the subsequent developments that eventually led to the partition of the subcontinent on religious lines. At this time there is a transition from the diffuse development of a Hindu cultural identity to the beginnings of political Hinduism.

Nita Kumar's important study of artisans of Banaras, was probably the only one of its kind to explore, historically, the social and cultural articulations of subaltern communities in contemporary times (Kumar 1988). The traditions of a 'Hindu' Banaras created over the last century and a half reverberate in the society and politics of the city, though in different ways. For one, it is now an acknowledged 'truth' that the city is predominantly Hindu. For another, Hinduization has proceeded apace involving further homogenization accompanied by marginalization of other traditions, whether it be the tradition of the subaltern groups of the lower castes, or that of the Muslims. This has also invariably meant the hardening of barriers to communication across communities. Today, Banaras has acquired importance in the strategy of consolidation of Hindutva (Hindu right wing) forces from the mid 1980s onwards, with the city becoming important in Hindutva's symbolic narrative and strategy of political mobilization. (Casolari 2002: 1414)

Stereotyping the Muslims of Banaras

The Muslims of Banaras, constituting one-quarter of the city's population and forming the core of the Banarasi sari industry find no place in standard accounts of the city. The great majority of Banaras Muslims are, we have seen, Momin Ansaris, originally *Julahas* who converted to Islam.

THE 'BIGOTED JULAHA'

Pandey's pioneering work details the social processes and the reality behind the colonial stereotype of the bigoted *Julaha* (Pandey 1990). Even scholars such as Francis Robinson refer to the 'bigotry' of the *Julahas* (Robinson 1993: 27). A negative image of the *Julahas* was also prevalent among the agricultural classes and their proverbs (Rai 2004). The response of the *Julahas* was to strive for a new identity within Islam and to seek legitimacy within the religio-cultural framework of Islam. This explains the movement from *Julahas* to Momin Ansaris.

MADANPURA

According to the Census of 2001, the municipal ward of Madanpura in the city of Banaras (Varanasi)² is inhabited by 1,530 households having a total population of 11,992, the overwhelming majority of whom are Momin Ansaris while the adjoining locality of Rewri Talaab has 1,297 households with a total population of 9,166. Generally, the two areas are spoken of in the same breath and share similar characteristics even though Madanpura is more commonly used to refer to the two areas. We shall use Madanpura to refer to both these areas.

The residents of Madanpura enjoy a special status among Banaras Muslims. Madanpura is a fairly prosperous locality where most of the well-to-do *gaddidars* (literally those who sit on *gaddis* (mattresses), but commonly used to refer to businessmen) and businessmen have their shops and establishments and homes. Madanpura is known for its superior quality of silk weaving and is also the most affected during periods of communal tension when properties and productive assets are destroyed. In the 'riot' of 1991, Madanpura was the most affected and rich and prosperous residents were targeted. The Muslims of Madanpura are considered the élite of Banaras Muslims. They are held in awe for their wealth and status by the residents of other *mohallas* (localities); there is also an element of envy, even as they are maligned by many Hindus. In fact there is a certain aura of mystery that surrounds Madanpura; ordinary Hindus living in other areas have hardly been to Madanpura. We were even warned by well-meaning Hindus to be careful during our trips there. There had been a subtle and insidious demonization at work with sections of the media imagining that there were secret underground tunnels (*surang*) and transmitters with

which they communicate with 'enemies'. In fact, the existence of underground tunnels had already assumed the character of 'truth' with some newspapers carrying stories which gave the whole matter a stamp of legitimacy. Madanpura was designated as 'mini-Pakistan' during the riot of 1991 in Banaras, with many deaths and continued curfew which was said to have lasted 45 days.

However, Madanpura has not always been the haven of the rich and the élite. Recalling Madanpura of the mid-1940s and the years just prior to independence, an 83-year-old businessman from Rewri Talaab, Haji Mohd. Ishaq Ansari³ stated:

People are talking of '*mandi*' (slump) in the market nowadays and its impact on the '*bunkars*' (weavers) and starving. People nowadays do not know what real starvation means. In the period just before independence and partition in 1947, the people of Madanpura hardly ate once a day. In this very Rewri Talaab where you are sitting, there was a pond and people would sit with fishing rods the whole day hoping to catch fish, but of course there were no fish. In Madanpura and Rewri Talaab, people today ask each other in the morning, 'Have you had *basi* (breakfast)?' The word '*basi*' (stale) has come from those days in the 1940s when people only ate the stale left-overs of the previous night for breakfast. There was so little to eat. Even today, many Madanpurias perhaps may not even know the origin of this usage; it has become part of the Madanpuria's lexicon.

The political aspirations of the Momin Ansaris were crystallized and articulated in the formation of the All India Momin Conference, also known as Jamaat-ul-Ansar in 1911. The Momin Conference articulated the aspirations and dilemmas of the weavers. British rule was held responsible for the plight of artisans and the destruction of their way of life. The Conference aimed to revive the traditional crafts of weavers, promote self-respect and devout religious conduct among the weavers and restore their independent status. Due to its firm anti-colonial stand, the Conference was closer to the Indian National Congress than the Muslim League, the latter being perceived a party of élite Muslims while the Momin Conference saw itself as articulating the interests of ordinary Muslims. It is significant that in the 1940s the Momin Conference passed a resolution against the partition of the country (Gooptu 2001). Even today, most articulate Muslim men from Madanpura and Banaras recall wistfully the wisdom and statesmanship of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who had passionately appealed to

the Muslims to stay back in 1947 since this was their *watan* (land) and there could be no other *watan*.

A recent book on the Momin Ansaris of Madanpura (in Urdu) also refers to this passionate appeal of Azad to Muslims (Abassi 2002). It would seem that a large majority of the Momin Ansaris of Banaras and Madanpura stayed back in 1947 though they did migrate to other cities such as Bangalore and Surat. Most of those who migrated, took to dyeing and polishing of *zari*. However, in Surat, they started working on powerlooms. A major wave of migration out of Madanpura to Bangalore started in the 1990s (*ibid.*: 71–79)

Since the 1970s, the community of the Momin Ansaris in Madanpura and in Banaras has become differentiated, and a small though significant section of *gaddidars* has emerged as entrepreneurs and businessmen from the ranks of weavers and master weavers. They are quite prosperous and visible. This represents a good example of capitalism from below, from the ranks of the producers. However, it is important to reiterate that the Banarasi sari business is still dominated by the Hindu traders and financiers. The fact that the weavers are still predominantly Muslim (particularly in the highly skilled art of silk weaving) and the buyers and traders predominantly Hindu, constitutes the basis for interdependence. However, many Hindu lower-caste groups (Koeris, Mallahs, and some Dalit castes) have also taken to the occupation of weaving. The large majority of Momin Ansaris are still ordinary weavers in very straitened circumstances, trying to eke out a livelihood (Raman 2002: 336).

The Surang of Madanpura

While Muslims have been victims of a certain kind of stereotyping for a long time, the 1990s inaugurated a demonization of Muslims which was unparalleled, at least since independence. The leitmotif of partition resurfaced with vengeance and ferocity and on a wider scale unknown since the partition. The tunnels of Madanpura were the creation of the media: Hindi newspapers resorted to sensational reportage, blurring the distinction between fact and fiction to such an extent that the tunnels tended to acquire the character of undisputed truth.

Dainik Jagran (Daily Awakening) and *Aaj* (Today) during the Banaras riots of 1991 excelled in sensational stories, abetted in spreading rumors

which ignited passions further, and overall were unabashedly open in their support for Hindus. Both newspapers reported the presence of underground tunnels in Madanpura, transmitters, petrodollars, and the presence of the ubiquitous Pakistan hand. When the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) of the state of Uttar Pradesh, Mrs Jyotsna Srivastava was asked about the '*surang*', she is reported to have said that it could not be seen with ordinary eyes, but required a 'military machine'. Many Hindu women residents of the area were confident about the existence of a *surang* and did not want to go there. Pradeep Kumar, a journalist writing on 24 November 1991 in the *Bharat Doot* (The Bharat Messenger), a Hindi newspaper known for its unbiased reporting, states: 'The administration is still trapped in the tunnels of Madanpura' (Khan 1993: Annexure V).

The *Dainik Jagran* became a prominent daily of northern India during the late 1980s and now it is one of the newspapers with the largest circulation in cities like Allahabad and Varanasi. It has undoubtedly played a major role in building consensus in favor of the Hindutva forces as far as north India is concerned. Communal tensions in Madanpura and its adjoining areas started on 8 November 1991. The tension and violence that erupted after the stone-pelting on the idol of goddess Kali's procession in Madanpura took the lives of more than half a dozen Muslims.

The residents of Madanpura and Rewari Talaab would find it difficult to forget the atrocities of the police and the para-military force of the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) that they had to face after the violence of 13 November 1991. The *Dainik Jagran*, however, unabashedly went on to justify the actions taken by the police and the administration of the city, which violated the basic rights of the residents of these localities and put a big question mark on the responsibilities of the state toward its citizens. The newspaper floated the idea that this riot was pre-planned. In its detailed reports of the riots of 13 November, it highlighted the 'unruly' and 'fanatical' nature of the Muslims of the Madanpura. It valorized the act of one of the police officers of the area in opening fire without permission to control such an unruly mob (14 November 1991). It also focused on the residents throwing bombs and stones on the police. Such 'details' prepared the ground to justify subsequent police atrocities. However, details of the police atrocities were missing from the pages of the newspapers and were only mentioned very casually.

That one of the most prominent leaders of the community and an important political figure of Madanpura and Banaras city, Dr Anees Ansari, was brutally killed in police custody was not big news for the newspaper. Dr Anees' death was mentioned vaguely as the death of a doctor of Madanpura (15 November 1991). The newspaper, without going into the details of the death of Dr Ansari, conveniently echoed the police statement that Dr Ansari was trying to protect the rioters and that the police found a few missing people in his house. While talking to the family members of Dr Anees Ansari and other local residents during our fieldwork, we were told that Dr Anees's murder was pre-planned. He was dragged to the police station and was brutally beaten to death. (We were also told by an ex-policeman⁴ who would like to remain anonymous that there was a conspiracy to kill important leaders of the community, including Swaleh Ansari, the then mayor of the city. However, he managed to escape the dragnet of the conspiracy.) An immediate combing and search operation was ordered in the Madanpura and Rewri Talaab areas by the city administration.

In the pages of *Dainik Jagran*, no mention was made of the difficulties, atrocities, and humiliation that the residents of Rewri Talaab and Madanpura had to face during the so-called combing operations. On the other hand, the paper lost no opportunity to discuss the difficulties that the police force had to face while entering the dense lanes and houses of Madanpura. It quoted a police officer saying that the police had to break at least 50 locks in order to enter a house! (15 November 1991). Madanpura was portrayed as a kind of fortress which was difficult to penetrate.

In contrast to this, there was almost no space for stories of victims. The tales of the systematic loot and verbal and physical assault of men, women, and children by the PAC were completely glossed over. The pain and anguish of the families and individuals of the neighborhood found no place in this newspaper.

Madanpura had not only emerged as a center of flourishing Muslim traders and businessmen but along with Rewri Talaab, also provided leadership to the Muslim community of Varanasi. In the context of the emergence of Hindutva as a more aggressive force in the early 1990s, a neighborhood like Madanpura, economically strong and politically vibrant, was perceived as a potent threat. Acting like a true party organ, *Dainik Jagran*, converted Madanpura into the hub of the

activities of Muslim 'fundamentalists' and 'anti-nationals'. Thus it saw a political motive behind the riots of 13 November.

The editorial of 16 November 1991, opined that the communal violence of Madanpura was meant to defame the BJP government of UP. It is from this lens that it viewed all incidents. The communal violence of Varanasi was portrayed as an outcome of the provocative statements made by Maulana Bukhari, the then Imam of the Jama Masjid of Delhi. In this process, the paper openly downplayed the role of the activists of the Bajrang Dal and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. The newspaper slotted people like Maulana Bukhari into the category of 'anti-nationals'. It also vehemently criticized other political parties for not opposing people like Bukhari.

As a result, according to *Dainik Jagran*, Varanasi, which had been known as one of the prominent centers of Hindu religion and tradition, became a nightmare for the Hindus (20 November 1991, editorial). In the same editorial, the newspaper criticized the Janata Dal and other political parties for commenting on the police atrocities in Madanpura. It said that such statements demoralized the police force and the administration. So, we find that the newspaper presented not only a biased picture but also tried to create opinion in favor of the Hindutva forces.

Aaj, is another Hindi newspaper with a wide circulation in the region. It started as a nationalist newspaper during the freedom movement from Varanasi and is still quite popular among the Hindi-speaking people of the region. In post-independence India, it was known for its pro-Congress leanings. During the 1970s, it was full of anti-Pakistan reports and discussed most of the national and local events in the same light. So, in April–June 1972, when students of the Aligarh Muslim University along with some other organizations and individuals, started protesting against the proposed Aligarh Muslim University Bill, they were labeled as anti-nationals.

Aaj, also came out with the reports of the police search in the area and the difficulties that the police had to face in these operations. It provided detailed reports about communal violence in Madanpura being pre-planned and to support this it published pictures of country-made guns and other weapons that the police had supposedly found (15 November 1991). *Aaj* highlighted the complicated geography of Madanpura which gave ample scope to the rioters to hide from

the police. It ignored altogether the fact that almost all Varanasi neighborhoods present the same picture geographically!

Aaj also published a series of features entitled 'Why do riots break out in Madanpura' (26–29 November 1991), wherein the geographical expansion of the Madanpura area was cited as a perpetual source of fear and anxiety for the Hindus. It noted that neo-rich and upwardly mobile Muslims were continuously buying properties and houses from the Hindus of the adjoining neighborhoods, Devnathpura, Jangambari, and Pande Haveli, thus intensifying the sense of insecurity among the Hindus. Referring to the fear generated amongst the majority community due to the 'fanatic' and 'aggressive' nature of the Mohurram processions and the disruptive attitude of Muslims to Hindu processions, it concluded that Madanpura was a serious threat to the city. The so-called secular leaders were urged to think about the problems that Madanpura was posing to the administration and police force of the city.

In another piece of the same series (27 November 1991), the paper reiterated popular myths about Madanpura, about its secret hiding places, basements and tunnels, some houses being equipped with transmitters! Old decaying buildings, giving way to solid fort-like structures led the paper to ask: In the era of modern architecture, what could possibly be the rationale for having such fort-like structures? In conclusion, concerns for safety of lives and property still begged the question 'Why should they be so bothered about their safety? Do they not trust the administration and non-Muslim population of the city?' The feature pointed out that the dwellers of the mysterious forts of Madanpura ran all kinds of illegal businesses in their basements and even the police and administration could not do much to stop them. It was conveniently forgotten that barring a few areas, Varanasi was a thickly populated cluster of narrow lanes and alleys. In this setting, new houses were being built in the available spaces to address the needs of a new affluent section of traders and master weavers with the resources to build better and bigger houses.

The article cited the fact that the Hindu community had a monopoly over the sari trade in Banaras but in the past few years, some powerful Muslims had successfully mobilized Muslim weavers in the name of religion. These Muslim weavers sold their saris directly to Muslim *gaddidars*. This emerging trend had seriously challenged the monopoly of the Hindus over the trade. Madanpura had flourished a bit too fast, a fact that Hindu businessmen found threatening. It is clear

therefore that the local print media was aware of the fact that business rivalry had been a major reason for targeting Madanpura and Rewri Talaab.

Fieldwork among residents of Madanpura and Rewri Talaab and other residents/scholars of Banaras, suggests a reality more complex than that portrayed by the media. In the next section, we explore the metaphor of *tana-bana*, the warp and the weft, which is most commonly used to refer to or to describe the relations between the Hindus and the Muslims in Banaras.

Tana-Bana: The Warp and the Weft

There are two contradictory aspects of Hindu-Muslim relations that are significant: On the one hand the city has acquired a reputation of being riot-prone and on the other, it is also perceived as one of mutual interdependence between the two communities. In fact the dominant metaphor is of *tana-bana*, the two communities being the warp and the weft of the Banarasi sari. Hindu women constitute the major customers of the Banarasi sari and no north Indian wedding is complete without the bride being draped in a Banarasi sari. How ironical that at the most auspicious ceremony of the Hindu, the wedding, it is the craft of the ritually-polluting Muslim weaver that occupies pride of place!

Over the last three decades and more, the city has seen riots which temporarily bring life to a standstill, particularly in Muslim-dominated pockets in the city, like Madanpura, Jaitpura, Alaipura, Bajardiha. In these riots, as in most others, it is principally Muslim lives that are lost, properties of Muslims and, more importantly, their looms are destroyed. It has been pointed out by some scholars that the metaphor of *tana-bana* is really a euphemism to characterize a relation that has essentially been one of domination and subordination.

A general perception of the phenomenon of communal violence in the city is that it is the direct outcome of the rise of a significant business and merchant class among the Ansaris which eroded the hegemony of the Hindu merchant groups. While the beginnings of this process can be dated to the 1940s, the social impact was visible only in the 1970s when, during the riots of this period, the Momin Ansari businessmen decided to make their own links to the market both nationally and internationally. Even middle-level but rising Ansaris from the

not-so-prosperous Jaitpura, like Riazul Haque Ansari⁵ share the perception that the purpose of the riots is to put an end to the hard-earned prosperity of sections of the Ansaris (as evidenced in the destruction of the looms) and to break the morale of the Muslims.

In the 1990s, the ascendance of the Hindutva forces in the politics of the nation and the state of Uttar Pradesh, gave the nature of riots a qualitatively a new dimension. There was an element of cynical premeditation with the express purpose of destroying the morale of Muslims by annihilating the leadership of the community (as is seen in the case of the murder of Dr Anees and Dr Nomani. Besides, both were important members of opposition political parties, the Congress and the Janata Dal, respectively). It has been said that the riot of 1991 was directed against the 'rich Madanpura' (Raman 2002: 334).

What is of significance to us is that both the phenomena—that is the demonization of Madanpura and Muslims, and the metaphor of *tana-bana* coexist simultaneously. Both are equally part of the social reality of the Banaras Muslims. How can we explain this? One possible explanation is that while the right-wing Hindutva forces would like a deeper divide between Hindus and Muslims, the economic interests of both Hindus and Muslims in the Banarasi sari business are so inter-linked that both the groups would swear by the slogan of *tana-bana*.

Discussions with Muslim businessmen in the sari business in Madanpura and Rewri Talaab revealed that the identity of being businessmen first, uncontaminated by sectarian divisions based on religion was very much cherished, however fragile such an identity may be. By and large, the same could be said for the Hindu traders and businessmen. Haji Mohd. Ishaq Ansari, in the course of a discussion, vehemently refuted the idea that the Hindu-Muslim question could even enter the sphere of business: 'The sari is not Hindu or Muslim!'

Despite such a firm assertion by Haji Mohd. Ishaq Ansari and many others, the fact is that historically the questions of economic boycott and economic annihilation of Muslims have been an integral element in the agenda of majoritarian Hindu chauvinist forces in northern India since the 1920s and 1930s (Gooptu 2001; Gupta 2001).

Over the years, a complex relationship of give and take has developed and no serious person involved in the business, either Hindu or Muslim, would deny this. Festivals like Diwali, Holi, or Id, and other solemn occasions like Moharrum, entail active involvement and participation of both communities in the ceremonies/festivities of the other. In these

ways, ties between the two communities are reinforced. Needless to say, Hindus would not eat food cooked by Muslims and the Muslims would respect this and send uncooked raw meat which was offered as *qurbani* (sacrifice) during Bakr Id. Likewise, during Holi, groups of Muslim singers (*gavaiyyas*) would move through the Hindu *mohallas*, singing the *khamsa* (a poetic form) and would be ceremonially received and fed. However, since the 1990s, these practices seem to have vanished.

Line of Control (LOC) and the Question of Social Boundaries

It would seem that many Muslims would indeed like to believe that the relationship in the Banarasi sari business between Hindus and Muslims is genuinely one of *tana-bana*. However, here too there are different inflections ranging from a eulogizing of the metaphor to a more pragmatic understanding of this relationship. Ateeq Ansari⁶ in a recent discussion on the subject says:

Tana-bana is a very good slogan; it has its uses and should be upheld; however, the relationship between Hindus and Muslims is a much more complex and nuanced one. There is a line of control (LOC) in this. There are some boundaries that cannot be crossed.

The very use of a military metaphor (that is the territorial boundary between India and Pakistan) to refer to the social boundary between Hindus and Muslims today is indicative of the rigidity of boundaries and increase in the social distance between the two communities. *Tana-bana* perhaps belongs to another time and another generation of Muslims. To substantiate the point, he gives examples of business dealings with a Hindu merchant. The latter would give him all the necessary financial help in times of need, give him substantial advances against orders placed with the reassurance that Ateeq could return the money whenever it was convenient for him. However, the very same businessman would very politely turn down offers of dining and hospitality offered by Ateeq Ansari on some pretext or the other. Most Muslims in Banaras would respect this 'line of control'. Thus in Muslim marriages, there would be separate parties and receptions held for Hindu customers, merchants, and business and other social and political

contacts, where the cooks would be Hindus and vegetarian meals would also be served. Ateeq Ansari, however, stated that he had one principle on this matter: He would accept hospitality and dine with only those who would reciprocate the gesture.

The LOC also shifted, depending on historical and social conjunctures. The social boundaries were far more fluid till the 1980s it would seem. Abdulla Ansari nostalgically recalled the time, in the 1960s when Muslims joined the Holi celebrations in the city. A piece written on 8 March 2001 in the Hindi daily *Dainik Jagran* by one Ayesha Ansari titled '*Kahan Gaye ve Khamisa ke Gavaaiyye?*' (Where have all the Singers of the Khamisa gone?) recalls the days when groups of poets (*shayars*) from all castes and groups would go around and recite the *khamisa*. This particular cultural form symbolized the Ganga–Jumna *tehzeeb* (Ganga–Jumna culture) of Banaras and the mingling of the two cultures, Hindu and Muslim. The article rues the fact that while many other festivals and cultural events have received official patronage this has been allowed to wither.

It would seem that both Hindus and Muslims accepted this LOC to differing degrees and even this 'acceptance' would vary depending on context. While commensality was still taboo, there were instances when there was commensality and people dined with each other, particularly on festive occasions. The social boundaries were more fluid among the lower caste/class Hindus and Muslims; visits to shrines of Sufi saints by both the communities still continue. Many Hindu traders began their day at the shops by paying obeisance at one of the Sufi shrines located near the Chowk.

However, when the LOC is violated and all social boundaries are broken, as in instances of marriage between Hindus and Muslims, the normal restraints and norms that characterize relations between the two communities are suddenly thrown out of gear. Expectedly, there have been very few instances of intermarriage in Banaras and generally people are aware of it.

It is our understanding that while social boundaries between the two communities keep shifting and are dependent on social and political constraints at the macro level, the necessity of a boundary is generally accepted by both the communities. Needless to say, this acceptance is not uniform and upper-caste Hindus would be the greatest advocates. However, the campaign of the politicized Hindu chauvinist forces of the 1930s to reconvert those of the lower castes who had converted to

Islam has meant that there are vehement supporters of this even among the middle-rung 'backward' castes. Besides, this movement was motivated as much by a desire to economically and socially annihilate the Muslims, as by a desire to expand the ranks of the Hindus. Another important strand in this agenda was to stem the tide of restiveness among the lower castes migrating to the cities and towns in search of work. The attempt was to give economic space to the lower castes by displacing the Muslims among the service castes. (Gupta 2001: 275–76).

Processes of Islamization

The 1990s led to the sharpening of the Hindu–Muslim divide leading to the intensification of community identities (both Hindu and Muslim). The economic differentiation of the Muslim community has been accompanied by social and sectarian differentiation. Among prosperous sections of the community there was an increasing emphasis on education of both the traditional and the modern, formal kind, along with a the movement toward a pure, scriptural Islam in the practice of religion, referred to as Islamization. Sometimes there is a conflation between Islamization and Ashrafization; while the former refers to the practice of religion in the day to day life of people, the latter refers to the emulation of lifestyles of Ashraf groups by ordinary Muslims in the lower rungs of the hierarchy. It is generally among the well-to-do Momin Ansaris that there is a discernible thrust towards Islamization. However, it needs to be noted that the movement toward Islamization should not be confused with 'Islamic fundamentalism' or political Islam (Raman 2002: 338). In fact Islamization has been viewed as an expression of social mobility and status among the élite and well-to-do Momin Ansaris wishing to distance themselves from the lives and practices of the rest of the community (Searle-Chatterji 1994: 83–95).

Islamization has proceeded apace among the well-to-do Ansaris rather than among the ordinary, generally indigent weavers who are still illiterate and whose life chances are limited by their overwhelming economic situation. The worlds of the Madanpura Ansari and that of the Jaitpura or Alaipura Ansari have indeed grown apart in many ways.

The deep crisis in the handloom industry (and now even the powerloom industry) looms large in the background, heightening the sense

of doom among ordinary weavers and the well-to-do entrepreneurial class. The rising prices of yarn have been a matter of concern for some time now. But the widespread demonstrations against the government's policy in the year 2003, to levy a tax on the products of the small powerloom holders in Banaras had a desperate edge to it; mass prayers were held in different parts of the city and in areas like Azamgarh and Mau, important weaving centers near Banaras. The agitation saw unparalleled unity in the ranks of weavers, businessmen and traders. Significantly, it was predominantly Muslims who participated in the agitation, though the Banaras Vastra Udyog Sangh, which is dominated by Hindu traders, supported the agitation. The crisis of the industry is so deep that there have been many reports of starvation deaths, mass migration out of Banaras, and even cases of suicides.

Given the backdrop of the crisis, the situation of both ordinary weavers and the affluent sections of Muslims of Banaras is indeed poignant. They are trapped between two contradictory metaphors,—the *surang* and *tana-bana*. While they still continue to swear by *tana-bana*, another more serious crisis is at their doorstep, threatening their very existence.

The Phenomenon of 'Mini-Pakistans'

A macabre way in which partition has resurfaced in the lives of the Indian Muslims, particularly since the 1990s, is the metaphor of a 'mini-Pakistan'. Partition is almost reenacted every time there is a 'riot' and Muslim areas have been affected. The portrayal of the 'riot' in the media recreates the horror of partition along with the entire notion of 'dismemberment of the sacred motherland of India'. The language and slogans of the Hindu right wing during the series of riots since 1992, when the Babri Masjid was vandalized, unabashedly recall partition. Some of the slogans—*Jao Pakistan warna banega kabristan* (Go to Pakistan or there will be graveyards) or the pejorative reference to Indian Muslims as *Babar ki aulad* (offspring of the first Moghul emperor, Babar)—target all Muslims, strengthening a siege mentality and heightening the tremendous sense of fear.

The above-mentioned aggressive slogans come to the forefront at the height of right-wing Hindutva mobilization or around the time of 'war', that is 'riots'; however, there is a 'peace time offensive' as well

which is continuously and insidiously at work, in the manner in which any issue concerning Muslims is portrayed. For example, the manner in which the question of Muslim fertility is represented by the vulgar slogans of the Hindu right wing forces—*Hamare liye hum do aur hamare do; unke liye woh panch aur unke pachees*—(For us [Hindus] it is two of us and two of ours whereas for them [Muslims] it is five of us and 25 of ours), a stereotyping of Muslim polygamy and a vulgarization of the government slogan on population control.

In north India, there were a series of popular writings and pamphlets which highlighted the conversion of lower-caste Hindus to Islam and Christianity, along with the alleged rising numbers of Muslims due to the prevalence of polygyny and proselytization (Gupta 2001: 222–30; also Gupta 2004). The fact that the language of ‘borders’ referring to the territorial/cartographic borders between India and Pakistan is now being used, particularly during the height of communal tension, to denote areas where the Muslims are in a majority, is ominously suggestive of the notion of ‘enemy territory’.

Ghettoization has often been used to refer to those groups that are generally socioeconomically marginal minorities, ethnically different from the dominant group and the ‘mainstream’, and supposedly choose to remain so. Thus, the onus of moving out of the ghettos, both socially and mentally is on the residents of the ghettos. In India, one of the characteristics of urban settlements from pre-capitalist times was that residence was determined on the basis of caste and occupation; some of the features of this persist even now with some modifications. Muslim residential patterns in urban areas also reflect this overall pattern, given that they are predominantly involved in artisanal occupations and are generally self-employed. However, there has been a distinct difference in the perception of these occupationally-differentiated residential patterns over the last 20 years or so, which have been determined by the overall political climate. With rising social insecurity arising out of the communally-tense situation, a significant section of the very thin professional stratum among Muslims who had moved into mixed neighborhoods in big cities during the 1960s and 1970s, have started to move back into the so-called ghettos.

However, what needs to be noted about the ghettos is that they have been created originally by a pattern of development which rested on the preexisting structures and, in recent years, by the blocking

of opportunities toward diversification of employment and the ideological offensive of the Hindu right, an important element of which is an economic boycott of Muslims. There are many more aspects to the phenomenon which we have referred to above. The hardening of social boundaries between the multiple groups that constitute Indian society, the rigidification of social identities privileging only the one based on religion, leading to an increasing social distance between groups and communities, all reflecting the changed balance of social and political forces.

The transformation of the Indian (Hindu) middle class can best be described by the following quote:

The key element in the recent atrocities is the new role of the prosperous, educated middle class. In the past, the middle class has halted communal violence, as members of state bureaucracy, police, and business community. Now it organizes communal cleansing with the efficiency of a business project (Choudhury 2003: 363).

What is of significance sociologically and historically is the manner in which both the history and the discourse of partition have been mobilized to further the agendas of the Hindu right.

It would seem that the Muslims of Banaras are caught in a double bind. Their heroic attempts to become citizens of India and part of the 'mainstream' through their hard work are ironically getting them trapped in the surang of Madanpura into which they have been pushed by a majoritarianism which has insidiously transformed into right-wing Hindu fundamentalist forces. They are not allowed to forget the partition. It is ironic that those who not only made the decision to stay on in India, but actively opposed the partition through the resolution of the All-India Momin Conference, are the ones who have to constantly prove their 'Indianness', while forces that speak in the name of the 'nation' are the ones drawing the boundaries between different kinds of Indians today.

Post-script and Concluding Remarks

Some recent events in Banaras were the bomb explosions in the city on 6 March 2006. One explosion took place at the Sankat Mochan temple,

dedicated to the god, Hanuman, worshipped for his power to overcome crises. At the time of evening prayers, the bomb explosion here killed 21 persons while another bomb went off at the cantonment railway station. The response of the citizens of Banaras has been remarkable and represents a sharp contrast to events in Gujarat 2002. The religious leaders of both communities came together in an extraordinary show of solidarity along with citizens to prevent any further retaliatory violence. Both Hindus and Muslims, spoke about the Ganga–Jumna *tehzeeb* referring to the intermingling of the two cultures. While Dr Veer Bhadra Mishra, the *mahant* (the head priest) of the Sankat Mochan temple paid tribute to Varanasi and its unique blend of Ganga–Jumna *sanskriti* (culture) and to the people of Banaras for responding with peace and dignity to an act of hatred and violence, the Mufti of Banaras and the Imam of the Gyanvapi Masjid issued a *fatwa* against terrorism stating that the Quran did not support terrorism. Muslim women in *burkhas* came out on the streets in large numbers against terrorism. Secular leaders and intellectuals, and artists from all over the country came together in a show of solidarity with the citizens of Banaras. Newspapers, both Hindi and English and the electronic media also covered this in an unusual display of unanimity. The spring festival of colors, Holi, was celebrated together by both Muslims and Hindus, after many years. Maulanas and Muslims generally were welcomed into the Sankat Mochan temple with colors and sweets. All this, despite the fact that right-wing Hindu political parties had given a call for a boycott of the festival as a protest. It would seem that *tana–bana* and the triumph of Banarasi identity had prevailed over communal identities.

Finally, if the complexity of the city of Banaras could enable us to think through another context, the concept of *tana–bana* could be fruitfully applied to understand Jerusalem of the 1940s. The notion of *tana–bana* richly resonates with Jerusalemites or those familiar with its plural culture and contested religious spaces. Salim Tamari writes about Jerusalem in the 1940s when economic inter-dependence reinforced social coexistence in relations between the Arab and Jewish communities. Tamari refers to the manner in which Jerusalem has been imaged and constructed, which is strikingly similar to the manner in which Hindu and sacred Banaras has been constructed. Certain salient features are common to the two: both are ancient cities where the realm of the ‘sacred’ in social life is preponderant and both have experienced

colonial domination. In both, the process of 'constructing' the cities as especially sacred has also attempted to deny or efface their plural, ethnic, and historically-diverse qualities, characterized by a considerable degree of mutual inter-dependence of groups and local solidarities, typical of pre-industrial urban centers. Tamari refers to the contested terrain, the ideological claims of Israelis and Palestinians which has made us forget that before the war

...there was an 'ordinary' city called Jerusalem, a city divided by communities, neighbourhoods, ethnicities (of various nationalities) as well as by class. The religious identity of the city, with its sacred geography, has since permeated our conception of the city to the detriment of its worldly character.

We...think of it as an Eastern and Western city, divided by nationality and united by the military might of Israel. These divisions are now drawn retroactively to define the contours of the city before the ruptures of the war, and even when we try to transcend them in an act of historical re-creation, we are compelled to use them as analytical categories (Tamari 1999).

Hence while Jerusalem became radically transformed in the post-1948 period, with the intrusion of the Zionist project, accompanied by an influx of Jews and backed by imperialist forces with the external being forcibly implanted in the body politic of Jerusalem, Banaras was impacted by colonial policies and orientalist perceptions. The latter had to rely on internal élites and dominant classes which constituted a significant internal social base for the emergence of Hindu right-wing assertion. Were these two ancient cities to be placed 'side by side', many interesting points of comparison and contrast would likely emerge, each illuminating the other at several levels. The theme of partition offers a good starting point for such an undertaking.

NOTES

1. This chapter is based on a study of Hindu-Muslim relations in Banaras, undertaken as part of my work at the Centre for Women's Development Studies (CWDS). The study draws on interviews conducted between 2001 and 2005, newspaper reports and other secondary sources. Grateful thanks to Muniza Khan, Registrar, Gandhian Institute of Studies, Varanasi; Prof. Mohammed Taha, Zeenut-ul Islam Girls School; Abdulla Ansari Saheb, Qudratullah Girls' School; Haji Mohammed Ishaq Ansari Saheb; Ateeq Ansari; Prof. Dipak Mallik, Director, Gandhian Institute of Studies; Deepayan from the Gandhian Institute

of Studies, and many others from Banaras who have spent innumerable hours discussing many questions with me and who have contributed to my understanding. I would also like to thank Priyanka Srivastava for going through some of the Hindi newspapers and Sabiha Hussain from the CWDS, Delhi for going through some material in Urdu. I am also thankful to my colleagues at CWDS Indu Agnihotri and Smita Jassal for their valuable suggestions and comments. Any errors, however, are entirely mine.

2. Both Banaras and Varanasi have been used interchangeably in the text depending on the sources referred to.
3. Interview with Haji Mohd. Ishaq Ansari, Banaras, April 2005.
4. Interview with ex-policeman, Banaras, 2003.
5. Interview with Riazul Haque Ansari, Banaras, 2002.
6. Interview with Ateeq Ansari, Banaras, April 2005.

REFERENCES

- Aaj*, November 1991.
- Abbasi, S. 2002. *Madanpura ki Momin Ansari Biradari*, (Urdu). Varanasi: Malti Baug.
- Bharucha, R. 2003. 'Muslims and Others: Anecdotes, Fragments and Uncertainties of Evidence', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Special Article, 4 October.
- Casolari, M. 2002. 'Role of Benaras in Constructing Political Hindu Identity', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 13 April.
- Choudhary, K. 2003. 'Hindutva's Foreign Hand and the Middle Class', in C. Krishna (ed.), *Fascism in India, Faces, Fangs and Facts*. New Delhi: Manak Publications.
- Cohn, B. 1987. *An Anthropologist Among Historians and Other Essays*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Dainik Jagran*, November 1991 and March 2001.
- Dalmia, V. 1997. *The Nationalisation of Hindu Traditions: Bharatendu Harischandra and Nineteenth Century Banaras*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Freitag, S. 1990. *Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Gooptu, N. 2001. *The Politics of the Urban Poor in Early Twentieth Century India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Gupta, C. 2001. *Sexuality, Obscenity, Community: Women, Muslims and the Hindu Public in Colonial India*. Delhi: Permanent Black.
- . 2004. 'Censuses, Communalism, Gender and Identity—A Historical Perspective', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 25 September.
- Khan, M. 1993. *A Report on the 1991 Communal Riots in Varanasi*, Monograph No. 48. Varanasi: Gandhian Institute of Studies.
- Kumar, N. 1988. *The Artisans of Banaras—Popular Culture and Identity, 1880–1986*. New Delhi: Orient Longman.
- Pandey, G. 1990. *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

- Rai, S. K. 2004. 'Halaat-I-Zindagi: The World of Weavers', *U.P. Historical Review*, New Series, Vol. 1, April. Gorakhpur University.
- Raman, V. 2002. 'Understanding Hindu-Muslim Relations: The Banaras Story', in L. Sarkar, K. Sharma and L. Kasturi (eds), *Between Tradition, Counter-Tradition and Heresy: Contributions in Honour of Vina Mazumdar*. Delhi: Rainbow Publishers.
- Robinson, F. 1993. *Separatism Among Indian Muslims*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Searle-Chatterji, M. 1994. 'Wahabi Sectarianism Among the Muslims of Banaras', *Contemporary South Asia*, 3(2).
- Tamari, Salim. 1999. 'Jerusalem 1948: The Phantom City', in *Jerusalem Quarterly Profile*, Vol. 3. Jerusalem: Institute of Jerusalem Studies.



Living in the Shadow of Emergency in Palestine

HONAI DA GHANIM

This is not an academic or a well-ordered essay; neither is it an assortment of reflections, a collection of old wives' tales, or an emotional chronicle. Rather, it is a phenomenological reflection on the meaning of life when life gets turned upside down; when social relationships and a geographically continuous landscape are torn apart by a ruthless, arbitrary borderline.

Palestine 1948: Tragedy and Dissection

The events of 1948 are inscribed in the psyche of the Palestinian people as the *Naqba* (catastrophe), a historical moment when the Palestinians lost their homeland, and were transformed into the permanent status of a national and political 'PROBLEM'. Between 1947 and 1949—at the height of the Israeli state-making enterprise—approximately 85 per cent of the Palestinians who had been living within the borders of what became the State of Israel, were forced to leave their land. They sought refuge in what is now known as the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and other countries (Abu-Sitta 1999). In the process, about 450 Palestinian villages were destroyed. The physical space, cleansed of its Palestinian inhabitants, was symbolically appropriated, as the Arabic names of streets, villages, and cities were discarded in favor of Zionist and Biblical ones (Benvenisti 2000). The Palestinian landscape was erased, becoming a mere historical trace.

The transformation of landscape and the erasure of its Palestinian inhabitants was best articulated by Moshe Dayan, an Israeli military commander at the time:

Jewish villages were built in the place of Arab villages. You do not even know the names of these Arab villages, and I do not blame you because geography books no longer exist, not only do the books not exist, the Arab villages are not there either. Nahalal arose in the place of Mahalul, Givat in the place of Jipta, Sarid in the place of Haneif and Kefar Yehoshua in the place of Tel Shama. There is not one place built in this country that didn't have a former Arab population (*Haaretz* 1969).

Figure 11.1

Palestinian Refugees, 1948: Journey to the Unknown



Source: http://www.krysstal.com/democracy_israel_refugees1948.html.

The events of 1948 led to the collapse of Palestinian society, of its leadership and of its national project. In 1949, this process was further formalized by the Rhodes Armistice Agreement signed by Israel and its neighbors (Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt). In accordance with the agreement, Israel would annex 78 per cent of the territory of historical Palestine, including the villages in Wadi A'ra, the Triangle, and a

large district adjacent to Kufr Qaseem and Ras el-Ein. Jordan annexed East Jerusalem and the West Bank of the Jordan River. Egypt took temporary control of the coastal plain around the city of Gaza, later referred to as the Gaza Strip.

Both Jordan and Egypt controlled these respective territories until the 1967 War when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza. The ceasefire line, drawn in a green pen on the map of negotiation during the Rhodes Agreement, came to be referred to as 'the green line'. In effect, this green line served to divide the remains of Palestinian villages in two: those 'inside' the green line would be under Israeli control and those 'outside' it would be controlled by Jordan. In 1949, 170,000 Palestinians (approximately 10 per cent of the Palestinian population) found themselves to be 'inside' the green line (Keiman 1984: 5).

The armistice agreement further served to create a *de facto* border and, for the Israelis at least, the green line became synonymous with 'the border line'—a line that had to be controlled and preserved through military means. For the Palestinian villagers on both sides of the line, however, the green line became an explicit signifier of national disaster and of socio-geographical decontextualization and dislocation. The green line could not and would not be conceptualized as a *fait accompli*. Between 1948 and 1966, Palestinians living in Israel under strict military control and surveillance, consistently attempted to cross the border. Their aim was not explicitly political. It was not an overt act of resistance. They were merely trying to visit their families, harvest their crops, and purchase merchandize. 'Infiltrating', 'sneaking', 'evading', and 'penetrating'—all strictly illegal actions as defined by the Israeli state—were, in fact, their only legitimate means of catching a glimpse, however temporary and curtailed, into their lives as they had lived them before that green pen inscribed itself so brutally into their everyday reality.

Negotiating the border, under the constant fear of being captured by either the Jordanian or Israeli soldiers, was a necessary activity undertaken by members of my family. They, like so many other Palestinians who suddenly found themselves separated from their land, from their means of subsistence, and from their friends and family, necessarily negotiated the border in order to accomplish even their most intimate social relations. My great-grandfather, Abu Ali, 'infiltrated' into the Jordanian side of the line in order to visit his wife. My grandfather, Abu Abdullah, used to similarly 'sneak' out of Israel so as to meet his mother. My uncle Khalid, for his part, had to 'creep' through in the

other direction so as to meet my grandmother. Other villagers from Qaqun—a village destroyed by the Israelis—were compelled to ‘infiltrate’ across the border so that they could collect their personal possessions which they had left behind.

For the Israelis there were a serious acts of transgression. The Palestinians who tried to cross the line, people like my family who merely wanted to visit their loved ones, or, alternatively, refugees who crossed to harvest their grain, were branded as ‘infiltrators’ and therefore a ‘security threat’ that must be treated accordingly. Visiting one’s wife, mother, or grandmother, became a life-threatening activity. The fact that the Israelis knew perfectly well that many of these ‘infiltrators’ posed no security threat whatsoever, made no difference. As such, Moshe Dayan argued:

Arabs cross to collect the grain that they left in the abandoned villages and we set mines for them and they go back without an arm or a leg.... [It may be that this] cannot pass review, but I know no other method of guarding the borders. Then tomorrow the State of Israel will have no borders (Morris 2001: 275).

The discourse of security was thus mobilized by the Israelis in order to maintain their interest in constructing a clearly-demarcated border. For the Palestinians, especially the refugees who began to face the substantial sense of loss and dispossession, subverting this very same border became an underground daily mission as claimed by Elias Shufani, a refugee from Galilee village Mi`ilya:

Every day long columns of farmers led their donkeys to the vicinity of the village watching posts and waited impatiently for the sun to set. At nightfall, they made their way through the curving valleys to the plains. All night long they cropped millet from the fields of Kabri and Zib. Before dawn, they loaded the night’s crop on their donkeys and returned home (Shoufani 1972).

MARJEH: THE STORY OF A LIFE THAT MIGRATED UNDERGROUND

One of the villages affected by the new border was Marjeh, my home village. Following the Rhodes Armistice, the village was annexed by

Israel in 1949. Large sections of its lands were pushed into 'the other side' by the border that arbitrarily runs through the *wadi* (dry river valley, stream bed that is mostly, except in the event of heavy rains) on the east.

Marjeh is colloquially referred to as *khirbeh* (hamlet) by its neighboring villagers. It is somewhat smaller than a village but larger than a farm. Marjeh's inhabitants are the descendants of several Palestinian families from the large village of Deir Al-Ghusun, adjacent to Tul-Karem, who decided, at the end of the 19th century, to settle on their various plots of land (including the plot of land that was to become Marjeh) in order to preserve and cultivate them. Following the Rhodes agreement, Marjeh, which had hitherto been merely an extension of Deir Al-Ghusun, was transformed into something of an orphan whose parents had forcibly abandoned it. In the space created by the absent parent, Marjeh was forced to mature into an independent village. Today, the place proudly proclaims its heroic ability to grow and develop into what is nearly a village, and even boasts of its achievements to its absentee parent.

My family, inhabitants of Marjeh, used to sit together on hot summer nights telling and listening to stories of the old days. On such nights, my eight uncles, their wives, and children, would gather together on the roof of our house, and grandfather would regale us with his life story. The stories, however, were always accompanied by a warning: We were cautioned against telling these stories to other people so as to protect our family's privacy and, most importantly, to protect us from the Shin Bet (Israeli security forces).

My grandfather would stretch his arm out toward the east and say: 'This light comes from the village of Deir Al-Ghusun, where I was raised by my uncle Ahmad after my father died and my mother remarried'. This orphaned grandfather of mine, growing up in an orphaned village, carried his burden in the hope that, if nothing else, the situation of national orphanhood would one day be sorted out. Ever since I was a child, I have seen him gaze eastward, ears glued to the radio, listening to BBC reports about a 'solution' that grew more and more distant by the day. He consistently held on to his hope, by now Messianic, that some metaphysical, omnipotent power would restore normality. For my part, I always wanted to explore the other side of his life, to understand how he came to be 'here' and not 'there'. 'Grandfather, why did you come here?' My father looks at me with something of a shy smile: 'Sssh... Grandfather must not be interrupted while he is talking'.

I fall silent, and the question continues to trouble me, and I remember to ask my mother the same bothersome question the following day.

Your grandfather came here because he fell in love with your grandmother, whose family owned much land here. They agreed that he marry her under the condition that he dig them water wells. So, he came from Deir al-Ghusun and began digging the wells. Then he bought an olive grove, married your grandmother, and they settled down here.

But how did he manage to meet with his mother and brothers who stayed in Deir Al-Ghusun after 1948?,

He would steal out at night and go to them. He always knew how to evade the Jordanians and the Israelis.

'Border fear', did not prevent my grandfather from 'infiltrating' back to his mother. The border, which was supposed to disconnect him from his mother, failed in its task. The darkness of night was his faithful ally, hiding him on his journey eastward and back.

Following Freud and Jung, The French philosopher Gaston Bachelard (1969) has stated that the unconscious cannot be civilized. He claimed that darkness denotes the unconscious, its nature mysterious and even frightening. My grandfather, although he had never read Bachelard or Jung, understood that only in the darkness/unconscious could he experience the normal/conscious. At night he became a ghost or a shadow, released from his physical presence, invisible to the Jordanian and Israeli border patrols.

The family tale box is overloaded with stories that revolve around the border passages, although not all of them concluded with the same kind of Hollywood-style happy ending as my grandfather Abu Abdullah's tale. This was certainly not the case for his father-in-law and my great-grandfather, Abu Ali. Even though he was not a prince on a white horse and his wife was not Snow White, his story inscribed itself into my childlike mind as the local story of love and desire.

Once upon a time, but not so long ago, when the 'Jews' conquered the village of Qaqun, destroying its houses, and expelling its inhabitants, several families from Qaqun escaped into Marjeh and found a temporary safe house in the midst of the families of our village. One such family settled near grandfather Abu Ali's land. Several months passed, and grandfather Abu Ali, who was a lonely widower, decided that he would marry again. Sa'ud, a refugee widow whose family was living near

grandfather's land, seemed like a perfect match for him: She would not ask for a fancy dowry like young brides nor would she tire him with a variety of demands and requests as the daughters of settled families were accustomed to doing. She would accept him as he was. The perfect choice perhaps, but certainly not in the perfect context.

She was an illegal resident and an unwelcome stepmother. From the perspective of the Israeli authorities, she was a right-less refugee who had not received permission to stay within the borders of the green line. From the perspective of her stepsons, she was a stranger and a poor woman whose offspring threatened their inheritance. Sa`ud, by no choice of her own, became the personification of the border, embodying the presence of the unwanted, the prohibited and the banned.

Sa`ud was able to handle the double pressure for the short period of one year and a few months. During this time, she gave a birth to Ibrahim, her only son from this marriage. When she could not take it anymore, she ran away and crossed the border toward the Jordanian side. For several years, she settled in Shwekieh, the closest village to Marjeh. Sa`ud, the persecuted wife, and Abu Ali, the frustrated husband, believed that this was the most tenable arrangement: She would rent a home and he would come to meet her once a week. Crossing the border was just a technical issue, or at least that's what they believed until they were to become aware of the problematics inherent in the border.

Abu Ali safely navigated the border many times to visit his son and wife. Sometimes he spent a night, sometimes an entire week. As his number of successful 'infiltrations' increased, rumors reached the ears of the Israeli and Jordanian authorities who began to pay attention to his movements.

The first time he was caught, the Jordanians issued a warning. They stressed that if he did not heed their warning, next time he would be sent to prison. Abu Ali promised to behave like a 'good citizen' and guaranteed that he would not return without the necessary permission.

He returned to Marjeh, on the Israeli side, waited a couple of weeks and then decided to traverse the border again. He received his permission, as he had on all previous occasions, from himself. But his bad luck and the Jordanian's good informants proved to be a recipe for disaster. He was apprehended by the Jordanian security forces who were extremely angry that he had broken his promise. They responded by arresting him and sending him to jail—but not before they violently

beat him. His encounter with the Jordanian judge who presided over his case became another family story. When the judge sentenced him to three months in prison, Abu Ali asked for permission to address the court:

Sir, I have a family that I need to feed—who will take care of them if I will be in jail for such a long time?

The judge responded: 'Don't worry. God will provide'.

But Abu Ali, who wasn't a very religious man, retorted:

Oh sir, if I, God and the donkey barely manage to provide, how on earth is God going to manage alone?

The judge obviously was not impressed by the argument and Abu Ali spent three months in a Jordanian prison. Having served his time, he was brought to the Israeli side. The Israelis, not wanting to be outdone by the Jordanian, proceeded to send him to an Israeli prison.

The prison experiences left Abu Ali—by then a 65-year-old man—reluctant to continue 'infiltrating' the border. He decided to wait a few months and hoped that the Jordanians and Israelis would forget about him in the meantime.

Several months passed by and Abu Ali decided to attempt another 'infiltration'. Crossing the border was by no means an impossible task but circumventing the network of collaborators and informants on the Jordanian side was. Having spent only a few hours with his wife and son, Abu Ali found himself in the hands of the Jordanian army who had come to the house to arrest the entire family. Abu Ali was sent to jail. His wife and son were transferred to an unknown place. When he was released from prison, Abu Ali returned to the village to find his family but was told by a neighbor that they had been transferred. He searched for them endlessly but never managed to find them. After the 1967 War, Sa'ud and her son, Ibrahim, came to visit the family in Marjeh revealing the story of their transfer to an area near Jericho. Abu Ali, who passed away in August 1967 without having seen his wife and son again, never heard the story.

For the people who lived in my village, the border was a physical sign of the reality of emergency into which they had been thrown. The border marked an abrupt severing of the people from their pre-*Naqba* lives. It symbolized both the forced cutting of family ties as well as the

loss of olive groves that had fallen on the other side of the border. After the *Naqba* came the military administration, and the border zone manifest itself as a performance site for life in the shadow of death. In the border zone the boundary between life and death became blurred, but was, at the same time articulated through the 'infiltrator' body.

The famished refugees who tried to cross the border in order to bring food or the other villagers who craved to meet their families, were listed under the 'infiltrator' category that the state needed to get rid of. My grandfather, who wished to see his mother or, alternatively, the mother wanting to meet her son, was linguistically and practically transformed by the Military Administration's authorities into a 'hostile' and infiltrating body. An 'infiltrating' body loses its human legitimacy: First it undergoes a symbolic murder through language, and thus, its actual physical execution becomes a 'meaningless death' which is devoid of content. Such a body is not murdered, but rather 'meets its fate'—a convenient euphemism that frames death as a minor cosmetic act. The practice through which the body physically disappears is enabled by, and serves to complement, the initial act of execution. The infiltrator is branded as felon, as a transgressor of the state-defined borders of 'normality'. The infiltrator, however, is at the same time the Palestinian who fights to win back his sense of normality. The act of an unauthorized border crossing becomes symbolic of an attempt to challenge the emergency that forcefully suspended any sense of normality. The infiltrators are my grandfather, great-grandfather, and many others like them.

In this context, a meeting between mother and son became an exception rather than a rule. The maintenance of a state of exceptionality with regard to the unexceptional was not the result of a security threat posed on the newly-founded state. Rather, the intention was, and remains, to construct the abnormal as 'the law of the land'. This 'law' was not the result of a temporary suspension of normal reality aimed at protecting the normal that was in danger. Instead, it was based, from the very outset, on a permanent suspension of the normal. The Emergency Regulations were thus not for a moment of crisis which would later be overcome, but rather formed the basis for a future where physical and symbolic space would be reorganized and reconstituted into a lasting state of abnormality. 'The state of exception is thus', according to Agamben (1998: 18), 'not the chaos that precedes order but rather the situation that results from its suspension'.

The normal was thus suspended by the military forces, by the death hovering over the border that manifest this suspension, and by the Border Guard who embodied and enforced this. Under this suspension, the Palestinian body could only infiltrate, trespass, and make cracks in the border. In so doing, it was able to experience the normal only in its exceptional form. The ability of the state to control the Palestinian in Israel during the Military Administration resulted from its ability to define him as a potential transgressor that must be treated accordingly. For the Palestinians in Israel living in the post-*Naqba* era and under military government, daily life became a site of contradictions. The experience of normal life, even in its basics, was only achievable at the price of risking normality itself, and risking normality was to risk nothing less than life. The normal act of a familial meeting between mother and son became, in border life, an act that contaminated the exceptional, whose purity could only be regained by expelling the exceptional-normal itself. Putting the Palestinian to death at the border was an execution of the body and of the mind behind it, a declaration that the normality of Palestinian life had been put to an end, and that this life would henceforth be lived in a constant state of emergency.

It was not merely the infiltrating Palestinian body that was refigured into a hostile body. The collective Palestinian body was also transformed, under the Military Administration, into a hostile one, a racialized body, strictly demarcated by a defined border, which could not be trespassed without permission. The space in which the Palestinian lived was treated by the Israeli as empty space, as was the collective Palestinian body. An empty body, which the Israeli authorities chose to fill with content that fit their interests, or, alternately, by an Orientalist classification that divided the Palestinians into infiltrators, hostile agents, collaborators, good guys, and bad guys. The stories that echo throughout my village until today still tell of this classification.

The Military Administration based itself on the mandatory Emergency Regulations of 1945. The Emergency Constitution enabled the Military Administration to close off areas of Arab population and to limit movement in and out to permit-holders alone. It was the military authorities who decided whether to issue permits or not. 'Security considerations' (Segev 1984: 64) were the only explanations which they were required to provide. Regulation 109 authorized the Military Administration to exile villagers from their homes. According to Regulation 110, every person could be compelled to report to one of the

police stations at any time or place so decreed. Additionally, the administration could order people to remain locked up in their homes until further notice. Furthermore, in accordance with Regulation 111, an individual could be placed under administrative arrest for an unlimited period of time. This could be done without supplying any explanations or, for that matter, holding a trial (Segev 1984).

The Military Administration served as a legal basis for deeds that would usually be considered abnormal. According to historian Tom Segev, in some places

...thousands of residents were removed from their houses in order to be examined and identified. The Military Administration people would concentrate them in an open field, in the sun, for many hours at a time, without food or drink and with no possibility to relieve themselves—men, women and children. While being led out of their houses, the Palestinians were ordered to leave the doors of their houses open, leaving them unguarded. By the time they returned home, many found that soldiers had stolen domestic items, jewelry, money and cash (ibid.: 64–65).

Thus, the populace was left exposed, its daily routine suspended. Segev notes that the Palestinians who remained in Israel (after 1948) were weak and frightened, posing no threat to the security of the state. The Military Administration intended, in his opinion, to achieve two goals: To prevent the refugees from returning to their homes, and to evacuate the remaining populace from half-forsaken neighborhoods and villages and relocate them elsewhere. Under these Emergency Regulations, in the shadow of continual emergency, the collective Palestinian body became a no man's land whose every movement could be controlled.

My father tells of Captain Bloom, who apparently held an important position in the Border Guard and used to mistreat the people of the village, leaving terror and fear in his wake:

He would always patrol here. Whenever he met anyone, he would ask him: 'Are you married?' If the answer was 'Yes', he would hit him and say: 'Do you want to breed more of this impure nation?' If the man would reply that he was not married, Captain Bloom would say: 'What does an ass like you lack? Do you think you're still young?', and would hit him too. Once, he came upon an elderly man from the village and ordered him to draw a circle and stand inside it, threatening to murder him if he stepped outside it. The man stood

inside the circle from the morning until the evening. The officer left him and returned in the evening to check if he was still standing inside the circle. When he found the man still there, he began beating him, saying: 'What sort of stupid ass are you for not running away?'

But as a child tasting fear, which turned with the 1967 occupation into a suffocating memory, I used to play in the hills with the other village children in a dry valley that separated Israel from the West Bank. I would jump, with one leap, from one side to the other, shouting: 'I'm in Israel!', 'Wow... Now I'm in the West Bank!' The very border that, before the occupation of the rest of the territories in 1967, was the border of death that cast great fear in all hearts, became a game and a diversion for us, a challenge to death. We would jump east of the line and shout, 'We're Palestinians!', jump back west and shout, 'We're Israelis!' Occasionally we would divide into two groups, each on a different side of the line, and play-act a war between Arabs and Jews. Between games we would pick *za'atar* (thyme) and steal almonds from the groves of the West Bankers behind the hill. The border normalized in an abnormal direction: 'Thanks' to the occupation, my grandfather was united with his mother and my father met my mother, who is also from Deir Al-Ghusun.

But my village does not only face east, it faces west too. Together with the eastern hilly landscape and the West Bank, it also looks out, with dizzying clarity, over the western area (of Israel). 'Over there' one can make out the sea, Netanya with its glittering lights, and Hadera, which is marked for me by the two high towers of the Electrical Company. But I also learned to see the village of Kakoun, which used to be there and was abandoned in a moment of panic in 1948, and today is nothing but a pile of ruins and a memorial to silent pain. At school, all they told us was of its historical castle, where the Sabar tree¹ stood silent, and I wonder about its silence. Is it waiting in silence for whoever planted it? Maybe it is confused, trying to digest its new neighbor, who already knew to call himself a Sabar? And maybe it is simply standing and observing?

'The West' was to me the mysterious, the foreign, the cold. In the spirit of Jacques Lacan, it was the 'Great Other.' It was the national, the historical, the cultural 'other' with whom I shared no dialog, as dialog requires an agreement of some sort—on the point of controversy at

hand or on a point of mutual agreement. This ‘other’ just stood silently, and when I went ‘there’ with my father I was always afraid, mute, my capacity for speech paralyzed. I felt then that if I opened my mouth, I would only prove my contrasting ‘otherness’. Maybe if I charmed them (‘She’s so cute’), or surprised them (‘A freckled, red-headed Arab!’), maybe if I scared them, well, in any of those encounters, I would not be present.

In this whirlpool of my childhood, the East was a ‘place’ and the West was a ‘territory’. The East was continuity: my grandmother’s house, the uncles from my mother’s side, the relatives and the market of Tul Karm. It was the hill that tolerated my presence even while I stole its flowers. The West, on the other hand, was disconnection, the forbidden, and the mysterious, from whence came the man from the Repossession Department, the policemen or the clerk from the Electrical Company (after whom we ran, as children, singing, ‘shalom, shalom’—the only Hebrew word we knew then).

THE ENDLESS END

The stories about the family underground meeting, and the border passages refuse to settle in the historical site of memory. They resist becoming just stories of the past and the border insists on remaining the ultimate site of death.

At the end of the 2002, the Israeli state began to build the ‘separation wall’. This wall passes on the east of Marjeh. It will cut through the wadi and tear apart the land of Shwekeh and Deir al-Ghosun. Uprooting hundreds of olive and almond trees, and turning the green mountain into heaps of ash and dust, the Israeli border guards, who continuously tour through the village, will simply be returning to their historical role by constructing a place devoid of family. Life stories will continue to be told and lived as underground stories, stories which strive for normality within a context aimed at normalizing the abnormal.

NOTE

1. Sabar is a common tree in the area that became, with the founding of the state of Israel, a well-known symbol for the earthy, native Israeli.

REFERENCES

- Abu-Sitta, S. 1999. 'Palestinian Refugees and the Permanent Status Negotiations: Policy Brief, No. 7'. Washington, DC: Palestine Center.
- Agamben, G. 1998. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (trans. D. Heller-Rozen). Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Bachelard, G. 1969. *The Poetics of Space* (trans from French by Maria Jolas). Boston: Beacon Press.
- Benvenisti, M. 2000. *Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land since 1948* (trans. M. Kaufman-Lacusta). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Haaretz, 1969. 'Mosheh Dyan Adrees the Techneion, Haifa', 4 April.
- Keiman, Ch. 1984. 'After the Catastrophe: the Arabs in Israel State 1948–1950', *Mahbarut Imahkar Webekurt*, 1, December.
- Morris, B. 2001. *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–1999*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Segev, T. 1984. *The First Israelis* (Hebrew). Jerusalem: Domeno.
- Shoufani, E. 1972. 'The Fall of a Village', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 1(4): 108–21.

WEB SITE

http://www.krysstal.com/democracy_israel_refugees1948.html

Partition in Contemporary Struggles over Religious Spaces in Bhopal

URSULA RAO

Located in central India, Bhopal is a city typically associated with India's Muslim past. For 227 years until 1947, Bhopal had been the capital of an independent Muslim state. However, post-independence Bhopal has undergone a thorough social transformation from a princely state ruled by Muslim nawabs and inhabited by a majority Muslim population, into a city where Hindus dominate in demographic, political, and economic terms. It has become the focal point for ongoing processes by which conscious attempts are being made to efface the Muslim past of the city and thereby Hinduize it. While there are several specific social, economic, and demographic factors that converge to bring about this trend, what is happening in Bhopal is also symptomatic of similar processes occurring in towns across north India where partition has played an important role in the re-drawing of social and territorial boundaries. The case of Bhopal is by no means unique to the Indian context alone since it is illustrative of peoples' understanding of space and territory. The specifics of the Bhopal case allow us to think through ways in which space might be appropriated in some other contexts, particularly in the partitioned societies that are the focus of this volume. Some of these cross-cultural comparisons are explored in the concluding sections of this chapter.

My case study focuses on the making of a Durga Temple in old Bhopal. It was constructed in 1981, as a conscious effort by the Hindu community to wrestle territory from this predominantly Muslim neighborhood, the only neighborhood of this kind left in Bhopal today. The history of the Durga Temple is the story of an inner partition that divided the historical center of Bhopal into separate Muslim and Hindu

religious territories. In narrating this story, I elaborate on the way the partition motif continues to be enacted in contemporary India, creating fresh memory of the theory that Muslims and Hindus constitute separate communities that cannot (easily) be accommodated in one nation.

This motif of inner borders is central to the remaking of the Indian nation, especially since the emergence of the Hindu right as a powerful political force in the 1980s. The ascent of the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) to power was closely associated with a movement for the destruction of a contested mosque at the site of Rama's mythical birthplace, Ayodhya. The conflict unleashed destructive communal violence and shifted focus to other sites where mosques jostle for space with ancient Hindu temples. The site of the famous Kashi Vishwanath Temple in Banaras, the Hindus' holiest shrine and Mathura, the sacred city associated with Krishna, are cases in point (see, for example, Elst 2003; Engineer 1990; Hartung 2004; Nandy et al. 1995; van der Veer 1987 and 1988). Sandria Freitag (1989) and Gyanendra Pandey (1990) have shown that in colonial India, the use of religious spaces made palpable the imagination of a Hindu community and merged it with concepts of the nation. The relevance of religious processions in this process has been outlined by Christophe Jaffrelot (1998). Others have explored how such ongoing negotiations of religious territories and boundaries are embedded in a re-formulation of power relations (Brass 1998; Davis 1996; Rao 2003b; Rao forthcoming).

Building on these theoretical insights, this chapter explores ways in which political activism appropriates and inscribes religious meaning on territories and neighborhoods in Bhopal. A summary of Bhopal's Muslim history provides the background for a discussion of the way Bhopal is re-structured through contemporary politico-religious movements and helps contextualize the dramatic changes the city experienced after joining the Indian Union.

Brief History of Bhopal and Hindu–Muslim Relations

Bhopal as a city and princely state was founded in 1722, by the Afghan adventurer Dost Muhammad Khan, who established a dynasty that ruled Bhopal until its independence in 1949. The initial years of the

Bhopal state were characterized by internal strife and external struggle against Marathas and other Muslim rulers. The stability of the state increased when the rulers of Bhopal entered into a pact with the East India Company in 1818. Mutual support between the two powers ensured that throughout colonial rule Bhopal would remain an independent princely state and even grow in size and political stature (Mittal 1990: 1–32).

In the era of British protection, three female rulers Nawab Sikandar Begum (1837–67), her daughter Nawab Shah Jahan Begum (1867–1901) and her granddaughter Nawab Sultan Jahan Begum (1901–26) are recognized as having contributed to the development of the city. They reorganized the army and administration, established courts of law, built infrastructure such as railways, and added to the impressive architecture of the old city. Improved water supplies, sanitary conditions, and health services, and modern education for both sexes are also attributed to them. From 1911 began the development of a cotton industry in Bhopal and the beginning of higher technical education (Luard 1908: 30–35; Mittal 1990: 22–97).

The image of a ‘golden era’ under female rulers presents a contrast with narrations about the reign of the controversial last heir of Bhopal state, Nawab Hamidullah Khan (1926–49), third son of Nawab Sultan Jahan Begum. As active member of the Chamber of Princes, he was criticized for opposing the independence movement and initiatives to protect the integrity of princely states in a future India (Mittal 1990: 128–43). The nawab’s political tactics and concern for Muslim unity, led him to attempt to convince the British that a united Muslim population in India could act as a counter-force to the independence movement and safeguard British interests in the colony. Later, when the political atmosphere changed, he became a vigorous supporter of the Muslim League and the plans for the making of a separate Muslim state. In his vision for a future Bhopal, Nawab Hamidullah Khan envisaged an independent India in which princely states could survive due to friendly relationships with neighboring Muslim states (*ibid.*: 129–45, 161–64).

While Nawab Hamidullah Khan protected Muslim communal activities, he sternly opposed political activities that rallied around concerns of Hindus. Hindu consciousness began to grow in Bhopal from the 1920s and soon found an organizational basis. In 1933, the Bhopal

Hindu Sabha became active as a chapter of the All India Hindu Maha Sabha. The Bhopal Arya Hindu Seva Sangh was another platform for the formulation of grievances of Hindu subjects, such as unequal treatment of Hindus in government employment policies and educational institutions, as well as discrimination against religious activities and traditions of Hindus. Political mobilization along religious lines produced, in Bhopal as in other parts of India, separate Hindu and Muslim political identities and created an atmosphere of communal tension during 1930s and 1940s. However, there are no records of major religious violence in Bhopal before 1946, when riots led to the looting of Hindu shops, amounting to an estimated loss of Rs 8,749 (Mittal 1990: 169–70; Publicity Officers, Government of Bhopal 1942: 3, 57).

Politicization did not take place on religious lines alone. The All India Congress was active in Bhopal since the 1920s. A major political player was the Bhopal Rajya Praja Mandal (State People's Association), founded in 1938 as a united front to overcome communal tension and struggle for a democratic Bhopal. This was much to the dislike of the ruler who tried to hinder all activities that called into question the political status quo. Threatened by the nearing independence of India, Nawab Hamidullah Khan formed a new interim government in 1947, and found a party called Praja Parishad (People's Party), to oppose and weaken the Praja Mandal. However this move was not popular, and only strengthened the opposition. In January 1949, the nawab finally gave in to the demands of the Merger Movement¹ and began negotiations which led to the integration of Bhopal into the union territory on 1 June 1949. In 1951, Bhopal was declared a Part C State² and five years later became part of the newly-founded state of Madhya Pradesh (Mittal 1990: 172–200; Shrivastav and Guru 1989: 79–83).

Changing Face of Bhopal

The year 1956 was decisive for the development of Bhopal's character in independent India. Two decisions led to a rapid rise of the city's population. First, Bhopal was chosen as state capital of Madhya Pradesh, which became the most important employer in the city. By 1961, the number of government servants reached 25,690. Ten years later,

the figure rose to approximately 46,900 (Shrivastav and Guru 1989: 275; Singh 1994: 55). In 1956, the national government decided to locate a company for the production of heavy electrical equipment in Bhopal, the first of its kind in India. The foundation stone for Bharat Heavy Electricals (India) Ltd. (BHEL) was laid in 1958, and ten years later the company employed 16,025 people (Shrivastav and Guru 1989: 183–89). Other industries followed; many of them were ancillary to the BHEL, the state government, or provided services for the rapidly growing population in the city. Famous among these smaller industries is the multinational company Union Carbide. It was founded in 1968–69 for the production of insecticides. The approximate number of employees throughout was 400 persons (ibid.: 199). In 1984, a lethal gas leak led to one of the most disastrous industrial accidents in contemporary times. The gas killed several thousand people and created chronic health problems for city inhabitants that persist to this day (estimations range from 20,000 to 200,000 affected people). Struggles for adequate compensation and specialized health care are ongoing.³ The disaster, known worldwide as the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, left the city with huge social problems. However, in the economic sphere the city continues to be dominated by two major players, the state government and the BHEL.

Employment opportunities created after 1956 attracted migrants from all over India and Bhopal grew at a fast pace, from around 75,000 inhabitants in 1941 to 1,837,000 by the turn of the millennium. The peak of population growth occurred in the formational years of 1951 to 1961, when the census registered a growth of 81 per cent (ibid.: 95). What is particularly interesting in our context is the unequal growth of the Hindu and Muslim population. Before Independence, Bhopal had experienced a decrease of Hindu population. From 1901 to 1941 the Hindu population dropped from 43 percent to 34 percent, while the Muslim population rose from 54 percent to 63 percent. This trend registered a turnaround after Independence. In 1951 there was a slight proportional growth of Hindus (Malhotra 1964: 19–21).⁴ A radical shift occurred during the next 10 years of immigration. In 1961, the census noted a proportional rise of the Hindu population by 19.80 percent against a fall of the Muslim population by 21.50 percent. Thereafter the proportion of Hindus continued to grow.

Table 12.1Proportion of Hindu and Muslim population in Bhopal city⁵

	1951	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001
Hindus	42.18%	61.98%	63.40%	66.55%	67.36%	76.60%
Muslims	55.36%	33.86%	30.49%	27.94%	27.78%	20.9%

Source: Official Census Data (Census Office, Bhopal).

In addition to demography, the new political and economic environment put Muslims at a disadvantage. The official language changed from Urdu to Hindi and Muslims were no longer preferred in government service (Lehri 1997: 40). After 1956, New Bhopal, situated south of the Old City, emerged as the new vibrant center for economic productivity, political decision-making bodies and posh residential areas. Muslims were marginal in these new centers. The majority of them continued to stay in Old Bhopal where they had always accounted for approximately 45 percent of the population (Lehri 1997: 131; Luard 1908: 36). In the 1980s, Lehri found higher education rare among Muslims in Bhopal. Muslims are underrepresented in government service; instead they engage in business enterprises and are active in the transport system. An overwhelming majority of automobile mechanics, drivers, and cleaners in the mini buses in Bhopal are Muslims (Lehri 1997: 88).

There is also a psychological moment in the transformation. Muslims who considered themselves the 'rulers' of Bhopal had to adjust to the fact that they lost their position of privilege and were reduced to a minority (*ibid.*: 40, 148). In the early years after independence, politics in Bhopal was dominated by the Congress and Communists, owing to the large work force and the Muslim population. In the 1980s, the BJP began making inroads through engagement in social work and the organization of Hindu festivals for migrants, combined with the spread of an aggressive Hindu nationalist ideology (Jaffrelot 1996: 512–13).

In 1993 elections, the BJP experienced a triumphant victory. For the first time, the BJP was able to win all four seats from Bhopal. Hence the constituency of old Bhopal, where 40 percent to 45 percent of the voting population are Muslims, went to a Hindu nationalist, Ramesh Sharma, who secured 50.35 percent of votes (*ibid.*: 513). This should be

understood as a major historical juncture also because it is an outcome of a major riot in December 1992—the first riot in Bhopal since independence. What began as protests of Muslims against the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, turned into a bloody communal confrontation during which approximately 139 people died. Hindu youths and BJP politicians were identified as instigators of this violence that lasted a week and is counted as the worst post-Ayodhya riot in the Hindi belt (*ibid.*: 460–63). After this incident, many people began to feel insecure in the old city, and Hindus left in large numbers from the ‘Muslim’ living space.

However, although Muslims have become marginalized in today’s Bhopal, the city still carries the memories of a bygone era. The skyline of the city is dominated by the towers of three large mosques, which mark out the area of the former royal capital. Although the city has long outgrown the space of the old town, it is this center, with the three mosques, the entry gates to the walled city, Fort of Fatehgarh—now the Medical College—that give an identity to the city. Interesting is the list of ‘Places of Interests’ on the official website of the state government of Madhya Pradesh. The first five items listed are Muslim structures: the Taj-ul-Masjid, the largest mosque in India, the Jama Masjid, the Moti Masjid, the Idqah, Shaukat Mahal, and Sardar Manzil (<http://bhopal.nic.in/default2.htm>, 24.10.2005). For inhabitants of Bhopal the past is present everywhere in the old city, where many public institutions reside in old Muslim structures and where almost half of the inhabitants are Muslims.

It is against this history, its architecture, and the concentration of Muslim population in the city center, that Hindu nationalists aggressively assert their project to Hinduize Bhopal. The desire is to oust the remains of an ‘inner Pakistan’ and to permanently inscribe Hindu presence onto the urban landscape as a means of symbolically marking the transformation in the power structure. Central to this project is the creation of a religious infrastructure for Hindus, aggressively pushed through in the old city associated most clearly with Muslim history. Informants in Bhopal point out that the construction of temples with *shikharas* (the typical pyramid-like roofs of north Indian temples) was banned inside the walled city in pre-independent India. Even today, the majority of temples in the city center are of a *haveli* (mansion) type, built inside

the houses, not visible from the outside. In the light of this historical legacy, the construction of impressive religious buildings in the old city became a symbolic act demonstrating the new era of 'Hindu dominance'.

A case in point is a popular Shiva Temple in the main bazaar area, that is said to be more than 100 years old. It received a huge *shikhara* in recent years. Another example is a Durga Temple, built illegally on one of the arterial roads that run through the heart of old Bhopal. The temple committee informed me that they would decorate the top of the *shikhara* with pure gold, using more of the fine material than has been used in the neighboring Moti Masjid. There is a Kali Temple on the margins of the old town that is growing in height every year and is planned to become the highest building in old Bhopal. Finally there is a large Ram Temple, ideologically linked to the temple planned in Ayodhya, erected within the walled city, which will purportedly be the largest temple in Bhopal and function as the center for Hindu orthodoxy.

The Construction of Durga Temple

In the following section I explore the history of one of these temples, the Durga Temple, to demonstrate the anti-Muslim bias of the construction undertaken to extinguish what is referred to as the 'inner Pakistan' of Bhopal.⁶ The temple was first founded in 1981 and now after 25 years of existence, it seems to have effectively changed the social atmosphere in old Bhopal, carving out a 'Hindu territory' in an area hitherto associated with Muslim history.

The Durga Temple is situated at Pir Gate, one of the entry gates to the walled city, today a major crossing in old Bhopal. It is the best known temple in the city not only due to its central location and beauty, but also due to the controversy surrounding its construction in the middle of a territory, hitherto identified with Muslim culture. The history of strife associated with the Durga Temple is preserved for future generations in a red inscription on the outer side of the temple. It introduces the structure as *Darbar Curfew Mata ka* (Hall of public audience of the Lady of Curfew).

Construction started in 1981, when the festival committee in charge of building a provisional Durga shrine for the autumnal goddess festival *navaratri* (festival of nine nights), fixed a permanent marble statue of Durga on the concrete platform in the center of the street, rather than the usual mud image in a makeshift shrine. The permanency of the structure communicated that the committee had no intention of removing the shrine after the nine days, as was the custom, but planned to retain the Durga image as a foundation for a larger temple. During the following nine days, supporters slowly built a small permanent temple at the center of Pir Gate crossing.

The committee members knew that their project would not be acceptable to the Muslims in the locality nor to the city administration. This is why they deliberately chose the days of the festival for the construction, knowing that the police could not intervene during this period without endangering the peace of the city. The year of construction was also chosen carefully. Since in 1981, both the collector and the superintendent of police were new to their posts, the committee members expected the administration to be weak and thus refrain from intervention. To further secure their position, those building the shrine had informed all Durga committees in the city, about forthcoming plans for a goddess temple at Pir Gate and asked them to plant saffron flags near the shrine to show their support, and mark off the territory as a 'Hindu area'. In turn, the Muslims feeling threatened by this 'invasion' of their territory, lodged a complaint with city authorities, who promised to intervene as soon as the festival was over. And indeed, the tenth day marked the beginning of an open fight.

When the Durga statue was not destroyed after the festival, the collector intervened at night and had the statue removed and the temple torn down. An ordinance was passed restricting the right to assemble at the Pir Gate crossing. Ignoring this directive, a large Hindu crowd gathered at Pir Gate in protest, conducting prayers and singing *bhajans* (devotional songs) at an improvised goddess shrine reinstalled at the same place where the temple had stood. Again, the police intervened and had the crossing cleared. Once again their efforts were frustrated when the policemen, now trapped in the middle of the crossing, were attacked by Hindus who had fled into the adjoining houses and lanes.

Locked in this strategically disadvantageous position, the policemen feared for their lives. There appeared to be no other solution than to clear the lanes with force, and to impose a curfew. One of the officers reproduced a vivid picture of the operation in an interview.

At 7:45 p.m., we got the order to clear the crossing. We assembled 250 men. The Collector took one street, I took another. It was night and the operation was difficult. With a jeep [...] we entered the lane [...]. The [police] men followed us in a jail van. This way they felt secure. We cleared one barricade after the other and secured the area and returned to Pir Gate. It was like war. [...] Then there was Mishra, my right-hand man, he wanted to be extra brave and got hit on the head by a stone. After that the police went wild. They were afraid [...] Besides the fear, the policemen are all religious so you have to convince them that the operation is necessary. But fortunately in Bhopal the troops are mostly secular [...] That time I had an excellent gunman, Amar Singh. After I got out of the jeep someone threw a rock, and he jumped and pushed me aside. The rock then landed on his foot and he had to be rushed to hospital. That was a dangerous situation, not that I would have got killed, but... By 9:40–10:00 p.m. we had cleared the lane (Interview with a police officer, Bhopal, 1998).

As soon as the crossing was cleared, negotiations began between Durga Temple Committee members, eminent Muslim leaders, representatives of the administration and police, and several leading politicians. The officers suggested an alternative site in old Bhopal for the construction of the temple, but the Hindus insisted on Pir Gate. After three days of negotiations, the parties agreed that the temple should remain on the crossing, though on one side rather than the center of the street. A space equivalent to four shops (10 times 12 feet) was allotted for the Durga Temple. As compensation for the destruction of the original temple, the Municipal Corporation agreed to prepare the foundations for the new building. They also consented that the statue should not immediately be taken to the new spot. Instead, it was to be reinstalled in its original place in the center of the crossing, from whence the committee members would transfer it to the new ground. In return, the Durga Temple Committee agreed to help restore an atmosphere of peace and goodwill in the city (agreement signed on 11 October 1981).

In order to fully understand the political intention of this act, one needs to refer to another point in the history of Pir Gate that occurred

ten years before the making of the temple. In 1972, the city administration had selected the area for the construction of an arterial road that would absorb the ever-increasing traffic in old Bhopal. As a result, many houses in this old Muslim neighborhood had to be pulled down. However, the effects of the new spacious crossing were nullified when the Durga Temple was built. Muslims thus complained that they had not given up their houses to create space for a new Hindu place of worship. The administration also anticipated that the temple would increase Hindu–Muslim tension in the locality. This fear was accentuated by the fact that it occupied a spot in the center of the city's three largest and most important mosques, the Taj-ul-Masjid, the Jama Masjid, and the Moti Masjid. As such, it formed an intrusion into a territory marked as the symbolic and religious heart of 'Muslim Bhopal'.

In turn, Hindus insisted that their community needed a place of worship and were determined to change the symbolic weight and the social atmosphere at Pir Gate. One of the activists formulated this view thus:

We were a group of ten to twelve men who spent their evenings together in Chowk⁷[...] or at the platform on Pir Gate. We always had difficulties with the Muslims. The neighborhood was in their hands. They always teased us [...] The Muslims in this area are notorious. [...] They are the reason why we decided to build a temple that would strengthen and unite the Hindus (Durga Temple Committee member).

Many others supported this view and felt that the area was not safe for Hindus. Accusations that a 'small Pakistan' existed in the middle of Bhopal were frequently heard:

In the beginning there were four to five people. They wanted to build the temple, because what is happening here is the making of a *second Pakistan*, to put that straight, because this is a place for all [communities] not only for one (Durga Temple committee member, 31 March 1998; emphasis mine).

These statements reveal the anti-Muslim bias of the temple project. The idea of a 'second Pakistan' connects Muslim inhabitants of Bhopal with pre-Independence times and more particularly with the desire of Nawab Hamidullah Khan to create a Pakistan-friendly Muslim state

in the middle of the Indian territory. In this context, the Durga Temple was rhetorically turned into an act of resistance against the remnants of the former Muslim state. It was designed to give 'due' representation to 'the Hindu community', which had demographically climbed to a secure majority position. The activists and supporters wished to undo what was perceived as 'historical injustice'. They proceeded to penetrate 'Muslim space' in the old city with the aim of completing the transformation of Bhopal from a Muslim to a Hindu city.

After the successful construction of the Durga Temple, the Hindu presence at Pir Gate was never again publicly questioned, although Hindus continued to transform the area, marginalizing Muslims from participation in the social activities at Pir Gate and establishing the place as the site for Hindu activities, including renaming it.

The crossing has a lot of names. It is called Pir Gate and Somvara, but we felt it should also have a Hindu name so we called it Mukhrakhi Chowk. The Muslims did not like the name and therefore started calling it Mohammadi Chowk. It is then that we gave the name Bhawani Chowk (Interview with a leading committee member, 3 January 1998).

This struggle for a new name aggravates the communal rivalry brought on by the construction of a new religious building. It is another step in erasing the Muslim history of the place. Pir Gate is the name of one of six entrance points to the old city. The four main gates were named after week days: *Pir* (Monday), *Jumerati* (Thursday), *Itwara* (Sunday), *Budhwara* (Wednesday) (Singh 1994: 51–52). Hindus wanted the name Pir Gate to be replaced by *mukhrakh*, which means 'to keep face', as a mark of Hindu self-assertion achieved during the temple movement. However, the new name was not accepted by Muslims. They proposed another name that sounded similar to the Hindu name; in effect, reclaiming the place as a Muslim site by invoking the Prophet Mohammad in the name, 'Mohammadi Chowk'. Subsequently, Hindus countered with another new name, 'Bhawani Chowk', the word *bhawani* signifying goddess. Today, many devotees use the latter name. Thus, a place once an integral part of a historical center has also been separated semantically from its environment, and given over to a Hindu goddess as patron of the local Hindu population.

After 25 years of social and religious activity around the Durga Temple, Pir Gate has indeed got transformed into Bhawani Chowk, in

the sense that most of the public activities on this square pertain to the Hindu community. Three types of activities mark the transformation of the place: the continued erection of structures suffused with Hindu symbolic meaning; the organization of religious activities that have established Pir Gate as the main celebration site for Hindus; the use of the site for political propaganda by Hindu fundamentalists.

From Pir Gate to Bhawani Chowk

While the temple committee initiated the project to change the atmosphere in this central Muslim locality, the ultimate success of their endeavors was based on the synchronized activity of many unconnected people who exploited the place for personal gains. A case in point is Arjun (name changed), an ambitious young man who aspired to acquire a position as BJP leader. He chose Pir Gate for his political activity, attaching himself to the extremely successful Durga Temple and the political project it stands for. He proved his sympathy for Hindu nationalist ideologies and his potential as leader by facilitating the construction of a water tank next to the temple to serve the needs of devotees. Arjun used a youth organization⁸ as platform to collect funds and convinced his patron, a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) from the BJP, to back him politically so that the tank would not be destroyed as an illegal construction by the city administration. Today the tank stands as testimony to his political prowess.

The political dimension of the Durga Temple again became overtly clear in 1996, when the BJP government of Bhopal installed a statue of the late Hindu leader Uddvadas Mehta across the temple, at the center of Pir Gate crossing. He can be seen facing the temple and bowing to the goddess with hands folded in the typical Hindu pose of polite greeting. The leader, remembered as a freedom fighter and known for Hindu nationalist politics in Bhopal, is hailed as a devotee of the goddess and remembered as a supporter of the temple. He is recognized as the architect of the partition of old Bhopal into separate Hindu and Muslim territories.

There are also economic dimensions to the Hinduization of Pir Gate. There are two permanent and three makeshift shops that deal in ritual offerings. The crossing hosts a sweet shop owned by the main

temple priest and run by his son. There is a shop for refreshments started by the son of the temple president and a tea stall called 'Arti Tea Shop', named after the daily ritual of *arti*⁴⁹ performed in every Hindu temple. Many devotees, usually males, settle down for tea here after visiting the goddess. The place is also a meeting point for local politicians and leaders.

I came across another new construction when I visited Bhopal again in 2002, the 'Devi (goddess) Apartments'. This multistoried apartment building is situated directly behind the temple. It has replaced an older Muslim-owned house, which initially used to host a liquor shop and a non-vegetarian restaurant. These enterprises were severely affected by the making of the Durga Temple, since Hindus do not allow alcohol and meat near temples. Thus the liquor shop had to close and the Muslim restaurant could serve only vegetarian food. Yet, the eating place continued to remain a thorn in the side of temple supporters. Its removal was facilitated by the activity of a prominent builder involved in the construction of the Durga Temple and other religious buildings in the city. Through long negotiations that lasted several years, he managed to take over the house from its former Muslim owner. Then, he had the structure torn down and erected a multi-storied apartment building in its stead. Today huge concrete letters on the upper part of the façade proclaim the name of the building: 'Devi Apartments'.

Today, Pir Gate has also emerged as one of the most important religious sites in the city. This is not by pure chance. The popularity of the Durga Temple is due to its central location on an arterial road adjoining the main bazaar, lending itself to quick visits before or after work, on the way to appointments, during shopping excursions, and so on. In addition, the temple committee frequently organizes religious mass events. All major festivals are celebrated with great vigor here. There is scarcely a religious procession in old Bhopal that does not pass by Pir Gate. The crossing is used for devotional musical events (*jagaran*) and sermons by famous religious leaders. There are other events that are more clearly political. The Bajrang Dal, for example, staged a protest here against cow slaughter. Pir Gate is used to felicitate visiting Hindu leaders or celebrate the electoral victory of the BJP. Also these political events integrate the temple into their programs and thus add a devotional element to their agenda. Together with the religious events they have brought about the transformation of Pir Gate into a site for political Hinduism.

The activism at Pir Gate is part of a social process through which Hinduism is defined, and a Hindu community organized and made palpable as a political entity. The making of the temple and the transformation of Pir Gate is based on the image of a split society, consisting of a majority Hindu and a minority Muslim community. It forcefully brings forward and enforces a narrative order that establishes Hindus and Muslims not only as potentially antagonistic groups but as separate political entities. It is this context that accounts for the connection between the local religio-political conflict in Bhopal and the partition motif. Through anti-Muslim activities like those in Bhopal, the 'two-nation' theory and the partition motif continue to organize everyday social relations in contemporary India.

Eradicating the Inner Muslim State

Hindu-Muslim relations in India are embedded in a narrative order that constructs Hindus and Muslims as belonging to two different communities that are mutually exclusive, or even antagonistic. The idea that people in India can be classified according to major religious labels that construct supposedly homogeneous categories, is a result of changes that followed the making of British India. There are many different theories about the origin of communalism¹⁰ and the reasons for its persistence. Nationalist historians blame the 'divide and rule politics' of the colonial powers (for example, Mehta and Patwardhan 1942). Marxist scholars continue this argument into post-colonial times and see communalism as a form of false consciousness spread by the élite to prevent people from fighting the real enemies, the dominant classes (for example, Chandra 1984; Panikkar 1991). Such theories are supported by data from riot analyzes that show how vested interests play a role in spreading religious hatred and violence (for example Banu 1989; Patel 1985). Finally, there are neo-traditionalist arguments that hold the institutions of modernity—science, nationalism, and secularism—as responsible for destroying a former tolerant and pluralistic (religious) tradition and replacing it with religious ideology that establishes boundaries between communities and forces people to develop non-ambiguous identities (Miller 1987; Nandy 1985, 1990).¹¹

More convincing than arguments that hold élite activities largely responsible for the spread of religious antagonism, are contextualized

analyzes of intersecting activities at all levels of society that have together established a narrative order that identifies religion with nation.¹² Pandey (1990), for example, shows that while in the initial phase (till about 1920), the national movement existed as a coalition of many different social and religious groups, the fight for freedom became more and more an ideological struggle that constructed an unbridgeable opposition between religious nationalism, that is, communalism and secular nationalism. This was also apparent in Bhopal, where the independence struggle also bore on organizations that pointedly brought forward concerns of a Hindu population that felt subjected to unjust rule. The political movement for democracy and independence led here, as elsewhere in India, to the construction of religious communities as political entities. The support the last ruler of pre-independence Bhopal extended to Muslim nationalism, and his efforts to suppress Hindu organizations and democratic movements, contributed to turning religious claims and resistance against a feudal state into a communal project.

In Bhopal, anti-Muslim feelings are tied to the 'memory' of the city's past. Memory here refers to a particular narrative tradition that constructs the former rulers of Bhopal as enemies of Hindus, or as antagonistic to Hindu interests, irrespective of historical evidence or personal memory. The architecture of old Bhopal, with its imposing Muslim religious infrastructure, appears to confirm a Muslim bias. It turns into a 'proof' for a particular reading of Bhopal history. Hindu fundamentalists complain that even today, nothing is done to counter-balance the overbearing effect of Muslim architecture in old Bhopal. It is protected not only by Muslim institutions (for example the Awqaf Board) but also by those state agencies and NGOs that fight for the preservation of historical buildings and institutions promoting tourism.

In this context, the desire to eradicate an 'inner Pakistan' takes on double meaning. It refers to the 'two-nation theory', the craving to make India the home of Hindus, just as Pakistan was created as the home of Indian Muslims. It is also the desire to oust the inner Muslim state, which had made the heart of Bhopal a Muslim territory, and its apparent resistance to change under the new rule. The list of statements that assert the need for a demonstration of Hindu strength at Pir Gate is long. 'Muslims know that a Hindu temple is a show of Hindu strength, this is why they are against it', remarked a devotee who came to attend *aarti* at the Durga Temple. The temple priest confirms that 'in earlier

times we used to be afraid of the Muslims but now they fear us. This temple has become our protection'. There are also more aggressive statements that demand Hindu unity in the old town, even justifying violence as a means for self-assertion.

Guttu Bhaya¹³ managed to win the last elections because he went around making people aware, telling them that if the Muslims are united you should also be united. So the Hindus voted together instead of giving their votes here and there. We have fought a lot for Hindus to be equal in this locality. We were totally subdued. We do not want to dominate but we want to be able to stand up and say our things. Muslims used to spit their *pan* when Hindu women passed by. Till today Muslims are dominant in some lanes [of old Bhopal]. We are all surrounded by Muslims. I finished three of them during the riot. I also went to jail for a month. But now they fear us. Now we can also speak up (Local political activist and devotee at the Durga Temple, 24 March 1998).

This statement makes a connection between the importance of Hindu unity, the BJP as ideal representative of Hindu interests, and the need for aggressive actions, referring to the 1992 Hindu–Muslim riots. The activist addresses the same issues that motivated the Durga Temple Committee to spring into action: the perceived under-representation of Hindus and the resulting insecurity. The call for unity results also from electoral calculations. In old Bhopal, Hindu nationalists can get their candidate through only if they manage to mobilize all non-Muslim voters—assuming of course that Muslims would not support Hindu nationalist politics.

Pir Gate activism has been a cornerstone in the process of communalizing the city. It constitutes public assertion against minorities and secularists and emphasizes that pockets of Muslim domination will not be accepted in contemporary India. This is not too far from the ideological position of Hindu fanatics proclaiming that if Muslims wish to live in India, they need to submit to the rules and interests of the 'Hindu majority'. Or to the vehement assertions violently expressed in the Ayodhya movement, that Muslims belong to Pakistan: *Hindi Hindu Hindustan, Muslims jao Pakistan* (India is for Hindi and Hindus, Muslims go to Pakistan) (Manuel 1996: 135).

I do not claim that the Durga Temple Committee subscribes only to this particularly aggressive kind of anti-Muslim ideology. Most of my informants emphasized that they were searching for a new balance,

rather than the extinction of the Muslim element of a composite culture. Yet, the point here is not about individual feelings or the intentions of the Durga Temple Committee. Abstracted from individual agency, Pir Gate today is a place where different religious and Hindu nationalist voices collapse. The place is symbolically overdetermined by its particular history and the way a broad range of agents, representing different shades of Hinduism and Hindu nationalism, attach themselves to the site, constantly reembedding the temple in a narrative of Hindu–Muslim conflict.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have drawn attention to the way partition continues to haunt India's present, more than half a century after independence and in a place, far removed from the actual borders. Our findings show the effects of a mental map that emerged as a result of partition and the ideologies that led to partition, which continue to inform Hindu–Muslim relations in contemporary India. Many studies have shown that partition and its memory continues to place a strain on Hindu–Muslim relations in India and that the memory of religious strife is refreshed and actualized in every Hindu–Muslim conflict (Butalia 1998; Kaul 2001; Mankekar 2000: 289–333). The case of Bhopal confirms the thesis that partition continues to imprint itself on the minds of Indians. By applying the metaphor of 'little Pakistan' to a territory in Bhopal, Hindu activists claim that the historical process of making two nations has not been completed. It has left Muslim patches intact, keeping Hindus as 'captives' in their own territory. Such polemic is used to justify the Hinduization of the territory. In Bhopal, Hindu nationalist activities are framed by the powerful presence of Muslim architecture. For Hindu fundamentalists, the city's architecture is a reminder of its Muslim origins. While Bhopal's history is rich with accounts of benevolent Muslim rulers, their contribution in the development of the city, education, and women's emancipation, the Durga Temple movement tends to gloss over such narratives, emphasizing rather the need to 'liberate' the city from a supposed 'historical injustice'.

Such interpretation emerges from the overtly anti-Muslim bias, conveniently mixing a political message with religious devotion. Today Bhopal has its own history of 'partition', into separate Hindu and

Muslim territories in old Bhopal. The history of this recent reenactment of the partition motif is kept alive by the inscription hailing the 'Lady of Curfew', whose blessing is publicly invoked, through loudspeakers, at every significant festival. These are unequivocal signs that Bhawani Chowk, the newly-transformed Pir Gate, symbolizes the xenophobic project of making India Hindu, thereby continuing the project of partition.

Such developments are hardly specific or unique to India, as this comparative volume shows. My conclusions resonate in many ways with the findings drawn from other examples. In her article on 'A Homeland Torn Apart' Nina Gren (this volume) describes partition as an ongoing process. Denying the bi-cultural (if not multi-cultural) reality of life in a territory that is claimed as homeland by Jews and Palestinians alike, political decisions progressively create frictions and distinctions between the different groups and among Palestinians. In this situation the two-nation theory, also promoted by the UN and the Oslo Agreement, has added new ruptures in the lives of people, while at the same time promising to offer a solution for the predicament of an internally divided nation.

Evidence from Bhopal has shown that despite the existence of two nations, there are increased feelings of insecurity among members of the Muslim minority. I would argue that partition as an experience of creating two nation-states, is merely one particular point in a continuous process of re-inscribing the partition motif into the lived realities of people. Pre- or post-partition, the ideological construction of two distinct nations historically locked in a joint territory continues to haunt people. And, while partition may appear persuasive as an ideological guide for reaching political decisions, it continues to encounter resistance through activities of people who remember and commemorate different, contesting meanings of space and its relation to the social order.

The Hinduization of Pir Gate remains an unfinished project, just as efforts to turn India into a mono-cultural nation is impossible. The presence of Muslims living at Pir Gate, their activities of crossing the place in great numbers to reach the mosque for Friday prayers, of celebrating their festivals and holding their own parades disrupts efforts at homogenization and keeps alive another layer of cultural meaning inscribed in this space. Due to its particular history as a Muslim space that has been aggressively taken from the community, Pir Gate has also

started to attract those who are fighting for maintaining an open multi-religious society. Programs for communal harmony emphasize the historical coexistence of Hindus and Muslims and the need for continuing inter-communal relations, and so on. Historical records, the built environment as well as the memory and practices of inhabitants, keep alive the multiple meanings that impede the establishment of a single hegemonic reading.

This power of space to prove resistant to projects of religious or cultural homogenization is also apparent from the examples of Zochrot cited by Jassal and Ben-Ari (Introduction, this volume). The organization Zochrot in Israel supports the victims of the *Naqba*, that is those displaced from their hometowns in the early days of the making of the Israeli nation-state. In recent years, members of Zochrot have encouraged and joined Palestinians during their annual commemorative visits to their ancestral places and intensified the symbolic content of these visits by reinstalling road-signs and plates with Arabic names of streets, places, and towns. As Jassal has pointed out, although the signs have been torn down again and again by new residents, thereby symbolically reenacting the expulsion, such public 'stagings' nevertheless serve to restore and revive collective memory and at least raise question-marks about the eclipse of the multiple and layered cultural meanings embedded in these territories. The enactments communicate a sense of the past to newer generations and those who were not present, or have little knowledge of the events and expulsions.

In this context, it is hardly surprising that many East German cities, and especially Berlin, are experiencing intensive struggles over the destruction of buildings, the re-naming of streets and the making of museums and commemoration sites (Binder 2001, 2003a, 2003b). Here too, space is appropriated as a tool to push through and legitimize new power constellations. However, symbolic inscriptions of the past tend to stick and destroy the 'purity' of the new hegemonic project. Thus while space is a privileged place for creating, inscribing, and fixing partition (see also Zureik, this volume), its function as a palimpsest that stores symbolic meanings of the past—however ephemeral—emerges as an obstacle. Therefore, whatever the context, rather than being closed or settled once and for all, partition continues to remain an open project, impinging in diverse and complex ways upon the present, disturbed by the memory of the horrors on which it is built.

NOTES

1. Merger Movement refers to the political struggle in Bhopal after India became independent in 1947, while Bhopal remained under the authority of the Nawab. The merger movement demanded the merger of the princely state of Bhopal with the Union Territory (Mittal 1990: 174–94).
2. After independence, the territory of the Indian Union was divided into A, B, and C states. Part A states were former provinces now ruled by an elected governor and state legislature. Part B and C states were former princely states and also commissioners' provinces. Part B states were governed by a *rajpramukh* and part C states by a commissioner (Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/States_and_territories_of_India)
3. The company was located in the north of the city, an area where mostly low-income groups live in slums. The area has a mixed population of Hindus and Muslims.
4. Immediately after partition, Bhopal was also attractive to Muslims since it was the second biggest Muslim state after Hyderabad. Thus, Muslims hoped to receive better protection here and came in great numbers. There was also a resettlement of Hindu refugees from Sindh.
5. The figures from 1951 and 1961 are taken from the census undertaken in Sehore district. They refer to the urban population, which means practically Bhopal, the only large city in Sehore district. After 1961, districts were reorganized and separate figures for Bhopal city became available.
6. More details about this case and other temple projects in Bhopal can be found in Rao 2003b.
7. This is the name of the place right at the center of the walled city, where the Jama Masjid is situated. The place is within walking distance from Pir Gate (five minutes by foot).
8. The organization is called Nav Yuvak Adhikar Manch (Forum for Young People's Rights). Arjun is the founder as well as the president of this organization, which he likes to portray as the youth wing of the BJP—which officially it is not.
9. *Arti* is a central temple ritual during which a camphor flame is circumambulated in front of the deity.
10. Communalism is used here in the particular Indian sense of antagonism between two religious communities. Both the Webster's and Oxford Dictionary refer to this meaning: '*communalism* [...] 2: loyalty to a sociopolitical group—based on religious affiliation' (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 1976: 227); or '*communal*, [...] (India) of the antagonistic religious and racial communities in a district' (Oxford Dictionary of Current English 1964: 244).
11. For an elaborate discussion of these positions and a critical reflection on them, see Rao 2003a.

12. See for example Brass 1998; Freitag 1989; Hansen and Jaffrelot 1998; Jaffrelot 1996; Ludden 1996.
13. This is the nickname used by locals for Ramesh Sharma, the BJP MLA elected from old Bhopal.

REFERENCES

- Chandra, Bipan. 1984. *Communalism in Modern India*. Delhi: Vikas.
- Banu, Zenab. 1989. *Politics of Communalism*. Bombay: Popular Prakashan.
- Binder, Beate. 2001. 'Capital under Construction. History and the Production of Locality in Contemporary Berlin', *Ethnologia Europaea*, 31(2): 19–40.
- . 2003a. 'Raum-Erinnerung-Identität. Zur Konstruktion von Gedächtnis- und Handlungsräumen im Prozess der Hauptstadtwerdung Berlins', in Silke Göttsch, and Christel Köhle-Hezinger (eds), *Komplexe Welt. Kulturelle Ordnungssysteme als Orientierung*, pp. 257–66. Münster u. a.: Waxmann.
- . 2003b. 'Kampf um ein Straßenschild. Cultural Performance als Politik der Symbolischen Transformation des Berliner Stadtraums', in Erika Fischer-Lichte, Christian Horn, Sandra Umthum, Matthias Warstat (eds), *Performativität und Ereignis*, pp. 359–75. Tübingen, Basel: Francke.
- Butalia, Urvashi. 1998. *The Other Side of Silence. Voices from the Partition of India*. New Delhi: Viking.
- Brass, Paul R. 1998. *Theft of an Idol. Text and Context in the Representation of Collective Violence*. Calcutta: Seagull.
- Davis, Richard H. 1996. 'The Iconography of Rama's Chariot', in David von Ludden (ed.), *Making India Hindu*, pp. 27–54. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Elst, Koenraad. 2003. *Ayodhya: The Finale: Science versus Secularism in the Excavations Debate*. Delhi: Voice of India.
- Engineer, Asghar Ali. (ed.). 1990. *Babri-Masjid Ramjanambhoomi Controversy*. Delhi: Ajanta Publications.
- Freitag, Sandra B. 1989. *Collective Action and Community. Public Areas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hansen, Thomas Blom and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds). 1998. *The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Hartung, Jan-Peter. 2004. *Ayodhya 1992–2003. The Assertion of Cultural and Religious Hegemony*. Delhi: Media House.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe. 1996. *The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics 1925 to the 1990s. Strategies of Identity-Building, Implantation and Mobilisation*. New Delhi: Viking.
- . 1998. 'The Politics of Processions and Hindu-Muslim Riots', in Amrita Basu and Atul Kohli (eds), *Community Conflicts and the State in India*, pp. 58–92. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Kaul, Suvir (ed.). 2001. *The Partitions of Memory*. Delhi: Permanent Black.

- Lehri, Chandralekhya 1997. *Socio-Demographic Profile of Muslims. Study of Bhopal City*. Delhi: Rawat Publications.
- Luard, Captain C. E. 1908. *Bhopal State Gazetteer* (Volume III. Text and Tables). Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing. (Reprint by the Gazetteer Unity Directorate of Rajbhasha and Culture, Government of Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal, 1995.)
- Ludden, David (ed.). 1996. *Making India Hindu. Religion, community, and the Politics of Democracy in India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Malhotra, P. C. 1964. *Socio-Economic Survey of Bhopal City and Bairagarh*. London: Asia Publishing House.
- Mankekar, Purnima. 2000. *Screening Culture, Viewing Politics. Television, Womanhood, and Nation in Modern India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Manuel, Peter. 1996. 'Music, the Media, and Communal Relations in North India, Past and Present', in David Ludden (ed.), *Making India Hindu*, pp. 119–39. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Mehta, Asoka and Achyut Patwardhan 1942: *The Communal Triangle in India*. Allahabad: Kitabistan.
- Miller, Donald F. 1987. 'Six thesis on the Question of Religion and Politics in India Today', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 22(30): PE-57–PE-63.
- Mittal, Kamla. 1990. *History of Bhopal State*. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
- Nandy, Ashis. 1985. 'An Anti-Secularist Manifesto', *Seminar*, 314.
- . 1990. 'The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance', in Veena Das (ed.), *Mirrors of Violence*, pp. 69–93. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Nandy, Ashis, Shikha Trivedy, Shail Mayaram, and Achyut Yagnik. 1995. *Creating a Nationality. The Ramjanmabhumi Movement and Fear of the Self*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Pandey, Gyanendra. 1990. *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India*. Bombay: Oxford University Press.
- Panikkar, K. M. (ed.). 1991. *Communalism in India. History Politics and Culture*. New Delhi: Manohar.
- Patel, Priyavadan. 1985. 'Recent History and Politics of Communalism and Communal Riots in Gujarat', in Asghar Ali Engineer and Moin Shakir (eds), *Communalism in India*, pp. 106–46. Delhi: Ajanta Publishing.
- Publicity Officers, Government of Bhopal. 1942. *Bhopal from 1932 to 1938*. Bombay: Government of India.
- Rao, Ursula. 2003a. *Kommunalismus in Indien. Eine Darstellung der wissenschaftlichen Diskussion über Hindu-Muslim-Konflikte*. Halle: Universität Halle.
- . 2003b. *Negotiating the Divine. Temple Religion and Temple Politics in Contemporary Urban India*. Delhi: Manohar.
- . (forthcoming). 'Contested Spaces. Temple Building and the Re-Creation of Religious Boundaries in Contemporary Urban India', in Frances Pine and João Pina-Cabral (eds), *On the Margins of Religion*. Oxford: Berghahn.
- Shrivastav, P. N. and S. D. Guru. 1989. *Madhya Pradesh District Gazetteers. Sehore and Bhopal*. Bhopal: Directorate of Gazetteers, Department of Culture.

- Singh, J. P. 1994. *Central India. Resources and Development*. Bhopal: Bhaskar Publishing.
- van derVeer, Peter. 1987. '“God must be Liberated!” A Hindu Liberation Movement in Ayodhya', *Modern Asian Studies*, 21(2): 283–301.
- . 1988. *Gods on Earth. The Management of Religious Experience and Identity in a North Indian Pilgrimage Centre*. London: The Athlone Press.

***Healing, Reconciliation,
and Comparative
Dimensions***



Collective Memory and Obstacles to Reconciliation Efforts in Israel

ZVI BEKERMAN

Introduction

From the perspective of memory studies (Zelizer 1995) memory is multifaceted. It is continuously unfolding (Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz 1991; Wertsch 2002) as meaning—of which it seems to be ever in search; it is always on its way somewhere and, in this process, is both transforming and transformed. Like many other concepts of western modernity, memory has excited the mind and been propelled into the world of material and interpretative performances (Connerton 1989). Memory is no longer to be found in the narrow coordinates of the psyche but in the broader coordinates of a social world wherein, though susceptible to homogenizing powers which might shape it as unitary (Halbwachs 1980), it is distributed, negotiated, and contested (Bodnar 1992).

Jorge Luis Borges (1996) doubted whether Funes could think. Thinking has to do with forgetting, he thought, and forgetting was the one thing Funes could not do. In Funes' world, there were only immediate details and he died trapped in memory. Remembrance of traumatic histories cannot be justified logically. True: no memory no self; but this still does not imply the need to remain attached to traumatic recollections. When we choose to do so, when we organize our institutional and public spheres in reminiscence of past tragedies, we may be suspected of an attempt to rally support for particular interests, not necessarily the ones which support accommodation. Too much memory seems to have a monologic character; it seems not to recognize other recollections and, if at all able to enter into dialog, it does so through denial.

Simon et al. (2000) have recently posited two predominant remembrance pedagogies which shape social memories of traumatic historical events. In the first, strategic practice, the formation of memory mobilizes attachments and knowledge to serve specific social and political interests, in particular, sociotemporal frameworks while hoping that the attention invested in past horrors can secure a moral and better tomorrow. The second, remembrance as a difficult return, endeavors to bring past figures into the present in order to honor their memory, thus living in a continuous relationship to the past while allowing the past to have claims in the present. Both strategies pose risks through the creation of a historical continuity which threatens to collapse differences across space and time, leaving those raised within such traditions unable to imagine more relational dialogical futures. The authors, as a possible solution, offer remembrance as critical learning which concerns itself with a new attentiveness to particular rememberings which deny master memories, and become reflexive and dialogical, thus opening new possibilities for learning and reconciliatory imagining.

In recent years there has been a growing concern by theoreticians to better understand coexistence and reconciliation processes in interethnic struggles. This chapter considers the potential of educational efforts to help participants overcome long-standing interethnic conflict, specifically the ritualized expressions of collective memory as these are staged in commemorative ceremonies. The commemorative ceremonies to be discussed, articulate both the struggle and attempts at reconciliation between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis in two bilingual integrated Jewish–Palestinian Israeli schools. The analysis shows how both the macro socio-political context and micro aspects in the development of working relations of the two communities in conflict—in our case the Palestinian and Jews who have come together to create the schools—seem seriously to influence the potential of school ceremonies and their associated remembering pedagogies to serve efforts at coexistence and reconciliation.

Coexistence, Reconciliation, and Remembrance

Coexistence and reconciliation are terms that refer to the ways in which antagonistic or formerly antagonistic groups relate to each other.

Coexistence points primarily at types of dispassionate relationships which exclude overt struggle, while reconciliation opens the door for more harmonious relations through overcoming wounds inflicted by extremely violent conflict. In general, interethnic coexistence can pave the way to reconciliation, making both become sequential with reconciliation helping stabilize and maintain coexistence (Kriesberg 1998). Since the terms 'coexistence' and 'reconciliation' are widely and variably used (Kritz 1995), we will first try to clarify their meanings in reference to the present Palestinian–Jewish situation in Israel.

Kriesberg (1998) considers coexistence as bearing on structural and subjective aspects of relationships between persons and groups. Applying this perspective, we could say that structurally, while sustaining a mostly separate existence within the borders of Israel, Palestinian and Jewish coexistence is integrated at the national level. Both groups live, for the most part, in discrete areas and participate in segregated educational systems. Though basic democratic rights, for both groups, are seemingly anchored within the Israeli legal system, it is apparent that Israel as an ethnic democracy (Smootha 1996), has developed multiple discriminatory strategies to subordinate the 20 percent of Israeli citizens who constitute the Palestinian minority. A high degree of economic inequality and social subordination accompanies the situation (*ibid.*). From the subjective aspect of coexistence, we could say that the Palestinian cohort has for many years accepted Jewish domination and even internalized their lower status within the Israeli system. Since the 1973 war, however, there has been a slow process of awakening within the Palestinian population that is expressed in an emergent political struggle and a growing identification with the Palestinians of the occupied territories and their struggle for an independent state. Their ongoing separate and contested existence has been provided for by an amalgam of stereotypes and violent practices which make available their accentuated identity (Rouhana 1997).

Reconciliation is a rather new concept in studies of interethnic struggle (Bar-Tal 2000). It points to the need for constructing peaceful cooperative and trusting relations in a society after a long period of harsh intergroup conflict.

Reconciliation processes are multifaceted and vary according to the future visions of peace held by the parties involved. These can range from integration, such as in the case of South Africa, to separation, such as in the case of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict (Ross 2000a).

In Central and Latin America, reconciliation efforts have been perceived as a prerequisite for the constitution of democratic regimes after long years of violent conflict (Hayner 1999; Kaye 1997). Reconciliation is in general hard to achieve, and in some instances in which it has been attempted, the process has been criticized for imposing a hegemonic discourse of justice and healing within liberal and humanitarian practices, such as in the case of the recent Rwandan Commission on Unity and National Reconciliation (Ranck 2000).

Interest in reconciliation seems to follow from a sense that dealing with ethnic conflicts only at the structural and legal levels is insufficient. Reconciliation should address basic threats to identity and a sense and experience of victimization as expressed in the cultural spheres of conflict-ridden areas, thus helping to cultivate a sense of trust and recognition between parties previously in conflict (Ross 2001). From a psychological perspective, reconciliation refers to the socio-cultural process undertaken by the majority of society members in which beliefs and attitudes concerning the groups previously engaged in open conflict are reframed (Bar-Tal 2000). Like peace-making, reconciliation has been conceptualized as a continuum, advancing from weaker to stronger versions (Kriesberg 1998). Lederach (1998) points at the transformative aspects of reconciliation which first reframe perspectives on 'the others', thereby allowing for a process leading towards a renewed encounter between 'we' and 'they'.

Long-lasting conflicts reach stages in which new generations are not aware of any other possible realities, making any attempt to overcome the current perceptions in the new generations very difficult (Arthur 1999). The move toward coexistence and reconciliation thus becomes a complex one, requiring the engagement of multiple domestic and international resources. The mobilization of social, cultural, and educational systems within a given society is central to the creation of an environment which fosters reconciliation (Bar-Tal 2002), especially those systems that will now be geared toward validating cultural variations between the groups previously in conflict, generating experiences which support equitable existence, and providing opportunities for the acknowledgement of mistakes and the expression of forgiveness. At the same time, international support can also contribute greatly to coexistence and reconciliation efforts (Gardner-Feldman 1999). Among the central factors which must be mobilized if reconciliation is to be

achieved, Bar-Tal (2000) ranks the educational system high due to its role in socializing new generations to live in peace with past enemies.

Anderson's (1983) classic assertion that a nation is primarily an 'imagined community', points at educational systems as one of the most central and effective arenas engaged by the state to form that community. Within this arena, rituals and ceremonial events play a crucial role. School ceremonies (Brunett 1976; Magolda 2000; McLaren 1993), like other types of ritual, can be conceptualized as stories enacted by the participating community, telling themselves about themselves (Geertz 1973a). These ceremonies are acts of performative memory which, through gesture and movement, become embodied (Connerton 1989). Emphasizing more the emotional than the cognitive aspects, they reinforce the creative and generative powers of the participants (Ben-Amos and Bet-El 1999; Kertzer 1988) and play a central role in the mnemonic socialization of citizens (Zerubavel 1996). Through the memorial ceremony, society announces its most central myths, presents its heroes as role models, and reinforces the collective through the remembrance of personal sacrifice on its behalf. Ceremonies become rituals of social affirmation, which periodically and routinely validate personal and group identities (Volkan 1988). Commemorative ritual events address and redress (Geertz 1973b; Ortner 1978) contemporary conflicts embedded in the social relationships of the participating communities, while at the same time mediating a cognitive and emotional experience through their enactment. Drawing upon fragments of texts and selected symbols, they weave a narrative that both remembers and potentially transforms.

Recent studies point at the centrality of ceremonial symbolic activity as part of the reconciliation process (Simon et al. 2000). Ross (2001) argues that ritual and symbolic actions are very central to the reconciliation process for they are closely associated with group identity which needs to be addressed if reconciliation is to be in any way successful. In his own works, Ross (2000a; 2000b) points at the need to invent or redefine rituals and symbolic actions so as to further the potential for inclusiveness and to better support coexistence and reconciliatory efforts. In the last decade or so, Israel has developed a wide variety of educational coexistence projects (Bard 1998). These are for the most part implemented within segregated schools, or are short-term bi-national enterprises conducted, for example, in the framework

of summer camps. Until recently there have been only two long-term fully integrated educational initiatives in Israel: the Jerusalem YMCA nursery/kindergarten project and the Neve Shalom/Wahat Al-Salam integrated elementary school in a Jewish–Palestinian cooperative village located outside of Jerusalem. Though a few studies have been conducted on the effects of short-term educational encounters on Palestinian–Jewish relations in Israel (for an overview see, for example, Abu-Nimer 1999), studies on long term educational initiatives, such as the schools under study are still scant (Bekerman 2005; Bekerman and Horenczyk 2004; Feuerverger 2001; Glazier 2003).

Our present study focuses in particular on the role of two separate and different ritual ceremonial events as these were enacted in two new bilingual primary schools which started their activities in 1997, one in Jerusalem and the other in the Galil in the northern part of Israel (for a full description of the educational sites and their goals and populations see Bekerman and Horenczyk (2004). I analyze the Hanukkah/Idel Fiter/Christmas ceremony at the Jerusalem school, which addresses mostly cultural religious issues, and the events which correspond in the national Jewish Israeli calendar to Memorial Day as it developed in the Galil school. Though the schools clearly aimed at strengthening coexistence between the Jewish and Palestinian groups in Israel through egalitarian educational efforts, reconciliation was never an openly declared aim of these schools. In general, there has been little discussion of reconciliation in Israel. From the perspective of the Jewish majority, such a concept would imply the open recognition of misdeeds toward the Palestinian Israeli minority which require reconciling—a rather difficult acknowledgment given present ideological perceptions. In focusing on the treatment of special ceremonial events in these schools, I wish to explore their potential to challenge mnemonic cannons and alleviate interethnic tensions.

Methodology

This study is based on an analysis of data collected, using a variety of ethnographic methods, during a five-year research effort conducted from August 1999 to July 2004. During the course of the research, over 100 interviews were conducted with parents—most of them in

individual sessions each lasting approximately one hour, and the rest in small group-meetings, which lasted approximately 90 minutes each. Almost all staff members—teachers, administrative staff and principals—were interviewed two/three times during the five-year period. I also talked with the children, either in brief semi-structured individual interviews or in more informal circumstances, mostly during recess. Interviews with Palestinian parents, teachers, and pupils were conducted in Hebrew or Arabic, according to the preference of the interviewee. All interviews were conducted according to qualitative ethnographic principles (Maykut and Morehouse 1994; Seidman 1991; Spradley 1979); the interviewer focused on a number of topics that seemed relevant to the study, but allowed subjects to tell their stories without limiting the interview to a fixed agenda. Meetings of the School Steering Committee (a consulting body comprising parents, teachers, and representatives from the non-governmental organization or NGO which established the schools) were also recorded during the years of the research. Multiple systematic as well as informal observations were conducted during class and recess, and almost all national and religious ceremonial events were observed and recorded. The qualitative data were carefully analyzed, looking for patterns and thematic issues of relevance, which were then coded so as to allow for further analysis.

Though large amounts of data, related to a variety of interactional, curricular, and pedagogical issues, were collected during my five-year research period, this study reports almost exclusively on the observations conducted during the ceremonial events, complemented by references to these topics in interviews with parents and teachers.

Festival of Light

Hanukkah is an important ceremonial event celebrated with parental participation in standard Jewish primary schools in Israel (Handelman 1990). It begins the calendar of celebrations which express the national Zionist narrative (Zerubavel 1995). Hanukkah commemorates both the Maccabean revolt against the Seleucid Greek conquest and the miracle of the oil, which continued to burn for eight days after the desecration of the Temple. Hanukkah, like many other winter festivals, is strongly associated with themes of light and the winter equinox.

In this sense, it can be combined with Christmas and, at times, with Idel Fiter, the Muslim festival that concludes the Ramadan fast. In this section I will relate specifically to the events that took place in the Hanukkah/Idel Fiter/Christmas ceremony at the Jerusalem school in 1999. This combination of festivals had been conceived from the start of the integrated educational initiative as a strong statement regarding the schools' commitment to the cultural recognition of all groups involved.

The festive celebration took place in the central room of a neighboring community center. Crescent moons, representing the sign of Ramadan, *hanukkiot* (Hanukkah candelabra), Christmas trees, and other related paraphernalia also decorated this hall and the table where, at the end of the evening, all invitees would partake of a light buffet together.

Parents entering were directed to the second floor where the ceremony would take place in a large rectangular room. This room too had been decorated with hanging *hanukkiot*, Christmas trees, and crescent moons. On stage, there were three equally large displays: a Christmas tree, a *hanukkiot*, and a replica of a mosque. In front of the 'mosque', ten chairs had been prepared for the actors participating in the presentation. Eight of the chairs were decorated with big cardboard candles (symbolic of the eight-stemmed hanukkah candelabra). The air was buzzing with excitement. All teachers, parents, and children were dressed festively. On center stage, a big poster in Hebrew and Arabic read 'Welcome' (preserving the school's principle of total symmetry between the two languages). The first to come on stage was the school principal who, speaking in Hebrew, greeted all those coming to the Festival of Lights commemorating the three festivals of Hanukkah, Ramadan and Christmas. Second to the stage was one of the co-directors of the Center for Bilingual Education (CBE) in Israel (the NGO that established the schools), a Muslim Palestinian, reinforcing the cornerstone policy of symmetry which characterizes the school activities. His opening words of welcome were spoken in Arabic and then, surprisingly, he moved into Hebrew and spoke about the sense of fulfillment he has from participating in this event which represents the success of something believed impossible: a school in which Palestinians and Jews are equally represented and work together for a better world. The teacher in charge of the event now invited a Jewish parent to light the first Hanukkah candle. A second parent was then invited to the stage,

a Palestinian dressed in traditional Arabic dress, who gave a short account of the meaning of Ramadan and Idel Fiter. Lastly, four mothers were invited to the stage. They formed a choir singing Christmas songs, and part of the audience joined in. After the parents' presentations, the student presentations commenced. These were organized like a television program. First to come on stage were two second-graders, a Palestinian and a Jew, carrying a cardboard construction resembling a television set. They introduced 'The Program of the Month' in Arabic and Hebrew. The first scene of the program related to Ramadan. In Arabic one of the children said: 'Black clouds, stars and moon, at dawn Ramadan begins and with the dusk it ends'. After this a song praising the month of Ramadan was sung by all the children in Arabic. The second scene of the program was introduced by the first two children who opened the new segment saying, 'And now a word from our sponsors'. At this point, in the corner of the stage, two girls appeared, a Palestinian and a Jew, each holding a basket with olives. One said to the other, 'I make the best olive oil'. The other responded, 'No, I make the best olive oil', after which they both said in unison, 'Together we make the best olive oil'. After this short scene in which both Hebrew and Arabic are spoken, all kindergarten children took the stage and danced in a big circle singing a Hebrew Hanukkah song about a little flask of oil (*Kad Katan*). All of the children followed by singing two more Hanukkah songs, 'A Great Miracle Happened Here' (*Nes Gadol Haya Po*) and 'Happy Days of Hanukkah' (*Yamei HaHanukkah*). The two children that hosted the simulated television show now announced the forecast for snow and, at this point, children who had been waiting at the side of the stage with boxes full of white Styrofoam, started throwing it in the air in an imitation of snow. Then a child in Santa's costume, came in ringing a bell and carrying a sack of sweets. He approached the children and offered gifts to them all. Santa's gifts to each child were a spinning top (*dreidel*) representing Hanukkah, a chocolate representing Christmas, and dates for Ramadan. Meanwhile the children sang a Christmas carol in Arabic. With this the presentation came to an end, and all parents were invited to the entrance hall for refreshments.

It was apparent throughout the event that a great effort had been made to provide a sense that all religious traditions were equally respected. The effort to create symmetry between the traditions was expressed in the way the stage and the decorations were constructed and

presented, as well as in the amount of time allotted to the different festivals represented. Despite the apparent symmetry however, one must note that two of the festivals, Hanukkah and Christmas, have been diluted in their symbolic messages. For example, in standard Jewish schools it is customary to see the figure of Judah the Maccabean, dressed in old Roman-style attire and armed with a sword, as part of the theatrical presentation for Hanukkah. This figure did not appear in this school ceremony: an apparent attempt to neutralize any conflictual nationalistic aspects related to the Zionist Hanukkah tradition. Instead, the religious version of Hanukkah was favored as in the Diaspora Jewish narrative, without emphasizing the Maccabean military victory. The rededication of the Temple, which was made possible by the miracle of the oil, was also left untold, presumably to avoid allusions to the disputed sovereignty over Jerusalem and the restoration of the Third Temple in place of the present Dome of the Rock on the Temple Mount, as advocated by certain extreme right-wing Jewish groups.

As for Christmas, in spite of it being a fully religious festival with no national overtones, for Jews it represents a long and problematic historical relationship between Christians and Jews particularly of European descent, whose collective Diasporic memory still dominates Israeli culture today. Christianity, which began as one of a number of Jewish sects in the West, became a competing tradition, often historically identified by Jews as the reason for anti-Semitic persecutions culminating in the Nazi Holocaust. In this sense, Jesus, the Christian Messiah figure, could have been seen as a threat to Jews and was therefore neutralized. Thus, in the school event, Christmas was represented as heralding the New Year and not as the birthday of the Messiah.

Idel Fiter seems to be less of a problem. For the most part, the Israeli Palestinian conflict is presented in common discourse and in the media as a national, not a religious conflict. Moreover, the Muslim religion has traditionally not been perceived as competing with Judaism and is known to recognize its debt to Judaism. Historically, East European Jews, the forefathers of the national Zionist movement, lacked exposure to Islam, and it therefore holds little associative meaning (even though from the start, Palestinian uprisings against Jews in Palestine, and later in the State of Israel, have been associated with Muslim religious leaders and fervent, religiously indignant mobs pouring out of mosques).

Even today the secular Israeli Jewish majority continues to read the Palestinian struggle as a national one, without emphasizing the central role of Islam. Christianity, therefore, remains the historically antagonistic enemy religion, though its effect on the Israeli experience is minuscule in comparison to the role of Islam. Therefore, the Christmas representation at the school ceremony underwent a radical revision while the Idel Fiter representation remained intact. At the religious level, there seems to have been a reversal of the role of the enemy: While nationally Muslim Palestinians are generally considered to be the enemy, Christians represent the greater cultural threat to the Jews (Bekerman 2003b).

The schools' dual goals of strengthening in-group identity, together with out-group tolerance and understanding, apparently require the revision of cultural identity markers. Both Jews and Christians forfeit central national and religious symbols in the public presentation—Judah the Maccabean and Jesus. Yet all parties seemed satisfied as the somewhat diluted religious emphasis seemed to achieve their higher aim of mutual recognition.

The Hanukkah/Idel Fiter/Christmas celebration, like all other rituals, is in the business of bringing out elements of all the possible might-have-beens of social reality (Douglas 1982). In the words of Handelman (1990: 15), 'Public events are locations of communication that convey participants into versions of social worlds in relatively coherent ways... Not only may they affect social life, they may also effect it'. From a perspective of pedagogical remembrance, the case presented seems to be working in the right direction. The mnemonic implementation is relaxed and allows for forgetfulness (or some selective amnesia) to enter the stage. Efforts are invested in paying special attention to the dynamic relations across national/ethnic/religious boundaries while encompassing broader societal and political issues (Freeman 2000; Lustig 1997) relevant to the particular conflictual Israeli context which shapes the occasion. As such, this public event is a construct dedicated to the making of a new order of peace and coexistence. Though a rather strict separation is maintained between the representational sketches in the ceremony, some of the foundational collective memories of the participating groups is allowed to be withdrawn. Allowing for some forgetfulness might not be yet dialog but it may be a first step toward the setting in motion of future critical perspectives.

The Naqba and Memorial Day Commemoration

As opposed to the Hanukkah/Idel Fiter/Christmas ceremony that is a broader school event including parents, the Memorial Day ceremony is a students-only event and takes place on the eve of Israeli Independence Day during regular school hours. Memorial ceremonies for Israel's fallen soldiers play an integral role in Israeli Jewish culture. These ceremonies are central to the constitution of the Jewish nation-state and its hegemonic collective memory, shaping its ethnocentric national identity, and establishing its continuity (Ben-Amos and Bet-El 1999; Etzioni 2000; Ichilov 1990; Ram 2000).

Jewish Memorial Day school ceremonies throughout Israel traditionally include the use of state symbols, menorahs, flags, and the Israeli Declaration of Independence. The ceremony starts when a siren is sounded at 11:00 o'clock for two minutes followed by a Yizkor prayer (a Jewish prayer traditionally recited in honor of the dead) written especially for this day, poetic or prose texts commemorating heroes or heroic acts, songs, a short speech recalling the fallen alumnae of the school, and concluding with the singing of the national anthem.

Due to the problematic aspects of such a ceremony in a school composed equally of children of Palestinian and Jewish parents committed to recognition and inclusion, the CBE organized parent workshops for each grade level conducted by the school advisor. During these two to three hour evening workshops, there was some inclination on the part of the parents to consider holding a joint ceremony for all students. Nonetheless, somewhat influenced by the predetermined views of the CBE and the teachers, they all agreed in the end to hold separate ceremonies; one for the Jewish children in commemoration of Israel's fallen soldiers, the other for the Palestinian children in commemoration of the *Naqba*.

Preparations at the school began a week in advance and included the creation of decorations for the courtyard and the classrooms. In 2001, these decorations included two large bulletin boards, one dedicated to the Palestinian cohort and the other to the Jewish one. The one representing Palestinian collective memory included a map of Mandatory Palestine, the story 'Haifa' (a children's story about an old Palestinian refugee in Lebanon dreaming about returning to his home in Haifa), pictures of Palestinian villages destroyed during the 1948 war,

and some drawings and short statements by the students in third grade, mostly telling stories about their own families' suffering during that time. The board representing Jewish collective memory was designed to include traditional Israeli national symbols, some pictures commemorating military acts of valor, and references to the Holocaust—one of the central arguments in post World War II Zionist ideology for the creation of the State of Israel.

All students were requested in advance to interview family members regarding the events of the 1948 war, or their recollections of past Memorial Days. The information gathered in the interviews became the basis for a class discussion, which took place immediately before the ceremonies. These classroom discussions were not uniformly structured or invariably harmonious. For example, in the second grade class, after the presentation of familial narratives, the Jewish teacher read from a recently published children's book, which she believed presented a relatively fair account of the 1948 events (that is it partially acknowledged Palestinian suffering). The reading of this book to the whole class triggered the Palestinian teacher's protest over the unfairness of the account. Two graphic representations in the book were considered to be offensive and misrepresentative of historical facts: (a) a Jew waving his hand offering peace and a Palestinian with his hand extended holding a sword; (b) a Jew offering a half apple symbolizing the acceptance of the partition plan and a Palestinian with his hand extended in rejection of his half of the apple.

Approximately 15 minutes before the 11:00 a.m. siren announced the official start of Memorial Day ceremonies around the country, the Palestinian and Jewish children were assembled in separate rooms, where each group would conduct its own commemorative act. The Jewish ceremony followed the traditional pattern for national ceremonies as described above. The only unusual detail was that the Jewish teachers emphasized some issues related to the Israeli flag, which had been left out from the regular joint classes. Some of the rhetoric used could be characterized as much more ethnocentric and nationalistic than the rhetoric used during regular joint classes, implying that once alone, teachers could speak their standard Israeli Jewish language. The Palestinian ceremony was organized much like the Jewish one. Texts were read, stories told, and songs sung. Again, I had the sense that teachers felt much more at ease and expressed themselves much more openly regarding national issues.

The agreement reached at the teachers' meetings in which the organization of the ceremonies had been discussed included the provision that no flags, Palestinian or Israeli, would be present in the school. However, the Jewish teachers had understood that no Israeli flag would be publicly displayed but that one could be used in the room where the Jewish ceremony would take place, and that no Palestinian flag would be present at all; while Palestinian teachers understood that no flags would be present in the school at all. The Jewish ceremony stuck to the compromise (as they understood it) and had a rather small Israeli flag hanging from the board in the room where the Jewish ceremony took place, alongside a *talit* (prayer shawl), traditionally acknowledged to be the inspiration for the present Israeli flag. In the Palestinian ceremony, a small Palestinian flag was used many times. A teacher pulled it out from her handbag when required, and put it back each time. By the end of 45 minutes, both ceremonies were over. The children returned to their homerooms and classes resumed. For the next hour, students in the second grade shared their experiences in both ceremonies and discussed some issues regarding peace and coexistence raised by the teachers. Throughout it was clear that what really interested the children by this point was recess. The break finally came and the children seemed pleased to return to their favorite activities: playing soccer and 'hide-and-go-seek', mostly in self-segregated national groups (as a rule, interaction between the children of different national backgrounds was relatively low, occurring mostly during class sessions, while during break time it was by and large absent). National issues had faded into the background.

It seems that in contrast to the Hanukkah/Idel Fiter/Christmas celebration, with its diluted memory which offers potentially new interpretative options, thus allowing for creative ways to bridge between the communities, Memorial and *Naqba* Day allows for little exegetical play. The historical proximity of the events, the present political situation and other contextual factors constrain interpretative possibilities (Bekerman 2000; Bekerman 2002; Bekerman 2003a; Bekerman 2004; Bekerman and Horenczyk 2004) and do not allow for amnesia. Pedagogical remembrance for the Memorial and *Naqba* Day seems only to be able to adopt a strategic practice and or a difficult return perspective.

Discussion

The events described above do not allow for a definitive answer as to whether or not ceremonial and ritual events, in their partial challenge to mnemonic canons, have the power to promote coexistence and contribute toward reconciliation efforts. While Hanukkah can afford a religious emphasis for the secular Jews at the expense of nationalistic overtones, Israel's Memorial Day does not seem to leave room for such calibrations without delegitimizing the Zionist narrative. Secular Jews see themselves as Jews due to their Israeli national sentiment; therefore surrendering this connection may seem too high a price to pay. For Palestinian participants, if the *Naqba* and the suffering and struggle of the Palestinian people are misrepresented within the bilingual educational initiative, they could be judged guilty of betraying their people. In the present political stage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there is no way they can afford such accusations.

Although the Festival of Lights is highly inclusive, it is not one which tries to minimize differences among the traditions. It is inclusive in presenting each holiday, in admitting all to the presentation and in giving each group a role; but it is exclusive in that it does not seek to bridge (or end) differences or suggest that all people should participate in the same ritual. Each group sits at the table (inclusion) but there is a recognition (if you like) that they don't all eat the same foods at their own home tables. At this point, on the other hand, the national ceremonies cannot afford to create a sense of inclusion; the wounds are still open and memories too fresh.

Given the present hegemony of secular Zionist ideology, particularly in the secular population which is associated with the schools, issues of culture and religion are seen in a radically different light from national ones. While for the most part there is perceived agreement on issues related to language, culture, and religion, it is the national subjects which become sites of friction. Every detail of activity, every word in a text, has the potential of becoming an obstacle. Memory is malleable indeed but its malleability is constrained by multiple socio-political contextual issues which limit the potential of tampering with it.

The bilingual schools allow those with a previous ideological commitment and a desire for good education to meet in the seemingly placid waters of cultural traditions. The groups stick to their memories,

and cultural traditions are performed. The Hanukkah/Idel Fiter/Christmas celebration carries the symbolic representation of who they are separately and, when excising some memory, the seeds of who they can be together in the future. Implicit messages for each cultural group are woven into the fabric of the ceremonial remembrance. Muslim Palestinian Israelis are urged to preserve their religious traditions but forego sweeping nationalistic demands for land. Christian Palestinians, however, are told to censor religious elements which are anathema to Jews, particularly Jesus himself. Zionist Jewish Israelis are challenged to review some of their 'natural' connections between religion and nation-state, and encouraged to choose neutral cultural symbols, even if this means finding solace in Diasporic traditions, where Hanukkah was about a supernatural miracle rather than a nationalistic victory, and Jews were bearers of monotheistic enlightenment rather than violent military conquest.

Hanukkah might be a national event, but it is also originally a religious one in the Jewish collective memory. Therefore, among secular Jews, we find an emphasis upon the Jewish religious meaning of Hanukkah, which at first glance might seem incongruous. Sacrificing Hanukkah's national overtones is not too threatening, as it does not require a wholly new search for meaning and identity. All in all, parents and teachers are happy with the results.

It seems that in contrast with the Hanukkah/Idel Fiter/Christmas celebration, which offers through partial amnesia a variety of interpretative options thus allowing for creative ways to bridge between the communities, Memorial and *Naqba* Day allows for little exegetical play. The historical proximity of the events, the very tense current political situation and other contextual factors constrain the pedagogical remembrance effort and its potential to offer new interpretative options.

Jews started this project believing it to be a peace offering of true recognition to Palestinian Israeli citizens, sending a message that they are different, that they understand the wrongs of the past, and seek a fresh start. Palestinians responded to the opportunity to afford a better education for their children and as an outlet to express their Israeli and Palestinian Arab identities. They might have doubted the extent to which the Jews in the initiative would allow expression of Palestinian national feelings, but given the present situation, an offer of good education for their children seemed to be 'good enough'. Cautiously they

had come to take seriously the offer of egalitarianism, and to see the Jews as real partners. The Jews, who at the beginning had believed that they understood what their offer meant, slowly realized they had not yet thoroughly thought through the meaning of inclusion and recognition. The more the Palestinian cohort believed in the open dialog offered by the Jews, the more confidence they gained in stating their positions, and the more the Jews questioned if Palestinian expectations were justifiable, and whether they, even as liberal Jews, could continue on this path of coexistence and reconciliation without endangering the basic character of the State of Israel.

The Jewish teachers believe they are doing their best. They assume they have gone a long way to allow for Palestinian inclusion, but at times have a sense that nothing will satisfy their counterparts' appetite. The Jewish teachers may express discontent and at times anger, but feel that they will never consider the option of turning back from what has been already achieved. Palestinian teachers, for their part, have become the true guardians of Palestinian national ideology in the larger secular Zionist-dominated educational arena, fighting battles which are not necessarily in line with the expectations of Palestinian parents.

It seems as if cultural/religious ceremonies have a potential for renewal while national ceremonies, as central stages for the shaping of national identity, focuses more on the preservation of the current social order. In the case of the Hanukkah presentation, the separation of religious and national symbolism helps isolate the main conflict in the secular arena of nationalism, outside the scope of the holiday celebrations. However, when schools attempt to commemorate purely secular, national events, current ideologies, and unresolved tensions prevent the taking of creative interpretational paths. Clearly, there are no 'real' limits to possible interpretations, but these have not yet been searched out or chosen. While Hanukkah can afford, through partial amnesia, a religious emphasis for the secular Jews at the expense of nationalistic overtones, Israel's Memorial Day doesn't seem to leave room for such calibrations without delegitimizing the Zionist narrative, something yet unacceptable to Jewish Israeli sensitivity.

Though the schools have not yet considered pedagogies as the ones suggested by Simon et al. (2000) when reflecting on remembrance as critical learning, they unintentionally seem to be juggling with these ideas. What we have in the example of the religious ceremony is an

interesting combination. The commemoration is highly inclusive but it is not one which tries to minimize differences among the traditions. Traditional memory is transformed (through partial amnesia) so as to allow for other traditions to live at its side. It is inclusive in presenting each holyday and in admitting all to the presentation and giving each group a role, but it gives up on mustering all to participate in the same ritual. In principle the national ceremonies could be built on premises similar to the religious ones but, for the year of the investigation with its very violent outbursts, this seems not to be an option, even if it was at times raised.

Bourdieu (1977: 164) has taught that 'every established order tends to produce the naturalization of its arbitrariness', and schools in general and in them ceremonial events in particular fulfill a central role in the naturalization of this arbitrariness. Needless to say, participants are not robots unwillingly fulfilling their tasks in the social sphere; still, disassociating memorial ceremonies from national demands has been shown not to be easy even in educational institutions ready to challenge very basic cultural assumptions (Lomsky-Feder 2004).

A critical remembering implies shrinking memory into the individual sphere so as to allow for the presence of other memories first, hoping later to enter with them in dialog. When flooded by memory, Funes lost his ability to think, to reflect; he drowned in the details of the immediate past. If we want to escape Funes' destiny, we need to do some forgetting without which reconciliation and coexistence seem to be unattainable.

REFERENCES

- Abu-Nimer, Mohammed. 1999. *Dialogue, Conflict, Resolution, and Change: Arab-Jewish Encounters in Israel*. Albany NY: State University of New York Press.
- Anderson, B. 1983. *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso.
- Arthur, P. 1999. 'The Anglo-Irish Peace Process: Obstacles to Reconciliation', in R. L. Rothstein (ed.), *After Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation*, pp. 85–109. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Bar-Tal, Daniel. 2000. 'From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis', *Political Psychology*, 21: 351–65.
- . 2002. 'The Elusive Nature of Peace Education', in Gabriel Salomon and B. Nevo (eds), *Peace Education*, pp. 27–36. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum.

- Bard, Mitchell C. 1998. 'The Variety of Coexistence Efforts in Israel: Lessons for the United States', in Eugene Weiner (ed.), *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence*, pp. 468–89. New York: Continuum.
- Bekerman, Z. 2000. 'Dialogic Directions: Conflicts in Israeli/Palestinian Education for Peace', *Intercultural Education*, 11: 41–51.
- . 2002. 'The Discourse of Nation and Culture: Its Impact on Palestinian–Jewish Encounters in Israel', *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 26: 409–27.
- . 2003a. 'Palestinian Jewish Bilingual Education in Israel: Its Influence on School Students', *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, 24: 473–84.
- . 2003b. 'Reshaping Conflict through School Ceremonial Events in Israeli Palestinian–Jewish Co-Education', *Anthropology & Education Quarterly*, 34: 205–24.
- . 2004. 'Multicultural Approaches and Options in Conflict Ridden Areas: Bilingual Palestinian–Jewish Education in Israel', *Teachers College Record*, 106: 574–610.
- . 2005. 'Complex Contexts and Ideologies: Bilingual Education in Conflict-ridden Areas', *Journal of Language Identity and Education*, 4: 1–20.
- Bekerman, Zvi and Gabriel Horenczyk. 2004. 'Arab–Jewish Bilingual Co-education in Israel: A Long-term Approach to Inter-group Conflict Resolution', *Journal of Social Issues*, 60.
- Ben-Amos, Avner, and Ilana Bet-El. 1999. 'Holocaust Day and Memorial Day in Israeli Schools: Ceremonies, Education and History', *Israel Studies*, 4: 258–84.
- Bodnar, J. 1992. *Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Borges, Jorge Luis. 1996. *Funes el Memorioso*. Barcelona: EMECE Publishers.
- Bourdieu, P. 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brunett, J. H. 1976. 'Ceremony, Rites, and Economy in the Student System of an American High School', in J. I. Roberts and S. K. Akinsaya (eds), *Educational Patterns and Cultural Configurations: The Anthropology of Education*, pp. 92–119. New York, NY: McKay.
- Connerton, Paul. 1989. *How Societies Remember*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Douglas, M. 1982. *In the Active Voice*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Etzioni, Amitai. 2000. 'Toward a Theory of Public Ritual', *Sociological Theory*, 18: 44–59.
- Feuerverger, Grace. 2001. *Oasis of Dreams: Teaching and Learning Peace in a Jewish–Palestinian Village in Israel*. New York: Routledge Falmer.
- Freeman, Rebecca. 2000. 'Contextual Challenges to Dual-language Education: A Case Study of a Developing Middle School Program', *Anthropology & Education Quarterly*, 31: 202–29.

- Gardner-Feldman, L. 1999. 'The Principle and Practice of Reconciliation in German Foreign Policy: Relations with France, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic', *International Affairs*, 75: 333–56.
- Geertz, C. 1973a. *The Interpretation of Culture*. New York: Basic Books.
- . 1973b. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.
- Glazier, Jocelyn Anne. 2003. 'Developing Cultural Fluency: Arab and Jewish Students Engaging in One Another's Company', *Harvard Educational Review*, 73.
- Halbwachs, M. 1980. *The Collective Memory*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
- Handelman, Don. 1990. *Models and Mirrors: Towards an Anthropology of Public Events*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hayner, Priscilla B. 1999. 'In Pursuit of Justice and Reconciliation: Contributions of Truth Telling', in Cynthia J. Arnson (ed.), *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America*, pp. 363–83. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Ichilov, Orit. 1990. 'Dimensions and Role Patterns of Citizenship in Democracy', in Orit Ichilov (ed.), *Political Socialization, Citizenship Education, and Democracy*, pp. 11–24. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University Press.
- Kaye, Mike. 1997. 'The Role of Truth Commission in the Search for Justice, Reconciliation and Democratization: The Salvadorean and Honduran Cases', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 29: 693–716.
- Kertzer, David. 1988. *Ritual, Politics and Power*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Kriesberg, Louis. 1998. 'Coexistence and Reconciliation of Communal Conflicts', in Eugene Wiener (ed.), *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence*, pp. 182–98. New York: Continuum Publishing Company.
- Kritz, Neil J. (ed.). 1995. *Transitional Justice*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.
- Lederach, John Paul. 1998. 'Beyond Violence: Building Sustainable Peace', in Eugene Weiner (ed.), *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence*, pp. 236–48. New York: Continuum.
- Lomsky-Feder, E. 2004. 'The Memorial Ceremony in Israeli Schools: Between the State and Civil Society', *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 25: 291–305.
- Lustig, Deborah Freedman. 1997. 'Of Kwanzaa, Cinco de Mayo, and Whispering: The Need for Intercultural Education', *Anthropology & Education Quarterly*, 28: 574–92.
- Magolda, Peter M. 2000. 'The Campus Tour: Ritual and Community in Higher Education', *Anthropology & Education Quarterly*, 31: 24–26.
- Maykut, Pamela and Richard Morehouse. 1994. *Beginning Qualitative Research: A Philosophic and Practical Guide*. London: The Falmer Press.
- McLaren, Peter (ed.). 1993. *Schooling as a Ritual Performance: Towards a Political Economy of Educational Symbols and Gestures*. London: Routledge.
- Ortner, Sherry. 1978. *Sherpas through their Rituals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ram, Uri. 2000. 'National, Ethnic, or Civic? Contesting Paradigms of Memory, Identity and Culture in Israel', *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 19: 405–22.

- Ranck, J. 2000. 'Beyond Reconciliation: Memory and Alterity in Post-Genocide Rwanda', in R. J. Simon, S. Rosenberg and C. Eppert (eds), *Between Hope and Despair: Pedagogy and the Remebrance of Historical Trauma*, pp. 187–212. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.
- Reicher, S. and N. Hopkins. 2001. *Self and Nation*. London: Sage Publications.
- Ross, Marc Howard. 2000a. "'Good-enough" isn't so Bad: Thinking about Success and Failure in Ethnic Conflict Management', *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 6: 27–47.
- . 2000b. 'Psychocultural Interpretations and Dramas: Identity Dynamics in Ethnic Conflict', *Political Psychology*, 22: 157–78.
- . 2001. 'Ritual and the Politics of Reconciliation', Conference on Reconciliation (12–13 June). Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute, Hebrew University.
- Rouhana, Nadim N. 1997. *Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Seidman, I. E. 1991. *Interviewing as Qualitative Research*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Simon, Roger J., Sharon Rosenberg, and Claudia Eppert. 2000. *Between Hope and Despair*. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.
- Smootha, S. 1996. 'Ethno-democracy: Israel as an Archetype', in P. Ginosar and A. Bareli (eds), *Zionism: A Contemporary Polemic*, pp. 277–311. Jerusalem: Ben-Gurion University (Hebrew).
- Spradley, J. P. 1979. *The Ethnographic Interview*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Volkan, Vamik D. 1988. *The Need to have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships*. New York: Jason Aronson.
- Wagner-Pacifici, R., and B. Schwartz. 1991. 'The Vietnam Veteran's Memorial: Commemorating a Difficult Past', *American Journal of Sociology*, 97: 376–420.
- Wertsch, James, V. 2002. *Voices of Collective Remembering*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Zelizer, B. 1995. 'Reading the Past against the Grain: The Shape of Memory Studies', *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, 12: 213–27.
- Zerubavel, Eviatar. 1996. 'Social Memories: Steps to a Sociology of the Past', *Qualitative Sociology*, 19: 283–99.
- Zerubavel, Yael. 1995. *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

North Korea South Korea

One Korea and the Relevance of German Reunification

JOHN BORNEMAN

Is German unification, which began in 1990 and has been unfolding since, relevant to the prospects of, and problems in, an anticipated Korean unification? This is a daunting and humbling question, not merely because the cultural differences between Korea and Germany are so great, but also because the literature on North Korea and its developments over the last half-century swings wildly between alarmist descriptions of Brave New World realized and more modest accounts that acknowledge a paucity of information.¹ Also, the grounds for legitimacy of the two Korean states, the 'inner justifications of political domination', in the sense employed by Max Weber, are so fundamentally different that I am tempted to throw up my hands and plead uniqueness for each Korea and noncomparability with Germany.² Before I begin, I wish to acknowledge that Korean unification—as an event and a process—will surely be unpredictable and unique, and that I am not prescient enough to predict how or what might happen with any degree of specificity.

With that caveat in mind, my approach will be neither traditionally historic nor ethnographic, but a risky comparison of one past with, at best, one emergent event. As Korean unification is an emergent event, I will engage in what I have termed 'anticipatory reflection' to provide scenarios for regime change (Borneman 2003; Borneman and Bude 1999).

My point of departure will be a similarity, not a difference. That is, from an anthropological perspective, what Koreans and Germans share is that both consider themselves a single nation—not tribes, sects, or religions—divided into two states. Many anthropologists have studied

the division of one social unit into two, which was also the subject of my own research on Germany during the Cold War. Claude Lévi-Strauss (1963) called the form of this divided unit, where two asymmetrical, complementary parts are created out of a whole, a 'dual organization'; Gregory Bateson (1972) called this process of continuous differentiation resulting from cumulative interactions 'schismogenesis'.

Anthropologically, then, national division is both a structure (dual organization) and a process (schismogenesis). Moreover, the nation, like any structure of belonging, is fundamentally unstable; it has a tendency to divide, sub-divide, fracture, splinter, differentiate—and the opposite, to unify, join, merge, combine, amalgamate.

That said, this similarity takes me to what I understand to be the central socio-cultural problem of unification: the recognition of difference in a process of unification. I will return, at the end of this chapter, to questions of legitimacy, temporality, and the specific factors that might distinguish Korean unification from the German one.

The Problem of Recognition of Difference

Although Koreans claim to be one people, a homogenous 'ethnic nation' some 5,000 years old, members of a 1,200-year-old country, during the recent period of political division into two modern states they have in fact become two quite distinct peoples. So, although people in the North and South both call themselves Koreans, they do not mean the same thing by that attribution. We might anticipate some problems from this misrecognition of difference.

Most Germans may also claim membership in an old mythical group, but the German intellectual community acknowledges a more recent membership—less than 150 years—in a nation. This intellectual recognition of the relative brevity of the nation, as well as of its mixed ethnic origins (many Germans are of mixed descent and their names—especially Jewish, Slavic, or French—suggest this), creates a critical dynamic, such that any deep and stable notion of cultural belonging is difficult to sustain. Such a critical dynamic appears absent in the Korean context. Moreover, in German thought, there is an important analytical distinction made between *Staatsnation* and *Kulturnation*. Germans of cultural origin, much like Koreans of cultural origin, have migrated to many parts of the world. German migrants or Germans living abroad

have, until recently, still been considered German people, part of a greater *Kulturnation*. Those Germans living within the territory of Germany belong, however, not merely to a cultural group but also to a political one, the *Staatsnation*.

The modern nation form seems to inevitably politicize the cultural nation by assuming that a nation needs a unified state for representation. This is the idea, for example, behind both Jewish Israel (and the right of Jews anywhere in the world to return to their 'Jewish homeland') and Palestinian calls for statehood (and the right of return of those expelled by Israel). For Germans, this idea of the unity of culture, nation, and state, dates back to the mid-19th century, when Bismarck authoritatively forged the political deal that united the various German principalities and *Länder* under the Prussian state. Prior to 1871, Germans did not think of themselves as a unified cultural nation, as, arguably, did the French or British (see Sheehan 1981)—or the Koreans. Kant, for example, declared in his *Anthropologie* in 1789 that Germans were without national pride and lacked passionate attachment to their fatherland. Historically, Germans have belonged to different political units and they have been acknowledged within Europe for their independent, decentralized polities, for provinciality and regionally accented identities. They have lacked ethnic uniformity—many spoke versions of German incomprehensible to others, and they have consistently intermarried with Slavs from the East—and not until the 19th century did they cultivate the notion that the state had to be coterminous with the nation (Meinecke 1908).

The 1871 political unification led, in the 20th century, to the creation of the legal category *Völkische*, folk or ethnic German, to delineate Germans living outside the territorial German state but nonetheless part of a culturally-delineated group, the *Kulturnation*. The question historically for Germany has been how to pose the relation between the state-nation and the cultural nation. Do Germans living in Germany, those with political rights, part of the state-nation, have responsibilities to cultural Germans who emigrated several hundreds years ago to Russia or Romania and have since picked up local citizenship in those countries?

After the fall of the Wall in 1989, the most powerful legitimating argument for unification was the notion that Germans in both East and West were members of the same cultural nation, and that they should naturally be united in one state instead of divided into two.

Without this imaginative possibility—one people must naturally live in one state—it would have been much more difficult, if not unlikely, for either ordinary East Germans or Helmut Kohl, the former West German Chancellor who pushed for a speedy unification, to so successfully bring West Germans and the international community to agree on the legitimacy of unification.

The concept of the German cultural nation is a form of traditional legitimacy that appeals to what Weber called an ‘eternal yesterday’. It has proven resilient, and a seemingly necessary fiction in the unification process to justify the imperative of negating the five decades of engineered social change and political division of the Cold War. But in many ways it has also served to obscure the conditions that might make actual unification possible, by providing an ideological justification that had little to do with empirical reality. The process of unification was driven, after all, not by traditional authority but by the legal-rational legitimacy of the West German state. To quote Weber, bureaucratic rationality ‘is domination by virtue of “legality”, by virtue of the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional “competence” based on rationally created rules. [O]bedience is expected in discharging statutory obligations’. I suspect that this same form of legitimacy—the legal-rational—will structure the Korean unification process, and the bearers of legality, the people who embody this domination, will be, much as in Germany, imported from the capitalist half to the socialist half.

One problem with positing the *Kulturnation*, a preexisting state of unity to which one can return, which, as I have said, was perhaps necessary, is that this notion creates a structure of longing for the ‘eternal yesterday’. Actual unification demanded of people not dreams of fulfillment in the past in a traditional cultural authority but obedience to statutory obligations, that is, submission to a form of legal-rational domination in an expanded West German state. East Germans were unprepared for this radical change in the ‘inner justification’ of rule, although it is also what most of them wanted. The vast majority of East Germans wanted the West German version of the rule of law, *Rechtsstaatlichkeit*, and an end to the arbitrary rule of the Socialist Unity Party, but for many the actual experience of unity resulted, paradoxically, in deep disillusionment. Their lack of preparation was partly due to the speed of unity—legal rationality came overnight—and wholesale absorption (with a few minor exceptions) into West Germany.

Moreover, it is impossible to bridge or overcome differences without first acknowledging the conditions that produce them. The opening of the Wall was not an appropriate time for rational reflection on difference but instead provided the opportunity to affirm affective ties and engage in emotional release. But because celebration of the pre-existent *Kulturnation* made it difficult to acknowledge the conditions that produced the differences between East and West, the conditions of difference (and the process of denying them) became a constitutive part of the unification process. There were a series of purposeful mis-recognitions: of unequal monetary resources (for example in overvaluation of the East German currency), of unequal cultural capital (for example in assuming equivalence of degrees, titles, or job qualifications), and of unequal access to social networks (for example in assuming that insider information, obtained only through membership in nepotistic and closed groups, would be available equally to East and West Germans). I want to dwell, for a moment, on the mis-recognition of cultural differences, which will present itself in nearly identical terms to Koreans as it did to Germans.

Koreans in both North and South count their membership in a cultural nation, to use the German concept, not in hundreds but in thousands of years. Koreans are even more homogeneous ethnically and Korean nationalism, therefore, we are told, is not merely, as in the German case, resilient, but also ancient, unyielding, enduring. Fred Alford (1999: 89) argues that Koreans (he is talking only of the south) place the highest value on *chong* (belonging and affection), which is integral to the family consisting of a strict father and loving mother. The strength of this assumption of unity, and the social disciplinary function of values such as *chong*, will undoubtedly propel the Korean unification process, should political division ever break down. But the strong convictions underlying these assumptions—of belonging and affection and unity through an ancient Korean culture—might make it even more difficult to admit the preexisting forms of difference within the group, and more difficult to obtain submission to a new form of domination, the bureaucratic rationality of the South Korean state. There is, moreover, an equally strong Korean notion of maintaining or saving face, and of self-reliance, which would lead those in the north to resist submission to southern norms even at the expense of belonging.

What will happen when people from the north and south experience their actual differences on an everyday basis? What happens if Koreans assume they know each other—we are the same people—but in fact this knowledge is not born out in their experience? If, by contrast, the South Koreans today united with the Chinese, they would think: you Chinese are different from us; you are Chinese, we are Koreans; so now, which differences must we acknowledge and accept, which are protected by law, and which ones must we abandon and overcome in order to act as a unity? But when North and South Koreans confront each other, they will be motivated by the fiction, an emotionally powerful and politically useful fiction, that they are uniting two peoples who are already the same, two peoples who can substitute for one another.

To be sure, in one sense, all Koreans know that the north and south are different, in fact radically different. Paik Nak-Chung (1993, 1996), in particular, in his analysis of a 'division system', has already made some of the arguments I am making. Paik is ultimately optimistic that the Korean value of loyalty, the reliance on what he calls 'vertical strength', and the past experience of colonial domination will buttress a national unification process. Moreover, in his writings of nearly a decade ago, he appeared to hold out some hope of a slow process of integration, of 'compound state structures', and a confederate structure in the short run. But in this process of unification, the fiction of unity will take on an independent existence in the daily experience of what will surely be a spontaneous and politically driven event. War, of course, as Paik emphasizes, is the third—cataclysmic and hardly thinkable—alternative. But without war, it is likely that both the North Koreans and the international state system will destabilize a protracted process of political unification. My more simple point here is that in the face of widespread belief that Koreans in the north and south are already the same, there will be strong pressures to deny or repress acknowledgment of the extreme cultural differences that have resulted from a half-century of radically opposed political and cultural socialization. The danger is that forms of denial often lead to destructive and violent acting out of frustrated expectations.

Let me point to some of the unanticipated consequences of this problem of misrecognition in Germany. I concluded in my first book, *Belonging in the Two Berlins: Kin State, Nation*, in 1992, that the goal of the two German states, notwithstanding official ideological statements

to the contrary, was to produce different peoples, and that this goal was successful. Yet, unification was sold to the public as a reunification of two peoples who had been previously one, prior to the Cold War, and that cultural divisions were not to be taken seriously. In the rush to unity, to take advantage of a propitious international moment, political unification was accomplished by means of Article 23, instead of by Article 146, of the West German Grundgesetz (Basic Law of 1949). The latter would have meant a slow process of negotiation between the two Germanys, with specific proposals from each side, followed by citizen ratification. Instead, according to Article 23, the East had to reorganize itself into the old *Länder* from 1945, and by means of a single parliamentary vote, and signing of the Unification Treaty, it acceded into the Federal Republic.

The supposedly trivial cultural differences between East and West have not only persisted, but also new forms of difference were produced in the unification process. Today there is still much debate about whether East and West Germans now share a common identity. Economically, there has been a huge and ongoing transfer of funds from the West to the East for the general purpose of development. Between 1990 and 1998, the sum exceeded one trillion deutschemarks (approximately 1/2 trillion dollars), with an annual amount today of approximately 70 billion dollars a year, half federal funds, half private. This transfer has alienated many West Germans, who have seen the social services of their welfare state cut accordingly, and it has not created the 'blooming landscapes' that Chancellor Helmut Kohl had initially promised. In this East, there has been a growth of *Ostalgie* (East nostalgia), an attempt retrospectively to claim an East identity that never existed in this form. Since 1990, the Allensbach Institute has tracked public opinion about unification, and that opinion has remained fairly consistent. They have asked the question whether people were either 'happy' with or 'concerned' about unification. Of the West Germans, 50 percent have been happy, 30 percent concerned. Of the East Germans, 60–65 percent happy, 20 percent concerned. Opinion polls differ, of course, and sometimes substantially, depending on how the question is asked. No poll, to my knowledge, however, has found that a large group of people in either East or West wants to return to the period of division.

My interest here, though, is not in measuring contentment or worry, but to point to comparative problems in the unification process,

which have, for all intents and purposes, now stabilized into structures. Enduring forms of social inequality, which were largely eliminated in both Cold War Germanys, have now been created, and many of these, though by no means all, correlate with East/West differences. Let me review the socio-logic of the continuation of old and creation of new divisions, all of which have direct applicability to a potential process of Korean unification.

Whereas ideologically Germans in the East and West pretend that they are formally equal members of the 'cultural nation', in practice there was a perceived need after formal political unification, among the dominant groups responsible for driving this process, of an exorcism of state socialism from the East. State socialism was identified as an evil or an illness associated with East Germans and their pasts. It had to be exorcised from the social body of the people in order to make possible the assimilation of 18 million individuals into West German ideologies and structures. This required a concerted effort to reverse history. Jean Baudrillard (1994: 11–13), taking his inspiration from Walter Benjamin and Elias Canetti, describes this experience as the 'curving back of history which causes it to retrace its own steps and obliterate its own tracks, ... to rewind modernity like a tape'. It is the 'retrospective melancholia of living everything through again in order to correct it all ... the canceling out one by one all the events which have preceded us by obliging them to repent'. In short, East Germans were asked to cancel out their history and to repent for it.

Prior to November 1989, an intense process of mirror-imaging and misrecognition drove the experience of partition in the everyday lives of both East and West Germans. Yet, while the West and East created the effect of being outside and external to each other, they were in fact involved in a mimetic relationship of devouring, or attempting to devour, each other in the same way that the two Koreas still today envision conquering each other.

The opening of the Berlin Wall came spontaneously, much as an unexpected happening will likely initiate a process of Korean unification.³ The experience of the opening was the event—a euphoric event, filled with the emotional bliss of fraternal feeling—that started the process of national unification, but it also initiated a process that entailed the dissolution of partition and of East Germany as well as a reversal of history of its residents. Officially, West Germany had always

insisted that the East should dissolve and become part of West Germany, that a separate socialist state made no sense, and, therefore, most West Germans experienced unification as a confirmation. But the East German experience was more ambivalent; many found the experience disorienting.

Unification, then, resulted in a re-reading of the entire Cold War, which was no longer understood as a mimetic construction of East–West asymmetry but a matter primarily of East bloc error, untruth, and sickness. The language of repentance, including the mass exorcism of all that was ‘East’ in the East, appeared in public discourse, on radio talk shows, and television discussions. Among the favorite East Germans on talk shows was a psychologist, Hans-Joachim Maaz, who concluded in his books that East Germans were ‘psychologically defective, infected by a virus of a pathological social deformation’. By contrast, he claimed that West Germans were engaged in a merciless striving for domination. The revolution against the East German socialist state he characterized as an ‘uprising in neurosis’.⁴ The new union involved founding a family, half of whose members have been deformed, argued Maaz, by premature separation of the child from the mother and by authoritarian education.

Maaz is in fact correct that in the unification process the West Germans were positioned as therapists to their East German patients, but what was required of the therapist was to act like the shaman or the priest, to take their patients’ illness or sins upon themselves and engage in a collective abreaction; instead West Germans distanced themselves from the supposed illness. Instead of acknowledging a transference relation with the East based on an understanding of differences and facilitating a process of bridging or overcoming them, West Germans constructed themselves as a superior and sanitized good (not in need of reform), which they contrasted with backwardness and impurity in the East German body. East Germans were asked to literally ‘mime’ this West, to consume its goods, learn its pedagogy, drive its automobiles, eat its food, fantasize in its Beate Uhse erotic shops, and, above all, to reorganize work into more impersonal capitalist relations and to privatize collective and state property.

The fundamental challenge for the West Germans, as they initially perceived it, was how to absorb the socialist differences of the East

without being contaminated by them. Above all, how could they protect the security that had been the basis of their pleasure—the social welfare state with all its benefits—now that its cognitive precondition, the distance from and sacrifice of the East Germans, no longer obtained? West Germans, accordingly, initially thought that unification would change the people in the East only, and they stubbornly denied any need for explicit changes in their own institutions. This need for system reform of the West has since, however, been acknowledged—but ten years later, by the prevailing ruling coalition of Social Democrats and Greens.

Three economic processes accelerated the dissolution of the East and the incorporation of East German people and things into West German markets: (a) Most property rights within the German Democratic Republic (GDR) were rolled back to 1944/48 or to the pre-Nazi period, if possible; (b) East German public holdings were privatized (after October 1990, through the actions of the *Treuhandanstalt*, a para-public trustee); and (c) There was a massive transfer of skilled labor from East to West.

The creation of a single market and single legal system enabled many West Germans to exploit their superior position (more knowledge, more capital) by buying labor, real estate, and other East German goods. Most East Germans, however, did not have enough savings or cultural capital to do the same either in their own country or in West Germany. They still initially earned East German marks, and even after the institution of one currency, pay rates in many jobs were pegged according to ‘productivity’, which was, in turn, equated with country of origin, with the East Germans obtaining somewhere around 75 percent of what the West Germans did. Moreover, many titles to property issued during the near half-century of the GDR were subject to legal challenge by former owners who now lived in West Germany. In response to this instability, many East Germans simply fled to West Germany to secure a deutschemark return for their increasingly devalued labor.

Nonetheless, East Germans initially seemed pleased that they could finally buy goods in the West. And certainly most of them looked forward to the prospect of new legal protections. But as many of the goods they produced were also produced in the West, and as their

markets in the East bloc collapsed, what they produced decreased in value, meaning that East German labor was also further devalued, which promoted a further flight of young skilled labor to the West. Paradoxically, then, East Germans who bought the goods they desired from the West reduced demand for the goods that they themselves were producing. This actually weakened their own positions within Germany by eliminating the need for their own labor. And as their legal codes were replaced by West German codes, with which they were unfamiliar, many East Germans experienced the legal rationality of the West German state as foreign, if not illegitimate, domination.

The sense of belonging to a single people, to a nation, which was so strong at the exact moment of the opening of the Wall, therefore, weakened as economic unification proceeded. Even in the domain of print media, West German newspapers and tabloids initially responded to the new market situation by creating different reading material for the East German publics, exploiting preexisting distinctions for the purposes of expanding market shares.

The initial experience of East Germans in their encounter with the West was colored by *Begrüßungsgeld*,—the 100 D-Mark of ‘greeting money’ (more for families) each East German was to receive yearly from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to help finance travel in the West. This fund had been created when less than one per cent of all East Germans could travel in the West. Suddenly all 17 million East Germans were free to travel. The gift had suddenly lost its purpose. Yet West German politicians and bureaucrats, who were not prepared for the opening, did not immediately rescind the law. This ‘greeting money’ set the tone for future relations between East and West: the West German government giving money, East German citizens receiving. At the same time the process of assessing value, restructuring, selling, and closing corporations, factories, academies, day-care centers, and the like came to be known as *die Abwicklung* (a carrying to completion or unwinding) of East German institutions.⁵

Although many people found new opportunities with the creation of a single national economic market, for most East and West Germans unity was also associated with emotional loss. One of the major losses for West Germans has been that of their East German ‘Other’, which reconstituted itself in altered form with respect to the West. If West Germans during the Cold War had always thought of themselves as

central, they were only so with respect to their inferior, supplementary mirror-image in the East. The fiction of the *Kulturnation*, the unity of culture, then, became an ideological alibi, which obscured the processes of dissolving the East, preserving certain forms of West German difference. The insider joke repeated by both sides around 1993 went: An East German says to a West German, '*Wir sind ein Volk*' (We are a/one people), and the West German replies, 'We are too!'

Confronted with the loss of an alter ego and with real economic costs in their unity with the East, West Germans partly compensated for this loss of coherence and direction by a successful projection of the East Germans as inferior in space and behind in time. Most East Germans, having already signaled an overriding desire for the material wealth enjoyed in the West, internalized these projections. With West Germany now the desired end, most East Germans were conceptualized and conceptualized themselves as merely needing to repent for their history and then recapitulate steps already taken since the 1950s in the FRG. Critical to this positioning of the East Germans as inferior and behind has been the notion, also applied to the other (former) East Europeans and Soviets, that their revolutions were, in the words of Jürgen Habermas (1990), *nachholende* or catching-up revolutions, aimed at recovering freedoms enjoyed by West Europeans since 1945. These revolutions, he claimed, were driven by a desire to make-up for lost time. Of primary importance in this recovery, he wrote, are the political and economic freedoms guaranteed in civil society by western capitalist, liberal democracies.

This placement of the recovering East versus the advanced West is reminiscent of the structure Norbert Elias (1969) posits for the development of the western world in *The Civilizing Process*. All of the former socialist states and their citizens, including the East Germans, were expected to undergo a process of changing etiquette, work habits, and individual psychology, marked above all by an internalization of forms of authority that previously had been exercised by coercive means from an external source. East Germans were encouraged to drop any inhibitions or ties to cultural tradition, and instead to abandon themselves to an external authority (capitalist managers, political and educational policy experts, primarily from the West) and submit their selves to a general reformation. Many East Germans, schooled in the western philosophical notions of agency and revolution, wanted to perceive

themselves as in charge of their world, and therefore resented the bureaucratic rationality of the unified state.

Likewise, North Koreans, coming out of a feudal, totalitarian dictatorship that denies all divisions of the people except the one between its beloved leader and his loving subjects, are known to be proud of their legacy of struggle against colonialism and imperialism in the spirit of autonomy (the *Juche* system). They question the legitimacy of South Korea (ruled by leaders who initially collaborated with colonial Japan, and now with the US). The positive appeal of submission to an alternative authority that is predictable instead of arbitrary will be balanced against the collaborationist history of southern leaders. In Germany, the promise of wealth and strong social welfare support did much to co-opt potential resistance to the dissolution of the East. In the case of Korea, the much greater economic and cultural disparity between North and South will make it much more difficult to mitigate the severe dislocations that accompany dissolution of the North. There simply may not be enough money to do this, in which case the South will look less fraternal and more like a country engaged in internal colonization.

Economically, the predictions of the Deutsche Bank have proven totally wrong. It had, in 1990, conceptualized the former East Germany as undergoing 'a time of transition and stabilization ... before the onset of a growth phase'. East Germany was envisioned as an area for new markets for West German goods, a land of virgin consumers eager to buy from the West. With 'open markets' and West German leadership, it was generally assumed that the East would undergo an economic miracle much like the West did in the 1950s. Obstacles that have since been encountered, such as declining GNP, growing unemployment, environmental pollution, chronic unemployment, and cultural displacement are interpreted as unintended costs attributable to past (ergo Communist) inefficiency.

In short, the East is still catching up with the West. The euphoric moments of change in 1989 gave way to bureaucratic training of East Germans for faulty socialization, wholesale rewinding of their histories, undoing their habits and thoughts, because ultimately they were not the proper (or prior) Germans, as many West Germans had thought. And all this occurs in a landscape of dismantled factories, deserted downtowns, closed day-care and youth centers—literally much of the East is dead today, and it is suffering serious depopulation.

My focus on problems has meant I have neglected the many positive changes. Above all, the process has been peaceful, both internally and in its geopolitical effects. There are zones of prosperity in the East, and a majority of people there has indeed gained from the dissolution of the East, in particular from the added legal security provided by an impartial and progressive judiciary, and from a political system with true division of powers. Although many people criticize the spiritual landscape of the East, few would argue that the material basis of life has not improved tremendously. For the former West, on the other hand, a kind of economic stagnation has set in, and many of the material benefits of the welfare state are slowly being rescinded as it, belatedly, undergoes its own economic restructuring.

Differences in the Korean Unification Process

I now hazard five pointed reflections on the applicability or nonapplicability of the German experience to Korean unification.

BAD TIMING

Germany's unification took place at a most propitious moment, coinciding with the end of the Cold War, when there was little external, foreign resistance to undoing the schismogenic processes of the Cold War. Moreover, it did so within a general process of Europeanization—the creation of a pan-continental identity—along with the consolidation and enlargement of the European Union, which lessened whatever threats an enlarged Germany might pose to its neighbors. This embedding of a national process in a continental unification served to ameliorate many of the potential negative effects, including the dampening of nationalist or xenophobic movements.

Korean unification, however, if it were to occur today, would unfold in the midst of what the current U.S. administration calls a 'War on Terror'. This war on terror, which itself is a euphemism for diverse aspirations, will have unique structuring effects on Korean unification, if in no other way than creating obstacles for any specifically Korean mode of coming together. Many foreign powers will undoubtedly find an enlarged, united, more powerful Korea threatening, economically

if not also politically. Not least the US, which is most suspicious of a united Korea with nuclear weapons. As there is no general Asianization process to parallel Europeanization, Korean unification will likely result in an increase in nationalist expression and xenophobia, which will certainly not be well received by its neighbors and other regional powers. Moreover, because one of the major factors that unites Koreans is a notion of shared historical suffering at the hands of centuries of colonial occupation, leaders during unification will likely feel compelled to appeal to nationalist sentiment, which will, in turn, confirm the fears of their neighbors.⁶

Therefore, whereas the legitimacy for the origins of German and Korean division resulted from similar Cold War processes, the legitimacy for their unifications will be different because there will likely never be a propitious moment, from an international standpoint, for a Korean unification.

CAPITALISM AND THE DISLOYALTY OF BUSINESS

In Germany, there was a general expectation that West German companies would participate in the unification process as patriots. The privatization of state- and collective-owned property, and government grants for investment in the East, were a tremendous boon to West German business. But West German companies and individuals, with a few exceptions, remained true not to the nation but to capitalism: profit and ever more profit. Companies in the West often bought up or took over their counterparts in the East with no intent to modernize but instead to eliminate them as competitors. Those awarded companies in the East by the *Treuhand*, the fiduciary responsible for privatization of collective property, frequently sold off the most profitable parts and gave the least profitable back to the trust for a second or third privatization. Or, under the reigning economic dogma of the time, they fired as many workers as possible in order to make the company competitive; but unemployment compensation for those many new jobless individuals was simply transferred to the government. Those companies that won government contracts were not sufficiently monitored to keep them honest, and a whole new division of the police was created to investigate and prosecute what they called 'unification criminality'. When the North Korean state and its companies are dismantled,

I suspect South Korean businessmen will eschew the Korean value of loyalty and behave no differently than German ones did—pursue profit for its own sake.

DEATH OF THE FATHER AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

Most observers describe the North Korean regime as a mix of a Stalinist 'worker's paradise' and Confucian filial piety. If that is the case, then its end, however that might come, will be both celebrated and mourned, for the attachment to a leader who represents himself as 'our Fatherly Leader' will be experienced with great ambivalence. This end of a family dynasty of 60 years will be experienced at one and the same time as a delegitimation of filial authority generally and as a demand that the North Koreans engage in a new form of democratic legitimacy, involving other rules of mobilization, delegation, and representation than those under the current despotic regime. If the socio-political transformations in East-Central Europe are at all relevant here, the legitimacy rules of the old regime will continue to function in the inner fabric of society long after formal institutions are replaced and the death of the Father-leader.

If the opening of contact between the Koreas is immediately followed by some kind of annexation of North Korea by the South, then the ambivalence about the death of the regime of Kim Jong-il will result in extreme disorientation if not emotional paralysis. The euphoria that will surely characterize the initial meetings of the two Koreans will be transformed over time into forms of estrangement in both North and South. It is not that the North Koreans will necessarily rebel (although youth rebellion of some sort always accompanies regime change), but they will be asked to democratically legitimate some very radical changes, such as economic rationalization (which means many will lose their jobs), the devaluing of their educational titles, the restructuring of home and work. The challenge is how to avoid identifying this new form of domination with old forms of colonialism. If all does not go well with unification, and surely much will not go well, many people in the North will blame the South for the death of their regime and for all the problems that follow it.

In passing, I would reiterate that while unification might not result in an extreme disorientation for the South Koreans, they will be equally

affected by the dissolution of the North Korean regime, and long-term changes will also be demanded of them.

COMPENSATION OR RETURN OF PROPERTY

Germany is alone among the East-Central European governments in prioritizing return of property over compensation in cases involving state collectivization or property disputes with East and West German owners. All other former socialist countries favored compensation over return, which worked to stabilize property relations and to not disadvantage those individuals who remained in the country to the end. Ultimately, German unification resulted in a transfer of collective property mostly to individual West German companies, and a few foreign, but the initial instability of property rights delayed much important investment in the East.

Pressures for a similar process of privatization will likely come to bear on North Korea. The simple fact is that former property owners, regardless of where they reside, are often politically connected and they will ask the government for as much as they can get. North Korean property arrangements—whether rent, lease, or ownership—will be subject to reversals that will uniformly penalize North Koreans, and uniformly reward ambitious and well-connected South Korean citizens.

SETTLING ACCOUNTS AND JUSTICE FOR PAST HARMS

These days, every regime change results in the demand for recognition of old injuries, and thus in renewed claims for justice, including prosecution for harms perpetrated under the old regime. Legal prosecutions, monetary compensations, truth commissions, historical investigations, and memorials are all means of redress, none satisfactory in itself but all necessary if for no other reason than to establish trust in the new legal and social order. The primary question is whether the judiciary is sufficiently autonomous and independent of politicians to actually respond impartially to claims for justice, or whether old injuries are instrumentalized for political capital. The German judiciary performed in an exemplary way following unification, carefully applying East German law, which itself was largely a progressive legal code arbitrarily enforced, to pre-unification legal disputes, and pan-German law to post-unity disputes. Given the total submission of North Korea's judiciary to

political control, the effort to create trust in a new judiciary, and to create a recognizable boundary between law and politics will be a major task following regime change.

NOTES

1. I initially presented my ideas on 24 June 2005, at the Korean University Centennial Conference, in Seoul, South Korea. It benefited from comments of the discussants, Kyung-Koo Han and Chung Byung-Ho. Among the published works on Korea that I have found, the following are particularly informative: Alford 1999; Breew 1998; Byung-Ho 2003; Cummings 2004; Grinker 1998; Martin 2004; Nak-Chung 1993: 79ff; 1996: 14–21.
2. Weber's three ideal types of domination—traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational—were meant only to orient study. Weber emphasized the instability of 'pure types ... rarely found in reality' and 'the highly complex variants, transitions, and combinations of these pure types'. Weber 1919; See also Gerth and Mills 1946: 77–128.
3. Cumings (2004: 207) makes the very strong argument that under no conditions will the North Korean regime simply yield authority. He cites approvingly a former president of CNN International, 'Neither the United States nor any other country is going to be able to force a collapse of that government'. Martin (2004: 656–82) makes a similar argument. Hence, it seems likely that unification will be an unplanned event, either the result of a catastrophe or a series of serendipitous events.
4. See Maaz 1990: 137–69; also see Maaz 1991, and a book he co-authored with Michael Moeller (1992). Maaz and Moeller (1992) take an explicit family therapy model and project it onto East and West relations. He and Moeller argue that Ossis play the traditional role of the woman (depressive, hesitant, and dependent) while the Wessis play the role of the dynamic, dominant, and aggressive male.
5. For different perspectives on *die Abwicklung*, see the collection of essays edited by Heinz Ludwig Arnold and Frauke Meyer-Gosau (1992). For two analyses of the work of the Treuhand, see Peter Christ and Ralf Neubauer (1991) and Christa Luft (1992).
6. I thank Kyung-Koo Han for this observation. The danger of a community of suffering is that the victim group turns aggressive and is unable to acknowledge the suffering of others. Germany, too, was united by a narrative of suffering after its defeat in World War I, ultimately leading to support for the ultra-nationalist Nazi movement. But after World War II, German leaders were no longer able to appeal to their suffering as singular, since the international community compelled them to acknowledge the suffering that Germany had inflicted on others.

REFERENCES

- Alford, Fred. 1999. *Think No Evil: Korean Values in The Age of Globalization*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Arnold, Heinz Ludwig and Frauke Meyer-Gosau (eds). 1992. *Die Abwicklung der DDR*. Göttingen: Göttinger Sudelblätter.
- Bateson, Gregory. 1972. *Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Baudrillard, Jean. 1994. *The Illusion of the End*. New York: Polity Press.
- Borneman, John. 1991. *After the Wall: East Meets West in the New Berlin*. New York: Basic Books.
- . 1992. *Belonging in the Two Berlins: Kin, State, Nation* (No. 86, Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1997a. 'State, Territory, and National Identity Formation in the Two Berlins, 1945–1995', in Akil Gupta and James Ferguson (eds), *Culture, Power, Place: Explorations in Critical Anthropology*, pp. 93–118. Durham: Duke University Press.
- . 1997b. 'Grenzregime (Border Regime): The Wall and Its Aftermath', in Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan (eds), *Border Cultures: Nation and State at International Boundaries*, pp. 162–90. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (First published in 1995 in shorter form, 'Heidi and the Wall', *Canadian Woman Studies/les cahiers de la femme* 16(1): 15–22).
- . 1997c. *Settling Accounts: Violence, Justice, and Accountability in Postsocialist Europe* (Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . 1998. *Subversions of International Order: Studies in the Political Anthropology of Culture*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- . 2002. 'Deutschsein: Fiction und das Reale', in Thomas Hauschild and Bernd Jürgen Warneken (eds), *Inspecting Germany*, pp. 73–94. Münster: LIT Verlag.
- . 2003. 'Responsibility after Military Intervention: What is Regime Change?', *POLAR: Political and Legal Anthropological Review*, 26(1): 28–54. (Response by Kunal Parker, and my 'Rejoinder', *POLAR*, 26(1): 49–54).
- (ed.). 2004. *Death of the Father: An Anthropology of The End in Political Authority*. New York: Berghahn Press.
- Borneman, John and Heinz Bude. 1999. 'Grundung durch Umzug. Die Hauptstadtwerdung Berlins', *Mittelweg*, 36(6/98): 25–35.
- Borneman, John and Nick Fowler. 1997. 'Europeanization', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 26: 487–514.
- Brew, Michael. 1998. *The Koreans: Who They Are, What They Want, Where Their Future Lies*. London: Orion Business Books.
- Byung-Ho, Chung. 2003. 'Living Dangerously in Two Worlds: The Risk and Tactics of North Korean Refugee Children in China', *Korea Journal*, 43(3) (Autumn): 191–211.

- Christ, Peter and Ralf Neubauer. 1991. *Kolonie im Eigenem Land*. Berlin: Rowohlt.
- Cumings, Bruce. 2004. *North Korea: Another Country*. New York: The New Press.
- Elias, Norbert. 1969. *The Civilizing Process, Vol. 1: The History of Manners*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- German Embassy (www.germany-info.org, accessed 17 March 2005).
- German Information Center, *The Week in Germany*. Washington, DC: 19.
- Gerth, H. and Mills, C. Wright (trans. and eds). 1949. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Grinker, Richard. 1998. *Korea and its Futures: Unification and the Unfinished War*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1990. 'Die Nacholende Revolution', *Kleine politische Schriften VII*. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.
- Kant, Immanuel. 1789. *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*. Koenigsberg: Universitaet Koenigsberg.
- Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1963 [1956]. 'Do Dual Organizations Exist', in Claude Lévi-Strauss (ed.), *Structural Anthropology*, pp. 132–63. New York: Basic Books.
- Luft, Christa. 1992. *Treuhandreport*. Berlin: Aufbau.
- Maaz, Hans Joachim. 1990. *Der Gefühlsstau. Ein Psychogramm der DDR*. Berlin: Rowohlt.
- . 1991. *Das Gestürzte Volk*. Berlin: Rowohlt.
- Maaz, Hans Joachim and Michael Moeller. 1992. *Die Einheit Beginnt Zu Zweit*. Berlin: Rowohlt.
- Martin, Bradley. 2004. *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Meinecke, Friedrich. 1970 [1908]. *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, trans. Robert B. Kimber. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Nak-Chung, Paik. 1993. 'South Korea: Unification and the Democratic Challenge', *New Left Review*, 197: 79ff.
- . 1996. 'Habermas on National Unification in Germany and Korea', *New Left Review*, 129: 14–21.
- Sheehan, James J. 1981. 'What is German History? Reflections on the Role of the Nation in German History and Historiography'. *Journal of Modern History*, 53: 1.
- Weber, Max. 1919. 'Politik als Beruf', Speech in 1918 at Munich University. Munich: Duncker & Humboldt.

About the Editors and Contributors



EDITORS

Smita Tewari Jassal, anthropologist, teaches Gender and Development at Columbia University, New York. She has taught at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University and American University, Washington, DC. She was Visiting Fellow at the Truman Institute for Peace, Hebrew University, Jerusalem (2003–05) and Senior Fellow at the Center for Women's Development Studies (1995–2002). Author of *Daughters of the Earth: Women and Land In Uttar Pradesh* (2001), her forthcoming book explores gender constructs and oral traditions of marginalized castes and communities.

Eyal Ben-Ari is Professor of Anthropology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has carried out fieldwork on Japanese white-collar suburbs, institutions of early childhood education and the Japanese community in Singapore. In Israel he has studied Jewish saint-worship and social and cultural aspects of the Israeli military. He is currently writing a book about the experience of Israeli soldiers in the current conflict with the Palestinians.

CONTRIBUTORS

Ellen Bal is Assistant Professor in the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology of the Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam. She received her Ph.D. degree in 2000 from the Erasmus University, Rotterdam, with her study of ethnogenesis and group formation processes in South Asia. She has authored a book entitled *They Ask if We Eat Frogs: Social Boundaries, Ethnic Categorisation and the Garo People of Bangladesh* (2000; revised edition forthcoming in 2007). She has since been involved in

research on the Indian diaspora in Surinam and the Netherlands, and has published in academic journals and edited books. She is co-editor of *Autobiography of an Indian Indentured Labourer: Munshi Rahman Khan* (1874–1972).

Zvi Bekerman teaches Anthropology of Education at the School of Education and The Melton Center, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is also a research fellow at the Truman Institute for Peace at the Hebrew University. His main interests are in the study of cultural, ethnic, and national identity, including identity processes and negotiation during intercultural encounters and in formal/informal learning contexts. Since 1999 he has been conducting a long-term ethnographic research project in the integrated/bilingual Palestinian–Jewish schools in Israel. He has recently edited (with N. Burbules and D. Silberman-Keller) *Learning in Places: The Informal Education Reader*, (2005) and is the Editor (with Seonaigh MacPherson) of the refereed journal, *Diaspora, Indigenous, and Minority Education: An International Journal* (2007).

Efrat Ben-Ze'ev teaches Anthropology at the Department of Behavioral Sciences, Ruppin Academic Center, Israel, and is a Research Fellow at the Truman Institute for Peace at the Hebrew University. Her main interest is in the intersection of history and anthropology and has written on the memories of Palestinian refugees and Jewish fighters. She is currently working on a book on the 1948 war in Palestine entitled *Underground Memories*.

Alok Bhalla is Professor of English Literature at the Central Institute of English and Foreign Languages, Hyderabad, and has published extensively on literature and politics. He has translated Dharamvir Bharati's play, *Andha Yug* and Intizar Husain's stories, *A Chronicle of the Peacocks*. He has also edited stories about the partition of India (3 volumes) and edited *Life and Works of Saadat Hasan Manto* (1997).

John Borneman is Professor of Anthropology at Princeton University and co-editor of P-ROK (Princeton Report on Knowledge). He has published widely on the relation of political division to everyday life. He is the author of *Belonging in the Two Berlins: Kin, State, Nation* (1992)

and editor of *Death of the Father: An Anthropology of the End in Political Authority* (2004). After several decades of research in Germany, he is now working in Syria and Lebanon. His forthcoming book is *Syrian Episodes: Sons, Fathers, and an Anthropologist in Aleppo* (2007).

Namita Chowdhury experienced partition first-hand, growing up in Shahidnagar Colony in Kolkata. She has documented her experiences in *Kichhu Tukro Chhayamay Ishara* (in Bengali) published in 2003. Her poem 'Udbastu Jibaner Kabya' (in Bengali) first appeared in 2000. The poem is translated by Nandini Guha.

Ina Dietzsch is completing post-doctoral research on the history of Folkloristic Studies (*Volkskunde*) as Public Science during 1860–1960 at the Humboldt University of Berlin and a Research Associate at Durham University, UK. From 1994 to 1999 she taught Gender Studies at the University of Potsdam. She is the author of *Grenzen überschreiben? Deutsch-deutsche Briefwechsel 1948–1989* (Köln/Weimar 2004); *An Analysis of Personal Letter Exchanges between East and West Germans During Partition* (2004); and with Kristina Bauer-Volke has co-edited *Labor Ostdeutschland. Kulturelle Praxis im gesellschaftlichen Wandel* (2003) on the theme of cultural dimensions of social change in Germany after unification.

Honaida Ghanim is Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Department of Sociology and Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University (2006–2007). She obtained her Ph.D. from the Hebrew University Sociology Department and focused on the social role of Palestinian intellectuals in Israel in the period 1948–2002. She was visiting lecturer at Al-Quds University, Beir Zeit University, Bethlehem University, and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem between 1998 and 2004. Her main interests are in the fields of the sociology of knowledge, phenomenology of life and death under military occupation and colonialism, citizenship, state of emergency and gender studies. Her book *Intellectuals Reinventing a Nation: Israeli-Palestinian Persons-of-Pen Crossing Boundaries and Struggling Liminality* is due to be published soon.

Nina Gren is a Ph.D. candidate in Social Anthropology at Göteborg University, Sweden. She has conducted a one-year fieldwork in a

Palestinian refugee camp outside Bethlehem on the West Bank. Her forthcoming thesis with the preliminary title 'Legacy of Al Nakba: Politics and Everyday Life in a Palestinian Refugee Camp' is due to be published in 2007.

Habibul Haque Khondker, Ph.D. (Pittsburgh), is Professor in the Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences at Zayed University, Abu Dhabi, UAE. He was Associate Professor in Sociology, National University of Singapore. His articles on globalization, democracy, famine, science, and gender issues have been published in journals such as *International Sociology*, *The British Journal of Sociology*, *Current Sociology*, *Armed Forces and Society*, *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, *International Journal of Contemporary Sociology*, *International Journal of Mass Emergencies*, *Asian Journal of Social Science*, *South Asia*, *Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society*, and *Economic and Political Weekly*. He is the author (with Goran Therborn) of *Asia and Europe in Globalization: Continents, Regions, and Nations* (2006) and is working on a book titled *Globalization East/West* with Bryan Turner.

Michael Nijhawan is Assistant Professor in Sociology at York University, Toronto. His interests include social theory, violence and subjectivity, culture and identity, performance and ritual, as well as migration and transnationalism. Nijhawan has conducted extensive field research in South Asia (Punjab) and on South Asian diaspora groups in Europe. His published works include: *Dhadi Darbar. Religion, Violence, and the Performance of Sikh History* (2006) and *Shared Idioms, Sacred Symbols, and the Articulations of Identity in South Asia* (forthcoming, 2007).

Vasanthi Raman is Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Center for Women's Development Studies, Delhi. Trained in sociology from Bombay University, her research areas include gender and communalism, childhood studies and problems of transition of marginalized tribes and castes in eastern India. Her current work is on Hindu-Muslim relations in Banaras. She has been Visiting Fellow at the Department of Sociology, University of Bombay.

Ursula Rao is Lecturer in Anthropology at the University Halle, Germany, and has recently completed a work on the interactive creation of news in India. She has worked extensively in the field of

Religious Anthropology and Performance Studies. Her recent books are *Negotiating the Divine: Temple Religion and Temple Politics in Contemporary Urban India* (2003) and *Celebrating Transgression. Method and Politics in the Anthropological Study of Culture* (2006; co-edited with John Hutnyk).

Kathinka Sinha-Kerkhoff is Director Research, in the Asian Development Research Institute (ADRI), Ranchi, India. She received her Ph.D. degree in 1995 from the Center of Asian Studies, University of Amsterdam. She has since carried out post-doctoral research on youth and globalization in India and has published in academic journals, edited books and is co-editor of *State, Society and Displaced People in South Asia* and of *Autobiography of an Indian Indentured Labourer. Munshi Rahman Khan*. Her latest book is *Tyranny of Partition. Hindus in Bangladesh and Muslims in India* (Gyan, 2006).

Tatjana Thelen is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle and the Humboldt Universität in Berlin. She teaches courses in Social Anthropology at Freie Universität Berlin and the Martin Luther University in Halle. Her doctoral research has been on post-socialist developments in rural Hungary and Romania. She is author of the book *Privatisierung und soziale Ungleichheit in der osteuropäischen Landwirtschaft* (Campus, 2003). Her ongoing research concerns changing social security relations in East Germany.

Elia Zureik is a Professor of Sociology at Queen's University, Ontario, Canada. He is the author of numerous articles and author/editor of several books on the Palestinians. He is currently completing a study on the role of information technology and human capital in nation-building in Palestine.

Index



- Aaj*, on riots in Banaras, 266, 267, 269–70
- academic scholarship, and depiction of partition, 31, 32
- Acts of Meaning*, 185
- Adha Gaon*, 170
- adivasis*, interaction with lower-caste Muslims in Jharkhand, 78, 80
- Africa, ethnic atrocities in, 192
- al-aqsa intifada*, 197, 198, 200, 205, 208
- al-Naqba*, 23, 199, 207
- and Palestinian diaspora, 208
- Al-Sharmani, Malkki, 216n
- Alford, Fred, 348
- Aligarh Muslim University Bill, protests against, 269
- All India Congress, in Bhopal, 300
- All India Hindu Maha Sabha, 300
- All-India Momin Conference, 261, 265
- and Indian National Congress, 265
- opposition to partition by, 278
- Allenby, Gen., conquering of Palestine in 1917, 102
- Allenby Bridge, on Jordan River, separating Jordan and Israel, 138, 139
- permits to cross, 208
- Anderson, Benedict, 103
- Ansari, Anees, killing of, in Banaras, 268, 272
- Ansari, Ateeq, 261, 273, 274
- Ansari, Haji Mohd. Ishaq, 272
- Ansari Muslims, in Jharkhand, 81
- and Bihari Muslims, 82
- Arab culture, narrative codes in, 28
- Arab–Palestinians, on Palestine, 98
- Arab population, in Israel, 128–30
- in Palestine, 104
- Arab-Israel conflict/war, 32, 44, 199
- Arafat, Yasser, 131
- Ashrafization, 275
- Atiquallah, Khwajah, of Dhaka, 246
- autobiography, intellectual dialog between poetry and, 157
- narratives, 162
- Awami League, in Bangladesh, 258
- Ayodhya, conflict in, 298
- movement, 313
- Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam, 265, 266
- on partition of India, 186
- Babri Masjid, protest/riots over destruction of, in Bhopal, 303
- Ramjanmabhoomi dispute, 1980s, 25
- vandalism of, 276
- Bachelard, Gaston, 288
- Badiuzzaman, *Chhako Ki Vapsi*, 169
- Badruddioza, narrative on partition of Bengal, 250–51
- Bajrang Dal, 269
- protest against cow slaughter, 310
- Banaras, bomb explosions in, 278–79
- communal riots in, 266–67, 271–72
- Hindu–Muslim relations in, 261
- partition motif in, 260
- as sacred Hindu city, 262

- sari business and Hindu–Muslim relations, 270–72
- social boundaries in, 32
- Banaras Vastra Udyog Sangh, 276
- Bandopodhay, Tarashankar, 251
- Bangladesh, Constitution of, and Islam in, 85
- counter-narratives of scheduled caste Hindus in, 77, 78, 87–90
- coup in 1975, 258
- creation/birth of, 84, 91, 243
- crisis in, 258
- discrimination against non-Muslims in, 85, 86
- Hindu population in, 86
- and India, contesting borders of mind in, 75
- liberation war, 88, 91
- nationalist movement in, 257–58
- significance of War of 1971 in, 30
- socioeconomic differences between Hindus and Muslims in, 86
- tribal Christian Garos in, 77, 90–93
- working of mental borders of Hindu Bengalis in, 85–87
- Bara Yosef, Eitan, 114
- Barth, Ferdrick, 246
- Basti*, 173–81
 - evocation of Rupnagar in, 175–77, 177, 181
 - fictional maps in, 175
 - migration by Zakir in, 180
 - nostalgic remembrance for Zakir, 177
- Bateson, Gregory, 345
- Baudrillard, Jean, 351
- Bedouin tribe, plight of, in Israeli narrative, 29
- Begrussungsgeld*, 354
- Bengal, anti-partition movement in, 246
 - first partition of 1905, 246
 - Muslims on partition of, 247
 - partition of 1947, memories of difference, 243, 244
 - and violence, 248
 - partition of 1971, 20, 85, 255–58
- 'Bengali concept', 84
- Bengali Hindus, migration into India, 247
 - on partition of India, 248
- Bengali identity, 243
- Bengali migrant communities, 245
- Bengali Muslims, 243, 244
 - on partition of India, 248–55
- Bengali nationalism, 257
- Begum Shaista Ikramullah, as ambassador for Pakistan, 253
 - narratives on Bengal partition, 252–55
- Benjamin, Walter, 351
- Berdahl, Daphne, 233
- Berlin Wall, 221, 222, 224, 226
 - fall of, 34, 67, 229, 346–48
 - opening of, 35
 - as a unifying factor, 238, 346–48, 351
- bhadralok*, Hindu, in western Bengal, 246, 247
 - Muslim, and creation of Pakistan, 247
- Bhalla, Alok, 23, 27, 41, 43, 44, 167
- Bharat Heavy Electricals (India) Ltd., in Bhopal, 301
- Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), ascent to power by, 298
 - government in Madhya Pradesh, 309
 - and Hindu unity in Bhopal, 313
 - victory in Madhya Pradesh elections, 302
- Bhawani Chowk, in Bhopal, 315
 - renaming of Pir Gate in Bhopal as, 308, 309–11
- Bhopal, capital city of Madhya Pradesh, 300
 - changing faces of, 300–4
 - founding of, 298

- Hindu and Muslim, population growth in, 297, 301–2
 Relationship in, 298–300
 Hindu nationalist activities in, 314
 Hindu penetration into 'Muslim space' in, 307, 308
 history of, 314–15
 integration into India, 300
 Islamic past of, 26
 as 'little Pakistan', 304, 307, 314
 Muslim female rulers in, 299
 Muslim nationalism in, 312
 Muslim religious structures in old, 312
 as Muslim state, 317n
 struggle over religious space, 297
- Bhopal Arya Hindu Sangh, 300
 Bhopal Hindu Sabha, 299–300
 Bhopal Rajya Praja Mandal, 300
 Biblical Palestine, 101, 102
 Bihar, bifurcation of, and establishment
 - of state of Jharkhand, 82
 Muslims in, 82
 riots in, 255
- Binyamina, Jewish settlement, 109
 Bismark, 346
 'Bon Voisinage Agreement', 103
 borders, as cause and effect of partition, 55
 contested, 20
 frontiers and state construction, 135–39
 geographical flexibility of creating a, 63
 of the mind, 75, 76
 and partitions, writings on, 145
 redrafting of geographical, 76
 state-mandated, 75
- Borges, Jorge Luis, 323
 Borneman, John, 21, 37, 40, 41, 68, 344
 boundaries, setting, of Palestine, 102–5
 'bowing letters', 59
 Brahminism, challenges to, 262
 British Mandate, on Palestine (1920–48), 95, 204, 207, 214
 and invention of mapping Palestine, 116
 British mapping, of India, 106
 British topographic maps, of Palestine, 99, 100, 101, 104, 107, 110, 111, 113–17
 Brockmeier, Jens, 58
 Bruner, Jerome, 185
 Buber, Martin, 169
 Buddhism, and Hinduism, 263
 Bukhari, Maulana, 269
 Burma, British war against, 105
 Burrows, Fredrick, 255
- Cabinet Mission Plan, 253
 Calcutta, Hindu–Muslim riots in, 253–55
 violence in, at partition of Bengal, 248
- Canetti, Elias, 351
 capitalism, 358–59
 cartography, power of, 95, 117–18
 census, importance of making, 127
 state-sponsored, 125, 131
- Central America, reconciliation efforts in, 326
 ceremonial symbolic activities, and reconciliation process, 327, 328
- Chenab*, Punjabi poem by Sohan Singh Seetal, 160–62
 imaginary crossing of river, 159
 memory of, 156–62
- Chhako Ki Vāpsi*, novel on partition and migration, 169
- Chotanagpur Momin Union (CMU), 81
- Christian Palestinians, 209–10
 migration to western countries, 208
 and Muslim Palestinians, 209
 preferential treatment to, 214
- Christianity, and anti-Semitic persecution, 332

372 * Index

- Christmas celebrations, in Jerusalem, 330–33, 338
- Chugtai, Ismat, 187
- cinema, partition narratives in, 31
- citizenship, concept of, 223
- rights and surveillance, 135
 - state-building and establishment of, 127
- class identity, 81
- coexistence, between formerly antagonistic groups, 324–28
- international support to, 326
 - role of schools in Palestine, 327–28
- Cold War, 19, 33, 69, 347, 352, 357, 358
- and West Germany, 224
- collective memory, and obstacles of reconciliation efforts, 323
- commemorative ceremonies, 324
- communal politics, in India, 246, 247
- communalism, 23
- origin of, 311–12
- communal riots, in India, 79
- Conder, Claude, 101
- Congress, Jharkhand Muslims link with, 82
- culture(al), and religious ceremonies, 44
- secure, 185
- Curzon, Lord, and division of Bengal, 244, 246
- Dainik Jagaran*, on riots in Banaras, 266–69
- Dalits, marginalization of, 29
- Das, Veena, 23
- Dayan, Moshe, 284, 286
- Declaration of Principles, in Middle East 1993, 132
- decolonization process, 20
- détente, politics of, 225
- Dekh Kabira Roya*, partition fiction on ruins of Lahore, 172–73
- descent community, 66
- dhadi*, as a 'border genre', 145, 146, 165
- as cultural form and political identity formation, 163
 - group, 158
 - music/songs, 162, 164
 - and Sikh identity, 163
 - repertoires, 156, 162
- Dheishe, refugee camp in Jerusalem, 197–98, 206
- political imprisonment of refugees from, 201
- diaspora, Jewish narrative, 33, 332
- see also Palestine
- die Abwicklung*, Germany, 354
- 'divide and rule' policy, of British colonial rulers in India, 243, 311
- Djupedal, Knut, 57
- Durga Temple, construction of, in Bhopal, 297, 304–9
- and demonstration of Hindu strength in Bhopal, 312–13
 - and disturbances, 305–6
 - political dimension of, 309
- Durga Temple Committee, anti-Muslim ideology of, 307, 313–14
- East Bengal, 243, 256
- nationalist movement in, 250
 - as part of Pakistan, 243, 244
 - war of liberation in, 243, 244
- East Germans, adjustments after unification of Germany, 230
- cultural difference between West Germans and, 69, 350
 - encounter with Russian Red Army, 64–65
 - encounter with West Germany, 33–34, 354
 - on end of Socialist Unity Party rule, 347
 - as inferior position of, 355
 - labeling of, 70
 - as less developed, 56, 352
 - 'Other', loss for West Germans, 354

- right to land after unification, 232
- on unification of Germany, 62–63, 352
- East India Company, 106
 - Bhopal rulers pact with, 299
- East Pakistan counter-narratives of Muslim Bengalis in, 84–85
- narratives of Muslim Bengalis in, 77, 84–85
- see also* East Bengal
- East and West, ways of constructing difference between, 61–65
- Eastern Europe, and Western Europe, 61
- Edison, John, 39
- educational system, role in co-existence in Jewish school, 43–44, 327–28
- Egypt, annexation of Palestinian territory by, 285
- Elias, Norbert, 355
- Emergency Regulation, 1945, in Palestine, 291–93
- epic imagery, of partition, 153
- ethnic boundaries, 246
- ethnic conflict, in India, 20
- Europe, cultural dimension of Eastern border, 61–62
- East and West, division of, 61
- Holocaust in, 192
- European Union, 357
- exclusion, process of, 55
- Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), 56, 224
 - see also* Germany
- familial solidarity, separation and, 59
- feminist historiography, 28, 29
- Festival of Lights, in Jerusalem, 337
- forced eviction, 24
 - and migration of people, 21
- 'forced migration', 93
- folk understandings, of partition, 27–28
- French, Patrick, 171
- Gandhi, M.K., 251
 - on colonialism as a form of 'homelessness', 187
 - on Dharma, 189
 - non-violence of, 26
 - notion of 'swaraj', 167
 - on partition, 187, 188
 - on religious conversion, 192n
- Ganga-Jumna *tehzeeb* (culture), in Banaras, 274
- Gangopadhyay, Sunil, *Purbo Paschim*, 248
- Garo tribals, counter-narratives of tribal Christian, in Bangladesh, 33, 77, 78, 90–93, 95n
 - in liberation war, 92
 - minority status of, 91
- Gaza Strip, Israeli occupation of, 99
 - Palestinian refugees in, 125, 283
- 'geo-body', ideology of, in Palestine, 105
 - outlook on, 105–6
- geographical borders, and mental borders, between India and Bangladesh, 93
 - see also* borders
- German culture, 64
- German Democratic Republic (GDR), 56, 64, 70
 - contemporary memory of, 72
 - policy of mail censorship in, 57
 - restrictions on kin movements from West Germany, 225
 - social change in, 68–69
- German identity, 71, 223, 238
- German kinship ties, paradox of, 221, 227
- German unification, 55, 56, 67, 71, 229, 346, 352–54, 357, 358
 - and economic unification, 227–354
 - goal of, 349–50
 - and kinship relations, 222, 223, 229
 - position of East after, 356
 - and settling disputes, 360

- relevance of, 344
- and rollback of properties of East Germany, 353, 360
- transfer of skilled labor from East to West, 353
- German Unification Treaty, 350
- 'German Unity Day', 221
- Germany, asymmetry and inequalities between East and West, 238
- and Cold War, 37
- cultural classification of East and West, 61, 347
- distinct national and ethnic identity in East and West, 221
- division of, 33, 69
- gift exchanges between East and West, 33–34, 227, 228, 233–35, 238–39
- law of inheritance in, 233
- partition of, 26, 71, 239n
- personal correspondence as source for sociological enquiry, 55–60
- reality of new border, 58
- restrictions on travel between East and West, 226–27
- role in Holocaust, 25
- role in World War II, 25
- Third Reich in, 224
- Ghatak, Ritwik, 248
- Gordon, Leonard, 246, 247
- Gourevitch, Philip, 192
- Great Triangular Survey, 106
- Greenberg, Jonathan, 190
- Grossman, David, *see under: Love*, 191
- Gujarat, violence and harmony project in, 45
- Habermas, Jurgen, 355
- Haider, Maj., 256
- handloom industry, crisis in Banaras, 275–77
- Hanukkah, ceremonial event in Israel, 329–31
- religious emphasis for secular Jews, 337–39
- Hasina, Sheikh, Prime Minister of Bangladesh, 258
- Hassain, Liakat, 246
- 'Hindu Banaras', construction of, 262–63
- Hindu Bengalis, in Bangladesh, 95n
- Working of mental borders among, 85–87
- Hindu fundamentalism, in Bhopal, 309
- Hindu identity, in Bhopal, 300
- Hindu–Muslim relations/conflicts, in India, 26, 38, 42, 249, 251, 311, 314
- in Banaras, 270–73, 275, 280n
- in Bhopal, 298–300, 313
- social boundary between, 273–75, 278
- Hindu nationalism, 314
- Hindu nationalist ideology, in Bhopal, 302, 303
- Hindu right-wing political parties, 278–80
- Hindu temples, in Bhopal, 303–4
- Durga Temple in Bhopal, 304–9
- Hinduization process, in India, 94
- Hindus, lower-caste, conversion to Islam, in Banaras, 274–75
- Hindutva, forces in Madanpura, 267, 268
- in Uttar Pradesh, 272, 273
- mobilization, 276
- historiography, India's, 22, 23
- Holocaust, 24, 335
- 'home', in partition narratives, 167
- homeland, and borders, notions of, 214
- Husain, Intizar, 173–76, 185
- Basti*, 173–81
- critics of, 176
- Ice-Candy Man*, cosmopolitan lexicon of Lahore in, 181
- irony of Hari in, 183, 184
- partition fiction in, 181–84

- Idel Fiter celebrations, in Jerusalem school, 331–33, 338
- identity, boundaries, state-building and, 127
- politics, 171
- politics in Pakistan, 30
- question of, in partition fictions, 184–85
- ‘imagined community’, of East and West Germans, 60
- India, *akhand Bharat*, notion of, 44
- and Bangladesh, contesting borders of mind, 75
- Bengali Muslims on partition of, 248–55
- Bharat Mata*, notion of, 44
- British mapping of, 106
- and Pakistan wars, 250
- partition of, 19, 20, 29, 75, 164, 171, 190, 247–48
- partition narratives and counter narratives, 77–93
- redrawing of social and territorial boundaries after partition, 297
- religious communities in, 171
- research on partition of, 145
- support to Liberation movement in East Bengal, 256
- women affected by partition, 38
- inheritance, changing meaning of, in Germany, 231–33
- interethnic coexistence, 325
- interethnic conflicts, 324
- Intermit Agreement, 1995, in Middle East, 132
- Islamic parties, in occupied West Bank, 197
- Islamization process, in Banaras, 275–76
- in Bangladesh, 94
- Israel, annexation of Palestinian territory, 284
- collective memories of Holocaust and siege of Masad Fortress, 24
- independence of, 24
- invasion into Lebanon, and PLO Centre, 125–26
- Jewish domination in, 325
- as Jewish State, 103, 127, 283, 335
- occupation of West Bank and Gaza Strip, 199, 285
- Palestine conflicts/relations, 19, 122, 196, 208, 214, 337
- Palestine workers in, monitoring of, 138–39
- politics of separation and reduced mobility of Palestinians, 201, 211, 212, 214
- population category in, 128
- population monitoring in, 132–33, 201
- segregated society in, 36
- survey of, 102
- and ‘War of Independence’, 24
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS), 127, 128, 132
- Israel/Jewish Memorial Day, 334–37, 339
- Israeli Arabs, as ‘present-absentee’ in Israel, 127
- Israeli Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 129
- Israeli narratives, 27
- Israeli nationalist discourse, 131
- Jaamat-I-Islami, government in Bangladesh, 258
- Jacotin’s map, 114
- Jalal, Ayesha, 171
- Jama Masjid, Bhopal, 307
- Jamaat-ul-Ansar *see* All-India Momin Conference
- Janata Dal, 269
- Jawhariyyeh, Wasif, 164
- Jerusalem, contested city of, 122
- imagination and construction of, 279–80
- Israeli annexation of, 216n
- Israeli-Palestinian contest over, 129

- as 'Jewish' city, 130
- 'Jews', on Christians, 190
- and 'non-Jews' population in Israel, 128–29
- and Palestinians coexistence of, 325
- persecution and exclusion of, 191
- 'return' to Israel, 43
- and 'War of Independence', 24
- Jewish culture, narrative codes in, 28
- Jewish forces, capturing of *al-Naqba*, 103
- Jewish settlements, 113
- Jinnah, Mohammad Ali, 83, 251, 260
- Jharkhand, counter narratives of lower castes in, 80–83
 - establishment of, 82, 94n
 - lower-caste Muslims and Adivasis in, 78, 80
- Jordan, annexation of Palestinian territory, 285
 - census on Jordanians and Palestinians, 126
 - Palestinian refugees in, 126
- Judaism, and Christianity, 332
 - and Islam, 332
- Jug Badal Gaya* (Time has Taken a Turn), on Punjabi rural culture, 153–56
- 'Julahas', Momin Ansai as, 261, 263, 264
- justice, restorative and retributive, 45
- Kamrunnesa, narrative on partition of Bengal by, 249–50
- Khalistan movement, 146
- Khan, Dost Mohammad, 298
- Khondkar, A.K., 256
- Khosla, Gopal Das, *Stern Recokening*, 149
- kinship relations, across German border, 221, 222
 - after unification of Germany, 222–23, 229–31
- Koeka, Jurgen, 221
- Kohl, Helmut, 347, 350
- Korea, partition of, 20
- Korea, North, economic disparity between South and, 356
 - historical narrative of, 31
- Korea, economic disparity between North and, 356
 - historical narratives of, 31
- Korean nationalism, 348
- Korean unification, future, 21, 341
 - and German unification, 344, 357–61
 - reflection on, 21, 344
- Korean War, 31, 37
- Koreans, cultural differences between South and North, 349
 - homogeneity among, 348
- Kulturation*, 345–48, 355
- Kumar, Nita, 263
- Kumar, Pradeep, 267
- Kumar, Radha, 20
- language movement, in East Pakistan 1952, 84–85
- Latin America, novels, on nation-state, 31
 - reconciliation efforts in, 326
- Lausanne Protocol 1923, 40
- Lebanon, Palestinian refugees in, 126
- letters, on community-building and practices, in Germany, 59
- Levi-Strauss, Claude, 345
- line of control (LOC), phenomenon of, 42, 260, 261
 - and question of social boundaries, 273–75
- Lustig, Arnost, 191
- Maaz, Hans-Joachim, 352
- Maccabean revolt, 329
- Madanpura, in Banaras city, 264–66
 - demonization of, 261
 - as 'mini Pakistan', 265
 - Muslims of, 264
 - migration to Bangalore, 266
 - police action in, 267–68
 - popular myths about, 270
 - Surang* (tunnel) of, 260, 264–71, 278

- Manto, Sadat Hasan, *Dekh Kabira Roya*, 172–73
 partition stories of, 153
 maps, 'prehistory' and logic of modern, 100–2, 107
 and symbols, 113
 unifying effects of, 113
 Zionists need for, in Palestine, 104
- Marjeh, Palestine, Israeli annexation of, 286–87
 underground migration by villagers, 286–95
- Masada, siege of fortress, 24
- Mehta, Uddvadas, statue of, at Pir Gate in Bhopal, 309
- memory, and homelessness, 186–89
- mobilization, formation of, 324
- mental borders, 76, 77, 79
 Garos and, in Bangladesh, 91
- Middle East, census-taking in, 124
 on family reunification, 134
 peace negotiations, 132
 partition motif in, 20
- Military Administration, in Palestine, 292, 293
- 'mini-Pakistan', phenomenon of, 260, 261, 276–78
- 'minorities', and majorities, 93
 and mental borders, 93
 narratives of, 93
 in partitioned countries, 77
- Momin Ansari Muslims, in Banaras, 261, 263–66, 275
- Moslema Begum, narratives on partition of Bengal, 251–52
- Mosely, Leonard, 186
- Moti Masjid, Bhopal, 307
- Muhlberg, Dietrich, 70
- Mukherjee, Shyama Prasad, 251
- Muslim nationalism, 247, 312
- Muslim otherness, in narratives, 152
- Muslims, Bengali, in East Pakistan, and narratives, 77, 84–85
- Muslims in India,
 in Banaras, 263
 Hindu relations in Banaras, 38, 42, 270–73, 275, 280n
 and Islamization process in Banaras, 275–76
 social boundaries between Hindus and, 273–75, 278
 weavers in Banaras, 265, 266, 270, 271
- in Bhopal, 301–2
 culture in Bhopal, 304
 Hindu relations in, 298–300
 counter-narratives in Jharkhand, 77, 84, 87, 90
 marginalization of, 29
 on partition, 26
 partition rhetoric and, 79–80
 as religious minorities, 79
 residential pattern among, 277
- Muslim League, 80, 82, 83, 253, 260
 support for Muslims in Jharkhand, 80
- Muslim State, eradicating the inner, 311–14
- Nak-Chung, Paik, 349
- Naqba*, 24, 45, 283, 291
 and memorial day commemoration in Jerusalem, 334–38
- nation-building, and kinship ties, 47, 223
 in Pakistan, 83–84
- nationhood, concept of, 64
- nation-states, identification of, 39, 30, 45, 75
- nationalism, 75, 103
 maps and emergence of, 100
- nationalist discourse, in India, 29
- native status, attaining, 63
- Nawab Hamidullah Khan, of Bhopal, 299, 307
 Praja Parishad of, 300
- Nawab Shah Jahan Begum, of Bhopal, 299

- Nawab Sikandar Begum, of Bhopal, 299
- Nawab Sultan Jahan Begum, of Bhopal, 299
- Nazi crimes, in partition novels, 192
- Nebenzhal, Kenneth, 102
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, on partition of India, 186
- Neo-Nazim, development of, 69
- Noakhali, violence in, at partition of Bengal, 248
- North Korea, regime of Kim Jong-il, 358
- judiciary in, 360–61
- North Koreans, and legacy of fight against colonialism and imperialism, 356
- Oslo Agreement, 1993, 125, 132, 139, 200, 204, 205, 315
- Olmert, Ehud, 129
- Ottoman, census in Palestine, 124, 125
- division of Palestine, 130
- Ozick, Cynthia, *The School*, 191
- Pakistan, army surrender to Indian and Bangladeshi forces, 256
- Bengali Hindus in, 87
- birth of, 243, 244, 248
- demand for, 79
- ideology in, 30
- and India, 19
- military crackdown on Dhaka, 258
- nation-building and partition rhetoric in, 83–84
- research on partition, 145
- ‘two-nation’ theory in, 77, 80
- Palestine/Palestinians, borders for, 288, 290–91
- case study, 98–118
- census, 124, 130, 131
- collective memory, 334
- as contested terrain, 124–33
- destruction of villages, 283–84
- diaspora, 23, 208
- in exile, geo-social space of, 24
- geographic features of, 110
- homeland, 207
- identity, 24, 43
- identity cards for, 130, 132, 136–38, 210, 211
- ‘infiltration, 286, 288–89, 291–92
- Israeli encounter/conflict, 24, 122, 137, 139, 208, 214, 325
- landscape of, 99, 102
- loss of homeland for, 283
- map-making of, 99
- movement, 36
- national ideology, 339
- notion of ‘one country’, 204–6
- in occupied territories, 199, 325
- and partition, 34, 42
- and politics of partition, 198–200
- population size, 124–25
- refugee camps, 196, 206, 215n
- gender differences in, 203
- refugees, 122, 131, 133–34
- restrictions on mobility, 211–14
- rights and statuses of, 208–10
- and rootedness, 212, 214
- struggle, 332, 333
- of Sunni Muslims, 126
- surveillance of, 122, 285
- tragedy of 1948, and dissection of, 283–86
- uprising, *al aqsa intifada*, 197, 198, 200
- workers in Israel, 206
- Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), 129, 130
- Palestine Exploration Fund Survey, 101–3, 114
- Palestine Jewish Colonization Association (PICA), 111, 112
- Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Centre, Israeli invasion of, 126
- Fateh in, 197
- and unity among Palestinians, 206
- Panjab da Ujara*, on partition violence, 148, 149–53

- Pardes, Amerigo, 165
- partition,
- fiction, 168–73
 - on anxiety and humiliation of migration, 181–84
 - characters in, 169–70
 - and identity, 184–86
 - migrants in, 168–71
 - and religion, 169, 170
 - and spiritual descent, 173–81
 - for fiction writers, 189, 191
 - and forced separation, 21
 - of India, impact on Muslims in India, 260–61
 - trauma of, 23, 25–26
 - influence on social process, 22
 - literature, 147–48
 - as memory and forgetfulness, 24–27
 - and migration, 238
 - motif, 298, 311
 - and kinship exchange in Germany, 223–29
 - in Punjabi *dhadi* repertoire, 162
 - narratives, 31, 32, 37, 162–64
 - as outcome and cause, 22–23
 - as outcome of modernity, 39–41
 - rhetoric, 77, 80, 81, 83–84
 - in Bangladesh, 90
 - and Muslims in India, 79
 - as solution, 41–47
 - sociological implications of, 21
 - as template for narratives, 27–32
 - violence, in memory, narratives and performance, 145–47
- Peel Commission, on Palestine partition plan, 20, 215n
- performance genres, impact of partition on, 146
- personal letters, as source material for enquiry into two Germanys, 55–60
- Pir Gate, in Bhopal, 314
- as Bhawani Chowk, 308, 309–11
 - Hindu dominance in, 308, 309–10, 315
 - temple construction at, 304, 306
- poetry, dialog between autobiog-raphy and, 157
- ‘The Polish Peasant in Europe and America’, 57
- popular culture, and depiction of partition, 31
- Portelli, Alessandro, 245
- Praja Parishad, 300
- Premchand, 156
- Punjab, books and films on partition, 248
- partition and splitting of, 149
 - performative genre in, 146
- Punjabi collective memory, to India’s partition, 151
- Punjabi composite culture, 156, 165
- Punjabi *dhadi* tradition, 145, 146
- Purbo Paschim*, on partition, 248
- Qasim, Abul, 246
- Qureshi, I.H., 171
- Radtke, Frank-Olaf, 69
- Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur, 92, 256
- call for independence, 257–58
 - murder of, 258
- Ramdan fast, and Idel Fiter celebrations, in Jerusalem, 330, 331
- Ranjha, of *Hir-Ranjha* story, 162
- Raphael, *The School of Athens* (painting), 192
- Rasal, Abdul, 246
- Rechstaatlichkeit*, 347
- reconciliation, 324–28
- support to, 326
- refugee, counts of Palestinians, 133–35
- definition of, 133
- Rehman, Ziaur, 85
- religion/religious, conflicts, partition of India and, 190
- identity, partition and, 186
 - spaces, use of, in India, 298
 - turmoil over, 25

- repatriation, discourse of, 213
 Rewri Talaab, 268, 271
 Rhodes Armistice Agreement, 1949
 284–87
 right of movement, 135–37
 Robinson, Francis, 264
 rootedness, partition and ideology of,
 212–14
 Russian immigrants, in Israel, 128
 Rwandan Commission on Unity and
 National Reconciliation, 326
- Said, Edward, 131
 Samuel, Herbert, 113
 scheduled caste Hindus, counter-
 narratives in Bangladesh, 87–90
 secular nationalism, 312
 secularism, 43
 Seetal, Sohan Singh, 156, 158, 163, 164
 ‘Chenab’ (poem), 160
 Jug Badal Gaya, 153–56
 Panjabda Ujara, 148, 149–53
 partition chronicle of, 147–56
 Punjabi vernacular writings of, 164
 Vekhi Mani Dunya, 157
- Segev, Tom, 293
 Sharma, Ramesh, 302
 Shirazi, Ismail Hussain, 246
Siam Mapped, 105
 Siddiqui, Kader, 256, 257
 Sidhwa, Bapsi, *Ice-Candy Man*, 181
 Sikhs, and Hindu refugees, 150
 narratives on sacrifice, 152
 on Sufi/folk *dhadi*, 147
 Sinai Peninsula, handing over to Egypt,
 99
 Singer, Isaac Bashevis, novel on exiled
 Jews from Poland, 191
 singers/storytellers, of Punjabi folk
 heroes, 23
 Sinha-Kerkhoff, Kathinka, 30, 33, 34,
 75
 Smith, George Adam, 101, 102
- Social classification, surviving mech-
 anism of, 67–71
Sohni Mahiwal, epic, 161
 Songs, on nationalist movements, 163
 South Africa, integration in, 325
 racial discrimination in, 137
 Srivastava, Jyotsna, 267
Staatsnation, 345, 346
 state-building, by Palestinians, 122, 124,
 127, 139
 Stolling, Erhard, 61
 Styron, William, *Sophie's Choice*, 191
 Sufi mysticism, 162
 Suhrawardy, Hussain Shaheed, and
 communal riots in Calcutta, 253–55
 plan for a united Bengal, 85
 surveillance, citizenship rights and, 135
 nature of, 136–39
 Sykes-Picot agreement, 103
- Taj-ul-Masjid, Bhopal, 307
 Tamari, Salim, 279, 280
tana-bana, concept, 43, 279
 as Hindu-Muslim relations, 260,
 261, 271–73
 Tel Hordes, map of, 110
 Temple Mount, 332
 textbooks, state-mandated, 30
 Topo-cadastral maps, 106, 108, 110
 Turkey, population transfer in, 40
 ‘two-nation’ theory, 84, 312, 315
- Udavastu Jibaner Kabya*, 17
 Union Carbide, lethal gas leak, in
 Bhopal, 301
 United Nations, on definition of re-
 fugees, 133–34
 partition proposal for Palestine, 20,
 198–99
 Relief and Works Agency
 (UNRWA), on needs of
 Palestine refugees, 133–34
 United States, ‘War on Terror’, 357

- Uttar Pradesh, BJP government in, 269
- Vekhi Mani Dunya*, a post-partition narrative, 157
- Vested Property Act, Bangladesh, 89
- Vietnam, partition of, 20
- Völkerdeutsche*, ethnic German, 346
- Vishwa Hindu Parishad, 269
- Watani Habibi*, Arab on Palestinian homeland, 163
- Weber, Max, 344, 347
- West Bank, demography and 'living conditions' of population in, 125
Israeli occupation of, 99
Palestinian refugees in, 202, 283
- West Germans, assimilation of East Germans into ideology of, 351
kinship network with East Germans, 237–38
political differences between East Germans and, 236–37
sending gifts to East German kin, 227–29, 233–35
- West Germany Grundgesetz Basic Law of 1949, 350
- West Punjab, forced migration of Sikhs and Hindus from, 151
- Western Europe, and Eastern Europe, 61
'Western Palestine', survey of, 101, 102
- Wiesel, Elie, *Night*, 191
- Winichakul, Thongchai, 105
- Women, 'missing' and 'abducted' during partition of India, 25
- World War I, 101
- World War II, and Japanese bombing of targets in Bengal, 250
- Zionist Commission on Palestine, 104
- Zionist ideology, hegemony of, 337
- Zionist Jewish Israelis, 338
- Zionist movement, 111
- Zionist narratives, 329
- Zochrot, in Israel, 44, 316

This important book is a conversation across cultures on the theme of partition and its far-reaching sociological implications for communal patterns, generational dynamics and individual lives. While the governing imagery of partition is drawn from the context of India and Pakistan, the analysis explores similar processes vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine and East and West Germany. Developing the concept of 'partition-societies', the volume succinctly explains the social, economic and political implications of such divisions.

The lens of partition is used to focus on how societies that have experienced breaks and traumas are organized and constituted and the ways in which they deploy their understanding of the past to reconstruct themselves. The book enquires into ways in which local communities as well as wider national entities use their knowledge of the past. The international contributors to this volume show how this separation was of significance not only in the strict political sense but formed the basis for long-term processes of identity, of memory and inspiration, and the very basis on which different societies were organized.

This book will be of interest to anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, students and scholars of culture studies, as also the general reader.

Smita Tewari Jassal, anthropologist, teaches Gender and Development at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C.

Eyal Ben-Ari is Professor of Anthropology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Contributors: Ellen Bal · Zvi Bekerman · Eyal Ben-Ari · Efrat Ben-Ze'ev · Alok Bhalla · John Borneman · Namita Chowdhury · Ina Dietzsch · Honaida Ghanimi · Nina Gren · Smita Tewari Jassal · Habibul Haque Khondker · Michael Nijhawan · Vasanthi Raman · Ursula Rao · Kathinka Sinha-Kerkhoff · Tatjana Thelen · Elia Zureik

Cover design by imagine!

 **SAGE Publications**
New Delhi ■ Thousand Oaks ■ London
www.indiasage.com

ISBN 0-7619-3547-9



9 780761 935476